http://mackenzieinstitute.

com/al-qaida-2/

Terrorism Profiles

Al Qaida (Core)
THE INSTITUTE11/13/2015, 12:00 pm

Alternative Names:
Al Jihad (AJ), Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), Vanguards of Conquest (VOC), The Islamic Army, Islamic
Salvation Foundation, The Base, Group for the Preservation of the Holy Sites, Islamic Army for the
Liberation of the Holy Places, World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, Osama Bin
Ladin Network, Osama Bin Ladin Organization and Qa’idat al-Jihad
Location:
Al Qaida core does not have a single headquarters: from 1991-1996 it operated out of Pakistan along the
Afghan border. However, during the Taliban regime this was moved to Afghanistan. Logically, once the
US-led war in Afghanistan began, Al Qaida once again began to operate out of Pakistan. That being said,
it has been documented that Al-Qaida has about 100 underground autonomous cells in countries like the
United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, France, Spain, Germany, Albania, and Uganda.
Leadership:
Founded by Osama bin Laden in the 1980’s.
Membership:
According to a 1998 U.S. federal indictment, a council that discusses and approves major undertakings
governs Al Qaida. The founder, Osama Bin Laden was the leader until U.S. Special Forces killed him on
May 1, 2011. A month after his death, Ayman al-Zawahiri claimed the leadership position. During the
War on Terror, several senior leaders in the network have been killed or detained. It is impossible to
estimate the number of members in Al Qaida as it is highly decentralized. Estimates range from several
hundred to several thousand members.
Funding Sources:
There are four main ways Al Qaida raises money; however, there are many more informal methods that
have been developed post 9/11.
(a) hawala networks
(b) commercial companies
(c) charitable organizations
(d) fundraisers
Origins:
Al Qaida was founded in 1988 by Osama bin Laden and it serves as the strategic hub and driver for the
global Islamist terrorist movement. Al Qaida has created relationships with other like-minded Islamist
terrorist groups and provides encouragement, inspiration, and funding to these groups. Al Qaida is most
well known for the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The
organization began from a clearinghouse for the international Muslim brigade in opposition to the 1979
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The services office recruited, trained, and financed thousands of foreign
mujahedeen from more than fifty countries. Bin Laden wanted these fighters to continue the “holy war”
beyond Afghanistan; therefore, he formed Al Qaida around 1988. With bin Laden’s death in May, 2011
Al Qaida suffered a significant blow but its networks around the world remain strong. Al Qaida’s affiliates
have grown in strength and size over the years. Al-Qaida, which was once described as a defined and
hierarchical group, is seen to have metastasized into a multinational movement and franchise operating in
at least 16 countries.
Timeline of Events:
 August 1988: Osama bin Laden and some of his top associates meet in a suburb of Peshawar, Pakistan. With
Soviet forces withdrawing from Afghanistan, the idea of global jihad seems possible, and Al Qaida, literally
“the Base”, is born.
 1991 – 1998: Bin Laden moves his base of operations to Sudan, where he forges links with militants across the
Middle East and North Africa who play a role in numerous terrorist attacks. In February 1998, after being
expelled from Sudan and returning to Afghanistan, he issues a fatwa against the US. Later that year, he orders
the US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, which kill 224 people.
 October 7, 2001: The War on Terror begins after the Taliban regime fails to produce Bin Laden, who is
accused of masterminding the 9/11 attacks. The bulk of Al Qaida has been driven into Pakistan, where the
organization reconstitutes itself and proceeds to play a role in bombings from Bali in 2002 to Madrid in 2004
to London in 2005.
 May 12, 2003: Al Qaida launches a sustained insurgency against Saudi Arabia, carrying out a series of
bombings in Riyadh. In November, the indigenous wing of bin Laden’s organization becomes the first to take
on the “Al Qaida” formulation, dubbing itself Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).
 October 17, 2004: al-Zarqawi pledges allegiance to bin Laden and founds al Qaida in Iraq (AQI). Around this
time, the CIA begins using the terms AQCore for Al Qaida Core, to distinguish between bin Laden’s Pakistan-
based group affiliates.
 July 2005: Bin Laden’s deputy, al-Zawahiri, chastises Zarqawi for his extreme tactics, warning that AQI’s
brutal beheading videos could alienate potential supporters. Terrorism analysts see this as evidence that Al
Qaida core is not in control of its affiliates.
