GRACE NOTES
COURT OF APPEALS
A. GENERAL MATTERS
ANTIPORDA V. GARCHITORENA
G.R. No. L-133289, 321 SCRA 551, December 23, 1999
FACTS: Petitioners were charged with the crime of kidnapping
one Elmer Ramos filed before the Sandiganbayan without
claiming that one of the accused is a public officer who took
advantage of his position. The information was amended to
effectively describe the offense charged herein and for the
court to effectively exercise its jurisdiction over the same by
stating that Antiporda took advantage of his position. Accused
filed a motion for new preliminary investigation and to hold in
abeyance and/or recall warrant of arrest issued. The same was
denied. The accused subsequently filed a motion to quash the
amended information for lack of jurisdiction over the offense
charged because of the amended information. This was denied
as well as the MR on the same. Hence, this petition before the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
subject matter.
RULING: YES. They are estopped from assailing the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan. The original Information filed with the
Sandiganbayan did not mention that the offense committed by
the accused is office-related. It was only after the same was
filed that the prosecution belatedly remembered that a
jurisdictional fact was omitted therein. However, we hold that
the petitioners are estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan for in the supplemental arguments to
motion for reconsideration and/or reinvestigation dated June
10, 1997 filed with the same court, it was they who "challenged
the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over the case and
clearly stated in their Motion for Reconsideration that the said
crime is work connected.
Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for
administering justice, that is, for hearing and deciding cases. In
order for the court to have authority to dispose of the case on
the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties. In the case of Arula vs. Espino it was quite clear
that all three requisites, i.e., jurisdiction over the offense,
territory and person, must concur before a court can acquire
jurisdiction to try a case. It is undisputed that the
Sandiganbayan had territorial jurisdiction over the case. And
we are in accord with the petitioners when they contended
that when they filed a motion to quash it was tantamount to a
voluntary submission to the Court's authority.
CRUZ V.
G.R. No. 123340. August 29, 2002
FACTS: Lutgarda Cruz was charged with the crime of “Estafa
through Falsification of Public Document” before the Manila
Regional Trial Court.
Petitioner executed before a Notary Public in the City of Manila
an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of a parcel of land stating that
she was the sole surviving heir of the registered owner when
in fact she knew there were other surviving heirs. Since the
offended party did not reserve the right to file a separate civil
action arising from the criminal offense, the civil action was
deemed instituted in the criminal case. On January 28, 1994,
petitioner received a copy of the decision. On February 10,
1994, petitioner filed by registered mail a motion for
reconsideration dated February 7, 1994, assailing the trial
court’s ruling on the civil aspect of the criminal case. Petitioner
furnished the City Prosecutor a copy of the motion by
registered mail. Left with no recourse, petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of Appeals
to nullify the two assailed orders of the trial court. Petitioner
also asked the Court of Appeals to compel the trial court to
resolve her motion for reconsideration of the decision dated
February 7, 1994.After trial on the merits, the trial court
rendered its decision dated January 17, 1994acquitting
petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt. In the same
decision, the trial court rendered judgment on the civil aspect
of the case, ordering the return to the surviving heirs of the
parcel of land located in Bulacan.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC of Manila had jurisdiction over
the civil aspect of the case
RULING: Yes. The RTC of Manila has jurisdiction to render
judgment on the civil aspect of the Criminal Case. There are
three important requisites which must be present before a
court can acquire criminal jurisdiction. First, the court must
have jurisdiction over the subject matter. Second, the court
must have jurisdiction over the territory where the offense
was committed. Third, the court must have jurisdiction over
the person of the accused.
In the instant case, the trial court had jurisdiction over the
subject matter as the law has conferred on the court the power
to hear and decide cases involving estafa through falsification
of a public document. The trial court also had jurisdiction over
the offense charged since the crime was committed within its
territorial jurisdiction. The trial court also acquired jurisdiction
over the person of accused-petitioner because she voluntarily
submitted to the court’s authority. Where the court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of the
accused, and the crime was committed within its territorial
jurisdiction, the court necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all
issues that the law requires the court to resolve. One of the
issues in a criminal case is the civil liability of the accused
arising from the crime. Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that “[E]very person criminally liable for a felony is
also civilly liable.” Article 104 of the same Code states that
“civil liability x x x includes restitution.”
COJUANGCO V. SANDIGANBAYAN
(Quisumbing, December 21, 1998)
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
a probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. The clause unequivocally means
that the judge must make his own determination—
independent of that of the prosecutor — of whether there is
probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest, based on the
complainant's and his witnesses' accounts, if any. Supporting
evidence other than the report and recommendation of the
investigators and the special prosecutor should be examined
by the court
FACTS: January 12, 1990, a complaint was filed by the Office of
the Solicitor General before the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG), petitioner, former Administrator of
the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA), and the former
members of the PCA Governing Board, petitioner among them,
for violation of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act for having conspired and confederated
together and taking undue advantage of their public positions
and/or using their powers; authority, influence, connections or
relationship with the former President Ferdinand E. Marcos
and former First Lady, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos without
authority, granted a donation in the amount of Two Million
Pesos (P2,000,000.00) to the Philippine Coconut Producers
Federation (COCOFED), a private entity, using PCA special
fund, thereby giving COCOFED unwarranted benefits,
advantage and preference through manifest partiality, evident
bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence to the grave (sic)
and prejudice of the Filipino people and to the Republic of the
Philippines.
