1
very definite conclusion of law also is that the uncles german are
CASES FOR RESERVA TRONCAL
1. G.R. No. 6878 September 13, 1913
MARCELINA EDROSO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
PABLO and BASILIO SABLAN, opponents-appellees.
Francisco Dominguez for appellant.
Crispin Oben for appellees.
ARELLANO, C.J.:
The subject matter of this appeal is the registration of certain
property classified as required by law to be reserved. Marcelina
Edroso applied for registration and issuance of title to two parcels
of land situated in the municipality of Pagsanjan, Province of
Laguna, one of 1 hectare 77 ares and 63 centares, and the other 1
hectare 6 ares and 26 centares. Two applications were filed, one
for each parcel, but both were heard and decided in a single
judgment.
Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan until his death
on September 22, 1882. In this marriage they had a son named
Pedro, who was born on August 1, 1881, and who at his father's
death inherited the two said parcels. Pedro also died on July 15,
1902, unmarried and without issue and by this decease the two
parcels of land passed through inheritance to his mother,
Marcelina Edroso. Hence the hereditary title whereupon is based
the application for registration of her ownership.
Two legitimate brothers of Victoriano Sablan — that is, two uncles
german of Pedro Sablan — appeared in the case to oppose the
registration, claiming one of two things: Either that the registration
be denied, "or that if granted to her the right reserved by law to
the opponents be recorded in the registration of each parcel." (B.
of E., 11, 12.)
The Court of Land Registration denied the registration and the
application appealed through a bill of exceptions.
Registration was denied because the trial court held that the
parcels of land in question partake of the nature of property
required by law to be reserved and that in such a case application
could only be presented jointly in the names of the mother and the
said two uncles of Pedro Sablan.
The appellant impugns as erroneous the first idea advanced
(second assignment of error), and denies that the land which are
the subject matter of the application are required by law to be
reserved — a contention we regard as indefensible.
Facts: (1) The applicant acquired said lands from her descendant
Pedro Sablan by inheritance; (2) Pedro Sablan had acquired them
from his ascendant Victoriano Sablan, likewise by inheritance; (3)
Victoriano Sablan had likewise acquired them by inheritance from
his ascendants, Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, they
having been adjudicated to him in the partition of hereditary
property had between him and his brothers. These are admitted
facts.
A very definite conclusions of law is that the hereditary title is one
without a valuable consideration [gratuitous title], and it is so
characterized in article 968 of the Civil Code, for he who acquires
by inheritance gives nothing in return for what he receives; and a
within the third degree of blood relationship.
The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property
which the latter acquired without a valuable consideration
from another ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is
under obligation to reserve what he has acquired by
operation of law for the relatives who are within the third
degree and belong to the line whence the property
proceeded. (Civil Code, art. 811.)
Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him
these two parcels of land which he had acquired without a valuable
consideration — that is, by inheritance from another ascendant, his
father Victoriano. Having acquired them by operation of law, she is
obligated to relatives within the third degree and belong to the line
of Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, whence the lands
proceeded. The trial court's ruling that they partake of the nature
property required by law to be reserved is therefore in accordance
with the law.
But the appellant contends that it is not proven that the two
parcels of land in question have been acquired by operation of law,
and that only property acquired without a valuable consideration,
which is by operation of law, is required by law to reserved.
The appellees justly argue that this defense was not alleged or
discussed in first instance, but only herein. Certainly, the allegation
in first instance was merely that "Pedro Sablan acquired the
property in question in 1882, before the enforcement of the Civil
Code, which establishes the alleged right required by law to be
reserved, of which the opponents speak; hence, prescription of the
right of action; and finally, opponents' renunciation of their right,
admitting that it existed and that they had it" (p. 49).
However that be, it is not superflous to say, although it may be
unnecessary, that the applicant inherited the two parcels of land
from her son Pedro, who died "unmarried and without issue." The
trial court so held as a conclusion of fact, without any objection on
the appellant's part. (B. of E., 17, 20.) When Pedro Sablan died
without issue, his mother became his heir by virtue of her right to
her son's legal portion under article 935 of the Civil Code:
In the absence of legitimate children and descendants of
the deceased, his ascendants shall from him, to the
exclusion of collaterals.
The contrary could only have occurred if the heiress had
demonstrated that any of these lands had passed into her
possession by free disposal in her son's will; but the case presents
no testamentary provision that demonstrate any transfer of
property from the son to the mother, not by operation of law, but
by her son's wish. The legal presumption is that the transfer of the
two parcels of land was abintestate or by operation of law, and not
by will or the wish of the predecessor in interest. (Act No. 190, sec.
334, No. 26.) All the provision of article 811 of the Civil Code have
therefore been fully complied with.
If Pedro Sablan had instituted his mother in a will as the universal
heiress of his property, all he left at death would not be required by
law to be reserved, but only what he would have perforce left her
as the legal portion of a legitimate ascendant.
The legal portion of the parents or ascendants is
constituted by one-half of the hereditary estate of the
children and descendants. The latter may unrestrictedly

dispose of the other half, with the exception of what is
established in article 836. (Civil Code, art. 809.)
In such case only the half constituting the legal portion would be
required by law to be reserved, because it is what by operation of
law could full to the mother from her son's inheritance; the other
half at free disposal would not have to be reserved. This is all that
article 811 of the Civil Code says.
No error has been incurred in holding that the two parcels of land
which are the subject matter of the application are required by law
to be reserved, because the interested party has not proved that
either of them became her inheritance through the free disposal of
her son.
Proof testate succession devolves upon the heir or heiress who
alleges it. It must be admitted that a half of Pedro Sablan's
inheritance was acquired by his mother by operation of law. The
law provides that the other half is also presumed to be acquired by
operation of law — that is, by intestate succession. Otherwise,
proof to offset this presumption must be presented by the
interested party, that is, that the other half was acquired by the
man's wish and not by operation of law.
Nor is the third assignments of error admissible — that the trial
court failed to sustain the renunciation of the right required by law
to be reserved, which the applicant attributes to the opponents.
Such renunciation does not appear in the case. The appellant
deduces it from the fact that the appellees did not contradict the
following statement of hers at the trial:
The day after my brother-in-law Pablo Sablan dies and was buried,
his brother came to my house and said that those rice lands were
mine, because we had already talked about making delivery of
them. (p. 91).
The other brother alluded to is Basilio Sablan, as stated on page 92.
From the fact that Basilio Sablan said that the lands belong to the
appellant and must be delivered to her it cannot be deduced that
he renounced the right required by law to be reserved in such lands
by virtue of the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code, for they
really belong to her and must be delivered to her.
The fourth assignments of error set up the defense of prescription
of the right of action. The appellant alleges prescription of the
opponent's right of action for requiring fulfillment of the obligation
they attribute to her recording in the property registry the right
required by law to be reserved, in accordance with the provisions
of the Mortgage Law; and as such obligation is created by law, it
prescribed in the time fixed in No. 2 of section 43 of Act No. 190.
She adds: "Prescription of the right alleged to the reserved by force
of law has not been invoked." (Eight allegation.)
The appellant does not state in her brief what those provisions of
the Mortgage Law are. Nor did she do so in first instance, where
she says only the following, which is quoted from the record: "I do
not refer to the prescription of the right required by law to be
reserved in the property; I refer to the prescription of the right of
action of those who are entitled to the guaranty of that right for
seeking that guaranty, for those who are entitled to that right the
Mortgage Law grants a period of time for recording it in the
property registry, if I remember correctly, ninety days, for seeking
entry in the registry; but as they have not exercised that right of
action, such right of action for seeking here that it be recorded has
prescribed. The right of action for requiring that the property be
reserved has not prescribed, but the right of action for
2
guaranteeing in the property registry that this property is required
by law to be reserved" (p. 69 of the record).
The appellees reply: It is true that their right of action has
prescribed for requiring the applicant to constitute the mortgage
imposed by the Mortgage Law for guaranteeing the effectiveness
of the required by law to be reserved; but because that right of
action has prescribed, that property has not been divested of its
character of property required by law to be reserved; that it has
such character by virtue of article 8112 of the Civil Code, which
went into effect in the Philippine in December, 1889, and not by
virtue of the Mortgage Law, which only went into effect in the
country by law of July 14, 1893; that from December, 1889, to July,
1893, property which under article 811 of the Civil Code acquired
the character of property reserved by operation of law was such
independently of the Mortgage Law, which did not yet form part of
the positive legislation of the country; that although the Mortgage
Law has been in effect in the country since July, 1893, still it has in
no way altered the force of article 811 of the Civil Code, but has
operated to reinforce the same merely by granting the right of
action to the persons in whose favor the right is reserved by
operation of law to require of the person holding the property a
guaranty in the form of a mortgage to answer for the enforcement,
in due time, of the right; that to lose the right of action to the
guaranty is not to lose the right itself; that the right reserved is the
principal obligation and the mortgage the accessory obligation, and
loss of the accessory does not mean loss of the principal. (Fifth and
sixth allegations.)
The existence of the right required by law to be reserved in the two
parcels of land in question being indisputable, even though it be
admitted that the right of action which the Mortgage Law grants as
a guaranty of final enforcement of such right has prescribed, the
only thing to be determined by this appeal is the question raised in
the first assignment of error, that is, how said two parcels of land
can and ought to be registered, not in the property registry newly
established by the Mortgage Law, but in the registry newly
organized by Act No. 496. But as the have slipped into the
allegations quoted some rather inexact ideas that further obscure
such an intricate subject as this of the rights required to be
reserved in Spanish-Philippine law, a brief disgression on the most
essential points may not be out of place here.
The Mortgage Law of July 14, 1893, to which the appellees allude,
is the amended one of the colonies, not the first enforced in the
colonies and consequently in the Philippines. The preamble of said
amended Mortgage Law states:
The Mortgage Law in force in Spain for thirty years went
into effect, with the modifications necessary for its
adaptation, in the Antilles on May 1, 1880, and in the
Philippines on December 1, 1889, thus commencing in
those regions the renovation of the law on real property,
and consequently of agrarian credit.
The Civil Code went into effect in the Philippines in the same year,
1889, but on the eight day.
Two kinds of property required by law to be reserved are
distinguished in the Civil Code, as set forth in article 968 thereof,
where it says:
Besides the reservation imposed by article 811, the widow or
widower contracting a seconds marriage shall be obliged to set
apart for the children and descendants of the first marriage the
ownership of all the property he or she may have required from the
 3

deceased spouse by will, by intestate succession, by gift, or other forth in the preceding article (relative to the right reserved
transfer without a valuable consideration." by article 968 of the Civil Code), applying to the
person obligated to reserve the right the provisions with
The Mortgage Law of Spain and the first law that went into effect in respect to the father.
the Philippines on December 1, 189, do not contain any provision
that can be applied to the right reserved by article 811 of the Civil In article 168 of the same law the new subsection 2 is added in
Code, for such right is a creation of the Civil Code. In those laws connection with article 199 quoted, so that said article 168 reads as
appear merely the provisions intended to guarantee the thus:
effectiveness of the right in favor of the children of the first
marriage when their father or mother contracts a second marriage. Legal mortgage is established:
Nevertheless, the holding of the supreme court of Spain, for the
first time set forth in the decision on appeal of November 8, 1894, 1. . . .
has been reiterated:
2. In favor of the relatives to whom article 811 of the Civil
That while the provisions of articles 977 and 978 of the Code refers, for the property required to be reserved,
Civil Code that tend to secure the right required to be upon the property of the person obliged to reserve it.
reserved in the property refer especially to the spouses
who contract second or later marriages, they do not
This being admitted, and admitted also that both the litigating
thereby cease to be applicable to the right establishes in
parties agree that the period of ninety days fixed for the right of
article 811, because, aside from the legal reason, which is
action to the guaranty, that is, to require the mortgage that
the same in both cases, such must be the construction
guarantees the effectiveness of the right required by law to be
from the important and conclusive circumstance that said
reserved, has prescribed, it is necessary to lay down a principle in
provisions are set forth in the chapter that deals with
this matter. Now it should by noted that such action has not
inheritances in common, either testate or intestate, and
prescribed, because the period of ninety days fixed by the
because article 968, which heads the section that deals in
Mortgage Law is not for the exercise of the right of action of the
general with property required by law to be reserved,
persons entitled to the right reserved, but for the fulfillment of the
makes reference to the provisions in article 811; and it
obligation of the person who must make the reservation.
would consequently be contradictory to the principle of
the law and of the common nature of said provisions not
Article 191 of the reads thus: "If ninety days pass without the
to hold them applicable to that right.
father's instituting in court the proceeding to which the foregoing
article refers, the relatives themselves may demand fulfillment,
Thus it was again stated in a decision on appeal, December 30,
etc., . . . applying, according to said article 199, to the person
1897, that: "As the supreme court has already declared, the
obligated to reserve the right the provisions with respect to the
guaranties that the Code fixes in article 977 and 978 for the rights
father."
required by law to the reserved to which said articles refer, are
applicable to the special right dealt with in article 811, because the
Article 203 of the regulation for the application of the Mortgage
same principle exists and because of the general nature of the
Law says: "In the case of article 199 of the law the proceedings to
provisions of the chapter in which they are found."
which article 190 thereof refers will be instituted within the ninety
days succeeding the date of the date of the acceptation of the
From this principle of jurisprudence it is inferred that if from
inheritance by the person obligated to reserve the property; after
December, 1889, to July, 1893, a case had occurred of a right
this period has elapsed, the interested parties may require the
required to be reserved by article 811, the persons entitled to such
institution of such proceedings, if they are of age; and in any other
right would have been able to institute, against the ascendant who
case, their legal representatives."
must make the reservation, proceedings for the assurance and
guaranty that article 977 and 978 grant to the children of a first
Thus it clearly appears that the lapse of the ninety days is not the
marriage against their father or mother who has married again. The
expiration by prescription of the period for the right must be
proceedings for assurance, under article 977; are: Inventory of the
reserved, but really the commencement thereof, enables them to
property subject to the right reserved, annotation in the property
exercise it at any time, since no limits is set in the law. So, if the
registry of such right reserved in the real property and appraisal of
annotation of the right required by law to be reserved in the two
the personal property; and the guaranty, under article 978, is the
parcels of land in question must be made in the property registry of
assurance by mortgage, in the case of realty, of the value of what is
the Mortgage Law, the persons entitled to it may now institute
validly alienated.
proceedings to that end, and an allegation of prescription against
the exercise of such right of action cannot be sustained.
But since the amended Mortgage Law went into effect by law of
July 14, 1893, in the Philippines this is not only a principle of
Since the applicant confesses that she does not allege prescription
jurisprudence which may be invoked for the applicability to the
of the right of action for requiring that the property be reserved, for
right reserved in article 811 of the remedies of assurance and
she explicitly so stated at the trial, and as the case presents no
guaranty provided for the right reserved in article 968, but there is
necessity for the proceedings that should be instituted in
a positive provision of said law, which is an advantage over the law
of Spain, to wit, article 199, which read thus: accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law, this
prescription of the right of action cannot take place, because such
right of action does not exist with reference to instituting
The special mortgage for guaranteeing the right reserved
proceedings for annotation in the registry of Act No. 496 of the
by article 811 of the Civil Code can only be required by the
right to the property required by law to be reserved. It is sufficient,
relatives in whose favor the property is to be reserved, if
as was done in the present case, to intervene in the registration
they are of age; if minors, it will be require by the person
proceedings with the claim set up by the two opponents for
who should legally represent them. In either case the right
recording therein the right reserved in either parcel of land.
of the persons in whose favor the property must be
reserved will be secured by the same requisites as set

