G.R. No.

L-63915 April 24, 1985

TANADA vs TUVERA

FACTS: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized
in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, as well as the principle that laws to be
valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively
promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish,
and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders.

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, sought outright dismissal of the case on the
ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the petition, d/t absence of
showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-
publication of the presidential issuances in question.

Petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is
to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their
petition to be given due course.

The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor
General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted
to a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be
subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the
public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights
are to be subserved " nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of the
mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real
party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show
that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen
and as such interested in the execution of the laws. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced is a
public right recognized by the fundamental law of the land. Respondents further contend that
publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws
where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. SC ruled that publication in the
Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its
effectivity date.

Respondents' argument is logically correct as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of
publication. The clear object of CA 638 provision is to give the general public adequate notice of
the various laws. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application
of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever,
not even a constructive notice.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for
their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall
within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of
persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption
that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of
general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may
be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice
Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not
been published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive
about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity
of those presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have
put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been
enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar
situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot
County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:

Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a
party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was
declared unconstitutional by this Court.

Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the

Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive
statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."

From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential
decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees
Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so
published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no
copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none
of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan
vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to
apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on
the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent
officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of
policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been
published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws
provide that they shall take effect immediately.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they
shall have no binding force and effect.

G.R. No. 103144 April 4, 2001

PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT vs SOLE

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari issued by respondent SOLE which affirmed the Order of POEA
found petitioner liable for 3 of illegal exaction, 2 counts of contract substitution and one count of
withholding or unlawful deduction from salaries of workers. In 1985, respondents, who were
recruited by petitioner for employment in Saudi Arabia, were required to pay placement fees( 5K
for Mikin, P6.5K for de Mesa and Leyson).

After execution of respective work contracts, respondents left for Saudi and began working for Al-
Hejailan Consultants A/E. They were allegedly made to sign a second contract for reduction of
benefits and privileges. On April 1985, foreign employer allegedly forced them to sign 3rd contract
which increased their work hours from 48 hours to 60 hours a week without increase in their basic
monthly salary. When they refused, they were terminated and were repatriated to Ph. Upon arrival,
they demanded from Philsa return of their placement fees and for payment of salaries for the
unexpired portion of their contract. When petitioner refused, they filed a case before the POEA
against petitioner Philsa and its foreign principal, Al-Hejailan for illegal dismissal, payment of
salary differentials, illegal deductions/withholding salaries, illegal exactions/refund of placement
fees and contract substitution

Under the rules of the POEA in 1985, complaints involving employer-employee relations from law
or contract involving OFWS money claims, are adjudicated by the Workers' Assistance and
Adjudication Office (hereinafter the "WAAO") thru the POEA Hearing Officers. 5 On the other hand,
complaints involving recruitment violations warranting suspension or cancellation of the license of
recruiting agencies are cognizable by the POEA thru its Licensing and Recruitment Office
(hereinafter the "LRO"). 6 In cases where a complaint partakes of the nature of both an employer-
employee relationship case and a recruitment regulation case, the POEA Hearing Officer shall act
as representative of both the WAAO and the LRO and both cases shall be heard simultaneously. In
such cases, the Hearing Officer shall submit two separate recommendations for the two aspects of
the case. 7

The first two causes of action were in the nature of money claims arising from the employer-
employee relations and were properly cognizable by the WAAO. The last two causes of action were
in the nature of recruitment violations and may be investigated by the LRO. The third cause of
action, illegal deduction/withholding of salary, is both a money claim and a violation of recruitment
regulations and is thus under the investigatory jurisdiction of both the WAAO and the LRO.

Petitioners failed to present evidence and consequently, private respondents filed a motion to
decide the case on the basis of the evidence on record. PHILSA was ordered to pay complainants
with principal Al-Hejail an. NLRC modified the appealed decision of the POEA Adjudication Office by
deleting the award of salary deductions and differentials not raised in the complaint filed by
private respondents. The NLRC likewise stated that there was nothing in the text of the decision
which would justify the award.

With respect to the first ground, petitioner would want us to overturn the findings of the POEA,
subsequently affirmed by the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, that it is
guilty of illegal exaction committed by collecting placement fees in excess of the amounts allowed
by law. This issue, however, is a question of fact which cannot be raised in a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65.
The question of whether or not petitioner charged private respondents placement fees in excess of
that allowed by law is clearly a question of fact which is for public respondent POEA, as a trier of
facts, to determine. As stated above, the settled rule is that the factual findings of quasi-judicial
agencies like the POEA, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to
specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect, but at times even finality if such findings
are supported by substantial evidence. 19

On this point, we have carefully examined the records of the case and it is clear that the ruling of
public respondent POEA that petitioner is guilty of illegal exaction is supported by substantial
evidence. Aside from the testimonial evidence offered by private respondents, they also presented
documentary evidence consisting of receipts issued by a duly authorized representative of
petitioner which show the payment of amounts in excess of those allowed by the POEA. Petitioner
insists, however, that it cannot be held liable for illegal exaction as POEA Memorandum Circular
No. 11 is void for lack of publication.

POEA Memorandum Order No. 2, Series of 1983 provides for the applicable schedule of
placement and documentation fees for private employment agencies or authority holders. Under
the said Order, the maximum amount which may be collected from prospective Filipino overseas
workers is P2,500.00. The said circular was issued in compliance with the provisions of Article 32 of
the Labor Code that any person applying with a private fee-charging employment agency for
employment assistance shall not be charged any fee until he has obtained employment through its
efforts or has actually commenced employment. Such fee shall be always covered with the
approved receipt clearly showing the amount paid.

Its purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. POEA
Administrative Circular No. 2 has not as yet been published or filed with the National
Administrative Register, the same is ineffective and may not be enforced.

The Office of the Solicitor General argues however that the imposition of administrative sanctions
on petitioner was based not on the questioned administrative circular but on Article 32 and Article
34 (a) of the Labor Code.

The said articles of the Labor Code were never cited, much less discussed, in the body of the
questioned Orders of the POEA and SOLE. In fact, the said Orders were consistent in mentioning
that petitioner's violation of Administrative Circular No. 2 was the basis for the imposition of
administrative sanctions against petitioner. Furthermore, even assuming that petitioner was held
liable under the said provisions of the Labor Code, Articles 32 and 34 (a) of the Labor Code
presupposes the promulgation of a valid schedule of fees by DOLE. Administrative Circular No. 2,
Series of 1983 embodying such a schedule of fees never took effect, there is thus no basis for the
imposition of the administrative sanctions against petitioner. Considering that POEA Administrative
Circular No. 2 was never filed with the National Administrative Register, the same cannot be used
as basis for the imposition of administrative sanctions against petitioner.

The Office of the Solicitor General likewise argues that the questioned administrative circular is not
among those requiring publication contemplated by Tañada vs. Tuvera as it is addressed only to a
specific group of persons and not to the general public. No merit in this argument.

The fact that the said circular is addressed only to a specified group, does not take it away from
the ambit of our ruling in Tañada vs. Tuvera. Our pronouncement in Tañada vs. Tuvera is clear and
categorical. Administrative rules and regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation., The only exceptions are interpretative
regulations, those merely internal in nature, or those so-called letters of instructions issued
by administrative superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties. Administrative Circular No. 2, has not been shown
to fall under any of these exceptions.

Solicitor General's reliance on the case of Yaokasin is misplaced. In the said case, the validity of
certain Customs Memorandum Orders were upheld despite their lack of publication as they were
addressed to a particular class of persons, the customs collectors, who were also the subordinates
of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. The claim for salary deduction was not raised by
private respondents in their complaint will not bar the POEA from holding petitioner liable for
illegal deduction or withholding of salaries as a ground for the suspension or cancellation of
petitioner's license.

As such, the fact that petitioner has been absolved by final judgment for the payment of the
money claim to private respondent de Mesa does not mean that it is likewise absolved from the
administrative sanctions which may be imposed as a result of the unlawful deduction or
withholding of private respondents' salary. The POEA thus committed no grave abuse of discretion
in finding petitioner administratively liable of one count of unlawful deduction/withholding of
salary.
To summarize, petitioner should be absolved from the three (3) counts of illegal exaction as POEA
Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 could not be the basis of administrative sanctions
against petitioner for lack of publication. However, we affirm the ruling of the POEA and the
Secretary of Labor and Employment that petitioner should be held administratively liable for two
(2) counts of contract substitution and one (1) count of withholding or unlawful deduction of salary.

Under the applicable schedule of penalties imposed by the POEA, the penalty for each count of
contract substitution is suspension of license for two (2) months or a fine of P10,000.00 while the
penalty for withholding or unlawful deduction of salaries is suspension of license for two (2)
months or fine equal to the salary withheld but not less than P10,000.00 plus restitution of the
amount in both instances. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the September 13, 1991 and
November 25, 1991 Orders of public respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment are hereby
MODIFIED. As modified, the license of private respondent Philsa International Placement and
Services Corporation is hereby suspended for six (6) months or, in lieu thereof, it is hereby ordered
to pay the amount of P30,000.00 as fine. Petitioner is likewise ordered to pay the amount of
SR1,000.00 to private respondent Vivencio A. de Mesa. All other monetary awards are deleted.

G.R. No. 100335. April 7, 1993.