 February 3, 2006 – 23 Al Qaida suspects escape from a Yemeni prison. Widely considered the moment of
conception for a “new” Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula.
 September 11, 2006 – Zawahiri announces the union of Al Qaida and the Group for Preaching and Combat
(GSPC). Four month later, GSPC rebrands itself Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and carries out a
series of deadly attacks in Algeria.
 July-October 2010 – Bin Laden asks a senior Al Qaida associate in Pakistan to draft a memorandum requiring
regional Al Qaida affiliates to consult with “Al Qaida central” before carrying out operations.
 May 2, 2011 – US Navy SEALs storm a nondescript compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, and kill bin Laden.
Zawahiri is tapped to succeed him, but the death of its longtime leader is seen as a near-knockout blow for Al
Qaida core.
 February 2012 – Al Qaida merges with Somali group al-Shabab. The following year, al-Shabab kills 61
civilians in Nairobi’s Westgate mall.
 September 2012 – Zawahiri calls on his followers to exploit the violence in Syria, where rebels are battling
Bashar al-assad’s regime. Seven months later, Al Qaida in Iraq changes its name to the Islamic State of Iraq
and al-Sham (ISIS) to emphasize its growing involvement in the Syrian conflict.
 June 15, 2013 – ISIS becomes the first Al Qaida affiliate to go rogue, defying an order from Zawahiri to quit
fighting in Syria and return to Iraq. ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declares in, February 2014, that Al
Qaida’s central command washes its hands of ISIS.
Ideological Roots:
Al Qaida holds Sunni Muslim Fundamentalist views. Al Qaida gains power from this ideology by
associating itself with other organizations who hold the same ideology. A partial list of terrorist
organizations who share Al Qaida’s Sunni Muslim Fundamentalist views are:
 Egyptian Islamic Jihad
 The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
 Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula
 Al Qaida in Iraq
 Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad (Kashmir)
 Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
 Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (Algeria) (formerly Salafist Group for Call and Combat)
 Armed Islamic Group (Algeria)
 Abu Sayyaf Group (Malaysia, Philippines)
 Jemaah Islamiya (Southeast Asia)
Objectives:
After the 9/11 attacks, the objectives of Al Qaida have been defined by, and propelled by, the United
States. Consistently the US government (including both the Bush and Obama administrations) state that
Al Qaida’s political goal is carrying out terrorist attacks on the US and their allies while leaving affiliates
to focus on local agendas. However, a recent excerpt from a declassified part of a National Intelligence
Estimate released in April 2006 asserts that there is a discrepancy between intelligence and the positions
of the Bush and Obama administrations. The NIE reports states that Al Qaida’s political goal is an “ultra-
conservative interpretation of sharia-based governance spanning the Muslim world.” Other terrorism
analysts argue that the group’s goals include uniting Muslims to fight the United States and other Western
powers deemed “non-Islamic” and to expel Westerners and non-Muslims from Muslim countries.
Tactics:
Al Qaida is known for suicide attacks, bombings, plane hijackings, and explosions. Note below a partial
list of Al Qaida-linked attacks:
 The August 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
 The October 2000 U.S.S. Cole bombing.
 The September 11, 2001, hijacking attacks on four U.S. airplanes, two of which crashed into the World Trade
Center, and a third which crashed into the Pentagon.
 The November 2002 car bomb attack and a failed attempt to shoot down an Israeli jetliner with shoulder-fired
missiles, both in Mombasa, Kenya.
 The October 2002 attack on a French tanker off the coast of Yemen.
 Several spring 2002 bombings in Pakistan.
 The April 2002 explosion of a fuel tanker outside a synagogue in Tunisia.
 The May 2003 car bomb attacks on three residential compounds in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
 The March 2004 bomb attacks on Madrid commuter trains, which killed nearly 200 people and left more than
1,800 injured.
 The July 2005 bombings of the London public transportation system.
 The February 2006 attack on the Abqaiq petroleum processing facility, the largest such facility in the world, in
Saudi Arabia.
 An October 2007 suicide bombing that narrowly missed killing former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir
Bhutto. Two months later, another bomber succeeds in killing the former prime minister; Pakistani officials
blame Baitullah Mahsud, a top Pakistani Taliban commander with close ties to Al Qaida.
 The attempted December 2009 bombing of a Detroit-bound Northwest Airlines flight.
Updated on November 13, 2015
 References