Now comes the main point in the appeal. The trial court denied the
registration because of this finding set forth in its decision:
Absolute title to the two parcels of land undoubtedly
belongs to the applicant and the two uncles of the
deceased Pedro Sablan, and the application cannot be
made except in the name of all of them in common. (B. of
E., p. 20.)
It must be remembered that absolute title consists of the rights to
use, enjoy, dispose of, and recover. The person who has in himself
all these rights has the absolute or complete ownership of the
thing; otherwise, the person who has the right to use and enjoy will
have the usufruct, and the person who has the rights of disposal
and recovery the direct title. The person who by law, act, or
contract is granted the right of usufruct has the first two rights or
using an enjoying, and then he is said not to have the fee simple —
that is, the rights of disposal and recovery, which pertain to
another who, after the usufruct expires, will come into full
ownership.
The question set up in the first assignment of error of the
appellant's brief is this:
What are the rights in the property of the person who
holds it subject to the reservation of article 811 of the Civil
Code?
There are not lacking writers who say, only those of a usufructuary,
the ultimate title belonging to the person in whose favor the
reservation is made. If that were so, the person holding the
property could not apply for registration of title, but the person in
whose favor it must be reserved, with the former's consent. This
opinion does not seem to be admissible, although it appears to be
supported by decisions of the supreme court of Spain of May 21,
1861, and June 18, 1880, prior to the Civil Code, and of June 22,
1895, somewhat subsequent to the enforcement thereof.
Another writer says: "This opinion only looks at two salient points
— the usufruct and the fee simple; the remaining features of the
arrangement are not perceived, but become obscure in the
presence of that deceptive emphasis which only brings out two
things: that the person holding the property will enjoy it and that
he must keep what he enjoys for other persons." (Manresa, VII,
189.)
In another place he says: "We do not believe that the third opinion
can now be maintained — that is, that the surviving spouse (the
person obliged by article 968 to make the reservation) can be
regarded as a mere usufructuary and the descendants immediately
as the owner; such theory has no serious foundation in the Code."
(Ibid., 238.)
The ascendants who inherits from a descendants, whether by the
latter's wish or by operation of law, requires the inheritance by
virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute ownership. All the
attributes of the right of ownership belong to him exclusively —
use, enjoyment, disposal and recovery. This absolute ownership,
which is inherent in the hereditary title, is not altered in the least, if
there be no relatives within the third degree in the line whence the
property proceeds or they die before the ascendant heir who is the
possessor and absolute owner of the property. If there should be
relatives within the third degree who belong to the line whence the
property proceeded, then a limitation to that absolute ownership
would arise. The nature and scope of this limitation must be
determined with exactness in order not to vitiate rights that the
law wishes to be effective. The opinion which makes this limitation
4
consist in reducing the ascendant heir to the condition in of a mere
usufructuary, depriving him of the right of disposal and recovery,
does not seem to have any support in the law, as it does not have,
according to the opinion that he has been expressed in speaking of
the rights of the father or mother who has married again. There is a
marked difference between the case where a man's wish institutes
two persons as his heirs, one as usufructuary and the other as
owner of his property, and the case of the ascendant in article 811
or of the father or mother in article 968. In the first case, there is
not the slightest doubt that the title to the hereditary property
resides in the hereditary owner and he can dispose of and recover
it, while the usufructuary can in no way perform any act of disposal
of the hereditary property (except that he may dispose of the right
of usufruct in accordance with the provisions of article 480 of the
Civil Code), or any act of recovery thereof except the limited one in
the form prescribed in article 486 of the Code itself, because he
totally lacks the fee simple. But the ascendants who holds the
property required by article 811 to be reserved, and the father of
mother required by article 986 to reserve the right, can dispose of
the property they might itself, the former from his descendant and
the latter from his of her child in first marriage, and recover it from
anyone who may unjustly detain it, while the persons in whose
favor the right is required to be reserved in either case cannot
perform any act whatsoever of disposal or of recovery.
Article 975 states explicitly that the father or mother required by
article 9687 to reserve the right may dispose of the property itself:
Alienation of the property required by law to be reserved
which may be made by the surviving
spouse after contracting a second marriage shall be valid
only if at his or her death no legitimate children or
descendants of the first marriage survive, without
prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage of Law.
It thus appears that the alienation is valid, although not altogether
effective, but under a condition subsequent, to wit: "If at his or her
death no legitimate children or descendants of the first marriage
survive."
If the title did not reside in the person holding the property to be
reserved, his alienation thereof would necessarily be null and void,
as executed without a right to do so and without a right which he
could transmit to the acquirer. The law says that the alienation
subsists (to subject is to continue to exist) "without prejudice to the
provisions of the Mortgage Law." Article 109 of this Law says:
The possessor of property subject to conditions
subsequent that are still pending may mortgage or
alienate it, provided always that he preserve the right of
the parties interested in said conditions by expressly
reserving that right in the registration.
In such case, the child or legitimate descendants of the first
marriage in whose favor the right is reserved cannot impugn the
validity of the alienation so long as the condition subsequent is
pending, that is, so long as the remarried spouse who must reserve
the right is alive, because it might easily happen that the person
who must reserve the right should outlive all the person in whose
favor the right is reserved and then there would be no reason for
the condition subsequent that they survive him, and, the object of
the law having disappeared, the right required to be reserved
would disappear, and the alienation would not only be valid but
also in very way absolutely effective. Consequently, the alienation
is valid when the right required by law to be reserved to the
children is respected; while the effects of the alienation depend
upon a condition, because it will or will not become definite, it will
continue to exist or cease to exist, according to circumstances. This

is what the law establishes with reference to the reservation of
article 968, wherein the legislator expressly directs that the
surviving spouse who contracts a second marriage shall reserve to
the children or descendants of the first marriage ownership. Article
811 says nothing more than that the ascendants must make the
reservation.
Manresa, with his recognized ability, summarizes the subject under
the heading, "Rights and obligations during the existence of the
right required by law to be reserved," in these words:
During the whole period between the constitution in legal form of
the right required by law to be reserved and the extinction thereof,
the relatives within the third degree, after the right that in their
turn may pertain to them has been assured, have only an
expectation, and therefore they do not even have the capacity to
transmit that expectation to their heirs.
The ascendant is in the first place a usufructuary who should use
and enjoy the things according to their nature, in the manner and
form already set forth in commenting upon the article of the Code
referring to use and usufruct.
But since in addition to being the usufructuary he is, even though
conditionally, the owner in fee simple of the property, he can
dispose of it in the manner provided in article 974 and 976 of the
same Code. Doubt arose also on this point, but the Direccion
General of the registries, in an opinion of June 25, 1892, declared
that articles 974 and 975, which are applicable by analogy, for they
refer to property reserved by law, reveal in the clearest manner the
attitude of the legislator on this subject, and the relatives with the
third degree ought not to be more privileged in the right reserved
in article 811 than the children in the right reserved by article 975,
chiefly for the reason that the right required to be reserved carries
with it a condition subsequent, and the property subject to those
conditions can validly be alienated in accordance with article 109 of
the Mortgage Law, such alienation to continue, pending fulfillment
of the condition." (Civil Code, VI, 270.)
Another commentator corroborates the foregoing in every way. He
says:
The ascendants acquires that property with a condition
subsequent, to wit, whether or not there exists at the time
of his death relatives within the third degree of the
descendants from whom they inherit in the line whence
the property proceeds. If such relatives exist, they acquire
ownership of the property at the death of the ascendants.
If they do not exist, the ascendants can freely dispose
thereof. If this is true, since the possessor of property
subject to conditions subsequent can alienate and
encumber it, the ascendants may alienate the property
required by law to be reserved, but he will alienate what
he has and nothing more because no one can give what
does not belong to him, and the acquirer will therefore
receive a limited and revocable title. The relatives within
the third degree will in their turn have an expectation to
the property while the ascendant lives, an expectation
that cannot be transmitted to their heirs, unless these are
also within the third degree. After the person who is
required by law to reserve the right has died, the relatives
may rescind the alienation of the realty required by law to
be reserved and they will complete ownership, in fee
simple, because the condition and the usufruct have been
terminated by the death of the usufructuary. (Morell,
Estudios sobre bienes reservable, 304, 305.)
5
The conclusion is that the person required by article 811 to reserve
the right has, beyond any doubt at all, the rights of use and
usufruct. He has, moreover, for the reasons set forth, the legal title
and dominion, although under a condition subsequent. Clearly he
has, under an express provision of the law, the right to dispose of
the property reserved, and to dispose of is to alienate, although
under a condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the
one who possesses or should possess it and have title to it,
although a limited and revocable one. In a word, the legal title and
dominion, even though under a condition, reside in him while he
lives. After the right required by law to be reserved has been
assured, he can do anything that a genuine owner can do.
On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose
favor of the right is reserved cannot dispose of the property, first
because it is no way, either actually, constructively or formally, in
their possession; and, moreover, because they have no title of
ownership or of the fee simple which they can transmit to another,
on the hypothesis that only when the person who must reserve the
right should die before them will they acquire it, thus creating a fee
simple, and only then will they take their place in the succession of
the descendants of whom they are relatives within the third
degree, that it to say, a second contingent place in said legitimate
succession in the fashion of aspirants to a possible future legacy. If
any of the persons in whose favor the right is reserved should, after
their rights has been assured in the registry, dare to dispose of
even nothing more than the fee simple of the property to be
reserved his act would be null and void, for, as was definitely
decided in the decision on appeal of December 30, 1897, it is
impossible to determine the part "that might pertain therein to the
relative at the time he exercised the right, because in view of the
nature and scope of the right required by law to be reserved the
extent of his right cannot be foreseen, for it may disappear by his
dying before the person required to reserve it, just as may even
become absolute should that person die."
Careful consideration of the matter forces the conclusion that no
act of disposal inter vivos of the person required by law to reserve
the right can be impugned by him in whose favor it is reserved,
because such person has all, absolutely all, the rights inherent in
ownership, except that the legal title is burdened with a condition
that the third party acquirer may ascertain from the registry in
order to know that he is acquiring a title subject to a condition
subsequent. In conclusion, it seems to us that only an act of
disposal mortis causa in favor of persons other than relatives within
the third degree of the descendants from whom he got the
property to be reserved must be prohibited to him, because this
alone has been the object of the law: "To prevent persons outside a
family from securing, by some special accident of life, property that
would otherwise have remained therein." (Decision of December
30, 1897.)
Practically, even in the opinion of those who reduce the person
reserving the right to the condition of a mere usufructuary, the
person in whose favor it must be reserved cannot attack the
alienation that may be absolutely made of the property the law
requires to be reserved, in the present case, that which the
appellant has made of the two parcels of land in question to a third
party, because the conditional alienation that is permitted her is
equivalent to an alienation of the usufruct, which is authorized by
article 480 of the Civil Code, and, practically, use and enjoyment of
the property required by law to be reserved are all that the person
who must reserve it has during his lifetime, and in alienating the
usufruct all the usefulness of the thing would be transmitted in an
incontrovertible manner. The question as to whether or not she
transmits the fee simple is purely academic, sine re, for it is not
real, actual positive, as is the case of the institution of two heirs,
 6

one a usufructuary and the other the owner, by the express wish of
the predecessor in interest.

If the person whom article 811 requires to reserve the right has all
the rights inherent in ownership, he can use, enjoy, dispose of and
recover it; and if, in addition to usufructuary, he is in fact and in law
the real owner and can alienate it, although under a condition, the
whole question is reduced to the following terms:

Cannot the heir of the property required by law to reserved, merely

because a condition subsequent is annexed to his right of disposal,
himself alone register the ownership of the property he has
inherited, when the persons in whose favor the reservation must
be made degree thereto, provided that the right reserved to them
in the two parcels of land be recorded, as the law provides?

It is well known that the vendee under pacto de retracto acquires

all the rights of the vendor:

The vendee substitutes the vendor in all his rights and

actions. (Civil Code, art. 1511.)

If the vendor can register his title, the vendee can also register this
same title after he has once acquired it. This title, however, in its
attribute of being disposable, has a condition subsequent annexed
— that the alienation the purchaser may make will be terminated,
if the vendor should exercise the right granted him by article 1507,
which says:

Conventional redemption shall take place when the vendor

reserves to himself the right to recover the thing sold, with the
obligation to comply with article 1518, and whatever more may
have been agreed upon," that is, if he recovers the thing sold by
repaying the vendee the price of the sale and other expenses.
Notwithstanding this condition subsequent, it is a point not at all
doubtful now that the vendee may register his title in the same
way as the owner of a thing mortgaged — that is to say, the latter
with the consent of his creditor and the former with the consent of
the vendor. He may alienate the thing bought when the acquirer
knows by well from the title entered in the registry that he acquires
a title revocable after a fixed period, a thing much more certain and
to be expected than the purely contingent expectation of the
person in whose favor is reserved a right to inherit some day what
another has inherited. The purpose of the law would be defeated in
not applying to the person who must make the reservation the
provision therein relative to the vendee under pacto de retracto,
since the argument in his favor is the more power and
conclusive; ubi eadem ratio, eadem legis dispositivo.

Therefore, we reverse the judgment appealed from, and in lieu

thereof decide and declare that the applicant is entitled to register
in her own name the two parcels of land which are the subject
matter of the applicants, recording in the registration the right
required by article 811 to be reserved to either or both of the
opponents, Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, should they survive
her; without special findings as to costs.

2. G.R. No. L-34395 May 19, 1981
BEATRIZ L. GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (BRANCH V), BENITO F.
LEGARDA, ROSARIO L. VALDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA, TERESA
LEGARDA, JOSE LEGARDA, BENITO LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ,
CARMEN LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y
HERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO
LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, RAMON LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ,
FILOMENA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JAIME LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT,
CELSO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT,
MA. TERESA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. ANTONIA LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, JOSE LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ROSARIO LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, BENITO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, EDUARDO LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, TRINIDAD F. LEGARDA, and the ESTATE OF DONA
FILOMENA ROCES DE LEGARDA, respondents.
AQUINO, J.:1äwphï1.ñët
Beatriz Legarda Gonzales appealed from the decision of the Court
of First Instance of Manila, dismissing her complaint for partition,
accounting, reconveyance and damages and holding, as not subject
to reserve troncal, the properties which her mother Filomena Races
inherited in 1943 from Filomena Legarda (Civil Case No. 73335).
The facts are as follows:
Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason,
died [Manila] on June 17, 1933. He was survived by his widow,
Filomena Races, and their seven children: four daughters named
Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena and three sons named
Benito, Alejandro and Jose.
On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y
Tuason were partitioned in three equal portions by his daughters,
Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son Benito
Legarda y De la Paz who were represented by Benito F. Legarda.
Filomena Legarda y Races died intestate and without issue on
March 19, 1943. Her sole heiress was her mother, Filomena Races
Vda. de Legarda.
Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit adjudicating
extrajudicially to herself the properties which she inherited from
her deceased daughter, Filomena Legarda. The said properties
consist of the following: 1äwphï1.ñët
(a) Savings deposit in the National City Bank of
New York with a credit balance of P3,699.63.
(b) 1,429 shares of the Benguet Consolidated
Mining Company and a 1/7 interest in certain
shares of the San Miguel Brewery, Tuason &
Legarda, Ltd., Philippine Guaranty Company,
Insular Life Assurance Company and the Manila
Times.
(c) 1/7 of the properties described in TCT Nos.
80226, 80237 to 80243 (7 titles), 80260, 80261
and 57512 of the Manila registry of deeds.
1/21st of the properties covered by TCT Nos.
48164, 84714, 48201, 48202, 48205, 48203,
48206, 48160 and 48192 of the Manila registry of
deeds;
7
1/21st of the property described in TCT No. 4475
of the registry of deeds of Rizal, now Quezon City;
1/14th of the property described in TCT No. 966
of the registry of deeds of Baguio;
1/7th of the lot and improvements at 127 Aviles
described in TCT No. 41862 of the Manila registry
of deeds; 1/7th of the lots and improvements at
181 San Rafael describe in TCT Nos. 50495 and
48161 of the Manila registry of deeds;
1/7th of the property described in TCT No. 48163
of the Manila registry of deeds (Streets);
l/21st of the properties described in TCT Nos.
48199 and 57551 of the Manila registry of deeds
(Streets and Estero):
2/21st of the property described in TCT No.
13458 of tile registry of deeds of T0ayabas.
These are the properties in litigation in this case. As a result of the
affidavit of adjudication, Filomena Races succeeded her deceased
daughter Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the properties
held proindiviso by her other six children.
Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two handwritten Identical
documents wherein she disposed of the properties, which she
inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of her sons,
Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all). The
document reads: 1äwphï1.ñët
A mis hijos :
Dispongo que se reparta a todos mis nietos hijos
de Ben, Mandu y Pepito, los bienes que he
heredado de mi difunta hija Filomena y tambien
los acciones de la Destileria La Rosario'
recientemente comprada a los hermanos Values
Legarda.
De los bienes de mi hija Filomena se deducira un
tote de terreno que yo he 0donada a las Hijas de
Jesus, en Guipit
La case No. 181 San Rafael, la cede a mi hijo
Mandu solo la casa; proque ella esta construida
sobre terreno de los hermanos Legarda
Races. 1äwphï1.ñët
(
S
g
d
.
)
F
I
L
O
M
E
N
A
R
 8

