#60 none
ideal proportions to the remaining half (1/2).
#61
ARBOLARIO v CA(G.R. No. 129163; April 22,
2003; J. Panganiban)FACTS:
The original owners of the controverted lot,
spouses Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan,
had 5 children.Everyone mentioned is
dead. The first child, Agueda Colinco, was
survived by her two children, namely, Antonio
Colinco and Irene Colinco (respondent);
Antonio Colinco predeceased his three
daughters, respondents Ruth, Orpha, and
Goldelina, all surnamed Colinco. The second
child, Catalina Baloyo, was married to Juan
Arbolario and their union was blessed with
the birth of only one child, Purificacion
Arbolario, who, in 1985, died a spinster and
without issue. Juan Arbolario, consorted with
another woman by the name of Francisca
Malvas and from this cohabitation petitioners
Voltaire Arbolario, Lucena Arbolario Taala, Fe
Arbolario, Exaltacion Arbolario, and
Carlos Arbolario (referred to hereinafter
as “Arbolarios‟) were born. All the foregoing
petitioners were born well before the year 1951.
In 1946, the third child, Eduardo Baloyo, sold
his entire interest in the lot to his sister, Agueda
(first child), by virtue of a notarized document.
In 1951, a notarized declaration of heirship was
executed by and between Agueda, Catalina,
Gaudencia, and their brothers Eduardo
and Julian, who extrajudicially declared
themselves to be the only heirs of the late
spouses Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria
Lirazan. The fourth child, Gaudencia Baloyo,
conveyed her interest in the said lot in favor of
her two nieces, Irene Colinco to one-half
(1/2) and Purificacion Arbolario to the other
half. Purificacion Arbolario was then allowed to
take possession of a portion of the disputed
parcel until her death sometime in 1984 or
1985.Respondents Irene Colinco, Ruth Colinco,
Orpha Colinco, and Goldelina Colinco, believing
themselves to be the only surviving heirs of
Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan, executed
a „Declaration of Heirship and Partition
Agreement‟, dated May 8, 1987 where they
adjudicated upon themselves their
proportionate or ideal shares: Irene Colinco, to
one-half (1/2); while the surviving daughters of
her (Irene‟s) late brother Antonio, namely Ruth,
Orpha, and Goldelina Colinco, to share in equal,
On October 2, 1987, the Colincos filed a case
against Spouses Rosalita Rodriguez Salhay
and Carlito Salhay, seeking to recover
possession of a portion of the aforesaid lot
occupied by respondent spouses
(„Salhays‟hereinafter) since 1970. The Salhays
alleged in their defense that they have been the
lawful lessees of the late Purificacion Arbolario
since 1971 up to 1978; and that said spouses
allegedly purchased the disputed portion of Lot
from the deceased lessor sometime in
September 1978.On May 9, 1988 before the
case was tried the Arbolarios and spouses
Carlito Salhay and Rosalita Rodriguez Salhay
(all respondents in the case) filed another case
for Cancellation of Title with Damages‟. The
Arbolarios, joined by the Salhays, contend that
the „Declaration of Heirship and Partition
Agreement‟ executed by the Colincos was
defective and thus voidable as they (Arbolarios)
were excluded therein. The Arbolarios claim
that they succeeded intestate to the inheritance
of their alleged half-sister, Purificacion
Arbolario; and, as forced heirs, they should be
included in the distribution of the aforesaid lot.
(Relevant) ISSUE:
(1) WoN Arbolarios are illegitimate children
HELD:
(1) YES, they are illegitimate.**
There is no solid basis for the argument of
petitioners that Juan Arbolario‟s marriage to
Francisca Malvas was valid. It does not follow
that just because his first wife has died, a man
is already conclusively married to the woman
who bore his children. A marriage certificate or
other generally accepted proof is necessary to
establish the marriage as an undisputable fact.
Since they failed to prove the fact (or even
the presumption) of marriage between their
parents, Juan Arbolario and Francisca Malvas;
hence, they cannot invoke a presumption of
legitimacy in their favor.
Paternity or filiation, or the lack of it, is a
relationship that must be judicially established.