1. Bajoria, Jayshree, and Greg Bruno. "al-Qaeda (a.k.a. al-Qaida, al-Qa'ida)." Council on Foreign Relations. Last
modified June 6, 2012. Accessed October 15, 2015. http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations-and-networks/al-
qaeda-k-al-qaida-al-qaida/p9126.
2. Byman, David L. "The History of Al Qaeda." The Brookings Institute. Last modified September 1, 2011. Accessed
October 15, 2015. http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/09/01-al-qaeda-history-byman.
3. "Currently Listed Entities." Public Safety Canada. Last modified November 20, 2014. Accessed July 30, 2015.
http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrt/cntr-trrrsm/lstd-ntts/crrnt-lstd-ntts-eng.aspx#2057.
4. Habeck, Mary. "What does Al-Qaeda want?" Foreign Policy. Last modified March 6, 2012. Accessed October 15,
2015. http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/03/06/what-does-al-qaeda-want/
5. Juan Miguel del Cid Gómez. "A Financial Profile of the Terrorism of Al-Qaeda and its Affiliates." Terrorism
Research Initiative. Accessed October 15, 2015.
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/113/html
6. Laub, Zachary. "The Islamic State." Edited by Jonathan Masters. Council on Foreign Relations. Last modified May
18, 2015. Accessed October 15, 2015. http://www.cfr.org/iraq/islamic-state/p14811
7. McCormick, Ty. "Al Qaeda Core: A Short History." Foreign Policy. Last modified March 17, 2014. Accessed
October 15, 2015. http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/03/17/al-qaeda-core-a-short-history/
8. "Proscribed Terrorist Organizations." The Government of the UK. Home Office. Last modified March 27, 2015.
Accessed July 30, 2015.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/417888/Proscription-20150327.pdf.
9. "Timeline: al-Qaida." The Guardian. Accessed October 15, 2015.
http://www.theguardian.com/alqaida/page/0,12643,852377,00.html
AfghanistanAl QaidaAl-QaedaGroup for the Preservation of the Holy SitesIslamic Army for the Liberation of the
Holy PlacesIslamic Salvation FoundationOsama bin LadenPakistanQa'idat al-JihadThe BaseThe Islamic
ArmyUsama Bin Laden NetworkUsama Bin Ladin OrganizationWorld Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and
Crusaders

http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/03/17/al-qaeda-core-a-short-history/

Al Qaeda Core: A Short History

How the franchise operations of the world's most infamous terrorist
organization became more potent than the mothership.
BY TY MCCORMICK
| MARCH 17, 2014, 5:17 PM

Ever since launching the war on terror in 2001, the United States has struggled to define — let alone
defeat — what has proved to be a maddeningly amorphous enemy. Al Qaeda, once a relatively defined and
hierarchical group, has metastasized into a multinational movement with franchise operations in at least
16 countries, from Mali to Syria, Yemen to Nigeria. These so-called affiliates have largely replaced the
Pakistan-based mothership — now known as "al Qaeda core" or "al Qaeda central" — as the driving force
of global jihad. That distinction, between the original terrorist group and its offshoots, has recently grown
in political significance as U.S. President Barack Obama touts his decimation of al Qaeda’s "core
leadership" — even if each new start-up renders that victory less and less reassuring.

Trending Articles

It’s Time for a Coup in Venezuela

Only nationalists in the military can restore a legitimate constitutional democracy.

Powered By

August
1988

After years of supporting the Afghan mujahideen, Osama bin Laden and some of his top associates meet in a suburb of
Peshawar, Pakistan. With Soviet forces withdrawing from Afghanistan, the idea of a global jihad suddenly seems
possible, and al Qaeda, literally "the Base," is born. "We used to call the training camp al Qaeda," bin
Laden would later recall. "And the name stayed."

1991-1998
Bin Laden moves his base of operations to Sudan, where he forges links with militants across the Middle East and North
Africa who play a role in numerous terrorist attacks, including the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center. In February
1998, after being expelled from Sudan and returning to Afghanistan, he issues a fatwa against the United States. Later
that year, he orders the U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, which kill 224 people.

October 7, 2001
U.S. and British forces attack Afghanistan after the Taliban regime fails to produce bin Laden, who is accused of
masterminding the 9/11 attacks. Within months, the bulk of al Qaeda has been driven into Pakistan, where the
organization reconstitutes itself and proceeds to play a role in bombings from Bali in 2002 to Madrid in 2004 to London
in 2005.