UNCIANO PARAMEDICAL vs CA
Statutory Construction- the laws shall act prospectively
REMEDIAL LAW; PROVISIONAL REMEDIES; The sole object of a preliminary injunction, whether
prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard.
The status quo is the last actual peaceable uncontested status which preceded the controversy.
FACTS: Petition for review on certiorari. In 1990, Private respondents Elena Villegas and Ted
Magallanes, thru their mothers filed before tRTC NCR 21 petition for injunction and damages with
prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against petitioners Unciano Paramedical
College. That the students proposed an organization of student council in school and solicited
support to the studentry by signing an endorsement with 180 signatories. Villegas and Barria were
summoned to the office and were admonished not to proceed with the proposal because,
according to her, the school does not allow and had never allowed such an organization. News
broke that said students would be barred from enrollment, they sought confirmation with
respondent Dr. Moral, Dean of Discipline, who told them 'it's not true unless you violate the rules
and regulations of the school and if you still insist with your student council. The students met with
Dean Vitug and Dr. Moral who informed them that they would be barred from enrollment for the
second semester because they supposedly harassed a female student, invited an outsider to the
school to speak before the students, and also because the school has an arrangement with DECS
not to allow their students to put up a student council. Students approached Dr. Moral who
informed them that they were no longer allowed to enroll because they are allegedly members of
National Union of Students of the Philippines (NUSP) and the League of Filipino Students (LFS),
officers of the student organization they organized, and, moreover 'drug addicts.' The students
asked for proof of these accusations but were not given any, and were told by Dr. Moral that the
school has people investigating but did not disclose their identities nor provide any proof to
support her allegations. After petitioners retained the services of counsel FREE LEGAL ASSISTANCE
GROUP (FLAG), they sent a letter to Mr. Mirando Unciano, President of the College, demanding that
the constitutional requirements of due process be complied with prior to unilaterally dismissing the
students. Due, however, to the inability of Dr. Moral to resolve the problem in the absence of the
College President and their legal counsel, meeting was reset to November 22, 1989 upon Dr.
Moral's request. However, notice was sent to the students' counsel from Unciano Paramedical
College resetting the meeting to November 27, 1989 stating that the President will attend
personally. Due to the absence of the school's legal counsel and the President who allegedly just
arrived from the United States, Dr. Moral again requested that the meeting be reset. A verbal
altercation occurred between the parties due to the delaying tactics of the school officials and the
failure to resolve the problem by their continuous refusal to discuss the merits of the accusations
against the students. The meeting, attended by Dr. Moral, Dean Vitug and Dean Dominador
Santos, ended with the school officials' request that it be reset for 29 November 19B9 and that the
students bring their parents or guardian with them at said meeting. The students agreed to this
request and their counsel prepared a written summary of the matters discussed and agreed during
the meeting. The school officials refused to sign it. Students were informed that the President had
unilaterally refused to allow them to enroll and it was up to their parents to request or appeal to
the school officials to change their decision. Mrs. Victoria Villegas and Mrs. Jacinta Magallanes
wrote to the school officials to request that their children be allowed to enroll but was refused. The
trial court issued a TRO enjoining school from enrolling respodents in CON and setting the hearing
for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners filed an opposition to the prayer for a
preliminary mandatory injunction on the ground that private respondents are not entitled thereto
and have no clear legal right to the relief demanded. On the same date, the trial court issued an
order, there will be irreparable injury to the petitioners if they are not allowed to enroll. At least
they will miss another semester.
"On the other hand, the injuries mentioned by Dr. Unciano, in particular the withdrawal of the
other students and the school will lose money if the petitioners are allowed to enroll is still a
speculation. Court GRANTS the petition for issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction,
ordering the respondents to allow petitioners to enroll for the first semester of school year 1990-
1991, upon filing by petitioners of a bond of P2,000.00 each. It must be repeatedly emphasized
that the contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary contract. It is imbued with
public interest, considering the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant
to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational institutions [See Art. XIV,
Secs. 1-2, 4(1).]
'Respondent school cannot justify its actions by relying on Paragraph 137 of the Manual of
Regulations for Private School. 'Termination of contract' theory does not even find support in the
Manual. Paragraph 137 merely clarifies that a college student enrolls for the entire semester. It
serves to protect schools wherein tuition fees are collected and paid on an installment basis. Thus,
even if a student does not complete the semester for which he was enrolled, but has stayed on for
more than two weeks, he may be required to pay his tuition fees for the whole semester before he
is given his credentials for transfer. 'Clearly, in no way may Paragraph 137 be construed to mean
that the student shall be enrolled for only one semester, and that after the semester is over his re-
enrollment is dependent solely on the sound discretion of the school.
ISSUE: WON THE NON DOCTRINE SHOULD BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY TO GOVERN AND
INVALIDATE THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF INCIDENTS THAT TOOK PLACE PRIOR TO ITS ADOPTION AND
WHICH INCIDENTS WERE PROPER AND VALID UNDER THE ALCUAZ DOCTRINE PREVAILING AT THE
TIME SAID INCIDENTS TOOK PLACE."
HELD: Alcuaz doctrine which was promulgated on May 2, 1988, the contract between them and
private respondents was validly terminated upon the end of the first semester of school year 1989-
1990. Although said doctrine was later abandoned in Non, et al. v. Dames II, et al., supra, this case
was promulgated much later, or on May 20, 1990, when the termination of the contract
between them had long become fait accompli. Settled is the rule that when a doctrine of this
Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine is applied prospectively, and
should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. The writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued by the trial court with grave abuse of discretion.
The ruling in the Non case should not be given a retroactive effect to cases that arose before its
promulgation on May 20, 1990, as in this case, which was filed on April 16, 1990. If it were
otherwise, it would result in oppression to petitioners and other schools similarly situated who
relied on the ruling in the Alcuaz case, promulgated on May 2, 1988, which recognized the
termination of contract theory.
It may only be resorted to by a litigant for the preservation or protection of his rights or interests
and for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal action (Calo vs. Roldan, 76 Phil.
445). It should only be granted if the party asking for it is clearly entitled thereto.
Inasmuch as a mandatory injunction tends to do more than to maintain the status quo, it is
generally improper to issue such an injunction prior to the final hearing (Manila Electric Railroad
and Light Co. vs. Del Rosario, 22 Phil. 433). It may, however, issue 'in cases of extreme urgency;
where the right is very clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in
complainant's favor where there is a willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiff's right against his
protest and remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one and where the effect of the
mandatory injunction is rather to re-establish and maintain a pre-existing continuing relation
between the parties, recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant, than to establish a new
relation. Indeed, the writ should not be denied the complainant when he makes out a clear case,
free from doubt and dispute.' (Commissioner of Customs vs. Cloribel, et al., 19 SCRA 235.)." 15
In the present case, the contract between the parties was validly terminated upon the end of the
first semester of school year 1989-1990, or in October, 1989. This is the status quo. The trial court
gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction which ordered
petitioners to allow private respondents "to enroll for the first semester of school year 1990-1190."
16 Guided by the Capitol case, certainly, this writ will not restore the status quo but will go a step
backward, then restore the condition preceding the status quo. Private respondents do not possess
any clear legal right to re-enroll, corollarily, petitioners are not obliged legally to re-admit them.

G.R. No. L-15127 May 30, 1961

EMETERIO CUI vs ARELLANO UNIVERSITY
FACTS: Appeal by plaintiff Emeterio Cui from a decision of CFI Manila, absolving defendant Arellano
University from plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff, before the school year 1948-1949 took up
preparatory law course in the defendant University. After finishing his preparatory law course
plaintiff enrolled in the College of Law of the defendant from the school year 1948-1949. Plaintiff
finished his law studies in the defendant university up to and including the first semester of the
fourth year. During all the school years in which plaintiff was studying law in defendant law
college, Capistrano, brother of the mother of plaintiff, was the dean of the College of Law and legal
counsel of the defendant university. Plaintiff enrolled for the last semester of his law studies in the
defendant university but failed to pay his tuition fees because his uncle Dean severed his
connection with defendant and having accepted the deanship and chancellorship of the College of
Law of Abad Santos University, plaintiff left the defendant's law college and enrolled for the last
semester of his fourth year law in the college of law of the ASU graduating from the college of law
of the latter university. Plaintiff, during all the time he was studying law in defendant university
was awarded scholarship grants, for scholastic merit, so that his semestral tuition fees were
returned to him after the ends of semester and when his scholarship grants were awarded to him.
The whole amount of tuition fees paid by plaintiff to defendant and refunded to him by the latter
from the first semester up to and including the first semester of his last year in the college of law
or the fourth year, is in total P1,033.87. After graduating in law from ASU he applied to take the
bar examination. To secure permission to take the bar he needed TOR in AU. Plaintiff petitioned the
latter to issue to him the needed transcripts. AU refused until after he had paid back the P1,033 87
which defendant refunded to him as above stated. As he could not take the bar examination
without those transcripts, plaintiff paid to defendant the said sum under protest. In consideration
of the scholarship granted to me by the University, I hereby waive my right to transfer to another
school without having refunded to the University (defendant) the equivalent of my scholarship
cash. It is admitted that, on August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued Memorandum
No. 38, series of 1949, on the subject of "Scholarship," addressed to "All heads of private schools,
colleges and universities,". Plaintiff was constrained to pay, and did pay under protest, said sum of
P1,033.87, in order that he could take the bar examination in 1953.
ISSUE: WON the quoted provision of the contract between plaintiff and the defendant, whereby the
former waived his right to transfer to another school without refunding to the latter the equivalent
of his scholarships in cash, is valid or not.