#62
CAMELO CABATANIAv.COURT OF APPEALS and
CAMELORE GODOS, respondents. [G.R. No.
124814. October 21, 2004, CORONA,J.
Facts: Florencia Regodos led a petition in behalf
of her minor son for recognition and support
from petitioner Camelo Cabatania. Cabatania,
however, denied the alleged paternity and
insisted that Florencia was already pregnant
when they had sex. The RTC gave more
probative weight to the testimony of Florencia
despite its discovery that she misrepresented
herself as a widow when, in reality, her husband
was alive.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner should be
compelled to acknowledge private respondent
Camelo Regodos as his illegitimate son and to
give support to the latter.
Ruling: No. Time and again, this Court has ruled
that a high standard of proof is required to
establish paternity and filiation. An order for
recognition and support may create an
unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to
the family or the lives of the parties so that it
must be issued only if paternity or filiation is
established by clear and convincing evidence.
The fact that Florencias husband is living and
there is a valid subsisting marriage between
them gives rise to the presumption that a child
born within that marriage is legitimate even
though the mother may have declared against
its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as
an adulteress. The presumption of legitimacy
does not only flow out oF a declaration in the
statute but is based on the broad principles oF
natural justice and the supposed virtue oF the
mother. The presumption is grounded on the
policy to protect innocent offspring From the
odium oF illegitimacy.
#63
Concepcion vs CA
Concepcion vs. CA
GR No. 123450, August 31, 2005
FACTS:
Gerardo Concepcion, the petitioner, and Ma.
Theresa Almonte, private respondent, were
married in December 1989, and begotten a child
named Jose Gerardo in December 1990. The
husband filed on December 1991, a petition to
have his marriage annulled on the ground of
bigamy since the wife married a certain Mario
Gopiao sometime in December 1980, whom
according to the husband was still alive and
living in Loyola Heights, QC. Trial court ruled
that the son was an illegitimate child and the
custody was awarded to the wife while Gerardo
was granted visitation rights. Theresa argued
that there was nothing in the law granting
“visitation rights in favor of the putative father
of an illegitimate child”. She further wanted to
have the surname of the son changed from
“Concepcion to Almonte”, her maiden name,
since an illegitimate child should use his
mother’s surname. After the requested oral
argument, trial court reversed its ruling and
held the son to be not the son of Gerardo but of
Mario. Hence, the child was a legitimate child
of Theresa and Mario.
HELD:
Considering that Theresa’s marriage with
Gerardo was void ab initio, the latter never
became the former’s husband and never
acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of
the child. Theresa’s contention was to have his
son be declared as not the legitimate child of her
and Mario but her illegitimate child with
Gerardo. In this case, the mother has no right
to disavow a child because maternity is never
uncertain. Hence, she is not permitted by law
to question the son’s legitimacy. Under Article
167 of the Family Code, “the child shall be
considered legitimate although the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may
have been sentenced as an adulteress”. Having
the best interest of the child in mind, the
presumption of his legitimacy was upheld by the
Court. As a legitimate child, the son shall have
the right to bear the surnames of Mario and
Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of
Civil Code on surnames. Gerardo cannot then
impose his surname to be used by the child,
since in the eyes of the law, the child is not
related to him in any way.
#64
Concepion vs. CA
G.R. No. 171713 December 17 2007
FACTS:
The Estate of Rogelio Ong opposed on the CA
order directing the Estate and Joanne Rodgin
Diaz for DNA analysis for determining the
paternity of the minor Joanne. Trial court
formerly rendered a decision and declared the
minor to be the illegitimate child of Rogelio Ong
with Jinky Diaz, and ordering him to support the
child until she reaches the age of majority.
Rogelio died during the pendency of the case
with the CA. The Estate filed a motion for
reconsideration with the CA. They contended
that a dead person cannot be subject to testing.
CA justified that "DNA paternity testing, as
current jurisprudence affirms, would be the
most reliable and effective method of settling
the present paternity dispute."
ISSUE:
Whether or not DNA analysis can still be done
despite the death of Rogelio.
RULING:
Yes.
