Mind Association

Which Word Wears the Trousers?

Author(s): S. Coval and Terry Forrest
Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 76, No. 301 (Jan., 1967), pp. 73-82
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2252028 .
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VI.-WHICH WORD WEARS THE TROUSERS?
By S. COVALand TERRY FORREST *

THERE is now in vogue, we think, an argument which changes

the status of the concept Real by suggesting a surprising and
highly gnomic inversion. This view is that the grammatically
affirmative uses of 'real' are actually negative or dependent or
merely exclusive in their function while it is the grammnatically
negative uses which are basic. As could be expected this counter-
intuitive inversion and its implications are being put to work with
concepts other than Real.' We want here, however, to attack
this argument by re-examining some of the relevant relations
between such expressions as 'that's a real x' and 'that's not a
real x'.
John Austin, in Sense and Sensibilia (63-77), puts forward
this intriguing idea that the normal direction of dependence
between a paired set of terms in which one clearly wears a negative,
and the other does not, is in certain instances surprisinglyreversed.
Thus, one might say with him, a trouser-word is that member of
the pair which although it wears a negative actually has the nor-
mal affirmative function. A 'skirt-word', although he does not
use the term, would be one which appears as the affirmative or
positive member but actually is the dependent one. 'A real x'
and 'not a real x ' are cases in point of such pairs whereof the
negative-appearing member is basic. Of such cases Austin says,
" It is usually thought, and I dare say usually rightly thought,
that what one might call the affirmative use of a term is basic-
that, to understand 'x' we need to know what it is to be x or
to be an x, and that knowing this apprises us of what it is not to
be x or not to be an x. But with ' real ' it is the negativeuse which
wears the trousers " (70). Thus, to use some of Austin's and Roland
Hall's2 examples, real experiences are not dreams, real ducks are
* Terry Forrest died Jan. 1965 at the age of 34.
1 Although we here restrict our considerationof the argumentto Austin's
exposition of' real' in Sense and Sensibilia, essentially the same argument
and variations of it occur, among other places, in " A Plea for Excuses ",
pp. 137-141 and " Other Minds ", pp. 54-57 in Austin's Philosophical
Papers. We also feel that the way in which Austin's treatment of' Real'
fails is related to an important oversight of his in the treatment of the
phenomenalist position. See, for example, pp. 15 of Sense and Sensibilia
where Austin says, ... . the notion of perceiving indirectly wears the
trousers '.
2 See Roland Hall's "Excluders ", Analysis, October 1959, a fruitful
article.
73

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74 S. COVAL AND T. FORREST:

not decoys, real tigers are not stuffed ones, real silk is not synthetic
silk, real estate is not moveable property. " That is, a definite
sense attaches to the assertion that something is real, a real
such-and-such, only in the light of a specific way in which it
might be, or might have been, not real. 'A real duck' differs
from the simple ' a duck ' only in that it is used to exclude
various ways of being not a real duck but a dummy, a toy,
a picture, a decoy etc.; and moreover I don't know just how
to take the assertion that it's a real duck unless I know just what,
on that particular occasion, the speaker has it in mind to exclude
... the function of ' real ' is not to contributepositively to the
characterizationof anything, but to exclude possible ways of being
not real [our italics]-and these ways, are both numerous ...
[and] ... quite different for things of different kinds " (70).
'Real' does not wear the trousers, hence we must protect
it with skirts; Roland Hall calls such seemingly dependent
words " excluders ". One of the things we hope to take issue with
is this supposed mere excluder function for skirt-words. What
we hope to argue is that expressions like 'real ' do not wear
skirts-are not mere excluders-mainly because the expressions
they have been paired off with do not wear the trousers; at which
time we shall introduce more appropriate terms to describe what
we take to be the roles of the related members of the group. It
might meanwhile serve to fill in the above sketch and to prepare
the way for its re-adjustment if we begin by stating what seem
to be reasons for discomfort with it.