HELD: Lower court resolved this question in the affirmative, the aforementioned memorandum of
the Director of Private Schools is not a law; that the provisions thereof are advisory, not mandatory
in nature; and that, although the contractual provision "may be unethical, yet it was more
unethical for plaintiff to quit studying with the defendant without good reasons and simply
because he wanted to follow the example of his uncle."
We do not deem it necessary or advisable to consider as the lower court did, the question whether
plaintiff had sufficient reasons or not to transfer from defendant University to ASU. SC held
stipulation in question is contrary to public policy and, hence, null and void. The aforesaid
memorandum merely incorporates a sound principle of public policy. If Arellano University
understood clearly the real essence of scholarships and the motives which prompted this office to
issue Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949, it should have not entered into a contract of waiver with Cui
on September 10, 1951, which is a direct violation of our Memorandum and an open challenge to
the authority of the Director of Private Schools because the contract was repugnant to sound
morality and civic honesty. In order to declare a contract void as against public policy, a court
must find that the contract as to consideration or the thing to be done, contravenes some
established interest of society, or is inconsistent with sound policy and good moralsor tends clearly
to undermine the security of individual rights. The policy enunciated in Memorandum No. 38, s.
1949 is sound policy. Scholarship are awarded in recognition of merit not to keep outstanding
students in school to bolster its prestige. It is good customs; those generally accepted principles
of morality which have received some kind of social and practical confirmation. not to attract and
to keep brilliant students in school for their propaganda mine but to reward merit or help gifted
students in whom society has an established interest or a first lien. (Emphasis supplied.)

G.R. No. L-30061 February 27, 1974

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs JABINAL
FACTS: At 9p.m. September 5, 1964, in poblacion of Batangas, accused, a person not authorized
by law, keep in his possession, custody and direct control a revolver Cal. .22, RG8 German Made
with one (1) live ammunition and four (4) empty shells without first securing the necessary permit
or license to possess the same. Accused entered a plea of not guilty. He claimed to be entitled to
exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret
Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from
the Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to
possess and carry the firearm in question. On March 15, 1964, the accused was also appointed by
Provincial Commander of Batangas as Confidential Agent with duties to furnish information
regarding smuggling activities, wanted persons, loose firearms, subversives and other similar
subjects that might affect the peace and order condition in Batangas province, and in connection
with these duties he was temporarily authorized to possess a ROHM revolver, Cal. .22 RG-8 SN-64,
for his personal protection while in the performance of his duties. The law is explicit that except as
thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to ... possess any firearm,
detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or
intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." No
provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt.
It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial Government in
1962, and Confidential Agent by the Provincial Commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the
matter was that laid down by Us
ISSUE: Should appellant be acquitted on the basis of Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or
should his conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of
the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa?
HELD: Article 8 of the New Civil Code "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system ... ." The interpretation upon a law by this Court
constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law originally passed, since this Court's
construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that law thus construed
intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of legal
maxim "legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet" — the interpretation placed upon the written law by a
competent court has the force of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part
of the jurisprudence, hence of the law, of the land, at the time appellant was found in possession
of the firearm in question. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but
when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should
be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and
acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal
laws, where it is necessary that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance
of society.
It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant conferred his appointments as Secret Agent
and Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine
enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero, under which no criminal liability would attach to his
possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit, appellant must be
absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was
held not to be punishable.

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

ALICE REYES VAN DORN vs ROMILLO For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the
parties and their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines
FACTS: Petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United
States; they were married in Hongkong in 1972; they established their residence in Ph; begot two
children born on 1973 and 1975; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982;
and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada to Theodore Van Dorn. Respondent filed suit
against petitionerin RTC Pasay petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, Galleon Shop, is conjugal
property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that
business, and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous
judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had
acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" to which the Court denied the
Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in Ph
so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case.
Denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject to appeal. Prohibition
would lie since it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property
because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that
they had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal
funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail
over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and
declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest
Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.
No question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The
decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent
cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union.
ISSUE: WON divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local
law and public policy.
HELD: It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from
the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. Private
respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case
below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is bound by the
Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998

FE D. QUITA vs CA
FACTS: FE QUITA and Arturo Padlan,Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18 May 1941. They
were not however blessed with children. their relationship soured. Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A. In 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce. 3 weeks thereafter
she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce.
Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont. In 1972 Arturo died. He
left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with RTC QC for issuance of
letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of Philtrust. Respondent
Dandan(as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturoand children, all
surnamed Padlan, named in the children of Arturo Padlan opposed the petition and prayed for the
appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Casaba, which was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon
motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by Higino Castillon. In 1973
the oppositors, Blandina and Padlan children, submitted certified photocopies of divorce between
petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the
deceased Arturo, intervened.
On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent and
the distribution of his estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987, private respondent as
well as the six (6) Padlan children and Ruperto failed to appear despite due notice. On the same
day, the trial court required the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten
(10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue on the
declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed period lapsed
The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escaño 1 which held that "a foreign divorce between Filipino
citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386) was not
entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction," 2 disregarded the divorce between petitioner
and Arturo. Consecuently, it expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until the death of
Arturo in 1972. Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicial settlement of conjugal properties
due to lack of judicial approval.In 1987, only petitioner and Ruperto were declared the intestate
heirs of Arturo. Accordingly, equal adjudication of the net hereditary estate was ordered in favor of
the two intestate heirs. 5
But controversy remains as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo. The trial court,
after the parties other than petitioner failed to appear during the scheduled hearing, issued an
order requiring the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days
from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the documents.
ISSUE: WON petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent considering that she had
secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact had twice remarried.
HELD: In Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. We deduce that the finding on
their citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court was not supplied
with a basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of their divorce. The doubt persisted
as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed. T Once proved that
she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable
and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.
Petitioner however did not bother to file a reply memorandum to erase the uncertainty about her
citizenship at the time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings to be conducted by the
trial court. Consequently, respondent appellate court did not err in ordering the case returned to
the trial court for further proceedings.
We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court should be limited
only to the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private respondent's
claim to heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April
1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a
bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code.
Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status
presupposes a legitimate relationship. 20
G.R. No. 167109 February 6, 2007

FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN vs CA
FACTS: This petition for review assails the CA Decision reversing the Decisionof RTC DAGUPAN
declaring the marriage between respondents Catalan and Braganza void on the ground of bigamy.
Petitioner Catalan married Orlando in 1950 at Mabini, Pangasinan. Thereafter, they migrated to
USA and allegedly became naturalized citizens. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando
divorced in April 1988.5
Two months after the divorce, or in 1988, Orlando married respondent Merope in Calasiao,
Pangasinan. Contending that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting
marriage with Eusebio Bristol, petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with
damages in the RTC of Dagupan City against Orlando and Merope.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss 8 on the ground of lack of cause of action as petitioner was
allegedly not a real party-in-interest, but it was denied.RTC rendered judgment in favor of the
petitioner, Catalan and against defendants Orlando B. Catalan and Merope E. Braganza
ISSUE: WON petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage of the respondents on the ground of bigamy. WON the petitioner and respondent
Orlando had indeed become naturalized American citizens and whether they had actually been
judicially granted a divorce decree.
CA mistakenly considered the failure of the petitioner to refute or contest the allegation in
respondents’ brief, that she and respondent Orlando were American citizens at the time they
secured their divorce in April 1988, as sufficient to establish the fact of naturalization and
divorce. We note that it was the petitioner who alleged in her complaint that they acquired
American citizenship and that respondent Orlando obtained a judicial divorce decree. 18 It is
settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not
evidence.
Divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But
divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo
matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the
marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.20 A divorce
obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid
according to the national law of the foreigner. However, before it can be recognized by our
courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to
the foreign law allowing it, which must be proved considering that our courts cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws.
RTC would be correct to declare the marriage of the respondents void for being bigamous, there
being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the
Philippines, one in Mabini, Pangasinan dated December 21, 1959 between Eusebio Bristol and
respondent Merope,24 and the other, in Calasiao, Pangasinan.
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married,
or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the
nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrate "proper interest" can file the
same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest 27 and must be based on a cause of action.In
fine, petitioner’s personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be
ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a
remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine
whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which
granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was
obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlando’s remarriage, then the trial court should
declare respondents’ marriage as bigamous and void ab initio On the contrary, if it is proved that a
valid divorce decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must
dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of marriage on the ground that petitioner Felicitas
Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to file the same.
G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007
EDGAR SAN LUIS, vs FELICIDAD SAN LUIS
FACTS: consolidated petitions for review assailing CA Decision reversed and set aside Resolutions
of RTC Makati involving settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, former governor of Laguna who
contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit in 1942 with 6 children, in
1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. In 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he
had a son, Tobias. In 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before
Family Court in Hawaii. In 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed
Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, in LA. He had no children with respondent but lived with
her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of
Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before
RTC Makati alleging she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent was
residing at Alabang; that the decedent’s surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six
children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real
properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at ₱30M; that the decedent does not have any
unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that
letters of administration be issued to her. Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his
first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a
cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been
filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death.
He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was
only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to
Merry Lee. MeTC issued an Order 11 denying the two motions to dismiss. Unaware of the denial of
the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her opposition 12 thereto. She
submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public
office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in Alabang which they bought in 1982.
She claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article
26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14
It ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the
petition and that venue was properly laid.
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term "place of
residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers
to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as
distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his
functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. The Court of Appeals
also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article
26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It
found that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the
decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a
result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a subsequent
marriage with respondent. Thus –
ISSUE: whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal capacity to file the
subject petition for letters of administration.
HELD: Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of
the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in RTC province "in which he resides at the time of his
death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal rule for
determining the residence – as contradistinguished from domicile – of the decedent for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and
should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules, residence rather than domicile is the
significant factor.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982
up to the time of his death. Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang for purposes of fixing the venue of
the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was
validly filed in RTC which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang. The subject petition was filed on
December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the RTC
which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati as per Supreme Court
Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the RTC of Makati
City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the petition for letters of
administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien
spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s marriage to
Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3,
1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code,
particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to
rule in the affirmative.
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. SC findsthe latter has the
legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered
the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts
during their cohabitation.
She may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision
governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property
acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall
be governed by the rules on co-ownership. through their joint labor, efforts and industry. SC ruled
respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration may arise from
her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code
or Article 148 of the Family Code.
G.R. No. 155635 November 7, 2008
BAYOT VS BAYOT
FACTS: Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San Jose. On its
face, the Marriage Certificate6 identified Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an American citizen
born in Guam. In 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca gave birth to Alix. From then on,
Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship have soured as the latter, in 1996, initiated divorce
proceedings in the Dominican Republic. Before CFI Santo Domingo, Rebecca personally appeared,
while Vicente was duly represented by counsel. Said agreement stated that "conjugal property
which they acquired during their marriage consist[s] only of the real property and all the
improvements, personal properties therein contained in Alabang."11