The death of Rogelio does not ipso facto negate
the application of DNA testing for as long as
there exist appropriate biological samples of his
DNA. New Rules on DNA Evidence allows the
conduct of DNA testing by using biological
samples--organic material originating from the
person's body, ie., blood, saliva, other body
fluids, tissues, hair, bones, even inorganic
materials- that is susceptible to DNA testing.
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be
unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be
difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines
genetic codes obtained from body cells of the
illegitimate child and any physical residue of the
long dead parent could be resorted to. (People
vs Umanito, citing Tecson vs Comelec 424 SCRA
277)
#65
De Jesus vs. Estate of Juan Dizon
G.R. No. 142877, October 2, 2001
FACTS:
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus
got married in August 1964. It was during this
marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and
Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein petitioners,
were born. In a notarized document, dated June
7, 1991, Juan G. Dizon
acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as
being his own illegitimate children by
Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan died intestate in
March 1992, leaving behind considerable assets
consisting of shares of stock in various
corporations and some real property. It was on
the strength of his notarized acknowledgement
that petitioners filed a complaint for
“Partition with Inventoryand Accounting” of the
Dizon estate with the RTC.
Respondent, the surviving spouse and
legitimate children of the decedent, including
the corporations of which the deceased was a
stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case,
arguing that the complaint, even while
denominated as being one for partition, would
nevertheless call for altering the status of
petitioners from being the legitimate children of
the spouses Danilo and Carolina de Jesus to
instead be the
illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and
deceased Juan Dizon.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are illegitimate
children of decedent Juan Dizon entitled to
inherit from him
RULING:
No. A scrutiny of the records would show that
petitioners were born during the valid marriage
of their parents Danilo and Carolina. The
certificates of birth also identified Danilo de
Jesus as their father. There is a presumption in
law that children born in wedlock are legitimate.
This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in
the absence of proof that there is physical
impossibility of access between the
spouses during the first 120 days of the 300
days which immediately precedes the birth of
the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of
the husband to have sexual intercourse with his
wife; (b) the fact the husband and wife are living
separately in such a way that sexual intercourse
is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the
husband, which absolutely prevents sexual chidren of the deceased stated that her mom
intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the and the deceased were legally married and that
expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, her parents were not separated legally or in
and in proper cases Article 171,of the Family fact.
Code (which took effect on August 3, 1988), the
action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would
no longer be legally feasible and the status ISSUE: WON the petitioner can impugn his own
conferred by the presumption becomes fixed legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of
and unassailable. the deceased.
In an attempt to establish their illegitimate
filiation to the late Juan, petitioners, in effect,
would impugn their legitimate status as being HELD:
children of Danilo and Carolina de Jesus. This
step cannot be aptly done because the law itself
establishes the legitimacy of children conceived
Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly
or born during the marriage of the parents. The
personal right of the husband, or in exceptional
presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for
cases, his heirs for the reason that he was the
the child born in wedlock, and only the father,
one directly confronted with the scandal and
or in exceptional instances the latter’s heirs, can
ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produced
contest in an appropriate action
and he should be the one to decide whether to
the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus,
conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the
it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been
moral and economic interest involved. Hence,
successfully impugned that the paternity of the
it was then settled that the legitimacy of the
husband can be rejected.
child can only be impugned in a direct action
#66 brought for that purpose, by the proper parties
and within the period limited by law.
Liyao vs Liyao

Liyao vs. Liyao

Furthermore, the court held that there was no
GR No. 138961, March 7, 2002 clear, competent and positive evidence
presented by the petitioner that his alleged
father had admitted or recognized his paternity.
FACTS:

William Liyao Jr., the illegitimate son of the
deceased, as represented by her mother
(Corazon), filed a petition ordering Juanita
Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl L. Tan, Tita L. Tan and
Linda Liyao to recognize and acknowledge the
former as a compulsory heir of the deceased
and to be entitled to all successional
rights. Liyao Jr. was in continuous possession
and enjoyment of the status as the child of the
deceased having been recognized and
acknowledged as such child by the decedent
during his lifetime. There were two sides of the
story. Corazon maintained that she and the
deceased were legally married but living
separately for more than 10 years and that they
cohabited from 1965 until the death of the
deceased. On the other hand, one of the
#67
Babiero vs. Catotal
G.R. No. 138493 June 15 2000
FACTS:
Presentacion questioned the authenticity of the
entry of birth of Teofista. She asserted that the
birth certificate is void ab initio, as it was totally
a simulated birth, the signature of informant
forged, and contained false entries, to wit:
That Teofista is the legitimate child of the late
spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena
Cariñosa;
Signature of the mother, Hermogena, is
falsified;
Teofista's correct family name is GUINTO, not
Babiera;
Her real mother was Flora Guinto, and her
status is an illegitimate child;
It was clinically and medically impossible for
Hermogena to bore a child at 54 years of age;
her last child birth was when Presentacion was
born.
