Valuation of Tesla Motors Inc.

Valuation of Tesla Motors Inc.
Copenhagen Business School, August 2014

Master Thesis
Supervisor: Peter Sehested

Number of standard pages: 80
Number of characters: 186 726
Hand in date: 08.08.2014
Nicoline Eeg Praem

Cand.merc. Finance and Strategic Management
Executive Summary TSLA
Price 31 M arch 14 USD 208.45
Tesla Motors, Inc. Target Price USD 184.01
The purpose of this thesis is to determine value of one Tesla Motors 52-week range USD 37.89 - 254.84
share as of March 31st 2014. An analysis of external and industry
specific factors will be followed by an internal analysis of the Key M etrics
company, in order to identify the determinants of value creation. The
Bloomberg: TSLA US Reuters: TSLA.O
thesis moves on to a financial analysis to determine the historical
profitability of the company. The analysis is based on a M arket cap. USD 25.7bn
reclassification and thorough assessment of financial statements. Shares outstanding 123m
NI BD, USD -136m
Based on the findings from the analysis, Tesla’s financial Enterprise Value, USD 22.6bn
performance will be forecasted. A discounted cash flow model is
used to determine the equity value, accompanied by a multiples and Shareprice performance 2010-2014
sensitivity analysis, to support the estimated value.
Tesla Motors is an innovative manufacturer of premium electric

vehicles and electric vehicle powertrains, with the characteristics of
a disruptive company. Their current product portfolio includes the
Model S luxury sedan. Upcoming products include the Model X in
mid-2015 and the Gen 3, a lower priced vehicle in 2017.
ROI C Q1 14 -5,8 %
Tesla’s growth will depend on factors within the company’s control: EBI TDA-margin Q1 14 0,0 %
EBI T-margin Q1 14 -7,1 %
project execution, store and infrastructure expansion, and quality, as
well as external factors: economic development, gasoline prices and WACC 8,1 %
the development of battery costs. A key hurdle for Tesla is battery
costs. For Tesla to drive electric vehicle adoption and become a mass-market player, battery costs must be
reduced from the current estimated cost of USD 320 per kWh.
As a young player in a competitive and capital-intensive industry, much of Tesla’s growth depends on proper
execution of upcoming projects. In 2020, Tesla expects to produce at full capacity of 500,000 vehicles. I
estimate unit sales of 398,000 and an EBITDA-margin of 14.5% in 2020. Based on my estimated value of
USD 184.01, I see the current market price as expensive, supported by industry multiples. My estimate is
lower than the current market value, indicating that most of the future profit potential is already priced in by
the market.
Highlights'000 F2012 F2013 E2014 E2015 E2016 E2017 E2018 E2019 E2020
Revenues 413 256 2 013 496 3 203 077 5 399 473 7 524 669 10 699 452 12 927 963 16 166 118 20 849 700
EBITDA (365 458) 44 800 50 735 350 119 704 434 1 084 412 1 424 983 2 210 833 3 032 573
NOPAT (394 418) (63 503) (61 116) 88 457 285 655 468 252 660 149 1 168 049 1 655 819
EPS (0,6) 0,7 2,1 3,4 4,5 8,3 11,9 12,0
Revenue growth 102 % 387 % 59 % 69 % 39 % 42 % 21 % 25 % 29 %
Profitability F2012 F2013 E2014 E2015 E2016 E2017 E2018 E2019 E2020
EBITDA-margin -88 % 2% 2% 6% 9% 10 % 11 % 14 % 15 %
EBIT-margin -95 % -3 % -3 % 2% 5% 6% 7% 10 % 11 %
ROIC (NOPAT) -134 % -12 % -8 % 7% 14 % 16 % 17 % 25 % 28 %
Multiples EV/Sales EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT

2014 2015 2020 2014 2015 2020 2014 2015 2020
TSLA 7.1x 4.2x 1.1x 445x 64.5x 7.4x N/A 191.5x 10.2x
Peers 0.9x 1.0x 7.2x 6.2x 11.7x 9.2x
2
Table of Contents
1.0 Introduction and Motivation .................................................................................................................... 5

1.1 Problem Statement....................................................................................................................................... 6
1.2 Delimitation ................................................................................................................................................. 7
1.3 Models and methodology ............................................................................................................................ 7
1.3.1 Data collection ..................................................................................................................................... 7
1.3.2 Strategic Analysis ................................................................................................................................. 8
1.3.3 Financial Analysis ................................................................................................................................ 9
1.3.4 Valuation .............................................................................................................................................. 9
2.0 Introduction to Tesla Motors and the Automotive Industry ............................................................... 10
2.1 Tesla Motors .............................................................................................................................................. 10
2.2 The Automotive Industry........................................................................................................................... 12
2.2.1 The Electric Vehicle Market............................................................................................................... 13
2.3 Historical Events and Share Price Developments ..................................................................................... 14
2.4 Organization .............................................................................................................................................. 15
2.4.1 Strategy and Business Model ............................................................................................................. 15
2.5 Ownership Structure .................................................................................................................................. 15
2.6 Business Segments .................................................................................................................................... 15
2.6.1 Development and Sales of Powertrain Components .......................................................................... 16
2.6.2 Emission credits ................................................................................................................................. 16
2.6.3 Stationary storage .............................................................................................................................. 17
2.6.4 Automobiles ........................................................................................................................................ 17
2.7 Geographical Segments ............................................................................................................................. 19
3.0 Strategic Analysis .................................................................................................................................... 20
3.1 PEST(EL) Analysis ................................................................................................................................... 20
3.1.1 Political and legislative drivers ......................................................................................................... 20
3.1.2 Economic drivers ............................................................................................................................... 22
3.1.3 Social and environmental drivers ...................................................................................................... 27
3.1.4 Technological drivers......................................................................................................................... 27
3.1.5 Conclusion of External Analysis ........................................................................................................ 29
3.2 Porters Five Forces .................................................................................................................................... 29
3.2.1 Threat of substitutes ........................................................................................................................... 30
3.2.2 Threat of new entrants ....................................................................................................................... 30
3.2.3 Bargaining power of customers ......................................................................................................... 31
3.2.4 Bargaining power of suppliers ........................................................................................................... 31
3.2.5 Intensity of existing rivalry ................................................................................................................. 32
3.2.6 Conclusion of Porter´s Five Forces ................................................................................................... 33
3.2.7 Market outlook for the automotive industry ....................................................................................... 33
3.3 Internal Analysis ........................................................................................................................................ 34
3.3.1 Value chain analysis .......................................................................................................................... 34
4.0 Financial Statement Analysis ................................................................................................................. 40
4.1 Reorganizing Financial Statements ........................................................................................................... 40
4.1.1 The analytical income statement ........................................................................................................ 40
4.1.2 The analytical balance sheet .............................................................................................................. 42
4.2 Historical Performance and Growth .......................................................................................................... 43
4.2.1 Operational Performance – Decomposed ROIC................................................................................ 43
4.2.2 Profit Margin ..................................................................................................................................... 45
3
4.2.3 Turnover rate of invested capital ....................................................................................................... 48
4.2.4 Return on Equity ................................................................................................................................ 50
4.3 Liquidity risk ............................................................................................................................................. 52
4.3.1 Short-term liquidity risk ..................................................................................................................... 52
4.4.2 Long-term liquidity risk...................................................................................................................... 53
4.4 Conclusion of Financial Analysis .............................................................................................................. 53
5.0 SWOT ....................................................................................................................................................... 54
6.0 Forecasting ............................................................................................................................................... 55
6.1 Budget period ............................................................................................................................................ 55
6.2 Terminal growth ........................................................................................................................................ 56
6.3 Explicit forecast – pro forma income statement ........................................................................................ 56
6.3.1 Development of automobile sales ....................................................................................................... 56
6.3.2 Profit Margin ..................................................................................................................................... 59
6.4 Explicit forecast – pro forma balance sheet ............................................................................................... 64
6.4.1 Fixed tangible assets (CAPEX) .......................................................................................................... 64
6.5 Development of profitability (ROIC) ........................................................................................................ 66
7.0 Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC)......................................................................................... 67
7.1 Expected return on equity, re .................................................................................................................... 68
7.1.1 The risk free rate, rf ................................................................................................................................ 68
7.1.2 Systematic risk, β.................................................................................................................................... 69
7.1.3 Equity risk premium ............................................................................................................................... 71
7.1.4 Liquidity premium .................................................................................................................................. 72
7.2 Cost of debt, rd .......................................................................................................................................... 72
7.2.1 Tax rate .............................................................................................................................................. 72
7.3 Long-term capital structure ....................................................................................................................... 73
8.0 Valuation .................................................................................................................................................. 75
8. 1 Discounted Cash Flow Model (DCF) ....................................................................................................... 75
8.2 Economic Value Added (EVA) ................................................................................................................. 76
8.3 Relative Valuation - Multiples .................................................................................................................. 77
9.0 Sensitivity Analysis .................................................................................................................................. 79
10.0 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................. 81
11.0 Bibliography........................................................................................................................................... 82
12.0 Appendix ................................................................................................................................................ 87
4
1.0 Introduction and Motivation
The subject of this thesis is a valuation of the American electric vehicle company Tesla Motors, Inc. (TSLA).
My motivation for writing this thesis stems from several factors.
The automobile industry is s highly cyclical business. The industry is closely tied to economical cycles and
prices, and macro factors need therefore be analysed carefully to determine the future potential of the
industry. Compared to the traditional segment, the alternative fuel segment benefits from increasing oil
prices but are highly dependent on the political and technological environment in terms of supporting
government initiatives and innovations that can drive down vehicle prices.
Figure 1.1: Share Price Development, EUR (L) and USD (R)
800 300
700
250
600
200
500
400 150
300
100
200
50
100
0 0
2010 2010 2011 2011 2011 2012 2012 2012 2013 2013 2013 2014
TSLA GM F TM BMW Audi
Source: Compiled by author / Nasdaq
After a century of fuelling vehicles with gasoline and diesel, the industry is in a transition towards alternative
fuel sources, largely driven by regulatory compliance with fuel-efficiency standards, due to concerns about
oil dependency and global warming1. Tesla is the youngest automobile company publicly traded and has
outperformed many players in the industry. This can be seen from the comparison among competitors in
figure 1.1. I find Tesla particularly interesting to analyse, due to their disruptive technology and their steep
year-on-year growth rate. If Tesla’s technology can challenge the notion of a “car” while also be socially
beneficial, I believe the company will be an interesting contribution to a rather mature industry. It has
recently been much debate among industry experts, whether Tesla’s valuation is justified.
When measuring market capitalization against actual sales, Tesla’s pricing is far from rooted in fundamental
value drivers. The volatility of the stock price is unlike any other industry player. This is where I find a
fundamental valuation and my analysis relevant.
1 Boston Consulting Group (2014), ”Accelerating Innocation: New Challenges for Automakers”, p. 5
5
1.1 Problem Statement
The purpose of the thesis is to perform an in-depth analysis and valuation of Tesla Motors. Most traditional
valuations and the theories on the subject, deals with mature companies. However, traditional valuation
processes are challenged when faced with young and growing companies. The reason is that cash flows from
operating activities are small and cash flows from investment activities is significant2. In the process of
forecasting future cash flows based on past performance, investors are therefore faced with a challenge.
However, while Tesla is a young company, they operate in a mature business. I therefore believe that an
analysis and valuation based on fundamental drivers, is reasonable approach to determine the actual value of
the company.
In this thesis, I will answer the following question:

What is the fair value of one Tesla Motors (TSLA) share as of 31.03.2014?
Sub questions
In order to answer this primary question, I will answer several sub questions:
Introduction to Tesla Motors and the Automotive Industry

- What characterizes Tesla’s business model and strategy?
- What characterizes the industry?
Strategic Analysis
- Which external factors affect Tesla?
- How does the structure of the industry affect earnings potential?
- Does Tesla have a competitive advantage and is it sustainable?
Financial analysis
- How has Tesla’s financial value drivers developed historically and relative to peers?
- What have been the drivers and challenges for Tesla’s growth?
- What are the prospects for future financial performance?
Forecasting
- How will the expected market outlook affect Tesla’s key driver?
- How will the costs and revenue develop with expansion of the business?
2 Damodaran, A. (2009), ”Valuing Young, Start-up and Growth Companies: Estimation Issues and Valuation Challenges”.
6
Valuation and Sensitivity Analysis
- What is the appropriate discount rate for investors in Tesla?
- What are the forecasted operating cash flows?
- How sensitive is the valuation to fluctuations in the underlying estimates?
1.2 Delimitation
Tesla Motors is a global company, and is present on different geographical markets. Throughout the analysis,
I will be using Tesla’s own segmentation: North America, Asia and Europe. Furthermore, the following
delimitations are made, due to the scope of this thesis.
- Tesla is not a 100% pure player in the automotive business. Their product portfolio consists of two main
business areas: automotive and powertrain components. Automotive also includes sales of powertrain
components and sales of emission credits. For the purpose of forecasting revenues, I will only be
budgeting the vehicle business. Revenues from this business area accounted for 87% in 2013 and 95%
in Q1 2014. However, all business areas will be addressed in the analysis, to get a complete picture of
value drivers and growth prospects.
- I will exclusively use publicly available information, including Tesla’s annual reports from 2009 to Q1
2014.
- All available information up to and including June 1st 2014 will be taken into account in the analysis.
- The chosen peer group: Bayerische Motoren Werke AG (BMW), Audi AG (Audi), Toyota Motor
Corporation (Toyota), Ford Motor Company (Ford) and General Motors Company (GM), use different
accounting standards. These include U.S. GAAP, IFRS and Japanese GAAP. In some areas, I have
found it valuable to make correction (such as in the reporting of R&D) to increase the comparability
with Tesla. However, due to the lack of details and the scope of this paper, it is not possible to correct
them all. While I am aware that these differences may lead to less than optimal comparison, I do believe
a proper benchmark analyses can be made.
1.3 Models and methodology

This chapter will provide a short description of the analysis, its purpose, and the chosen models and
methodology. On the basis of the chosen models, the research is structured in six sections, followed by a
sensitivity analysis and conclusion. After the initial chapter, the reader will be introduced to the case-
company Tesla Motors. This brief description contains information about the organization, ownership
structure and the marked- and product situation.
1.3.1 Data collection

The thesis is written from the perspective of an independent analyst and is based on publicly available
information. The information used is primarily annual reports, research reports and market data. In order to
structure the analysis in a representative matter, I have applied well-known theories and models. These will
now be presented in more detail.
7
1.3.2 Strategic Analysis Figure 1.2 Research Structure
It is essential for the valuation to estimate future cash
Introduction to the industry
flows. The foundation for these estimates will be and the company
made in the strategic analysis. The purpose here is to

Strategic Analysis:
identify the non-financial value drivers, which I PEST(EL), Porters Five Financial Analysis: DuPont,
Forces, Value Chain and Benchmarking, Liquidity
VRIO
consider to have the greatest influence on the future
value creation of the business. The analysis will SWOT
follow a ”top-down” approach, where a macro- Forecast
environmental-, industry-, and internal analysis

WACC
provides an assessment of Tesla’s strengths,
DCF, EVA, Multiples
weaknesses, opportunities and threats.
Sensitivity and discussion
1.3.2.1 External analysis: PEST(EL) Conclusion

A PEST(EL) analysis is performed on a macro
Source: Compiled by author
economical level, where the most relevant factors will
be analysed3. The framework provides an understanding of the outlook of the market.
The PEST(EL) model can be criticized for not taking into account all the factors that affects Tesla’s
operations. The result of the analysis will to a large extent depend on the quality of inputs and how these are
interpreted. As a result, there is a high risk that the result will be somewhat biased. Furthermore, the model
provides only a static view of the factors. Since the reality is far from static, the analysis may quickly be out-
dated and irrelevant. To address this issue, I have included a short discussion of the market outlook for the
industry.
1.3.2.2 Industry Analysis: Porters Five Forces of Competition

Following the external analysis, I will focus on industry specific factors and explain the extent to which these
factors influence the industry. The traditional model consists of two vertical sources of competition; the
power of suppliers and the power of buyers, and three horizontal; competition from established rivals,
competition from substitutes and competition from new entrants4. The traditional Five Forces model has also
been criticized for presenting a static picture of the industry structure. The model was originally designed to
deal with industrial societies, where production was the single area of focus. To address this issue, I have
included briefly discuss the potential future changes in the industry.
3 Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Environmental, Legislative

4 Grant, R. M (2010), Contemporary Strategic Analysis, p. 69
8
1.3.2.3 Internal analysis: Porters Value Chain and VRIO
Porters Value Chain will be used to analyse Tesla’s internal situation. The model identifies the company’s
core capabilities by focusing on organizational strengths that creates value for customers and provides a
competitive advantage. The model provides a useful framework for analysing the company’s activities.
Lastly, the VRIO-model is drawn upon to decide if the identified competencies generate a sustainable
competitive advantage for Tesla. A competitive advantage stems from a company’s. Each of the resources
identified through the value chain analysis will be analysed by answering for questions:5
- Value: Does the resource enable Tesla to exploit opportunities or neutralize threats?
- Rarity: Is the resource only controlled by a limited number of firms?
- Imitability: Is there a cost disadvantage other firms in obtaining or developing it?
- Organization: Is the company positioned to exploit the resource?
1.3.3 Financial Analysis

As the next step in the valuation process, I will preform a historical financial analysis. In order to compare
and benchmark performance across different periods and companies within the industry, and calculate the
correct value creation, income statements and balance sheets for Tesla, BMW, Audi, General Motors, Ford
and Toyota, will be reformulated based on Petersen & Plenborg (2012) unless otherwise stated. I have also
drawn upon Damodaran (2012) and Koller et al. (2010) in cases where I have found it useful to draw upon
several sources. Profitability, growth and risk will be focused on. The analysis of financial ratios will follow
the structure of the Du Pont model as described by Petersen & Plenborg (2012). A complete overview of the
model and the definition of each ratio can be found in Appendix 4.3.
1.3.4 Valuation
The theoretical valuation methods include present value models, relative valuation models (multiple
analysis), liquidation models and contingent claim valuation. The two latter are not a part of this analysis, as
they are only rarely used for companies who operate under highly unusual circumstances6. The choice
between the respective methodologies presents a trade-off between four main criteria’s that characterizes the
ideal valuation model: Precision (unbiased estimates), realistic assumptions, usability and understandable
results. None of the above mentioned methods comply with all four criteria’s. According to Petersen &
Plenborg (2012), the Economic Value Added (EVA) model is the best option, as it provides the most
comprehensive result. Under the correct assumptions and application, the Discounted Cash Flow model
(DCF) will provide the same result as the EVA model. It is based upon the fundamental value drivers of a
company and should therefore be less exposed to ”market moods”7. Thus, the DCF model identifies the
underlying characteristics of the firm. Therefore, I view the DCF model to be the most appropriate method
5 Barney, J. B. & Hesterly, W. (2012), Strategic Management and Competitive Advantage. p. 68

6 Petersen & Plenborg (2012), Financial Statement Analysis, p. 237
7 Damodaran, A. (2004), ”An Introduction to Valuation”, p. 24
9
for valuing Tesla. I will estimate the value of the company using both models to increase the validity of the
estimated value. The validity of the value will also be tested using a multiple analysis.
Discounted Cash Flow Model

The DCF model determines the enterprise value (EV) based on free cash flows to firm (FCFF) using the
following formula:8
𝑛
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑡 𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑛+1 1
𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒0 = ∑ 𝑡
+ 𝑡
×
(1 + 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶) (𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 − 𝑔) (1 + 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶)𝑛
𝑡=1
The market value of equity is calculated by deducting the market value of net interest bearing debt.9
Economic Value Added

The EVA model separates value creation in three parts: invested capital in year 0, the present value of all
future expected returns (EVAs) and the EVA in the terminal period. Again, the enterprise value is found by
deducting the market value of invested capital. The enterprise value is calculated with the following
formula:10
𝑛
𝐸𝑉𝐴𝑡 𝐸𝑉𝐴𝑛+1 1
𝐸𝑉𝐴𝑡 = ∑ 𝑡
+ 𝑡
×
(1 + 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶) (𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 − 𝑔) (1 + 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶)𝑛
𝑡=1
2.0 Introduction to Tesla Motors and the Automotive Industry

2.1 Tesla Motors
Tesla Motors is a manufacturer of electric vehicles and electric vehicle powertrain components, and was
founded in Palo Alto, California in 200311. In 2014, Elon Musk invested USD 30 million in the company and
later became CEO. The company went public on NASDAQ stock exchange on 29.06.2010 under the ticker
TSLA12. The current market cap is USD 25.68 billion and their operating income for 2013 was USD -61
billion, an increase from USD -393 billion in 2012.
The company launched their first vehicle, the Tesla Roadster in 2008 and currently sell the Model S luxury
sedan in North America, Europe and China13. In 2013, the Model S received the highest customer
satisfaction score of any car in world by Consumer Reports14. Tesla invests in charging infrastructure in the

11 Reuters, website, company profile (2014)
12 Sager, Rebekah (01.07.2013), ”Tesla´s Stocks Soar”
13 Tesla Annual Report (2014), p. 4
14 Consumer Reports, website (February 2014)
10
U.S. and in Europe to allow vehicle drivers to drive free and long distances. In March 2014 they had 110
Supercharger stations and expect to expand in these regions as well as in Asia during 201415.
Tesla is strategically positioned in the automobile market as a high-end manufacturer and dealer. Their
company-owned stores and service centres, technological innovations and high performance vehicle, is a
competitive advantage.
In 2010, Tesla bought their manufacturing plant in Fremont, California, which was previously used to
produce vehicles for Toyota and General Motors16. The facility is close to Tesla’s headquarter in Palo Alto
and close to skilled engineers. The plant has a production capacity of 500,000 vehicles per year, and Tesla
expects to deliver 35,000 this year. Musk has also announced that the company is targeting 500,000 vehicles
by 2020, which would mean a CAGR of 56% from the 22,477 delivered in 2013.
The key hurdle to launch a mass-market electric vehicle is the supply of lithium-ion batteries. The shortage
of supply of these batteries that powers Tesla’s vehicles is the reason why the Fremont plant is currently
utilizing only 7% of full capacity17. To deal with this hurdle, Tesla plans to build the world’s largest
Lithium-ion battery factory by 2017. If successful, this will allow Tesla to produce 500,000 vehicles
annually18.
Before describing the market and going into detail about Tesla, I find it necessary to highlight the areas in
which Tesla stands out from the traditional automotive industry. Tesla departs from traditional model by
exclusively focusing on electric powertrain technology and owning their stores19. Tesla has several of the
characteristics of a disruptive company. Christensen (2001) argues that disruptive technologies often come
from lower profit segments that industry leaders ignore. New entrants develop the technology and
successfully sell to niche markets. By continuing to improve, they ultimately develop a technology that is
more cost-efficient than the existing one20. Similar to previous disruptive technologies, there is no mass-
market for electric vehicles. This may explain why entrenched automakers have not been more eager to push
electric vehicles (EVs) to the market. Tesla has found a profitable, albeit small, segment. If they prove to be
successful, Tesla may be a threat to the established automotive industry21.

16 Sibley, Lisa (27.10.2010), ”Tesla Officially replaces NUMMI in Fremont”.
17 Tesla Motors, Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2013 Shareholde Letter.
18 CNBC (19.03.2014), ”Tesla´s bet on winning the global lithium race”.
19 Nasdaq OMX (20.03.2014)
20 Christensen, C. (2011). The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary Book That Will Change the Way You Do Business, p. 336
21 Agassi, S (19.08.2013), ”Tesla´s a Threat to the Auto Industry, But Detroit´s Reacting All Wrong”.
11
2.2 The Automotive Industry
The automotive industry is highly competitive, with 35 global players and the 10 largest companies
controlling ~80% of the market. Tesla’s market share is currently 2.6%22.
Growth rates
The number of passenger cars and light vehicles sold globally was 76.3 million in 2013, a 5% increase from
201223. Since 2000, world vehicle sales have been growing at a CAGR of ~4%.
Figure 2.1: Automotive Sales Growth

30%
20%
10%
0%
-10%
-20%
-30%
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Asia Europe U.S. World

Source: Compiled by author / Bloomberg
As can be seen from 2.1, volume growth differs across global markets. The U.S. market has been growing
since 2009 and has reached a higher growth level than before the financial crisis of 2008. Since 2010, sales
have been growing at a CAGR of 10%, which is more than any other market. Asia has experienced the
highest growth rate over the entire period from 2000 through 2013, but growth has been declining in recent
time. Still, Asia pacific is the largest market with 46% of global sales in 2013. Asia has experienced a CAGR
of 6% over the last three years24. As a result of the crisis in Europe, Tesla is focusing on strong European
economies such as the UK, Germany, The Netherlands, Switzerland and Norway. However, most of the
growth going forward will come from China, which is expected to remain the largest light-vehicle market
through 202025.
Premium segment
The global premium segment accounted for 9.8% of total vehicle sales in 2013 and is expected to grow to
10.7% in 202026. Sales cyclicality varies across segments. In the premium segment, competition rests on
factors such as quality and brand image, resulting in lower price cyclicality compared to mass-market
22 Bloomberg data (30.02.2014)

25 Standard & Poor´s (2013), ”The Global Auto Industry Shifts Its Focus To Overseas and Emerging Markets”. p. 16
26 Little, A. D. (2013), ”Battle for Sales in the Premium Segment: Six Key Levers Impacting Current Automotive Sales Models”. p. 1
12
manufacturers. Despite intensified competition in the premium vehicle market, the segment has not been
gaining significant market shares in the past years. BMW, Lexus and Mercedes-Benz have historically held
the largest market shares, with Audi and Cadillac continuing to increase their presence in the segment. In a
study by HIS Automotive, they forecasted the premium vehicle segment to account for 10.7% of total sales
in 202027.
2.2.1 The Electric Vehicle Market

The electric vehicle (EV) industry has in the past years moved past the infant state, which was characterized
by a number of young companies that failed to commercialize their electric cars. In today’s early
adolescence, business models are starting to shape and reach profitability. Competition in the automotive
industry is intense, and increasing regulatory standards, pressure manufacturers to reduce vehicle emissions.
New regulatory requirements coupled with technological advances in powertrain are shifting demand
towards electric-based vehicles28. The Electric Vehicles Initiative (EVI) seeks to have 20 million EVs on the
road by 2020 and 2.4 billion charging stations29. In early 2014, there were more than 400,000 EVs on the
road worldwide30. The goal set out by the EVI, implies a CAGR of more than 90% from the current level31.
Electric vehicle segments

Tesla competes in the market based on the traditional automotive segment as well as in the market for
alternative fuel vehicles. The latter consist of three segments: Electric vehicles (EVs), plug-in hybrid
vehicles (PHEV) and hybrid electric vehicles (HEV)32:
 Electric Vehicles are completely powered by a single energy storage system (battery packs) that
must be refuelled from an electricity source. The Model S is an example of an electric vehicle.
 Plug-in Hybrid Vehicles are powered by both a battery pack and an internal combustion engine, and
can therefore be fuelled both with traditional petroleum and electricity.
 Hybrid Electric Vehicles are powered by both a battery pack and an internal combustion engine, but
can only be refuelled with petroleum as the battery is charged with regenerative braking.
Sales volumes of hybrid cars have also been fluctuating with the overall economy during the past years. The
market was hit hard in 2008, but sales began to pick up when the U.S. economy stabilized in 2012 33 .
However, in terms of volume growth, the hybrid and electrical car market has outperformed the traditional
27 Libby, T. (08.01.2014), ”Luxury Share of U.S. Auto Market Remains in 10-11% Range”.
29 Clean Energy Ministerial (2014), Electric Vehicle Initiative (EVI).
30 Electric Vehicle News (2014)
31 (20 million/400,000)^(1/6)-1 = 92%
33 Market Line (17.03.2014), ”Hybrids and Electric Cars in the US – Two differing strategies”, p. 7.
13
gas fuelled car with a CAGR of 13.6% from 2008 to 2013, compared to 3.3% for traditional vehicles.
According to IHS Automotive, production of plug-in hybrids and electric vehicles are expected to account
for 5.7% of total vehicle production in 201934.
2.3 Historical Events and Share Price Developments

Tesla is the first publicly listed pure play electric vehicle manufacturer. Since the IPO in 2010, the share
price has been highly volatile, but climbing as of 2013. The price was USD 17 at the date of the IPO and
reached a record high of USD 254.8 in March 2014. As of March 31st, the price is USD 208.4, giving an
annual return of ~57% since the IPO35. The continuous increase has been driven by the company’s ability to
exceed the markets expectations.
Figure 2.2: TSLA Share Price Development, USD 300

Gigafactory and bond offering
250
Model S fire
200
Guidance of
profitability
150
Opens Fremont
factory Model S launch 100
IPO Model X unveiled Gen 3
50
0
2010 2010 2011 2011 2011 2012 2012 2012 2013 2013 2013 2014
Source: Compiled by author / Nasdaq / teslamotors.com
In 2012, Tesla launched the Model S and revealed the Model X. During 2013, the company announced a
series of positive events, including a guidance of full profitability in the first quarter of 2013 (in non-GAAP
terms). In 2013, Tesla also announced a secondary share offering, their plans to expand the charger network
and plans to create a cheaper vehicle (Gen 3). The stock price fell on news about a Model S vehicles
catching fire, but rose again on announcements of plans to build a Gigafactory before 2020, that will create
batteries and cells for the stationary storage market. To finance the battery factory, Tesla offered USD 1.6
billion in convertible bonds. In Q1 2014, Tesla delivered its first car to China and has to date delivered a
total of 6,457 Model36.
34 Bloomberg (2014).
35 CAGR = (IPO price/price today)^(1/years)-1
36 Tesla Annual Report (Q1 2014), p. 4
14
2.4 Organization
The company is vertically integrated, and sell cars directly to consumers through a network of company-
owned stores. Manufacturing and assembly is integrated at the Tesla Factory in Fremont, California and at
the assembly facility in the Netherlands, which deliver vehicles to the European market37. The factory in
Fremont has a capacity of 500,000 vehicles per year. Tesla also intends to build a battery cell factory by
2020, to supply future vehicle models. In addition to the following presentations of Tesla’s strategy and
business model, the management team is presented in Appendix 1.1.
2.4.1 Strategy and Business Model

From a valuation perspective, it is important to understand Tesla’s strategic objectives and business model.
An analysis of the internal and external aspects of the business will be covered in detail in the strategic
analysis. In order to evaluate to which degree Tesla have been successful in obtaining strategic objectives, I
have outlines their goal38:
Tesla’s goal is to accelerate the world’s transition to electric mobility with a full range on increasingly
affordable electric cars. We are catalysing change in the industry. Tesla vehicles and EVs powered by
Tesla are fun to drive and environmentally responsible.
2.5 Ownership Structure

The management of the company holds the majority of Tesla’s shares. While insiders combined own 23.2%
of share outstanding, the dominant shareholder is CEO Elon Musk with 22.8% ownership39. The largest
outside shareholder is Fidelity Management and Research Centre with 7.96% ownership, while Daimler AG
and Toyota Group are among the ten largest shareholders. Their stake in the company is largely due to the
powertrain partnership with Tesla, which I will elaborate on shortly. The remaining shares are divided
among institutions and funds40. In terms of geography, 53% of shares are held in the U.S. with the remaining
amount held by investors in various countries worldwide.
2.6 Business Segments

Over the period from 2012 to 2013, Tesla quadrupled their revenues and achieved a positive profit margin
(EBITDA) for the first time in their operating history. This development caused the stock price to accelerate
to new hights. In order to understand the factors that have historically been driving the growth seen from
figure 2.3, it is important to identify all sources of revenue. While Tesla is first and foremost a vehicle
manufacturer who operates in the automotive industry, they also profit from other segments.

