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- Villafuerte v CA
deliver the thing.
Spouses Reynaldo C. Villafuerte and Perlita Tan-Villafuerte Having disregarded the plain requirement of the law, private
operated a gasoline station known as Peewees Petron respondents were held accountable to petitioners for the
Powerhouse Service Station and General Merchandise on the various damages prayed for by petitioners in their amended
premises of three (3) adjoining lots at the corner of Gomez complaint.
Street and Quezon Avenue in Lucena City. One of these lots,
is owned by several persons namely, Edilberto de Mesa,
Gonzalo Daleon and his brother Federico A. Daleon and Mrs.
Anicia Yap-Tan, mother of appellee Perlita Tan-Villafuerte.
- Delfin v Billones
Appellants Edilberto de Mesa and Gonzalo Daleon acquired
their respective lots subject to the lease by Petrophil Facts:
Corporation which had built thereon the gasoline station Spouses Delfin then consolidated Lots No. 213 and No. 3414
being managed by the Villafuerte couple. When the lease of and subdivided the resulting lot into six (6) smaller lots. The
Petrophil Corporation expired on December 31, 1988, the spouses Delfin then consolidated Lots No. 213 and No. 3414
Villafuertes obtained a new lease on the lot of Edilberto de and subdivided the resulting lot into six (6) smaller lots.[6] Lot
Mesa for a period expiring on December 31, 1989. No. 1, covered by TCT No. T-19618, was sold to Roberto
Delfin on 21 October 1989; Lot No. 2 covered by TCT No. T-
As regards the lot of Daleon brothers, the Villafuertes were 19619 to Recio Daos on 25 April 1985; Lot No. 3 covered by
not as lucky. For, instead of obtaining a lease renewal, what TCT No. T-19620 to Gina Maalat on 14 June 1989, and; Lot
they received were demand letters from the brothers counsel No. 4 covered by TCT No. T-19621 to Shirley Tamayo on 11
ordering them to vacate the premises. Instead of complying August 1989. Lot No. 5 remained with the spouses Delfin,
therewith, the Villafuertes simply ignored the demand and while Lot No. 6 was used as an access road.
continued operating the gas station.
On 12 April 1994, herein respondents, claiming to be the
Gonzalo Daleon filed a complaint against the Villafuertes in heirs of the former owners of Lots No. 213 and No. 3414, filed
the Office of the Barangay Captain of Barangay Tres, Lucena an action for annulment, reconveyance, recovery of
City. No settlement was reached. ownership and possession and damages. According to them,
it was only in 1989[9] when they discovered that Teresa Daos,
Villafuertes, upon expiration of lease contract with Edilberto sick and in dire need of money, was constrained to mortgage
de Mesa, the same was not renewed. The spouses continued the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 3414 to the spouses
to operate their gasoline station and other businesses on the Delfin for P300.00 sometime in 1965.[10] Taking advantage of
lot of de Mesa despite the latters demand to vacate. her condition, the spouses Delfin made her sign a document
purporting to be a mortgage, but which turned out to be an
Edilberto de Mesa and Gonzalo Daleon, with the aid of extrajudicial partition with deed of absolute sale. As to Lot
several persons and without the knowledge of the No. 213, respondents averred that the Deed of Sale covering
Villafuertes, caused the closure of the latters gasoline station the property was fictitious and the signatures and thumb
by constructing fences around it. Villafuertes countered with marks contained therein were all forged because three (3) of
a complaint for damages with preliminary mandatory the signatories therein died before the alleged sale in 1960,
injunction against both Edilberto de Mesa and Gonzalo namely: Estrella Daradar, who died in 1934, and Esperanza
Daleon. The complaint seeks vindication for the alleged Daradar and Cipriano Degala, who both died in 1946.[11] As
malicious and unlawful fencing of the plaintiffs’ business proof thereof, respondents presented certifications[12] on
premises. the deaths of Esperanza Daradar and Cipriano Degala by the
Local Civil Registrar of Panitan, Capiz.