Presentacion ask the court to declare Teofista's
certificate of birth void and ineffective, and to
order the City Civil Registrar to cancel the same
as it affect the hereditary rights of Presentacion
who inherited the estate.
Teofista countered that she and Presentacion
are full-blooded sisters, as showed therein her
certificate of birth, Certificate of Baptism, and
her School Report Card. She also filed a motion
on the grounds that:
the petition states no cause of action, being an
attack on her legitimacy as the child of
Hermogena and Eugenio; that Presentacion has
no legal capacity to file the petition pursuant to
Art. 171 of the Family Code;
and that the petition was barred from
prescription in accordance with Art. 170 of the
Family Code.
The trial court ruled in favor of Presentacion. CA
affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Presentacion has legal
capacity to file the special proceedings pursuant
to Art. 171;
2. Whether or not the special proceedings is
improper and barred by the statute of
limitation;
3. Whether or not the public record of Teofista's
birth is superior to the oral testimony of
Presentacion.
RULING:
Petition is not meritorious.
1. Article 171 is not applicable in this case.
Article 171 of the Family Code shows that it
applies to instances which the father impugns
the legitimacy of his wife's child. The provision,
however, presupposes that the child was the
undisputed child of the mother. Present case
alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give
birth to Teofista. The present action does not
impugn Teofista's filiation to Eugenio and
Hermogeno, be there is no blood relation to
impugn in the first place. The reason why
Presentacion took interest on Teofista's status is
to protect the former's successional rights.
2. Article 170 of the FC does not apply. The
provision provides a prescriptive period for
action to impugn the legitimacy of the child. The
present action involves the cancellation of
Teofista's Birth Certificate, it does not impugn
her legitimacy. The action to nullify the birth
certificate does not prescribe because it was
allegedly declared void ab initio.
3. The specific attendant in the case at bar and
the totality of the evidence presented during
trial, sufficiently negates the presumption of
regularity in the issuance of birth certificate.
First, the birth certificate was not signed by the
local civil registrar, and the mother's signature
was different from other signatures. Second, no
medical records or doctor's prescription that
provide as evidence of Hermogena's pregnancy.
It was impossible for her to have given birth at
54 years of age. Third, the disposition of
Hermogena which states that she did not give
brith to Teofista and that the latter was not hers
of Eugenio.
#68
Tison vs. CA
Facts:
This is a case of an action for reconveyance of a
parcel of land and an apartment. Teodora
Guerrero died and left a parcel of land and an
apartment. Her husband Martin Guerrero
adjudicates the said land to him and
consequently sold to Teodora Domingo. The
nephews and nieces Tison et al seek to inherit
by right of representation from the property
disputed property presenting documentary
evidence to prove filial relation. The respondent
contended that the documents/evidence
presented is inadmissible for being hearsay
since the affiants were never presented for
cross-examination.
Issue:
Whether or not the evidence presented is
hearsay evidence and is inadmissible.
Held:
The evidence submitted does not conform to the
rules on their admissibility; however the same
may be admitted by reason of private
respondent's failure to interpose any timely
objection thereto at the time they were being
offered in evidence. It is elementary that an
objection shall be made at the time when an
alleged inadmissible document is offered in
evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be
treated as waived, since the right to object is
merely a privilege which the party may waive.