Subsequently, however, the Court ruled that all proceedings in
the preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG were null
and void and the PCGG was directed to transmit the
complaints and records of the case to the Office of the
Ombudsman for appropriate action.
In a Resolution dated June 2, 1992, the panel of investigators
recommended the filling of an Information for violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Resolution dated June 2, 1992
was referred by Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L.
Aportadera, Jr. to the Office of the Special Prosecutor for
review and if warranted, for the preparation of the criminal
information. In a memorandum dated July l5, 1992 the Office
of the Special Prosecutor affirmed the recommendation as
contained in the Resolution dated June 2,1992. August 19,
1992 then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez ordered the
panel of investigators to discuss the merits of the prejudicial
question posed by respondent Lobregat. In a Memorandum
dated December 1, 1993 the panel of investigators
recommended that the motion to suspend proceedings be
granted. On December 3, 1993 then Ombudsman Vasquez
referred for comment to the Office of the Special Prosecutors
the Memorandum dated December 1, 1993 of the panel of
investigators on the issue of the existence of prejudicial
question. On February 17, 1995, an order for the arrest of
petitioner was issued by the respondent Sandiganbayan. On
February 22, 1995, petitioner posted bail. On the same day he
likewise filed, through counsel, a Manifestation stating that he
was posting bail without prejudice to the Opposition To
Issuance of Warrant of Arrest with Motion For Leave To File a
Motion For Reconsideration of the Ombudsman's Resolution
which he filed. In a Resolution dated February 20, 1995, the
respondent Sandiganbayan barred petitioner from leaving the
country except upon approval of the court. On May 25, 1995,
petitioner was conditionally arraigned pleading not guilty to
the Information. In the meantime, in a Memorandum dated
October 22, 1995, Special Prosecution Officer Victorio U.
Tabanguil found no probable cause to warrant the filing
against petitioner and recommended the dismissal of the case.
There commendation for dismissal was approved by the
Honorable Ombudsman on November 15, 1996. On December
13, 1996 petitioner filed an Urgent Motion To Dismiss alleging
that with the reversal of the earlier findings of the Ombudsman
of probable cause, there was therefore nothing on record
before the respondent Sandiganbayan which would warrant
the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the assumption of
jurisdiction over the instant case.
ISSUES:
WON the warrant of arrest issued by respondent
Sandiganbayan is null and void, or should now be lifted if
initially valid? YES
WON the Sandiganbayan still acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the petitioner? YES
RULING:
Sandiganbayan had two pieces of documents to consider when
it resolved to issue the warrant of arrest against the accused:
a. the Resolution dated June 2, 1992 of the Panel of
Investigators of the Office of the Ombudsman recommending
the filing of the Information and b. the Memorandum dated
June 16, 1995 of the Office of the Special Prosecutor denying
the existence of a prejudicial question which will warrant the
suspension of the criminal case. The Sandiganbayan had
nothing more to support its resolution.
The Sandiganbayan failed to abide by the constitutional
mandate of Personally determining the existence of probable
cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. The 2 cited document
above were the product of somebody else’s determination,
insufficient to support a finding of probable cause by the
Sandiganbayan.
FUKUZUME V. PEOPLE
FACTS: Sometime in July 1991, Yu, a businessman engaged in
buying and selling aluminum scrap wires, accompanied by
Jovate, went to the house of Fukuzume in Parañaque. Jovate
introduced Fukuzume to Yu telling the latter that Fukuzume is
from Furukawa Electric Corporation and that he has at his
disposal aluminum scrap wires. Fukuzume confirmed this
information and told Yu that the scrap wires belong to
Furukawa but they are under the care of NAPOCOR. Believing
Fukuzume’s representation to be true, Yu agreed to buy the
aluminum scrap wires from Fukuzume. This transaction later
turned uneventful as Fukuzume failed to comply his
undertaking to return Yu’s money when Yu was refused by
NAPOCOR, thus, prompting Yu to file an estafa case.
Upon arraignment, Fukuzume pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued,
finding the accused guilty as charged. Aggrieved by the trial
court’s decision, he appealed to CA but CA affirmed the trial
courts’ decision modifying only the penalty, hence, the
petition before the SC.
ISSUE: WON the trial court of Makati has jurisdiction over the
offense charged
RULING: SC answered on the negative. We agree with
Fukuzume’s contention that the CA erred in ruling that the RTC
of Makati has jurisdiction over the offense charged.
The CA ruled on the basis of the sworn statement of Yu filed
with the NBI and the affidavit subscribed by Fukuzume. With
respect to the sworn statement of Yu, which was presented in
evidence by the prosecution, it is clear that he alleged that he
gave Fukuzume the amount of P50,000.00 at the
Intercontinental Hotel in Makati. However, we agree with
Fukuzume’s contention that Yu testified during his direct
examination that he gave the amount of P50,000.00 to
Fukuzume in the latter’s house. It is not disputed that
Fukuzume’s house is located in Parañaque.