38 teslamotors.com/about
39 Bloomberg (2014)
40 Bloomberg (2014)
15
Figure 2.3: Development in Revenue and EBITDA, USD 1,000
2.500.000 450%
2013 496,0 400%
2.000.000
350%
1.500.000 300%
250%
1.000.000
200%
413 256,0
500.000 204 242,0 150%
116 744,0 44 800,0 100%
0
50%
(136 215,0)
-500.000 (234 569,0) (365 458,0) 0%
FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013
Revenues EBITDA Growth in revenues
Source: Author / Company Reports
Tesla’s revenue comes from operations within automotive sales and development services. The core business
is automotive sales, which accounted for 99.6% of gross profits in 2013. By breaking down automobile sales,
it can be seen that these revenues includes sales of vehicles, emission credits and powertrain components. As
a result, only 87% of Tesla’s revenues come from actual vehicle sales. However, by Q1 2014, the share of
vehicle sales had grown to 95%. Development services have only limited contribution to the result, and
revenues have fluctuated between USD 16 and 57 million in the last four years.
2.6.1 Development and Sales of Powertrain Components

Sales and services related to powertrain components accounted for 3% of revenues in 2013. Tesla provides
services for the development of electric powertrain systems and components, and sell powertrain
components to Daimler AG and Toyota Motors41. In 2008, Tesla entered into a powertrain development
agreement with Daimler. By the end of 2009, product development under this contract was completed, and
deliveries began in 2010. To date, Tesla has sold 2,600 battery packs to Daimler and expects to deliver more
in 2014. Tesla also cooperates with Toyota on the development of a powertrain system for Toyota RAV4.
Deliveries are expected to complete this year42. Since revenues from development of sales of powertrain
components have been entirely generated from these two agreements, future revenue from this business is
highly uncertain.
2.6.2 Emission credits

Certain U.S. states have laws that require manufacturers to ensure that a given portion of vehicles sold in the
state, are emission free vehicles. Manufacturers that earn excess credits can sell these to other companies
who seek to comply with regulations. Since all of Tesla’s vehicles are zero emission vehicles, they recognize

16
revenue from sales emission credits43. As
Figure 2.4: Li-ion Battery Demand (Gwh)
competition in the EV segments 12
increases, and manufacturers conform to 10

8
these standards, these revenues will likely 6
10,4
phase out. 4
2
0 2,3
2.6.3 Stationary storage 0
In 2013, Tesla began developing 2011 2015 2020
Source: Roland Berger
stationary energy storage products for use
in homes. The plan is to start sales of these battery systems during 2014 in order to profit on their capability
in battery technology (the capability will be discussed in later sections)44. According to Roland Berger,
Lithium-ion batteries are in an early stage of development in electric storage systems, and demand for these
systems will grow with a CAGR of 35% from 2.3 GWh in 2015 to 10.4 GWh in 202045. Morgan Stanley
estimates the battery storage business to be worth USD 2 billion globally46. If Tesla is successful with the
Gigafactory, these segments may open up to new revenue sources. However, due to the uncertainty of the
development of this segment, it will not be included further in the analysis.
2.6.4 Automobiles
Tesla’s strategy for bringing electric vehicles to the mass market is a three-step process depending on their
ability to utilize production capacity at the Tesla Factory. The first step was to produce a high-price/low-
volume car (The Roadster), followed by a mid-price/mid-volume car (Model S and Model X), and finally a
low-price/high-volume car (Gen 3). Currently, Tesla is past halfway into their strategy.
2.6.4.1 Previous models

Tesla Roadster was the first automobile to use Lithium-ion battery cells and the first all electric vehicle to
travel more than 320 km per charge47. Tesla terminated the production of the Roadster sports car in 2012.
2.6.4.2 Current models

Tesla Model S was unveiled in 2009 and launched in 2012. Model S is developed and assembled at Tesla’s
Fremont factory. As of 2013, 22,477 vehicles had been sold worldwide and the company delivered 6,457
more in the first quarter of 2014. Tesla expects to deliver 7,500 in Q2 and 35,000 in total for 201448. For the
Model S, Tesla is benchmarking the performance of BMW 5-series. Thus, the vehicle should compete in the
premium vehicle segment. Model S is offered with three different battery pack options: 60kWh, 85kWh and

45 Roland Berger (2012), ”Technology and Market Drivers for Stationary and Automotive Battery Systems”.
46 Market Watch (25.02.2014), ”Tesla Power? Why Tesla may want to sell you more than an electric car”
47 Motor Authority (11.04.2010), ”The World´s Only Electric Sports Car: 2010 Tesla Roadster”.
48 Tesla Quarterly Report (Q1 2014), p. 4
17
an 85kWh performance version. The three versions vary in driving range, top speed, motor power and price
as shown in table 2.149. The Model S offers better range than any other vehicle on the market.
Battery Pack Table 2.1: Model S 85 kWh

60 kWh 85 kWh
Features Performace
The battery pack consist of more than Price in the U.S. $69,900 $79,900 $93,400
7,000 electric vehicle lithium-ion Range 242 miles 312 miles 312 miles
0 to 60 mph 5.9 seconds 5.4 seconds 4.2 seconds
battery cells, produced by Panasonic,
Top speed 120 mph 125 mph 130 mph
and contain 2-3 times the energy of Max power 285 kWh 285 kWh 350 kWh
other electric vehicle battery packs on Supercharging ($2,000) Included Included
Source: Compiled by author / teslamotors.com
the market. This significantly
increases the range of the Model S50. Tesla’s battery pack uses the same Li-ion cells that are typically used in
consumer electronics and laptop batteries. These cells are relatively low in cost.
Powertrain
Compared to a traditional combustion engine with hundreds of moving parts, the Tesla motor has only one:
the rotor. Model S acceleration is therefore instantaneous, and can go from 0 to 60 miles per hour in 4.2-5.9
seconds51. With few moving pieces, there is also less tear on the engine, reducing the need for maintenance.
Zero Emissions
Traditional gasoline-powered and hybrids burn refined petroleum. Tesla vehicles can use electricity no
matter the source (coal, solar, hydro or wind power) and can be recharged with an adapter or at charging
station, which refuels the entire battery in 30 minutes52. However, this is still longer than the minutes it takes
to fill the tank of an internal combustion engine (ICE). In terms of price, Tesla estimates the cost of fuel to
be ~20% of that of ICEs that run on gasoline.
2.6.4.3 Upcoming models

A prototype for Tesla Model X was revealed in 2012. Model X is a high-performance SUV that will have
seats for seven adults. The vehicle will be built on the same platform as Model S, offered with the same
battery options and be priced slightly higher than the Model S (due to its size). Tesla expects Model X to be
delivered to customers during 2015 and is targeting a production of ~20,000 vehicles per year53. The car will
be sold in the same geographical markets as Model S. Tesla has also announced their intention to develop a
third generation vehicle, Gen 3, which will be produced at the Tesla factory. The objective is to offer a
vehicle at a lower price point and in higher volumes than Model S. The current guidance is a price below
49 teslamotors.com
51 teslamotors.com
52 teslamotors.com
18
USD 40,000, which is almost half the price of the Model S. It will also use a 48 kWh battery - 20%
reduction from the batteries currently used. According to Tesla, they expect production of Gen 3 to begin in
2016 followed by deliveries in 201754.
2.7 Geographical Segments

In order to review the competitive advantage and the growth prospects for Tesla, it is important to review
their ability to extend market shares. Tesla has three main geographical markets. Figure 2.5 illustrates the
distribution of revenue across each segment.
Figure 2.5: Geographical Segments

100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 Q1 2014
North America Europe Asia
Source: Compiled by author / Tesla Annual Report
North America has historically been the largest segment, accounting for 77% of total revenue in 2013. Prior
to 2012, Tesla’s only product was the Roadster. The vehicle generated most of it sales in Europe and North
America, with only limited sales in Asia. Tesla began deliveries of Model S in 2012, focusing exclusively on
North America. The amount of sales generated in Europe and Asia in 2012, was the remaining inventory of
the Roadster55.
Tesla began deliveries of Model S in Europe in Q3 2013. The nine stores that were bought for sale of the
Roadster were re-used for the Model S. While Tesla is planning on a broad rollout throughout Europe,
deliveries began in Norway, Switzerland and the Netherlands. These markets were selected, as they have
high import tariffs on gasoline driven luxury cars, but have significantly reduced these tariffs for foreign
electric vehicles. Norway is Tesla’s largest market in Europe, a development that can largely be explained by
the “engansavgift”. This one-time tax fee (including VAT) makes the upfront cost of a traditional luxury

19
vehicle with the same price, weight and maximum motor power as a Model S, USD ~97,000 (NOK
580,000)56 57 more expensive.
China is the largest automotive market in the world and the largest producer of emissions58. It is also the
fastest-growing luxury vehicle market, which makes China an important market for luxury EVs in terms of
growth potential59. Tesla is planning on establishing a presence in China in 2014. Major variables affecting
the long-term value of the company, is contingent upon progress in China. Currently, the Model S is priced
at USD ~120,000 in China (almost 50% more than in the U.S.) due to import duties imposed on foreign
companies. This price range position Tesla in the middle luxury segment with other foreign competitors such
as Audi and BMW60. Local production would qualify Tesla to avoid import duties and receive subsidies, but
this requires Tesla to form a joint venture with a Chinese partner. Tesla continues to invest in infrastructure
in China, Japan and Hong Kong and is expanding capacity in China61.
3.0 Strategic Analysis

3.1 PEST(EL) Analysis
Macro economical factors are events or conditions over which a company does not have control. This section
discusses and identifies external factors that are likely to affect Tesla’s performance in terms of profitability
and risk. Demand for automobiles is a function of different factors. Revenue is to a large extend determined
by factors which they have no influence over, especially economic growth and the price of oil and gas.
However, revenues are also driven by factors that are, to some extent influenced by Tesla. Battery costs and
infrastructure is the most significant. Since Tesla is leading the way in the plug-in electric vehicle market,
they are able to affect the external factors that influence the market. Thus, the external analysis has to also
recognize these factors in order to provide a full picture of external drivers.
3.1.1 Political and legislative drivers

The role of the government is highly significant in the auto industry and energy and environmental policies
will play a vital role in forming the industry in coming years. Political change is heightening the need for
sustainability and conformity with CO2 limits. For the automotive industry, this increases the pressure to
reduce fuel consumption and emissions.
56 Mick, Jason (24.04.3014), ”As Sales Level in the U.S., Tesla Model S Charges Ahead in Europe, China”.
57 Smarte Penger (16.04.2014)
58 Marquis, C., Zhang, H., Zhou, L. (2013), ”China´s Quest to Adopt Electric Vehicles”. p. 1
59 McKinsey & Company (2013), ”Upward Mobility: The Future of China´s Premium Car Market”.
60 The Wall Street Journal (23.01.2014), ”Tesla in China to Charge $120,000 for Model S”.
20
Incentives
In order to reduce the dependency on oil, governments across the world are providing incentives to
consumers and manufacturers for the adoption of electric cars. Supply side incentives help manufacturers
and suppliers enter the EV market, expand operations or conduct research and development, while demand
side incentives involves tax credits to reduce the initial cost and the operating cost of EVs, and various non-
financial incentives 62 . The Department of Energy (DOE) has set aside USD 25 billion for helping
automakers create fuel-efficient vehicles through their Advanced Technology Vehicle Manufacturing
(ATVM) Loan Program. Fuel Economy standards also force manufacturers to drive consumer demand
towards alternative powertrain vehicles, in order to achieve regulatory compliance 63 . While government
subsidies are a significant market driver today, it is unknown whether these incentives will sustain when EVs
approach mass adoption.
Local governments have various policy incentives for the purchase of greener vehicles. The US government
offer tax credits to consumer, both as an upfront reduction in purchasing price and to cover expenses related
to home charging systems64. A tax credit of USD 7,500 for the purchase of plug-in electric vehicles in the
U.S. is considered the most crucial incentive, but will cease once a manufacturer has sold 200,000 vehicles65.
In Europe, Denmark and Norway gives the highest benefits to EV buyers, while there is a lower level of
support in Central and Eastern Europe. In Asia, the Chinese government offers as much as USD 9,800 in
cash incentives, while Japan offers purchase incentives of up to 1,000,000 JPY (USD ~10,000). The early
adoption of electric vehicles is therefore partially attributed to these incentives. However, tax incentives
along with free parking and similar exemptions are starting to phase out and may have an adverse affect on
the adoption rate of EVs going forward. The primary incentives offered to EV customers are summarized in
table 3.1.
62 International Economic Development Council (2013), ”Creating the Clean Energy Economy: Analysis of the Electric Vehicle
Industry”. p. 33
63 Bloomberg Industries (07.05.2014)
64 PriceWaterhouseCooper (2013), ”State of the Plug-in Electric Vehicle Market”.
65 Alternative Fuel Data Centre (06.04.2014), ”Qualified Plug-In Electric Drive Motor Vehicle Tax Credit”.
21
Table 3.1: EV Incentives in Tesla’s Main Markets
US Norway Switzerland The Netherlands China and HK
Lower annual fee; higher Depending on Exclusion of vehicle tax
milage allowance writedown; canton until 2015; No BPM Up to $9,800 tax
$7,500 Federal exemption from congestion (county) (private motor vehicle credit (China);
Taxes
tax credit charge, initial car tax and reduction/no tax) until 2017; 4% registration tax
VAT (~$97,000); 50% annual road Bijtelling (tax credit) for waived (HK)
discount on company car tax tax 5 years
Various Free vehicle
purchase licence worth up
Subsidies
subsisies/rebat to $14,000
es for Evs (China)
Parking
Free access to some parking
Parking incentives for
spots
Evs
Access to HOV
Bus lanes Bus lane access
lanes
Several other
Other incentives for Free pass in toll roads
EV owners
Source: Compiled by author / fueleconomy.gov / teslamotors.com / belastingdienst.nl
3.1.2 Economic drivers
3.1.2.1 Economic development

Activity in the automotive industry tends to move with the overall business cycle. The relationship between
GDP and automotive demand can be seen from figure 3.1 which show the development of GDP and vehicle
sales from 2000 through 2013.
Automotive companies depend heavily on consumer trends, as consumer sales accounts for the largest
source of revenue. Vehicles represent big-ticket items for most consumers, and consumer confidence is key
when considering a purchase. For this reason, vehicle sales tend to move with consumer confidence, which is
directly related to GDP. The correlation between global GDP, and global automotive sales was 0.5 from
2005 until 2013, with the highest correlation in the U.S. (0.8) and the lowest correlation in Asia (0.15). In the
years from 2008 to 2013, the correlation between economic growth and vehicle sales were as high as 0.8 (see
Appendix 3.1).
Figure 3.1: Sales Growth (%) and GDP
20
15
10
5
0
-5
-10
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
World Vehicle Sales World GDP constant

Source: Compiled by author / Bloomberg / IMF
22
During the financial crisis of 2008, GDP in developed markets experienced negative growth, leading to a
decrease in vehicle supply and demand. This downfall resulted in this decade’s lowest level of production in
2009, which almost destroyed the U.S. auto industry and threatened the two largest manufacturers General
Motors and Chrysler66. Downturns in the economy tend to lead consumers to delay the purchase of a new
car, unless replacement is necessary. Due to postponed purchases in the developed countries from 2008 to
2011, pent-up demand was created which lead to an increase in sales in 2012 and 201367. This can be seen
from figure 3.1, where vehicle sales grew, while GDP trended slightly downwards.
As can be seen from figure 3.2, bot the U.S., Europe and Asia experienced economic contraction during
2007-2009, although Asia was less affected than North America and Europe. In the years after the crisis, all
economies grew, with the U.S. economy recovering at the fastest pace. From 2011 through 2013, the Euro
zone again experienced negative growth, before GDP began to rise slowly in end-201368. In developed
economies, the recovery from the financial crisis has been driven by fundamental factors such as a record-
low key interest rate and quantitative easing, initiated by the U.S. Federal Reserve and the European Central
Bank to boost inflation69. While GDP in all markets have recovered since the financial crisis, Asia has seen
a significantly higher economic growth over the entire decade, with China being one of the fastest growing
economies in the world. As a result, China has been a critical market for global automakers in order to offset
falling sales in Europe70.
Figure 3.2: Historical and Expected GDP Key Markets

14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
-6
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
World Europe U.S. Asia

Source: Compiled by autor / IMF
66 Centre for American Progress (09.10.2012)

67 Bloomberg (25.02.2014)
68 Herari, D. (2014), ”US economy: developments since the 2008/2009 recession”, p. 2-4
69 DNB Markets (2014), ”Økonomiske utsikter”, p. 5
70 Business Insider (09.01.2014), ” China´s Booming Car Market Is Terrific News for Western Automakers”.
23
Outlook for the world economy
The global outlook for GDP looks positive. After a downturn in the preceding couple of years, the global
economy stabilized in 2013, ending at a growth rate of 3.0%. The economy is expected to improve further
over the next two years as advanced economies continue to recover. According to IMF (2014), Global
growth is expected to reach 3.6% in 2014 and 3.9% in 2015. From 2015 through 2019, growth is expected to
be within the interval of 3.9% and 4.0%71. Going forward, Asia will be the main driver of global economic
growth. Asia is expected to grow 6.7%, while the U.S. is expected to grow 2.8% in 2014. As the Euro zone
recovers from the recession, GDP is expected to grow 1.2% in 2014, up from -0.5% in 2013.
3.1.2.2 Commodity and energy markets

Crude oil
The price of crude oil has significant implications for automakers, as fluctuations in gasoline prices affect the
purchasing power of consumers and the cost of production. Oil and gas is a non-renewable fuel with limited
supply. Since oil is traded globally, rising prices impacts the entire auto market. Rising oil prices have mixed
effects on the industry, as they will decrease demand for new ICE vehicles, but drive adoption towards
electrical vehicles. An example of sensitivity to gas prices occurred when oil prices rose up to mid-2008,
driving material costs up and shifting consumers’ preferences towards smaller vehicles. As a result of the
recession, the average gas price fell sharply to USD 62 per barrel in 2009. Oil prices reached a 10-year high
in 2011, prompting higher sales of electric and hybrid cars72. Since then, prices have continued to rise up to
USD 98 per barrel of WTI crude oil and USD 108 per barrel of Brent crude oil in 201373.
Figure 3.3: Crude Oil, avg spot, USD/bbl
120
100 CAGR = 3.3%
80
60
40
20
0
Source: IMF
71 IMF, World Economic Outlook - Database

72 Market Line (2014), ”Hybrid and Electric Cars in the US: Two differing strategies”, p. 11
73 BMW Annual Report 2013, p. 25
24
Outlook for oil prices
Oil prices in North America have declined recently, and most financial institutions expect prices to continue
to fall slightly over the next years. In Europe the price of crude oil held a high level in 2013, due to the
uncertain situation in the Middle East74. According to International Energy Agency (IEA), almost half of the
global oil demand is expected to come from China over the next decade, and oil demand will continue to
grow in Asia due to a rising transportation sector. On the other hand, demand in OECD countries is expected
to decline. While average prices may decline slightly in the short-term, they are likely to trend higher over
the long-term, given global demand. Economic growth is the most important driver of oil demand, and with
GDP expected to rise globally, I expect oil prices to trend higher in the long-run.
The World Bank and IMF expect oil prices in the range of USD 89-98 per bbl over the next two years75.
Combined with expectations of higher demand, I find it unlikely that prices will trend below this level.
3.1.2.3 Raw materials

Rising commodity prices Figure 3.4: Historical and Expected Commodity Prices
leads to pressured margins 40000
35000
and costs that cannot be 30000
25000
passed on to consumers, due
20000
to the competitive pressure 15000
10000
and long lead-time in the 5000
industry (I will describe the 0
competitive nature in the next

Nickel, $/mt Copper, $/mt Aluminum, $/mt
section)76. This, in turn has a Source: Compiled by author / World Bank
negative affect on profitability. According to Bloomberg, the average cost structure of a passenger vehicle is
comprised of ~47% steel in addition to iron, plastics, aluminium, glass and other materials. As global
penetration of electric vehicles rises, so will the demand for raw metals used for batteries. Tesla is especially
subject to volatility in battery input prices such as lithium, nickel and copper. They are also exposed to
changes in aluminium prices, as they use mainly aluminium for the vehicle body77.
Lithium
There is already a market for Lithium-ion (Li-ion) batteries, which is commonly used in portable electronics
devices. According to Goldman Sachs, Tesla’s battery factory (at full capacity) will consume as much as

75 EIA (2014), ”Annual Energy Outlook 2014”
76 IBISWorld Industry Report (2013), ”Car & Automobile Manufacturing in the US: Market Research Report”. p. 5
25
17% of the total current lithium output78. There is a concern that the demand for battery metals will increase
to the point at which a shortage of supply will occur. A study by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) showed
that lithium is the least likely of battery metals to be substituted, because it has the highest charge-to-weight
ratio. A supply constraint may therefore have an adverse effect on battery cell production. However, global
consumption of battery-grade lithium is estimates to grow at a CAGR of ~134% from 2012 to 2017 and
USGS believe that over the next 20 years, mineral production will increase to meet demand79.
Outlook for other raw material

While commodity prices have declined recently, they are likely to increase slightly in the future, given
growing demand. However, as will be described in Porters Five Forces, automakers have relatively high
purchasing power over suppliers, and the industry have therefore not experienced major cost peaks except
for the a general cost increase in components80.
3.1.2.4 Interest rates and credit availability

Most cars and vehicles are
Figure 3.5: Interest Rates, Capitive Rates, Amount Financed
sold with loans and credits,
35
and the U.S. especially has a 30
25
deep tradition of buying on
20
credit. Interest rates rise with 15
10
inflation, and decrease the
5
availability of credit. As a 0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
result, interest rates play an
Interest Rate (%) Captive Rate (%) Avg. Amount Financed ($1000)
important role in the demand Source: Compiled by author / Bloomberg
for vehicles. When borrowing rates are high, consumers tend to shy away from taking up loans because the
price of a car bought on credit rises. Figure 3.5 show the relationship and development in central bank
interest rates, captive rates (the interest rate offered by automakers’ own financing subsidiaries) and
borrowing amounts, between 2005 and 2011. The figure also highlights the effects of the financial crisis in
2008.
When interest rates on car loans rose as a result of collapsed credit markets in 2008, credit became more
expensive and car sales suffered. As can bee seen from 3.5, interest rates in the U.S. have averaged ~6%
from 1971 until 2014, reaching a record low of 0.25% in 2008 81 . One of the catalysts for economic
improvement following the crisis is the Federal Reserve Banks’s (Fed) quantitative easing program, which
78 Bloomberg News (28.05.2014)

79 Goona, G. T. (2012), ”Lithium Use in Batteries”. p. 1
80 Ford Annual Report (2013), p. 12
81 Bloomberg Data (04.05.2014)
26
has ensured money supply in the economy, and artificially low interest rates (0-0.25%)82. These low rates
have aided the affordability of automobiles.
Outlook for interest rates

In December 2013, Fed announced that it would begin to gradually cease the quantitative easing program,
buying less and less assets as capital markets return to normal83. The bond purchasing is expected to end
during 2014 and the Fed may raise interest rates shortly after84. If interest rates increase, consumers may be
less willing to lend which in turn can cause a reduction in sales. Nevertheless, interest rates will continue to
be low throughout 2014.
3.1.2.5 Currency exchange rates

Exchange rates play a vital role in the industry’s ability to stay competitive. A depreciation of the U.S. dollar
will, all else equal, lead to a rise in exports, which is positive for revenue. Tesla continues to expand their
operations internationally as part of their growth plan. With operations in foreign countries, risk in terms of
foreign currency fluctuations increases. Since part of their revenues and costs are denominated in other
currencies, movements relative to the U.S. dollar may harm financial results85. If the dollar depreciates, costs
will increase and damage margins. As a result of policy changes in Japan, the JPY has depreciated over the
last year, adding pressure on vehicle prices globally86.
3.1.3 Social and environmental drivers

Consumers are becoming more environmentally conscious. This trend is evident in the increasing preference
for companies, which can provide them with green choices. According to BCG (2014), connectivity, safety
and fuel efficiency are the top three priorities of automobile buyers, and the ability to innovate in these areas
will be crucial for success in the next years87.
3.1.4 Technological drivers

Two significant constraints for consumer adoption of EVs are the battery costs and so-called range anxiety
(fear of batteries running out before reaching destination).
3.1.4.1 Batteries
The battery pack is the most technically challenging component of an electric vehicle. Manufacturers want to
develop batteries that are safe, can last long and can withstand temperature changes88. At the same time they
aim for cost reductions. The economics of electric vehicles begin with the batteries, whose costs have been
82 The Federal Reserve System (08.01.2014), ”The Federal Reserve´s respose to the financial crisis and actions to foster maximum
employment and price stability”.
83 The Federal Reserve System (08.01.2014), ”The Federal Reserve´s respose to the financial crisis and actions to foster maximum
employment and price stability”.