The primary proof that was considered in
ascertaining the relationship between the
parties concerned is the testimony of Corazon
Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime
in 1946, categorically declared that the former
is Teodora's niece. Such a statement is
considered a declaration about pedigree which
is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay
rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, subject to the following conditions: (1)
that the declarant is dead or unable to testify;
(2) that the declarant be related to the person
whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3)
that such relationship be shown by evidence
other than the declaration; and (4) that the
declaration was made ante litem motam, that
is, not only before the commencement of the
suit involving the subject matter of the
declaration, but before any controversy has
arisen thereon.
#69 DONE
#70 MISSING
#71
Braza vs. The Civil Registrar
Braza vs. Civil Registrar of Negros Occidental
G.R. No. 181174, December 4, 2009
Facts: Petitioner Ma. Cristina Braza and Pablo
Braza Jr. were married. In 2002, Pablo died in a
vehicular accident. During the
wake, respondent Lucille Titular and her son,
Patrick Alvin Titutar showed up and introduced
themselves as the wife and son, respectively, of
Pablo. Cristina made inquiries in the course of
which she obtained Patrick’s birth certificate
from the Local Civil Registrar of Negros
Occidental which stated that: (1) Pablo is the
father of Patrick having acknowledged by the
father on January 13, 1997; and, (2) Patrick
was legitimated by virtue of the subsequent
marriage of his parents; hence, his name was
changed to Patrick Alvin Titular Braza. Cristina
likewise obtained a copy of a marriage contract
showing that Pablo and Lucille were married in
1998.
Cristina and her co-petitioner (her three
legitimate children with Pablo) filed before the
RTC of Negros a petition to correct the entries
in the birth certificate record of Patrick in the
Local Civil Registry. They contended that Patrick
could not have been legitimated by the
supposed subsequent marriage between Lucille
and Pablo because said marriage is bigamous on
account of a valid and subsisting marriage
between her (Cristina) and Pablo.
Petitioner prayed for the:
1. Correction of the entries in Patrick’s birth
record with respect to his legitimation, the name
of the father and his acknowledgment and the
use of the last name “BRAZA”;
2. A directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all
surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor
Patrick, to submit Patrick to DNA testing to
determine his paternity and filiation;
3. The declaration of nullity of the legitimation
of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and,
for this purpose, the declaration of the marriage
between Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.
The trial court dismissed the petition holding
that in a special proceeding for correction of
entry, the court, which is not acting as a family
court under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction
over an action to annul the marriage of Lucille
and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and
order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test, and
that the controversy should be ventilated in an
ordinary adversarial action.
Issue:
May the court pass upon the validity of marriage
and questions on legitimacy in an action to
correct entries in the civil registrar?
Held:
No. In a special proceeding for correction of
entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Original Registry),
the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify
marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiations.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis-a-vis Article
412 of the Civil Code charts the procedure by
which an entry in the civil registry may be
cancelled or corrected. The proceeding
contemplated therein may generally be used
only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical
and other innocuous errors in the civil registry.
A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes
or obvious to the understanding; an error made
by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying
or writing, or a harmless change such as a
correction of name that is clearly misspelled or
of a misstatement of the occupation of the
parent. Substantial or contentious alterations
may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings,
in which all interested parties are impleaded and
due process is properly observed.
The petitioners’ cause of action is actually to
seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucille’s
marriage as void for being bigamous and
impugn Patrick’s legitimacy, which causes of
action are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15,
2003, and Art. 171 of the Family Code,
respectively; hence, the petition should be filed
in a Family Court as expressly provided in said
Code. It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally,
validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and
filiation can be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, and not
through collateral attack such as the petition
filed before the court a quo.
#72 MISSIING
#73
Mariategui vs CA
Mariategui vs. CA
GR NO. 57062, January 24, 1992
FACTS:
Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26,
1953 and contracted 3 marriages during his
lifetime. He acquired the Muntinlupa Estate
while he was still a bachelor. He had 4 children
with his first wife Eusebia Montellano, who died
in 1904 namely Baldomera, Maria del Rosario,
Urbano and Ireneo. Baldomera had 7 children
namely Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria,
Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed
Espina. Ireneo on the other hand had a son
named Ruperto. On the other hand, Lupo’s
second wife is Flaviana Montellano where they
had a daughter named Cresenciana. Lupo got
married for the third time in 1930 with Felipa
Velasco and had 3 children namely Jacinto,
Julian and Paulina. Jacinto testified that his
parents got married before a Justice of the
Peace of Taguig Rizal. The spouses deported
themselves as husband and wife, and were #74
known in the community to be such.