Issue:
To counter respondents arguments, petitioners alleged that
2. Whether or not it was improper for private respondents action was already barred by prescription and
respondents to resort to fencing their properties in order to laches. Further, they argued that the spouses Delfin, as well
remove petitioners from the premises. as the subsequent owners of the subject properties, are
innocent purchasers for value and in good faith, whose titles
Ruling: to the lots at the time of the purchase were all clean and free
2. No. from liens and encumbrances.[13] The documents
Spouses Lumbres v Sps Tablada Meanwhile, due to the respondents’ alleged failure to pay
the P230,000.00 unpaid balance as per the Contract to Sell
FACTS: on January 9, 1995 Spring Homes, former owner of earlier adverted to despite demands, the subject lot was sold
the parcel of land in dispute, entered into a pro forma by Spring Homes to the petitioners, again by way of a Deed
Contract to Sell with the respondent spouses Tablada. The of Absolute Sale executed on December 22, 2000 for and in
prepared typewritten contract, with the blank spaces therein consideration of the sum of P157,500.00. The mortgage on
merely filled up, contains the designation of the parcel sold, the lot was released by Premiere Development Bank.
the price per square meter and the stipulation as to payment. Subsequently a TCT covering the subject lot was issued in
After having been paid the sum total of P179,500.00, which petitioners’ favor.
the respondents claim to be the full purchase price of the
subject lot, Spring Homes executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in The instant case cropped up when, asserting their ownership
favor of the respondents. In the deed the subject lot was of the subject lot on the basis of the TCT the petitioners
already made to appear as covered by a TCT. Because the demanded of the respondents to vacate said lot and to pay
anticipated Pag-Ibig loan failed to materialize, them the rentals due thereon. Their demands having come to
the P230,000.00, which, under the Contract to Sell, was naught, the petitioner spouses then filed in the MTCC for
supposed to be paid upon release of the loan, was left ejectment against respondent Tabladas and all persons
unpaid. claiming rights under them. The MTCC dismissed the
petitioners’ ejectment complaint and ruled for the
Respondents later declared the subject lot for taxation respondents.
purposes and paid the corresponding real property taxes
thereon. Using their own funds, they caused the construction Aggrieved, the petitioners appealed to the RTC. In The RTC
thereon of a residential house, which they presently occupy. reversed and set aside the MTCC decision and ordered the
A Certificate of Occupancy was issued to them and the house respondent spouses to vacate subject lot to surrender the
was declared in their names. possession thereof to the petitioners. In holding that the
petitioners have superior right on the subject lot over the
With the execution of the aforesaid Deed of Absolute Sale, respondents, the RTC, applying the provisions of Articles
the respondent spouses sent a demand letter to Spring 1350, 1352 and 1409 of the Civil Code, deemed the Deed of
Homes for the transfer and release to them of the original or Absolute Sale in favor of the respondents void ab initio for
owner’s copy of the TCT, who promised to deliver the said want of valid consideration. With their MR having been
title and even apologized for the delay. However, to their denied by the RTC in the respondent spouses then went to
great dismay, the spouses subsequently learned that the TCT the CA on a petition for review.
was canceled and a new one issued to the petitioners. On
account thereof, the respondent spouses filed with the RTC a The CA granted the respondents’ petition, thereby reversing
civil suit against the petitioners, Spring Homes and the RD of the assailed Orders of the RTC and reinstating the earlier
decision of the MTCC. Their MR having been denied by the
CA,petitioners are now before us via the instant recourse construct a house thereon after their Pag-Ibig loan did not
raising the following issues: materialize. It is highly unjust for the [respondents] to pay for
the amount of the house when the loan did not materialize
ISSUE: Who, as between the petitioners and the respondents, due to the failure of Spring Homes to deliver the owner’s
is entitled to the physical or material possession of the duplicate copy of the TCT.