On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa RTC, for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriageon the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological
incapacity. In it, Rebecca also sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with
application for support pendente lite for her and Alix. Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be ordered
to pay a permanent monthly support for their daughter Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000. RTC
issued an Order denying Vicente's motion to dismiss and granting Rebecca's application for
support pendente lite, divorce judgment invoked by Vicente as bar to the petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage is a matter of defense best taken up during actual trial.
To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicente's motion to dismiss on the basis of the following
premises:
(1) As held in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the hypothetical-admission
rule applies in determining whether a complaint or petition states a cause of action. 27 Applying
said rule in the light of the essential elements of a cause of action, 28 Rebecca had no cause of
action against Vicente for declaration of nullity of marriage.
(2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this jurisdiction to have her marriage with Vicente
declared void, the union having previously been dissolved on February 22, 1996 by the foreign
divorce decree she personally secured as an American citizen. Pursuant to the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code, such divorce restored Vicente's capacity to contract another
marriage.
(3) Rebecca's contention about the nullity of a divorce, she being a Filipino citizen at the time the
foreign divorce decree was rendered, was dubious. Her allegation as to her alleged Filipino
citizenship was also doubtful as it was not shown that her father, at the time of her birth, was still
a Filipino citizen. The Certification of Birth of Rebecca issued by the Government of Guam also did
not indicate the nationality of her father.
(4) Rebecca was estopped from denying her American citizenship, having professed to have that
nationality status and having made representations to that effect during momentous events of her
life, such as: (a) during her marriage; (b) when she applied for divorce; and (c) when she applied
for and eventually secured an American passport
(5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship, being born of a purportedly Filipino father in Guam,
which follows the jus soli principle, Rebecca's representation and assertion about being an
American citizen when she secured her foreign divorce precluded her from denying her citizenship
and impugning the validity of the divorce.
Three legal premises need to be underscored at the outset. First, a divorce obtained abroad by an
alien married to a Philippine national may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the decree of
divorce is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. 31 Second, the reckoning point is not
the citizenship of the divorcing parties at birth or at the time of marriage, but their citizenship at
the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad. And third, an absolute divorce secured by a Filipino
married to another Filipino is contrary to our concept of public policy and morality and shall not be
recognized in this jurisdiction.32
ISSUES: first, whether petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce judgment
was rendered in the Dominican Republic and second, whether the judgment of divorce is valid and,
if so, what are its consequent legal effects?
HELD: There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and obtained her
divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of an effective
repudiation of such citizenship. The following are compelling circumstances indicative of her
American citizenship: (1) she was born in Guam; (2) the principle of jus soli is followed in this
American territory granting American citizenship to those who are born there; and (3) she was,
and may still be, a holder of an American passport. 33
It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of Immigration (Bureau) of Identification (ID)
Certificate No. RC 9778 and a Philippine Passport. On its face, ID Certificate would tend to show
that she has indeed been recognized as a Filipino citizen. It cannot be over-emphasized, however,
that such recognition was given only on June 8, 2000 upon the affirmation by SOJ of Rebecca.
When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a
Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One
The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino citizen. But from the foregoing
disquisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of Filipino citizen when she
secured the February 22, 1996 judgment of divorce from the Dominican Republic. What were
attached consisted of the following material documents: Marriage Contract (Annex "A") and
Divorce Decree. It was only through her Opposition (To Respondent's Motion to Dismiss dated 31
May 2001)36 did Rebecca attach as Annex "C" ID Certificate.
At the time of the divorce, Rebecca was still to be recognized, assuming for argument that she was
in fact later recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but represented herself in public documents as an
American citizen. She chose, before, during, and shortly after her divorce, her American citizenship
to govern her marital relationship. Second, she secured personally said divorce as an American
citizen, as is evident in the text of the Civil Decrees.
Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of
America, a country which allows divorce. Fourth, the property relations of Vicente and Rebecca
were properly adjudicated through their Agreement executed on December 14, 1996. Veritably,
the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was valid. It is essential that there should be an
opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly
determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to
actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment |merely
constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to
proof to the contrary.41 Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same
shall be given a res judicataeffect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce decree
obtained, the marital vinculumbetween Rebecca and Vicente is considered severed; they are both
freed from the bond of matrimony. In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband
and wife to each other. Rebecca has not repudiated the property settlement contained in the
Agreement. She is thus estopped by her representation before the divorce court from asserting
that her and Vicente's conjugal property was not limited to their family home in Ayala
Alabang.With the valid foreign divorce secured by Rebecca, there is no more marital tie binding
her to Vicente. There is in fine no more marriage to be dissolved or nullified.

G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963

CHRISTENSEN VS HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA

FACTS: In accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen. The will
was executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the following provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs.
Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is
now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants except my
above named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo
Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that she was
baptized Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has she been at any time
adopted by me, and who, from all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao,
Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine
Currency the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the
 Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred
Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until the principal thereof as well as any
interest which may have accrued thereon, is exhausted.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar
as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child. The legal grounds of
opposition are (a) that the distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b)
that said order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of
two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full ownership. The court below ruled
that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of California at
the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to
be governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose
of his property in the way he desires, because the right of absolute dominion over his property is
sacred and inviolable.
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly after the
making of his last will and testament (now in question herein) which he executed at his
lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of
Manila on April 30, 1953.
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we are persuaded
by the fact that he was born in New York, migrated to California and resided there for nine years,
and since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and only for
short visits.Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere temporary
presence to the most permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to denote something more
than mere physical presence.
We find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he resided in California from 1904
to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines.
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows: ART. 16. Real property as well as personal
property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. However, intestate and
testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the
nature of the property and regardless of the country where said property may be found. The
theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in determining the question before
it. Reason demands that We should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its citizens
residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must
enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of our
Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in accordance with the express mandate
thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and its conflict-of-
laws rule for those domiciled abroad.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the place
where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in
said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not be
sustained. As explained in the various authorities cited above the national law mentioned in
Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, authorizes the
reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in
California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled
in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile
can not and should not refer the case back to California. The Philippine court must apply its own
law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be
decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for
children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural
children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.
The Philippine cases cited by appellees to support the decision can not possibly apply in the case
at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not appear to be a citizen of a
state in the United States but with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not appear in each case
that there exists in the state of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art.
946 of the California Civil Code.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the
Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the
appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil
Code of California, not by the internal law of California..partition be made as the Philippine law on
succession provides.
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS VS BELLIS
FACTS: Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of Texas and of States." By his first wife, Mary
E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children, by his second wife, Violet Kennedy,
who survived him, he had three legitimate childrens and finally, he had three illegitimate children.
IN 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed (a) $240,000.00 to
his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr.,
Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items
have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second
wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G.
Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1äwphï1.ñët
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of Texas. His will was admitted to
probate in the CFI Manila September 15, 1958. The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor
of the will, paid all the bequests therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares
of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina
Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their
respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the
lower court approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three
requesting partial advances on account of their respective legacies. Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that
they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of
the deceased.
Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this
case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
ISSUE: Which law must apply — Texas law or Philippine law.
HELD: assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the
domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law,
but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs
theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are
situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the
absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed
different from ours. Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated,
they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case
falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article
16 of the Civil Code.
Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next
preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil
Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old
Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of
Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas
estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to
govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a
separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50
Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed
in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national
law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil
Code states said national law should govern. The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis,
was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced
heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the
amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
G.R. No. 124371 November 23, 2000
LLORENTE VS CA
FACTS: The case raises a conflict of laws issue. RTC Iriga City 2 declaring respondent Alicia as co-
owners of whatever property she and the deceased Lorenzo may have acquired during 25years
that they lived together as husband and wife. Lorenzo was an enlisted serviceman of US Navy from
March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957. In 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula married in Camsur.
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for US and Paula stayed in the conjugal
home. In 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to US citizenship and Certificate of Naturalizationwas issued
in his favor Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited
the Philippines.He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was "living in" and having an
adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente. 8 Paula gave birth to a boy registered in
the Office of the Registrar "Crisologo Llorente," with the certificate stating that the child was not
legitimate and the line for the father’s name was left blank. 9
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February 2, 1946, the couple drew a
written agreement to the effect that (1) all the family allowances allotted by the United States
Navy as part of Lorenzo’s salary and all other obligations for Paula’s daily maintenance and
support would be suspended; (2) they would dissolve their marital union in accordance with
judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal property
acquired during their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act
since she voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully. The
agreement was signed by both Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by Paula’s father and
stepmother. The agreement was notarized by Notary Public. In 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia in
Manila.13 Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided in the
same town as Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation. From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo
and Alicia lived together as husband and wife.Their twenty-five (25) year union produced three
children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente. In 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and
Testament. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children. Order
was published in the newspaper "Bicol Star". RTC issued a joint decision, that the divorce decree
granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the
marriage he contracted with Alicia void. This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the
issuance of letters testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled to receive any share from
the estate even if the will especially said so her relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status
of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).
Amending its decision of May 18, 1987, the trial court declared Beverly Llorente as the only
illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the
free portion of the estate
ISSUE: Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?
HELD: The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at
the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4)
death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed.
The Civil Code clearly provides:
"Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
"Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
"However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country
wherein said property may be found."
We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently proven, in
the same breath it made the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that "American law
follows the ‘domiciliary theory’ hence, Philippine law applies when determining the validity of
Lorenzo’s will.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals,41 that once proven that
respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the
ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could "very well lose her right to
inherit" from him.
We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was
valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects of this
divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the
determination of the trial court.
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is
glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a
foreigner, not covered by our laws on "family rights and duties, status, condition and legal
capacity." Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best
proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in
accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will
was duly probated.
Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of
divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of
California in and for the County of San Diego, made final on December 4, 1952.