84 BBC News (20.03.2014), ”Federal Reserve hints at interest rate rise in 2015”.
85 Tesla Annual Report (2013), p. 42.
86 Ford Annual Report (2014), p. 11
87 Mosquet, X. et al (2014), ”Accelerating Innovation: New Challenges for Automakers”.
88 UBS – Tesla Motors, Initiation Coverage (26.03.2014)
27
declining 6-8 per cent annually 89 . Plug-in electrical vehicles are much more expensive than traditional
internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEs) and hybrid vehicles due to the cost of the lithium-ion battery.
Reduced battery costs through advances in technology and higher production scale will reduce the initial cost
and be crucial in order for EVs to be more competitive. According to McKinsey & Company (2012), the
interaction between fuel prices and battery costs will determine the future size of the EV market (figure 3.6).
For electric vehicles, battery prices will need to come down to USD 250 per kWh if gas prices remains at the
current level (USD 3.50-4.00)90. Although the operating cost of an EV is lower than for gasoline driven
vehicles, consumers are more sensitive to the initial purchasing price, which is currently too high for mass-
market adoption.
Outlook for battery costs

There is a significant variation in the estimates of battery costs, as manufacturers do not disclose pricing
details. McKinsey & Co. estimated the Figure 3.6: The Interaction of Battery and Fuel Costs
price of a complete battery pack to USD Fuel price, USD per gallon
500-600 per kWh in 2012, and expects the

level to decrease to about USD 200 per
kWh by 2020 91 . Currently, most industry
insiders believe that prices is somewhere in
the interval of USD 400-750 per kWh.
However, governments can help bridge this
gap through subsidies. By funding battery
research and development, the Department
Source: McKinsey & Company Battery prices, USD per kWh
of Energy (DOE) is aiming at USD 300 per
kWh in 2015 92 and USD 150 per kWh by 2020 93 . Regardless of the current battery costs, I believe a
significant reduction is likely over the next decade due to increased scale and experience as EV volumes
expand. However, the capital intensity in the industry limits competition from new innovations and thus the
speed of this change relative to other industries.
3.1.4.2 Infrastructure
Battery charging infrastructure is a major network externality for the electric vehicle market. For electrical
cars to achieve wide-scale global adoption, battery networks must be competitive with existing gasoline
fuelling infrastructure in terms of price, range and reliability94. Most Americans drive well within the range
89 McKinsey & Company (2009), ”Electrifying Cars: How three industries will evolve”.
90 McKinsey & Company (2012), ”Battery Technology Charges Ahead”.
91 McKinsey & Company (2012), ”Battery Technology Charges Ahead”.
92 Davis, P. (2012), ”Advancing the Development of Electric Vehicles”. p. 2
94 Becker, A. T. & Sidhu, I. (2009), ”Electric Vehicles in the United States: A New Model With Forecasts to 2030”. p. 3
28
for all battery-electric vehicles95. Still, range anxiety represents a significant hurdle that producers need to
overcome in order to improve the penetration of BEVs. Note that this only applies to battery-electric vehicles
and not hybrids, which also run on gasoline. Electric vehicle infrastructure is still in an infant stage. The
most significant factor for expanding this infrastructure is a network of charging and battery swapping
stations. As the EV market leader, Tesla has the opportunity to shape the infrastructure for the industry as
they are developing a network (Superchargers) for their own vehicles. For plug-in vehicles such as Model S
and soon to be launched Model X, market expansion depends on building this kind of infrastructure 96 .
Charging stations increased to 19,410 in the U.S. in 2013 compared to 541 in 2010, and the DOE aims to
further increase the number of charging stations to 22,000 in 201497.
3.1.5 Conclusion of External Analysis

The future growth of Tesla, the automotive industry and the adoption of electric vehicles depend on a vast
number of external factors. The most significant for the industry as a whole, is economic growth, which
affects consumers’ ability to purchase vehicles and especially premium models. GDP is expected to grow
going forward, with most of this growth coming from Asia. As consumer confidence increases, this will have
a positive affect on sales in the premium segment. Oil prices will also increase in the long run as a result of
economic growth, driving adoption of EVs. However, this effect will likely be somewhat offset by demand
for gasoline driven vehicles from emerging countries. Raw materials are expected to increase slightly over
the next years and there is still some uncertainty in regards to the supply of lithium, which is a key input for
batteries. A major increase in input prices will hurt manufacturer’s margins. Battery prices are the most
significant driver of EV adoption, and industry’s most crucial constraint going forward. While I expect
innovation and learning effects to decrease costs through 2020, these estimates are highly uncertain. The
same is true for the infrastructure. Charging infrastructure will need to be expanded in large increments in
order to deal with consumer’s range anxiety.
3.2 Porters Five Forces

The attractiveness of an industry is a determined by the possibilities of earning a return above the cost of
capital. In general, the attractiveness is determined by the competitive landscape. The more intense the
competition, the lower are chances of gaining above normal returns 98 . For valuation purposes and for
investors it is therefore important to analyse the factors that affect the competition and thus return on
investment. Tesla operates in the premium segment, with full focus on electric vehicles (EVs). Most major
incumbent automotive manufacturers produce both internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEs) and different
powertrain electrification vehicles. In order to analyse the current state of the industry, it is important to

96 Booz & Company (2012), ”U.S. Automotive Industry Survey and Confidence Index”, p. 7
97 Bloomberg (20.03.2014)
29
notice that existing manufacturers are facing significant industry-wide changes 99 . The impact of new
regulations on vehicle emissions, technological advances and shifting customer trends is driving the industry
to evolve in the EV segment. The automotive industry includes traditional ICE vehicles, electric vehicles,
plug-in hybrid vehicles and hybrid electric vehicles, and Tesla competes with manufacturers in all segments.
3.2.1 Threat of substitutes

There are various forms of transportation available to consumers such as buses, trains, airplanes and
bicycles. Although none of these offers the convenience and flexibility of a car, the geographical location of
the customer may make public transportation more preferable. However, while there are alternatives to cars,
none of these are direct substitutes.
Based on this, I find the threat of substitutes low.
3.2.2 Threat of new entrants

In order to determine the threat on new entrants, it is necessary to look at the barrier to entry. The ability to
enter the automotive industry is determined by capital requirements, economies of scale, technological
complexity, distribution network, infrastructure and policies.
The industry is characterized as capital intense, with a high capital-to-labour ratio and large size production
capacity100. The long product development cycles in the industry involve high initial investments and capital
expenditures in continuing projects101. As of January 2014, the average CAPEX in the industry was USD
16.8 million102. These capital requirements generate significant sunk costs for entrants with no market to
offset expenditures. The high investment requirements also make economies of scale crucial to obtain, which
is difficult for small players with limited resource.
Most incumbent automakers have developed strong distribution networks through forward integration with
dealerships. In many regions, the government also tend to protect national manufacturers because their size
(in terms of number of employees, capital size and production output) plays a vital role in the economy as a
whole. With the high capital requirements mentioned above, the only way to limit risk for manufacturers and
for investors is for the government to commit to the industry. One example is the ~25% import tax the
Chinese government imposes on foreign companies103.
99 Tesla Motors – Investor Relations

100 Beltramello, A. (2012), “Market Development for Green Cars”,
101 Audi AG Annual Report (2013), p. 200
102 Damodaran, A. (2014), Dataset – Capital Expenditures by Sector
103 International Business Times (31.07.2013), $724,000 For a Ferrari? China´s Rich Are Getting Shafted Buing Luxury Cars, But
Who´s Ripping Them Off”.
30
Branding can help offset part of this entry risk. In the premium segment, brand equity accounts for a
significant entry barrier, since the reputation of the brand is important for customers. Brand recognition and
perception of quality matters more for luxury manufacturers, and is extremely difficult for new entrants to
match.
I conclude that the threat of entry is low, and even lower in the premium segment.
3.2.3 Bargaining power of customers

The degree to which customers have bargaining power, depend on their sensitivity to prices and relative
bargaining power104. Buyers in the industry are end costumers and consist of households and businesses.
Private household consumers are the main source of profit generations, and these are highly sensitive to
prices. Due to this sensitivity, automakers are unable to offset a lager increase in costs, and have to sell at a
low profit to reduce inventory105. To offset this effect, manufacturers invest heavily in brand building in
order to weaken the bargaining power of customers. On the other hand, customers in the premium segment
are less price-sensitive. As a result, profit margins are higher and manufacturers are less exposed to
economic cyclicality. This is evident from the higher and more stable margins earned by Audi and BMW
compared to the other companies in the peer group106.
The industry is characterized by a large sales volume, (~76 million in 2013), and a large number of
costumers. The high number of players in the market reduces buyer power as they have limited relative
bargaining power.
A third way to analyse customer power, is to determine their ability to vertically integrate into the
industry107 . Due to the high number of customers and the vast amount of resources needed to produce
vehicles, the risk of backward integration is more or less non-existing.
I conclude that the bargaining power of buyers is moderate and slightly lower in the premium segment.
3.2.4 Bargaining power of suppliers

The automotive industry has a supply chain structure divided in “tires”. In order to determine the power of
suppliers, I will discuss the most critical suppliers: raw material and Tier 1108.
104 Grant, R. M (2010), Contemporary Stratetegic Analysis, 7th edition, p. 76

105 Automotive World (2011), ”Purchasing: the impact of rising and volatile raw material prices”, p. 2
106 Appendix 4.3 – Common-size analysis of income statement.
107 Grant, R. M (2010), Contemporary Stratetegic Snalysis, 7th edition, p. 77
108 Automotive World (2011), ”Purchasing: the impact of rising and volatile raw material prices”
31
Tier 1 suppliers mainly focus on exterior, interior, body, powertrain, electrical or chassis 109. Most Tier 1
suppliers are auto-specific and rely on a low number of customers. This dependency put them in a bargaining
disadvantage. Their financial performance vary in terms of region, product focus and business model, and
may indicate different degrees on bargaining power. According to Roland Berger (2013), suppliers focused
on chassis and powertrain have relatively strong margins, indicating the relative importance of these
suppliers110.
In the premium segment, manufacturers require higher-quality materials. Since only a limited number of
suppliers are able to deliver exclusive materials, premium manufacturers have higher switching costs relative
to mass-market competitors. However, the relationship works both ways, as premium manufacturers demand
more differentiated inputs from suppliers.
The competitive landscape for suppliers of raw materials is fragmented and most suppliers sell to a large
number of manufacturers in various industries. This means that volumes are critical for profitability, but also
that OEMs (Original Equipment Manufacturers) only contribute to a fraction of total revenues. This
strengthens supplier power. However, manufacturers rely on a highly diverse distribution channel, and thus
can threaten to cut volumes. This reduces the bargaining power of a single supplier.
Key inputs include commodities such as nickel, steel, copper, aluminium and lithium. Raw materials offer
limited differentiation, and suppliers are rather homogenous. Fluctuations in raw material prices have
significant impact on margins, as manufacturers cannot charge higher prices to offset increased cost (due to
the price sensitivity of the end consumer). When raw material costs doubled leading up to 2008,
manufacturers exploited their bargaining power to limit suppliers’ ability to increase prices111.
I conclude that the bargaining power of suppliers is moderate.
3.2.5 Intensity of existing rivalry

Competition in the automotive industry is intense and evolving with rising material costs, price pressure and
stricter environmental regulation, forcing automakers to reduce costs and invest in alternative fuel in order to
stay competitive112. In developed countries, the automotive market is in a mature stage, putting pressure on
manufacturers to capture market shares with new innovations. In emerging countries, rivalry is somewhat
109 PwC (2013), ”North American Automotive Supplier: Supply Chain Performance Study”. p. 2
110 Roland Berger (2013), ”Global Automotive Supplier Study”, p. 10
111 McKinsey & Company (2012), ”The Future of The North American Automotive Supplier Industry”. p. 14
112 Beltramello, A. (2012), “Market Development for Green Cars”.
32
weaker due to the relative size and a growing market. On the global market, there are around 35 companies,
with 22 based in Asia113.
While the ICE segment has reached the maturity stage, entrenched automakers are investing more seriously
in EVs and competing to establish industry standards. With increasing pressure on companies to innovate,
competition is likely to be more intense going forward.
By using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, which is a measure of market concentration, I find the
concentration in the automotive industry to be ~726114. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, this
classifies the market as concentrated and therefore highly competitive115.
I conclude that the intensity of existing rivalry is high.
3.2.6 Conclusion of Porter’s Five Forces

The Five Forces analysis aimed at determining the degree to which specific factors affect industry
profitability. My findings are that the capital intensity of the industry limits the threat from new entrants, and
also pressure players to achieve critical scale. Buyer and supplier have only limited bargaining power as they
are highly dependent on the industry. Intense competition is the most significant limitation for industry
profitability, and the maturity of the industry leaves few possibilities for capturing market shares.
3.2.7 Market outlook for the automotive industry

Porter’s Five Forces provide an implication of the profitability of the industry. However, it fails to indicate
how these mechanisms will play out over time116.
In the industry analysis, I identified that the automotive industry is in a mature stage of the industry life-
lifecycle. This stage is characterized by factors such as intense rivalry, high barriers, requirements for
technical expertise, and a controlled distribution network. Due to high sunk costs, exit barriers are high. Few
companies are therefore likely to leave the industry.
Due to the sensitivity to economic cycles, I expect automakers to diversify their product portfolio and enter
new markets. The innovation in the electrical vehicle segment is a result of such diversification. There are
several large players in the industry, and therefore difficult for any company to increase market shares. From
Appendix 3.2, it can be seen that the ten largest players in the industry have maintained the same market
share since 2003. Given the tightening of environmental regulations and the focus on reducing oil
113 Bloomberg Data

114 HHI = ∑𝑁 2
𝑖=0 𝑠𝑖
115 U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (2010), ”Horizontal Merger Guiideline”, p. 18
116 Sørensen, O. (2012), Regnskabsanalyse og Værdiansættelse, p. 77
33
dependency, diverse powertrains will take a larger place in the market. Although this may cause some
structural changes, changes are likely to come from existing players given the high entry barriers. Changes
will also evolve over a long period of time, due to the high capital investments required for growth.
3.3 Internal Analysis

3.3.1 Value chain analysis
Up until this section, I have analysed the macroeconomic factors and the competitive environment affecting
the automotive industry. In this section, I will analyse Tesla’s internal resources and capabilities and assess
how these are exploited to generate returns to shareholders. Critical resources and capabilities are recognized
with the use of a value chain analysis. After assessing each step, I will make use of the VRIO model to
determine potential competitive advantages and identify sustainable competitive advantages117.
Tesla strives to create superior products and use proprietary technology to differentiate their brand. Core
competencies are expressed through the activities in their value chain, which creates customer value. The
analysis will follow the structure of Porters Value Chain where activities are separated depending on whether
they are primary or supportive. As I have exclusively based my analysis on publicly available information, I
do not have sufficient information to assess all internal processes. In the process of filtering available
information, I have focused on actual value creation. Therefore, only Tesla’s core competencies are
analysed.
Figure 3.7: Tesla’s Value Chain
Technology
Inbound Production Outbound Marketing and

Logistics Logistics Sales
• Gigafactory • Vehicle quality • Company- • Word-of-

• Technical owned stores mouth
expertise marketing
• Vertical • Elon Musk
integration • Superchargers
Tesla has taken an innovative approach to the traditional OEM business model. The company has integrated
most parts of their value chain, including design, manufacturing and sales. All of these functions are
controlled under the Tesla brand. This vertically integrated model contributes to costs reduction and control
over the quality of their products. Tesla develops the powertrain at their factory in California and sources
117 Barney, Jay B. and Hesterly, William S. (2012), Strategic management and competitive advantage, 4th ed., p. 68
34
battery cells, which is the key input, from Panasonic 118 . The integrated distribution system includes
company-owned stores and online sales, which is unlike traditional OEMs who distribute vehicles through
local dealerships. Tesla operates in the premium segment and is pursuing a differentiation strategy. They are
able to charge a premium price, because perceptions about quality, powertrain reliability and design are
important for customers. In the value chain analysis, I will focus on how Tesla creates value for customers in
each step of the value chain.
3.3.1.5 Support activities - Technology

Powertrain and battery pack technology
Tesla has 203 patents and 280 patents pending119. Most of these patents revolve around the battery and
electric powertrain components, which is the most important component of the vehicle. The battery pack is
Tesla’s core competence. It is designed to allow flexibility with regards to battery cell chemistry, form and
vendor in order to adapt to future advancements. As a result, Tesla will be able to optimize their battery pack
as battery cells improve in energy storage, capacity and cost per kWh120.
The company has developed an extensive technology portfolio that may help them bring lower-priced
vehicles to the market (ref. Gen 3). This is an important technological advantage and a competitive
advantage that position the company for future growth. Tesla has invested a vast amount of resources in
innovation. As I will elaborate on in the financial analysis, Tesla spent 12% of revenues on R&D in 2013,
while premium peers spent on average 4%121. It is difficult to quantify the financial return on this technology
besides from the performance of the vehicles. In the annual report for 2013, Tesla comment on their
technology and batteries122 123:
Our proprietary technology includes cooling systems, safety systems, charge balancing systems, battery
engineering for vibration and environmental durability, customized motor design and the software and
electronics management systems… These technology innovations have resulted in an extensive intellectual
property portfolio… We believe one of our core competencies is the design of our complete battery pack
system… We believe our ability to change battery cell chemistries and vendors while retaining our existing
investments… will enable us to quickly deploy various battery cells into our products and leverage the latest
advancements in battery cell technology.
118 teslamotors.com, press release, 11.10.2011

121 Appendix 4.3 – Common-size analysis of income statement
123 Tesla Annual Report (2013), p. 8-9
35
As mentioned in the introduction, the high price of EVs compared to ICEs is to a large extent explained by
the battery cost. Most manufacturers seek to reduce the cost by minimizing the size of the battery. As a
result, most EVs have only a limited range. By acknowledging that there is a market for premium EVs, Tesla
has taken the opposite strategy: 85 kWh battery pack and the longest range in the industry (ref. table 2.1).
Tesla’s core capability is their powertrain and battery pack technology. This is the single most valuable
strategic factor and is highly rare. Imitating this capability is costly and demands high technical expertise.
The company is organized to capture value by using the technology for their own vehicles as well as selling
powertrain components to other manufacturers. If the Gigafactory is successful, they will be able to capture
even more value. I therefore conclude that the powertrain and battery pack technology is a sustainable
competitive advantage. Tesla also has a cost advantage in producing battery packs. However, competition
and technology advancements will likely eliminate this advantage over the long run.
Picture 3.1: Planned Gigafactory Production Exceeds 2013 Global Production

3.3.1.1 Inbound logistics
The Gigafactory
Tesla currently sources battery cells
from Panasonic, who has agreed to
supply cells for Model S and Model X.
In an attempt to push down battery
costs and secure the supply of battery
cells for Gen 3, Tesla has announced
their plans to build a battery factory
Source: teslamotors.com
with the capacity to produce more
batteries than the total world output in 2013 (picture 3.1). With the Gigafactory, the entire battery pack
production will be vertically integrated. This will create significant scale advantages and allow Tesla to build
the Gen 3 with a 200 miles range and half the price of the Model S124.
In collaboration with battery manufacturing partners, including Panasonic, Tesla plan to build a factory to
achieve scale and minimize costs through manufacturing, less logistics waste, optimization of processes and
reduced overhead. The plan is to begin construction during 2014 with production starting in 2017. Musk
expects the factory to supply battery cells for 500,000 vehicles annually and reduce the current battery cost
by 30%125. Tesla could potentially become the worlds leading producer of lithium-ion batteries.
124 Tesla Motors – Gigafactory Presentations

36
The Gigafactory has the potential to be a sustainable competitive advantage while also creating a new
source of revenue. However, the true value of this project is still unknown.
3.3.1.2 Production
Manufacturing at the Fremont factory
Tesla’s proprietary technology makes the components of the Model S difficult to source from suppliers. As a
result, the company has adapted an integrated production strategy where design, engineering and assembly
are handled in-house. This includes the aluminium body and chassis stamping, interior, heating and cooling
and electrical systems. Components are designed to be light in weights to reduce the load on the battery
pack, thereby extending the driving range126.
All vehicle manufacturing is carried out at the Fremont factory in California, which has a capacity of
500,000 vehicles per year. The plant has been redesigned from scratch to maximize flexibility and
adaptability in manufacturing. Instead of using heavy equipment, Tesla uses automated vehicles and robots
to move the cars and components around the factory. This has reduced overhead need, and made the
manufacturing process leaner and more cost efficient. Additionally, the design and engineering team are
placed in the same location, which, according to Tesla, enables faster processes, better products and
reduction of logistics waste. The location was strategically chosen to be close to technical expertise and
engineering labour in Palo Alto, California127.
The flexible manufacturing process and the high-technology composition of the Fremont factory is rare
among auto companies. Tesla is the only company with a plant built entirely for electric vehicles. The
company has the opportunity to maintain an advantage in EV manufacturing in the short-term as
construction time and technical know-how (as mentioned in the industry analysis) will make competitors lag
a few years behind. Thus, the Fremont plant is a temporary competitive advantage.
3.3.1.3 Outbound logistics

Company-owned stores
Tesla has pursued an integrated distribution model, which is different from the traditional dealership model.
The company has spent large amounts of capital to expand the network of stores and service centres globally,
and incurs high expenses related to operating them. As I will explain in detail in the financial analysis, Tesla
spent significantly more than peers on sales, general and administrative (SG&A) in 2013. These expenses are
mainly related to headcount to support their stores and the supercharging network128. However, Tesla may in
the long run be able to capture more margins. The rationale for this business model is that for existing

37
dealerships, there is a conflict of interest between selling gasoline driven cars and electric cars. Explaining
the advantages of one will undermine the other129. Tesla’s stores are located in visible venues such as malls
and shopping streets to reach customers when they are open-minded. The stores carry no inventory and are
solely designed to be informative. Brand perception is extremely important for Tesla, and with integrated
stores, Tesla controls the entire customer experience.
Based on the analysis, I find that Tesla’s stores and service centres are valuable for the company, in order to
educate customers and maintain a good brand perception. It is also rare, as Tesla is the only auto company
who has adopted a vertically integrated distribution model. The relatively high SG&A expenses, highlights
that this resource is costly, but not impossible to imitate. In such, the stores provide a temporary competitive
advantage.
3.3.1.4 Marketing and sales

Supercharger network
Picture 3.3: Supercharger Europe Coverage, Now vs. Winter 2014-2015
Tesla’s superchargers are on average, 16 times
faster than public charging stations and the
company currently have 110 stations in North
America and Europe and has recently opened
their first station in China. By the end of 2014,
they plan to cover 98% of the U.S.
population130. Faster charging and convenience
of the superchargers, gives Tesla a competitive
advantage. While it will take time for
competitors to build a similar network, it can Source: teslamotors.com
be imitated. Picture 3.3 shows the current supercharger coverage in Europe, versus the expected coverage in
late 2014-2015, highlighting the pace at which the company is building infrastructure.
I conclude that Tesla’s Superharger network is a temporary competitive advantage.
Brand and the CEO

Automotive costumers are relatively loyal, as long as brands are perceived as reliable in terms of quality,
design and price. For premium brands, customers are more loyal, and companies invest accordingly more in
marketing to exploit the revenue potential. From 2010 to 2013, premium peers i.e. BMW and Audi, spent on
average 5% of revenues on marketing and sales, whereas Tesla spent only 1% during the same period131.
129 Tesla Motors, Blog Post – Tesla´s Approach to Distributing and Servicing Cars
130 Tesla Motors, Blog Post – 100 Supercharger Stations
131 Appendix 4.3 – Common-size analysis of income statement
38
Tesla’s brand represents attributes of luxury, modern technology and environmental consciousness.
Customers have also attached a “coolness” factor to the company, the products and to Elon Musk himself.
Few CEOs in the industry have the same track record and knowledge of alternative energy132. With superior
performance, the company has established a strong brand and was voted car of the year by Consumer
Reports in 2013133. By building a car that exceeds expectations, Musk knows that customers who buy a
Model S become a sales person to a community of like-minded people134. Instead of relying on traditional
advertising, Tesla relies on word-of-mouth and media coverage135.
Elon Musk and customer advocates are valuable for the company and rare in an industry were switching
costs and brand loyalty is relatively low136. While competitors may change brand perceptions by introducing
new models, Elon Musk is not imitable. I conclude that Tesla’s marketing strategy is a temporary
competitive advantage while Elon Musk is sustainable competitive advantage.
3.3.1.7 Conclusion of internal strategic analysis

Based on the value chain analysis, I have identified Tesla’s most valuable resources and capabilities. With
use of the VRIO-model, I assessed the competitive implication of each factor. The findings from the internal
analysis are summarized in table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Summary of Internal Strategic Analysis

Resource / Capability Valuable Rare Imitable Exploited Competitve Implication
Battery pack & powertrain Sustainable competitive
Yes Yes Unlikely Yes
technology advantage
Only in the Temporary competitive
Cost of battery pack Yes Yes Yes
long-run advantage
Potential sustainable
The Gigafactory Potentially Yes Unlikely Not yet
competitive advantage
Manufacturing Yes Yes Yes
long-run advantage
Company-owned stores Yes Yes Yes
long-run advantage
Supercharger network Yes Yes Yes
long-run advantage
Brand Yes Yes Yes
long-run advantage
Sustainable competitive
Elon Musk Yes Yes Unlikely Yes
advantage
132 Appendix 1.1 – Management Team

133 Consumer Reports (February 2014)
134 Agassi, S. (18.08.2013), ”Tesla’s a Threat to the Auto Industry, But Detroit’s Reacting All Wrong”
136 See Portes´s Five Forces Analysis.
39
4.0 Financial Statement Analysis
In order to understand Tesla’s financial position and to forecast cash flows, it is vital to assess the historical
development and performance. By analysing previous financial statements, it can be seen how Tesla has
created value and how the company has performed relative to peers. As shown in figure 1.1, Tesla’s stock
price has been highly volatile since 2013. From the financial year of 2012 to 2013, revenues increased
~500%, and the stock price followed on from a price of USD 37.9 in March 2013, to USD 208.5 in March
2014. This growth pattern hampers the estimation of future cash flows based on historical performance.
However, as earlier discussed, Tesla operates in a mature industry with established manufacturers. I
therefore believe that growth can be projected and verified by analysing the historical development of Tesla
and industry peers.
Tesla’s financial performance will be compared and benchmarked against a selected group of peers, based on
operational criteria’s and market (Appendix 4.1). The analysis is based on annual reports from 2009 to Q1
2014. Due to high growth rate, I find it useful to also look at results from the first quarter of 2014. For the
same reason, it is impractical to go further back is time. There is a significant degree of seasonality in vehicle
sales, causing fluctuations in sales from quarter to quarter. Therefore, I have exclusively benchmarked Tesla
with peers in the period from 2010 to 2013.
4.1 Reorganizing Financial Statements

In this section I will explain the process of reformulating the income statement and balance sheet for
analytical purposes and the assumptions taken to arrive at key performance measures. I will reorganize
Tesla’s financial statements by separating operating items from non-operating items and interest bearing
assets from interest bearing liabilities. Finally, I will analyse essential ratios that will be used in combination
with the strategic analysis to forecast cash flows. All statements and details on the reorganization of peers’
financial statements can be found in Appendix 4.2.
4.1.1 The analytical income statement

Operating income is an important measure of performance, and shows the firm’s result from core activities
without accounting for the choice of financing137. In order to analyse Tesla’s core operations and compare it
to peers, I have classified all items according to how they relate to the core business. This has led me to
calculate their operating earnings in terms of EBITDA, EBIT and NOPAT138. I have reviewed certain
questionable items of the income statement:
 Other income (expense) net in 2013 was significantly higher than in previous years, as a result of the
repayment of all outstanding principal and interest under the DOE loan facility. In such, the change in
137Plenborg & Petersen (2012), Financial Statement Analysis, p. 73.