Settled is the rule that whenever there is inconsistency
between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court,
the testimony commands greater weight considering that
affidavits taken ex parte are inferior to testimony given in
court, the former being almost invariably incomplete and
oftentimes inaccurate.
More importantly, we find nothing in the direct or cross-
examination of Yu to establish that he gave any money to
Fukuzume or transacted business with him with respect to the
subject aluminum scrap wires inside or within the premises of
the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati, or anywhere in Makati for
that matter. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of
jurisdiction. Citing Uy vs. Court of Appeals: However, if the
evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was
committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the
action for want of jurisdiction.
The crime was alleged in the Information as having been
committed in Makati. However, aside from the sworn
statement executed by Yu, the prosecution presented no other
evidence, testimonial or documentary, to corroborate Yu’s
sworn statement or to prove that any of the above-
enumerated elements of the offense charged was committed
in Makati. From the foregoing, it is evident that the
prosecution failed to prove that Fukuzume committed the
crime of estafa in Makati or that any of the essential
ingredients of the offense took place in the said city. Hence,
the judgment of the trial court convicting Fukuzume of the
crime of estafa should be set aside for want of jurisdiction,
without prejudice, however, to the filing of appropriate
charges with the court of competent jurisdiction.
CUDIA V. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Renato Cudia was arrested on June 28, 1989 in Mabalacat,
Pampanga for the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunition. He was brought to Sto. Domingo, Angeles City
which a preliminary investigation was conducted and as a
result the City Prosecutor filed an information against him. The
case against him was raffled to Branch 60 of the Regional Trial
Court of Angeles City. Upon his arraignment, the court called
the attention of the parties and contrary to the information,
Renatio Cudia had committed the offense in Mabalacat and
not in Angeles City. Thus the judge ordered that the case
should be assigned to a court involving crimes committed
outside Angeles City consequently it was assigned to Branch 56
of the Angeles City RTC. However, the Provincial Prosecutor of
Pampanga filed an information charging Renato Cudio with the
same crime and it was likewise assigned to Branch 56 of the
Angeles City RTC which resulted into two Information filed
with the same crime. This prompted the City Prosecutor to file
a Motion to Dismiss/ Withdraw the Information which the trial
court granted. Renato filed a Motion to Quash the criminal
case filed by the Provincial Prosecutor on the ground that his
continued prosecution for the offense of illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition for which he had been arraigned in
the first criminal case, and which had been dismissed despite
his opposition would violate his right not to be put twice in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The trial court
denied the motion to quash; hence, petitioner raised the issue
to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, stating that there
was no double jeopardy, dismissed the same on the ground
that the petition could not have been convicted under the first
information as the same was defective. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied; hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it
found that the City Prosecutor of Angeles City did not have the
authority to file the first information
RULING: No. It is plainly apparent that the City Prosecutor of
Angeles City had no authority to file the first information, the
offense having been committed in the Municipality of
Mabalacat, which is beyond his jurisdiction. Presidential
Decree No.1275, in relation to Section 9 of the Administrative
Code of 1987, pertinently provides that:
Sec. 11. The provincial or the city fiscal shall:
b) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of
crimes, misdemeanors and violations of all penal laws and
ordinances within their respective jurisdictions and have the
necessary information or complaint prepared or made against
the persons accused. In the conduct of such investigations he
or his assistants shall receive the sworn statements or take oral
evidence of witnesses summoned by subpoena for the
purpose. It is thus the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not
the City Prosecutor, who should prepare information for
offenses committed within Pampanga but outside of Angeles
City. An information, when required to be filed by a public
prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by another. It must be
exhibited or presented by the prosecuting attorney or
someone authorized by law. If not, the court does not acquire
jurisdiction. In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient
complaint or information in the former prosecution. As the
fiscal had no authority to file the information, the dismissal of
the first information would not be a bar to petitioner's
subsequent prosecution. As the first information was fatally
defective for lack of authority of the officer filing it, the instant
petition must fail for failure to comply with all the requisites
necessary to invoke double jeopardy. Thus Motion for
Reconsideration is DENIED.
UY V. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: In Uy vs Sandiganbayan [G.R. Nos. 105965-70. August
9, 1999], petitioner Uy, who was Deputy Comptroller of the
Philippine navy and designated as Assistant Chief of Naval Staff
for Comptrollership was charged with estafa through
falsification of official documents and violation of RA 3019. The
petitioner filed a motion to quash, arguing that the
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the offense charged
and that the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor had no
authority to file the offense.
The court ruled that:
1. It is the court-martial, not the Sandiganbayan, which has
jurisdiction to try petitioner since he was a regular officer of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and fell squarely under
Article 2 of the Articles of War mentioned in Section 1(b) of
P.D. 1850, “Providing for the trial by courts-martial of
members of the Integrated National Police and further
defining the jurisdiction of courts-martial over members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines”
2. As to the violations of Republic Act No. 3019, the
petitioner does not fall within the “rank” requirement stated
in Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, thus, exclusive
jurisdiction over petitioner is vested in the regular courts , as
amended by R.A. No. 8249, which states that “In cases where
none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to
Salary Grade ‘27’ or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic
Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above,
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal
trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be,
pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.”
