Republic of the Philippines

VS
Marelyn Tanedo Manalo
GR. No. 221029
April 24, 2018

1. New Doctrine: Divorce obtained by Filipino Spouse against her

foreign spouse is valid.

Facts:
Marelyn Tando Manalo (respondent) filed a petition for cancellation
of entry of marriage by reason of divorce judgement obtained from
Japanese court. The respondent had initiated the divorce in the
Japanese court and granted the same. The RTC of Dagupan granted the
petition. The Solicitor General, as the Republic of the Philippines, filed a
Manifestation and Motion questioning the title or the caption of the
petition. That proper action should be a petition for recognition and
enforcement of a foreign judgement. The respondent has amended the
petition for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgement. The
respondent presented the forms and other necessary requirements for
the validating a divorce. The Solicitor General had filed a motion for
certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not the divorce obtained by a Filipino spouse against a
foreigner spouse be valid in the Philippines

Held:

Yes. The divorce obtained by a Filipino spouse against a foreigner

spouse is considered valid in the Philippines. Underwent Paragraph 2 of
Article 25 of the civil code, the idea of the amendment is to avoid the
absurd situation of a Filipino still being married to his or her alien
spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the former. That
whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or
not, a favourable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating
his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result, the Filipino
spouse will effectivity be without a husband or wife. That the subject
provision should not make a distinction there. As the necessary
materials for divorce where presented properly proving the divorce as
valid in Japanese court, therefore, the divorce obtained abroad has been
considered as valid in the Philippines therefore the respondent has been
granted the permission to remarry again and the petition for certiorari
has been denied.
People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee
VS
Juvy D. Amarela and Junard G. Racho, Accused-Appellant
GR. No. 225642-43
January 17, 2018

2. New Doctrine: Maria Clara Doctrine

Facts:
The victim (AAA), single and a housekeeper, was watching a beauty
contest with her aunt. The contest was being held at a basketball court
where a make-shift stage was put-up. The only light available were those
coming from the vehicles around. She had the urge to urinate and went
to Comfort room beside the building of the Maligatong Cooperative near
the basketball court. She stated that Amarela(1 st accused) was waiting
for her and pulled her under the stage of the day care center and raped
her. She shouted for help and then 3 men came to her rescue and
Amarela Fled. The 3 men attempted to rape her in a hut. She fled and
hid in a neighboring house. When she saw the persons no longer around,
she went to the house of Godo Dumandan and want to go to her aunt’s
house. As Dumandan thought that her aunt was not at home, she was
accompanied to Racho residence instead. Neneng Racho, instructed
Racho (2nd accused) to escort the victim to her house. But instead of
escorting her home, the victim stated that Racho brought her a shanty
and raped her. RTC ruled that the 2 accused were guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.

The case was appealed where the initial decision of the RTC was
held reversed and set aside. That the 2 accused were acquitted.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the Maria Clara Doctrine is a valid concept in
ruling the aforementioned case.

Held:
 No. In the current case, the Maria Clara Doctrine is not a valid
concept to be used in the same case. As a general rule, Maria Clara
Doctrine also known as “Woman’s Honor” indicates that no young
Filipina of decent repute would publicly admit that she has been sexually
abuse, unless that is the truth, for it is her natural instinct to protect her
honor such in the case of People vs Tana where Justice Alejo said, “it is a
well-known fact that women, especially Filipinos, would not admit that
they have been abused unless that abuse had actually happened. This is
due to their natural instincts to protect their honor. We cannot believe
that the offended part would have positively states that intercourse took
place unless it did actually take place”. However, in this case, there is a
reasonable doubt that linger due to the doubt on the victim’s testimony
whereby; (1) the version of the victim’s story in her affidavit complaint is
different from her testimony; (2) the victim could not easily identify
Amarela (1st accused) as the crime scene was dark and she only saw him
the first time; (3) her testimony lacks material details on how she was
brought under the stage against her will and lastly (4) the medical
findings do not corroborate physical injuries and are inclusive for any
signs. That the Maria Clara doctrine, once was a definitive doctrine for
the decision of a rape case, has been added wherein there must be a
supporting proof beyond reasonable doubt or moral certainty that the
accused is guilty. Therefore, the doctrine cannot be applied to the
presented case.
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares
VS
COMELEC and Estrella C. Elamparo
GR. No. 221697
March 8, 2016

3. New Doctrine: Doctrine of Incorporation. That the state of the

individual laws of nations all over the world, which treat foundlings
in their respective countries as citizens – in addition to the various
international conventions and treaties that deal with the rights of
children and statelessness – is sufficient to already consider the
same as a generally accepted principle of international law, so as
to form part of the law of the land under the doctrine of
incorporation.