Alfredo Velayo vs Shell Company , 100 Phil 168

FACTS: Prior to 1948, Commercial Airlines (CALI) owed P170k (abt. $79k) to Shell and CAL offered
its C-54 plane as payment to Shell Company (the plane was in California) but Shell at that time
declined as it thought CALI had sufficient money to pay its debt. In 1948 however, CALI was going
bankrupt so it called upon an informal meeting of its creditors. In that meeting, the creditors
agreed to appoint representatives to a working committee that would determine the order of
preference as to how each creditor should be paid. They also agreed not to file suit against CALI
but CALI did reserve that it will file insolvency proceedings should its assets be not enough to pay
them up. Shell Company was represented by a certain Fitzgerald to the three man working
committee. Later, the working committee convened to discuss how CALI’s asset should be divided
amongst the creditors but while such was pending, Fitzgerald sent a telegraph message to Shell
USA advising the latter that Shell Philippines is assigning its credit to Shell USA in the amount of
$79k, thereby effectively collecting almost all if not the entire indebtedness of CALI to Shell
Philippines. Shell USA got wind of the fact that CALI has a C-54 plane is California and so Shell USA
petitioned before a California court to have the plane be the subject of a writ of attachment which
was granted.
Meanwhile, the stockholders of CALI were unaware of the assignment of credit made by Shell
Philippines to Shell USA and they went on to approve the sale of CALI’s asset to the Philippine
Airlines. In September 1948, the other creditors learned of the assignment made by Shell. This
prompted these other creditors to file their own complaint of attachment against CALI’s assets.
CALI then filed for insolvency proceedings to protect its assets in the Philippines from being
attached. Velayo’s appointment as CALI’s assignee was approved in lieu of the insolvency
proceeding. In order for him to recover the C-54 plane in California, it filed for a writ of injunction
against Shell Philippines in order for the latter to restrain Shell USA from proceeding with the
attachment and in the alternative that judgment be awarded in favor of CALI for damages double
the amount of the C-54 plane. The C-54 plane was not recovered. Shell Company argued it is not
liable for damages because there is nothing in the law which prohibits a company from assigning
its credit, it being a common practice.
ISSUE: Whether or not Shell is liable for damages considering that it did not violate any law.
HELD: Yes. The basis of such liability, in the absence of law, is Article 21 of the Civil Code which
states:
“Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage”.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved (as it was approved), would
vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold numbers of moral wrongs which is impossible for
human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. A moral wrong or injury, even if it does
not constitute a violation of a statute law, should be compensated by damages. Moral damages
(Art. 2217) may be recovered (Art. 2219). In Article 20, the liability for damages arises from a
willful or negligent act contrary to law. In this article, the act is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy.

MACKAY VS CA
FACTS: Respondent. Tobias was employed by petitioner Globe Mackay Cable and Radio
Corporation (GLOBE MACKAY) in a dual capacity as a purchasing agent and administrative
assistant to the engineering operations manager. In 1972, GLOBE MACKAY discovered fictitious
purchases and other fraudulent transactions for which it lost several thousands of pesos.
According to private respondent it was he who actually discovered the anomalies and reported
them his immediate superior Ferraren and to petitioner Hendry who was then the Executive Vice-
President and General Manager of GLOBE MACKAY.

One day after Tobias made the report, petitioner Hendry confronted him by stating that he was the
number one suspect, and ordered him to take a one week forced leave, not to communicate with
the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to leave the office keys.

When private respondent Tobias returned to work after the forced leave, petitioner Hendry went up
to him and called him a “crook” and a “swindler.” Tobias was then ordered to take a lie detector
test. He was also instructed to submit specimen of his handwriting, signature, and initials for
examination by the police investigators to determine his complicity in the anomalies.

The Manila police investigators submitted a laboratory crime report clearing private respondent of
participation in the anomalies.
Not satisfied with the police report, petitioners hired a private investigator submitted a report
finding Tobias guilty. This report however expressly stated that further investigation was still to be
conducted.

Nevertheless Hendry issued a memorandum suspending Tobias from work preparatory to the filing
of criminal charges against him.

Tagle, Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner, after investigating other documents
pertaining to the alleged anomalous transactions, submitted a second laboratory crime report
reiterating his previous finding that the handwritings, signatures, and initials appearing in the
checks and other documents involved in the fraudulent transactions were not those of Tobias. The
lie detector tests conducted on Tobias also yielded negative results.

Notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from the anomalies and the fact that the
report of the private investigator, was, by its own terms, not yet complete, petitioners filed with
the City Fiscal of Manila a complaint for estafa through falsification of commercial documents, later
amended to just estafa. Subsequently five other criminal complaints were filed against Tobias, four
of which were for estafa through Falsification of commercial document while the fifth was for of
Article 290 of’ the Revised Penal Code (Discovering Secrets Through Seizure of
Correspondence). All of the six criminal complaints were dismissed by the fiscal.
In the meantime Tobias received a notice from petitioners that his employment has been
terminated effective December 13, 1972. Whereupon, Tobias filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
The labor arbiter dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the labor arbiter’s
decision. However, the Secretary of Labor, acting on petitioners’ appeal from the NLRC ruling,
reinstated the labor arbiter’s decision. Tobias appealed the Secretary of Labor’s order with the
Office of the President. During the pendency of the appeal with said office, petitioners and private
respondent Tobias entered into a compromise agreement regarding the latter’s complaint for
illegal dismissal.

Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the RETELCO. However, petitioner Hendry, without
being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE
MACKAY due to dishonesty.

Private respondent Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious,
oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. The RTC of Manila rendered judgment in favor of
private respondent by ordering petitioners to pay actual damages, moral damages, exemplary
damages, attorney’s fees, and costs. Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the CA. On the other
hand, Tobias appealed as to the amount of damages.

The CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been
denied, the instant petition for review on certiorari was filed.
ISSUE: WON petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent.
HELD: The petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
YES

Petitioners contend that they could not be made liable for damages in the lawful exercise of their
right to dismiss private respondent.

On the other hand, private respondent contends that because of petitioners’ abusive manner in
dismissing him as well as for the inhuman treatment he got from them, the Petitioners must
indemnify him for the damage that he had suffered.

One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of “some basic
principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the
stability of the social order.” Foremost among these principles is that pronounced in Article 19
which provides:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of
rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but
also in the performance of one’s duties.
The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms
of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because
recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality.
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article
19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer
must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of
human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its
violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.

Article 20, which pertains to damage arising from a violation of law, provides that:

Art. 20. Every person who contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.

However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not violate any provision of law since
they were merely exercising their legal right to dismiss private respondent. This does not,
however, leave private respondent with no relief because Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that:

Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked, there is no rigid test
which can be applied. While the Court has not hesitated to apply Article 19 whether the legal and
factual circumstances called for its application, the question of whether or not the principle of
abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 or other
applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. And in the instant case,
the Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant circumstances, finds that
all petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to private
respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified.

XX

The trial court made a finding that notwithstanding the fact that it was private respondent Tobias
who reported the possible existence of anomalous transactions, petitioner Hendry “showed
belligerence..” This, petitioners do not dispute. But regardless of whether or not it was private
respondent Tobias who reported the anomalies to petitioners, the latter’s reaction towards the
former upon uncovering the anomalies was less than civil. An employer who harbors suspicions
that an employee has committed dishonesty might be justified in taking the appropriate action
such as ordering an investigation and directing the employee to go on a leave. Firmness and the
resolve to uncover the truth would also be expected from such employer. But the high-handed
treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was certainly uncalled for. And this reprehensible
attitude of petitioners was to continue when private respondent returned to work on after his one
week forced leave. Upon reporting for work, Tobias was confronted by Hendry who said. “Tobby,
you are the crook and swindler in this company.”

Considering that the first report made by the police investigators was submitted some time later,
the statement made by petitioner Hendry was baseless. The imputation of guilt without basis and
the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human
conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. If the dismissal is done abusively, then the
employer is liable for damages to the employee. Under the circumstances of the instant case, the
petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the
latter the right to recover damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code.

But petitioners were not content with just dismissing Tobias. Several other tortious acts were
committed by petitioners against Tobias after the latter’s termination from work. after the filing of
the first of six criminal complaints against Tobias, the latter talked to Hendry to protest the actions
taken against him. In response, Hendry cut short Tobias’ protestations by telling him to just
confess or else the company would file a hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail.
Hendry added that, “You Filipinos cannot be trusted.” The threat unmasked petitioner’s bad faith in
the various actions taken against Tobias. On the other hand, the scornful remark about Filipinos as
well as Hendry’s earlier statements about Tobias being a “crook” and “swindler” are clear
violations of ‘Tobias’ personal dignity

The next tortious act committed by petitioners was the writing of a letter to RETELCO .Because of
the letter, Tobias failed to gain employment with RETELCO and as a result of which, Tobias
remained unemployed for a longer period of time. For this further damage suffered by Tobias,
petitioners must likewise be held liable for damages consistent with Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
Petitioners, however, contend that they have a “moral, if not legal, duty to forewarn other
employers of the kind of employee the plaintiff (private respondent herein) was.” Petitioners
further claim that “it is the accepted moral and societal obligation of every man to advise or warn
his fellowmen of any threat or danger to the latter’s life, honor or property. And this includes
warning one’s brethren of the possible dangers involved in dealing with, or accepting into
confidence, a man whose honesty and integrity is suspect” These arguments, rather than justify
petitioners’ act, reveal a seeming obsession to prevent Tobias from getting a job, even after almost
two years from the time Tobias was dismissed.