In this connection, it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman,
who has the authority to file the corresponding information/s
against petitioner in the regional trial court. The Ombudsman
exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan.
In February 20, 2000, a motion for clarification which in fact
appeared to be a partial motion for reconsideration was filed
by the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor filed, which
was denied.
The instant case is a Motion for Further Clarification filed by
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto of the Court's ruling in its
decision dated August 9, 1999 and resolution dated February
22, 2000.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecutory power of the
Ombudsman extends only to cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and that the Ombudsman has no authority to
prosecute cases falling within the jurisdiction of regular courts.
RULING: No. The Ombudsman is clothed with authority to
conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute all criminal
cases involving public officers and employees, not only those
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, but those within
the jurisdiction of the regular courts as well. The power to
investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the
Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act
or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.
The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts.
It has been held that the clause "any illegal act or omission of
any public official" is broad enough to embrace all kinds of
malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance committed by
public officers and employees during their tenure of office.
The exercise by the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction
over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not
incompatible with the discharge of his duty to investigate and
prosecute other offenses committed by public officers and
employees. The prosecution of offenses committed by public
officers and employees is one of the most important functions
of the Ombudsman. In passing RA 6770, the Congress
deliberately endowed the Ombudsman with such power to
make him a more active and effective agent of the people in
ensuring accountability in public office.
Even a perusal of the law (PD 1630) originally creating the
Office of the Ombudsman then (to be known as the
Tanodbayan), and the amendatory laws issued subsequent
thereto will show that, at its inception, the Office of the
Ombudsman was already vested with the power to investigate
and prosecute civil and criminal cases before the
Sandiganbayan and even the regular courts.
CUYOS V. GARCIA
FACTS: Petitioner Alfredo Cuyos was charged with homicide
with multiple serious physical injuries and damage to property
through reckless imprudence before the Municipal Court of
San Fernando, Pampanga. Cuyos entered a plea of not guilty at
the arraignment and the judge set the case for trial, but before
it could commence, petitioner filed a Motion to Remand the
Case to the Court of First Instance. Cuyos claimed that there is
lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Municipal Court and
contended that the damages suffered by the Volkswagen he
hit amounted to P18,000.00. He argued that under Art. 365,
par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime would carry a fine
in an amount ranging from the amount of the damage to three
times the value of the damage alleged (i.e. 3 x P18,000.00 =
P54,000.00). Under S87 of the Judiciary Art of 1948, the
Municipal Court of Pampanga only has jurisdiction over
offenses punishable by a fine not exceeding P 6,000.00. Cuyos
filed an Urgent Motion to Postpose the Trial. The municipal
judge denied the motion to transfer and set the case for trial.
Cuyos’ verbal motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence,
the present petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Municipal Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga has jurisdiction to try the case against
Cuyos
RULING: The Court agrees with the position of the Solicitor
Geeral that the Municipal Court has no jurisdiction to try the
present case. The case at bar involves a complex crime of
homicide, multiple serious physical injuries and damage to
property resulting from reckless imprudence. Art. 365., par. 2
of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty imposable
upon petitioner, if found guilty of homicide through reckless
imprudence, would be prision correctional in its medium and
maximum periods. At the time the complaint was filed, the
Municipal Court had jurisdiction to impose a penalty of
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine not
exceeding P6,000.00 or both. Thus, because of the penalty for
damage to property through reckless imprudence or
negligence as provided in Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code
is, “a fine ranging from the amount equal to the value of
damages to three times such value, the case must be
forwarded to the Court of First Instance. Art. 365 simply means
that if there is only damage to property, the amount fixed shall
be imposed, but if there is also physical injuries, there should
be an additional penalty for the latter. The applicable rule on
allocation of jurisdiction on cases involving cases of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide or physical injuries is
summarized by Justice Barrera. Barreda stated that in such
cases, Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code is applicable, but there
may be cases when the imposable penalty is within the
jurisdiction of the Municipal Court, while the fine is under the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. Since the information
cannot be split into two, the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the fine imposable for the damage to property
resulting from the reckless imprudence. The maximum fine
imposable for the crime in this case is P54,000.00 and the
maximum imprisonment for homicide is six (6) years.
Therefore, the criminal charge falls outside the jurisdiction of
the Municipal Court and within the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court.