OIn an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 only legal issues can be
Craised under undisputed facts. Since on the basis of the stipulated
E facts the lower court resolved only the issue of whether the
S properties in question are subject to reserva troncal that is the only
legal issue to be resolved in this appeal.
L
E The other issues raised by the defendants-appellees, particularly
Gthose involving factual matters, cannot be resolved in this appeal.
AAs the trial court did not pass upon those issues, there is no ruling
Rwhich can be reviewed by this Court.
D
AThe question is whether the disputed properties are reservable
properties under article 891 of the Civil Code, formerly article 811,
6 Marzo 1953 and whether Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda could dispose of
them in his will in favor of her grandchildren to the exclusion of her
During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959 Mrs. Legarda six children.
and her six surviving children partitioned the properties consisting
of the one-third share in the estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason Did Mrs. Legarda have the right to convey mortis causa what she
which the children inherited in representation of their father, inherited from her daughter Filomena to the reservees within
Benito Legarda y De la Paz. the third degree and to bypass the reservees in the second
degree or should that inheritance automatically go to the reservees
Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was admitted to in the second degree, the six children of Mrs. Legarda?
probate as a holographic will in the order dated July 16, 1968 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No. 70878, As will hereinafter be shown that is not a novel issue or a question
Testate Estate of Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda. The decree of of first impression. lt was resolved in Florentino vs. Florentino, 40
probate was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in Legarda vs. Phil. 480. Before discussing the applicability to this case of the
Gonzales, CA-G.R. No. 43480-R, July 30,1976. doctrine in the Florentino case and other pertinent rulings, it may
be useful to make a brief discourse on the nature of reserve
In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of troncal, also called lineal, familiar, extraordinaria o semi-troncal.
the testatrix, filed on May 20, 1968 a motion to exclude from the
inventory of her mother's estate the properties which she inherited Much time, effort and energy were spent by the parties in their five
from her deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said briefs in descanting on the nature of reserve troncal which together
properties are reservable properties which should be inherited by with the reserva viudal and reversion legal, was abolished by the
Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three brothers and not by the Code Commission to prevent the decedent's estate from being
children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda. That entailed, to eliminate the uncertainty in ownership caused by the
motion was opposed by the administrator, Benito F. Legarda. reservation (which uncertainty impedes the improvement of the
reservable property) and to discourage the confinement of
Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzales property within a certain family for generations which situation
filed on June 20, 1968 an ordinary civil action against her brothers, allegedly leads to economic oligarchy, and is incompatible with the
sisters, nephews and nieces and her mother's estate for the socialization of ownership.
purpose of securing a declaration that the said properties are
reservable properties which Mrs. Legarda could not bequeath in The Code Commission regarded the reservas as remnants of
her holographic will to her grandchildren to the exclusion of her feudalism which fomented agrarian unrest. Moreover,
three daughters and her three sons (See Paz vs. Madrigal, 100 Phil. the reserves, insofar as they penalize legitimate relationship, is
1085). considered unjust and inequitable.

As already stated, the lower court dismissed the action of Mrs.
Gonzales. ln this appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 she contends
in her six assignments of error that the lower court erred in not
regarding the properties in question as reservable properties under
article 891 of the Civil Code.
On the other hand, defendants-appellees in their six counter-
assignments of error contend that the lower court erred in not
holding that Mrs. Legarda acquired the estate of her daughter
Filomena] Legarda in exchange for her conjugal and hereditary
shares in the estate of her husband Benito Legarda y De la Paz and
in not holding that Mrs. Gonzales waived her right to the reservable
properties and that her claim is barred by estoppel, laches and
prescription.
The preliminary issue raised by the private respondents as to the
timeliness of Mrs. Gonzales' petition for review is a closed matter.
This Court in its resolution of December 16, 1971 denied
respondents' motion to dismiss and gave due course to the petition
for review.
However, the lawmaking body, not agreeing entirely with the Code
Commission, restored the reserve troncal, a legal institution which,
according to Manresa and Castan Tobenas has provoked questions
and doubts that are difficult to resolve.
Reserva troncal is provided for in article 811 of the Spanish Civil
Code, now article 891, which reads: 1äwphï1.ñët
ART. 811. El ascendiente que heredare de su
descendiente bienes que este hubiese adquirido
por titulo lucrative de otro ascendiente, o de un
hermano, se halla obligado a reservas los que
hubiere adquirido por ministerio de la ley en
favor de los parientes que eaten dentro del tercer
grade y pertenezcan a la linea de donde los
bienes proceden
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his
descendant any property which the latter may
have acquired by gratuitous title from another
ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to

reserve such property as he may have acquired
by operation of law for the benefit of relatives
who are within the third degree and who belong
to the line from which said property came.
In reserve troncal (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by
gratuitous title property from an ascendant or from a brother or
sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another ascendant or is
acquired by him by operation of law from the said descendant, and
(3) the said ascendant should reserve the said property for the
benefit of relatives who are within the third degree from the
deceased descendant (prepositus) and who belong to the line from
which the said property came.
So, three transmissions are involved: (I) a first transmission by
lucrative title (inheritance or donation) from an ascendant or
brother or sister to the deceased descendant; (2) a posterior
transmission, by operation of law (intestate succession or legitime)
from the deceased descendant (causante de la reserve) in favor of
another ascendant, the reservor or reservista, which two
transmissions precede the reservation, and (3) a third
transmissions of the same property (in consequence of the
reservation) from the reservor to the reservees (reservatarios) or
the relatives within the third degree from the deceased descendant
belonging to the line of the first ascendant, brother or sister of the
deceased descendant (6 Castan Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l, 1960,
6th Ed., pp. 198-9).
If there are only two transmissions there is no reserve. Thus, where
one Bonifacia Lacerna died and her properties were inherited by
her son, Juan Marbebe, upon the death of Juan, those lands should
be inherited by his half-sister, to the exclusion of his maternal first
cousins. The said lands are not reservable property within the
meaning of article 811 (Lacerna vs. Vda. de Corcino, l l l Phil. 872).
The persons involved in reserve troncal are (1) the ascendant or
brother or sister from whom the property was received by the
descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title, (2) the descendant
or prepositus (prepositus) who received the property, (3) the
reservor (reservista) the other ascendant who obtained the
property from the (prepositus) by operation of law and (4) the
reserves (reservatario) who is within the third degree from
the prepositus and who belongs to the (line o tronco) from which
the property came and for whom the property should be reserved
by the reservor.
The reservees may be half-brothers and sisters (Rodriguez vs.
Rodriguez, 101 Phil. 1098; Chua vs. Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, L-29901, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 412). Fourth degree
relatives are not included (Jardin vs. Villamayor, 72 Phil. 392).
The rationale of reserve troncal is to avoid "el peligro de que bienes
poseidos secularmente por una familia pasen bruscamente a titulo
gratuito a manos extrañas por el azar de los enlaces y muertes
prematuras or impeder que, por un azar de la vide personas
extranas a una familia puedan adquirir bienes que sin aquel
hubieran quedado en ella (6 Castan Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l,
6th Ed., 1980, p. 203; Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).
An illustration of reserve troncal is found in Edroso vs. Sablan, 25
Phil. 295. ln that case, Pedro Sablan inherited two parcels of land
from his father Victorians. Pedro died in 1902, single and without
issue. His mother, Marcelina Edroso, inherited from him the two
parcels of land.
It was held that the land was reservable property in the hands of
Marcelina. The reservees were Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, the
9
paternal uncles of Pedro Sablan, the prepositus. Marcelina could
register the land under the Torrens system in her name but the fact
that the land was reservable property in favor of her two brothers-
in-law, should they survive her, should be noted in the title.
In another case, it appears that Maria Aglibot died intestate in
1906. Her one-half share of a parcel of conjugal land was inherited
by her daughter, Juliana Mañalac. When Juliana died intestate in
1920, said one-half share was inherited by her father, Anacleto
Mañalac who owned the other one-half portion.
Anacleto died intestate in 1942, survived by his second wife and
their six children. lt was held that the said one-half portion was
reservable property in the hands of Anacleto Mañalac and, upon
his death, should be inherited by Leona Aglibot and Evarista
Aglibot, sisters of Maria and materna aunts of Juliana Mañalac,
who belonged to the line from which said one-half portion came
(Aglibot vs. Mañalac 114 Phil. 964).
Other illustrations of reserva troncal are found in Florentino vs
Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; Nieva and Alcala vs. Alcala and Deocampo,
41 Phil. 915; Maghirang and Gutierrez vs. Balcita 46 Phil.
551; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Dizon vs. Galang, 48 Phil.
601; Riosa vs. Rocha, 48 Phil. 737; Centeno vs. Centeno 52 Phil.
322; Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89; Director of Lands vs.
Aguas, 63 Phil. 279; Fallorfina vs. Abille, CA 39 O.G. 1784.
The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the
descendant, or the one at the end of the line from which the
property came and upon whom the property last revolved by
descent. He is called the prepositus(Cabardo vs. Villanueva. 44 Phil.
186, 190).
In the Cabardo case, one Cornelia Abordo inherited property from
her mother, Basilia Cabardo. When Cornelia died, her estate passed
to her father, Lorenzo Abordo. ln his hands, the property was
reservable property. Upon the death of Lorenzo, the person
entitled to the property was Rosa Cabardo, a maternal aunt of
Cornelia, who was her nearest relative within the third degree.
First cousins of the prepositus are in the fourth degree and are not
reservees. They cannot even represent their parents because
representation is confined to relatives within the third degree
(Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480).
Within the third degree, the nearest relatives exclude the more
remote subject to the rule of representation. But the
representative should be within the third degree from
the prepositus (Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).
Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate relationship. illegitimate
relationship and relationship by affinity are excluded.
Gratuitous title or titulo lucrativo refers to a transmission wherein
the recipient gives nothing in return such as donacion and
succession (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 189-190, citing 6
Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., 195 l, p. 360).
The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the
death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at
the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging
to the line from which the property came
(Sienes vs. E Esparcia l l l Phil. 349, 353).
The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable
property but subject to the resolutory condition that such title is
extinguished if the reservor predeceased the reservee. The

reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable property. He may
alienate it subject to the reservation. The transferee gets the
revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor. The
transferee's rights are revoked upon the survival of the reservees at
the time of the death of the reservor but become indefeasible
when the reservees predecease the reservor. (Sienes vs. Esparcia,
111 Phil. 349, 353; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295; Lunsod vs.
Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480: Director
of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279.)
The reservor's title has been compared with that of the vendee
a retro in a pacta de retro sale or to a fideicomiso conditional.
The reservor's alienation of the reservable property is subject to a
resolutory condition, meaning that if at the time of the reservor's
death, there are reservees, the transferee of the property should
deliver it to the reservees. lf there are no reservees at the time of
the reservor's death, the transferee's title would become absolute.
(Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944;
Mono vs. Nequia 93 Phil. 120).
On the other hand, the reserves has only an inchoate, expectant or
contingent right. His expectant right would disappear if he
predeceased the reservor. lt would become absolute should the
reservor predecease the reserves.
The reserves cannot impugn any conveyance made by the reservor
but he can require that the reservable character of the property be
recognized by the purchaser (Riosa vs. Rocha 48 Phil. 737; Edroso
vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295, 312-3; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944).
There is a holding that the renunciation of the reservee's right to
the reservable property is illegal for being a contract regarding
future inheritance (Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89, 96).
And there is a dictum that the reservee's right is a real right which
he may alienate and dispose of conditionally. The condition is that
the alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and
when the reserves survives the reservor (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111
Phil. 349, 353). 1äwphï1.ñët
The reservatario receives the property as a
conditional heir of the descendant (prepositus)
said property merely reverting to the line of
origin from which it had temporarily and
accidentally stayed during
the reservista's lifetime. The authorities are all
agreed that there being reservatarios that survive
the reservists, the latter must be deemed to have
enjoyed no more than a than interest in the
reservable property. (J. J. B. L. Reyes in Cane vs.
Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)
Even during the reservista's lifetime,
the reservatarios, who are the ultimate acquirers
of the property, can already assert the right to
prevent the reservista from doing anything that
might frustrate their reversionary right, and, for
this purpose, they can compel the annotation of
their right in the registry of property even while
the (reservista) is alive (Ley Hipotecaria de
Ultramar, Arts. 168, 199; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25
Phil. 295).
This right is incompatible with the mere
expectancy that corresponds to the natural heirs
of the reservista lt is likewise clear that the
10
reservable property is no part of the estate of the
reservista who may not dispose of them (it) by
will, so long as there are reservatarios existing
(Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 226, 237).
The latter, therefore, do not inherit from
the reservista but from the descendant
(prepositus) of whom the reservatarios are the
heirs mortis causa, subject to the condition that
they must survive the reservista. (Sanchez
Roman, Vol. VI Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa,
Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310, cited
by J. J.B.L. Reyes in Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960,
December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).
Hence, upon the reservista's death, the reservatario nearest to
the prepositus becomes, "automatically and by operation of law,
the owner of the reservable property." (Cane vs. Director of Lands,
105 Phil. l5.)
In the instant case, the properties in question were indubitably
reservable properties in the hands of Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly,
she was a reservor. The reservation became a certainty when at the
time of her death the reservees or relatives within the third degree
of the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living or they survived
Mrs. Legarda.
So, the ultimate issue in this case is whether Mrs. Legarda, as
reservor, could convey the reservable properties by will or mortis
causa to the reservees within the third degree (her sixteen
grandchildren) to the exclusion of the reservees in the second
degree, her three daughters and three sons. As indicated at the
outset, that issue is already res judicata or cosa juzgada.
We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will
to her sixteen grandchildren the reservable properties which she
had inherited from her daughter Filomena because the reservable
properties did not form part of her estate (Cabardo vs. Villanueva,
44 Phil. 186, 191). The reservor cannot make a disposition mortis
causa of the reservable properties as long as the reservees survived
the reservor.
As repeatedly held in the Cano and Padura cases, the reservees
inherit the reservable properties from the prepositus, not from the
reservor.
Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should
be inherited by all the nearest relatives within the third degree
from the prepositus who in this case are the six children of Mrs.
Legarda. She could not select the reservees to whom the reservable
property should be given and deprive the other reservees of their
share therein.
To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary
disposition of the reservable properties in favor of the reservees in
the third degree and, consequently, to ignore the reservees in
the second degree would be a glaring violation of article 891. That
testamentary disposition cannot be allowed.
We have stated earlier that this case is governed by the doctrine
of Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, a similar case, where it
was ruled: 1äwphï1.ñët
Reservable property left, through a will or
otherwise, by the death of ascendant (reservista)
together with his own property in favor of
another of his descendants as forced heir, forms