Finally, there is the matter of the filing by petitioners of six criminal complaints against Tobias.
Petitioners contend that there is no case against them for malicious prosecution and that they
cannot be “penalized for exercising their right and prerogative of seeking justice by filing criminal
complaints against an employee who was their principal suspect in the commission of forgeries
and in the perpetration of anomalous transactions which defrauded them of substantial sums of
money”

While sound principles of justice and public policy dictate that persons shall have free resort to the
courts for redress of wrongs and vindication of their rights, the right to institute criminal
prosecutions can not be exercised maliciously and in bad faith.

To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a
design to vex and humiliate a person and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant
knowing that the charges were false and groundless

In fine, considering the haste in which the criminal complaints were filed, the fact that they were
filed during the pendency of the illegal dismissal case against petitioners, the threat made by
Hendry, the fact that the cases were filed notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating
Tobias from involvement in the anomalies committed against GLOBE MACKAY, coupled by the
eventual dismissal of all the cases, the Court is led into no other conclusion than that petitioners
were motivated by malicious intent in filing the six criminal complaints against Tobias.

XX (on damages)

Petitioners next contend that the award of damages was excessive.

It must be underscored that petitioners have been guilty of committing several actionable tortious
acts, i.e., the abusive manner in which they dismissed Tobias from work including the baseless
imputation of guilt and the harassment during the investigations; the defamatory language
heaped on Tobias as well as the scornful remark on Filipinos; the poison letter sent to RETELCO
which resulted in Tobias’ loss of possible employment; and, the malicious filing of the criminal
complaints. Considering the extent of the damage wrought on Tobias, the Court finds that,
contrary to petitioners’ contention, the amount of damages awarded to Tobias was reasonable
under the circumstances.

NOTES:

Yet, petitioners still insist that the award of damages was improper, invoking the principle of
damnum absque injuria. It is argued that “[t]he only probable actual damage that plaintiff (private
respondent herein) could have suffered was a direct result of his having been dismissed from his
employment, which was a valid and legal act of the defendants-appellants (petitioners herein).
According to the principle of damnum absque injuria, damage or loss which does not constitute a
violation of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong is not actionable. This principle finds no
application in this case. It bears repeating that even granting that petitioners might have had the
right to dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive manner in which that right was exercised amounted
to a legal wrong for which petitioners must now be held liable. Moreover, the damage incurred by
Tobias was not only in connection with the abusive manner in which he was dismissed but was also
the result of several other quasi-delictual acts committed by petitioners.
Petitioners next question the award of moral damages. However, the Court has already ruled in a
case that [p]er express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are
recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code.” Hence, the CA committed no error
in awarding moral damages to Tobias.
Lastly, the award of exemplary damages is impugned by petitioners. Although Article 2231 of the
Civil Code provides that “[i]n quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant
acted with gross negligence,” the Court, in Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., ruled that
if gross negligence warrants the award of exemplary damages, with more reason is its imposition
justified when the act performed is deliberate, malicious and tainted with bad faith. As in
the Zulueta case, the nature of the wrongful acts shown to have been committed by petitioners
against Tobias is sufficient basis for the award of exemplary damages to the latter.

BARON MARKETING VS CA
Article 1248. Unless there is an express stipulation to that
effect, the creditor cannot be compelled partially to receive the
prestation in which the obligation consists. Neither may the
debtor be required to make partial payments.
However, when the debt is in part liquidated and in
part unliquidated, the creditor may demand and the debtor
may effect the payment of the former without waiting for the
liquidation of the latter.
Facts:
· August 31, 1973. Phelps Dodge appointed Barons Marketing as one of its dealers of
electrical wires and cables effective Sept. 1, 1973. Defendant was given 60 days credit for its
purchases of Phelps Dodge’s electrical products
· Barons Marketing purchased, on credit, from Phelps Dodge’s electrical wires and cable in the
total amount of P4,102,483.30. This was then sold to MERALCO, Baron Mktg being the accredited
supplier of the electrical requirements of MERALCO.
· Under the sales invoices issued by Phelps Dodge to Barons Mktg for the subject purchases,
it is stipulated that interest at 12% on the amount of atty’s fees and collection. Baron’s Mktg paid
P300,000 out of its total purchases leaving an unpaid account of P3,802,478.20. Phelps Dodge
wrote Barons Mktg demanding payment of its outstanding obligations due Phelps Dodge. Baron
Mktg responded by requesting if it could pay its outstanding account in monthly installments of
P500,000 plus 1%interest per month until full payment, this request was rejected and Phelps
Dodge demanded full payment
· Phelps Dodge then filed a complaint before the Pasig Trial Court for the recovery of
P3,802,478.20 and it also prayed to be awarded with attorney’s fee at the rate of 25% of the
amount demanded, exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000, the expenses of litigation and
the costs of suit.
· The court ruled in favor of Phelps Dodge with the exemplary damages of P10,000 and
recovery of P3,108,000
· Both parties appealed. Phelps Dodge claimed that court should have awarded the sum of
P3,802,478.20. It also said that the amount awarded was a result of a typographical error.
· Barons Mktg claimed that Phelps Dodge’s claim for damages is a result of “creditor’s abuse”
and it also claimed that Phelps Dodge failed to prove its cause of action against it.
· CoA ruled in favor of Phelps Dodge with the correct amount but only with the 5% for the
Atty’s fee. No costs.
· Barons Mktg then alleged that the Coa erred its decision

Issue: W/ON private respondent is guilty of abuse of right

Held: No. a creditor cannot be considered in delay if he refuses to accept partial performance
because, unless otherwise provided by law or stipulated by the parties, a creditor cannot be
compelled to accept
partial performance; however, if good faith necessitates acceptance or if the creditor abuses his
right in not accepting, the creditor will incur in delay if he does not accept such partial
performance.
MWSS VS ACT THEATER

CARPIO vs VALMONTE
FACTS: Respondent Leonora Valmonte is a wedding coordinator. Michelle del Rosario and Jon
Sierra engaged her services for their church weddinng on October 10, 1996. At about 4:30 pm on
that day, Valmonte went to the Manila Hotel and when she arrived at Suite 326-A, several persons
were already there including Soledad Carpio, the aunt of the bride.

After reporting to the bride, Valmonte went out of the suite to go to the reception hall to give the
meal allowance to the band and to pay the suppliers. Upon entering the suite, Valmonte noticed
the people staring at her and it was at this juncture that Soledad Carpio allegedly uttered the
following words to Valmonte: “Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang dala mong bag? Saan
ka pumunta? Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha” It turned out that after
Valmonte left the room to attend to her duties, petitioner discovered that the pieces of jewelry
which she placed ins i de the comfort room in a paper bag were lost and these include diamond
rings, earrings, bracelet and diamong necklace with a total value of about 1M pesos. Valmonte was
allegedly bodily searched, interrogated and trailed by the police officers, but the pe titioner kept
on saying the words “Siya lang ang lumabas ng kwarto.” Valmonte’s car was also searched but the
search yielded nothing.

Few days after the incident, petitioner received a letter from Valmonte demanding a formal letter
of apology which she wanted to be circulated to the newlyweds’ relatives and guests to redeem
her smeared reputation but the petitioner did not respond. Valmonte filed a suit for damages.

The trial court dismissed the complaint and ruled that when sought investigation for the loss of her
jewelry, she was merely exercising her right and if damage results from a person exercising his
legal right, it is damnum absque injuria. It added that no proof was presented by Valmonte to show
that petitioner acted maliciously and in bad fai th in pointing to her as the culprit.
The CA ruled out differently and opined that Valmonte has clearly established that she was singled
out by the petitioner as the one responsible for the loss of her jewelry. However, the court find no
sufficient evidence to justify the award of actual damages.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent is entitled to the award of actual and moral damages

HELD: The Court ruled that the respondent in entitled to moral damages but not to actual
damages.

In the sphere of our law on human relations, one of the fundamental precepts is the principle
known as “abuse of rights” under Article 19 of the Civil Code. To find existence of an abuse of
right, the following elements must be present: 1) there is legal right or duty; 2) which is exercised
in bad faith; 3) for the sole intent or prejudicing or injuring another. Thus, a person should be
protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is when he acts with
prudence and good faith; but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.

The Court said that petitioner’s verbal reproach against respondent was certainly uncalled for
considering that by her own account nobody knew that she brought such kind and amount of
jewelry inside the paper bag. This being the case, she had no right to attack respondent with her
innuendos which were not merely inquisitve but outrightly accusatory. By openly accusing
respondent as the only person who went out of the room before the loss of the jewelry in the
presence of all the guests therein, and ordering that she be immediately bodily searched,
petitioner virtually branded respondent as the thief. Petitioner had willfully caused injury to
respondent in a manner which is contrary to morals and good customs. Certainly, petitioner
transgressed the provisions of Article 19 in relation to Article 20 for which she should be held
accountable.