Facts:
May Grace Natividad Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found
abandoned in a Parish Church in and was registered as foundling with
the Civil Registrar. The petitioner was given a foundling certificate with
certificate of live birth with a given name of Mary Grace Natividad Militar
which was later changed to Mary Grace Natividad Poe when she was
adopted.
At age of 18, she was a registered voter or San Juan and was
issued a Philippine passport in 1988. She got married in July 1991 and
flew to the US right after the wedding. In April 1992, the petitioner
became a naturalized citizen and obtained a US passport on the same
year.
In December 2004, the petitioner had return to the Philippines
because of her father’s deteriorating condition. The petitioner decided to
move and reside permanently in the Philippines, had prepared for
resettlement including the notification of their children’s schools,
coordination with property movers and others. Upon returning back to
the Philippines in May 24, 2005, she immediately secure a TIN, took her
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to R.A.
9225 in July 7, 2006 and filed a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine
citizenship together with petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of
her three children in July 10, 2006.
Had executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the US
before a notary republic in Pasig City on October 20, 2010, had
submitted the affidavit to the Bureau of Immigration and took her oath
as a chairperson of MTRCB and had stopped using her American
passport since.
In July 12, 2011, the petitioner had executed an Oath/Affirmation
of Renunciation of Nationality of the US before the Vice Consul of the US
Embassy in Manila in December 9, 2011, the US Vice Consul issued a
Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the US effective in October 21, 2010.
The petitioner had filed her certificate of candidacy for Presidency in
October 15, 2015.
The respondents filed a petition against the petitioner due to some
issues alleging that (1) the petitioner had committed material
misrepresentation in her certificate of candidacy regarding her year of
residency in the Philippines; (2) that the petitioner is not a natural-born
citizen of the country and (3) that the petitioner’s candidacy shoulder be
cancelled for committing material misrepresentation in the certificate of
candidacy.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC can cancel the COC of the petitioner
on the ground of false representation of the qualification.
2. Whether or not the petitioner be considered as a natural-born
citizen.
3. Whether or not the petitioner rendered the 10 year residency
requirement.

Held:
1. No. The COMELEC cannot cancel the certificate of the petitioner.
According to the Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution
wherein the senate and the House of Representative shall each
have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their
 respective members. In this case, the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction to decide on whether to cancel the petitioner’s
certificate. Further, it is only when there is a prior disqualification
provided by the constitution that the COMELEC can cancel the
candidacy of the petitioner on the ground of false representations
for her qualifications.

2. Yes. The petitioner is considered a natural born citizen. The 1934

Constitutional Convention manifest that the framers intended
foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. Though in Article IV,
September 1 of the 1935 Constitution, the enumeration is silent as
to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would exclude
otherwise. Further, according to international law, it is presumed
that foundlings have been born citizens of the place to where they
are found. Therefore, the petitioner is considered as a natural born
citizen of the Philippines.

3. Yes. The petitioner has been considered to have rendered the 10

year residency. According to the law, she had fulfilled the new
domicile which is the Philippine, requirement of animus manendi
coupled with animus revertendi. It this case, the petitioner had
timely returned and stayed to the Philippines for good since May
25, 2005. Also, petitioner had presented evidence showing that she
and her family had abandoned their U.S. domicile and relocated
for food. Therefore, starting from May 25, 2015, she has been
clearly a resident of the Philippines for 10 years and 11 months.
SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 226679
August 15, 2017

4. New Doctrine: Plea-bargaining agreement. That those accused in

drug-related offenses may now plead guilty to a lesser offense,
provided the prosecutor allows it.
Facts:
Salvador A. Estipona Jr. (Petitioner) was accused for violation of
Section 11 of R.A. 9165, for possession of 0.084 gram Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride (Shabu) drug. The petition filed a Motion to Allow the
Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining Agreement arguing that Section
23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates: 1. The intent of the law expressed in
paragraph 3, section 2 thereof; 2. The rule-making authority of the
Supreme Court under Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 constitution and
3. Principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches of
the government. The RTC denied the motion.