Eceta vs Eceta

Eceta vs Eceta
Lupo’s descendants by his first and second
marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial GR No. 157037, May 20, 2004
partition whereby they adjudicated themselves
Lot NO. 163 of the Muntinlupa Estate and was
subjected to a voluntary registration FACTS:
proceedings and a decree ordering the
registration of the lot was issued. The siblings
in the third marriage prayed for inclusion in the
Rosalina Vda de Eceta was married to Isaac
partition of the estate of their deceased father
Eceta in 1926. They had a son named
and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial
Vicente. The husband died in 1967 leaving
partition dated Dec. 1967.
Rosalina and Vicente as his compulsory
heirs. However, the deceased has an
illegitimate daughter named Theresa whose
ISSUE: Whether the marriage of Lupo with grandmother was Rosalina, the petitioner.
Felipa is valid in the absence of a marriage
license.
ISSUE: WON the admission made by Rosalina
that Theresa was her granddaughter is enough
HELD: to prove the filiation with the deceased.

Although no marriage certificate was introduced HELD:

to prove Lupo and Felipa’s marriage, no
evidence was likewise offered to controvert
these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no
The filiation of illegitimate children, like
record of the marriage exists does not invalidate
legitimate children, is established by:
the marriage, provided all requisites for its
validity are present. (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or

(2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a

Under these circumstances, a marriage may be
public document or a private handwritten
presumed to have taken place between Lupo
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a
woman, deporting themselves as husband and
wife, have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved
there being no divorce, absolute or from bed by:
and board is legitimate; and that things have
(1) the open and continuous possession of the
happened according to the ordinary course of
status of a legitimate child; or
nature and the ordinary habits of life.
(2) any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws.
Hence, Felipa’s children are legitimate and
therefore have successional rights.
The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court
of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself,
a consummated act of acknowledgement of the
child, and no further court action is required. In
fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a
ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself
a voluntary recognition that does not require a
separate action for judicial approval. However,
what was tried before the trial court and CA was
for partition and accounting of damages
only. The filiation or compusolry recognition by
Vicente of Theresa was never put in issue. In
fact both agreed in the trial court’s pre trial
order that Theresa was Rosalina’s
granddaughter. The deceased establishing
acknowledgement of his paternity over Theresa
nevertheless signed the duly authenticated birth
certificate shown by the latter. Hence, the
Court granted 1/8 share of the land to Theresa.
#75 MISSING
#76
G.R. No. 57227 May 14, 1992
AMELITA CONSTANTINO and MICHAEL
CONSTANTINO, the latter represented herein by
the former, his mother and natural
guardian, petitioners,
vs.
IVAN MENDEZ and the HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
FACTS: This is a petition for review
on certiorari questioning the decision of the
Court of Appeals which dismissed petitioner’s
complaint and set aside the resolution of the
then Court of First Instance of Davao, ordering
private respondent: (1) to acknowledge the
minor Michael Constantino as his illegitimate
child; (2) to give a monthly support of P300.00
to the minor child; (3) to pay complainant
Amelita Constantino the sum of P8,200.00 as
actual and moral damages; and (4) to pay
attorney’s fees in the sum of P5,000 plus costs.
Petitioner filed with the then CFI of Davao an
action for acknowledgment, support and
damages against private respondent in June
1975. Petitioner alleges, that sometime in the
month of August, 1974, she met respondent at
Tony’s Restaurant, where she worked as a
waitress; the following day respondent invited
petitioner to dine with him at Hotel Enrico where
he was billeted; on the pretext of getting
something, respondent brought petitioner
inside his hotel room and through a promise of
marriage succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with the latter and repeated
whenever respondent is in Manila even after
respondent confessed that he is a married man
after their first sexual contact.
In respondent’s answer in August 1975, Ivan
admitted that he met petitioner at Tony’s
Cocktail Lounge but denied having sexual
knowledge or illicit relations with her. He prayed
for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of
cause of action.