no part of the latter's lawful inheritance nor of
the legitime, for the reason that, as said property
continued to be reservable, the heir receiving the
same as an inheritance from his ascendant has
the strict obligation of its delivery to the relatives,
within the third degree, of the predecessor in
interest (prepositus), without prejudicing the
right of the heir to an aliquot part of the
property, if he has at the same time the right of
a reservatario (reserves).
ln the Florentino case, it appears that Apolonio Florentino II and his
second wife Severina Faz de Leon begot two children, Mercedes
and Apolonio III. These two inherited properties from their father.
Upon Apolonio III death in 1891, his properties were inherited by
his mother, Severina, who died in 1908. ln her will, she instituted
her daughter Mercedes as heiress to all her properties, including
those coming from her deceased husband through their son,
Apolonio III.
The surviving children, begotten by Apolonio II with his first wife
Antonia Faz de Leon and the descendants of the deceased children
of his first marriage, sued Mercedes Florentino for the recovery of
their share in the reservable properties, which Severina de Leon
had inherited from Apolonio III which the latter had inherited from
his father Apolonio II and which Severina willed to her daughter
Mercedes.
Plaintiff's theory was that the said properties, as reservable
properties, could not be disposed of in Severina's will in favor of
Mercedes only. That theory was sustained by this Court.
It was held that the said properties, being reservable properties, did
not form part of Severina's estate and could not be inherited from
her by her daughter Mercedes alone.
As there were seven reservees, Mercedes was entitled, as a
reserves, to one-seventh of the properties. The other six sevenths
portions were adjudicated to the other six reservees.
Under the rule of stare decisis et non quieta movere, we are bound
to follow in this case the doctrine of the Florentino case. That
doctrine means that as long as during the reservor's lifetime and
upon his death there are relatives within the third degree of
the prepositus regardless of whether those reservees are common
descendants of the reservor and the ascendant from whom the
property came, the property retains its reservable character. The
property should go to the nearest reservees. The reservor cannot,
by means of his will, choose the reserves to whom the reservable
property should be awarded.
The alleged opinion of Sanchez Roman that there is no reserva
troncal when the only relatives within the third degree are the
common descendants of the predeceased ascendant and the
ascendant who would be obliged to reserve is irrelevant and sans
binding force in the light of the ruling in the Florentino case.
It is contended by the appellees herein that the properties in
question are not reservable properties because only relatives
within the third degree from the paternal line have survived and
that when Mrs. Legarda willed the said properties to her sixteen
grandchildren, who are third-degree relatives of Filomena Legarda
and who belong to the paternal line, the reason for the reserva
troncal has been satisfied: "to prevent persons outside a family
from securing, by some special accident of life, property that would
otherwise have remained therein".
11
That same contention was advanced in the Florentino case where
the reservor willed the reservable properties to her daughter, a
full-blood sister of the prepositus and ignored the other six
reservors, the relatives of the half-blood of the prepositus.
In rejecting that contention, this Court held that the reservable
property bequeathed by the reservor to her daughter does not
form part of the reservor's estate nor of the daughter's estate but
should be given to all the seven reservees or nearest relatives of
the prepositus within the third degree.
This Court noted that, while it is true that by giving the reservable
property to only one reserves it did not pass into the hands of
strangers, nevertheless, it is likewise true that the heiress of the
reservor was only one of the reservees and there is no reason
founded upon law and justice why the other reservees should be
deprived of their shares in the reservable property (pp. 894-5).
Applying that doctrine to this case, it results that Mrs. Legarda
could not dispose of in her will the properties in question even if
the disposition is in favor of the relatives within the third degree
from Filomena Legarda. The said properties, by operation of Article
891, should go to Mrs. Legarda's six children as reservees within
the second degree from Filomena Legarda.
It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the
reservor but from the reservor but from the prepositus, of whom
the reservees are the heirs mortis causa subject to the condition
that they must survive the reservor (Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960,
December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).
The trial court said that the disputed properties lost their
reservable character due to the non-existence of third-degree
relatives of Filomena Legarda at the time of the death of the
reservor, Mrs. Legarda, belonging to the Legarda family, "except
third-degree relatives who pertain to both" the Legarda and Races
lines.
That holding is erroneous. The reservation could have been
extinguished only by the absence of reservees at the time of Mrs.
Legarda's death. Since at the time of her death, there were (and
still are) reservees belonging to the second and third degrees, the
disputed properties did not lose their reservable character. The
disposition of the said properties should be made in accordance
with article 891 or the rule on reserva troncal and not in
accordance with the reservor's holographic will. The said properties
did not form part of Mrs. Legarda's estate. (Cane vs. Director of
Lands, 105 Phil. l, 4).
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. lt
is hereby adjudged that the properties inherited by Filomena Roces
Vda. de Legarda from her daughter Filomena Legarda, with all the
fruits and accessions thereof, are reservable properties which
belong to Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa, Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all
surnamed Legarda y Roces, as reservees. The shares of Rosario L.
Valdes and Benito F. Legarda, who died in 1969 and 1973,
respectively, should pertain to their respective heirs. Costs against
the private respondents.
 12

3. G.R. No. L-19003 December 13, 1922 In the first place, it is evident that the property which Cornelia
Abordo acquired from her mother, Basilia Cabardo, upon the death
ROSA CABARDO, assisted by her husband Apolinario of the latter in 1899, became impressed with the character of
Zalameda, plaintiff-appellee, reservable property in the hands of Lorenzo Abordo when he
vs. succeeded to those properties by inheritance from his daughter
FRANCISCO VILLANUEVA, individually, and in his capacity as Cornelia; and the circumstance that said property originally
administrator of the estate of Lorenzo Abordo, pertained to the conjugal partnership composed of Basilia Cabardo
deceased, defendant-appellant. and Lorenzo Abordo is immaterial. It is sufficient that Cornelia
acquired it by inheritance from her mother, there being no
O'Donovan, Muller and Tanner for appellant. difference in this respect between property owned by the ancestor
Recto, Casal and Ozaeta for appellee. as member of conjugal partnership and property owned by such
ancestor in separate right.lawphil.net

In the second place, it is no less evident that the property acquired

by Cornelia Abordo from her grandmother, Isabela Macaraya, upon
the death of the latter in 1912 — whether by testate or intestate
STREET, J.:
succession is immaterial — also pertains to the reservable estate,
notwithstanding the fact that a division of Isabel Macaraya's estate
This action was instituted on September 3, 1921, in the Court of
was effected by a partition deed executed by the persons in
First Instance of the Province of Laguna, by Rosa Cabardo (with
interest. It is sufficient that the property descended to Cornelia
whom is joined her husband, Apolinario Zalameda) to establish her
Abordo from her grandmother by gratuitous title ( por titulo
right as reservee, under article 811 of the Civil Code, to certain
lucrativo), the meaning of which expression is explained by the
property of considerable value, chiefly real property, now in the
commentator Manresa as follows:
possession of the defendant, Francisco Villanueva, executor of the
estate of Lorenzo Abordo, deceased. The trial judge having
The transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when
determined the case favorably to the plaintiff, the defendant
the recipient does not give anything in return. It matters
appealed.
not whether the property transmitted be or be not subject
to any prior charges; what is essential is that the
It appears that the last owner of the property in question who held
transmission be made gratuitously, or by an act of mere
by descent was one Cornelia Abordo, resident of Pagsanjan, in the
liberality of the person making it, without imposing any
Province of Laguna, who died on October 30, 1918, intestate and
obligation on the part of the recipient; and that the person
without issue. Her mother, Basilia Cabardo, died as far back as in
receiving the property transmitted deliver, give or do
February, of the year 1899; and as Cornelia left no brothers or
nothing in return.
sister, the nearest living person qualified to take by inheritance
from her was her own father, Lorenzo Abordo, who accordingly
The typical gratuitous titles, to which all imaginable sorts
succeeded to all of Cornelia's property.
are reducible, are donation and testate and intestate
succession, which are specified as such in article 968.
The estate possessed by Cornelia at the time of her death, and
which thus passed to her father, Lorenzo Abordo, was derived by
In a case where the questions raised were as to the rights of a
inheritance from two sources, that is, in part from her mother
minor to the inheritance of his grandmother, and which questions
Basilia Cabardo, and in part from Isabel Macaraya, the mother of
were settled by a compromise, in a decision rendered November 8,
Basilia Cabardo (and therefore grandmother of Cornelia), who died
1894, the Supreme Court held that it was not the document of
in November, 1912. Lorenzo Abordo, the father, having thus
compromise that determined the character of the title by virtue of
succeeded to the property aforesaid by inheritance from his
which the minor got the amounts awarded to him, but the thing
daughter, himself died in December, 1920. The present claimant
which was the subject-matter of the compromise, namely the
and plaintiff in this case, Rosa Cabardo, was a sister to Basilia
hereditary rights, which import a gratuitous title, and that,
Cabardo in life, and therefore aunt to Cornelia Abordo. Rosa
therefore, when said minor inherited the property from his father,
Cabardo had no brothers or sisters living at the time of the death of
he was under obligation to reserve such as was included in the
Cornelia Abordo, though formerly there were two, namely, Juan
document, in favor of the relatives of the line whence it came. (6
Cabardo and Guadalupe Cabardo, both of whom left children who
Manresa, 285, 3d ed.)
are still alive.

The third point drawn in question by the attorneys for the

Upon the facts above stated, it is evident that the properties in
appellant is whether the plaintiff is within the third degree
question were, upon the decease of Cornelia Abordo, impressed
belonging to the line from which the property was derived; and in
with the reservable character in the hands of Lorenzo Abordo, and
this connection it is suggested that Lorenzo Abordo should be
that upon his death the plaintiff was entitled to succeed thereto,
treated as the propositus or person from whom the degrees are to
she being the only living person within the limits of the third degree
be reckoned, with the consequence that the plaintiff would be in
belonging to the line from which the property came. The case
the fourth degree reckoning through Cornelia Abordo, Basilia
therefore falls precisely under article 811 of the Civil Code, and the
Cabardo, and Isabel Macaraya, successively, to the plaintiff.
trial judge committed no error in applying that article to the case.

This contention is in our opinion likewise untenable, as the person

The appellant's attorney in a lengthy brief have drawn in question
from whom the degrees should here be reckoned is clearly Cornelia
several points which, in the light of former decisions of this court
Abordo herself, since she was at the end of the line from which the
and of the supreme court of Spain, are clearly settled; and a few
properly came and the person upon whom the property last
words of passing comment will suffice to dispose of these
devolved by descent. Lorenzo Abordo was a stranger to that line
contentions.
and not related by blood to those for whom the property is
reserved. That the degrees are to be thus reckoned is understood
by Manresa; and our own decisions, as well as those of the
 13

supreme court of Spain, are accordant. (Manresa, Civ. Code, 3d ed.,

vol. 6, p. 252; Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil., 480.)

Still another point urged against the appealed judgment is the error
supposed to have been committed by the trial court in permitting
this reivindicatory action to be maintained against the defendant
Francisco Villanueva in his capacity as administrator; and it is
insisted that an executor or administrator is not subject to be sued
with respect to the property which pertains to the estate in his
possession. The reply to this is, that, supposing the property in
question to be of a reservable character, all interest on the part of
Lorenzo Abordo and his heirs therein terminated with his death.
Said property therefore does not pertain to his estate at all, and his
administrator is wrongfully withholding possession from the
plaintiff. In this connection the last clause of section 699 of the
Code of Civil Procedure is pertinent, where it is expressly declared
that actions to recover the seisin and possession of real estate and
personal chattels claimed by the estate may be maintained against
the executor or administrator. In other words, the property here in
question is not, property speaking, a part of the estate in
administration at all.

Various other considerations impugning the appealed judgment are

adduced in the appellant's brief, but apparently they are not such
as to require refutation at our hands.

Upon one additional point only will a few words be added, namely,
with reference to the action of the trial judge in reserving to the
plaintiff the future right to require the defendant to account for the
rents and profits of the property during the time the same has
been in his charge. As to this we note that the petitory part of the
complaint contains no prayer either for an award of damages or for
an accounting for rents and profits. It follows that the right to
recover damages, or rents and profits, was never legitimately in
issue in this action; and it was undoubtedly an act of
supererogation on the part of his Honor to reserve to the plaintiff
the right to require an accounting for rents and profits in another
action. Whether such an accounting can be had is a question that
must be determined by the proper tribunal when occasion arises,
and no pronouncement thereon is here necessary except to say
that, so far as concerns the appealed judgment, the reservation
therein contained is mere surplusage.

With this explanation the judgment is affirmed; and it is so ordered

with costs against the appellant.
 14

4. G.R. No. L-12957 March 24, 1961 records of Ayuquitan, the properties left by Saturnino upon his
death — the date of which does not clearly appear of record —
CONSTANCIO SIENES, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, were left to his children as follows: Lot 3366 to Cipriana, Lot 3367
vs. to Fernando, Lot 3375 to Agaton, Lot 3377 (southern portion) to
FIDEL ESPARCIA, ET AL., defendants-appellees. Paulina, and Lot 3368 (western portion) to Francisco. As a result of
the cadastral proceedings, Original Certificate of Title No. 10275
Proceso R. Remollo for plaintiffs-appellants. covering Lot 3368 was issued in the name of Francisco. Because
Leonardo D. Mancao for defendants-appellees. Francisco was a minor at the time, his mother administered the
property for him, declared it in her name for taxation purposes
(Exhs A & A-1), and paid the taxes due thereon (Exhs. B, C, C-1 & C-
DIZON, J.:
2). When Francisco died on May 29, 1932 at the age of 20, single
and without any descendant, his mother, as his sole heir, executed
Appellants commenced this action below to secure judgment (1)
the public instrument Exhibit F entitled EXTRAJUDICIAL
declaring null and void the sale executed by Paulina and Cipriana
SETTLEMENT AND SALE whereby, among other things, for and in
Yaeso in favor of appellees, the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina
consideration of the sum of P800.00 she sold the property in
Sienes; (2) ordering the Esparcia spouses to reconvey to appellants
question to appellants. When thereafter said vendees demanded
Lot 3368 of the Cadastral Survey of Ayuquitan (now Amlan),
from Paulina Yaeso and her husband Jose Esparcia, the surrender
Oriental Negros; and (3) ordering all the appellees to pay, jointly
of Original Certificate of Title No. 10275 — which was in their
and severally, to appellants the sum of P500.00 as damages, plus
possession — the latter refused, thus giving rise to the filing of the
the costs of suit. In their answer appellees disclaimed any
corresponding motion in the cadastral record No. 507. The same,
knowledge or information regarding the sale allegedly made on
however, was denied (Exhs. 8 & 9).
April 20, 1951 by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellants and alleged
that, if such sale was made, the same was void on the ground that
Thereafter, or more specifically, on July 30, 1951, Cipriana and
Andrea Gutang had no right to dispose of the property subject
Paulina Yaeso, the surviving half-sisters of Francisco, and who as
matter thereof. They further alleged that said property had never
such had declared the property in their name, on January 1, 1951
been in possession of appellants, the truth being that appellees, as
executed a deed of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and
owners, had been in continuous possession thereof since the death
Paulina Sienes (Exh. 2) who, in turn, declared it in their name for
of Francisco Yaeso. By way of affirmative defense and
tax purposes and thereafter secured the issuance in their name of
counterclaim, they further alleged that on July 30, 1951, Paulina
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2141 (Exhs. 5 & 5-A).
and Cipriana Yaeso, as the only surviving heirs of Francisco Yaeso,
executed a public instrument of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel
Esparcia and Paulina Sienes, the said sale having been registered As held by the trial court, it is clear upon the facts already stated,
together with an affidavit of adjudication executed by Paulina and that the land in question was reservable property. Francisco Yaeso
Cipriana on July 18, 1951, as sole surviving heirs of the aforesaid inherited it by operation of law from his father Saturnino, and upon
deceased; that since then the Esparcias had been in possession of Francisco's death, unmarried and without descendants, it was
the property as owners. inherited, in turn, by his mother, Andrea Gutang. The latter was,
therefore, under obligation to reserve it for the benefit of relatives
within the third degree belonging to the line from which said
After trial upon the issues thus joined, the lower court rendered
property came, if any survived her. The record discloses in this
judgment as follows:
connection that Andrea Gutang died on December 13, 1951, the
lone reservee surviving her being Cipriana Yaeso who died only on
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby
January 13, 1952 (Exh. 10).
rendered declaring (1) that the sale of Lot No. 3368 made
by Andrea Gutang to the plaintiff spouses Constancio
In connection with reservable property, the weight of opinion is
Sienes and Genoveva Silay is void, and the reconveyance
that the reserve creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the
prayed for by them is denied; (2) that the sale made by
death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at
Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of defendants Fidel
the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging
Esparcia and Paulina Sienes involving the same lot is also
to the line from which the property came (6 Manresa 268-269; 6
void, and they have no valid title thereto; and (3) that the
Sanchez Roman 1934). This Court has held in connection with this
reservable property in question is part of and must be
matter that the reservista has the legal title and dominion to the
reverted to the estate of Cipriana Yaeso, the lone surviving
reservable property but subject to a resolutory condition; that he is
relative and heir of Francisco Yaeso at the death of Andrea
like a life usufructuary of the reservable property; that he may
Gutang as of December 13, 1951. No pronouncement as to
alienate the same but subject to reservation, said alienation
the costs.
transmitting only the revocable and conditional ownership of the
reservists, the rights acquired by the transferee being revoked or
From the above decision the Sienes spouse interposed the present
resolved by the survival of reservatarios at the time of the death of
appeal, their principal contentions being, firstly, that the lower
the reservista (Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega,
court erred in holding that Lot 3368 of the Cadastral Survey of
46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; and Director of
Ayuquitan was a reservable property; secondly, in annulling the
Lands vs. Aguas, 65 Phil. 279).
sale of said lot executed by Andrea Gutang in their favor; and lastly,
in holding that Cipriana Yaeso, as reservee, was entitled to inherit
The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was,
said land.
therefore, subject to the condition that the vendees would
definitely acquire ownership, by virtue of the alienation, only if the
There is no dispute as to the following facts:
vendor died without being survived by any person entitled to the
reservable property. Inasmuch much as when Andrea Gutang died,
Lot 3368 originally belonged to Saturnino Yaeso. With his first wife, Cipriana Yaeso was still alive, the conclusion becomes inescapable
Teresa Ruales, he had four children named Agaton, Fernando, that the previous sale made by the former in favor of appellants
Paulina and Cipriana, while with his second wife, Andrea Gutang, became of no legal effect and the reservable property subject
he had an only son named Francisco. According to the cadastral matter thereof passed in exclusive ownership to Cipriana.
 15