property involved, independent of their respective claims of If the total selling price was indeed P409,500.00, as
ownership thereof [petitioners] would like to poster, said amount should have
appeared as the consideration in the deed of absolute sale
HELD: dated January 15, 1996. However, only P157,500.00 was
petition denied. stated. The amount stated in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
January 15, 1996 was not only a portion of the selling price,
Before proceeding with a discussion of the issues laid out because the Deed of Sale dated December 22, 2000 also
above, it must be stressed that the present case is one reflected P157,500.00 as consideration. It is not shown that
forejectment. As such, our judgment hereon is effective only [petitioners] likewise applied for a loan with Pag-Ibig. The
with respect to possession. It does not bind the title or affect reasonable inference is that the consistent amount stated in
the ownership of the lot in question. the two Deeds of Absolute Sale was the true selling price as
Upon scrutiny, however, the CA astutely observed that it perfectly jibed with the computation in the Contract to
despite there being no question that the total land area of Sell.
the subject lot is 105 square meters, the Contract to Sell
executed and entered into by Spring Homes and the We find the CA’s reasoning to be sound. At any rate, the
respondent spouses states, however, that while there is only execution of the January 16, 1996 Deed of Absolute Sale in
one parcel of land being sold, the Contract to Sell speaks of favor of the respondents effectively rendered the previous
two (2) land areas, namely, “105 sqm” and “42 sqm,” and two Contract to Sell ineffective and canceled. Furthermore, we
(2) prices per square meter differ. find no merit in petitioners’ contention that the first sale to
the respondents was void for want of consideration. As the
The CA could only think of one possible explanation: the CA pointed out in its assailed decision:
Contract to Sell refers only to a single lot with a total land
area of 105 square meters. The 42 square meters mentioned Other than the [petitioners'] self-serving assertion that the
in the same contract and therein computed at the rate Deeds of Absolute Sale was executed solely for the purpose
ofP6,000 per square meter refer to the cost of the house of obtaining a Pag-Ibig loan, no other concrete evidence was
which would be constructed by the respondents on the tendered to justify the execution of the deed of absolute sale.
subject lot through a Pag-Ibig loan. They failed to overcome the clear and convincing evidence of
the [respondents] that as early as July 5, 1995 the latter had
Looking at that portion of the Contract to Sell, the CA found already paid the total amount of P179,500.00, much bigger
merit in the respondents’ contention that the total selling than the actual purchase price for the subject land.
price of P409,500 includes not only the price of the lot
but also the cost of the house that would be constructed Having stated that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed in
thereon. We are inclined to agree. The CA went on to say: favor of the respondent spouses is valid and with sufficient
consideration, the MTCC correctly applied the provisions of
It could be argued that the contract to sell never mentions Article 1544 of the Civil Code. Article 1544 reads:
the construction of any house or building on the subject
property. Had it been the intention of the parties that the Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to
total selling price would include the amount of the house that different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the
would be taken from a loan to be obtained from Pag-Ibig, person who may have first taken possession thereof in good
they could have specified so. However, one should not lose faith, if it should be movable property.
sight of the fact that the contract to sell is an accomplished Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong
form. [Respondents,] trusting Spring Homes, could not be to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it
expected to demand that another contract duly reflective of in the Registry of Property.
their agreements be utilized instead of the accomplished
form. The terms and conditions of the contract may not Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to
contemplate the inclusion of the cost of the house in the total the person who in good faith was first in the possession, and,
selling price, but the entries typewritten thereon sufficiently in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest
reveal the intentions of the parties. title, provided there is good faith.
The position of the [respondents] finds support in the Notwithstanding the fact that the petitioners, as the second
documents and subsequent actuations of Bertha Pasic, the buyer, registered their Deed of Absolute Sale, in contrast to
representative of Spring Homes. [Respondents] undeniably the Deed of Sale of the respondents which was not registered
proved that they spent their own hard-earned money to at all precisely because of Spring Homes’ failure to deliver the
owner’s copy of the TCT, the respondents’ right could not be Rosa Sales v Barro
deemed defeated as the petitioners are in bad faith.