138EBITDA = Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization, EBIT = Earnings before interest and tax, NOPAT = Net
operating profit after tax
40
fair value of the warrant of USD 10.7 million was recognized in other income. Other income also
contributed to profits in 2013, due to the realization of a favourable currency swap related to the
Japanese yen139. The depreciation in JPY was discussed in the external analysis.
 Interest expenses in 2013 deviated from previous years, as a result of the extinguishment of the
Department of Energy (DOE) loan facility were all issuance costs were written off to interest expense140.
The DOE loan granted in 2010 came with very low interest rates but at the costs of certain financial
covenants, which, according to Tesla restrained them from pursuing certain aspects of their business
plan. Interest expenses are a recurring item, but since the extinguishment of the DOE loan was a one-
time event, expenses will likely be lower in the future. Due to the lack of details regarding the
segregation of this item, I have not made further changes.
After assessing the income statement for the above-mentioned items, I have chosen to make changes in the
setup to increase the level of details and make it easier to calculate key ratios.
 Revenue: In order to analyse the key value drivers, I have separated revenue based on the source of
income and geographic segment.
 EBITDA: Tesla does not report EBITDA on their income statement, as this is not a requirement under
U.S. GAAP. Since I want to use this measure in relation to the valuation, I have calculated EBITDA.
 Depreciation and amortization (D&A) is recorded in cost of automotive sales. To determine EBITDA, I
have therefore excluded D&A from cost of automotive sales, and added it to operating income (EBIT)
for each year. This gives a higher than reported gross profit and an unchanged net income.
 NOPAT: The result from operating and financial activities both have consequences for taxes. In the
official income statement, only provision for income taxes is reported. I have calculated operating
income after tax (NOPAT), by determining the effective tax rate and allocating it between operational
(NOPAT) and financial items141. I have done this by calculating the tax shield on net financial expenses.
Lastly, I have chosen not to capitalize research and development, although it can be argued that Tesla’s high
R&D expenses results in an understated invested capital and overstated ROIC142. However, by separating
R&D expenses from operating expenses for companies in the peer group, I believe the companies can be
compared.

141 Plenborg & Petersen (2012), Financial Statement Analysis, p. 68
142 Koller, T. Goedhart, M. And Wessels, D. (2010), Valuation, p. 160
41
4.1.2 The analytical balance sheet
To determine the company’s ability to make profit, it is necessary to reorganize the official balance sheet to
identify the two drivers of profitability: operational activities and financial activities143. I have categorized
assets and liabilities as either operating or financial, and calculated invested capital by deducting total
operating liabilities from operating assets. Invested capital is the assets financed by shareholders (equity) and
lenders (debt), and equals the sum of total equity and NIBD (net interest bearing debt)144.
I have examined each balance sheet item and categorized them based on whether or not I see it as related to
core operations or financing. I have reviewed certain questionable items:
 Other (non-current) assets include emission permits related to the operations of the Tesla Factory, debt
issuance costs and loan facility issuance costs145. Debt issuance costs include underwriting, legal and
administrative fees for issuing debt. I do not have access to further information, but deems that these
assets are not interest bearing. I have therefore categorized other assets as operational.
 Operating Lease Vehicle, Net. Tesla offers a resale value guarantee where customers have the option of
reselling their vehicle back after three years, for a pre-determined price. The initial purchases price less
the resale value (operating lease vehicle) is recognized in automotive sales. If the customer decides not
to sell their vehicle back after three years, the operating lease vehicle value is recognized in automotive
sales146. However, if Tesla takes the car back, there is a risk that they may not be able to resell the car at
the amount they recognized as revenues. Any amount less is a loss, and will be reflected as a decrease in
revenues over the next year. Operating lease vehicles is therefore considered a part of the company’s
operations.
 Reservation payments for Model X and customer deposits for Model S both refer to prepayments of
vehicles, which is an important part of Tesla’s business model. Since these prepayments are later
reflected in operating profits147 and a part of the on-going operations, it is classified as an operating
liability.
 Resale value guarantee is a new program in 2013 offered to customers who purchase the Model S.
Customers are given the option to sell back the vehicle within a certain time limit at a pre-determined
resale value. The resale value guarantee directly affects revenues, and have therefore been categorized an
operating liability.
 Cash and cash equivalents are excess cash invested in securities or treasury stock, used to repay debt or
to pay out dividends. The separation between cash used for such activities and cash used for on-going
143 Sørensen, O. (2012), Regnskabsanalyse of værdiansættelse, p. 158

144 NIBD = Financial liabilities – Financial assets.
145 Tesla Annual Report (2013)
42
operation are not mentioned in the annual report. I have classified the item as a financial asset, since
failing to exclude the item from operating assets will depress ROIC148.
Based on the reformulated financial statements for Tesla and peers, I have arrived at EBITDA, NOPAT,
invested capital and net interest bearing debt. These measures will in the following section be used to
calculate several key ratios.
4.2 Historical Performance and Growth

In order to analyse the key drivers of Tesla’s performance and growth, financial performance are
benchmarked against peers. This will provide a better indication of the financial situation and the relative
performance of Tesla. This section will follow the structure of the DuPont model created by Petersen &
Plenborg (2012)149. All balance sheet items included in the ratios are based on average numbers. Therefore
balance sheet ratios are analyzed from the period 2010 to 2013, where 2010 measures the average of 2009
and 2010. The most important measure of profitability for shareholders is the return on equity (ROE). ROE
captures the result of both operational and financial decisions, which I will illustrate by decomposing the
ratio into return on invested capital (ROIC) financial gearing and spread. In such the effect of financial
gearing is isolated to view its impact on the return to shareholders150. In order to evaluate Tesla’s financial
performance and development, I will make use of indexing and common-size analyses for benchmarking.
The analysis will help to identify value drivers and operational areas with improvement potential.
Before assessing Tesla’s financial ratios in a cross-sectional analysis with peers, it is again important to
mention, that companies in the early stage of their lifecycle are not directly comparable to other companies
in the industry151. However, historical performance of mature companies provides valuable information
about Tesla’s future earnings potential. Furthermore, in the assessment of the company’s performance over
time, the main focus will be on growth and performance in the last two years, as I believe this provides a
better indication of future earnings potential.
4.2.1 Operational Performance – Decomposed ROIC

In the comparison with the peer group, ROIC is calculated before tax, due to the high variation in effective
tax rates between years and between the companies. While this will overstate ROIC, it provides a more
comparable measure. Figure 4.1 illustrates the historical development of ROIC for the period 2010 until
2013.

149 Appendix 4.3
43
From 2010 to 2013 Tesla has experienced significant operating losses, albeit a steep growth. The upward
trend from 2012 until 2013 is to a vide extent a result of the launch of Model S, which has contributed to an
increase in year-over-year vehicle sales of ~460%. Furthermore, the company has experienced growth in
other business areas and geographical segments, as discussed in section 2.6 and 2.7. Over the period, Tesla
has expanded production to keep up with demand. However, compared to the estimated WACC from chapter
7 of 8.12%, Tesla has not delivered satisfying returns.
Figure 4.1: ROIC, Peers (L) and Tesla (R)
60% 0%
-11%
50% -50%
40%
-100%
30% -134%
-150%
20% -156%
-200%
10%
0% -250%
-260%
-10% -300%
FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013
BMW Audi Toyota Ford GM Tesla
Tesla has historically had a negative ROIC, and their ability to create value for shareholders is significantly
poorer than peers. GM and Toyota showed a slight improvement in 2013, while BMW, Audi and Ford
experienced a decrease in profitability. The slump in GM’s profitability in 2012 was primarily an effect of
increased costs of revenues. According to their annual statement, this was partially caused by an
unfavourable vehicle mix, as consumers favoured smaller and cheaper vehicles. Furthermore, GM
experienced higher pension and labour expenses compared to previous years152. The slight improvement in
Toyota’s ROIC during the fiscal year of 2013 was a reflection of favourable currency exchanged rates
between JPY and USD, as mentioned in the strategic analysis. A weaker yen relative to the U.S. dollar gave
Toyota and export advantage and improved their competitive advantage relative to U.S. automakers. In
extension, Toyota was able to return more capital to their investors153. Audi and BMW have consequently
outperformed the other companies over the period, which can be explained by their presence in the premium
segment. However, the economic contraction in Europe had adverse effects on the industry, which to some
extent explain the downward trend in ROIC for BMW and Audi since 2011. While the profitability of the
industry has followed the cyclicality of the economy, Tesla’s ROIC has grown rapidly. In order to fully
152 General Montors Annual Report (2012), p. 30

153 Mattera, S. (07.08.2013), ”Why You Should Buy Toyota, and Not Tesla”.
44
understand the drivers behind Tesla’s improved, but negative performance, I have broken down ROIC in
profit margin and turnover on invested capital.
4.2.2 Profit Margin

Profit margin (EBITDA) illustrates the result from core operations as a percentage of revenues, and shows a
company’s ability to generate profits after covering all operating expenses. Profit margin can be improved
through higher revenues or lower costs i.e. increased efficiency. In the following, I will analyse each
component separately.
Development of revenues
Since Tesla’s first financial year as a public company, revenues have grown at a compounded annual growth
rate (CAGR) of 158%. The company has experience a net operating loss in every year. In 2013, margins
significantly improved as the company grew sales by ~387% from the previous year. In order to identify the
significant drivers of profit margin, I have conducted a common-size analysis of the income statement.
Table 4.1: Common-Size of Income Statement FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013

Total Revenues 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %
Automotive sales 83 % 73 % 93 % 99 %
Vehicle Sales 62 % 48 % 76 % 87 %
Emission credits 2% 1% 10 % 10 %
Sale of powertrain components 19 % 23 % 8% 2%
Development Services 17 % 27 % 7% 1%
Depreciation -14 % -13 % -8 % -7 %
Gross Profit, adjusted 35 % 38 % 14 % 28 %
Research and development -80 % -102 % -66 % -12 %

Selling, general and administrative -72 % -51 % -36 % -14 %
EBITDA -117 % -115 % -88 % 2%

Depreciation -9 % -8 % -7 % -5 %
EBIT -126 % -123 % -95 % -3 %
The relative contribution of each business segment is shown in table 4.1. It is evident that vehicle sales have
historically been the key revenue driver. Development services contributed with 27% revenues in 2011, but
revenues from this segment have declined, and contributed only 1% in 2013. Both sales of powertrain
components and development service have been falling over the years. As mentioned in section 2.6.1,
revenue from sales of powertrain components and development services has been generated by Tesla’s
contracts with Daimler and Toyota. The company has not announced any new agreements, and it is therefore
unlikely that these revenue streams are sustainable. Emission credits contributed nearly 10% to revenues in
2013, which was an important factor for achieving positive EBITDA. Without revenue from this segment,
margins would have been negative. Going forward, I expect vehicle sales to account for the majority of
45
profits. Gross profits doubled from 2012 to 2013, while expenses related to research and development and
selling, general and administrative was significantly reduced. This positive trend resulted in a positive
EBITDA-margin in 2013.
After establishing that Tesla, over the analysed period, has successfully expanded revenues while
simultaneously increasing margins, I find it necessary to benchmark the company’s cost structure. Tesla is a
growing company, and their financial performance will develop rapidly over the next years. A benchmark
analysis will therefore provide valuable insight to how Tesla’s financials develop. I have decomposed the
essential cost items based on information from annual reports. For peers, ratios are based on the average
from 2010 through 2013.
Table 4.2: Common-Size and Benchmark of Income Statement

FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 Tesla (R) and Peers (L) GM Ford Toyota BMW Audi
65% 62 % 86 % 72 % COGS 78 % 81 % 80 % 69 % 71 %
N/A N/A N/A N/A - Materials/commodities 52 % 54 % N/A 59 % 63 %
3% 2% 2% 3% - Warranty N/A -2 % N/A 2% N/A
0% 0% 0% 0% - Pension & OPEB 2% 1% N/A 1% 0%
80 % 102 % 66 % 12 % R&D 5% 4% 4% 6% 1%
72 % 51 % 36 % 14 % SG&A 8% 7% 10 % 9% 10 %
3% 2% 1% 0% - Advertising and sales 4% 3% 2% 7% 9%
70 % 49 % 36 % 14 % - Administrative and other 5% 4% 8% 3% 1%
-117 % -115 % -88 % 2% EBITDA 9% 8% 7% 16 % 16 %
9% 8% 7% 5% D&A 5% 3% 5% 6% 5%
-126 % -123 % -95 % -3 % EBIT 3% 5% 2% 10 % 11 %
Variable costs: Cost of goods sold

In the strategic analysis, I discussed how the volatility in commodity prices is a significant risk factor in the
industry. While only BMW and Audi report exact values, GM and Ford mention in the annual report that
material costs accounts for about two thirds of cost of revenues (COGS). Material costs for these two
companies are therefore based on own estimations.
As can be seen from table 4.2, Tesla has historically operated with relatively low COGS (with exception of
2012). This is partially a result of centralized manufacturing154, low headcount and lower battery costs
relative to peers, which was pointed out in the value chain analysis. The decrease in gross margin from 2011
to 2012 is a reflection of the lower margins on Model S relative to the low volume/high price Roadster,
which ended production in 2011. Gross profit increased significantly from 14% in 2012 to 28% in 2013,
implying that revenue grew faster than cost of revenues. The high COGS in 2012, was mainly caused by cost
154 Headquarter and manufacturing is located in close proximity in California.
46
inefficiencies during the production ramp-up of Model S and high material prices155. As a result of increased
manufacturing efficiency, sales growth and lower material costs, Tesla has been able to improve gross
margin and obtained a margin in line with premium manufacturers (represented by BMW and Audi) in 2013.
Fixed costs
Tesla’s operating expenses decreased from 2010-2013, as can be seen from table 4.1. As mentioned in the
value chain analysis, production ramp-up and expansion of stores and service centres are the main drivers of
operating expenses. Research and development (R&D) and sales, general and administrative expenses
(SG&A) decreased over the year.
Research and Development expenses have remained at a steady rate among pees over the period. For peers,
R&D accounted for on average 7-10% of revenues, while Tesla reported 12% in 2013. Prior to 2012, all
manufacturing costs were captured in R&D due to U.S. GAAP Accounting Standards that prohibits
capitalization of pre-production research and development156. As a result, R&D was more than 100% of sales
in 2011. In the beginning of 2013, R&D expenses were entirely related to Model S activities and specifically
for entering new markets in Europe and Asia. In the first quarter of 2014, R&D expenses increased slightly,
reflecting accelerated engineering work on Model X157.
The nominal value of Selling, General and Administrative expenses nearly doubled from 2012 to 2013 as
Tesla continued to increase their presence in all markets158. According to Bloomberg, the number of
employees grew from ~2,960 to ~5,860 over the same period, which explains much of the increase in
SG&A. While Tesla suffers from high administrative expenses, they benefit from minimal marketing and
advertising costs, which have accounted for on average 3% of costs for mass-market manufacturers and 8%
for premium manufacturers. For premium manufacturers, these high advertising expenses highlight the
importance of branding as discussed in the Five Forces analysis.
After the assessment of primary cost drivers, I conclude that increased manufacturing efficiency, volume
growth and better management of SG&A expenses explains the majority of the observed increase in profit
margin over the period. The development in OPEX indicates that Tesla has a high share of fixed costs and
has struggled to control costs during the growth phase. If revenues decline, this may cause profits to decline
faster than sales. While this is a characteristic of the industry, Tesla is currently not generating enough profit
to cover their high fixed costs. In order to offset costs, Tesla needs to obtain economies of scale. Therefore,

158 Appendix 4.2 – Tesla Motors Analytical Income Statement
47
the combination of production ramp-up and cost control will be crucial going forward. As the company
continue to invest in growth by expanding production capacity for Model S and Model X, invest in stores
and charging infrastructure and begin design of the third generation vehicle, I expect and increase in
operating expenses.
EBITDA-margin
The increase in Tesla’s revenues combined with improved management of fixed costs has resulted in a
higher EBITDA-margin. Only GM and Toyota experienced a positive growth in profit margin in the last
fiscal year. Audi, BMW and Ford all experience negative growth159. It is evident from the development in
profit margin for peers, that EBITDA has followed the same pattern as ROIC. Therefore, it can be concluded
that the profitability of the industry (or lack thereof), has been partially driven by revenues and expenses.
4.2.3 Turnover rate of invested capital

Invested capital turnover is an expression of a company’s ability to utilize invested capital, and can also be
described as the revenue per dollar invested in operations. The inverse of invested capital turnover illustrates
how many invested dollars are needed to generate one dollar in revenue. All else equal, it is attractive for a
company to increase turnover.160
Figure 4.2: Invested Capital Turnover
5,0
4,5
4,0
3,5
3,0
2,5
2,0
1,5
1,0
0,5
FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013
Tesla BMW Audi Toyota Ford GM
The turnover rate for industry peers, improved from 2010 and 2011, but showed a downward trend in the
years after. As earlier mentioned, Tesla’s revenues increased significantly over the financial year of 2013,
which partially explain the positive development in capital turnover. While Tesla has increased their return
on invested capital, invested capital turnover fell from 2010 to 2012. In this period, capital turnover was
159 Appendix 4.3 – Common-Sise Analysis of Income Statatement

160 Petersen & Plenborg (2012), Financial Statement Analysis, p. 108.
48
close to or below one, as the company had not yet materialized on their investments. In order to identify the
most significant factors behind the improvement in capital turnover, I have performed an indexing and
common-size analysis of invested capital. The detailed index analysis of Tesla and peers can be found in
appendix 4.3.
Indexing and common-size analysis of invested capital

All companies except for BMW increased invested capital over the analysed period. Audi increased their
investments significantly more than other peers, and more than doubled invested capital over the period due
to investments in intangible assets and affiliated companies. Besides from Audi, Ford also grew invested
capital, as more capital was tied in deferred tax assets and inventory161. For both companies, this explains the
decrease in invested capital turnover from 2011 to 2013 as seen from figure 4.2. The increase in investments,
coupled with a decrease in turnover rate, indicates that assets grew more than revenues. For the remaining
companies, invested capital turnover as well as invested capital has remained relatively stable since 2011.
Table 4.3: Days Turnover of Invested Capital FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013
Operational Assets
Property, plant and equipment 216 369 376 117
Other assets 40 40 20 4
Operating lease vehicles, net 12 18 10 36
Inventory 107 85 141 55
Accounts receivable 16 15 16 7
Prepaid expenses and other current assets 24 18 8 3
Total Operational Assets 415 953 2016 3829
Operational Liabilities
Resale value guarantee 21
Other long-term liabilities 25 24 18 8
Accounts payable 69 76 159 55
Accrued liabilities 55 47 32 13
Deferred development compensation 0
Customer deposits and reservation payments 89 109 102 27
Total Operational Liabilities 238 257 310 125
Invested Capital 177 288 259 97
In 2011, one dollar invested by Tesla was on average tied up for 288 days, but in 2013, the company
managed to improve efficiency to 97 days. This positive development can especially be traced to
improvements in the turnover on property, plant and equipment (PP&E) and inventory. While the nominal
value of these assets rose, the increase was far less than the increase in revenues. The high PP&E day’s
161 Appendix 4.3 – Indexing of Invested Capital
49
turnover prior to 2013 reflects the significant constructions that took place in order to prepare the Tesla
Factory for manufacturing of Model S162.
A breakdown of assets included in PP&E, shows that “construction in progress” accounted for ~30% of total
assets in 2011, while only ~7% in 2012. Tesla bought the Fremont factory in 2010, and significant
investments in building improvements, tooling and machinery were made during 2011 to prepare for the
release of Model S163. As these assets became ready for use in 2012, investments were recognized as
machinery, equipment and tooling. Turnover of operating liabilities also increased over the period, a
development that was caused by higher accounts payable and customer deposits related to reservations of
Model S. This contributed positively to capital turnover. Lastly, as Tesla began production of Model S in
2012, inventory rose. The drawdown of inventory in 2013 reflects demand for Model S relative to
production.
In conclusion, it looks like all the automotive companies have been affected by the cyclicality of the
aggregate economy. Tesla’s improved turnover rate in the period 2010-2012 can be explained by less capital
tied in fixed assets and inventory. The increase in ROIC was a result of an increase in both profit margin and
invested capital turnover. Nevertheless, ROIC increased more than capital turnover from 2012 to 2013, as
revenue growth exceeded asset growth. From the development of ROIC, it is evident that after a period with
high investments in assets and sluggish revenue growth, Tesla may have begun to benefit from these
investments.
4.2.4 Return on Equity

The key ratios that have been analysed up until this point have focused solely on operating profitability.
Return on equity (ROE) measures profitability, taking into account both operations and financial leverage
(FGEAR). As long as ROIC exceeds interest expenses and leverage is positive, ROE will exceed ROIC. If
interest expenses are higher than ROIC, leverage will lead to a negative return164.
Table 4.4 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 Q1 2014

Leverage -59 % -25 % 68 % 35 % -7 %
Net borrowing cost -1 % 0% 0% 23 % -21 %
Spread -259 % -157 % -134 % -35 % 15 %
In 2011 and 2012 ~80% of interest bearing debt was a fixed rate loan from The Department of Energy
(DOE), which came with an interest rate of only 1.6%165. The USD 465 million DOE loan and proceeds

165 Schoenberg, T. (16.01.2013), ”Department of Energy Sued for $675 Million Over Clean Energy Loans”.
50
resulted in higher leverage in 2012, which can be seen from table 4.4. In 2013, Tesla issued USD 660 million
in convertible bonds to pay of the DOE loan and fund the construction of the Gigafactory166. The fact that
FGEAR did not increase more in 2013 was due to an increase in equity over the same period, which partially
offset the amount of leverage. In the first quarter of 2014, Tesla raised another USD 2 billion in convertible
bonds. However, the proceeds from the convertible bond offering are currently sitting as cash on the balance
sheet, which is reflected in a negative net interest bearing debt in Q1 2014. The proceeds from the offering
are expected to go into CAPEX for the Gigafactory towards the end of 2014 and should therefore bring
FGEAR up as the amount of cash is drawn down167 168.
Lastly, spread has also been negative over the period, indicating that it has been value destroying for the
company to be indebted.
Figure 4.3: ROE, Peers (L) and Tesla (R)
60% -19% 20%

50% -40%
40% -118% -100%
30% -113% -160%
20% -220%
-227%
10% -280%
0% -340%
-10% -400%
FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013
Toyota BMW Audi GM Tesla
Source: Author / Conpany Reports
As can be seen from figure 4.3, Tesla increased return on equity from 2012 to 2013, leading to less of a loss
for shareholders. The required return on equity, which will be explained in detail in section 7.1, is estimated
to be 8.65%. Historically, Tesla has been far from able to deliver on these requirements. Comparing the
development in ROE to the share price in figure 1.1, it is evident that the sharp increase in share price has
followed the signs of increased profitability of Tesla’s activities.
Over the analysed period Tesla improved both profit margin and the turnover rate on invested capital. Toyota
and GM created more value for shareholders between 2012 and 2013, while premium manufacturer BMW
166 Tesla Annual Report (2013), p. 65-66

167 Tesla Annual Report (Q1 2014), p. 39
168 Tesla Motors (26.02.2014), ”Tesla announces $1.6 billion convertible notes offering”.
51
and Audi has experienced a downward trend since 2011, partially due to negative economic growth in
Europe. Lastly, Ford has been excluded from the analysis of ROE, as the company had negative equity in
2010 and 2011.
4.3 Liquidity risk

Liquidity risk is analysed for the purpose of understanding the company’s ability to meet obligations. Failure
to do so will significantly limit operating flexibility and eventually lead to bankruptcy. For valuation
purposes, this matters because liquidity risk affects Tesla’s ability to raise funds. The automotive business is
capital intensive, and Tesla’s success in the industry depends on the delivery of Model S and Gen 3. If the
cost of developing these vehicles exceeds expectations, Tesla will need to raise more capital.
Liquidity risk is measured on a short-term and long-term basis. The short-term analysis determines Tesla’s
ability to meet current liabilities, while the long-term analysis measures the ability to cover long-term
obligations169.
4.3.1 Short-term liquidity risk

Tesla’s ability to meet short-term obligations can be examined with several methods. In addition to assessing
the turnover rate of capital, I have considered the current ratio and quick ratio. In the calculation of quick
ratio, inventory is excluded. The rationale is that inventory is not liquid enough and excluding it provides a
more accurate picture of liquidity170.
Table 4.5 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 Q1 2014

Current Ratio 2,4 2,2 1,2 1,5 2,1
Quick Ratio 1,3 1,4 0,7 0,9 1,7
Cash Burn Rate 9 14 7 175 725
Table 4.5 shows that Tesla’s short-term liquidity ratios have fallen from the 2011 level, although increasing
in Q1 2014. According to Petersen & Plenborg (2012), a liquidity ratio above 1 is generally considered
adequate, and a ratio above 2 indicates a low liquidity risk171.
Short-term liquidity risk is also assessed with use of cash burn rate, which is one of the most conservative
measures. The ratio illustrates how long a company can continue to fund operations without raising more
funds172. This ratio is typically used for companies with significant investments and little earnings, which
makes it appropriate for Tesla. Table 4.5 illustrates the cash burn rate in months. From 2010 to 2013, Tesla
169 Plenborg & Petersen (2012), Financial Statement Analysis, p. 155-156

170 Plenborg & Petersen (2012), Financial Statement Analysis, p. 155-156
52
increased the number of months they can continue operations from 9 to more that 700. Based on the three
measures of liquidity, I do not believe that Tesla has significant short-term liquidity risk.
4.4.2 Long-term liquidity risk

To assess the long-term liquidity risk, I have used the financial leverage ratio and interest coverage ratio. The
leverage ratio compares total liabilities to equity. Petersen & Plenborg (2012) recommends using the market
value of equity instead of book value. Interest coverage ratio measures Tesla’s ability to cover interest
expenses. The long-term liquidity risk is low, if the leverage ratio is low and interest coverage ratio is
high173.
Table 4.6 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 Q1 2014
Leverage ratio 0,07 0,16 0,25 0,09 0,14
Interest coverage ratio -200 1186 11597 -1,9 -3,7
Over the analysed period, Tesla has increased their leverage. However, during in the same period the
company also issued stocks to raise capital. Loans have been taken to finance growth, as Tesla has not
generated sufficient cash from its business to fund major investments. Tesla has a high long-term liquidity
risk in terms of non-existing interest rate coverage. In 2011 and 2012, Tesla had net interest income due to
the low interest rate paid on the DOE loan. As of today, Tesla is unable to cover interest expenses due to
negative operating profits. In contrast, the company’s total liabilities are only on average 10% of the market
value of equity, which is fairly lower than peers.
Based on the analysis of liquidity risk, I believe Tesla has the ability to meet short-term liabilities, but incurs
high long-term risk. While the company has historically relied on equity financing, the recent bond issuances
increases the company’s financial risk. The combination of higher leverage and the inability to cover interest
expenses makes the company vulnerable in the long-term.
4.4 Conclusion of Financial Analysis

From 2010 to 2013, Tesla improved the return on equity with 94 percentage points from -113% to -19%.
None of the peers have matched this growth. However, Tesla’s ROE is still far below the required return on
equity. The profitability of invested capital increased by 250 percentage points over the period, which is the
primary factor for the improvement in ROE. This is a result of both components of ROIC. The profit margin
has been driven by improvement in nearly all income statement items. This includes higher revenues,
reduced production and components costs, and lower expenses related to sales, general and administrative
and research and development. The turnover rate on assets have similarly been improved, as Tesla could
collect receivables, reduce inventory and improve the turnover rate on fixed assets through sales of the
Model S. Tesla has recently increased their leverage by issuing convertible bonds. This enabled them to pay
173 Leverage ratio = Total liabilities/Market cap. Interest coverage ratio = EBIT/Net interest expenses
53
off the DOE loan in 2012, and have provided them with funds to finance future growth plans, particularly the
construction of the Gigafactory. Lastly, Tesla’s short-term and long-term liquidity risk was analysed.
Through relatively sufficient current and quick ratios, it was found that the company’s primary liquidity risk
is long-term. The combination of higher debt levels and a negative coverage ratio means that Tesla may
experience difficulties in servicing its debt in the future.
On every measure of profitability, Tesla has delivered negative results. However, based on the same
measures, profitability is trending in the right direction. Lastly, it is important to notice that margins have
been consistently negative before the introduction of Model S in late-2012. This highlights the fact that
future profitability depends on successful execution of upcoming projects. These factors will be reflected in
the following valuation.
5.0 SWOT
The Purpose of chapter 3 was to identify Tesla’s strategic value drivers. The first part of this analysis
focused on the external opportunities and threats that affect growth and profit margin, while the second part
addressed Tesla’s internal strengths and weaknesses that may secure or harm their competitive position. In
chapter 4, I identified financial value drivers. In this chapter, the foregoing analyses are summarized in a
SWOT analysis174. With this, I intend to create a structured sketch of Tesla’s strategic and financial position,
which will lay the foundation for future growth and earnings potential.
174
Strenghts, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats
54
Strenghts Weaknesses
• Vertically integrated value • Already high OPEX is
chain allow for cost and expected to increase
quality control • Poor return on invested
• The Gigafactory capital and equity
• Company-owned stores • Higher CAPEX requirements
• Proprietary technology over the next years
• Low marketing expenses • High long-term liquidity risk
• Efficient production
• Lower battery costs
• Good brand perception
Opportunities Threats
• Economic growth in key • Higher raw material prices
markets and especially in • EV incentives phase out
China • Intese competition from
• Higher oil prices manufacturers with more
• Stricter emission policies resources
• Currently low interest rates • Lithium supply constraint
• Lower oil prices short term
6.0 Forecasting
The challenge of valuing a young company such as Tesla is evident from the financial analysis, which
showed that the company has historically experienced negative cash flows. This means that the value of the
company comes from future growth, with historical profitability being less predictive of future value
creation. The forecasts in this chapter are based on my belief that Tesla’s operating profitability will
converge towards a target level.
6.1 Budget period

