Mercado v.

Espiritu

ACTS:

The case was about the contract made by Luis Espiritu (father of Jose Espiritu, the
defendant) and the heirs of his sister Margarita Mercado; Domingo and Josepha
Mercado, who pretended to be of legal age to give their consent into the contract of sale
of the land they inherited from their deceased mother Margarita Mercado (sister of Luis
Mercado). The siblings Domingo et. al., sought for the annulment of contract asserting
that Domingo and Josepha were minors during the perfection of contract.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the deed of sale is valid when the minors presented themselves that
they were of legal age.

HELD:

The court declared that the contract of sale was VALID, even if it were made and
entered into by minors, who pretended to be of legal age. The court stated that they will
not be permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the obligations contracted
by them, or to have them annulled.

The ruling was in accordance with the provisions on law on estoppel and Rule 123,
Section 6 paragraph A which states that “whenever a party has, by its own declaration,
act or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another party to believe a particular
thing to be true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of
such declaration, cannot be permitted to falsify it.

Article 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil-interdiction
are mere restrictions on the capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain
obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements.
Also, these minors cannot be permitted afterwards to excuse themselves from compliance with the
obligation assumed by them or seek their annulment. This is in accordance with the provisions of the law
on estoppels.
This is in accordance with the provisions of the law on estoppel.
Art 1431 of Civil Code. Through estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the
person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.
This is also in accordance with the provisions of Rule 123, Sec 68, Par. A
Rule 123, sec 68, Par. A...”Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act or omission, intentionally and deliberately
led another to believe a particular thing to be true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of
such declaration, act or omission, cannot be permitted to falsify it.

BAMBALAN v MARAMBA

FACTS:
Bambalan’s parents Paula Prado and her first husband, Isidro Bambalan Y Calcotura received a loan
from Genoveva Muerong and German Maramba in 1915. Calcotura died leaving Bambalan as the sole
heir of his estate. In 1922, Muerong and Maramba forced Bambalan, who was at that time, a minor, to sell
their land as payment for the loan. Bambalan signed, but said that he was forced because they were
threatening his mother with imprisonment. Muerong and Maramba bought Bambalan’s first cedula to
acknowledge the document.

ISSUE:
Whether sale of the land to Maramaba and Muerong is valid.

RATIO:
The sale is void as to the plaintiff, because he was a minor at the time of execution. The Doctrine laid
down in the case of Mercado vs. Espiritu is not applicable to this case, because the plaintiff did not
pretend to be of age, and the defendant knew him as a minor.

As regards this minority, the doctrine laid down in the case of Mercado and Mercado vs. Espiritu (37
Phil., 215), wherein the minor was held to be estopped from contesting the contract executed by him
pretending to be age, is not applicable herein. In the case now before us the plaintiff did not pretend
to be of age; his minority was well known to the purchaser, the defendant, who was the one who
purchased the plaintiff's first cedula used in the acknowledgment of the document.

Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao vs. Ramon Alcantara

Facts:
 · On August 3, 1931, a deed of sale was executed by Rufino Alcantara and his
sons Damaso Alcantara and Ramon Alcantara conveying to Sia Suan five parcels of
land to petitioner Sia Suan
 · On August 27, 1931, Gaw Chiao (husband of Sia Suan) received a letter from
Francisco Alfonso, attorney of Ramon Alcantara, informing him that Ramon Alcantara
was a minor and accordingly disavowing the contract.
 · After Gaw Chiao responded to the letter, Ramon Alcantara went to the office
of Gaw Chiao’s counsel ratifying the sale.
 · Ramon Alcantara received from Gaw Chiao the sum of P500 as payment for
the sold parcels of land.
 · On August 8, 1940, an action was instituted by Ramon Alcantara in the Court
of First Instance of Laguna for the annulment of the deed of sale on the ground of his
minority at the time of sale. Action was denied a n d S ia S u a n , Gaw Chiao,
Ramon’s father and brother, Nicolas and Antonio Azores were absolved
  · Ramon brought the case to CA; CFI decision reversed.
 · Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
· Whether or not Ramon Alcantara’s execution of the deed of sale is valid despite being a
minor at the time of its execution.

Held:
Ramon Alcantara in his minority may not be allowed to execute the deed of sale but his
act of ratification, the contract was given a binding effect.
Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao versus Ramon Alcantara Digest

Facts: On August 3, 1931, appellant Sia Suan executed a deed of sale with Rufino Alcantara
and his sons Damaso Alcantara and appellee Ramon Alcantara, conveying five parcels of
land to said petitioner. Ramon Alcantara was then 17 years, 10 months and 22 days old. On
August 27, 1931, Gaw Chiao (husband of Sia Suan) received a letter from Francisco Alfonso,
attorney of Ramon Alcantara, informing Gaw Chiao that Ramon Alcantara was a minor and
accordingly disavowing the contract. After being contacted by Gaw Chiao, however, Ramon
Alcantara executed an affidavit ratifying the deed of sale. On said occasion Ramon Alcantara
received from Gaw Chiao the sum of P500. In the meantime, Sia Suan sold one of the lots to
Nicolas Azores from whom Antonio Azores inherited the same. On August 8, 1940, an action
was instituted by respondent Ramon Alcantara in the CFI (Court of First Instance) of
Laguna for the annulment of the deed of sale as regards his undivided share in the two
parcels of land covered by certificates of title Nos. 751 and 752 of Laguna. The CFI of Laguna
rendered a decision in favor of appellee Alcantara in view of his minority during the
execution of the contract. Thus, this appeal by certiorari of Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao.