On the other hand, it is also clear that the sale executed by the
sisters Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of the spouses Fidel
Esparcia and Paulina Sienes was subject to a similar resolutory
condition. The reserve instituted by law in favor of the heirs within
the third degree belonging to the line from which the reservable
property came, constitutes a real right which the reservee may
alienate and dispose of, albeit conditionally, the condition being
that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if
and when the reservee survives the person obliged to reserve. In
the present case, Cipriana Yaeso, one of the reservees, was still
alive when Andrea Gutang, the person obliged to reserve, died.
Thus the former became the absolute owner of the reservable
property upon Andrea's death. While it may be true that the sale
made by her and her sister prior to this event, became effective
because of the occurrence of the resolutory condition, we are not
now in a position to reverse the appealed decision, in so far as it
orders the reversion of the property in question to the Estate of
Cipriana Yaeso, because the vendees — the Esparcia spouses did —
not appeal therefrom.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision — as above modified — is

affirmed, with costs, and without prejudice to whatever action in
equity the Esparcia spouses may have against the Estate of Cipriana
Yaeso for the reconveyance of the property in question.

5. DIONISIA PADURA, ET AL. , PETITIONERS-APPELLEES,
VERSUS MELANIA BALDOVINO, ET AL., OPPOSITORS-
APPELLANTS
DECISION
27 DEC 1958 | JURISPRUDENCE
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal on a pure question of law from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna in its Special Proceedings No. 4551.
The facts are simple and undisputed. Agustin Padura contracted
two marriages during his lifetime. With his first wife, Gervacia
Landig, he had one child whom they named Manuel Padura, and
with his second, Benita Garing; he had two children named
Fortunato Padura and Candelaria Padura.
Agustin Padura died on April 26, 1908, leaving a last will and
testament, duly probated in Special Proceedings No, 664 of the
Court of First Instance of Laguna, wherein he bequeathed his
properties among his children, Manuel, Candelaria and Fortunato,
and his surviving spouse, Benita Garing. Under the probate
proceedings, Fortunate was adjudicated four parcels of land
covered under Decree No. 25960 issued In Land Registration Case
No. 86 G. L. R. O. No. 10818, object of this appeal.
Fortunato Padura died unmarried on May 28, 1908, without having
executed a will; and not having any issue, the said parcels of land
were inherited exclusively by her mother, Benita Garing. She
applied for and later was issued a Torrens Certificate of Title in her
name, but subject to the condition that the properties were
reservable in favor of relatives within the third degree belonging to
the line from which said property came, in accordance with the
applicable provision of law, under a decree of the court dated
August 25, 1916, in Land Registration Case No. G. L. R. O. No.
10818.
On August 26, 1934, Candelaria Padura died leaving as her only
heirs, her four legitimate children, the appellants herein, Cristeta,
Melania, Anicia and Pablo, all surnamed Baldovino, Six years later,
on October 6, 1940, Manuel Padura also died. Surviving him are his
legitimate children, Dionisia, Felisa, Flora, Gornelio, Francisco,
Juana, and Severino, all surnamed Padura, the appellees herein.
Upon the death of Benita Garing (the reservista), on October 15,
1952, appellants and appellees took possession of the reservable
properties. In a resolution, dated August 1, 1953, of the Court of
First Instance of Laguna in Special Proceedings No. 4551, the
legitimate children of the deceased Manuel Padura and Candelaria
Baldovino were declared to be the rightful reservees, and as such,
entitled to the reservable properties (the original reserveess
Candelaria Padura and Manuel Padura, having predeceased
the reservista). The instant petition, dated October 22, 1956, filed
by appellants Baldovino seeks to have these properties partitioned,
such that one-half of the same be adjudicated to them, and the
other half to the appellees, allegedly on the basis that they inherit
by right of representation from their respective parents, the
original reservees. To this petition, appellees filed their opposition,
maintaining that they should all (the eleven reservees) be deemed
as inheriting in their own right, under which, they claim, each
should have an equal share.
Based on the foregoing finding of facts, the lower court rendered
judgment declaring all the reservees (without distinction) “co-
16
owners, pro-indiviso, equal shares of the parcels of land” subject
matter of the suit.
The issue in this appeal may be formulated as follows: In a case of
reserva troncal, where the only reservatarios (reservees) surviving
the reservista, and belonging to the line of origin, are nephews of
the descendant (prepositus), but some are nephews of the half
blood and the others are nephews of the whole blood, should the
reserved properties be apportioned among them equally, or should
the nephews of the whole blood take a share twice as large as that
of the nephews of the half blood?
The appellants contend that notwithstanding the reservable
character of the property under Art, 891 of the new Civil Code (Art.
811 of the Code of 1889) the reservatarios nephews of the whole
blood are entitled to a share twice as large as that of the others, in
conformity with Arts, 1006, 1008 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
(Arts. 949 and 951 of the Code of 1889) on intestate succession.
“Art. 1006. Should brothers and sisters of the full blood survive
together with brothers and sisters of the half blood, the former
shall be entitled to a share double that of the latter.(949)n
“Art. 1008. Children of brothers and sisters of the half blood shall
succeed per capita or per stripes, in accordance with the rules laid
down for brothers and sisters of the full blood, (951)”
The case is one of first impression and has divided the Spanish
commentators on the subject. After mature reflection, we have
concluded that the position of the appellants is correct.
The reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the
return of the reservable property to the third degree relatives
belonging to the line from which the property originally came, and
avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting
ascendant (reservista). To this end, the Code provides:
“Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title
from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve
such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the
benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who
belong to the line from which said property came. (811)”
It is well known that the reserva troncal had no direct precedent in
the law of Castile. The President of the Spanish Code Commission,
D. Manuel Alonso Martinez, explained the motives for the
formulation of the reserva troncal in the Civil Code of 1889 in his
book “El Codigo Civil en sus relaciones con las Legislaciones
Forales” (Madrid, 1884, Vol. 1, pp. 226-228, 233-235) in the
following words:
“La base cuarta, á más de estar en pugna con la legislacion
española, es una desviacion del antiguo derecho romano y del
moderno derecho europeo, perfectamente conformes ambos con
el tradicional sistema de Castilla. En qué se fundó, pues, la
Comision para semejante novedad? Que razones pudieron moverla
á establecer la sucesion lineal, separándose del cáuce secular?
“Lo diré en breves frases. Hay un case, no del todo raro, que
subleva el sentimiento de cuantos lo imaginan ó lo ven: el hijo
mayor de un magnate sucede á su padre en la mitad Integra de
pingues mayorazgos, tocando á sus hermanos un lote modestisimo
en la division de la herencia paterna; aquel hijo se casa y fallece al
poco tiempo dejando un tierno vástago; la viuda, todavia jóven,

contrae segundas bodas y tiene la desdicha de perder al hijo del
primer matrimonio heredando toda su fortuna con exclusion de la
madre y los hermanos de su primer marido. No hay para qué decir
que, si hay descendientes del segundo matrimonio, á ellos se
trasmite en su dia la hereticia. Por donde resulta el irritante
espectáculo de que los vástagos directos del magnate viven en la
estrechez y tal vez en la miseria, mientras gozan de su rico
patrimonio personas extrañas á su familia y que, por un órden
natural, la son profundamente antipáticas. Esta hipótesis se puede
realizar y se realize, aunque por lo general en menor escala, entre
propietarios, banqueros é industriales. labradores y comerciantes,
sin necesidad de vinculaciones ni titulos nobiliarios.
“Pues bien, la mayoria de la Comision se preocupó vivamente de
esto, considerando el principio de familia como superior al del
afecto presumible del difunto. A esta impresion obedecia la
propuesta del Sr. Garcia Goyena, para que á los ascendientes se les
diera su legitima tan sólo en usufructo: en idéntica razon se
apoyaba el Sr. Franco para pedir con insistencia se declarase que, si
un ascendiente tenia hecha una donacion á su descendiente, bien
fuese al contraer matrinionio ó bien con cualquiera otro motivo, y
muriese el donatario sin sucesion, volvieran los bienes donados al
donante, sin perjuicio de la legitima que pudiera corresponderle en
su calidad de ascendiente. La Comision no se atrevió a ir tan allá
como estos dos Sres. Vocales; pero, para eludir las consecuencias
que á las veces produce el principio de la proximidad del
parentesco y que he puesto de relieve poco há, proclamó, no sin
vacilar, la doctrina de la sucesion lineal.” (pp.226-227)
“Y este fué el temperamento que, por indicacion mia, adoptó la
Comision Codificadora, norabrando una Sub-comision que
redactara las bases é que habia de sujetarse esta especie de
reversion de los bienes inmuebles al tronco de donde procedan, lo
mismo en la sucesion testamentaria que en la intestada, sin
perjuicio del derecho sacratisimo de los padres al disfrute de la
herencia de sus hijos malogrados prematuramente.
“Dicha Subcomision, compuesta de los Sres. Durán y Bás y Franco
como defensores del régimen f oral, y de los Sres. Manresa y Garcia
Goyena en representacion de la legislacion castellana, sometieron á
la deliberacion de la Comision Codificadora la proposicion
siguiente:
‘El ascendiente que heredare de su descendiente bienes que este
hubiese adquirido por titulo lucrativo de_ otro ascendiente ó de un
hermano, se halla obligado á reservar los que hubiese adquirido
por ministerio de la ley en favor de los parientes del difunto que se
hallaran comprendidos dentro del tercer grado y que lo sean por la
parte de donde proceden los bienes.’
“No voy á discutir ahora si esta fórmula es más ó ménos feliz, y si
debe aprobarse tal cual está redactada ó si há menester de
enmienda ó adicion. Aplazo este examen para cuando trate de la
sucesion intestada, á la cual tiene mayor aplicacion. Por el
momento me limito á reconocer. primero: que con esta base
desaparece el peligro de que bienes poseidos secularmente por
una familia pasen bruscamente y á titulo gratuito á manos extrañas
por el azar de los enlaces y de muertes prematuras; segundo: que
sin negar que sea una novedad esta base del derecho de Castllla,
tiene en rigor en su abono la autoridad de los Códigos más
niveladores y el ejemplo de las naciones más democráticas de
Europe, si no en la extension en que lo presenta la Comision
Codificadora, á lo ménos en el principio generador de la reforma.”
(pp.233-235)
17
The stated purpose o£ the reserva is accomplished once property
has devolved to the specified relatives of the line of origin. But
from this time on, there is no further occasion for its application. In
the relations between one reservatario and another of the same
degree, there is no call for applying Art. 891 any longer; wherefore,
the respective share of each in the reversionary property should be
governed by the ordinary rules of intestate succession. In this spirit
the jurisprudence of this Court and that of Spain has resolved that
upon the death of the ascendant reservista, the reservable
property should pass, not to all the reservatorios as a class, but
only to those nearest in degree to the descendant (prepositus) ,
excluding those reservatarios of more remote degree (Florentine
vs. Florentine, 40 Phil. 489-490; T. S. 8 Nov. 1894; Dir. Gen. de los
Registros, Resol. 20 March 1905). And within the third degree of
relationship from the descendant (prepositus), the right of
representation operates in favor of nephews (Florentino vs.
Florentino, supra).
“Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession,
when there are re1atives of the descendant within the third
degree, the right of the nearest relative, called reservatario, over
the property which the reservista (person holding it subject to
reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more
remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when the
one claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is
not among the relatives within the third degree belonging to the
line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted
by the Civil Code in Article 811 is in the highest degree personal and
for the exclusive benefit of designated persons who are within the
third degree of the person from whom the reservable property
came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding
degrees can never be considered as reservatarios, since the law
does not recognize them as such.
In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation
on the part of one alleging his right as reservatario who is not
within the third degree of relationship, nevertheless there is right
of representation on the part of reservatarios who are within the
third degree mentioned by law, as in the case of nephews of the
deceased person from whom the reservable property came. x x x.”
(Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, 489-490) (Emphasis
supplied) (see also Nieva and Alacala vs. Alcala and de Ocampo, 41
Phil. 915)
Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles
of ordinary intestate succession; so is the rule that whole blood
brothers and nephews are entitled to a share double that of
brothers and nephews of half-blood. If in determining the rights of
the reservatarios inter se, proximity of degree and the right of
representation of nephews are made to apply, the rule of double
share for immediate collaterals of the whole blood should be
likewise operative.
In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of
relatives (reservatarios) to whom the property should be returned;
but within that group, the individual right to the property should be
decided by the applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession,
since Art. 891 does not specify otherwise. This conclusion is
strengthened by the circumstance that the reserva being an
exceptional case, its application should be limited to what is strictly
needed to accomplish the purpose of the law. As expressed by
Manresa in his Commentaries (Vol. 6, 6th Ed., p. 250):
“creándose un verdadero estado excepcipnal del derecho, no debe
ampliarse, sino más bien restringirse, el alcance del precepto,
manteniendo la excepción mientras fuere necesaria y estuviese
 18

realmente contenida en la disposicion, y aplicando las reglas All told, our considered opinion is that reason and policy favor
generales y fundamentals del Código en materia de sucesión, en keeping to a minimum the alterations introduced by the reserva in
aquellos extremos no resueltos de un raodo expreso, y que quedan the basic rules of succession mortis causa.
fuera de la propia esfera de accián de la reserva que se crea.”
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of November 5, 1956 is reversed
The restrictive interpretation is the more imperative in view of the and set aside, and the reservatarios who are nephews of the whole
new Civil Code’s hostility to successional reservas and reversions, blood are declared entitled to a share twice as large as that of the
as exemplified by the suppression of the reserve viudal and nephews of the half-blood. Let the records be remanded to the
the reversion legal of the Code of 1889 (Arts. 812 and 968-980). court below for further proceedings in accordance with this
decision.
There is a third point that deserves consideration. Even during
the reservista’slifetime, the reservatarios, who are the ultimate
acquirers of the property, can already assert the right to prevent
the reservista from doing anything that might frustrate their
reversionary right: and for this purpose they can compel the
annotation of their right in the Registry of Property even while the
reservista is alive (Ley Hipotecaria de Ultramar, Arts. 168, 199;
Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295). This right is incompatible with the
mere expectancy that corresponds to the natural heirs of
the reservista. It is likewise clear that the reservable property is no
part of the estate of the reservista, who may not dispose of them
by will, so long as there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs.
Gerona, 58 Phil. 237). The latter, therefore, do not inherit from
the reservist, but from the descendant prepositus, of whom
the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject to the
condition that they must survive the reservista. (Sanchez Roman,
Vol. VI, Torao 2, p. 286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed.,
pp. 274, 310) Had the nephews of whole and half-blood succeeded
the prepositus directly, those of full-blood would undoubtedly
receive a double share compared to those of the half-blood (Arts.
1008 and 1006, jam cit.) Why then should the latter receive equal
shares simply because the transmission of the property was
delayed by the interregnum of the reserva? The decedent
(causante) the heirs and their relationship being the same, there is
no cogent reason why the hereditary portions should vary.