In order to estimate future cash flows, it is necessary to determine an appropriate time frame for the budget
period. A continuing-value approach assumes a steady-state performance, and the explicit forecast must
therefore be long enough for the company to reach a steady state175. To ensure this, I have considered Tesla’s
strategic plans and chosen a period that reflects future products and the construction of the Gigafactory. The
period must also be long enough for the growth rates to be less than or similar to the growth of the economy
and for demand and supply to balance. The company will experience a high growth until they are able to
55
service existing demand. Based on findings in the strategic and financial analysis, I believe that a
supply/demand balance will be achieved some time after 2020, driven by cheaper models and sufficient
supply of battery cells as the full capacity of the Gigafactory is utilized. In the years following 2020, I
believe growth will be higher than the aggregate economy but decreasing. However, due to the uncertainty of
forecasting each line item beyond 2020, I have chosen a two-stage forecast model where the high growth
phase from 2014 to 2020 is based on explicit budgeting and a medium growth stage from 2020 to 2023
where the growth rate will fade towards the growth of the economy.
6.2 Terminal growth

In the strategic analysis, I found that the global vehicle market have grown at a CAGR of 4% since 2000. As
the industry is highly sensitive to economic cyclicality, I believe that this historical growth rate captures
volatility over the long-term. I also depicted that there is a high correlation between vehicle sales and GDP.
This is further highlighted by the fact that the global economy is expected to grow ~3.9%-4.0% annually
over the period. This means that the industry has matured up to a point where the long-term growth rate
mirrors the growth of the economy. As I believe Tesla will reach a steady state in 2024, I base my estimate
on the prospects of the global economy, and expect long-term growth of 4%, in line with IMF (2014)
projections and the historical growth rate of the industry. The terminal growth will be further discussed in the
sensitivity analysis in chapter 9.
6.3 Explicit forecast – pro forma income statement

The explicit forecast from 2014 to 2020 will be based on findings from the strategic and financial analysis of
the company. As can be seen from table 4.1, revenues from development services have been highly volatile
and decreasing. Furthermore, revenues from sale of emission credits are expected to cease as customers of
these credits i.e. automakers, conform to the emission standards and increase their portfolio of EVs. I do not
see these sources of revenue as sustainable in the future, and deems them as only having a miniscule impact
on operating profits. My forecast will therefore be based exclusively on my expectations for vehicle sales.
6.3.1 Development of automobile sales

Revenue growth and margins express my expectations of future volumes, product mix and OPEX
development. The key constraint for revenue growth is the production limitations of the Tesla Factory and
long production lead-time. It is therefore highly unlikely that there will be an oversupply of Model S, Model
X and Gen 3 over the period. In this regard, revenue is forecasted based on my expectations for production
rates.
6.3.1.1 Price
Tesla’s pricing strategy is based on transparency and equal pricing across markets176. This means that the
differences in prices are due to country-specific taxes, EV incentives and transportation costs. As mentioned
56
in the company introduction, both Model S and Model X is and will be offered with three different battery
options at prices from USD 69,000 to USD 93,400 for the performance version, excluding the USD 7,500
tax credit. However, this also excludes battery options and other features, which led to an average sales price
of USD ~91,500 in Q1 2014. In 2014, I have forecasted with this price level. In subsequent years, I believe
that increased competition from incumbent manufacturers will drive prices downwards. Lastly, Tesla has
guided a price point below USD 40,000 for Gen 3, excluding battery options. Based on the premium paid for
Model S above the guided price, I estimate a starting price of USD 45,000 for Gen 3.
6.3.1.2 Production volume

In order to assess future production in volumes, I have taken a bottom-up approach based on management’s
targets and my own expectations of capacity ramp-up at the Fremont plant. Estimated volumes, combined
with estimated product mix and average sales prices, will be used to determine the revenue from automotive
sales. Finally, I will determine Tesla’s potential market share based on the estimated sales numbers and my
expectations of the global industry and premium segment. A bottom-up approach supplemented with a top-
down market sizing as a sanity check, will contribute to a reliable forecast of sales.
In 2012, Tesla produced on average ~50 units Model S per week. Since then, the company has consistently
increased production rate to 600 vehicles per week by the end of 2013, and delivered a total of 22,477
vehicles globally177. Management has guided a production rate of 1,000 per week (~50,000 annually) during
2014 and expect to deliver 35,000 vehicles in total this year. This implies a growth in vehicle sales of 64%
from 2013. The Fremont facility has an estimated capacity of 500,000 vehicles per year and management is
targeting this run rate by 2020. The high production growth will be catalysed by the construction of the
Gigafactory, which is expected to supply lithium-ion batteries to serve 500,000 vehicles (ref. section
3.3.1.1). The factory will be fully operational by 2017 and is projected to contribute to economies of scale
and lower battery costs. Besides from the new battery factory, Tesla is focusing on increasing vehicle
production through manufacturing improvements178.
As mentioned in the strategic analysis, Tesla has historically proven their ability to execute on their projects.
This will also be necessary in order to accomplish future production targets. The guidance of 500,000
vehicles in 2020 would mean a production CAGR of ~49% from the 31,000 in 2013. While this seems
ambitious, the company have a history of exceeding their own guidance. In order to forecast production for
2014, I have based my estimate of the current production rate and the units produced in the first quarter. In
Q1 2014, Tesla produced 7,535 vehicles. If this rate remains flat throughout the year, Tesla would reach
~30,000 units. However, given the focus on expanding factory capacity and the manufacturing efficiency
177 Appendix 6.1 – Forecast fo sales

57
identified in the strategic analysis, I forecast production of 50,000 vehicles in 2014 and deliveries of 35,000,
in line with management’s guidance. From 2014, I forecast a ~47% CAGR in production and an output of
500,000 vehicles in 2020.
6.3.1.3 Sales growth

As I believe production expansion will be the key driver of sales growth between 2014 and 2020, I forecast
the quantity of vehicles sold within the limits of production. With the introduction of new vehicle platforms
over the next years, revenue growth will be step-wise. Therefore, I have applied an expected year-over-year
growth rate instead of a continuous rate to reflect the step-changes of new vehicle platforms. For all
segments, I forecast a high growth in the first two years of introduction, followed by a more modest growth
rate and a flat or falling growth in subsequent years.
For Model S, I expect unit sales to be driven by demand in North America and Europe though 2017, and
growth to decline with the introduction of Gen 3. Tesla is targeting a production rate of 20,000 Model X
vehicles annually. Deliveries are expected to start in mid-2015. I therefore believe that a total of 10,000 units
of the Model X will be delivered in 2015. With the launch of the Model X at the same price and with equal
battery size as Model S, the growth rate for Model S should decrease from 2015 an onwards as Model X will
cannibalize part of the market for Model S. This is reflected in my model, where Model S deliveries stabilize
between 2015 and 2016, as most sales growth will come from Model X.
Gen 3 will begin deliveries in 2017, and will make Tesla able to tap into the mid-price premium segment,
which I expect is a fairly larger market. This is reflected in a longer high-growth period and a significantly
larger volume than the previous models. While Gen 3 will attract a different customer segment, the depletion
of EV incentives and a lower number of early adopters among customers should drive customers towards the
cheaper Gen 3, at the expense of Model S and Model X. With this expected development, I am conservative
in the forecast of Model S from 2017-2020 and expect only a small increase in year-on-year sales. In 2020, I
believe that Gen 3 will account for ~75% of total units delivered.
58
Table 6.1: Sales F 2013 E 2014 E 2015 E 2016 E 2017 E 2018 E 2019 E 2020
Production 31 000 50 000 73 390 107 722 158 114 232 079 340 646 500 000
Deliveries
Model S, Units 22 477 35 000 50 000 55 000 58 300 57 134 55 420 53 757
Growth 55,7 % 43 % 10 % 6% -2 % -3 % -3 %
Model X, Units 10 000 30 000 39 000 42 900 45 045 47 297
Growth 200 % 30 % 10 % 5% 5%
Gen 3, Units 50 000 100 000 180 000 297 000
Growth 100 % 80 % 65 %
Total Deliveries 22 477 35 000 60 000 85 000 147 300 200 034 280 465 398 055
Avg. price /unit (t)
Model S 78 92 90 88 86 84 83 81
Model X 92 90 88 86 84 83
Gen 3 45 44 43 42
Revenue (bn)
Model S 3 203 4 484 4 834 5 022 4 823 4 585 4 358
Model X 915 2 691 3 428 3 695 3 802 3 913
Gen 3 2 250 4 410 7 779 12 579
Total Revenue 1 758 3 203 5 399 7 525 10 699 12 927 16 166 20 849
6.3.1.4 Implied market share

Tesla’s revenue expansion has been greater than the average seen for the peer group during the past three
years. This implies that Tesla is gaining market share179. Apart from the acquisition of the Tesla Factory in
2010, growth has been organically. As mentioned earlier, the global vehicle market has been growing at a
CAGR of ~4% since 2000. Given that the global economy is expected to grow between 3.9% and 4.0% from
2015-2019, I forecast global vehicle sales to reach ~100 million in 2020180. Furthermore, if the total premium
segment grows to 10.7% of total sales in 2020, Tesla would achieve a market share of 3.7% in 2020181. Even
with the expected sales of ~400,000 vehicles in 2020, Tesla will remain a small player in the premium
segment.
6.3.2 Profit Margin

To project Tesla’s future profit margin, I will include my expectations for each sub-component of operating
expenses as illustrated in figure 6.1: Cost of goods sold182, sales, general and administrative expenses183, and
research and development184. Lastly, a budgeting of depreciation and taxes will lay the foundation for the
forecast of the total operating profit margin. Expectations of the development of profit margin in the explicit
budgeting period are based on conclusions from PEST, Porters five forces, the value chain analysis, and the
financial analysis. The target long-term profit margin is also based on the margins earned by peers.
179 See financial statement analysis

180 See PEST-analysis
181 Appendix 6.2 – Implied Market Share
182 Commodities and raw-materials, manufacturing labor and other costs.
183 Expenses related to distribution and sales labor, freight, advertising and marketing and salaries and other expenses related to
administration.
184 Research and development of new models, battery and powertrain and other.
59
Figure 6.1: Tesla EBIT Walk FY 2013
2.200.000
194 500,0
1758 184,0 60 812,0
1.800.000
1.400.000
1.000.000
600.000
1451 151,0
200.000
285 569,0
231 976,0 106 083,0
-200.000 (61 283,0)
Auto Sales Dev. Services Em.Credits COGS SG&A R&D Depreciation EBIT 2013
6.3.2.1 Profit margin, 2020 

As noted in the financial analysis, Tesla is currently operating with a negative margin. The EBITDA-margin
calculated for peers is 7-9% for mass-market manufacturers and 15-16% for premium manufacturers185. By
2020, I believe Tesla will obtain a profit margin that captures the previously estimated mix of Model S/X
and Gen 3. This will position Tesla in both the premium market and the mid-price premium/high-end mass-
market (definitions vary in different geographical areas). In the long run, company-owned distribution is a
competitive advantage, which will make Tesla able to capture dealership margins186. Tesla should also
benefit from relatively low advertising costs once distribution related expenses stabilize. In my model, I
target a long-term EBITDA-margin of 15%, in line with peers in the premium segment.
6.3.2.2 Profit margin forecast, 2014-2020

In the financial analysis, I discussed how revenue Table 6.2: Profit margin drivers
Positives Negatives
growth and expansion in vehicle gross margin is the Decreasing battery costs Rising raw-material prices
Premium segment Increasing intensity of rivalry
primary driver of profit margin. Going forward, this Efficient manufacturing High SG&A
Company-owned stores High R&D expenses
will partially be offset by lower emission credit sales Low advertising expenses
(100% profit margin), which was an important factor for achieving positive EBITDA in 2013 (see figure
6.1). Additionally, margins will continue to be limited by high SG&A and R&D expenses. On the positive
side, I see falling battery costs as a key driver of profit margin. The positive and negative drivers of profit
margin are summarized in table 6.2.
Cost of revenues (COGS)

In the financial analysis, it was found that typical industry costs of vehicle sales include commodities and
materials, warranties, pension costs and other manufacturing costs. COGS are on average ~80%-90% of
185 Appendix 4.3 - Common-size analysis of Income Statement

186 According to Autonews (2014), the average pre-tax profit margin for U.S. dealerships was 2,2% in 2013
60
revenues for mass-market manufacturers and ~70% for premium manufacturers. Since 2012, Tesla has
expanded gross margin from 14% to 28%187. Management has guided a gross margin (including D&A and
excluding emission credits) of 28% in 2014. This is well in line with premium manufacturers.
Materials and commodities are the largest cost factor and account for on average ~60% of revenues. For
peers, material costs have increased slightly over the years, which can be explained by the inflation in raw
material costs covered in the strategic analysis. Tesla’s COGS structure differs from traditional OEMs, as the
largest component of material cost is the battery pack. In order to reflect the effect of changes in the
underlying cost components in my model, I have broken down COGS to determine gross profit. The
complete forecast of critical variable cost components can be found in appendix 6.3.
As was found in the strategic analysis, Tesla has a temporary competitive advantage due to lower battery cell
costs. Additionally, battery costs are expected to decrease by 30% in 2020 with the construction of the
Gigafactory and with industry wide innovation188. As mentioned in the external analysis, battery costs are not
publicly listed and estimates are therefore highly uncertain. The media and most industry analysts believe
that the current price of Tesla’s battery pack is USD 400 per kWh, based on the assumption that the price
difference of USD 10,000 between a 60kWh and a 85kWh version of Model S comes from the added costs
of the battery pack. However, as can be seen from table 2.1, this price difference includes a “Supercharging”
premium of USD 2,000, which is included in the 85kWh model. Adjusting for this, I estimate a current cost
of USD 320189. This is significantly cheaper than the industry level (USD 400-750) and gives Tesla a
competitive advantage over other EV manufacturers as depicted in the value chain analysis.
With a cost reduction of 30% from the current level, battery costs should fall at a compounded annual rate of
~5% to USD 224 per kWh in 2020. Table 6.2 shows my expectations of future battery costs per kWh and per
vehicle, based on an equal weighting between sales of the 60 kWh, 85 kWh and Performance 85 kWh Model
S/X. For Gen 3, Tesla has guided a battery size reduction of 30%, in which I estimate an equal weighting
between a 65 kWh and 48 kWh versions.
187 Table 4.2

189 ($10,000 - $8,000) / 25kWh = $320
61
Table: 6.2
Battery Cost Forecast F 2013 E 2014 E 2015 E 2016 E 2017 E 2018 E 2019 E 2020
Battery Pack (bn) (551) (816) (1 329) (1 790) (2 652) (3 242 (4 107) (5 328)
Per vehicle (t)
Model S (25) (23) (22) (21) (20) (19) (18) (17)
Model X (22) (21) (20) (19) (18) (17)
Gen 3 (14) (13) (13) (12)
Per kWh 320 304 289 275 261 248 236 224
The remaining amount of material costs is the raw materials mentioned in the external analysis. According to
the World Bank (2014), the prices of nickel, copper and aluminium is expected to increase with a CAGR of
~1% over the next years190. This will have a negative impact on gross margins and is reflected in the model
where material costs (ex. battery pack) increases annually at this rate. In the industry analysis, I concluded
that typical OEM suppliers have moderate bargaining power. Tesla is still in a growth phase where financial
and operational risk may limit their bargaining power over suppliers. As the company grows, they should be
able to exert more power over suppliers and limit potential price increases.
Driven by a slight increase in material costs (ex. battery pack) and a reduction in battery cell costs, I forecast
gross margin for automotive sales to 30% over the next three years. With the launch of Gen 3 in 2017, gross
margin decreases towards 25% in 2020, as margins of this vehicle will be lower.
Fixed costs
Tesla’s negative result has primarily been due to high SG&A and R&D expenses, which can be explained by
the growth rate and stage in the company’s lifecycle. The explicit forecast of these expenses is based on the
company’s future growth prospects as described in the internal analysis, and the financial value drivers
identified in the financial analysis.
Sales, general and administrative expenses has historically accounted for ~42% of revenue, with only 1-2%
attributed to advertising. As mentioned in the financial analysis, the level was significantly reduced to ~14%
in 2013 as a result of the growth in revenues. In 2014, the expansion of stores and services centres should
result in higher SG&A expenses. However, the forecasted increase in revenue will offset part of this
increase. I therefore forecast SG&A to 15% of revenues in 2014 (unlike 14% in 2013) . As mentioned in the
financial analysis, the average SG&A spending for peers is 8%. From 2015 and onwards, I see SG&A
expenses decreasing at an increasing rate. I have forecasted 6% in SG&A in 2020, as Tesla should benefit
from the low marketing expenses relative to peers in the premium segment.
190 World Bank (2014) - Nickel prices remain stable, copper to deacrease at CAGR ~1%, aluminium to increase at CAGR ~2%.
62
The ramp-up of production of Model S and Model X and the development of Gen 3 will require significantly
more R&D spending in a shorter term. In 2014, Tesla has guided an increase in R&D expenses, but rates are
expected to decrease and approach the industry level over time, due to Tesla’s relatively narrow product
portfolio and future scale economies.
Other income statement items

 Depreciation: With the forthcoming of two new vehicle platforms and the construction of the
Gigafactory, the relationship between capital expenditures and revenue will be nonlinear. In this case,
McKinsey (2010) recommend forecasting depreciation as a percentage of PP&E191. From 2010-2013,
depreciation was on average 8.6% of property, plant and equipment, which equals a linear depreciation
of ~12 years. Computer equipment has a useful life of 3 year, machinery and equipment 3 to 12 years,
while buildings are depreciated over 30 years192. Machinery and equipment will account for a significant
amount of total PP&E as Tesla expands its network of stores and superchargers and invest in tooling for
Model X and Gen 3. I therefore believe depreciation over 12 years i.e. 8.6% annually is the best estimate
going forward.
 Effective tax rate: I have applied an effective tax rate of 25%. This is the global average as will be
described in the calculation of WACC.
 Net borrowing rate (NBC) has historically been 0.2% of revenues, with exception of 2013 as mentioned
in section 4.1.1. Historically, interest expenses were related to the DOE loan. With the issuance of
convertible bonds, historical NBC is a bad proxy for the future. As will be described in detail in relation
to WACC in chapter 7, Tesla’s credit rating implies a credit spread of 7.25% above the risk free rate. I
have therefore estimated the costs debt to 10.06%.
Forecast of the pro forma income statement is presented in table 6.3. Note that numbers are rounded off.

63
Table 6.3.
Pro forma Income Statement Hist. E 14 E 15 E 16 E 17 E 18 E 19 E 20 E 21 E 22 E 23 E 24
Revenue Growth 142% 59% 69% 39% 42% 21% 25% 29% 15% 10% 5% 4%
Gross-margin 26% 30% 30% 30% 28% 27% 26% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25%
SG&A, % of revenue 42% 15% 13% 12% 10% 9% 7% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6%
R&D, % of revenue 55% 13% 11% 9% 8% 7% 5% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%
Net borrowing rate 0% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10%
Effective tax rate -1% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25%
Depreciation, % of PP&E 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9%
6.4 Explicit forecast – pro forma balance sheet

The relationship between balance sheet items and revenues are more stable than the relationship between
changes in the balance sheet and changes in revenues193. I have therefore chosen to link balance sheet items
to revenue. In light of the financial analysis, I project the key components of capital turnover separately.
6.4.1 Fixed tangible assets (CAPEX)

Investments in fixed assets are a function of capital expenditures (CAPEX) and depend on the capital
intensity of the industry and company-specific strategies194. As analysed in Porters Five Forces, the
automotive industry is highly capital intensive, and Tesla’s aggressive growth strategy will require
significant investments above the industry normal. Investments in property, plant and equipment (PP&E) has
on average accounted for ~60% of total operating assets, and is the main driver of asset growth. In 2013,
machinery, equipment and tooling contributed to the majority of investment in PP&E. I expect investment in
fixed assets to steadily increase concurrently with expansion of production capacity, infrastructure and the
Gigafactory. From 2014 to 2020, I project investments in tangible assets to include the following:
 Expansion of production capacity at the Fremont factory for Model S and Model X from 31,000 vehicles
in 2013 to the expected 107,722 vehicles in 2016195. For Model X, this will require additional tooling
and equipment. However, as Model X is a crossover from Model S i.e. built on the same platform, I
believe the investment need is lower than for the launch of Model S.
 Over the course of 2014-2015, Tesla will expand the stores and service infrastructure from the current
110 locations by 75% and install 200 Supercharges in North America, Europe and China in 2014196.
 Between 2014 and 2015 construction of the Gigafactory will begin. Tesla expects production of battery
cells to begin in 2017, and capacity to be fully utilized in 2020. Through 2020, ~USD 4-5 billion will be
invested in the factory, of which 2 billion will be invested by Tesla197.
 The launch of Gen 3 in 2017 will require significant investments in tooling.
193 Koller, T. Goedhart, M. & Wessels, D. (2010), Valuation, p. 199

194 Koller, T. Goedhart, M. & Wessels, D. (2010), Valuation, p. 201
195 Appendix 6.1 – Forecast of Sales
197 Appendix 3.3 - Gigafactory Projected Timeline
64
Tesla has guided capital expenditures of USD 650-850 million in 2014198. Given the significant investments
above, I believe USD 850 million is appropriate199. CAPEX should be higher from 2014-2017. After the
launch of Gen 3 in 2017, investment needs will slowly decrease as a percentage of revenue. Tesla has not
guided any investments beyond this point. My expectation is that from 2020 and onwards Tesla will need to
invest in a second manufacturing plant and battery cell facility, if they are to increase production beyond the
500,000 vehicles anticipated in 2020. However, by this time the company should be able to utilize retained
earnings and be in less need of external funding. In 2024, I expect CAPEX to stabilize at 6% of revenues.
My expectations for PP&E and CAPEX from 2014-2020 is illustrated in figure 6.2. The pike in 2017 is a
reflection of the revenue growth from Gen 3.
Figure 6.2: Investment in PP&E and CAPEX 2013 - 2020

160% (3000 000,0)
140%
(2500 000,0)
120%
(2000 000,0)
100%
80% (1500 000,0)
60%
(1000 000,0)
40%
(500 000,0)
20%
0% 0,0
FY 2013 Q1 2014 EY 2014 EY 2015 EY 2016 EY 2017 EY 2018 EY 2019 EY 2020
Property, Plant and Equipment CAPEX
Other balance sheet items

All other balance sheet items are estimated as a percentage of revenue except for net interest bearing debt,
and based on historical values and my expectations for future development. Forecasts are shown in table 6.4.
 Net interest bearing debt (NIBD): To bring net interest bearing debt on the balance sheet in line with the
capital structure implied in WACC, I have used the expected long-term debt-ratio calculated in chapter
7, of 48.4%. As will be described in more detail in the calculation of WACC, I expect NIBD to increase
gradually up to the target debt level due to the investments in PP&E.
 Accounts receivable have on historically been 4.8% of revenues and include sales of powertrain systems
and emission credits200. As mentioned, credit sales and powertrain serviced and development is expected
to decline in the future and I therefore expect changes in sales contracts. However, with the business
expanding in other areas, receivable is likely to come from other sources. I forecasted accounts
receivable to stay at the same rate.