MOBILIA PRODUCTS V. UMEZAWA
FACTS: Umezawa, then the President and General Manager of
MPI, organized another company with his wife Kimiko, and his
sister, Mitsuyo Yaguchi, to be known as Astem Philippines
Corporation, without knowledge of the Board of Directors of
MPI. The said company would be engaged in the same business
as Mobilia. Umezawa stole products from MPI amounting to
P3,219,875.00. MPI and public prosecutor filed criminal
complaints against Umezawa. The trial court asserted that the
controversy involving the criminal cases was between
Umezawa and the other stockholders of MPI. It also held that
the SEC, not the trial court, had jurisdiction over intra-
corporate controversies. CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC that
the dispute between Umezawa and the other stockholders and
officers over the implementation of the MPI’s standard
procedure is intra-corporate in nature; hence, within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC. The petitioner MPI filed the
instant petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: WON CA is correct
RULING: Patently, then, based on the material allegations of
the information, the court a quo has exclusive jurisdiction over
the crimes charged. CA erred in holding that the dispute
between it and the respondent is intra-corporate in nature;
hence, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC. As gleaned
from the material allegations of the information, the RTC had
exclusive jurisdiction over the crimes charged. According to
Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129 Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except
those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent
jurisdiction of the body, except those now falling under the
exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter. Case law has it
that in order to determine the jurisdiction of the court in
criminal cases, the complaint or information must be
examined for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the
facts set out therein and the prescribed period provided for by
law are within the jurisdiction of the court, where the said
information or complaint is filed. It is settled that the
jurisdiction of the court in criminal cases is determined by the
allegations of the complaint or information and not by the
findings based on the evident of the court after trial.
Jurisdiction is conferred only the Constitution or by the law in
force at the time of the filing of the information or complaint.
Once jurisdiction is vested in the court, it is retained up to the
end of the litigation.
PANGALINAN V. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Mila Pangilinan was charged and convicted of the
Crime of Estafa before the RTC, a crime cognizable by MTC. She
brought the case to CA for new trial but the same was denied.
In her Petition for Review on Certiorari to the SC, she alleged
that the Decision of the trial court is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction over the crime charged. Relying in the landmark
case of Tijam vs. Sibanghanoy, the Office of the Solicitor
General contends that the appellant is barred from raising the
issue of jurisdiction, estoppels having already set in. In the
aforementioned case, the Court ruled: It has been held that a
party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure
affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or
failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction. In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule,
it was further said that the question whether the court had
jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the
parties was not important in such cases because the party is
barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order
of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for
the reason that such a practice cannot be tolerated obviously
for reasons of public policy.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is barred for raising the issue of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter because estoppel already
set in
RULING: No. The Office of the Solicitor General's reliance on
the said ruling is misplaced. The doctrine laid down in the Tijam
case is an exception to and not the general rule. Estoppel
attached to the party assailing the jurisdiction of the court, as
it was the same party who sought recourse in the said forum.
In the case at bar, appellant cannot in anyway be said to have
invoked the jurisdiction of the trial court. Thus, we apply the
general rule that jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be
conferred or waived by the parties. Even on appeal and even if
the reviewing parties did not raise the issue of jurisdiction, the
reviewing court is not precluded from ruling that the lower
court had no jurisdiction over the case: The operation of the
principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly
depends upon whether the lower court had jurisdiction or not.
If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided
upon the theory it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred,
on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same "must
exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent
of the parties or by estoppel. Estoppel in questioning the
jurisdiction of the court is only brought to bear when not to do
so will subvert the ends of justice.
VALDEPENAS V. PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: Jurisdiction over the person of an accused is
acquired upon either his apprehension, with or without
warrant, or his submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
FACTS: Appeal by Valdepenas from the decision of CA,
affirming that the CFI Cagayan, convicting him of the crime of
abduction with consent, and sentencing him to an
indeterminate penalty and to imdemnify Ester Ulsano. Ester
Ulsano, 17 years old, assisted by her mother filed forcible
abduction with rape against Valdepenas. CFI found him guilty
as charged. CA modified to abduction with consent.
Valdepenas filed an MR and MNT on the finding of minority at
time of occurrence which was granted but on retrial the prior
CA ruling was affirmed. Second MR based on lack of
jurisdiction of CFI was denied so he filed petition for certiorari.
Petitioner’s theory is that no complaint for abduction with
consent has been filed and the lower court acquired no
jurisdiction over his person or over the crime of abduction with
consent and had, therefore, no authority to convict him.
ISSUE: WON CA erred in not reversing CFI for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused and that subject
matter of the action for the offense of abduction with consent
RULING: No. Jurisdiction over the person of an accused is
acquired upon either his apprehension, with or without
warrant, or his submission to the jurisdiction of the court. In
the case at bar, it is not claimed that petitioner had not been
apprehended or had not submitted himself to the jurisdiction
of the court. Indeed, although brought before the bar of justice
as early as January 25, 1956, first, before the then justice of the
peace court of Piat, then before the CFI of Cagayan, later
before the CA, thereafter, back to CFI, and then, again, before
the CA, never, within the period of six (6) years had the
questioned the judicial authority of any of these three (3)
courts over his person. He is deemed waived whatever
objection he might have has to the jurisdiction over his person,
and, hence, to have submitted himself to the Court’s
jurisdiction. His behavior and every single one of the steps
taken by him before said courts – particularly the motions
therein filed by him – implied, not merely a submission to the
jurisdiction thereof, but, also, that he urged the courts to
exercise the authority therof over his person.
Abduction with consent – jurisdiction over a given crime, not
vested by law upon a particular court, may not be conferred
thereto by the parties involved in the offense.