It should be stated, in justice to the trial court, that its opinion is

supported by distinguished commentators of the Civil Code of
1889, among them Sanchez Román (Estudios, Vol. 65 Tomo 2, p.
1008) and Mucius Scaevola (Código Civil, Vol 14, p. 342). The
reason given by these authors is that the reservatarios are called by
law to take the reservable property because they belong to the line
of origin; and not because of their relationship. But the argument,
if logically pursued, would lead to the conclusion that the property
should pass to any and all the reservatarios, as a class, and in equal
shares, regardless of lines and degrees. In truth, such is the thesis
of Scaevola, that later became known as the theory of reserva
integral (14 Scaevola, Cod. Civ. p. 332 et seq.). But, as we have
seen, the Supreme Courts of Spain and of the Philippines have
rejected that view, and consider that the reservable property
should be succeeded by the reservatario who is nearest in degree,
according to the basic rules of intestacy. The refutation of the trial
court’s position is found in the following, passage of Manresa’s
Commentaries (Vol. 6, 7th Ed., p. 346):

“A esto se objeta que el derecho consignado en el articulo 811 es

un derecho propio que nace de la mera calidad de pariente; no un
derecho que se adquiere por sucesión. Ciertamente, el derecho se
concede a los parientes lineales dentro del tercer grado; pero se les
concede con motivo de la muerte de un descendiente y en la
sucesión de este. Ellos suceden por la procedencia especial de los
bienes después de ser éstos disfrutados por el ascendiente; pero
suceden a titulo lucrativo y por causa de muerte y ministerio de la
ley, lo cual es dificil poderlo negar. Hasta podrlan estimarse esos
parientes legitimarios o herederos forzosos, como el mismo autor
reconoce en otro lugar de su obra. De modo que este argumento
no es convincente.”

6. G.R. No. L-14856 November 15, 1919
ENCARNACION FLORENTINO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MERCEDES FLORENTINO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Ramon Querubin, Simeon Ramos and Orense and Vera for
appellants.
Vicente Foz, Jose Singsong Tongson and Angel Encarnacion for
appellees.
TORRES, J.:
On January 17, 1918, counsel for Encarnacion (together with her
husband Simeon Serrano), Gabriel, Magdalena, Ramon, Miguel,
Victorino, and Antonino of the surname Florentino; for Miguel
Florentino, guardian ad litem of the minor Rosario Florentino; for
Eugenio Singson, the father and guardian ad litem of Emilia, Jesus,
Lourdes, Caridad, and Dolores of the surname Singson y Florentino;
and for Eugenio Singson, guardian of the minors Jose and Asuncion
Florentino, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Sur, against Mercedes Florentino and her husband, alleging as
follows:
That Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II married the first time Antonia
Faz de Leon; that during the marriage he begot nine children called,
Jose, Juan, Maria, Encarnacion, Isabel, Espirita, Gabriel, Pedro, and
Magdalena of the surname Florentino y de Leon; that on becoming
a widower he married the second time Severina Faz de Leon with
whom he had two children, Mercedes and Apolonio III of the
surname Florentino y de Leon; that Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II
died on February 13, 1890; that he was survived by his second wife
Severina Faz de Leon and the ten children first above mentioned;
that his eleventh son, Apolonio III, was born on the following 4th of
March 1890.
That of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo's aforementioned eleven
children, Juan, Maria and Isabel died single, without leaving any
ascendants or descendants; that Ramon, Miguel, Victorino,
Antonio, and Rosario are the legitimate children of the deceased
Jose Florentino who was one of the children of the deceased
Apolonio Isabelo; that Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad, and Dolores
are the legitimate children of Espirita Florentino, now deceased,
and her husband Eugenio Singson; that Jose and Asuncion are the
children of Pedro Florentino, another son of the deceased Apolonio
Isabelo Florentino.
That on January 17 and February 13, 1890, Apolonio Isabelo
Florentino executed a will before the notary public of Ilocos Sur,
instituting as his universal heirs his aforementioned ten children,
the posthumos Apolonio III and his widow Severina Faz de Leon;
that he declared, in one of the paragraphs of said will, all his
property should be divided among all of his children of both
marriages.
That, in the partition of the said testator's estate, there was given
to Apolonio Florentino III, his posthumos son, the property marked
with the letters A, B, C, D, E, and F in the complaint, a gold rosary,
pieces of gold, of silver and of table service, livestock, palay, some
personal property and other objects mentioned in the complaint.
That Apolonio Florentino III, the posthumos son of the second
marriage, died in 1891; that his mother, Severina Faz de Leon,
succeeded to all his property described in the complaint; that the
widow, Severina Faz de Leon died on November 18, 1908, leaving a
will instituting as her universal heiress her only living daughter,
19
Mercedes Florentino; that, as such heir, said daughter took
possession of all the property left at the death of her mother,
Severina Faz de Leon; that among same is included the property,
described in the complaint, which the said Severina Faz de Leon
inherited from her deceased son, the posthumos Apolonio, as
reservable property; that, as a reservist, the heir of the said
Mercedes Florentino deceased had been gathering for herself
alone the fruits of lands described in the complaint; that each and
every one of the parties mentioned in said complaint is entitled to
one-seventh of the fruits of the reservable property described
therein, either by direct participation or by representation, in the
manner mentioned in paragraph 9 of the complaint.
That several times the plaintiffs have, in an amicable manner, asked
the defendants to deliver their corresponding part of the
reservable property; that without any justifiable motive the
defendants have refused and do refuse to deliver said property or
to pay for its value; that for nine years Mercedes Florentino has
been receiving, as rent for the lands mentioned, 360 bundles of
palay at fifty pesos per bundle and 90 bundles of corn at four pesos
per bundle; that thereby the plaintiffs have suffered damages in
the sum of fifteen thousand four hundred and twenty-eight pesos
and fifty-eight centavos, in addition to three hundred and eight
pesos and fifty-eight centavos for the value of the fruits not
gathered, of one thousand pesos (P1,000) for the unjustifiable
retention of the aforementioned reservable property and for the
expenses of this suit. Wherefore they pray it be declared that all
the foregoing property is reservable property; that the plaintiffs
had and do have a right to the same, in the quantity and proportion
mentioned in the aforementioned paragraph 9 of the complaint;
that the defendants Mercedes Florentino and her husband be
ordered to deliver to the plaintiffs their share of the property in
question, of the palay and of the corn above mentioned, or their
value; and that they be condemned to pay the plaintiffs the sum of
one thousand pesos (P1,000) together with the costs of this
instance.
To the preceding complaint counsel for the defendants demurred,
alleging that the cause of action is based on the obligation of the
widow Severina Faz de Leon to reserve the property she inherited
from her deceased son Apolonio Florentino y de Leon who, in turn,
inherited same from his father Apolonio Isabelo Florentino; that,
there being no allegation to the contrary, it is to be presumed that
the widow Severina Faz de Leon did not remarry after the death of
this husband nor have any natural child; that the right claimed by
the plaintiffs is not that mentioned in article 968 and the following
articles, but that established in article 811 of the Civil Code; that
the object of the provisions of the aforementioned articles is to
avoid the transfer of said reservable property to those extraneous
to the family of the owner thereof; that if the property inherited by
the widow Severina Faz de Leon from her deceased son Apolonio
Florentino y Faz de Leon (property which originated from his father
and her husband) has all passed into the hands of the defendant,
Mercedes Florentino y Encarnacion, a daughter of the common
ancestor's second marriage (said Apolonio Isabelo Florentino with
the deceased Severina Faz de Leon) it is evident that the property
left at the death of the posthumos son Apolonio Florentino y Faz de
Leon did not pass after the death of his mother Severina, his
legitimate heirs as an ascendant, into the hands of strangers; that
said property having been inherited by Mercedes Florentino y
Encarnacion from her mother (Severina), article 811 of the Civil
Code is absolutely inapplicable to the present case because, when
the defendant Mercedes, by operation law, entered into and
succeeded to, the possession, of the property lawfully inherited
from her mother Severina Faz de Leon, said property had, while in
the possession of her mother, lost the character of reservable
property — there being a legitimate daughter of Severina Faz de
Leon with the right to succeed her in all her rights, property and

actions; that the restraints of the law whereby said property may
not passed into the possession of strangers are void, inasmuch as
the said widow had no obligation to reserve same, as Mercedes
Florentino is a forced heiress of her mother Severina Faz de Leon;
that, in the present case, there is no property reserved for the
plaintiffs since there is a forced heiress, entitled to the property left
by the death of the widow Severina Faz de Leon who never
remarried; that the obligation to reserve is secondary to the duty of
respecting the legitime; that in the instant case, the widow
Severina Faz de Leon was in duty bound to respect the legitime of
her daughter Mercedes the defendant; that her obligation to
reserve the property could not be fulfilled to the prejudice of the
legitime which belongs to her forced heiress, citing in support of
these statements the decision of the supreme court of Spain of
January 4, 1911; that, finally, the application of article 811 of the
Civil Code in favor of the plaintiffs would presuppose the exclusion
of the defendant from here right to succeed exclusively to all the
property, rights and actions left by her legitimate mother, although
the said defendant has a better right than the plaintiffs; and that
there would be injustice if the property claimed be adjudicated to
the plaintiffs, as well as violation of section 5 of the Jones Law
which invalidates any law depriving any person of an equal
protection. Wherefore they prayed that the demurrer be sustained,
with costs against the plaintiffs.
After the hearing of the demurrer, on August 22, 1918, the judge
absolved the defendants from the complaint and condemned the
plaintiffs to pay the costs.
Counsel for the plaintiffs excepted to this order, moved to vacate it
and to grant them a new trial; said motion was overruled; the
plaintiffs expected thereto and filed the corresponding bill of
exceptions which was allowed, certified and forwarded to the clerk
of this court.
On appeal the trial judge sustained the demurrer of the defendants
to the complaint of the plaintiffs, but, instead of ordering the latter
to amend their complaint within the period prescribed by the rules
— undoubtedly believing that the plaintiffs could not alter nor
change the facts constituting the cause of action, and that, as both
parties were agreed as to the facts alleged in the complaint as well
as in the demurrer, every question reduced itself to one of the law,
already submitted to the decision of the court — the said judge,
disregarding the ordinary procedure established by law, decided
the case by absolving the defendants from the complaint and by
condemning the plaintiffs to pay the costs of the instance.
There certainly was no real trial, inasmuch as the defendants,
instead of answering the complaint of the plaintiffs, confined
themselves to filing a demurrer based on the ground that the facts
alleged in the complaint do not constitute a cause of action.
However, the judge preferred to absolve the defendants, thereby
making an end to the cause, instead of dismissing the same,
because undoubtedly he believed, in view of the controversy
between the parties, that the arguments adduced to support the
demurrer would be the same which the defendants would allege in
their answer — those dealing with a mere question of law which
the courts would have to decide — and that, the demurrer having
been sustained, if the plaintiffs should insist — they could do no
less — upon alleging the same facts as those set out in their
complaint and if another demurrer were afterwards set up, he
would be obliged to dismiss said complaint with costs against the
plaintiffs — in spite of being undoubtedly convinced in the instant
case that the plaintiffs absolutely lack the right to bring the action
stated in their complaint.
Being of the opinion that the emendation of the indicated defects
is not necessary — as in this case what has been done does not
20
prejudice the parties — the appellate court will now proceed to
decide the suit according to its merits, as found in the record and to
the legal provisions applicable to the question of law in controversy
so that unnecessary delay and greater expense may be avoided,
inasmuch as, even if all the ordinary proceedings be followed, the
suit would be subsequently decided in the manner and terms that
it is now decided in the opinion thoughtfully and conscientiously
formed for its determination.
In order to decide whether the plaintiffs are or are not entitled to
invoke, in their favor, the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code,
and whether the same article is applicable to the question of law
presented in this suit, it is necessary to determine whether the
property enumerated in paragraph 5 of the complaint is of the
nature of reservable property; and if so, whether in accordance
with the provision of the Civil Code in article 811, Severina Faz de
Leon (the widow of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino) who
inherited said property from her son Apolonio Florentino III (born
after the death of his father Apolonio Isabelo) had the obligation to
preserve and reserve same for the relatives, within the third
degree, of her aforementioned deceased son Apolonio III.
The above mentioned article reads:
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
property acquired by the latter gratuitously from some
other ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is obliged to
reserve such of the property as he may have acquired by
operation of law for the benefit of relatives within the
third degree belonging to the line from which such
property came.
During the marriage of Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II and Severina
Faz de Leon two children were born, namely the defendant
Mercedes Florentino and Apolonio Florentino III (born after the
death of his father). At the death of Apolonio Isabelo Florentino
under a will, his eleven children succeeded to the inheritance he
left, one of whom, the posthumos son Apolonio III, was given, as
his share, the aforementioned property enumerated in the
complaint. In 1891 the said posthumos son Apolonio Florentino III
died and was succeeded by his legitimate mother Severina Faz de
Leon, who inherited the property he left and who on dying,
November 18, 1908, instituted by will as her sole heiress her
surviving daughter, Mercedes Florentino, the defendant herein,
who took possession of all property left by her father, same
constituting the inheritance. Included in said inheritance is the
property, specified in by the posthumos son Apolonio Florentino III
from his father Apolonio Isabelo Florentino, and which, at the
death of the said posthumos son, had in turn been inherited by his
mother, Severina Faz de Leon. Even if Severina left in her will said
property, together with her own, to her only daughter and forced
heiress, Mercedes Florentino, nevertheless this property had not
lost its reservable nature inasmuch as it originated from the
common ancestor of the litigants, Apolonio Isabelo; was inherited
by his son Apolonio III; was transmitted by same (by operation of
law) to his legitimate mother and ascendant, Severina Faz de Leon.
The posthumos son, Apolonio Florentino III, acquired the property,
now claimed by his brothers, by a lucrative title or by inheritance
from his aforementioned legitimate father, Apolonio Isabelo
Florentino II. Although said property was inherited by his mother,
Severina Faz de Leon, nevertheless, she was in duty bound,
according to article 811 of the Civil Code, to reserve the property
thus acquired for the benefit of the relatives, within the third
degree, of the line from which such property came.
According to the provisions of law, ascendants do not inherit the
reservable property, but its enjoyment, use or trust, merely for the