Discomfortswith Austin's Account

1. One wants an explanation of why the philosophical grammar
or analysis of trouser- and skirt-words should be so neatly at
odds with the prima-facie grammatical clues. Why should there
be this negative pose to trouser-words if they actually perform
the affirmative or basic function? Why should the prima-facie
grammar of skirt-words pose as basic or affirmative as in the
supposed case of 'real', where actually a non-basic or skirt- or
merely excluding-function is performed?
In brief, one wants and does not have an explanation why in the
case of trouser- and skirt-words the normal order of " depen-
dence ", if there is such, of a grammatically negative expression
upon a non-negative one should be reversed. We think we have
such an explanation but it involves a rather drastic re-adjustment
of the trouser-skirt distinction suggested by Austin.
2. A related way of patting somewhat the same point would

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 WHICH WORD WEARS THE TROUSERS ? 75
be as follows. A trouser-word, which is an expression only posing
as a true negative or excluding term, is one found not actually
to perform an excluding function. Nevertheless the expression
which 'actually wears the trousers' does, ex hypothesi,contain a
negative part to its appearance.What conceivable role is there for
this negative particle if, not to produce a contrast dependentupon,
not as the thesis goes, independent of, its non-negative partner?
Why should the independent expression be dependent on its
form? Why should the lines have been so artificially crossed that
the independent or primary partner in a pair must be invested
with what amounts to double negation or " double dependence"
in order not to be construed as the dependent partner?
We believe we have an explanation which clears this artificiality
mainly by showing that ' real ' and ' not real ' operate not as a
duo but as two of a trio whose third member holds the key to a
more precise assessment of the actual dependency roles involved;
more important, these dependencies tuxn out not to involve
those of simple negation or exclusion between pairs at all.
3. Contrary to the view expressed by Austin there do seem
to be affirmatively-memberedlists of properties associable with
at least some skirt-expressions. This would counter the claim that
skirt-words are merely excluders (' . . . the function of " real "
[and presumably other skirt-words]is not to contribute positively
to the characterization of anything. . . '), something held by
Roland Hall also, such that their function is merely to cross out
alternatives initially incorporate to the trouser-wearing expres-
sion. Take the skirt-wearing phrases, 'normal temperature ',
' proper kiss', ' real duck', ' plain bread'. ' Not normal temper-
ature ' could mean above or below a certain range, let's say;
but certainly 'normal temperature' need not parasitically mean
merely ' neither above nor below a certain range'. It need not
have its sense limited merely to exclusion of the not-normal. We
may and often do specify the normal range. Not a proper kiss
might have been a peck or a bit cool. But this need not mean
that one cannot specify directly what a proper kiss is and must
lean fully upon the exclusion of certain labial short-comings in
order to describe what is a proper kiss. In the case of ' real duck '
why again must my explication of its role be limited to a list of
possible exclusions? Why could not at least part of its role involve
the use of an affirmatively-memberedlist including such things as
temperature, movements, biology, anatomy, etc.? We are of
course not suggesting that the role of the phrase ' real duck' is
just a short way of listing what the affirmative properties would
be. Clearly ' real duck ' is used partly to counter a claim or possible

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76 S. COVAL AND T. FORREST:

claim that the duck is or might not be real in this or that way
and so on. What we suggest is that whatever its further role
' real duck' is not and need not be limited to excluding possible
ways of being not a real duck. Furthermore, we hope to show that
the actual function of ' real ' could not be accomplished by " mere
exclusion ". To have excluded the possibility that say, an object
is a decoy, to have done only that, is not yet to have done what
uttering 'it's a real duck' would do.
4. It seems to us there is a final and perhaps more persuasive
reason for questioning the view that it is the negative phrase
which is basic in cases of pairs like ' a real x ' and ' not a real x '.
The operative term in this part of the view is, of course, 'basic'.
And what 'basic' means is that if we apply to a term what we
might call the " i.e. test " we are by it apparently yielded up a
non-negative expression; on the other hand, non-basic terms, or
excluders, when put to the " i.e. test " yield up " negative "
expressions. Thus, we might say, " It's not a real duck, i.e. it's a
decoy or dummy, or a toy ". If we had however said " It's a real
duck ", and been asked for specification by someone who " did
not know just how to take the assertion " we should have had to
offer something like, " it's not a decoy " or " it's not a dummy "
or some other negative expression. Hence, 'real duck' is not a
"basic " expression, but " negative ", where by the same test
'not a real duck' comes out as the "basic " or " affirmative"
partner of this pair.
If this is Austin's test, and we think it is, there seems to be a
aweaknessin it. If terms are wont to masquerade as affirmative
when they are " really negative " what more suspect participants
in that masque than, ' decoy', 'artificial', 'fake', ' false ',
'bogus ', ' makeshift ', ' dummy', 'synthetic', 'toy'? This, for
Austin, is the group of terms of which ' not a real x ' is "the most
general and comprehensive " (71);-and a group which Austin
himself calls (71) "the negative side ". The members of this
group are, crucially, what the " i.e. test " yields up as assurance
that 'not a real x' is, in relation to ' a real x', a basic, non-
dependent, non-negative expression. Hence we need more inde-
pendent assurance of their status than just that they " fulfill the
same function " as the negative uses of ' real'. It was, we remem-
ber, just this class of words which was meant to have already
stood as the test of that very same function. If we are right about
this, then the weakness of Austin's test as to which of the expres-
sions in question is " basic " is that of circularity or at best
indeterminacy until there are independent means produced to
establish the status of such terms as 'decoy', 'false', 'dummy', etc.