Issue: Whether or not the Deed of Sale executed on August 31, 1931 is null and void

Ruling: No. The SC ruled that Ramon is not allowed to annul such deed, because he already
ratified it. The letter written by him informing the appellants of his minority constituted an
effective disaffirmance of the sale, and that although the choice to disaffirm will not by itself
avoid the contract until the courts adjudge the agreement to be invalid, said notice shielded
Ramon from laches and consequent estoppel.. Ramon may have executed his acts in bad faith
for he earned money from Gaw Chiao as a result of the sale and its ratification, yet he
summons the courts to annul the sale because he executed it while still a minor. The appealed
decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and the appellants absolved from the complaint,
with costs against the appellee, Ramon Alcantara

De Branzaga v. De villa Abrille

Facts:

Rosario Braganza and her sons loaned from De Villa Abrille P70,000 in Japanese war notes and
in consideration thereof, promised in writing to pay him P10,00 + 2% per annum in legal currency
of the Philippines 2 years after the cessation of the war. Because they have no paid, Abrille sued
them in March 1949. The Manila court of first instance and CA held the family solidarily liable to
pay according to the contract they signed. The family petitioned to review the decision of the CA
whereby they were ordered to solidarily pay De Villa Abrille P10,000 + 2% interest, praying for
consideration of the minority of the Braganza sons when they signed the contract.

They also averred that Guillermo and Rodolfo were minors when they signed the promissory note
Court of Appeals found them liable pursuant to the following reasoning:

. . . . These two appellants did not make it appears in the promissory note that they were not yet
of legal age. If they were really to their creditor, they should have appraised him on their
incapacity, and if the former, in spite of the information relative to their age, parted with his
money, then he should be contended with the consequence of his act. But, that was not the
case. Perhaps defendants in their desire to acquire much needed money, they readily and
willingly signed the promissory note, without disclosing the legal impediment with respect to
Guillermo and Rodolfo. When minor, like in the instant case, pretended to be of legal age, in fact
they were not, they will not later on be permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the
obligation contracted by them or to have it annulled. (Mercado, et al. vs. Espiritu, 37 Phil., 215.)
[Emphasis Ours.]
Issue: WON the minors are liable for the PN?
Ruling: No, in order to hold the infant liable, the fraud must be actual and not
constructive. It has been held that his mere silence when making a contract as to his age
does not constitute a fraud which can be made the basis of an action of deceit
Ratio:

minors' failure to disclose their minority in the same promissory note they signed, it does not
follow as a legal proposition, that they will not be permitted thereafter to assert it. They had no
juridical duty to disclose their inability. In fact, according to Corpuz Juris Secundum,

. . . . Some authorities consider that a false representation as to age including a

contract as part of the contract and accordingly hold that it cannot be the basis of
an action in tort. Other authorities hold that such misrepresentation may be the
basis of such an action, on the theory that such misrepresentation is not a part
of, and does not grow out of, the contract, or that the enforcement of liability for
such misrepresentation as tort does not constitute an indirect of enforcing liability
on the contract. In order to hold infant liable, however, the fraud must be actual and
not constructure. It has been held that his mere silence when making a contract as to
age does not constitute a fraud which can be made the basis of an action of decit.

The fraud of which an infant may be held liable to one who contracts with him in the
belief that he is of full age must be actual not constructive, and mere failure of the infant
to disclose his age is not sufficient.

HOWEVER The boys, though not bound by the provisions of the contract, are still liable to pay
the actual amount they have profited from the loan. Art. 1340 states that even if the written
contract is unenforceable because of their non-age, they shall make restitution to the extent that
they may have profited by the money received.
Notes:
Only the boys are relieved not their mother so the mother is still liable for the 1/3+interest
US v. Vaquilar (Killing his Wife and Daughter)

Facts: Evaristo Vaquilar was found guilty of killing his wife and his daughter, as well as injuring
other persons with a bolo. Eyewitnesses testified that the defendant appeared to be insane prior to
the commission of the crimes. They also testified that the appellant was complaining of pains in
his head and stomach prior to the killing. The witnesses’ evidence for insanity include:

• “appellants eyes were very big and red with his sight penetrating at the time he was killing
his wife.”

• “he looked at me he was crazy because if he was not, he wouldn’t have killed his family”

• at the moment of cutting those people, “he looked like a madman; crazy because he would
cut anybody at random”

• sister said, “…then he pursued me….he must have been crazy because he cut me”

Issue: Whether or not these pieces of evidence are sufficient to declare the accused as insane,
therefore exempt from criminal liability.

Held: The evidence is insufficient to declare him insane. The appellant’s conduct was consistent
with the acts of an enraged criminal, not of a person with an unsound mind at the time he committed
the crimes. The fact that a person acts crazy is not conclusive that he is insane. The popular
meaning of “crazy” is not synonymous with the legal terms “insane”. The conduct of the appellant
after he was confined in jail is not inconsistent with the actions of a sane person (not saying a word
in the cell, crying out loud at night) who has reflected and felt remorse after the commission of the
crime.

The court further held that mere mental depravity, or moral insanity which results not from any
disease of the mind, but from a perverted condition of the moral system where the person is
mentally sane, does not exempt one from criminal responsibility. In the absence of proof that the
defendant had lost his reason or became demented after a few moments prior to or during the
perpetration of the crime, it is presumed that he was in a normal state of mind.