reason that said law imposes the obligation to reserve and preserve
same for certain designated persons who, on the death of the said
ascendants reservists, (taking into consideration the nature of the
line from which such property came) acquire the ownership of said
property in fact and by operation of law in the same manner as
forced heirs (because they are also such) — said property reverts to
said line as long as the aforementioned persons who, from the
death of the ascendant-reservists, acquire in fact the right
of reservatarios (person for whom property is reserved), and are
relatives, within the third degree, of the descendant from whom
the reservable property came.
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property,
while there are living, within the third degree, relatives of the
latter, is nothing but a life usufructuary or a fiduciary of the
reservable property received. He is, however, the legitimate owner
of his own property which is not reservable property and which
constitutes his legitime, according to article 809 of the Civil Code.
But if, afterwards, all of the relatives, within the third degree, of
the descendant (from whom came the reservable property) die or
disappear, the said property becomes free property, by operation
of law, and is thereby converted into the legitime of the ascendant
heir who can transmit it at his death to his legitimate successors or
testamentary heirs. This property has now lost its nature of
reservable property, pertaining thereto at the death of the
relatives, called reservatarios, who belonged within the third
degree to the line from which such property came.lawphil.net
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession,
when there are relatives of the descendant within the third degree,
the right of the nearest relative, called reservatario, over the
property which the reservista (person holding it subject to
reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more
remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when the
one claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is
not among the relatives within the third degree belonging to the
line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted
by the Civil Code in article 811 is in the highest degree personal and
for the exclusive benefit of designated persons who are the
relatives, within the third degree, of the person from whom the
reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and
the succeeding degrees can never be considered as reservatarios,
since the law does not recognize them as such.
In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation
on the part of one alleging his right as reservatario who is not
within the third degree of relationship, nevertheless there is right
of representation on the part of reservatarios who are within the
third degree mentioned by law, as in the case of nephews of the
deceased person from whom the reservable property came.
These reservatarios have the right to represent their ascendants
(fathers and mothers) who are the brothers of the said deceased
person and relatives within the third degree in accordance with
article 811 of the Civil Code.
In this case it is conceded without denial by defendants, that the
plaintiffs Encarnacion, Gabriel and Magdalena are the legitimate
children of the first marriage of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo
Florentino II; that Ramon, Miguel, Ceferino, Antonio, and Rosario
are both grandchildren of Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II, and
children of his deceased son, Jose Florentino; that the same have
the right to represent their aforementioned father, Jose Florentino;
that Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad, and Dolores are the legitimate
children of the deceased Espirita Florentino, one of the daughters
of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II, and represent the
right of their aforementioned mother; and that the other plaintiffs,
Jose and Asuncion, have also the right to represent their legitimate
father Pedro Florentino one of the sons of the aforementioned
21
Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II. It is a fact, admitted by both parties,
that the other children of the first marriage of the deceased
Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II died without issue so that this
decision does not deal with them.
There are then seven "reservatarios" who are entitled to the
reservable property left at the death of Apolonio III; the posthumos
son of the aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo II, to wit, his three
children of his first marriage — Encarnacion, Gabriel, Magdalena;
his three children, Jose, Espirita and Pedro who are represented by
their own twelve children respectively; and Mercedes Florentino,
his daughter by a second marriage. All of the plaintiffs are the
relatives of the deceased posthumos son, Apolonio Florentino III,
within the third degree (four of whom being his half-brothers and
the remaining twelve being his nephews as they are the children of
his three half-brothers). As the first four are his relatives within the
third degree in their own right and the other twelve are such by
representation, all of them are indisputably entitled
as reservatarios to the property which came from the common
ancestor, Apolonio Isabelo, to Apolonio Florentino III by inheritance
during his life-time, and in turn by inheritance to his legitimate
mother, Severina Faz de Leon, widow of the aforementioned
Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II.
In spite of the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code already
cited, the trial judge refused to accept the theory of the plaintiffs
and, accepting that of the defendants, absolved the latter from the
complaint on the ground that said article is absolutely inapplicable
to the instant case, inasmuch as the defendant Mercedes
Florentino survived her brother, Apolonio III, from whom the
reservable property came and her mother, Severina Faz de Leon,
the widow of her father, Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II; that the
defendant Mercedes, being the only daughter of Severina Faz de
Leon, is likewise her forced heiress; that when she inherited the
property left at the death of her mother, together with that which
came from her deceased brother Apolonio III, the fundamental
object of article 811 of the Code was thereby complied with,
inasmuch as the danger that the property coming from the same
line might fall into the hands of strangers had been avoided; and
that the hope or expectation on the part of the plaintiffs of the
right to acquire the property of the deceased Apolonio III never did
come into existence because there is a forced heiress who is
entitled to such property.
The judgment appealed from is also founded on the theory that
article 811 of the Civil Code does not destroy the system of
legitimate succession and that the pretension of the plaintiffs to
apply said article in the instant case would be permitting the
reservable right to reduce and impair the forced legitimate which
exclusively belongs to the defendant Mercedes Florentino, in
violation of the precept of article 813 of the same Code which
provides that the testator cannot deprive his heirs of their legitime,
except in the cases expressly determined by law. Neither can he
impose upon it any burden, condition, or substitution of any kind
whatsoever, saving the provisions concerning the usufruct of the
surviving spouse, citing the decision of the Supreme Court of Spain
of January 4, 1911.
The principal question submitted to the court for decision consists
mainly in determining whether they property left at the death of
Apolonio III, the posthumos son of Apolonio Isabelo II, was or was
not invested with the character of reservable property when it was
received by his mother, Severina Faz de Leon.
The property enumerated by the plaintiffs in paragraph 5 of their
complaint came, without any doubt whatsoever, from the common
ancestor Apolonio Isabelo II, and when, on the death of Apolonio III
without issue the same passed by operation of law into the hands

of his legitimate mother, Severina Faz de Leon, it became
reservable property, in accordance with the provision of article 811
of the Code, with the object that the same should not fall into the
possession of persons other than those comprehended within the
order of person other than those comprehended within the order
of succession traced by the law from Apolonio Isabelo II, the source
of said property. If this property was in fact clothed with the
character and condition of reservable property when Severina Faz
de Leon inherited same from her son Apolonio III, she did not
thereby acquire the dominion or right of ownership but only the
right of usufruct or of fiduciary with the necessary obligation to
preserve and to deliver or return it as such reservable property to
her deceased son's relatives within the third degree, among whom
is her daughter, Mercedes Florentino.
Reservable property neither comes, nor falls under, the absolute
dominion of the ascendant who inherits and receives same from his
descendant, therefore it does not form part of his own property
nor become the legitimate of his forced heirs. It becomes his own
property only in case that all the relatives of his descendant shall
have died (reservista) in which case said reservable property losses
such character.
With full right Severina Faz de Leon could have disposed in her will
of all her own property in favor of her only living daughter,
Mercedes Florentino, as forced heiress. But whatever provision
there is in her will concerning the reservable property received
from her son Apolonio III, or rather, whatever provision will reduce
the rights of the other reservatarios, the half brothers and nephews
of her daughter Mercedes, is unlawful, null and void, inasmuch as
said property is not her own and she has only the right of usufruct
or of fiduciary, with the obligation to preserve and to deliver same
to the reservatarios, one of whom is her own daughter, Mercedes
Florentino.
It cannot reasonably be affirmed, founded upon an express
provision of law, that by operation of law all of the reservable
property, received during lifetime by Severina Faz de Leon from her
son, Apolonio III, constitutes or forms parts of the legitime
pertaining to Mercedes Florentino. If said property did not come to
be the legitimate and exclusive property of Severina Faz de Leon,
her only legitimate and forced heiress, the defendant Mercedes,
could not inherit all by operation of law and in accordance with the
order of legitimate succession, because the other relatives of the
deceased Apolonio III, within the third degree, as well as herself are
entitled to such reservable property.
For this reason, in no manner can it be claimed that the legitime of
Mercedes Florentino, coming from the inheritance of her mother
Severina Faz de Leon, has been reduced and impaired; and the
application of article 811 of the Code to the instant case in no way
prejudices the rights of the defendant Mercedes Florentino,
inasmuch as she is entitled to a part only of the reservable
property, there being no lawful or just reason which serves as real
foundation to disregard the right to Apolonio III's other relatives,
within the third degree, to participate in the reservable property in
question. As these relatives are at present living, claiming for it
with an indisputable right, we cannot find any reasonable and
lawful motive why their rights should not be upheld and why they
should not be granted equal participation with the defendant in the
litigated property.
The claim that because of Severina Faz de Leon's forced heiress,
her daughter Mercedes, the property received from the deceased
son Apolonio III lost the character, previously held, of reservable
property; and that the mother, the said Severina, therefore, had no
further obligation to reserve same for the relatives within the third
degree of the deceased Apolonio III, is evidently erroneous for the
22
reason that, as has been already stated, the reservable property,
left in a will by the aforementioned Severina to her only daughter
Mercedes, does not form part of the inheritance left by her death
nor of the legitimate of the heiress Mercedes. Just because she has
a forced heiress, with a right to her inheritance, does not relieve
Severina of her obligation to reserve the property which she
received from her deceased son, nor did same lose the character of
reservable property, held before the reservatariosreceived same.
It is true that when Mercedes Florentino, the heiress of the
reservista Severina, took possession of the property in question,
same did not pass into the hands of strangers. But it is likewise true
that the said Mercedes is not the only reservataria. And there is no
reason founded upon law and upon the principle of justice why the
other reservatarios, the other brothers and nephews, relatives
within the third degree in accordance with the precept of article
811 of the Civil Code, should be deprived of portions of the
property which, as reservable property, pertain to them.
From the foregoing it has been shown that the doctrine announced
by the Supreme Court of Spain on January 4, 1911, for the violation
of articles 811, 968 and consequently of the Civil Code is not
applicable in the instant case.
Following the provisions of article 813, the Supreme Court of Spain
held that the legitime of the forced heirs cannot be reduced or
impaired and said article is expressly respected in this decision.
However, in spite of the efforts of the appellee to defend their
supposed rights, it has not been shown, upon any legal foundation,
that the reservable property belonged to, and was under the
absolute dominion of, the reservista, there being relatives within
the third degree of the person from whom same came; that said
property, upon passing into the hands of the forced heiress of the
deceased reservista, formed part of the legitime of the former; and
that the said forced heiress, in addition to being a reservataria, had
an exclusive right to receive all of said property and to deprive the
other reservatarios, her relatives within the third degree of certain
portions thereof.
Concerning the prayer in the complaint relative to the indemnity
for damages and the delivery of the fruits collected, it is not proper
to grant the first for there is no evidence of any damage which can
give rise to the obligation of refunding same. As to the second, the
delivery of the fruits produced by the land forming the principal
part of the reservable property, the defendants are undoubtedly in
duty bound to deliver to the plaintiffs six-sevenths of the fruits or
rents of the portions of land claimed in the complaint, in the
quantity expressed in paragraph 11 of the same, from January 17,
1918, the date the complaint was filed; and the remaining seventh
part should go to the defendant Mercedes.
For the foregoing reasons it follows that with the reversal of the
order of decision appealed from we should declare, as we hereby
do, that the aforementioned property, inherited by the deceased
Severina Faz de Leon from her son Apolonio Florentino III, is
reservable property; that the plaintiffs, being relatives of the
deceased Apolonio III within the third degree, are entitled to six-
sevenths of said reservable property; that the defendant Mercedes
is entitled to the remaining seventh part thereof; that the latter,
together with her husband Angel Encarnacion, shall deliver to the
plaintiffs, jointly, six-sevenths of the fruits or rents, claimed from
said portion of the land and of the quantity claimed, from January
17, 1918, until fully delivered; and that the indemnity for one
thousand pesos (P1,000) prayed for in the complaint is denied,
without special findings as to the costs of both instances. So
ordered.

7. G.R. No. L-13386 October 27, 1920
SEGUNDA MARIA NIEVA with her husband ANGEL
ALCALA, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MANUELA ALCALA and JOSE DEOCAMPO, defendants-appellees.
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide for appellants.
Felipe Agoncillo for appellees.
JOHNSON, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
the Province of Tayabas, absolving the defendants from all liability
under the plaintiff's complaint, without any finding as to costs.
Juliana Nieva, the alleged natural mother of the plaintiff Segunda
Maria Nieva, married Francisco Deocampo. Of said marriage Alfeo
Deocampo was born.
Julian Nieva died intestate on April 19, 1889, and her said son,
Alfeo Deocampo, inherited from her, ab intestate, the parcels of
land described in Paragraphs V and X of the complaint.
Alfeo Deocampo died intestate and without issue on July 7, 1890.
Thereupon the two parcels of land above-mentioned passed to his
father, Francisco Deocampo, by intestate succession. Thereafter
Francisco Deocampo married the herein defendant Manuela Alcala,
of which marriage was born Jose Deocampo, the other defendant
herein.
Francisco Deocampo died on August 15, 1914, whereupon his
widow and son, the defendants herein, took possession of the
parcels of land in question, under the claim that the said son, the
defendant Jose Deocampoo (a minor) had inherited the same, ab
intestate, from his deceased father.
On September 30, 1915, the plaintiff herein, claiming to be an
acknowledged natural daughter of the said Juliana Nieva, instituted
the present action for the purposes of recovering from the
defendants the parcels of land in question, particularly described in
Paragraphs V and X of the complaint, invoking the provisions of
article 811 of the Civil Code.
The lower court held that, even granting, without deciding, that the
plaintiff was an acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva,
she was not entitled to the property here in question because, in its
opinion, an illegitimate relative has no right to the reserva
troncal under the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.
The first question presented by this appeal is, whether or not the
plaintiff is an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased
Juliana Nieva. It appears from the record that the said Juliana
Nieva, while unmarried, gave birth to the plaintiff on March 29,
1882, and that the plaintiff was duly baptized as her natural
daughter, of unknown father (Exhibit C, baptismal certificate); that
the said Juliana Nieva nourished and reared her said child, the
plaintiff herein; that the plaintiff lived with her said mother until
the latter was married to Francisco Deocampo; that the said
mother treated the plaintiff, and exhibited her publicly, as a
legitimate daughter. (See testimony of Antero Gala, pp. 5-6;
23
Prudencio de la Cuesta, pp. 16-17; and Mamerto Palabrica, pp. 26-
27, sten. notes.)
The foregoing facts, which are not controverted, are analogous to
the facts in the case of Llorente vs. Rodriguez (3 Phil., 697, 699).
Under the decision of this court in that case we are of the opinion
and so decide, without rediscussing here the law and legal
principles involved, that the plaintiff Segunda Maria Nieva is an
acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva. (See also In
re estate of Enriquez and Reyes, 29 Phil., 167.)
The other and more important question presented by this appeal
is, whether or not an illegitimate relative within the third degree is
entitled to the reserva troncal provided for by article 811 of the
Civil Code. That article reads as follows:
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
property acquired by the latter gratuitously from some
other ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is obliged to
reserve such of the property as he may have acquired by
operation of law for the benefit of relatives within the
third degree belonging to the line from which such
property came.
The property here in question was inherited, by operation by law,
by Francisco Deocampo from his son Alfeo Deocampo, who, in turn,
had inherited it, in the same manner, from his mother Juliana
Nieva, the natural mother of the plaintiff. The plaintiff is
the natural sister of Alfeo Deocampo, and she belongs to the same
line from which the property in question came. Was Francisco
Deocampo obliged by law to reserve said property for the benefit
of the plaintiff, an illegitimate relative within the third degree of
Alfeo Deocampo? If he was, then, upon his death, the plaintiff, and
not his son the defendant Jose Deocampo, was entitled to the said
property; if he was not, the plaintiff's action must fail.1awph!l.net
There can be no question whatever but that, under said article 811
of the Civil Code, the plaintiff would be entitled to the property in
question if she were a legitimate daughter of Julian Nieva. (Edroso
vs. Sablan, 25 Phil., 295.) But in said article 811 the legislator uses
the generic terms "ascendant," "descendant," and "relatives,"
without specifying whether or not they have to be legitimate. Does
the legislator, then, refer to legitimate as well as to illegitimate
relatives? Counsel for the appellant, in a lengthy and carefully
prepared brief, attempts to maintain the affirmative.
This question, so far as our investigation shows, has not been
decided before by any court or tribunal. However, eminent
commentators on the Spanish Civil Code, who have devoted their
lives to the study and solution of the intricate and difficult
problems that may arise under the provisions of that Code, have
dealt with the very question now before us, and are unanimous in
the opinion that the provision of article 811 of the Civil Code apply
only to legitimate relative. One of such commentators,
undoubtedly the best known of them all, is Manresa. We believe
we can do no better than to adopt his reasons and conclusions, in
deciding the question before us. In determining the persons who
are obliged to reserve under article 811, he says:
Is every ascendant, whether legitimate or not, obliged to
reserve? Should the natural father or grandfather reserve
the properties proceeding from the mother or other
natural ascendant? Article 811 does not distinguish; it
speaks of the ascendant, without attaching the
qualification of legitimate, and, on the other hand, the
same reason that exists for applying the provision to the
natural family exists for applying it to the legitimate