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 WHICH WORD WEARS THE TROUSERS ? 77
Put in its most simple terms our discomfort here is that the
"basic " nature of the negative uses of' real' is meant to depend
upon the fact that the affirmative uses of ' real ' in their specifica-
tions negate terms like 'decoy 'while 'not a real' affirms them
in its specifications; but if 'decoy' is prima facie and, by
admission, of the same negative stamp as 'not a real' then
the negative uses of 'real' are by this test still negative and
the affirmative, affirmative, until some truly independent test
shows otherwise. We, however, believe we can explain why when
you specify what you mean by 'not a real x ' you seem to come
up with an " affirmative " term and why when you specify what
you mean by 'a real x' you seem to come up with the " exclu-
sion " or " negation " of such a term. And we believe we can
explain this without suggesting that the negative uses of 'real'
wear the trousers and the affirmative uses merely exclude what
is associated or suggested by the negative one. We now turn to
some such adjustments of Austin's account.
Adjustments
At least part of the reason for discomfort with Austin's insights
into The Nature of Reality is that some essential backdrop
material has been left unintegrated. This backdrop Austin him-
self is aware of, but not as such. Indeed, it is the last of the features
he attributes to 'real', namely that " ' real' also belongs to a
large and important family of words that we may call adjuster-
words (73) ". An adjuster-word is one which offers us means to
cope systematically, rather than in an ad hoc fashion, with those
numerous situations in which our vocabulary will, because of its
severely finite nature, be inadequate to the demands of its un-
folding subject. " ' Like' is the great adjuster-word (74)."
Austin has got this somewhat wrong. ' Real' is not an adjuster-
word. Actually Austin's examples are anyway at odds with his
statement that 'real' is an adjuster-word. His examples are
first, " . . . having said of this animal that it's like a pig, we may
proceed with the remark, ' But it isn't a real pig. . . '. The
function of these adjuster-words is to free us from the disability
of being able to shoot only straight ahead; by their use on occasion,
such words as 'pig' can be so to speak, brought into connexion
with targets lying slightly off. . . " (74). And, second, " In this
way we gain, besides flexibility, precision; for if I can say, 'Not
a real pig, but like a pig I don't have to tamper with the mean-
ing of ' pig ' itself " (75).
To be noted in these examples is that it is the negatively-
phrased uses of 'real' ('isn't a real pig' and 'not a real pig '),

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78 S. COVAL AND T. FORREST:

which do adjuster work. 'Real', simpliciter, does not and cainnot

serve such a purpose. Two things emerge from this.
1. On the assumption that it is the negatively-phrased uses
of 'real' which are actually the adjusters it may now become
clearer what the backdrop to such adjustment is and hence
what phrases like 'not a real x ' are themselves already meant to
be placed in contrast with, what they themselves may be used
to " exclude " or adjust. If the phrase 'not a real x ' is actually
an adjuster it is hardly likely to be the " basic " term in such a
relation; hardly likely to have been the initial move in a context.
2. Where the work of adjustment is done by the negatively-
phrased uses of 'real' and where, as Austin argues, we think
correctly, the affirmative phrasing of 'real' come into use post-
logically to its negative phrasings, it will appear to be the case
that 'real' is itself rather than an adjuster word, a re-adjuster
word. It remains to be seen whether such re-adjuster work is
accomplishable merely by exclusion. These two points need now
to be amplified.
1. First, then, if 'not a real x ' is an adjuster-phrase it will
operate by measured departure from the standard cases, the x
cases, the first member of the trio. It is these standard cases, we
suggest, which actually wear the trousers in this triangle.
Austin asks, "Why then do we need 'real' [he means 'not
a real '] as an adjuster-word as well as ' like '? " (76). We suggest
the following-but perhaps not for every use of this adjuster-
phrase. When one says correctly that it's like an x, this x may
be deviated from in almost any way but it must be unmistakably
off standard; when one says correctly that it's not a real x, the
standard x will be deviated from in such a way that the devianlt
case does or would normal:lyhave a tendency or capability of
being mistaken for the standard x. A decoy or dummy duck is
one with a capability of being taken for a duck under certain
conditions, (at teast by ducks). They are artifacts made expressly
for that purpose. What is not real silk will be silk made to appear
like mulberryworms ' silk. What is not real money will be counter-
feited. ' These are not real diamonds, they're paste.' ' That's not
the real colour of her hair, it's dyed.' ' It's not a real offer, he's
bluffing.'
By the way, ' That's not a real duck, it's a toy', is not an
utterance for which we could easily find a context mainly because
toy ducks are hardly likely to be mistaken for ducks. Size can
be too good a clue to allow us to go astray. To the extent that
there is the likelihood of deception we have the tendency to
remark on this and give the toy a further description such as

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 WHICH WORD WEARS THE TROUSERS ? 79
'remarkably lifelike'. Neither are pictures of ducks easily
construed as cases of not real ducks except again under quite
exceptional conditions where too we should add a further descrip-
tion such as ' trompel'oeil '. Usually these sorts of things are not
factitiously enough like the standard cases to occasion either
caution or error or, therefore, the use of' not a real x '.
But not all 'not real x's ' will be artificially tailored so that
they either intentionally or inadvertently have this capability
and tendency of being mistaken for standard x's. There are cases,
in nature let's say, where this same tendency and capability also
occurs of mistaking a trickily deviant x for the standard x.
Dreams, and of course illusions and hallucinations are examples.
" It wasn't a real monster, Enos; you dreamt it." "It's not a
real dagger; she's hallucinating."
Dreams, hallucinations, delusions and illusions are recognised
and themselvesstandardways of mistaking something else for the
standard x. There are, in other words, more or less standard
although numerous cases which have the bonafide tendency to
mislead us and hence there can be standard ways of marking
such occurrences. To say, 'that's not a real x' is one leading
way of so doing. But it is worth emphasizing that the adjustment
marked by the appropriate utterance of that expression is not
merely where there is some deviation or other from the standard
case: it must be a case of the sort where there is the recognizable
liability and non-eccentric capability of mistaking the tenden-
tiously misleading for the standard. This is the particular adjuster-
work done by such phrases as ' it's not a real x ' and, perhaps, ' it's
not really an x '.
Where such conditions are absent but there is still some
deviation from the standard we use other expressions to mark
the adjustment required. We might say that it looked, seemed,
or appeared x or that it was like an x, or not an x, and so on;
but not that it was not a real x.
But, what perversely persists is that as between the two
lesser members of the trio it is the negatively phrased adjuster
which is dominant: 'that's a real x' comes into play only as a
counter to the invocation or possible invocation of 'that's not a
real x.' The negative phrase adjusts off the standard in a particu-
lar way while the affirmative one re-adjusts back to standard.
What needs to be explained is the-perverse fact that as between
these two members of the trio it is the dominant one which is
negatively phrased. This seems to be involved with the question
why, given that ' like x ' and ' not a real x ' are both adjusters,
one of them is negatively phrased and the other not.

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80 S. COVAL AND T. FORREST:

One suggestion is that if adjusters are meant to be flexibility

devices for shoring up parts of our language against the exigencies
of its unfolding subject, there would be desirable at least two
general sorts of such maintenance. It might on the one hand be
the case that we have need to point up the similarities of a (new)
case to the standard; or it might be that we wish to point up the
differences of the case from the standard. There will be various
and special ways of highlighting these two forms of apposition to
a substantive. One obvious way of pointing up the similarities,
but probably not just any similarity, to a standard is by the use of
' like '. And one way of indicating a very special type of deviation
from the standard is by the use of the phrase ' not a real x '.
The special sort of difference so indicated is, we saw, one so set
among similarities to the standard that the case does have a
bonafide and recognizable tendency to be taken for the standard.
Hence the need to highlight the difference.
Thus if we suppose ' like x ' and ' not a real x ' are in some
sense both adjusters and yet stand appositely to their substantives
in an inversely related way it is natural to expect this inversion
to be most handily marked by the presence of a negation. That
is, if there is a function for both similarity-adjusters and differ-
ence-adjiusters-adjusters which indicate how close and how off
the mark a case may be-then if we take the apposited substantive
as basic it is the similarity-adjuster which would tend to be
affirmative and the difference-adjuster which would tend to be
negative. Perhaps this is why 'not a real x' wears a negative in
its adjuster work while 'like (an) x' does not.
And perhaps the foregoing helps to explain why the re-adjuster
phrase ' real x ' is affirmative in form and the logically prior
adjuster phrase, 'not a real x', is negative in form. The first
phrase puts us back to standard, the original basic case, while
this particular adjuster sets us off the standard. Seen in relation
to the actually trousered member of the trio, it is not paradoxical
that the only memberwhich signals departurefrom that authority
should be dependently or negatively phrased even though it is in
other respects not the last member of the trio. It is however the
" off" member. And if the presence in a phrase of a negative
particle implies dependence of some sort, this being " off " seems
the only such subordinate aspect available to accommodate such
an implication.
We must anyhow remember 'real' comes to us with' some
previous background. In its other context of use it is (was) a
word associated with a standard. A word such as 'real' already
with overtones of a standard would fit nicely as a re-adjuster

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 WHICH WORD WEARS THE TROUSERS ? 81
term where the adjustment to be redressedwas of a sort which had
misleadingly suggested that a case was standard. Following the
economy of importation, the adjuster phrase, even if it had some
priority of function, could then be incorporated merely as the
grammatical negate of the import whose use was a simplification
because of its appropriate background.
Had there, however, been in stock some non-negative word
which would have fitted as nicely into the role of the required
sort of adjuster term then the re-adjuster expression could have
been the one negatively phrased. 'Phony x ', a near enough case
to 'not a real x' is one where the adjuster is not dependent for
its phrasing upon the re-adjuster but vice-versa.As a matter of
fact most adjusters of our particular class are " affirmatively "
phrased: 'decoy', 'artificial', 'fake', 'bogus', etc. Some of
these would of course not pass scrutiny-but why should they
not be eitheraffirmative or negative so long as their subordination
to a standard substantive remains clear?
These speculations are meant only to offer possible conditions
under which it would be reasonable but irrelevant for our purposes
that an expression like 'not a real x' should in its phrasing be
dependent upon the very term, ' real ', whose own use pre-
supposes the contextual priority of its dependently phrased
partner.
2. As for the second point: it is now a simpler matter to describe
the role of the affirmative-lookingmember,' real '. We have agreed
with Austin that we should not say ' it's a real x ' were there not
some reason to raise or respond to the possibility of its being not
a real x; the former is contextually dependent upon the latter.
Austin however adds that such response consists in " merely
excluding " ways of being not a real x'. But, given the involvement
now of the standard x, "excluding" cannot be the word to
describe the function of' not a real x'. Given that ' not a real x'
is the adjuster, and that ' real x' comes into play as a response to
such adjustment or the suspicion of it, ' it's a real x ' seems meant
to assert a re-dressal or re-adjustment back to the standard
from which ' not a real x ' took its very special sort of de-
parture. ' It's a real x ' is used to return us to standard
when we might have been or have actually been mistaken
in recognizable and tempting ways as to whether it was a
standard x.
Although 'it's a real x' admittedly may need to " exclude"
the particular way in which we may have occasioned the prior
adjustment in order to successfully work its re-adjustment, it
cannot merely exclude the, mistake let's say, and have done its

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82 COVAL AND FORREST: WHICH WORD WEARS THE TROUSERS?

work. For if it merely excludes then it ambiguously leaves open

the matter of whether or not other ways obtain under which it
might still be not a real x, i.e. whether it might still be a tempt-
ingly aberrant rather than a re-adjusted x, a real x. What is
needed to complete the work is to include within the convention
or re-adjustment the fact that the standard x does now obtain.
Only this would cut off the possibility of other special adjust-
ments still obtaining: something ' a real x ' is obviously meant to
do. It also explains, by the way, why affirmatively-membered
lists of properties are associable with real ducks, real silk, real
money. These lists would describe nothing new but ducks, silk
and money, the standard cases to which the re-adjustment
returns us-Reality.
Unitversityof British Columbia.

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