199 Tesla will go from a production rate of 31,000 vehicles in 2013 to 50,000 vehicles in 2014 = 61% increase
65
 The analysis of invested capital, showed that inventory as a percentage of revenue was at its highest in
2012, when Tesla increased inventory to meet production requirements for Model S201. In 2013,
inventory dropped to ~17%. With better inventory management, I believe that the ~17% in 2013, is the
best estimation for future levels.
 Operating liabilities have historically been high but significantly decreased from about 120% in 2012 to
40% in 2013. I expect that operating liabilities, as a percentage of revenue will stabilize around 40%, but
decrease slightly over the years.
Table 6.4
Pro forma Balance Sheet Hist. E 14 E 15 E 16 E 17 E 18 E 19 E 20 E 21 E 22 E 23 E 24
PP&E, % of Revenue 104% 48% 50% 50% 50% 49% 47% 46% 46% 46% 46% 46%
Inventories, % of Revenue 36% 17% 17% 17% 17% 17% 17% 17% 17% 17% 17% 17%
Notes and accounts, % of Revenue 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5%
Operational liabilities, % of Revenue 85% 42% 40% 40% 38% 38% 36% 36% 36% 36% 36% 36%
NIBD, % of Invested Capital -4% 4% 20% 30% 40% 45% 48% 48% 48% 48% 48% 48%
CAPEX, % of Revenue -74% -27% -24% -17% -18% -11% -11% -13% -9% -8% -6% -6%
6.5 Development of profitability (ROIC)

Based on the assumptions presented in this chapter, I have forecasted the financial statements. The
development of ROIC and profit margin, is illustrated in figure 6.3. ROIC and profit margin is measured
after tax, to reflect the forecasted tax rate.
Tesla has grown immensely since the initial public offering in 2010. However, capital investments, high
fixed costs and limited sales have resulted in a negative NOPAT-margin. I believe the revenue growth
observed with the launch of Model S support a positive development that will be reinforced with the launch
of Model X and Gen 3. Over the period, profit margin will increase and stabilize at 10-11% in 2020, a
margin seen for comparable premium manufacturers.
Tesla’s growth will come in two increments, one for Model X from 2015 to 2017 and one for Gen 3 in 2017.
The transition from one growth phase to another is reflected in the small kink in ROIC 2018.
ROIC will continue to grow until Tesla reaches the production target of 500,000 vehicles in 2020. Beyond
this point, ROIC should gradually decline toward a steady state, but still be in line with the profitability of
Audi and BMW. Based on these assumptions, I see validity in my forecast.
66
Figure 6.3: Development of ROIC and NOPAT
28% 27%
30% 26% 26% 26%
25%
25%
20% 16% 17%
14%
15%
7% 7% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8%
10% 4% 5%
4%
5% 2%
-3% -2%
0%
-8%
-5%
-12%
-10%
-15%
FY 2013 EY 2014 EY 2015 EY 2016 EY 2017 EY 2018 EY 2019 EY 2020 EY 2021 EY 2022 EY 2023 EY 2024
ROIC (NOPAT) NOPAT-margin
7.0 Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC)

The weighted average cost of capital is used for discounting the excess return (EVA) and free cash flow
(DCF) to time 0. WACC reflects equity and debt investors’ expected compensation for the time value of
money and the risk related to the particular asset202. In case of default, debt holders have the priority. The
required return must therefore be calculated separately for the two types of investors. As of today, Tesla has
no subsidiaries and therefore only access to external financing in terms of equity and debt. WACC can be
expressed with the following formula203:
𝑁𝐼𝐵𝐷 𝐸
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 = × 𝑟𝑑 × (1 − 𝑡) + × 𝑟𝑒
(𝑁𝐼𝐵𝐷 + 𝐸) (𝑁𝐼𝐵𝐷 + 𝐸)
In the next sections, each component of WACC will be estimated following these steps:
1. Expected return on equity
- The risk-free rate
- Beta
- Marked risk premium
- Liquidity premium
2. Cost of debt
3. Long-term capital structure

67
7.1 Expected return on equity, 𝒓𝒆
The cost of equity is a measure of investors’ required return on a security, equal to the opportunity cost of
investing in an alternative portfolio. The majority of the literature recommends using the CAPM-model for
this purpose, which relies upon a number of assumptions and illustrates the relationship between the return
on equity and the risk associated with the market portfolio204 205. I have chosen this model to estimate the
return to Tesla’s shareholders. Since the company only have common shares outstanding, I will only
estimate a single return on equity.
7.1.1 The risk free rate, 𝒓𝒇

The risk free rate is the return on a security that investors can expect with certainly, i.e. no risk. In most
developed countries, where the government is viewed as default free, the long-term government bond rate
can be used as a proxy for the risk free rate. Damodaran (2009) highlights the importance of consistency
between cash flows and the risk free rates, in order to deal with currency and inflation. When cash flows are
estimated in nominal terms, the U.S. Treasury bond rate is appropriate. U.S. Treasury bonds are measured in
nominal values, since the U.S. have relatively stable and low inflations206. Tesla’s cash flows are also
nominal and reported and forecasted in USD. Using U.S. bonds therefore provides sufficient consistency.
Figure 7.1: U.S. Treasury Bond Rate, %

6
0
04 .04 .04 /05 /05 .06 .06 .07 /07 /07 /08 /08 .09 .09 /10 /10 /10 .11 .11 /12 /12 /13 /13 .13
2. 8 2 0 2 2 4 0 4 9 5 9 9 1 9 2 4 2 4 3 4 3 7 3
1 .0 6.0 1.1 4/2 9/2 3.0 8.0 1.1 6/1 1/1 4/2 9/2 3.0 8.1 1/1 6/2 1/2 5.0 0.0 3/1 8/1 1/2 6/2 2.0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
10-year U.S. Treasury bond Avg. 2008-2014
Source: Compiled by author / U.S. Department of Treasury
In theory, the long-term government bond can only be used as a proxy for the risk free rate, if it is default
free and thus have no default premium. Since the valuation assumes infinite cash flows, a 30-year zero-
coupon bond would match the cash flows better than a 10-year government bond. However, there are some
risk of deflation and illiquidity over the long run, which is reflected in a risk premium on 30-year zero-
coupon bonds207. Based on the 10-year bond per 31.03.2014, I estimate the risk free rate to be 2.73%208. As
204 Petersen & Plenborg (2012), Financial Statement Analysis, p. 245,

205 𝑟𝑒 = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽 × (𝑟𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓 )
206 Damodaran, A. (2008), ”What is the risk free rate? A search for the basic building block”.
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can be seen from figure 7.1, this is lower than the 6-year average of 2.81%. Since WACC is assumed to be
constant in the future, I have chosen the average rate from 2008 to 2014 to reflect the long-term risk free
rate. This reduces the risk of using a too low rate, which will overestimate the value of the company.
7.1.2 Systematic risk, β

Beta is a measure of systematic risk and is derived as a function of the relationship between the actual return
on the respective stock and the return on the market portfolio. Beta captures the risk added by a single
security to a broad and diversified portfolio209. Beta can be determined in multiple ways, and the implications
vary across the different methods. In order to estimate the most valid beta value, I have explored the most
common methods and arrived at a conclusion based on the average of these estimates.
Regression beta
Beta can be estimated by regressing the historically observed returns against the market portfolio. According
to Damodaran (2009), there are a number of factors to consider that have implications for the estimate210.
1. The choice of Market index

2. The choice of time period
3. The choice of return interval
4. Post-regression beta adjustments
As mentioned in the introduction, American investors hold the majority of Tesla’s shares. The remaining
amount is spread across different countries. In such, I have chosen the S&P 500 index and MSCI North-
America index to represent the majority of investors. The MSCI World index is also chosen to represent
foreign investors, and to include an index with more securities. According to Damodaran (2012), indices that
include more securities and are market-weighted, yields better estimates. All of the above indexes are
market-weighted. The validity of the covariance estimates increases with the frequency of data, suggesting
the use of daily observations211. Given Tesla’s short history as a public company and the high liquidity of the
security, I have chosen to regress beta based on daily observations from 2012-2014.
Table 7.1: Regression Beta
Raw beta 2012-2014 Levered Unlevered
Beta MSCI World 1,260 1,166
Beta MSCI North America 1,513 1,401
Beta S&P 1,469 1,360
Average 1,414 1,309
208 U.S. Department of Treasury – Interest Rate Statistics

210 Damodaran, A. (2009), ”Estimating Risk Parameters”. pg. 6
211 R. Merton (1980), “On Estimating the Expected Return on the Market”.
69
The levered regression beta is affected by the company’s capital structure. For the purpose of deriving
WACC, I will use the expected future capital structure. Thus, beta has been unlevered by adjusting for the
average debt/equity ratio and effective tax rate over the period of the regression. This gives an unlevered beta
of 1.31.
For valuation purposes, company beta should be relatively stable over the historical period. The one-year
moving average of beta in figure 7.2 highlights the volatility across the three indices. This increases the need
for comparing different methods to reduce potential sourcing errors.
Figure 7.2: 1-Year Moving Average Beta

2
1,8
1,6
1,4
1,2
1
0,8
0,6
0,4
2011 2011 2011 2012 2012 2012 2012 2013 2013 2013 2013 2014
MSCI North America MSCI World SNP
Source: Compiled by author / Nasdaq / MSCI
Fundamental beta
A second way to estimate beta is to analyse the fundamentals of the business. Beta is determined from three
variables: the business the firm operates in, the degree of operating leverage and the financial leverage212. As
discussed in the strategic analysis, the automobile business is highly cyclical and sensitive to economic
conditions. Damodaran (2012) also extends this view to a firm’s products, arguing that firms whose products
are more discretionary (customers can defer from buying them) should have higher betas213. This should
place Tesla in the high end of the scale. From the strategic and financial analysis, I have gained insights that
can be used to assess the operating and financial risk of the firm. The analysis can be found in appendix 7.1.
Based on the analysis, I classify Tesla’s operating risk as high and the financial risk as neutral, leading to an
overall high level. According to Petersen & Plenborg (2012), this translates into an unlevered beta of 1.15-
1.40214. Taking the average, I estimate a beta of 1.28.
212 Damodaran, A. (2012), Investment Valuation, p. 183

213 Damodaran, A. (2012), Investment Valuation p. 184
70
Industry beta
An alternative way to estimate beta without the disadvantages arising from using beta from regression and
comparable firms, is the industry beta. Over time, Tesla’s beta should approach the one observed for
industry. Damodaran (2014) use estimates of beta based on the average beta across the entire industry. In a
dataset from 2014, he estimates the auto industry beta based on 26 global companies. The result is an
unlevered beta of 0.72215.
Unlevered beta
As the last step, I have re-levered the average beta by adjusting for the expected capital structure and
corporate tax, and find an unlevered beta of 1.10216. Finally, beta has been adjusted according to a
Bloomberg method where weights are assigned to push the estimate towards one217. The rational for this
technique, is the notion that betas tend to move towards one over time218. The final adjusted unlevered beta,
based on the average across methods is 1.07. I believe this is more realistic estimate than the output from the
regression, as Tesla will become less risky overt time. However, I acknowledge that the beta interval from
0.72 to 1.31 increases the chance of estimation errors. The sensitivity of the share price to beta will therefore
be analysed in chapter 9.
7.1.3 Equity risk premium

Equity risk premium is the return in excess of the risk free rate that shareholders expect as compensation for
taking on the risk of investing in other assets than the risk free Treasury bond. There are three main methods
to estimate the premium: 1) Gather a number of estimates from investors and taking the average, 2) Calculate
the ex-post excess return based on historical data and 3) Calculate the implicit ex-ante premium based on
current stock prices219. The ex-post approach is the most widely used. Various practitioners have compared
the actual returns earned on stocks over time and compared this to the actual returns on a risk free security220.
Koller et al. (2010) argues that 4.5 to 5.5% is an appropriate range221. However, such results tend to vary
significantly due to differences in choice of time period and risk free security. Fernandez et al. (2012)
surveyed the equity risk premium used in 82 countries and found the median estimate for the U.S. to be
5.4%222. Similarly, Damodaran continuously updates his estimates and provides an equity risk premium of
5.5% for the S&P500 in March 2014223. Thus, the average of 5.5% is a reasonable estimate for the market
premium.
215 Damodaran, A. (2014), Dataset – Betas by Sector

𝐷
216 𝛽𝐿 = (1 + (1 − 𝑇) ∗
𝐸
217 Adj. Beta = regression beta*(2/3) + 1*(1/3)
218 Damodaran, A. (2009), ”Estimating Risk Parameters”., p. 11
220 Damodaran, A. (2012), “Equity Risk Premium”, p. 5.
221 Koller, T. Goedhart, M. And Wessels, D. (2010), Valuation p. 245
222 Fernandez et al. (2012), Marker risk premium used in 82 countries in 2012.
223 Damodaran, A. (2014), Dataset – ERP by Month
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7.1.4 Liquidity premium
The last factor included in the expected return of equity is the premium received for illiquidity, which refers
to the cost of converting securities to cash. Tesla’s trade volume has been relatively high since 2013. The
ownership structure is also highly dispersed, which increases the liquidity of the stock. As a result, I do not
assign a liquidity premium to Tesla’s shares.
7.2 Cost of debt, 𝒓𝒅

Creditors require a return above the risk free rate to fund a company. The rate is based on operational and
financial risk and is calculated as the credit spread above the risk free rate that is based on the credit rating
assigned to the company224. Since the rate reflects the costs that the company can borrow at today, estimation
should be based on the current yield of outstanding bonds225.
Large corporations usually have more than one category of debt, which should be assigned different rates
depending on seniority and collateral226. However, since Tesla’s bonds are convertible, yields depend mostly
on stock movements as debt is directly tied to stock-conversion. The yield is therefore not indicative of
Tesla’s actual costs of debt.
Standard & Poor’s recently assigned Tesla’s bonds a B- rating due to elevated risk of default. According to
S&P, a B-rating suggests that a company is “more vulnerable to adverse business, financial and economic
conditions but currently has the capacity to meet financial commitments”227. Based on my assessment of risk,
in relations to the fundamental beta and the previous liquidity analysis, this rating supports my view.
Plenborg & Petersen (2012) argues that a B- rated obligation can be assigned a credit spread between 3.2%
and 13.1%228. Damodaran (2014) assigns a credit spread of 7.25% for large manufacturing firms (market
cap. above USD 5 billion) with B3/B- rating229. This estimates lie well within Petersen & Plenborg’s
interval. In appendix 7.2, I have created a synthetic credit rating to illustrate the reasoning for Tesla’s
assigned junk bond rating.
Adjusting for the risk free rate, this gives a required return on straight debt of 10.06%.
7.2.1 Tax rate

Free cash flows are forecasted on an after tax basis and the costs of capital must be adjusted accordingly.
Tesla has historically operated with negative operating cash flows, and only been subject to an average tax
rate below 1% over the past five years. Applying the effective tax rate is therefore inconvenient for

225 Sørensen, O. (2012), Regnskabsanalyse og værdiansættelse, p. 48
227 Standard & Poor´s (2014)
228Petersen & Plenborg (2012), Financial Statement Analysis, p. 291
229 Damodaran, A. (2014), Dataset – Estimating country risk premium
72
estimating the future tax rate. As Tesla operates under different national tax laws, I have used the global
average tax rate of ~25% for tax allocations. I also assume that the effective tax rate will adjust to the
marginal rate when EBIT turns positive.
7.3 Long-term capital structure

The final stage in the process of estimating WACC is determining the long-term relationship between debt
and equity. To estimate the weight of the two components, it is important to use market values to represent
expected future returns230. Since the market value of debt is unknown, the book value of net interest bearing
debt is therefore used as an approximation231. The true value of equity is also unknown, in which the
observed market value is used232.
Tesla has historically relied on equity financing, although the capital structure has been subject to changes
since the IPO. During the first quarter of 2014, the company raised USD 2 billion in convertible bonds - their
most significant debt offering so far. However, during the same period, share prices also rose sharply (figure
1.1).
Using the current market value of equity as an approximation leads to a circularity issue. This compromises
my objective of challenging the existing share price. In the derivation of a steady-state capital structure, I
have instead benchmarked the capital structure of comparable firms233. Tesla states in their annual report that
the leverage ratio will depend on the cash flows the firm generates in the future. Thus, the company does not
opt for a target ratio. The average debt ratio for peers over the period is 52.4%. However, as can bee seen
from figure 7.3, levels vary significantly between companies, as a result of economic cyclicality and
institutional differences.
Table 7.2: Peers Capital Structure

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Avg. Hist.
GM 35,3 % 23,8 % 26,2 % 30,3 % 45,6 % 32,2 %
Toyota 53,4 % 53,2 % 52,1 % 52,6 % 51,8 % 52,6 %
Ford 106,3 % 100,6 % 86,9 % 86,6 % 81,1 % 92,3 %
BMW 75,5 % 72,3 % 71,5 % 69,4 % 66,4 % 71,0 %
Audi 5,2 % 6,8 % 8,5 % 27,8 % 21,8 % 14,0 %
52,4 %

232 The objective of this analysis is to challenge (or confirm) the value of equity.
73
To address this issue, Petersen & Plenborg (2012) suggests expanding the sample size234. I have therefore
compared the average debt ratio of peers to the industry in general. Based on 26 companies world wide,
Damodaran (2014) estimate the industry average debt ratio to 48.4%.235. In 2012 and 2013, Tesla’s
NIBD/EV was 41.1% and 26.2%, respectively236. I believe 48.4% is the best approximation for Tesla’s
future capital structure. In Q1 2014, NIBD was negative due to a significant amount of cash equivalents. As
mentioned in the liquidity analysis, these cash holdings are expected to be invested in the Gigafactory by the
end of 2014. Beginning in 2015, I expect the capital structure to approach the industry level as Tesla utilizes
its debt capacity. Over the subsequent years of the forecast period, debt levels will increase and end at the
industry normal of 48.4% debt and 51.6% equity.
Figure 7.3 : Tesla Debt/EV
1,00
0,43 0,47 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48

0,41 0,36
0,50 0,26 0,26
0,15
0,04
-0,34 -0,07
0,00
2010 2011 2012 2013 Q1 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
2014
-0,50
-1,00
-1,41
-1,50
Based on the CAPM model and the inputs estimated above, WACC can be calculated. The required return on
equity is 8.65% based on an unlevered beta of 1.07. With a pre-tax cost of debt of 10.06%, I estimate a
WACC of 8.12%.
0.484 0.516
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 = × 0.1006 × (1 − 0.25) + × 0.0865
(0.484 + 0.516) (0.484 + 0.516)

235 Damodaran, A. (2014) – Data Set - Debt Fundamentals by Sector
236 Based on average measures.
74
8.0 Valuation
8.1 Discounted Cash Flow Model (DCF)
This chapter will start with an explanation of the chosen valuation model, followed by a valuation of Tesla
Motors based on the previous analysis.
The purpose of an equity valuation model is to obtain the fundamental value of the equity and thus challenge
or support the market value of a company. Since the value of a stock depend on the company’s future
earnings potential, the valuation model aim to estimate the present value of uncertain future cash flows. The
discounted cash flow model is a commonly used valuation model. The theoretical background for this model
is elaborated on in methodology section. In the calculation of FCFF, I use the WACC from chapter 7, equal
to 8.12%. The complete pro forma statements can be found in appendix 6.6.
Table 8.1 Discounted Cash Flow Model, USD 1,000

DCF Valuation FY 2013 FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 FY 2018 FY 2019 FY 2020
FCFF (250 238) (731 531) (383 782) (745 794) 42 877 115 648 342 152
Discount factor 0,92 0,86 0,79 0,73 0,68 0,63 0,58
PV of FCFF (231 454) (625 826) (303 680) (545 834) 29 025 72 411 198 149
PV of FCFF explicit foecast (1 407 209)
PV of FCFF, fade period 1 973 347
PV of FCFF, terminal 21 581 413
Enterprise Value 31/3-14 22 583 855
NIBD (136 802)
Equity Value 22 720 657
Shares outstanding, 1000 123 473
Share price, USD 184,01
DCF Valuation FY 2013 FY 2021 FY 2022 FY 2023 FY 2024

FCFF 919 044 1 339 331 1 783 938 1 938 376
Discount factor 0,54 0,50 0,46 11,13
PV of FCFF 492 289 663 563 817 494 21 581 413
NIBD (136 802)
The estimated FCFF is negative in the first four years, reflecting the CAPEX requirements and higher fixed
costs related to the expansion of existing and new vehicle platforms, expansion of stores and infrastructure,
and the construction of the Gigafactory. With the launch of Gen 3, Tesla will begin to reap the profits from
75
these investments. The non-linearity in cash flow growth is an effect of the step-changes in revenue growth,
from the introduction of new automotive platforms. It is also worth mentioning that the enterprise value is
almost the same as the equity value, as Tesla has more cash than interest bearing debt due to the proceeds
from their last bond offering.
The enterprise value is USD 22.58 billion, representing the value of all future cash flows. By deducting net
interest bearing debt, I find the free equity value. On the 31.03.2014, Tesla had 123.472,8 shares outstanding.
This gives a fundamental equity value per share of USD 184.01. On that same day the stock traded at a price
of USD 208.45 at Nasdaq Stock Exchange. I therefore believe the stock should trade 13% lower.
It is evident from the DCF model that cash outflows in the first four years gives a negative present value of
the explicit forecast period. This is, however, offset by positive cash flows in the second forecast period
2021to 2023. Still, only 4% of Tesla’s value comes from the forecast period. The significant impact of the
terminal value is addressed in a sensitivity analysis in chapter 9.
8.2 Economic Value Added (EVA)

The EVA model is based on the notion that the value of a company is determined by the initial amount of
invested capital and the present value of future EVAs237. The theoretical background for the model is
described in 1.3.4. The EVA model is based on the same assumptions and inputs as the DCF and will
therefore yield the same result. The difference is that while the DCF uses cash flows, EVA uses NOPAT and
adjusts for WACC directly. The result of the valuation can bee seen from table 8.2.
Table 8.2: Economic Value Added Model, USD 1,000

EVA Valuation FY 2013 FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 FY 2018 FY 2019 FY 2020
Invested Capital 691 724 880 846 1 700 834 2 370 271 3 584 316 4 201 588 5 253 988 6 567 656
NOPAT (63 503) (61 116) 88 457 285 655 468 252 660 149 1 168 049 1 655 819
EVA (117 256) 16 968 147 617 275 883 369 250 827 053 1 229 412
Discount factor 0,92 0,86 0,79 0,73 0,68 0,63 0,58
PV of EVA (108 454) 14 516 116 807 201 914 249 961 517 841 711 985
PV of EVA, explicit forecast 1 704 571
PV of EVA, fade period 2 167 404
PV of EVA, terminal 17 583 851
Invested Capital, t 0 691 724
Enterprise value1/1-14 22 147 550
NIBD (136 802)
237
Petersen & Plenborg (2012), Financial Statement Analysis, p. 220
76
EVA Valuation FY 2013 FY 2021 FY 2022 FY 2023 FY 2024
Invested Capital 691 724 7 552 804 8 308 084 8 723 488 9 072 428
NOPAT (63 503) 1 904 192 2 094 611 2 199 342 2 287 316
EVA 1 371 169 1 481 635 1 525 068 1 579 327
Discount factor 0,54 0,50 0,46 11,13
PV of EVA 734 471 734 067 698 866 17 583 851
NIBD (136 802)
In the first year of forecasting, EVA is negative. This illustrates that Tesla initially destroys shareholder
value. This changes in year 2. Compared to DCF, the forecast period contributes with 9% of enterprise value.
8.3 Relative Valuation - Multiples

Valuation based on multiples is not theoretically reasoned, and therefore will receive only limited attention
in this dissertation. The method is, however, implemented, to provide an objective idea of the price range in
which the Tesla stock should lie. The use of the right multiples is essential for the validity of multiples.
According to Koller et. al. (2010), EV/EBIT tells more about the company than any other multiple, as it
incorporates growth rates, ROIC, tax and cost of debt238. Since manufacturers have different depreciation
schemes, I have also used EV/EBITDA. EV/Sales are only useful for companies with volatile earning and
situations when earnings fail to represent long-term potential239. I believe this is the case for Tesla, and
have therefore included the multiple.
Empirical evidence suggests that forward-looking multiples are more accurate than historical multiples240.
For comparable companies, I have used 2014 and 2015 multiples. For Tesla, I have also included multiples
for 2020, to reflect the full impact of Model S, Model X and Gen 3. The forward-looking multiples are
gathered from Bloomberg and presented in table 8.4.
Based on my valuation of Tesla, all multiples are significantly higher than the industry average in 2014 and
2015. In 2014, Tesla’s price is 7.1 times the estimated sales, compared to the industry multiple of 0.9. This
means, that Tesla is much more expensive than its peers. The high premium above the industry is justified by
the high growth over the period, which is already price in by the market. During 2015, I expect EBIT to turn
238 Koller, T. Goedhart, M. And Wessels, D. (2010), Valuation. p. 305

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positive. EV/EBIT therefore changes from being insignificant in 2014, to significantly high in 2015. All
multiples fall from 2014 to 2015, as sales, EBITDA-margin and EBIT-margin increases. The same
development is true for pees, indicating that most analysts expect the industry to grow over the year.
Table 8.4: Multiples Valuation

Comparables EV/Sales EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT Tesla 2014 2015 2020
2014 2015 2014 2015 2014 2015 EV/Sales 7.1x 4.2x 1.1x
Toyota 1.3x 1.2x 9.6x 8.7x 13.5x 12.4x EV/EBITDA 445.1x 64.5x 7.4x
GM 0.3x 0.2x 3.5x 2.5x 7.3x 4.1x EV/EBIT N/A 191.5x 10.2x
Ford 0.4x 0.4x 6.1x 4.5x 12.3x 7.1x
Mass-market average 0.7x 0.6x 6.4x 5.2x 11.0x 7.9x
BMW 1.5x 1.4x 9.5x 8.9x 13.8x 13.3x
Audi N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Premium average 1.5x 1.4x 9.5x 8.9x 13.8x 13.3x
Peer Average 0.9x 1.0x 7.2x 6.2x 11.7x 9.2x
Source: Bloomberg
The 2020 multiples are much more indicative of Tesla´s value. By this time, Tesla should have capitalized
on all planned projects. Beyond this point, growth should stabilize. In 2020, I have estimated an
EV/EBITDA of 7.4x, an EV/EBIT of 10.2x and an EV/Sales of 1.1x.
With the price I have estimated, Tesla trades at a slight premium measure by all three multiples. However,
their presence in the high-end segment, should explain the premium in 2020, when looking at high-end
manufacturer BMW. Based on the multiples for 2020, my estimate seems fair.
Lastly, I have compared my estimated multiples for 2014 and 2015 with the Bloomberg consensus. The
consensus estimate is illustrated in appendix 8.2, and indicates that my forecast is below average on
EV/EBIT and EV/EBITDA. This difference can be explained by my conservative estimation of this year’s
profit margin. I believe the company is more expensive than the analyst consensus, due to the capital
intensity of the industry and the even higher capital requirements for Tesla. I also believe that SG&A
expenses will be high through the year and in 2015, which will pressure margins and limit returns over the
period. The relative conservatism of my estimate indicates that the potential for upside limited. However,
due to the following factors, I believe my estimates are reliable.
Tesla is first of all an automotive manufacturer, and subject to the structural characteristics of the industry:
capital intensity, high fixed costs, high leverage and intense competition. I see Tesla as a strong player in the
premium EV segment and in the premium segments as a whole. Tightening emission policies, rising fuel
prices and economic growth, lays the foundation for Tesla to grow sales and increase their market share.
78
Coupled with impeccable product quality, technological leadership and the ability to execute, I see little
potential for failure. However, while I believe in the future of Tesla and their vehicles, I also believe that the
company is overvalued compared to industry peers.
9.0 Sensitivity Analysis

The DCF and EVA valuation is based on parameter estimates and assumptions, which is vitiated by
subjectivity and uncertainty. In this chapter, I will perform a sensitivity analysis of the estimated
fundamental value. The terminal value accounts ~96% of the total enterprise value. Thus, the share price is
highly sensitive to the terminal growth rate. The same is true for the estimated costs of capital, as it is used to
discount all future cash flows to the present value.
The terminal growth rate of 4% is based on the expected aggregate growth of the economy. According to
IMF (2014), the economy will expand at a rate of 2-4% over the next five years241. Developed economies
are facing low inflation, while developing countries continue to grow. This makes it difficult to forecast
growth rates far out in the horizon. In table 9.1, I have tested the sensitivity of the estimated share price to
changes in the growth rate and WACC. A change of 0.5% in terminal growth would change the price with
USD ~20 in either direction. The estimated share price is also sensitive to the estimated costs of capital,
which is based on several underlying assumptions and estimations. While I have estimated WACC based on
well-known theories, I acknowledge the possibility of errors in my estimation.
Table 9.1
Terminal growth (H) and WACC (V)
1T84,0 2,5 % 3,0 % 3,5 % 4,0 % 4,5 % 5,0 % 5,5 %
6,6 % 135,9 148,6 164,1 183,3 207,9 240,3 285,2
7,1 % 136,1 148,8 164,3 183,6 208,2 240,6 285,5
7,6 % 136,2 149,0 164,5 183,8 208,4 240,9 285,9
8,1 % 136,4 149,2 164,7 184,0 208,7 241,2 286,2
8,6 % 136,6 149,4 164,9 184,2 208,9 241,5 286,6
9,1 % 136,7 149,5 165,1 184,5 209,2 241,8 286,9
9,6 % 136,9 149,7 165,3 184,7 209,4 242,1 287,2
Table 9.2 Adj. Beta (H) and Risk free rate (V)
184,0 0,92 0,97 1,02 1,07 1,12 1,17 1,22
1,31 % 370,0 345,1 322,9 303,0 285,0 268,7 253,9
1,81 % 300,9 283,1 267,0 252,3 238,8 226,5 215,2
2,31 % 250,7 237,4 225,2 213,9 203,5 193,9 185,0
2,81 % 212,7 202,4 192,9 184,0 175,8 168,1 160,9
3,31 % 183,0 174,9 167,2 160,1 153,4 147,1 141,2
3,81 % 159,3 152,6 146,4 140,5 135,0 129,8 124,8
4,31 % 139,9 134,4 129,2 124,3 119,6 115,2 111,1
241 International Monetary Fund (2014), ”Recovery Strengthens, Remains Uneven”. World Economic Outlook. p. 187
79
The sensitivity to WACC can be measured by segregating its component. In table 9.2, I have tested the price
sensitivity to beta and the risk free rate. It is evident from table 9.1, that Tesla’s share price is less sensitive
to small changes in WACC. However, WACC seems highly sensitive to changes is beta and the interest rate,
which will in turn affect the price. Only a small change of 0.05 in systematic risk, changes the price with
USD ~10. To limit sourcing errors, beta has been estimated as the average of different methods. Based on
the results from the different approaches, and the beta estimates for comparable companies, I believe the
estimate of beta is valid.
As previously mentioned, the interest rates in developed economies are currently lower than the historical
rate. Acknowledging this, I have estimated the risk free interest rate from the 6-year average to limit the
possibility of overestimating the value of company. As can be seen from table 9.2, Tesla’s stock price is
highly sensitive to the interest level. With interest rates at a historical low, I believe there is a possibility that
rates will rise.
Table 9.3
One of the key drivers of Tesla’s value is the Battery cost
Share price EBITDA-margin Share price
reduction
development of battery costs. My estimation
-6,5 % 251,2 13,0 % 154,2
assumes a negative compounded annual
-6,0 % 230,0 13,5 % 164,2
growth rate of 5% in battery costs from 2014 -5,5 % 208,1 14,0 % 174,1
to 2020. The uncertainty regarding the future -5,0 % 184,0 14,5 % 184,0
-4,5 % 162,2 15,0 % 193,9
of battery electric vehicles and the supply of
-4,0 % 138,1 15,5 % 203,9
lithium makes this particular estimate -3,5 % 113,4 16,0 % 213,8
interesting to test for validity. Should battery costs “only” decline by 4% annually, the estimated value would
fall by more than USD 40. To overcome the supply constraint of battery cells, Tesla is building their own
battery plant. Still, there is a possibility that this will take longer than expected and that battery metals may
be difficult to source. If this occurs, the company will likely experience a deterioration of the business and
the value of their shares.
The company’s negative operating result can to a large extent be explained by high fixed costs. The
estimated profit margin is based on the assumption that these costs will decrease and be offset by higher
revenues going forward. The profit margin in the terminal period is also based on the assumption that Tesla
will continue to be a player in the premium segment, and therefore enjoy the margins of comparable
premium manufacturers. If the products mix changes in favour of Gen 3 at the expense of the more
expensive Model S/X, profit margins will be affected. As shown in table 9.3, a 1% change in EBITDA-
margins changes the share price by USD ~20.
80
10.0 Conclusion
The objective of this thesis was to determine the fair value one Tesla Motors share per 31.03.2014, and thus
challenge the current market price. The company was chosen because it offers an interesting case for a
fundamental valuation. Tesla has many of the characteristics of a growth company, with negative operating
income and high investments. They also have many of the characteristics of a disruptive company, as they
have aggressively gone head-to-head with large and resourceful industry peers to create a mass-market for
electric vehicles.
Over that last year, the company grew revenues by ~500% and the stock price followed on with a 52-week
rage of USD 37.9 – 254.8. Over the last 12 month, Tesla delivered capital gains of ~450%242. Yet, on
every measure of profitability, Tesla has delivered negative results since 2010.
Tesla’s growth depends on macroeconomic factors, such as the development of GDP, oil prices and the
development of battery costs. Battery costs constitute a major hurdle that Tesla has to overcome in order to
drive electric vehicle adoption. Tesla also depends on factors within the company’s control, such as the
expansion of stores and charging network. As a new player in a capital intense industry, Tesla will need to
invest heavily in growth, in order to obtain a critical scale. Most of these investments will be allocated to the
new Gigafactory, a battery cell factory that is expected to secure sufficient supply of Lithium-ion battery
cells to their upcoming Gen 3 vehicle and also reduce the battery cost by 30%.
In the process of estimating future cash flows, I have focused on production capacity, capital investments
and battery costs, as my analysis showed that these factors are critical drivers of value over the next years.
With the introduction of two new vehicle platforms, I believe growth will come in two increments. I estimate
unit sales of ~398,000 and an EBITDA-margin of 14.5% by 2020. My valuation shows that one Tesla share
is worth USD 184.01. At the day of the valuation, shares traded at USD 208.5, which implies that there is
limited upside to the valuation. This is also supported by industry multiples, which suggests that Tesla is
relatively expensive. The current market price also indicates that the market has already priced in most of the
company’s future profitability. Lastly, my sensitivity analysis showed that the share price is highly sensitive
to the development of battery costs.
The estimated share price is below the average consensus, which may indicate a conservative estimate.
However, given the capital intensity of the industry and the Tesla’s aggressive growth strategy, I see validity
in my estimate.
𝑃 𝑃
242 1− 0
𝑃0
81
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86
12.0 Appendix
Appendix 1.1: Management Team
Appendix 3.1: Correlations between vehicle sales and GDP in selected economies
Appendix 3.2: Market shares of the ten largest players
Appendix 3.3: Gigafactory process flow and timeline
Appendix 4.1: Peer group selection
Appendix 4.2: Reformulated income statement and balance sheet for Tesla and peers
Appendix 4.3: Financial ratios for Tesla and peers
Appendix 6.1: Forecast of sales
Appendix 6.2: Implied market share
Appendix 6.3: Cost forecast
Appendix 6.4: Historical development of value drivers
Appendix 6.5: Expected profit margin drivers
Appendix 6.6: Forecasting: Pro forma income statement and balance sheet
Appendix 7.1: Beta estimation
Appendix 8.1: Valuation
Appendix 8.2: Bloomberg consensus comparison of multiples
87
Appendix 1.1: Management Team
Elon Musk, Co-Founder, CEO and Product Architect