In the case at bar, the offended woman and her mother have
negated such preference by filing the complaint and going
through the trials and tribulations concomitant with the
proceedings in this case, before several courts, for the last ten
(10) years. Petitioner says that the complaint was for forcible
abduction, not abduction with consent; but, as already
adverted to, the latter is included in the former.
This allegation implies that Ester is a minor living under patria
protestas, and, hence, single, thus leading to the presumption
that she is a virgin. She was taken by force from their dwelling
when her mother was away and brought to a secluded area
and raped.
CA and CFI affirmed. Cost against Valdepenas.
GIMENEZ V. NAZARENO
FACTS: On 3 August 1973, Samson Suan, Alex Potot, Rogelio
Mula, Fernando Cargando, Rogelio Baguio and Teodoro de la
Vega, Jr., were charged with the crime of murder. The accused
were arraigned and each of them pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged. Following the arraignment, the judge, Hon.
Ramon E. Nazareno, set the hearing of the case for 18
September 1973 at 1:00 p.m. All the accused were duly
informed of this. Before the scheduled date of the first hearing
the de la Vega escaped from his detention center and on the
said date, failed to appear in court. This prompted the fiscals
handling the case (Fiscal Celso M. Gimenez and Federico B.
Mercado) to file a motion with the lower court to proceed with
the hearing of the case against all the accused praying that de
la Vega, Jr. be tried in absentia invoking the application of
Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. Pursuant to the
above-written provision, the lower court proceeded with the
trial of the case but nevertheless gave de ala Vega the
opportunity to take the witness stand the moment he shows
up in court. After due trial, or on 6 November 1973, the lower
court rendered a decision dismissing the case against the other
five accused (Suan, et. al.) while holding in abeyance the
proceedings against de la Vega. On 16 November 1973,
Gimenez and Mercado filed a Motion for Reconsideration
questioning the dispositive portion of the court's decision on
the ground that it will render nugatory the constitutional
provision on "trial in absentia" cited earlier. However, this was
denied by the lower court in an Order dated 22 November
1973. Gimenez and Mercado filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether judgment upon an accused tried should be in
abeyance pending the appearance of the accused before the
court.
RULING: The second part of Section 19, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution provides that a "trial in absentia" may be had
when the following requisites are present:
(1) that there has been an arraignment
(2) that the accused has been notified;
(3) that he fails to appear and his failure to do so is unjustified.
Herein, all the above conditions were attendant calling for a
trial in absentia. De la Vega was arraigned on 22 August 1973
and in the said arraignment he pleaded not guilty. He was also
informed of the scheduled hearings set on September 18 and
19, 1973 and this is evidenced by his signature on the notice
issued by the lower court. It was also proved by a certified copy
of the Police Blotter that de la Vega escaped from his detention
center. No explanation for his failure to appear in court in any
of the scheduled hearings was given. Even the trial court
considered his absence unjustified.
The lower court correctly proceeded with the reception of the
evidence of the prosecution and the other accused in the
absence of de la Vega, but it erred when it suspended the
proceedings as to de la Vega and rendered a decision as to the
other accused only. Upon the termination of a trial in absentia,
the court has the duty to rule upon the evidence presented in
court. The court need not wait for the time until the accused
who escape from custody finally decides to appear in court to
present his evidence and cross-examine the witnesses against
him. To allow the delay of proceedings for this purpose is to
render ineffective the constitutional provision on trial in
absentia. Still, the accused remain to be presumed innocent, a
judgment of conviction must still be based upon the evidence
presented in court, and such evidence must prove him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. There can be no violation of due
process since the accused was given the opportunity to be
heard. By his failure to appear during the trial of which he had
notice, he virtually waived the rights to cross-examine and to
present evidence on his behalf. Thus, an escapee who has been
duly tried in absentia waives his right to present evidence on
his own behalf and to confront and cross-examine witnesses
who testified against him.
DOCTRINE: The trial against the fugitives, just like those of the
others, should have been brought to its ultimate conclusion.
Thereafter, the trial court had the duty to rule on the evidence
presented by the prosecution against all the accused and to
render its judgment accordingly. It should not wait for the
fugitives’ re-appearance or re-arrest. They were deemed to
have waived their right to present evidence on their own
behalf and to confront and cross-examine the witnesses who
testified against them.
MIRANDA V. TULIAO
FACTS: On March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in
Ramon, Isabela which were later identified as the bodies of
Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of the private
respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness
protection program.
Two Informations for murder were filed against 5 police
officers including SPO2 Maderal in the RTC of Santiago City.
The venue was later transferred to the RTC of Manila. The RTC
convicted the accused and sentenced them two counts of
reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be
arraigned at that time being at large. Upon automatic review,
the SC acquitted the accused on the ground of reasonable
doubt.
In Sept. 1999, Maderal was arrested. He executed a sworn
confession and identified the petitioners as the ones
responsible for the death of the victims, so, Tuliao filed a
criminal complaint for murder against the petitioners. Acting
Presiding Judge Tumaliuan issued a warrant of arrest against
the petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.