May 12, 2003

Al Qaeda launches a sustained insurgency against Saudi Arabia, carrying out a series of bombings in Riyadh. In
November, the indigenous wing of bin Laden’s organization becomes the first to take on the "al Qaeda in" formulation,
dubbing itself al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Over the next three years, AQAP kills hundreds before Saudi
security forces are able to stomp it out.
October 17, 2004
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, whose terrorist group has perpetrated some of the most dramatic attacks of the Iraq war, pledges
allegiance to bin Laden and founds al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Around this time, the CIA begins using the term "AQCore,"
for al Qaeda core, to distinguish bin Laden’s Pakistan-based group from such offshoots.

July 2005
Bin Laden’s deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, chastises Zarqawi for his extreme tactics, warning that AQI’s brutal beheading
videos could alienate potential supporters. Terrorism analysts see this as evidence that al Qaeda core is not in control of
its affiliates.

February 3, 2006
Twenty-three al Qaeda suspects escape from a Yemeni prison. Widely considered the moment of conception for a "new"
AQAP — one of the inmates, Nasser al-Wuhayshi, would go on to lead the organization after its official founding in
2009 — the jailbreak breathes new life into al Qaeda’s presence in Yemen.

September 11, 2006

Zawahiri announces the union of al Qaeda and the Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC)*, a militant Salafi
organization with roots in the Algerian civil war. Four months later, GSPC rebrands itself al Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM) and carries out a series of deadly attacks in Algeria. By 2012, AQIM has established footholds in Niger
and Mauritania and has briefly joined forces with Tuareg rebels to seize control of northern Mali.

December 25, 2009

As Northwest Airlines Flight 253 descends toward Detroit, passenger Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempts
to detonate plastic explosives sewn into his underwear. The attack, which would have been the first on American soil by
an al Qaeda affiliate, fails. He tells the FBI that he received training and the explosive device from AQAP. But there is no
evidence that the group coordinated the plot with al Qaeda core.

July-October 2010

Bin Laden asks a senior al Qaeda associate in Pakistan to draft a memorandum requiring regional al Qaeda affiliates
("brothers") to consult with "al Qaeda central" before carrying out operations — another apparent sign that the core is
losing control of the periphery.

May 2, 2011
U.S. Navy SEALs storm a nondescript compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, and kill bin Laden. Zawahiri is tapped to
succeed him, but the death of its longtime leader is seen as a near-knockout blow for al Qaeda core.

January 31, 2012

"As long as we sustain the pressure on it, we judge that core al Qaeda will be of largely symbolic importance to the
global jihadist movement," National Director of Intelligence James Clapper tells the U.S. Senate. "But regional affiliates
… and, to a lesser extent, small cells and individuals will drive the global jihad agenda."

February 2012
Al Qaeda merges with Somali insurgent group al-Shabab, with which it had long maintained close ties. The following
year, al-Shabab kills 61 civilians in Nairobi’s Westgate mall.

September 2012
Zawahiri calls on his followers to exploit the violence in Syria, where rebels are battling Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Seven
months later, al Qaeda in Iraq changes its name to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) to emphasize its growing
involvement in the Syrian conflict. But ISIS soon begins to feud with another al Qaeda affiliate in Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra.

June 15, 2013

ISIS becomes the first al Qaeda affiliate to go rogue, defying an order from Zawahiri to quit fighting in Syria and return
to Iraq. "I have to choose between the rule of God and the rule of al-Zawahiri, and I choose the rule of God," ISIS leader
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declares. In February 2014, al Qaeda’s central command washes its hands of ISIS, saying it "is not
a branch of the al Qaeda group."

August 2013
Zawahiri promotes AQAP chief Wuhayshi to the No. 2 position in al Qaeda’s core and ordershim to carry out an attack,
triggering the closure of 22 U.S. embassies across the Muslim world. The promotion "discredits the widespread claim
that al Qaeda’s ‘core’ is based solely in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area," notes the Long War Journal.

January 3, 2014
As Iraq slides toward civil war, ISIS captures the city of Fallujah. "The police and the Army have abandoned the city," a
local journalist tells the Washington Post. "Al Qaeda has taken down all the Iraqi flags and burned them, and it has raised
its own flag on all the buildings."