Elon Musk is the CEO and Product Architect of Tesla Motors. He oversees all development and design of
Tesla´s vehicles. Prior to Tesla, he co-founded PayPal, which were sold to Ebay in 2002 for $1.5bn243. His
visionary leadership has given Tesla significant attention as a company. Much like Steve Jobs, his leadership
is characterised by a desire to revolutionize the industry. In an interview on 60 minutes, Musk states:
Well, I didn´t really think Tesla would be successful. I thought we would most likely fail. But I though that we
at least could address the false perception that people have that an electric car had to be ugly and slow and
boring like a golf cart. Elon Musk, 2014
Musk´s key passion is sustainable energy. He is also the CEO of Space Exploration Technologies (Space X)
and the chairman of SolarCity. His appetite for risk makes him well suited to lead Tesla for the next years as
it goes through the transition from a luxury electric carmaker to mainstream electric cars. The ability to take
risk could enable
JB Straubel, CTO
Straubel is the co-founder of Tesla Motors. He oversees the technical and engineering design. Prior to Tesla,
he co-founded Volacom, a aerospace company that developed an electric aircraft platform. At Volacom,
Straubel invented a hybrid-electric propulsion concept that was licenced to Boing244.
Deepak Ahuja, CFO

Ahuja has been CFO since 2008. Prior to joining Tesla Motors, he was a controller at Ford North America
and before that the CFO of Ford Southern Africa245.
Franz von Holzhausen, Chief Designer

Holzhausen is the Chief Designer at Tesla Motors, responsible for establishing design concepts for vehicles.
Prior to Tesla, he was the Director of Design at Mazda North America and before that the Design Director at
General Motors246.
Gilbert Passin, VP Manufacturing
243 http://news.cnet.com/2100-1017-941964.html
244 ir.teslamotors.com/management
88
Passin is the Vice President of manufacturing of Tesla Motors. He has 23 years of automotive experience,
and has launched several successful Toyota vehicles. Passin has an engineering degree from Ecole Centrale
de Paris and has been a lecturer in Engineering at the University of Bath, U.K247.
George Blankenship, VP Worldwide Retail

Blankenship became Vice President of worldwide retail at Tesla Motors in 2013. He has previously been
credited for being the architect of Apple´s brand building retail strategy. Blankenship attended the University
of Delaware248.
89
Appendix 3.1 Correlation between vehicle sales and GDP in selected economies
Source: Compiled by author / IMF / Bloomberg
Asia: Sales Growth and GDP

30
25
20
15
10
5
0
-5
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Vehicle Sales GDP constant

Source: Compiled by autor / Bloomberg / IMF
Europe: Sales Growth and GDP

10
-5
-10
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

U.S.: Sales Growth and GDP

20
10
0
-10
-20
-30
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

90
Appendix 3.2 – Market shares of the ten largest players have remained constant since 2003.
Source: Compiled by author / Bloomberg
100 % Peugeot SA
90 %
Honda Motor Co Ltd
80 %
Fiat - Chrysler Group
70 %
SAIC Motor Corp Ltd
60 %
50 % Ford Motor Co
40 % Renault - Nissan Group

30 % Hyundai - Kia Group
20 % Volkswagen AG
10 %
General Motors Co
0%
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Toyota Motor Corp
Appendix 3.3 – Gigafactory process flow and timeline

Source: teslamotors.com
91
Financial Statement Analysis
Appendix 4.1 – Peer group selection
Source: Compiled by author / Company reports and websites
For the purpose of analysing Tesla´s performance over the period from 2009 to 2013, I have defined a peer
group. The group will be used as a benchmark throughout the financial analysis and part of the strategic
analysis and for the multiples valuation.
When selecting the peer group, several factor have been taken into considerations. According to Petersen &
Plenborg (2012), peers need to have similar operations and business, and the financial statements should be
based on the same accounting standards and have a similar risk profile.249 For comparison of multiples, peers
should have a similar outlook for long-term growth.
Tesla has a unique business structure. Its competitors in the industry are large and mature while Tesla´s
business model is relatively new. This makes finding comparable companies difficult. Tesla is a global
company and the choice of a global peer group was therefore only natural. The question of whether Tesla
will evolve ass a niche premium manufacturer or eventually become a mass-market play, is still unknown.
Telsa´s objective is to take on the premium market before entering the mass-market with their Gen 3 model.
I have therefore chosen a peer group who operates in both segments.
92
Appendix 4.2: Reformulated income statement and balance sheet for Tesla and peers
Source: Annual Reports from 2009-2013 and Q1 2014; Bayerische Motoren Werke AG (BMW), Audi AG
(Audi), Toyota Motor Corporation (Toyota), Ford Motor Company (Ford) and General Motors Company
(GM).
All financial statements have been reformulated based on the structure and method of Petersen & Plenborg
(2012) unless otherwise stated. The reformulation of Tesla´s income statement and balance sheet is described
in chapter 4. The reformulation of the peer group has been made based on the same approach, and will be
commented on in the following appendix.
The chosen peer group use different accounting standards. These include U.S. GAAP, IFRS and Japanese
GAAP. In some areas, I have found it valuable to make correction (such as in the reporting of R&D) to
increase the comparability with Tesla. However, due to the lack of details and the scope of this paper, it is
not possible to correct them all. While I am aware that these differences may lead to less than optimal
comparisons, I do believe a proper benchmark analyses can be made.
Many OEMs have captive financial services operations in addition to the core vehicle (industrial) business.
This includes automobile financing, leasing and insurance. Since these subsidiaries charge interests, they
resemble banks. According to Koller et al. (2010), banks are valued differently than manufacturing firms.
Line items from this part of the business should therefore be separated from the calculation of invested
capital and from the operating result250. The financial analysis of the company and peers, are therefore based
on financial statements of core industrial operations, which is the dominant business.
EBITDA is not reported under IFRS and U.S. GAAP. As I have chosen to use before-tax ratios in the
financial analysis, I have calculated EBITDA. For all peers, research and development and depreciation and
amortization is recognized as cost of revenues. In order to perform a common-size analysis and to compare
the cost structure of each respective company, these items are added back to COGS and deducted from gross
profits. This results in a higher operating result and unchanged net result.
Due to the difficulty of separating operating cash from excess cash, cash and cash equivalents are recognized
as financial assets.
250 Koller, T. Goedhart, M. And Wessels, D. (2010), Valuation, pg. 143
93
BMW
The Analytical Income Statement
- BMW report according to IFRS and includes R&D expenses under costs of sales. For comparison with
Tesla, these are deducted from costs of sales at stated separately on the income statement.
- Other operating expense/income includes exchange gains, reversal/additions to provisions,
reversal/expense for impairment losses and write-downs, disposal of assets and other operating expenses.
These are considered as operating activities and classified as operating expenses/income.
The Analytical Balance Sheet

- Other financial results are income from investments in subsidiaries and participations, which is not part of
core operations. Changes in financial results for 2013 were primarily due to gains on interest rate and
commodity derivatives251. The item is therefore classified as a financial item.
- Results on investments relate to interest in associated companies252 and are classified as operating.
General Motors
On July 10, 2009 General Motors applied new accounting standards and stated that all financial information
after this date is not comparable with the financial information provided before and on this date253. Though I
recognize this creates an issue of consistency in the analytical statements, I have exclusively compared ratios
from 2010 until 2013. Therefore, I believe this change will have little significance for the analysis.

- Goodwill impairment charges of USD 27,1bn was recorded in 2012 as a result of the estimated value
exceeding the carrying amount for reporting units in North-America, European, Korea, South Africa and GM
Holden. In 2012, GM reversed deferred tax assets of UDS 36,2bn for the North-America unit which caused
the units carrying amount to exceed its fair value. The exceeding value of the deferred tax asset resulted in
less implied Goodwill254. Although impairment of Goodwill may occur in the future, the above-average
recorded amount in 2012 is more likely a one-time event and is recognized as a non-recurring item.

In order to ensure consistency in the comparison of operating performance between Tesla and peers, ROIC is
measured both with and without goodwill.

253 General Motors Annual Report 2010, p. 22
254 General Motors Annual Report 2012, p. 59
94
- Other assets and deferred income taxes consist mainly of deferred income taxes. Deferred income taxes
arise because the firm pays too much in tax, usually when realised earnings are lower than expected. In such
it is classified as an operating asset255.
- Assets held for sale are assets that are no longer a part of operations and therefore considered a financial
asset. The same is true for liabilities held for sale.
Ford Motors
- Other non-operating income (expense), net is gains/losses on cash equivalents and marketable securities,
gain/losses on dispositions and gains/losses on extinguishment of debt. These are recognized as non-
recurring items for consistency.

- Accrued liabilities and deferred revenue consist of deferred revenue, dealer/customer claims, other, OPEB,
pension and employee benefits. In order to obtain consistency across the peer companies, OPEB, pension
and employee benefits are reorganized as financial liabilities. The same is true for other liabilities which
contain non-current OPEB and benefit liabilities.
Toyota Motors
- Investments and other assets are marketable securities and securities investments, affiliated companies,
employee’s receivables and other. Toyota does not expand investments and other assets for all years and
does not separate between financial services and automobile segment. Therefore, I have recognized the item
as operational, for consistency with other peers.
Audi
- Investment property relates to buildings and land leased on the basis of a financial lease agreement256. Since
financial leases are structured as debt, investment property is classified as a financial asset.
- Other long-term investments are investments in nonconsolidated affiliated and associated companies. These
are regarded as financial assets according to Koller et al. (2010).
255 Petersen & Plenborg (2012), Financial Statement Analysis, p. 79.

256 Audi AG Annual Report 2013, p. 246
95
Tesla Motors
Analytical Income Statement
USD 1,000
Tesla - Income Statement FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 Q1 2014
Total revenues 111 943,0 116 744,0 204 242,0 413 256,0 2 013 496,0 620 542,0
Automotive sales 111 943,0 97 078,0 148 568,0 385 699,0 1 997 786,0 618 811,0
Vehicle Sales 103 355,0 72 659,0 99 008,0 313 844,0 1 758 184,0 590 922,0
Emission credits 8 200,0 2 800,0 2 700,0 40 500,0 194 500,0 11 600,0
Powertrain components 388,0 21 619,0 46 860,0 31 355,0 45 102,0 16 289,0
Development services 0,0 19 666,0 55 674,0 27 557,0 15 710,0 1 731,0
Revenue by segment
North America 90 833,0 41 866,0 109 233,0 355 325,0 1 545 413,0 288 379,0
Europe 21 110,0 70 542,0 84 397,0 50 318,0 467 079,0 332 108,0
Asia 0,0 4 336,0 10 612,0 7 613,0 1 004,0 55,0
Total cost of revenues (95 468,0) (75 390,0) (125 728,0) (354 364,0) (1 451 151,0) (421 146,0)
Automotive sales (102 408,0) (79 982,0) (115 482,0) (371 658,0) (1 543 878,0) (462 471,0)
Development services 0,0 (6 031,0) (27 165,0) (11 531,0) (13 356,0) (2 943,0)
Depreciation 6 940,0 10 623,0 16 919,0 28 825,0 106 083,0 44 268,0
Gross profit, adjusted 16 475,0 41 354,0 78 514,0 58 892,0 562 345,0 199 396,0
Research and development (19 282,0) (92 996,0) (208 981,0) (273 978,0) (231 976,0) (81 544,0)
SG&A (42 150,0) (84 573,0) (104 102,0) (150 372,0) (285 569,0) (117 551,0)
EBITDA (44 957,0) (136 215,0) (234 569,0) (365 458,0) 44 800,0 301,0
Depreciation (6 940,0) (10 623,0) (16 919,0) (28 825,0) (106 083,0) (44 268,0)
EBIT (51 897,0) (146 838,0) (251 488,0) (394 283,0) (61 283,0) (43 967,0)
Interest income 159,0 258,0 255,0 288,0 189,0 141,0

Interest expense (2 531,0) (992,0) (43,0) (254,0) (32 934,0) (11 883,0)
Net financial expenses
EBT (54 269,0) (147 572,0) (251 276,0) (394 249,0) (94 028,0) (55 709,0)
Income tax (26,0) (173,0) (489,0) (136,0) (2 588,0) (809,0)

Effective tax rate -0,05 % -0,11 % -0,19 % -0,03 % -3,62 % -1,65 %
Tax on EBIT (24,2) (164,8) (484,3) (135,4) (2 220,5) (726,0)
NOPAT (51 921,2) (147 002,8) (251 972,3) (394 418,4) (63 503,5) (44 693,0)
Net financial expenses (2 372,0) (734,0) 212,0 34,0 (32 745,0) (11 742,0)
Tax shield (1,1) (0,8) 0,4 0,0 (1 186,5) (193,9)
Net income (54 294,3) (147 737,6) (251 759,9) (394 384,4) (97 434,9) (56 628,9)
Total non-recurring items (1 445,0) (6 583,0) (2 646,0) (1 828,0) 22 602,0 6 718,0

Tax shield in non-recurring
items (0,7) (7,4) (5,1) (0,6) 818,9 110,9
Total Income (55 740,0) (154 328,0) (254 411,0) (396 213,0) (74 014,0) (49 800,0)
96
Tesla Motors
Analytical Balance Sheet
USD 1,000
Tesla Motors - Balance Sheet FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 Q1 2014
Operational Assets
Property, plant and equipment 23 535,0 114 636,0 298 414,0 552 229,0 738 494,0 849 389,0
Other assets 2 750,0 22 730,0 22 371,0 21 963,0 23 637,0 36 143,0
Operating lease vehicles, net 0,0 7 963,0 11 757,0 10 071,0 382 425,0 451 729,0
Inventory 23 222,0 45 182,0 50 082,0 268 504,0 340 355,0 450 730,0
Accounts receivable 3 488,0 6 710,0 9 539,0 26 842,0 49 109,0 72 380,0
Prepaid expenses, current assets 4 222,0 10 839,0 9 414,0 8 438,0 27 574,0 48 869,0
Total Operatinal Assets 57 217,0 208 060,0 401 577,0 888 047,0 1 561 594,0 1 909 240,0
Resale value guarantee 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 236 299,0 290 617,0
Other long-term liabilities 3 459,0 12 274,0 14 915,0 25 170,0 58 197,0 70 969,0
Accounts payable 15 086,0 28 951,0 56 141,0 303 382,0 303 969,0 375 778,0
Accrued liabilities 14 532,0 20 945,0 32 109,0 39 798,0 108 252,0 128 674,0
Deferred development compensation 156,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Reservation payments 26 048,0 30 755,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Customer deposits 0,0 0,0 91 761,0 138 817,0 163 153,0 198 006,0
Total Operational Liabilities 59 281,0 92 925,0 194 926,0 507 167,0 869 870,0 1 064 044,0
NWC (28 349,0) (30 194,0) (125 891,0) (203 383,0) (452 832,0) (492 065,0)
∆ NWC (1 845,0) (95 697,0) (77 492,0) (249 449,0) (39 233,0)
Invested Capital (2 064,0) 115 135,0 206 651,0 380 880,0 691 724,0 845 196,0
Financial Liabilities
Capital lease obligations, current 290,0 279,0 1 067,0 4 365,0 7 722,0 8 397,0
Convertible debt, current 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 182,0 589 875,0
Long-term debt, current 0,0 0,0 7 916,0 50 841,0 0,0 0,0
Deferred revenue 1 377,0 4 635,0 2 345,0 1 905,0 91 882,0 112 740,0
Total short-term debt 1 667,0 4 914,0 11 328,0 57 111,0 99 786,0 711 012,0
Convertible debt 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 586 119,0 0,0
Common stock warrant liability 0,0 6 088,0 8 838,0 10 692,0 0,0 0,0
Convertible preferred stock warrant
liability 1 734,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Capital lease obligations 800,0 496,0 2 830,0 9 965,0 12 855,0 12 572,0
Long-term debt 0,0 71 828,0 268 335,0 401 495,0 0,0 1 519 967,0
Deferred revenue 1 240,0 2 783,0 3 146,0 3 060,0 181 180,0 210 817,0
Total long-term debt 3 774,0 81 195,0 283 149,0 425 212,0 780 154,0 1 743 356,0
Financial Assets
Restricted cash 3 580,0 4 867,0 8 068,0 5 159,0 6 435,0 7 102,0
Cash and cash equivalents 69 627,0 99 558,0 255 266,0 201 890,0 845 889,0 2 393 908,0
Short-term marketable securities 0,0 0,0 25 061,0 0,0 0,0 189 111,0
Restricted cash 0,0 73 597,0 23 476,0 19 094,0 3 012,0 1 049,0
Net Interest Bearing Debt (67 766,0) (91 913,0) (17 394,0) 256 180,0 24 604,0 (136 802,0)
Total Equity 65 702,0 207 048,0 224 045,0 124 700,0 667 120,0 981 998,0
Invested Capital (NIBD + E) (2 064,0) 115 135,0 206 651,0 380 880,0 691 724,0 845 196,0
97
Bayerische Motoren Werke AG
EUR million
BMW - Income Statement FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013
Net Sales 43 737,0 54 137,0 63 229,0 70 208,0 70 629,0
Cost of Sales (39 616,0) (44 703,0) (50 164,0) (56 525,0) (57 771,0)
Depreciation and amortization 3 603,0 3 861,0 3 654,0 3 716,0 3 830,0
Research and development 2 587,0 3 082,0 3 610,0 3 993,0 4 117,0
Gross profit, adjusted 10 311,0 16 377,0 20 329,0 21 392,0 20 805,0
Selling, General and Administrative Expenses (4 329,0) (4 778,0) (5 260,0) (5 862,0) (6 112,0)
Research and development (2 587,0) (3 082,0) (3 610,0) (3 993,0) (4 117,0)
Other operating income/expenses -57 -301 -328 -222 -89
Results on investmnets 42 98 164 271 398
EBITDA 3 380,0 8 314,0 11 295,0 11 586,0 10 885,0
Depreciation and amortization (3 603,0) (3 861,0) (3 654,0) (3 716,0) (3 830,0)

EBIT (223,0) 4 453,0 7 641,0 7 870,0 7 055,0
Interest income 560,0 556,0 680,0 353,0 303,0

Interest expence (1 055,0) (871,0) (889,0) (552,0) (534,0)
EBT (718,0) 4 138,0 7 432,0 7 671,0 6 824,0
Income tax expense (benefit) 149,0 (1 280,0) (1 832,0) (2 453,0) (2 153,0)

Effective tax rate 25,3% 32,9% 26,9% 34,2% 32,8%
Tax on EBIT 56,5 (1 466,4) (2 051,6) (2 692,5) (2 315,1)
NOPAT (166,5) 2 986,6 5 589,4 5 177,5 4 739,9
Net financial expenses (495,0) (315,0) (209,0) (199,0) (231,0)

Tax shield 125,4 103,7 56,1 68,1 75,8
Net Income before minority interest (536,1) 2 775,3 5 436,5 5 046,6 4 584,7
(Income) loss attributable to minority interests (6,0) (15,0) (25,0) (24,0) (17,0)
Net Income (542,1) 2 760,3 5 411,5 5 022,6 4 567,7
Other financial result 130 -251 -609 -501 -263

Total non-recurring items 130,0 (251,0) (609,0) (501,0) (263,0)
Tax shield on non-recurring items (32,9) 82,7 163,5 171,4 86,3
Total Income (445,0) 2 592,0 4 966,0 4 693,0 4 391,0
BMW - Adjustments FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013

98
Bayerische Motoren Werke AG
EUR million
BMW - Balance Sheet FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013
Operational Assets
Intangible assets 5 230,0 4 892,0 4 682,0 4 648,0 5 646,0
Property, plant and equipment 11 181,0 11 216,0 11 444,0 13 053,0 14 808,0
Leased products 187,0 182,0 151,0 128,0 19,0
Investments accounted for using the egquity method 114,0 189,0 281,0 514,0 652,0
Deferred tax 1 514,0 1 888,0 2 276,0 2 217,0 2 226,0
Other assets 2 114,0 2 473,0 3 139,0 3 862,0 2 797,0
Inventories 6 289,0 7 468,0 9 309,0 9 366,0 9 259,0
Trade receivables 1 608,0 1 983,0 3 014,0 2 305,0 2 184,0
Current tax 789,0 1 068,0 1 065,0 775,0 1 002,0
Other assets 14 863,0 15 871,0 15 333,0 16 162,0 15 480,0
Other provisions 2 295,0 2 348,0 2 840,0 3 103,0 3 075,0
Deferred tax 1 694,0 1 726,0 893,0 492,0 1 072,0
Other liabilities 3 401,0 2 873,0 3 289,0 3 394,0 3 584,0
Current tax 650,0 1 026,0 1 188,0 1 269,0 1 021,0
Trade payables 2 556,0 3 713,0 4 719,0 5 669,0 6 764,0
Total Operational Liabilities 24 291,0 32 184,0 33 382,0 35 184,0 37 580,0
Invested Capital 19 598,0 15 046,0 17 312,0 17 846,0 16 493,0
NIBD
Pension provisions 1 652,0 349,0 811,0 2 358,0 938,0
Finanical liabilities 259,0 1 164,0 1 822,0 1 775,0 1 604,0
Financial liabilities 4 736,0 961,0 1 468,0 1 289,0 725,0
Financial Assets
Other investments 2 678,0 3 263,0 4 520,0 4 789,0 5 253,0
Financial assets 475,0 662,0 287,0 759,0 1 183,0
Financial assets 1 666,0 1 911,0 2 307,0 2 746,0 4 479,0
Cash and cash equivalents 4 331,0 5 585,0 5 829,0 7 484,0 6 768,0
Net Interest Bearing Debt (2 503,0) (8 947,0) (8 842,0) (10 356,0) (14 416,0)
Equity 22 101,0 23 993,0 26 154,0 28 202,0 30 909,0
Invested Capital (NIBD + E) 19 598,0 15 046,0 17 312,0 17 846,0 16 493,0
99
Audi AG
EUR million
Audi AG - Income Statement FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013
Net Sales 29 840,0 35 441,0 44 096,0 48 771,0 49 880,0
Cost of Sales (25 649,0) (29 706,0) (36 000,0) (39 061,0) (40 691,0)
Distribution costs (3 138,0) (3 038,0) (3 599,0) (4 594,0) (4 641,0)

Administrative expenses (301,0) (374,0) (429,0) (527,0) (566,0)
Other operating income 1475 1684 1967 1881 1952
Other operating expense -622 -667 -687 -1106 -903
Result from investments 110 220 270 415 454
EBITDA 3 490,0 5 730,0 7 411,0 7 713,0 7 555,0

EBIT 1 715,0 3 560,0 5 618,0 5 779,0 5 485,0
Financial expenses (269,0) (294,0) (264,0) (403,0) (158,0)

Financial income 483,0 368,0 687,0 574,0 (4,0)
EBT 1 929,0 3 634,0 6 041,0 5 950,0 5 323,0
Income tax expense (benefit) (581,0) (1 004,0) (1 601,0) (1 602,0) (1 309,0)

Tax on EBIT (516,5) (983,6) (1 488,9) (1 556,0) (1 348,8)
NOPAT 1 198,5 2 576,4 4 129,1 4 223,0 4 136,2
Net financial expenses 214,0 74,0 423,0 171,0 (162,0)

Tax shield (64,5) (20,4) (112,1) (46,0) 39,8
Net Income before minority interest 1 348,0 2 630,0 4 440,0 4 348,0 4 014,0
(Income) loss attributable to minority interests (48,0) (45,0) (51,0) (69,0) (53,0)
Net Income 1 300,0 2 585,0 4 389,0 4 279,0 3 961,0
Total Income 1 300,0 2 585,0 4 389,0 4 279,0 3 961,0
Audi AG - Adjustments FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013

100
Audi AG
EUR million
Audi AG - Balance Sheet FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013
Operational Assets
Intangible assets 2 171,0 2 357,0 2 531,0 4 038,0 4 689,0
Property, plant and equipment 5 795,0 5 803,0 6 716,0 7 605,0 8 413,0
Leasing and rental assets 0,0 0,0 5,0 2,0 0,0
Investments accounted for using equity method 212,0 326,0 460,0 3 638,0 3 678,0
Deferred tax assets 919,0 1 347,0 1 839,0 1 713,0 1 720,0
Other receivables 46,0 37,0 21,0 13,0 12,0
Inventories 2 568,0 3 354,0 4 377,0 4 331,0 4 495,0
Trade receivables 2 281,0 2 099,0 3 009,0 2 251,0 3 176,0
Effective income tax assets 23,0 13,0 11,0 43,0 35,0
Other receivables 368,0 408,0 273,0 451,0 479,0
Cash funds 6 455,0 10 724,0 8 513,0 11 170,0 13 332,0
Deferred tax liabilities 45,0 22,0 16,0 208,0 517,0
Other liabilities 348,0 483,0 511,0 711,0 843,0
Effective income tax obligations, non-current 773,0 636,0 754,0 913,0 979,0
Effective income tax obligations, current 405,0 857,0 929,0 346,0 225,0
Trade payables 3 114,0 3 510,0 4 193,0 4 270,0 5 163,0
Invested Capital (NIBD + E)