Garcia, Jr. v. Salvador (2007) / Ynares-Santiago

Facts
Ranida Salvador started working as a trainee in LBHT. She underwent a medical exam @ CDC with
Garcia (medtech) conducting the HBs Ag test. Her result was REACTIVE. The company physician
(Sto. Domingo) told her she is suffering from HepaB, and based on the medical report SD
submitted, LBHT terminated her employment. Ranida told her father Ramon about her condition,
then the latter suffered a heart attack and was confined at Bataan Doctors Hospital. Ranida took
another HBs Ag test in BDH, and the result was NON-REACTIVE. She told Dr. SD about it but the
latter said the CDC test was more reliable, so she took another test at CDC again, and the result
this time was NON-REACTIVE. She took the same test used in CDC @ BDH and the result was NON-
REACTIVE (four tests!). She submitted the results to the LBHT ExecOff who requested her to
undergo under test (WTF!) - result is NEGATIVE (5th test, haha), so LBHT rehired her.
Ranida and Ramon filed a complaint for damages against medtech Garcia + pathologist Castro,
claiming that the erroneous interpretation led her to lose her job, suffer mental anxiety, while
Ramon was hospitalized + lost business opportunities. Garcia denied the allegations of gross
negligence and incompetence; explained "false positive." Castro said he did not examine Ranida,
and that the results bore only his stamped signature.
RTC dismissed the Salvadors' complaint for failure to present sufficient evidence. CA
reversed this and ordered Garcia to pay moral damages (50k), exemplary damages (50k), and
atty's fees (25k). Castro was exonerated.

Issue and Holding

WON CA correctly found Garcia liable for damages. YES

1. WON a person is negligent is a question of fact -- petition for review on certiorari limited to
reviewing errors of law
1. Negligence - failure to observe for the protection of another's interest that degree of
care, precaution and vigilance which circ demand, whereby the other suffers injury
1. ALL ELEMENTS OF AN ACTIONABLE CONDUCT ARE PRESENT IN THIS CASE
1. Duty
2. Breach
3. Injury
4. Proximate causation
2. Negligence is a violation of statutory duty -- so many laws were broken!
1. CDC is not administered, directed, supervised by licensed physician but by a
licensed medtech
1. Castro's infrequent visit barely qualifies as an admin supervision and
control
2. Garcia conducted HBs Ag test of Ranida without Castro's supervision
3. HBs Ag test result released to Ranida without Castro's authorization
3. Garcia's failure to comply with laws, rules promulgated for the protection of public
safety and interest is failure to observe the care which a reasonably prudent health
care provider would observe --> BREACH OF DUTY!
4. Injuries suffered by Ranida could have been avoided had proper safeguards been
followed
 5. NCC 20 is the legal basis for award of damages to one who suffers whenever another
commits an act in violation of some legal provision
Damages, fees upheld. Garcia guilty of gross negligence.

MERALCO VS CA
To recover the damages due to embarrassment, humiliation, hurt pride, and wounded feelings
inflicted by MERALCO and Yambao during the disconnection of the Chavez family’s electrical
service; the Chavez family filed a complaint at CFI-Manila.
Private respondents Isaac Chavez and Juana O. Chavez, husband and wife, filed the complaint for
damages, together with their children, Isaac O. Chaves, Jr. and Rosendo O. Chaves. Isaac Sr. and
Isaac Jr. and Rosendo were members of the Philippine Bar; Isaac, Sr. and Isaac, Jr. were practicing
lawyers and Rosendo was a Legal Officer at the Agricultural Productivity Commission. Juana O.
Chaves was a public school teacher.
Petitioner Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) is a public utility corporation providing electric
power for the consumption of the general public in Metro Manila. Petitioner Pedro Yambao is a bill
collector of MERALCO.
Plaintiff Isaac Chavez became a customer of defendant MERALCO in the year 1953 when he and
his family were residing in Manila. On February 12, 1953, Chavez deposited the sum of P5.00 with
defendant MERALCO in connection with the contract for electrical service.
At or about the end of March, 1965, defendant Pedro Yambao went to the residence of plaintiffs
and presented two overdue bills, one for January 11 to February 9,1965, for the sum of P7.90 and
the other for February 9 to March 10, 1965, for the amount of P7. Juana O. Chaves, however,
informed Yambao that these bills would be paid at the MERALCO main office.
Unfortunately, Isaac went to the main office only to pay the bill of P7.90 leaving the other bill
unpaid. Thus, in the afternoon of April 21, 1965, MERALCO caused the electric service of the
Chavez family to be disconnected and the power line cut off.
Petitioners dispute the finding that there was no notice given to herein respondent.
They contend that in the absence of bad faith, they could not be held liable for moral and
exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees. The failure to give a notice of disconnection to
private respondents might have been a breach of duty or breach of contract, but by itself does not
constitute bad faith or fraud; it must be shown that such a failure was motivated by in or done with
fraudulent intent. They also maintain that ‘private respondents were in arrears in the payment of
their electricity bills when their electric service was connected, no moral damages may be
recovered by them under the ‘clean hands’ doctrine.
Issue:
Whether or not, in the absence of bad faith in disconnecting the service to Chavez family,
MERALCO and Yambao could be held liable for damages.
Held:
YES, MERALCO and YAMBAO CAN BE HELD LIABLE.
There is no abuse of discretion in the part of the CA in affirming the assailed decision of the CFI
Manila. The right to disconnect the electric service of a delinquent customer shall be accompanied
by a given notice 48 hours in advanced as provided for in Section 97 of the Revised Order No. 1 of
the Public Service Commission which provides as follows:
Section 97. Payment of bills. — A public service, may require that bills for service be paid within a
specified time after rendition. When the billing period covers a month or more, the minimum time
allowed will be ten days and upon expiration of the specified time, service may be discontinued for
the non-payment of bills, provided that a 48 hours’ written notice of such disconnection has been
given the customer: Provided, however, that disconnections of service shall not be made on
Sundays and official holidays and never after 2 p.m. of any working day: Provided, further, that if
at the moment the disconnection is to be made the customer tenders payment of the unpaid bill to
the agent or employee of the operator who is to effect the disconnection, the said agent or
employee shall be obliged to accept tender of payment and issue a temporary receipt for the
amount and shall desist from disconnecting the service.
In accordance with the previous rulings, failure to give such prior notice amounts to a tort. And
since, MERALCO and Yambao in this particular case disregarded the rule on 48-hour notice prior to
disconnection which is protected by law, MERALCO and Yambao can be held liable for damages
according to Article 1170 of the civil code, therefore, the Chavez family was entitled to claim
damages.

G.R. No. 116100. February 9, 1996

CUSTODIO VS CA

DOCTRINE:
The mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages. To
warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted
by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or
damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of
the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.

Damnum absque injuria – There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the
illegal invasion of a legal right;damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury;
and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there
can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a
violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.

Article 21 – Article 21 of the New Civil Code provides the basis for the principle of abuse of rights.
For there to be an abuse of rights, the following requisites must concur: (1) defendant acted in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful and; (3)
There was damage or injury to the plaintiff.

FACTS:
Private Respondent Mabasa wanted to establish an easement of right of way going into their
property against petitioners who built an adobe wall in their properties which thereby
restricted access to the Mabasa property. Petitioners claim that they built the wall in order to
protect their persons and their property from their intrusive neighbors. The Trial Court nonetheless
ordered that an easement be created.

Not satisfied, Mabasa went to the Court of Appeals which modified the decision of the trial court by
awarding actual damages (p65,000.00), moral damages (p30,000.00) and exemplary damages
(p10,000.00). Hence this petition. Damages were based on the fact of loss in the form of
unrealized rentals on the property due to the adobe wall restricting access.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in awarding damages.

HELD:
Yes. The Court of Appeals erred, the award for damages has no legal basis. The mere fact of loss
does not give rise to a right to recover damages. There must be both a right of action for a legal
wrong inflicted by defendant and a damage to the plaintiff resulting therefrom.Damages are
merely a part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.

An injury is an illegal invasion of a legal right, any loss, hurt and harm resulting from the injury is
damage. Damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. In this
case, the petitioners merely constructed an adobe wall which was in keeping with and is a valid
exercise of their rights as the owner of their respective properties—i.e. there was no abuse of right
as provided for in Article 21 of the New Civil Code and where the following requisites must
concur: (1) defendant acted in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The
acts should be willful and; (3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff. None of these requisites
was present in this case.

The loss was therefore not a result of a violation of a legal duty. Instances where the damage was
not a result of an injury is calleddamnum absque injuria and the plaintiff is not normally given an
award for damages.

In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act must be
not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria.

BAKSH VS CA
FACTS: Petitioner was a medicine student at Lyceum Northwestern Colleges at Dagupan City. He
was an Iranian exchange student and was 29 years old. Respondent was a former waitress on a
luncheonette, and was 22 years old. Petitioner was allegedly the lover of the respondent, and was
said to promise marriage to the latter, which convinced her to live with him in his apartment. It
was even alleged that the petitioner went to the house of the respondent to inform her family
about the marriage on the end of the semester. However, the marriage did not materialize, with
several beatings and maltreatment experienced by the respondent from the petitioner. The case
was filed in the RTC of Pangasinan, and the decision was held in favor of the respondent. However,
the petitioner claimed that the judgment of the RTC was an error, for the claims of the respondent
are not true, and that he did not know about the custom of the Filipinos; his acts were in
accordance of his custom. The decision of the RTC was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.
Hence, the petitioner filed an appeal to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent could claim payment for the damages incurred by the
petitioner.
RULING: Mere breach of marriage is not punishable by law. However, since the respondent was
proved to have a good moral character, and that she had just let her virginity be taken away by
the petitioner since the latter offered a promise of marriage, then she could ask for payment for
damages. Furthermore, since she let her lover, the petitioner, “deflowered” her since she believed
that his promise to marry was true, and not due to her carnal desire, then she could have her
claims against the petitioner. Moreover, the father of the respondent had already looked for pigs
and chicken for the marriage reception and the sponsors for the marriage, and then damages were
caused by the petitioner against the respondents, which qualified the claims of the respondent
against the petitioner

RELLOSA vs. PELLOSIS

GR # 138964 Aug 9, 2001

FACTS:
Respondents were lessees of a panel of land owned by Marta Reyes located at San Pascual St.,
Malate, Manila. After the demise of Marta, Victor Reyes, her son, inherited the land. Victor
informed the respondents that they would have a right of first refusal to buy the land. In 1989,
without the knowledge of respondents, the land was sold to petitioner Cynthia Ortega who was
able to ultimately secure title to the property in her name.
On May 25, 1989, Cynthia Ortega filed petition for condemnation of the structures on the land. The
office of building Official issued a resolution ordering the demolition of the houses of respondents
on November 27, 1989. Copies were received by respondents on December 7, 1989 and on
December 12, the day respondents filed an appeal contesting the order, petitioners proceeded
with the demolition of the house.
Respondents filed case before Manila RTC which was dismissed. On appeal, CA reversed the
decision and ordered petitioners to pay respondents for moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA ruling in favor of respondents tenable.