January 2014
Terrorism experts Peter Bergen and Jennifer Rowland report that, with recent gains in Syria and Iraq, al Qaeda and its
affiliates "control more territory in the Arab world than … at any time in its history." Obama later argues, "There is a
distinction between the capacity and reach of a bin Laden and a network that is actively planning major terrorist plots
against the homeland versus jihadists who are engaged in various local power struggles and disputes, often sectarian." His
analogy: "If a jayvee team puts on Lakers uniforms, that doesn’t make them Kobe Bryant."

*Correction, March 17, 2014: This article originally misstated that Ayman
al-Zawahiri announced the union of al Qaeda and the Armed Islamic Group
(GIA). The union was between al Qaeda and the Group for Preaching and
Combat (GSPC), which had previously broken away from GIA.

Special thanks to Peter Bergen, Thomas Hegghammer, and Bruce Riedel.

Se intensifică încercarea de a trage șiiți-i șiiți și sunniții irakieni într-un război civil sângeros. Cupola Moscheii siite
Al-Askari din Samarra sau Moscheea de Aur a fost distrusă de un raid de insurgenți bine pregătit și bine executat,
în stil comando, îmbrăcat ca poliție irakiană. Potrivit CNN, "Un grup de bărbați îmbrăcați ca niște comandanți ai
poliției irakiene au declanșat explozibili". Se pare că suspecții sunt acum în custodie, "Zece oameni - toți îmbrăcați
în comenzi de poliție irakiene".

Probabilul vinovat este al-Qaeda din Irak sau grupuri sub noul consiliu Shuja Mujahedeen. Zarqawi a dorit un
război sectar între șiți și sunniți de la intrarea sa în conflict, după cum a afirmat clar în scrisoarea sa adresată lui
Osama bin Laden. al Qaeda din Irak a trecut prin dureri mari pentru a nega acest lucru și, foarte probabil, nu va lua
credit într-un astfel de atac evident asupra credincioșilor șiiți. Tacerea și în mod incert vor juca în mâinile lor și vor
alimenta teoriile conspirației despre cine a comis un astfel de act. Dar natura țintei și sofisticarea unui astfel de
atac indică în mod incontestabil al-Qaeda. "Comandoanele" deținute vor fi interogate temeinic, iar FBI-ul va fi
probabil chemat să determine natura acuzațiilor folosite pentru a distruge domul.

Golden Mosque.JPG Semnificația moscheii către șiți nu poate fi supraestimată. CNN furnizează o fișă de informații
despre Moscheea de Aur:

• Moscheea de Aur este unul dintre cele patru mari sanctuare șiite din Irak. Celelalte site-uri importante sunt în
Najaf, Kerbala și districtul Bagdad din Kadhimiya.

• Două dintre cele 12 imamuri șiite shiite sunt îngropate în altar. Imam Ali al-Hadi, care a murit în 868 d.Hr. și fiul
său, al 11-lea Imam Hasan al-Askari, care a murit în 874 d.Hr.

• Shiții cred că al 12-lea imam, Imam Mehdi, cunoscut sub numele de imam ascuns, sa ascuns dintr-o pivniță din
complex în 878. Ș.I. Șiiți spun că se va întoarce înainte de Ziua Judecății pentru a reveni la justiție într-o lume plină
de opresiune.

• Comandoanele irakiene au reluat Moscheea de Aur de la insurgenți în timpul ofensivei conduse de SUA
împotriva lui Samarra în octombrie 2004.

Golden Mosque Destroyed.jpg Omar la Irak Modelul oferă un raport pe teren despre tensiunile și evoluțiile din
Irak. Încurajând, Marele Ayatollah Sistani a cerut împiedicarea. În mod surprinzător, Muqtada al-Sadr, clericul anti-
american, liderul armatei Mahdi și oponentul Sistani, a cerut de asemenea reținere:

Ayatollahul Sistani a reacționat rapid la mânia escaladând emiterea unei fatwa care îi interzice pe adepții săi de a
"lua orice acțiune împotriva site-urilor sunni", în mod evident, pentru a descuraja urmașii săi să efectueze atacuri
de răzbunare asupra moscheilor sunnite. Sistani a cerut, de asemenea, o doliu de 7 zile și să o considere o
săptămână, dar guvernul a anunțat până acum doar o duminică oficială de 3 zile. Muqtada și-a tăiat turneul în
Liban și se îndreaptă spre Bagdad și ia chemat pe urmașii săi din Beirut să "aibă autocontrol și să se abțină de la
violență".