family. Nevertheless, the article in referring to the
ascendant in an indeterminate manner shows that it
imposes the obligation to reserve only upon the legitimate
ascendant.
Let us overlook for the moment the question whether the
Code recognizes or does not recognize the existence of the
natural family, or whether it admits only the bond
established by acknowledgement between the father or
mother who acknowledges and the acknowledged
children. However it may be, it may be stated as an
indisputable truth, that in said Code, the legitimate
relationship forms the general rule and the natural
relationship the exception; which is the reason why, as
may be easily seen, the law in many articles speaks only of
children or parents, of ascendants or descendants, and in
them reference is of course made of those who are
legitimate; and when it desires to make a provision
applicable only to natural relationship, it does not say
father or mother, but natural father or natural mother; it
does not say child, but natural child; it does not speak of
ascendants, brothers or parents in the abstract, but of
natural ascendants, natural brothers or natural parents.
(See, for example, articles 294, 302, 809, 810, 846, 935, to
938, 944 and 945 and 946 to 955.)
Articles 809 and 810 themselves speak only of ascendants.
Can it in any way be maintained that they refer to
legitimate as well as to natural ascendants? They evidently
establish the legitime of the legitimate ascendants
included as forced heirs in number 2 of article 807. And
article 811, — and as we will see also article 812, —
continues to treat of this same legitime. The right of the
natural parents and children in the testamentary
succession in wholly included in the eighth section and is
limited to the parents, other ascendants of such class
being excluded in articles 807, No. 3, and 846. Therefore,
the place which article 811 occupies in the Code of proof
that it refers only to legitimate ascendants. And if there
were any doubt, it disappears upon considering the text of
article 938, which states that the provisions of article 811
applies to intestate succession, which is just established in
favor of the legitimate direct ascending line, the text of
articles 939 to 945, which treat of intestate succession of
natural parents, as well as that of articles 840 to 847,
treating of their testamentary succession, which do not
allude directly or indirectly to that provision.
Lastly, the principle which underlies the exception which
article 811 creates in the right to succeed neither admits
of any other interpretation. Whether the provision is due
to the desire that the properties should not pass, by
reason of new marriage, out of the family to which they
belonged, or is directly derived from the system of the so-
called "reserva troncal," and whether the idea of
reservation or that of lineal rights (troncalidad)
predominate the patrimony which is intended to be
preserved is that of the legitimate family. Only to
legitimate ascendants and descendants do article 968 et
seq. of the Code refer, arising as they do from the danger
of second or subsequent marriage; only to legitimate
parents do the special laws of Navarra, Aragon, Vizcaya
and Cataluña concede the right to succeed with respect to
lineal properties (bienes troncales); only to the legitimate
ascendants does article 811 impose the duty to reserve.
The convenience of amplifying the precept to natural
parents and ascendants may be raised just as the question
24
whether it would be preferable to suppress it altogether
may be raised; but in the realm of the statute law there is
no remedy but to admit that article 811, the interpretation
of which should on the other hand be strict was drafted by
the legislator with respect only to legitimate ascendants.
(Manresa, Codigo Civil, vol. 6, 3d ed., pp. 249-250.)
The same jurist, in determining the persons in whose favor the
reservation is established, says:
Persons in whose favor the reservation is established. —
This is one of the most delicate points in the interpretation
of article 811. According to this article, the reservation is
established in favor of the parents who are within the third
degree and belong to the line from which the properties
came.
It treats of blood, relationship, which is applicable to
questions on succession, according to articles 915 to 920.
It could not be otherwise, because relationship by affinity
is established between each spouse and the family of the
other, by marriage, and to admit it, would be to favor the
transmission of the properties of the family of one spouse
to that of the other, which is just what this article intends
to prevent.
It also treats of legitimate relationship. The person obliged
to reserve it a legitimate ascendant who inherits from a
descendant property which proceeds from the same
legitimate family, and this being true, there can be no
question, because the line from which the properties
proceed must be the line of that family and only in favor of
that line is the reservation established. Furthermore, we
have already said, the object is to protect the patrimony of
the legitimate family, following the precedents of the foral
law. And it could not be otherwise. Article 943 denies to
legitimate parents the right to succeed the natural child
and viceversa, from which it must be deduced that natural
parents neither have the right to inhering from legitimate
ones; the law in the article cited established a barrier
between the two families; properties of the legitimate
family shall never pass by operation of law to the natural
family. (Ibid. pp. 251-252.)
Scævola, after a very extended discussion of this same
subject, arrives at the same conclusion as Manresa. "La
reserva del articulo 811 es privilegio de la familia legitima.
(The reservation in article 811 is a privilege of the
legitimate family.)" (See Scævola, Codigo Civil, Vol. 14, pp.
211-224, 3401-305.)
Article 943, above referred to by Manresa, provides as follows:
A natural or legitimated child has no right to succeed ab
intestate the legitimate children and relatives of the father
or mother who has acknowledged it; nor shall such
children or relatives so inherit from the natural or
legitimated child.
To hold that the appellant is entitled to the property left by her
natural brother, Alfeo Deocampo, by operation of law, would be a
fragrant violate of the express provision of the foregoing article
(943).
For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court is
hereby affirmed, without any finding as to costs. So ordered.

8. G.R. No. L-29901 August 31, 1977
IGNACIO FRIAS CHUA, DOMINADOR CHUA and REMEDIOS
CHUA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL,
BRANCH V and SUSANA DE LA TORRE, in her capacity as
Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la
Torre, respondents.
Dominador G. Abaria and Primitivo Blanca for private respondent.
Rodrigo O. Delfinado for petitioners.
MARTIN, J.:
Petition for review of the decision of the respondent Court which
dismissed the complaint of petitioners in Civil Case No. 7839-A,
entitled "Ignacio Frias Chua, et al. vs. Susana de la Torre,
Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre"
It appears that in the first marriage of Jose Frias Chua with Patricia
S. Militar alias Sy Quio he sired three children, namely: Ignacio,
Lorenzo and Manuel, all surnamed Frias Chua. When Patricia S.
Militar died, Jose Frias Chua contracted a second marriage with
Consolacion de la Torre with whom he had a child by the name of
Juanita Frias Chua. Manuel Frias Chua died without leaving any
issue. Then in 1929, Jose Frias Chua died intestate leaving his
widow Consolacion de la Torre and his son Juanito Frias Chua of the
second marriage and sons Ignacio Frias Chua and Lorenzo Frias
Chua of his first marriage. In Intestate Proceeding No. 4816, the
lower court issued an order dated January 15, 1931 1 adjudicating,
among others, the one-half (1/2,) portion of Lot No. 399 and the
sum of P8,000.00 in favor of Jose Frias Chua's widow, Consolacion
de la Torre, the other half of Lot No. 399 in favor of Juanito Frias
Chua, his son in the second marriage; P3,000.00 in favor of Lorenze
Frias chua; and P1,550.00 in favor of Ignacio Frias, Chua, his sons of
the first marriage. By virtue of said adjudication, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. TR-980 (14483) 2 dated April 28, 1932 was
issued by the Register of Deeds in the names of Consolacion de la
Torre and Juanito Frias Chua as owners pro-indiviso of Lot No. 399.
On February 27, 1952, Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage
died intestate without any issue. After his death, his mother
Consolacion de la Torre succeeded to his pro-indivisio share of Lot
No. 399. In a week's time or on March 6, 1952, Consolacion de la
Torre executed a declaration of heirship adjudicating in her favor
the pro-indiviso share of her son Juanito as a result of which
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31796 covering the whole Lot No.
399 was issued in her name. Then on March 5, 1966, Consolacion
de la Torre died intestate leaving no direct heir either in the
descending or ascending line except her brother and sisters.
In the "Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre", docketed as Sp.
Proc. No. 7839-A, the petitioners herein, Ignacio Frias Chua, of the
first marriage and dominador and Remedios Chua, the supposed
legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, also of the
first marriage filed the complaint a quo 3 (subseqently segregated
as a distinct suit and docketed as Civil Case No. 7839-A) on May 11,
1966 before the respondent Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, Branch V, praying that the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot
No. 399 which formerly belonged to Juanito Frias but which passed
to Consolacion de la Torre upon the latter's death, be declaredas a
reservable property for the reason that the lot in questionn was
subject to reserval troncal pursuant to Article 981 of the New Civil
25
Code, Private respondent as administratrix of the estate of
individually the complaint of petitioners 4
On July 29, 1986, the respondent Court rendered a decision
dismissing the complaint of petitioner. Hence this instant.
The pertinent provision of reserva troncal under the New Civil Code
provides:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inheritts from his
descendant any property which the latter may
have acquired by gratuitous title from another
ascendat, or a brother or sister, is obliged to
reserve such property as he may have acquired
by operation of law for the benefit of relatives
who are within the third degree and belong to
the line from which said property came.
Persuant to the foregoing provision, in order that a property may
be impressed with a reservable character the following requisites
must exist, to wit: (1) that the property was acquired by a
descendant from an asscendant or from a brother or sister by
gratuitous title; (2) that said descendant died without an issue; (3)
that the property is inherited by another ascendant by operation of
law; and (4) that there are relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which said property came. 5 In the case
before Us, all of the foregoing requisites are present. Thus, as
borne out by the records, Juanoito Frias Chua of the second
marriage died intestate in 1952; he died withour leaving any issue;
his pro-indiviso of 1/2 share of Lot No. 399 was acquired by his
mother, Consolacion de la Torre died, Juannnito Frias Chua who
died intestate had relatives within the third degree. These relatives
are Ignacio Frias Chua and Dominador Chua and Remidios Chua,
the suppose legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias
Chua, who are the petitioners herein.
The crux of the problem in instant petition is focused on the first
requisit of reserva troncal — whether the property in question was
acquired by Juanito Frias Chua from his father Jose Frias Chua,
gratuitously or not. In resolving this point, the respondent Court
said:
It appears from Exh. "3", which is part of Exh. "D",
that the property in question was not acquired by
Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias
Chua gratuitously but for a consideration,
namely, that the legatees were to pay the
interest and cost and other fees resulting from
Civil Case No. 5300 of this Court. As such it is
undeniable that the lot in question is not subject
tot a reserva troncal, under Art. 891 of the New
Civil Code, and as such the plaintiff's complaint
must fail.
We are not prepared to sustain the respondent Court's conclusion
that the lot in question is not subject to a reserva troncal under Art.
891 of the New Civil Code. It is, As explained by Manresa which this
Court quoted with approval in Cabardo v. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186,
"The transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the
recipient does not give anything in return." It matters not whether
the property transmitted be or be not subject to any prior charges;
what is essential is that the transmission be made gratuitously, or
by an act of mere liberality of the person making it, without
imposing any obligation on the part of the recipient; and that the
person receiving the property gives or does nothing in return; or, as
ably put by an eminent Filipino commentator, 6 "the essential thing
is that the person who transmits it does so gratuitously, from pure
 26

generosity, without requiring from the transferee any prestation."
It is evident from the record that the transmission of the property
in question to Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage upon the
death of his father Jose Frias Chua was by means of a hereditary
succession and therefore gratuitous. It is true that there is the
order (Exh. "D") of the probate Court in Intestate Proceeding No.
4816 which estates in express terms;
2. — Se adjudicada pro el presente a favor de
Consolacion de la Torre, viuda, mayor de edad, y
de su hiju, Juanito Frias Chua, menor de edad,
todos residente de San Enrique, Negros
Occidental, I.F.,como herederos del finado Jose
Frias Chua Choo, estas propiadades:
14483
La parcela de terrenno concida por Lote No. 399
del Catsatro de la Carlota, Negros Occidental, de
191.954 metros cuadddrados y cubierto por el
Certificado de Titulo No. 11759, en partes equales
pro-indiviso; por con la obligscion de pagar a las
Standard Oil Co. of New York la deuda de
P3971.20, sus intereses, costas y demas gastos
resultantes del asunto civil No. 5300de este
jusgado
relatives within the third degree of Jose Frias Chua from whom the
property came. These relatives are the petitioner herein.
It is claimed that the complaint of petitioners to recover the one-
half portion of Lot 399 which originally belonged to Juanito Frias
Chua has already prescribed when it was filed on May 11, 1966. We
do not believe so. It must be remembered that the petitioners
herein are claiming as reservees did not arise until the time the
reservor, Consolacion de la Torre, died in March 1966. When the
petitioners therefore filed their complaint to recover the one-half
(1/2) portion of Lot 399, they were very much in time to do so.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby
set aside. The petitioners Ignacio Frias Chua, Dominador Chua and
Remedios Chua are declared owners of 1/2 undivided portion of
Lot 399; and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental is hereby
ordered to cancel. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31796 covering
Lot No. 399 issued in the name of Consolacion de la Torre and to
issue a new Certificate of Title in the names of Consolacion de la
Torre, 1/2 undivided portion; Ignacio Frias Chua, 1/4 undivided
portion; and Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua, 1/4 undivided
portion, of said lot. Without pronouncement as to costs.

But the obligation of paying the Standard Oil Co. of New York the
amount of P3,971.20 is imposed upon Consolacion de la Torre and
Juanito Frias Chua not personally by the deceased Jose Frias Chua
in his last will and testament but by an order of the court in the
Testate Proceeding No.4816 dated January 15, 1931. As long as the
transmission of the property to the heirs is free from any condition
imposed by the deceased himself and the property is given out of
pure generosity, itg is gratuitous. it does not matter if later the
court orders one of the heirs, in this case Juanito Frias Chua, to pay
the Standare oil co. of New York the amount of P3,971.20. This
does not change the gratuitous nature of the transmission of the
property to him. This being the case the lot in question is subject
to reserva troncal under Art, 891 of the New Civil Code.

It is contented that the distribution of the shares of the estate of

Jose Frias Chua to the respondent heirs or legatees was agreed
upon by the heirs in their project of partition based on the last will
and testament of Jose Frias Chua. But petitioners claim that the
supposed Last Will and Testament of Jose Frias Chua was never
probated. The fact that the will was not probated was admitted in
paragraph 6 of the respondents' answer. 7 There is nothing
mentioned in the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 7839 A
which is the subject of the present appeal nor in the order of
January 15, 1931 of the trial court in the Testate Estate Proceeding
No. 4816 nor in the private respondent's brief, that the Last Will
and Testament of Jose Frias Chua has ever been probated. With the
foregoing, it is easy to deduce that if the Last Will and Testament
has in fact been probated there would have been no need for the
testamentary heirs to prepare a project of partition among
themselves. The very will itself could be made the basis for the
adjudication of the estate as in fact they did in their project of
partition with Juanito Frias Chua getting one-half of Lot 399 by
inheritance as a sone of the deceased Jose Frias Chua by the latter's
second marriage.

According to the record, Juanito Frias Chua died on February 27,

1952 without any issue. After his death his mother Consolation de
la Torre succeeded to his one-half pro-indiviso share of Lot 399.
This was, however, subject to the condition that the property was
reservable in character under Art. 891 of the Civil Code in favor of