Petitioners cannot claim good faith since at the time of the Facts:
execution of the Compromise Agreement in Civil Case, they
were indisputably and reasonably informed that the subject This case originated from the ejectment complaint filed by
lot was previously sold to the respondents. In fact, they the petitioners against the respondent, his wife. In their
were already aware that the respondents had constructed a complaint, the petitioners alleged among others that (1) they
house thereon and are presently in possession of the same. are owners of the lot; the respondent constructed a shanty
thereon without their consent; (3) the respondent and his co-
Knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale defendants have not been paying any rent to the petitioners
defeats his rights even if he is the first to register the second for their occupation thereof; (4) the respondent and his co-
sale because such knowledge taints his prior registration with defendants refused the formal demand made by the
bad faith. For the second buyer to displace the first, he must petitioners for them to vacate the subject lot.
show that he acted in good faith throughout (i.e. in ignorance
of the first sale and of the first buyer’s rights) from the time the respondent denied the allegations of the complaint, and
of acquisition until the title is transferred to him by essentially claimed that (1) his construction of the temporary
registration. makeshift house on the lot was tolerated by the petitioners,
considering that he acted as the caretaker thereof; and (2) he
Hence, there was nothing to cede or transfer to the does not remember receiving any demand letter and
petitioners when the Compromise Agreement was entered summons from the barangay and so he was surprised to
into insofar as the subject lot is concerned as it was already know that an ejectment complaint was filed against him.
sold to and fully paid for by the respondents as early as
January 16, 1996 when the Absolute Deed of Sale was he MeTC found in favor of the petitioners. The respondent
executed in their favor by Spring Homes. More so that Spring appealed to the RTC.
Homes has no more to sell to the petitioners when it
executed in the latter’s favor the second deed of absolute Ruling:
sale on December 22, 2000. After carefully examining the averments of the petitioners
complaint and the character of the reliefs sought therein, we
The respondents are the current occupants of the subject lot. hold that the Court of Appeals did not err in finding that the
They had constructed their residential house thereon and are complaint was for forcible entry, and that the Court of
living there at present. The action for ejectment was Appeals correctly dismissed it.
fashioned to provide a speedy, albeit temporary, remedy to
the dispossessed party while the issue of lawful possession There are two reasons why we could not subscribe to the
or de jure possession is pending or about to be filed. The petitioners submission that their complaint was for unlawful
remedy of ejectment ought to maintain the status quo and detainer. Firstly, the petitioners own averment in the
prevent the party-litigants from further aggravating the complaint that the defendant constructed a shanty in the lot
situation and causing further damage. of the plaintiffs without their consent, and the relief asked for
by the petitioners that the respondent and his wife pay the
NOTES: amount of P10,000 a month beginning January 2004 as for
1. When acting as an ejectment court, the Metropolitan, reasonable rent of the subject premises,[15] clearly
Municipal and Circuit Trial Courts’ jurisdiction is limited to the contradict their claim. It must be highlighted that as admitted
determination of the issue on possession de facto and not by the petitioners in their motion for reconsideration[16]
possession de jure.11 By way of exception, however, if the before the appellate court, and as evidenced by the TCT No.
issue of possession depends on the resolution of the issue of 262237 annexed to the complaint, the petitioners became
ownership, which is sufficiently alleged in the complaint, as owners of the property only on January 6, 2004. By averring
here, the MTCC may resolve the issue of ownership although that the respondent constructed his shanty on the lot without
the resulting judgment would be conclusive only with respect their consent and then praying that the MeTC direct the
to possession but not to the ownership of the property. respondent to pay them rent from January 2004, or from the
2. Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the inception of the respondents occupation of the lot, no other
property, the party in peaceful, quiet possession thereof shall conclusion can be made except that the petitioners had
not be ejected therefrom. Thus, a party who can prove prior always considered respondents occupation of the same to be
possession can recover such possession even against the unlawful from the very beginning. Hence, the complaint can
owner himself. Whatever may be the character of the never support a case for unlawful detainer. It is a settled rule
defendant’s prior possession, whether it be legal or illegal, that in order to justify an action for unlawful detainer, the
since he had in his favor priority in time, he has the security owners permission or tolerance must be present at the
that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully beginning of the possession.
ejected therefrom by a person having a better right by accion
publciana or accion reivindicatoria
Secondly, the nature of the complaint is neither changed nor
dependent upon the allegations and/or defenses made in the
answer. As we had previously stated in Caiza v. Court of
Appeals, it is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an
action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it, are the
allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief
sought.