RULING:
The court rules for affirmance of the assailed decision.
A right to power, privilege or immunity guaranteed under a constitution, statute or decisional law
or recognized as a result of long usage constitute of a legally enforceable claim of one person
against another.
The decision of CA was MODIFIED by reducing the awards for exemplary and moral damages to
P20,000 to each respondent. The decision of the appellate court is affirmed.

NAPOCOR VS PHILIPP BROTHERS

National Power Corporation vs. Philipp Brothers Oceanic, Inc., 369 SCRA 629 , November 20, 2001
Same; Damages; A person will be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his
right, that is, when he acts with prudence and in good faith; but not when he acts with negligence
or abuse.—Owing to the discretionary character of the right involved in this case, the propriety of
NAPOCOR’s act should therefore be judged on the basis of the general principles regulating human
relations, the forefront provision of which is Article 19 of the Civil Code which provides that “every
person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.” Accordingly, a person will be
protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with
prudence and in good faith; but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.

Same; Same; To recover actual damages, the amount of loss must not only be capable of proof but
must actually be proven with reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or
best evidence obtainable of the actual amount thereof.—Basic is the rule that to recover actual
damages, the amount of loss must not only be capable of proof but must actually be proven with
reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or best evidence obtainable of the
actual amount thereof. A court cannot merely rely on speculations, conjectures, or guesswork as to
the fact and amount of damages. Thus, while indemnification for damages shall comprehend not
only the value of the loss suffered, but also that of the profits which the obligee failed to obtain, it
is imperative that the basis of the alleged unearned profits is not too speculative and conjectural
as to show the actual damages which may be suffered on a future period.

Same; Same; Moral damages are not, as a general rule, granted to a corporation.—The award of
moral damages is likewise improper. To reiterate, NAPOCOR did not act in bad faith. Moreover,
moral damages are not, as a general rule, granted to a corporation. While it is true that
besmirched reputation is included in moral damages, it cannot cause mental anguish to a
corporation, unlike in the case of a natural person, for a corporation has no reputation in the sense
that an individual has, and besides, it is inherently impossible for a corporation to suffer mental
anguish. [National Power Corporation vs. Philipp Brothers Oceanic, Inc., 369 SCRA 629(2001)]
National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) issued invitations to bid for the supply and delivery of
120,000 metric tons of imported coal for its Batangas Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant of
which Philipp Brothers Oceanic, Inc. (PHIBRO) bidded and was accepted.
On July 10, 1987, PHIBRO told NAPOCOR that disputes might soon plague Australia that will

seriously hamper its ability to supply coal. On July 23 to July 31, 1987, PHIBRO informed NAPOCOR

that unless a "strike-free" clause is incorporated in the charter party or the contract of carriage,

the ship owners are unwilling to load their cargo. In order to hasten the transfer of coal, they

should share the burden of the "strike-free" clause but NAPOCOR refused.

PHIBRO effected its first shipment only on November 17, 1987 which was supposed to be on the

30th day after receipt of the letter of credit of which it received on August 6, 1987.

Consequently, In October 1987: NAPOCOR once more advertised for the delivery of coal to its

Calaca thermal plant of which PHIBRO applied but was rejected since it was not able to satisfy the

demand for damages on its delay. PHIBRO filed for damages in the RTC alleging that the rejection

was tainted with malice and bad faith.

After the trial, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of PHIBRO, ordering the defendant

NAPOCOR to reinstate PHIBRO in the defendant National Power Corporation’s list of accredited

bidders and indemnify the same actual, moral and exemplary damages. On appeal, the CA

affirmed in toto the decision of RTC.

FRENZEL v. CATITO
G.R. No. 143958. July 11, 2003
Ponente: J. CALLEJO Sr.

DOCTRINE:
A contract that violates the Constitution and the law, is null and void and vests no rights and
creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The petitioner, being a party to an illegal
contract, cannot come into a court of law and ask to have his illegal objective carried out

FACTS:

Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel is an Australian citizen of German descent. He was so enamored with
Ederlina that he bought her numerous properties such as house and lot in Quezon City and in
Davao City. He also put up a beauty parlor business in the name of Ederlina. Alfred was unaware
that Ederlina was married until her spouse Klaus Muller wrote a letter to Alfred begging the latter
to leave her wife alone.

When Alfred and Ederlinas relationship started deteriorating. Ederlina had not been able to secure
a divorce from Klaus. The latter could charge her for bigamy and could even involve Alfred, who
himself was still married. To avoid complications, Alfred decided to live separately from Ederlina
and cut off all contacts with her.

On October 15, 1985, Alfred wrote to Ederlinas father, complaining that Ederlina had taken all his
life savings and because of this, he was virtually penniless. He further accused the Catito family of
acquiring for themselves the properties he had purchased with his own money. He demanded the
return of all the amounts that Ederlina and her family had stolen and turn over all the properties
acquired by him and Ederlina during their coverture.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner could recover the money used in purchasing the several properties

HELD:

No, even if, as claimed by the petitioner, the sales in question were entered into by him as the real
vendee, the said transactions are in violation of the Constitution; hence, are null and void ab initio.
A contract that violates the Constitution and the law, is null and void and vests no rights and
creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The petitioner, being a party to an illegal
contract, cannot come into a court of law and ask to have his illegal objective carried out. One who
loses his money or property by knowingly engaging in a contract or transaction which involves his
own moral turpitude may not maintain an action for his losses. To him who moves in deliberation
and premeditation, the law is unyielding. The law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or
agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them

LIM VS REYES
Facts: Petitioner David Reyes filed a complaint for annulment of contract and damages against
respondents. The complaint alleged that Reyes as seller and Lim as buyer entered into a contract
to sell a parcel of land located along F.B. Harrison Street, Pasay City with a monthly rental of
P35,000.
The complaint claimed that Reyes had informed Harrison Lumber to vacate the Property before the
end of January 1995. Reyes also informed Keng and Harrison Lumber that if they failed to vacate
by 8 March 1995, he would hold them liable for the penalty of P400,000 a month as provided in
the Contract to Sell. It was also alleged that Lim connived with Harrison Lumber not to vacate the
Property until the P400,000 monthly penalty would have accumulated and equaled the unpaid
purchase price of P18,000,000.
Keng and Harrison Lumber denied that they connived with Lim to defraud Reyes, and that Reyes
approved their request for an extension of time to vacate the Property due to their difficulty in
finding a new location for their business. Harrison Lumber claimed that it had already started
transferring some of its merchandise to its new business location in Malabon.
Lim filed his Answer stating that he was ready and willing to pay the balance of the purchase price.
Lim requested a meeting with Reyes through the latter’s daughter on the signing of the Deed of
Absolute Sale and the payment of the balance but Reyes kept postponing their meeting. Reyes
offered to return the P10 million down payment to Lim because Reyes was having problems in
removing the lessee from the Property. Lim rejected Reyes’ offer and proceeded to verify the
status of Reyes’ title to the Property. Lim learned that Reyes had already sold the Property to Line
One Foods Corporation Lim denied conniving with Keng and Harrison Lumber to defraud
Reyes.Reyes filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint due to supervening facts. These
included the filing by Lim of a complaint for estafa against Reyes as well as an action for specific
performance and nullification of sale and title plus damages before another trial court. The trial
court granted the motion.
In his Amended Answer Lim prayed for the cancellation of the Contract to Sell and for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary attachment against Reyes. The trial court denied the prayer for a writ of
preliminary attachment.
Lim requested in open court that Reyes be ordered to deposit the P10 million down payment with
the cashier of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque. The trial court granted this motion.
Reyes filed a Motion to Set Aside the Order on the ground the Order practically granted the reliefs
Lim prayed for in his Amended Answer. The trial court denied Reyes’ motion.
The trial court denied Reyes’ Motion for Reconsideration. In the same order, the trial court directed
Reyes to deposit the P10 million down payment with the Clerk of Court.
Reyes filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals and prayed that the orders of the trial
court be set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. But the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition for review.
Issue: Whether on not the equity jurisdiction is an applicable law on the matter?
Held: The instant case, the Supreme Court held that if this was a case where there is hiatus in the
law and in the Rules of Court. If this case was left alone, the hiatus will result in unjust enrichment
to Reyes at the expense of Lim. Here the court excercised equity jurisdiction.The purpose of the
exercise of equity jurisdiction in this case is to prevent unjust enrichment and to ensure restitution
so that substantial justice may be attained in cases where the prescribed or customary forms of
ordinary law are inadequate.
The Supreme Court also state that rescission is possible only when the person demanding
rescission can return whatever he may be obliged to restore. A court of equity will not rescind a
contract unless there is restitution, that is, the parties are restored to the status quo ante.
In this case, it was just, equitable and proper for the trial court to order the deposit of the P10
million down payment. The decision of the Court of Appeals.was affirmed.