Then, the petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete
preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall or
quash the warrant of arrest. In the hearing of the urgent
motion, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of the petitioners
and issued a Joint order denying the urgent motion on the
ground that since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over
their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the
court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an accused can seek judicial relief if he does
not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court
Whether or not a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires
jurisdiction over the person of the accused
RULING: No, one who seeks affirmative relief is deemed to
have submitted to the Jurisdiction of the Court. Adjudication
of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither
jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody of law
over the body of the accused.
Citing Santiago v. Vasquez, there is a distinction between the
custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of
the law is required before the Court can act upon the
application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of
other relief sought by the dependant where by mere
application, thereof, constitutes a waiver of the defence of lack
of jurisdiction over the person accused.
PADERANGA V. DRILON
FACTS: Definition of Preliminary Examination – Generally
inquisitorial, often only means of discovering the persons who
may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal
to prepare his complaint or information.
The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound
discretion of the Fiscal. He has the quasi-judicial discretion to
determine wither or not a criminal case should be filed in
Court.
GENERAL RULE: Injunction will not be granted to restrain a
criminal prosecution
Exception (Brocka vs Enrile):
1. Afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights
of the accused
2. Necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to
avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions
3. When there is a prejudicial question
4. When the acts of the officers are without or excess of
authority
5. Double jeopardy is clearly apparent
6. When the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense
7. A case of persecution rather than prosecution
8. The charges are manifestly false and motivated by
vengeance
9. Clearly no Prima Facie case against the accused
The right of the accused to ask clarificatory questions is not
ABSOLUTE.
QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE required in preliminary investigation
is such such evidence sufficient to “engender” a well-founded
belief as to the fact of the omission of a crime and respondents
probable guilt.
CRESPO V. MOGUL
FACTS: Petitioner Mario Crespo was accused for Estafa in the
Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City. When the case was set
for arraignment, the accused filed a motion for defer
arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition
for review filed with the Secretary of Justice. However, Justice
Mogul denied the motion, but the arraignment was deferred
in a much later date to afford time for the petitioner to elevate
the mater to the appellate court.
The accused filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction to the CA. The CA
ordered the trial court to refrain from proceeding with the
arraignment until further orders of the Court. Undersecretary
of Justice, Hon. Catalino Macaraig Jr., resolved the petition for
review reversed the resolution of the office of the Provincial
Fiscal and directed the Fiscal to move for immediate dismissal
of the information filed against the accused. Judge Mogul
denied the motion for dismissal of the case ad set the
arraignment. The accused then filed a petition for Certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with petition for the issuance of
preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining
order in the CA. The CA dismissed the order and lifted the
restraining order.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court may refuse to grant a motion to
dismiss filed by the Fiscal under orders from the Secretary of
Justice and insists on arraignment and trial on the merits.
RULING: It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either
commenced by complaint or by information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. 17 The
institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound
discretion of the fiscal. The reason for placing the criminal
prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to
prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private
persons. 19 It cannot be controlled by the complainant.
However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without
any limitation or control. The same is subject to the approval
of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as
the case maybe and it may be elevated for review to the
Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or
reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal. Consequently, the
Secretary of Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss the
case be filed in Court or otherwise, that an information be filed
in Court.
The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a
criminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over
the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the
case. The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for
the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists
warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon
the filing of the information in the proper court.
ISIP V. PEOPLE
FACTS: Petitioner Manuel Isip was charged with Estafa before
the RTC of Cavite City, after he allegedly received from
complainant, Atty. Jose, a seven-carat diamond men’s ring
valued at P200,000.00, for the purpose of selling the same on
commission basis and to deliver the proceeds of the sale
thereof or return the same if not sold. Petitioner denied
receiving the jewelry and failed to return the ring or proceeds
of the sale even after repeated demand. On the other hand,
petitioner’s wife, Marietta Isip, was indicted before the same
court for 7 counts of Violation of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law)
after she issued checks in payment for assorted pieces of
jewelry she received from Atty. Jose which were subsequently
dishonoured for insufficiency of funds. The complainant
alleged that the foregoing transactions happened at his
ancestral house in Cavite while he was on leave of absence
from the Bureau of Customs. In defense, petitioner averred
that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case because he and
his wife had transactions with the complainant at the latter’s
residence located at Plaza Tower Condominium in Manila as
both of them were also Manila residents. Despite this, the trial
court found them guilty of the said allegations. Upon appeal to
the CA, Marietta Isip died before any decision could have been
promulgated thereby extinguishing her criminal and civil
liability. However, the CA still affirmed Manuel Isip’s conviction
for estafa, hence this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the offense
imputed to petitioner and for which he was convicted.
RULING: Yes. The complainant had sufficiently shown that the
transaction took place in his home in Cavite. Since it has been
shown that venue was properly laid, it is now petitioner’s task
to prove otherwise. In the instant case, petitioner failed to
establish by sufficient and competent evidence that the
transaction happened in Manila due to the following reasons:
a. Even if petitioner lives in Manila and the issued checks were
drawn against banks in Manila or Makati, it still does not prove
that the transactions did not happen in Cavite. Distance will
not prevent any person from going to a distant place where he
can procure goods he can sell to earn a living. b. It is settled
that when the RTC’s findings have been affirmed by the
appellate court, said findings are generally conclusive and
binding upon this Court.