Issue:
 1. Whether section 23 of republic act no. 9165, which prohibits plea
bargaining in all violations of the said law, is unconstitutional for
being violative of the constitutional right to equal protection of the
law

2. Whether section 23 of republic act no. 9165 is unconstitutional as

it encroached upon the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate
rules of procedure.

3. Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional for being

violative of the Constitutional right to equal protection of the law.

Held:
1. Yes, Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional for two reasons. First,
it violates the equal protection clause since other criminals (rapists,
murderers, etc.) are allowed to plea bargain but drug offenders are not,
considering that rape and murder are more heinous than drug offenses.
Second, it violates the doctrine of separation of powers by encroaching
upon the rule-making power of the Supreme Court under the
constitution. Plea-bargaining is procedural in nature and it is within the
sole prerogative of the Supreme Court.

2. No. It is not constitutional. As a general rule, plea bargain is not

allowed to rehabilitate an accused of a drug offense. However, in the
present case, please bargain is allowed. The ruling of the Supreme Court
in this case manifested the relaxation of an otherwise stringent
application of Republic Act No. 9165 in order to serve an intent for the
enactment of the law, that is, to rehabilitate the offender. Under the new
rule on plea bargaining 2000, wherein at arraignment, the accused, with
the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by
the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily
included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the
accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after
withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or
information is necessary. That in this case, it will be the prerogative of
the court on whether to amend the plea bargain. Thus, it will be
unconstitutional to enforce that the accused cannot petition for plea
bargain.

4. No. It is not constitutional. The current section 23 of R.A. No. 9165

was not repealed or amended thus, it will still be considered as a
valid law that is not contrary to the constitution. Pending
deliberation on whether or not to adopt the statutory provision in
toto or a qualified version thereof, the Court deemed it proper to
declare as invalid the prohibition against plea bargaining on drug
cases until and unless it is made part of the rules of procedure
through an administrative circular duly issued for the purpose.
VALERIO E. KALAW
VS
MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 166357
January 14, 2015

5. New Doctrine: A finding of psychological incapacity must be

supported by well-established facts. It is the plaintiffs burden to
convince the court of the existence of these facts.

FACTS:

Petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez

(Malyn) met in 1973 and married in Hong Kong on November 4, 1976
and have 4 children.

Tyrone have an extramarital affair with Jocelyn Quejano (Jocelyn), who

gave birth to a son in March 1983. In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal
home (the house of her Kalaw in-laws and her four children with Tyrone
while Tyrone started living with Jocelyn and had 3 more children.
Tyron left the country with his second family to United States and left
his 4 children with Malyn with on a house help and a driver. In
accordance with their custody agreement, the children stayed with Malyn
on weekends and the house help would just call Malyn whenever the
children were sick.

In July 1994, Tyrone filed a declaration of nullity of marriage based on

Article 36 of the Family Code. He further claimed that her psychological
incapacity was manifested by her immaturity and irresponsibility
towards Tyrone and their children during their co-habitation. Tyrone
presented a psychologist and a Catholic canon law expert. Malyn denied
being psychologically incapacitated. After summarizing the evidence
presented by both parties, the trial court concluded that both parties are
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations
under the Family Code. Malyn appealed the trial court’s Decision to the
CA. The CA reversed the trial court’s ruling because it is not supported
by the facts on record. Tyrone filed a motion for reconsideration.
In Tyrone’s Motion for Reconsideration,3 the petitioner implores the Court
to take a thorough second look into what constitutes psychological
incapacity; to uphold the findings of the trial court as supported by the
testimonies of three expert witnesses; and consequently to find that the
respondent, if not both parties, were psychologically incapacitated to
perform their respective essential marital obligation. The court had
granted the said motion.

Issue:

Held:
Although the petitioner, as the plaintiff, carried the burden to prove the
nullity of the marriage, the respondent, as the defendant spouse, could
establish the psychological incapacity of her husband because she raised
the matter in her answer. The courts are justified in declaring a marriage
null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code regardless of whether it
is the petitioner or the respondent who imputes the psychological
incapacity to the other as long as the imputation is fully substantiated
with proof. Indeed, psychological incapacity may exist in one party alone
or in both of them, and if psychological incapacity of either or both is
established, the marriage has to be deemed null and void.