The trial court rendered a decision, in favor of
petitioner. Respondent is to pay for actual and
moral damages, attorney’s fees and the costs of
the suit. Both parties filed their separate motion
for reconsideration. Respondent anchored his
motion on the ground that the award of
damages was not supported by evidence.
Petitioner sought the recognition and support of
her son Michael Constantino as the illegitimate
son of Ivan Mendez.
The trial court granted petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
On appeal the amended decision was set aside
and the complaint was dismissed. Hence, this
petition for review.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS
ENTITLED TO CLAIM FOR DAMAGES BASED ON
ARTICLES 19 & 21
HELD: NO, PETITIONER CANNOT CLAIM FOR
DAMAGES BASED ON ARTICLES 19 & 21
According to ART. 19 Every person must, in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.
In the case at bar petitioner was already 28
years old and she admitted that she was
attracted to respondent. Petitioner’s attraction
to respondent is the reason why she
surrendered her womanhood. Had petitioner
been induced or deceived because of a promise
of marriage, she could have immediately ended
her relation with respondent when she knew
that respondent was a married man after their
first sexual contact. Her declaration that in the
months of September, October and November,
1974, they repeated their sexual intercourse
only indicates that passion and not the alleged
promise of marriage was the moving force that
made her submit herself to respondent. The
Supreme Court said “Damages could only be
awarded if sexual intercourse is not a product of
voluntariness and mutual desire” therefore
petitioner is not entitled to claim for damages
based on articles 19 & 21
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is Dismissed
for lack of merit.
#77
LABAGALA vs. SANTIAGO
FACTS:
Jose T. Santiago owned a parcel of land in
Manila. However, his sisters sued him for
recovery of
2/3 share of the land alleging that he had
fraudulently registered it in his name. The trial
court decided in favor of his sisters. Jose died
intestate. His sisters then filed a complaint
before the RTC for recovery of the 1/3 portion
of said property which was in the possession of
Ida C. Labagala (who claimed to be Ida C.
Santiago, the daughter of Jose).The trial court
ruled in favor of Labagala. According to the trial
court, the said deed constitutes a valid
donation. Even if it were not, petitioner would
still be entitled to Jose's 1/3 portion of the
property as Jose's daughter. When appealed,
the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the decision
of the trial court. It took into account that Ida
was born of different parents, as indicated her
birth certificate.
ISSUES:
1. WON respondents may impugn petitioner's
filiation in this action for recovery of title and
possession.
2. WON petitioner is entitled to Jose's 1/3
portion of the property he co-owned with
respondents, through succession, sale, or
donation.
HELD:
The Court AFFIRMED the decision of the CA.
On Issue No. 1
Yes.
Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the
legitimacy of a child, to assert and prove that a
person is not a man's child by his wife. However,
the present respondents are asserting not
merely that petitioner is not a legitimate child of
Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at all. A
baptismal certificate, a private document, is not
conclusive proof of filiation. Use of a family
name certainly does not establish pedigree.
Thus, she cannot inherit from him through
intestate succession.
On Issue No. 2
No. The Court ruled that there is no valid sale in
this case. Jose did not have the right to transfer
ownership of the entire property to petitioner
since 2/3 thereof belonged to his sisters.
Petitioner could not have given her consent to
the contract, being a minor at the time. Consent
of the contracting parties is among the essential
requisites of a contract, including one of sale,
absent which there can be no valid contract.
Moreover, petitioner admittedly did not pay any
centavo for the property which makes the sale
void. Article 1471 of the Civil Code provides that
if the price is simulated, the sale is void, but the
act may be shown to have been in reality a
donation, or some other act or contract.
Neither may the purported deed of sale be a
valid deed of donation. Even assuming that the
deed is genuine, it cannot be a valid donation.
It lacks the acceptance of the donee required by
Art. 725 of the Civil Code. Being a minor, the
acceptance of the donation should have been
made by her father or mother or her legal
representative pursuant to Art. 741 of the same
Code. No one of those mentioned in the law
accepted the donation for Ida.
#78 MISSING
#79 MISSING
#80 MISSING
#81 MISSING
#82 MISSING