PEOPLE V. TAROY
FACTS: Mila is Taroy’s wife. Mila has an eldest daughter from
her first marriage named Des. The couple lived with Mila’s
children in Benguet at the boundary of Baguio City. According
to Des, when she was still 10 years old, Taroy raped her when
she was alone cleaning their house. She was told not to tell
anyone lest Mila and her siblings would suffer harm. This
incident was followed by another sexual abuse on the next
year. This time it occurred inside Des’ bedroom where Taroy
pointed a knife at her and ordered her to undress and submit
to his sexual desires. Des only confided the story to her mother
and aunt four years later. They accompanied her to the NBI to
complain. She also underwent medical examination where it
was revealed that there was indeed a history of previous blunt
force caused by an insertion of an erect penis. The public
prosecutor charged Taroy with two counts of before the RTC
of La Trinidad, Benguet. Correspondingly, the RTC convicted
Taroy of the offense and penalized him to suffer reclusion
perpetua. Taroy challenged the Benguet RTC’s jurisdiction over
the crimes charged contending that their residence where the
alleged offenses took place was at the boundary of Baguio City.
The RTC held, however, that Taroy’s testimony that their
residence was in Baguio City did not strip the court of its
jurisdiction since he waived the jurisdictional requirement. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. It held that
the prosecution has sufficiently established the jurisdiction of
the RTC. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: WON the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet has jurisdiction to
hear the rape cases against Taroy.
RULING: Appeal DISMISSED.
Venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases. It can neither be
waived nor subjected to stipulation. The right venue must exist
as a matter of law. Thus, for territorial jurisdiction to attach,
the criminal action must be instituted and tried in the proper
court of the municipality, city, or province where the offense
was committed or where any of its essential ingredients took
place. The Informations filed with the RTC of La Trinidad state
that the crimes were committed in the victim and the
offender’s house in City Limit, Tuding, Municipality of Itogon,
Province of Benguet. This allegation conferred territorial
jurisdiction over the subject offenses on the RTC of La Trinidad,
Benguet. The testimonies of Mila and Des as well as the
affidavit of arrest point to this fact.
Clearly, Taroy’s uncorroborated assertion that the subject
offenses took place in Baguio City is not entitled to belief.
Besides, he admitted during the pre-trial in the case that it was
the RTC of La Trinidad that had jurisdiction to hear the case.
Taken altogether, that RTC’s jurisdiction to hear the case is
beyond dispute.
BONIFACIO V. RTC OF MAKATI
FACTS: Petitioners Bonifacio et al were charged with the crime
of libel after private respondent Gimenez, on behalf of
Yuchengco family and Malayan Insurance Co., filed a criminal
complaint before the Makati City Prosecutor for libel under
Article 355 in relation to Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code.
The complaint alleged that petitioners, together with several
John Does, publicly and maliciously with intention of attacking
the honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character and
reputation of Malayan Insurance Co. Inc., and Yuchengco
family for exposing them to public hatred and contempt, and
published in the said website http://www.pepcoalition.com a
defamatory article persuading the public to remove their
investments and policies from the said company. This is after
the petitioners filed to seek their redress for their pecuniary
loss under the policies they obtained from the company.
Makati City Prosecutor, after finding probable cause to indict
the petitioners, filed separate information against them.
Petitioners filed before the respondent RTC of Makati a Motion
to Quash on the grounds that it failed to vest jurisdiction on
the Makati RTC; the acts complained of in the Information are
not punishable by law since internet libel is not covered by
Article 353 of the RPC. Petitioners maintained that the
Information failed to allege a particular place within the trial
courts jurisdiction where the subject article was printed and
first published or that the offended parties resided in Makati
at the time the alleged defamatory material was printed and
first published, and the prosecution erroneously laid the venue
of the case in the place where the offended party accessed the
internet-published article.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners’ Motion to Quash due to lack of

jurisdiction is valid

RULING: Yes. Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such

that the place where the crime was committed determines not
only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential
element of jurisdiction. The venue of libel cases where the
complainant is a private individual is limited to only either of
two places, namely: 1) where the complainant actually resides
at the time of the commission of the offense; or 2) where the
alleged defamatory article was printed and first published.

The Amended Information in the case opted to lay the venue

by stating that the offending article was first published and
accessed by the private complainant in Makati City. In other
words, it considered the phrase to be equivalent to the
requisite allegation of printing and first publication. This is
wrong. For the court to hold that the Amended Information
sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts of Makati simply
because the defamatory article was accessed therein would
open the floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other
locations where the pepcoalition website is likewise accessed
or capable of being accessed. This goes against the purpose as
to why Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted. It lays down
specific rules as to the venue of the criminal action so as to
prevent the offended party in written defamation cases from
inconveniencing the accused by means of out-of-town libel
suits, meaning complaints filed in remote municipal courts.

IN FINE, the public respondent committed grave abuse of

discretion in denying petitioners motion to quash the
Amended Information.