NIBD
Financial liabilities 2,0 15,0 21,0 145,0 186,0
Other financial liabilities 179,0 229,0 569,0 244,0 196,0
Provision for pensions 2 098,0 2 331,0 2 505,0 3 470,0 3 209,0
Financial liabilities 577,0 810,0 1 172,0 1 168,0 1 228,0
Other financial liabilities 120,0 291,0 4 273,0 4 485,0 3 759,0
Financial Assets
Investment property 12,0 12,0 3,0 118,0 171,0
Other Long-term investments 107,0 180,0 244,0 254,0 290,0
Other financial assets 389,0 523,0 391,0 662,0 969,0
Securities 821,0 1 339,0 1 594,0 1 807,0 2 400,0
Other finanical assets 4 396,0 2 250,0 7 033,0 2 303,0 1 296,0
Net Interest Bearing Debt (2 749,0) (628,0) (725,0) 4 368,0 3 452,0
Equity 10 646,0 11 310,0 12 903,0 15 091,0 18 561,0
101
Toyota Motors
JPY million
Toyota Motors - Income Statement FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013
Net Sales 19 182 161,0 17 732 143,0 17 826 986,0 17 534 872,0 20 943 634,0
Cost of Sales (17 470 791) (15 973 442) (15 986 741) (15 796 635) (18 034 256)
Depreciation and amortization 1 105 233,0 1 065 749,0 844 708,0 769 073,0 768 581,0
Gross profit, adjusted 3 720 678,0 3 549 795,0 3 415 293,0 3 287 116,0 4 485 413,0
Selling, General and Administrative (2 097 674,0) (1 854 710,0) (1 723 071,0) (1 676 999,0) (1 899 997,0)
Equity in net income/loss of affiliated
companies 53 226,0 109 944,0 214 229,0 196 544,0 230 078,0
EBITDA 772 155,0 1 079 684,0 1 176 111,0 1 026 855,0 2 008 040,0
Depreciation and amortization (1 105 233,0) (1 065 749,0) (844 708,0) (769 073,0) (768 581,0)
EBIT (333 078,0) 13 935,0 331 403,0 257 782,0 1 239 459,0
Interest income (71 925,0) 178 034,0 118 158,0 92 857,0 102 804,0
Interest expense 0,0 (33 409,0) (29 318,0) (22 922,0) (22 967,0)
EBT (405 003,0) 158 560,0 420 243,0 327 717,0 1 319 296,0
Income tax 10 152,0 (42 342,0) (178 795,0) (141 558,0) (436 223,0)
Tax on EBIT 8 558,5 83 618,8 (101 692,7) (66 086,2) (404 248,9)
NOPAT (324 519,5) 97 553,8 229 710,3 191 695,8 835 210,1
Net financial expenses (71 925,0) 144 625,0 88 840,0 69 935,0 79 837,0
Tax shield 1 593,5 (125 960,8) (77 102,3) (75 471,8) (31 974,1)
Net Income before minority interest (394 851,0) 116 218,0 241 448,0 186 159,0 883 073,0
Minority interests 26 282,0 (32 103,0) (54 055,0) (82 181,0) (119 359,0)
Net Income (368 569,0) 84 115,0 187 393,0 103 978,0 763 714,0
Total non-recurring items

Tax shield on non-recurring items
Total Income (368 569,0) 84 115,0 187 393,0 103 978,0 763 714,0
Toyota Motors - Adjustments FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013

Depreciation and amortization 1 105 233,0 1 065 749,0 844 708,0 769 073,0 768 581,0
102
Toyota Motors
JPY million
Toyota Motors - Balance Sheet FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013
Operational Assets
Investments and other assets 4 254 126,0 4 549 658,0 5 825 966,0 6 218 377,0 7 462 767,0
Property, plant and equipment 5 504 559,0 4 996 321,0 4 608 309,0 4 510 716,0 4 741 357,0
Trade accounts and notes receivable 1 404 292,0 1 908 884,0 1 483 551,0 2 031 472,0 2 033 831,0
Inventories 1 459 394,0 1 422 373,0 1 304 128,0 1 622 154,0 1 715 634,0
Prepaid expenses and other current assets 1 534 119,0 1 793 622,0 1 383 616,0 1 464 124,0 1 597 514,0
Other long-term liabilities 444 529,0 604 903,0 554 402,0 531 982,0 969 668,0
Accounts payable 1 299 523,0 1 954 147,0 1 497 253,0 2 234 316,0 2 092 722,0
Accrued expenses 1 432 988,0 1 627 228,0 1 666 748,0 1 737 490,0 2 092 102,0
Income taxes payable 47 648,0 140 210,0 104 392,0 123 344,0 140 935,0
Other current liabilities 944 303,0 931 727,0 1 024 662,0 1 175 801,0 1 186 870,0
Total Operational Liabilities 4 168 991,0 5 258 215,0 4 847 457,0 5 802 933,0 6 482 297,0
Invested Capital 9 987 499,0 9 412 643,0 9 758 113,0 10 043 910,0 11 068 806,0

NIBD
Long-term debt 850 233,0 1 095 270,0 839 611,0 503 070,0 521 428,0
Accrued pension and severance cost 629 870,0 672 905,0 660 918,0 700 211,0 754 360,0
Short-term borrowing 825 029,0 575 890,0 478 646,0 715 019,0 576 685,0
Current portion of long-term debt 115 942,0 289 447,0 243 817,0 339 441,0 185 582,0
Financial Assets
Cash and cash equivalents 1 648 143,0 1 338 821,0 1 300 553,0 1 104 636,0 1 107 409,0
Marketable securities 494 476,0 1 783 629,0 1 036 555,0 1 015 626,0 1 204 447,0
Net Interest Bearing Debt 278 455,0 (488 938,0) (114 116,0) 137 479,0 (273 801,0)
Equity 9 709 044,0 9 901 581,0 9 872 229,0 9 906 431,0 11 342 607,0
Invested Capital (NIBD + E) 9 987 499,0 9 412 643,0 9 758 113,0 10 043 910,0 11 068 806,0
103
General Motors
USD 100,000
General Motors - Income Statement FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013
Net Sales 105 147,0 136 749,0 152 058,0 151 857,0 153 902,0
Cost of Sales (112 130,0) (118 768,0) (130 386,0) (140 236,0) (134 925,0)
EBITDA (8 036,0) 13 458,0 15 567,0 8 992,0 13 607,0
EBIT (19 150,0) 6 535,0 9 509,0 (2 410,0) 6 595,0
Interest income 367,0 465,0 455,0 343,0 249,0

Interest expense (6 122,0) (1 098,0) (540,0) (489,0) (334,0)
EBT (24 905,0) 5 902,0 9 424,0 (2 556,0) 6 510,0
Income tax expense (benefit) 2 166,0 (672,0) (295,0) 34 654,0 (1 827,0)

Tax on EBIT 1 735,1 (619,4) (348,8) 4 474,7 (1 757,9)
NOPAT (17 414,9) 5 915,6 9 160,2 2 064,7 4 837,1
Net financial expenses (5 755,0) (633,0) (85,0) (146,0) (85,0)

Tax shield 506,7 76,9 4,7 164,5 31,2
(Income) loss attributable to minority interests (396,0) (331,0) (97,0) 52,0 15,0
Net Income (23 059,3) 5 028,5 8 982,9 2 135,2 4 798,3
Goodwill impairment charges 0,0 0,0 (1 286,0) (27 145,0) (541,0)

Other non-operating income 860,0 1 066,0 396,0 502,0 814,0
Total non-recurring items 860,0 1 066,0 (890,0) (26 643,0) 273,0
Tax shield on non-recurring items (75,7) (129,5) 49,1 30 014,8 (100,3)
Total Income (22 275,0) 5 965,0 8 142,0 5 507,0 4 971,0
General Motors - Adjustments FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013

104
General Motors
USD 100,000
General Motors - Balance Sheet FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013
Operational Assets
Equity in net assets on nonconsolidated affiliates 7 936,0 8 529,0 6 790,0 6 883,0 8 094,0
Property, net 18 687,0 19 235,0 23 005,0 24 196,0 25 867,0
Intangible assets, net 14 547,0 11 882,0 10 014,0 6 809,0 5 668,0
Other assets 2 623,0 3 286,0 2 416,0 2 358,0 2 352,0,
Deferred income taxes 564,0 308,0 512,0 27 922,0 22 736,0
Accounts and notes receivable 7 518,0 8 699,0 9 964,0 10 395,0 8 535,0
Inventories 10 107,0 12 125,0 14 324,0 14 714,0 14 039,0
Equipment on operating leases, net 2 727,0 2 568,0 2 464,0 1 782,0 2 398,0
Other current assets and deferred income taxes 1 777,0 1 805,0 1 169,0 1 536,0 1 662,0
Deferred income taxes 0,0 0,0 527,0 9 429,0 10 349,0
Other liabilities an deferred income taxes 13 279,0 13 021,0 12 442,0 13 169,0 13 353,0
Accounts payable 18 725,0 21 497,0 24 551,0 25 166,0 23 621,0
Accrued liabilities 22 288,0 24 044,0 22 875,0 23 308,0 24 633,0
Invested Capital excluding Goodwill 12 194,0 9 875,0 11 317,0 44 381,0 40 093,0

Goodwill 30 672,0 30 513,0 29 019,0 1 973,0 1 560,0
NIBD
Long-term debt 5 562,0 3 014,0 3 613,0 3 424,0 6 573,0
Postretirement benefits and other pensions 9 554,0 9 294,0 6 836,0 7 309,0 5 897,0
Pensions 27 086,0 21 894,0 25 075,0 27 420,0 19 483,0
Liabilities held for sale 625,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Short-term debt and current portion of long-term debt 10 221,0 1 616,0 1 682,0 1 748,0 564,0
Financial Assets
Assets held for sale 918,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Marketable securities 134,0 5 555,0 16 148,0 8 988,0 8 972,0
Restricted cash and marketable securities 15 406,0 2 400,0 2 233,0 1 368,0 2 076,0
Net Interest Bearing Debt 13 911,0 6 802,0 2 754,0 11 123,0 1 448,0
Equity 28 955,0 33 586,0 37 582,0 35 231,0 40 205,0
105
Ford Motors
USD 100,000
Ford Motors - Income Statement FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013
Net Sales 103 868,0 119 280,0 128 168,0 126 567,0 139 369,0
Cost of Sales (98 866,0) (104 451,0) (113 345,0) (112 578,0) (125 234,0)
Equity in net income/loss of affiliated companies 330,0 526,0 479,0 555,0 1 046,0
EBITDA 854,0 10 188,0 9 775,0 9 193,0 9 259,0

EBIT (3 022,0) 6 315,0 6 242,0 5 538,0 5 184,0
Interest income 205,0 262,0 387,0 272,0 163,0

Interest expense (1 477,0) (1 807,0) (817,0) (713,0) (829,0)
EBT (4 294,0) 4 770,0 5 812,0 5 097,0 4 518,0
Income tax 113,0 (592,0) 11 541,0 (2 056,0) 147,0

Effective tax rate -24,8% 16,4% -191,2% 35,0% -3,4%
Tax on EBIT (832,5) (946,7) 11 017,2 (1 745,6) 142,0
NOPAT (3 854,5) 5 368,3 17 259,2 3 792,4 5 326,0
Net financial expenses (1 272,0) (1 545,0) (430,0) (441,0) (666,0)

Tax shield (315,9) 252,7 (822,0) 154,5 (22,9)
Minority interests 0,0 4,0 (9,0) (1,0) (7,0)

Net Income (5 442,4) 4 080,0 15 998,2 3 504,9 4 630,2
Other non-operating income 5 079,0 (624,0) 704,0 1 327,0 811,0

Total non-recurring items 5 079,0 (624,0) 704,0 1 327,0 811,0
Tax shield on non-recurring items 1 261,4 102,0 1 345,8 (464,9) 27,8
Total Income 898,0 3 558,0 18 048,0 4 367,0 5 469,0
Ford Motors - Adjustments FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013

106
Ford Motors
USD 100,000
Ford Motors - Balance Sheet FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013
Operational Assets
Equity in net assets of affiliated companies 2 246,0 2 441,0 2 797,0 3 112,0 3 546,0
Net property 22 455,0 23 027,0 22 229,0 24 813,0 27 492,0
Deferred income taxes 5 660,0 2 468,0 13 932,0 13 325,0 13 283,0
Net intangible assets 165,0 102,0 100,0 0,0 0,0
Other assets 1 681,0 2 019,0 1 549,0 2 033,0 2 824,0
Non-current receivables from Financial Services 0,0 181,0 32,0 0,0 724,0
Receivables, less allowance 3 378,0 3 992,0 4 219,0 5 361,0 5 641,0
Inventories 5 041,0 5 917,0 5 901,0 7 362,0 7 708,0
Deferred income taxes 479,0 359,0 1 791,0 3 488,0 1 574,0
Net investment in operating leases 2 208,0 1 282,0 1 356,0 1 415,0 1 384,0
Other current assets 688,0 610,0 1 053,0 1 124,0 1 034,0
Current receivables from Financial Services 2 568,0 1 700,0 878,0 0,0 0,0
Deferred income taxes 561,0 344,0 255,0 514,0 430,0
Payables 11 607,0 13 466,0 14 015,0 18 151,0 18 035,0
Other payables 1 458,0 1 544,0 2 734,0 0,0 0,0
Deferred income taxes 3 091,0 392,0 40,0 81,0 267,0
Current payables to Financial Services 1 638,0 2 049,0 1 033,0 252,0 907,0

NIBD
Long-term debt 31 972,0 17 028,0 12 061,0 12 870,0 14 426,0
Other liabilities and deferred revenue 23 132,0 23 016,0 26 910,0 30 549,0 21 665,0
Liabilities of held for sale operations 5 321,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Other liabilities and deferred revenue 18 138,0 17 065,0 15 003,0 15 358,0 16 537,0
Debt payable within one yeat 0,0 0,0 0,0 1 386,0 1 257,0
Financial Assets
Assets of held for sale operations 7 618,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Marketable securities 15 169,0 14 207,0 14 984,0 18 178,0 20 157,0
Net Interest Bearing Debt 46 014,0 36 601,0 31 025,0 35 738,0 28 769,0
Equity (17 800,0) (10 298,0) 6 735,0 7 297,0 16 802,0
107
Appendix 4.3: Financial ratios for Tesla and peers and DuPont structure and formulas
Source: Compiled by author / Petersen & Plenborg (2012) / Company Reports
ROE
= ROIC + FGEAR
ROIC
NOPAT/Invested
Capital
Profit Margin Turnover Ratio FGEAR SPREAD

Revenue/Inv.
EBIT/Revenue NIBD/Equity ROIC-r
Capital
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝑅𝑂𝐸 = 𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐶 + 𝐹𝐺𝐸𝐴𝑅
𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐴𝑇
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙, 𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐶 =
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑁𝐼𝐵𝐷
𝐹𝐺𝐸𝐴𝑅 =
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑠

𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠, 𝑁𝐵𝐶 =
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑁𝐼𝐵𝐷
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 =
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
108
DuPont Ratios
Tesla Motors - Ratios FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013

Ratios, before tax
ROIC -260% -156% -134% -11%
Profit Margin (EBIT-margin) -126% -123% -95% -3%
Profit Margin (EBITDA-margin) -117% -115% -88% 2%
Turnover of Invested Capital 2,06 1,27 1,41 3,75
Turnover of Invested Capital, days 177 288 260 97
Net borrowing cost -0,9% 0,4% 0,0% 23%
Spread -259% -157% -134% -35%
Leverage -0,59 -0,25 0,68 0,35
ROE -108% -117% -226% -24%
ROIC (NOPAT) -260% -157% -134% -12%
BMW - Ratios FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013

Ratios, before tax
ROIC 26% 47% 45% 41%
Profit Margin (EBIT-margin) 8% 12% 11% 10%
Profit Margin (EBITDA-margin) 15% 18% 17% 15%
Net borrowing cost -5,5% -2,3% -2,1% -1,9%
Spread 31% 50% 47% 43%
Leverage -0,25 -0,35 -0,35 -0,42
ROE 18% 30% 28% 23%
ROIC (NOPAT) 17% 35% 30% 28%
Audi AG - Ratios FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013

Ratios, before tax
ROIC 38% 49% 36% 27%
Profit Margin (EBIT-margin) 10% 13% 12% 11%
Net borrowing cost 4,4% 63% -9% 4%
Spread 34% -13% 46% 22%
Leverage -0,15 -0,06 0,13 0,23
ROE 33% 50% 43% 32%
ROIC (NOPAT) 28% 36% 27% 20%
109
Toyota Motors - Ratios FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013
Ratios, before tax
ROIC 0,1% 4% 3% 12%
Profit Margin (EBIT-margin) 0,1% 2% 2% 6%
Net borrowing cost 137% 30% -599% 117%
Spread -137% -26% 601% -105%
Leverage -0,01 -0,03 0,00 -0,01
ROE 2% 4% 3% 12%
ROIC (NOPAT) 1% 2% 2% 8%
Ford Motors - Ratios FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013

Ratios, before tax
ROIC 23% 20% 14% 11,7%
Profit Margin (EBIT-margin) 5% 5% 4% 3,7%
Profit Margin (EBITDA-margin) 9% 8% 7% 6,6%
Turnover of Invested Capital, days 83 91 117 116,0
Net borrowing cost 4% 1% 1% 2,1%
Spread 19% 18% 12% 9,6%
Leverage -2,94 -18,98 4,76 2,68
ROE -34% -326% 73% 38%
ROIC (NOPAT) 20% 54% 9% 12%
General Motors - Ratios FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013

Ratios, before tax
ROIC 16% 24% -6% 15%
Profit Margin (EBIT-margin) 5% 6% -2% 4%
Net borrowing cost 6% 2% 2,% 1%
Spread 10% 22% -8% 14%
Leverage 0,33 0,13 0,19 0,17
ROE 19% 27% -7% 17%
ROIC (NOPAT) 14% 23% 5% 11%
110
Common-Size Analysis of Income Statement
Tesla, Common-size of Income Statement FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 Q1 2014

Revenue 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %
Automotive sales 83 % 73 % 93 % 99 % 99,7 %
Vehicle Sales 62 % 48 % 76 % 87 % 95 %
Emission credits 2% 1% 10 % 10 % 2%
Sale of powertrain components 19 % 23 % 8% 2% 3%
Depreciation -14 % -13 % -8 % -7 % -11 %
Gross profit, adjusted 35 % 38 % 14 % 28 % 32 %
R&D -80 % -102 % -66 % -12 % -13 %
SG&A -72 % -51 % -36 % -14 % -19 %
EBITDA -117 % -115 % -88 % 2% 0%
Depreciation -9 % -8 % -7 % -5 % -7 %
EBIT -126 % -123 % -95 % -3 % -7 %
Tax on EBIT 0% 0% 0% -4 % -2 %
NOPAT -126 % -123 % -95 % -3 % -7 %
BMW, Common-size of Income Statement FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013

Revenue 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %
Cost of revenues -76 % -70 % -68 % -70 % -71 %
Gross profit 24 % 30 % 32 % 30 % 29 %
R&D -6 % -6 % -6 % -6 % -6 %
SG&A -10 % -9 % -8 % -8 % -9 %
EBITDA 8% 15 % 18 % 17 % 15 %
Depreciation and amortization -8 % -7 % -6 % -5 % -5 %
EBIT -1 % 8% 12 % 11 % 10 %
NOPAT 0% 6% 9% 7% 7%
Audi, Common-size of Income Statement FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013

Revenue 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %
Cost of revenues -73 % -71 % -72 % -70 % -71 %
Gross profit 27 % 29 % 28 % 30 % 29 %
R&D -1 % -1 % -1 % -1 % -1 %
SG&A -12 % -10 % -9 % -11 % -10 %
EBITDA 12 % 16 % 17 % 16 % 15 %
EBIT 6% 10 % 13 % 12 % 11 %
NOPAT 4% 7% 9% 9% 8%
Toyota, Common-size of Income Statement FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013

Revenue 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %
Cost of revenues -81 % -80 % -81 % -81 % -79 %
Gross profit 19 % 20 % 19 % 19 % 21 %
R&D -5 % -4 % -4 % -4 % -4 %
SG&A -11 % -10 % -10 % -10 % -9 %
EBITDA 4% 6% 7% 6% 10 %
EBIT -2 % 0% 2% 1% 6%
NOPAT -2 % 1% 1% 1% 4%
111
Ford, Common-size of Income Statement FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013
Revenue 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %
Cost of revenues -87 % -80 % -82 % -82 % -82 %
Gross profit 13 % 20 % 18 % 18 % 18 %
R&D -5 % -4 % -4 % -4 % -5 %
SG&A -8 % -8 % -7 % -7 % -7 %
EBITDA 1% 9% 8% 7% 7%
EBIT -3 % 5% 5% 4% 4%
NOPAT -4 % 5% 13 % 3% 4%
GM, Common-size of Income Statement FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013

Revenue 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %
Cost of revenues -90 % -77 % -76 % -80 % -78 %
Gross profit 10 % 23 % 24 % 20 % 22 %
R&D -6 % -5 % -5 % -5 % -5 %
SG&A -12 % -8 % -8 % -9 % -8 %
EBITDA -8 % 10 % 10 % 6% 9%
EBIT -18 % 5% 6% -2 % 4%
NOPAT -17 % 4% 6% 1% 3%
112
Tesla: Indexing and Day´s Turnover of Invested Capital, Liquidity Ratios
Tesla, Indexing of Invested Capital FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013

Operational Assets
Property, plant and equipment 100,0 298,9 615,6 934,1
Other assets 100,0 177,0 174,0 179,0
Operating lease vehicles, net 100,0 247,6 274,1 4 929,0
Inventory 100,0 139,3 465,7 890,1
Accounts receivable 100,0 159,3 356,7 744,8
Prepaid expenses and other current assets 100,0 134,5 118,5 239,1
Total Operational Assets 100,0 229,8 486,1 923,4
Resale value guarantee 833,7 1 418,6
Other long-term liabilities 100,0 172,8 254,8 529,9
Accounts payable 100,0 193,2 816,4 1 379,2
Accrued liabilities 100,0 149,5 202,7 417,3
Deferred development compensation 100,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Reservation payments 100,0 54,1 0,0 0,0
Customer deposits 100,0 251,3 329,1
Total Operational Liabilities 100,0 189,1 461,3 904,7
Invested Capital 100,0 284,6 519,6 948,6
Tesla, Days Turnover of Invested Capital FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013

Operational Assets
Other assets 9,2 9,1 18,6 88,3
Operating lease vehicles, net 29,3 20,7 37,9 10,3
Inventory 3,4 4,3 2,6 6,6
Resale value guarantee 8,5
Accounts payable 5,3 4,8 2,3 6,6
Deferred development compensation 1496,7
Customer deposits and reservation payments 4,1 3,3 3,6 13,3
Tesla Motors - Ratios FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 Q1 2014

Liquidity Ratios
Current Ratio 2,35 2,20 1,23 1,47 2,12
Quick Ratio 1,25 1,43 0,71 0,93 1,70
Cash Burn Rate 16,9 8,7 13,8 7,0 175,3 724,7
Finanical gearing 0,07 0,16 0,25 0,09 0,14
Solvency ratio 1,04 1,01 0,94 1,00 1,01
Interest coverage ratio (EBIT) (21,9) (200,1) 1 186,3 11 596,6 (1,9) (3,7)
113
BMW: Indexing and Day´s Turnover of Invested Capital
BMW, Indexing of Invested Capital FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013

Operational Assets
Intangible assets 100,0 94,6 92,2 101,7
Leased products 100,0 90,2 75,6 39,8
Incestments 100,0 155,1 262,4 384,8
Deferred tax 100,0 122,4 132,1 130,6
Other assets 100,0 122,3 152,6 145,2
Inventories 100,0 122,0 135,7 135,4
Trade receivables 100,0 139,2 148,1 125,0
Current tax 100,0 114,9 99,1 95,7
Other assets 100,0 100,0 86,3 83,3
Other provisions 100,0 111,7 128,0 133,1
Deferred tax 100,0 76,6 40,5 45,7
Other liabilities 100,0 98,2 106,5 111,2
Current tax 100,0 132,1 146,6 136,6
Trade payables 100,0 134,5 165,7 198,3
BMW, Days Turnover of Invested Capital FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013

PP&E 75,5 65,4 63,7 72,0
Investments 29,2 30,5 32,7 32,1
Inventory 46,4 48,4 48,5 48,1
Operating liabilities (190,4) (189,2) (178,2) (188,0)
Invested capital 116,8 93,4 91,4 88,7
114
Audi: Indexing and Day´s Turnover of Invested Capital
Audi, Indexing of Invested Capital FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013

Operational Assets
Leasing and rental assets 140,0 40,0
Investments accounted for using equity method 100,0 146,1 761,7 1 359,9
Deferred tax assets 100,0 140,6 156,8 151,5
Other receivables 100,0 69,9 41,0 30,1
Inventories 100,0 130,5 147,0 149,0
Trade receivables 100,0 116,6 120,1 123,9
Effective income tax assets 100,0 66,7 150,0 216,7
Other receivables 100,0 87,8 93,3 119,8
Deferred tax liabilities 100,0 56,7 334,3 1 082,1
Effective income tax obligations, non-current 100,0 98,7 118,3 134,3
Trade payables 100,0 116,3 127,8 142,4
Audi, Days Turnover of Invested Capital FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013

PP&E 59,7 51,8 53,6 58,6
Investments 14,9 16,7 28,8 39,4
Inventory 30,5 32,0 32,6 32,3
115
Toyota: Indexing and Day´s Turnover of Invested Capital
Toyota Motors, Indexing of Invested Capital FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013

Operational Assets
Investments and other assets 100,0 117,9 136,8 155,4
Trade accounts and notes receivable 100,0 102,4 106,1 122,7
Inventories 100,0 94,6 101,5 115,8
Accrued expenses 100,0 107,6 111,2 125,1
Income taxes payable 100,0 130,2 121,2 140,7
Other current liabilities 100,0 104,3 117,3 125,9
Toyota Motors, Indexing of Invested Capital FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013

PP&E 108,1 98,3 94,9 80,6
Investments 90,6 106,2 125,4 119,2
Inventory 29,7 27,9 30,5 29,1
116
Ford: Indexing and Day´s Turnover of Invested Capital
Ford Motors, Indexing of Invested Capital FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013

Invested Capital
Operational Assets
Equity in net assets of affiliated companies 100,0 111,8 126,1 142,1
Net property 100,0 99,5 103,4 115,0
Deferred income taxes 100,0 201,8 335,3 327,4
Net intangible assets 100,0 75,7 37,5 0,0
Other assets 100,0 96,4 96,8 131,3
Non-current receivables from Financial Services 100,0 117,7 17,7 400,0
Receivables, less allowance 100,0 111,4 130,0 149,3
Inventories 100,0 107,8 121,0 137,5
Net investment in operating leases 100,0 75,6 79,4 80,2
Other current assets 100,0 128,1 167,7 166,3
Current receivables from Financial Services 100,0 60,4 20,6 0,0
Payables 100,0 109,6 128,3 144,3
Other payables 100,0 142,5 91,1 0,0
Current payables to Financial Services 100,0 83,6 34,9 31,4
Ford, Days Turnover of Invested Capital FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013

PP&E 69,6 64,4 67,8 68,5
Intangible assets 0,4 0,3 0,1
Investments 25,5 36,2 53,0 50,9
Inventory 16,8 16,8 19,1 19,7
117
GM: Indexing and Day´s Turnover of Invested Capital
General Motors, Indexing of Invested Capital FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013

Operational Assets
Equity in net assets on nonconsolidated affiliates 100,0 93,0 83,0 91,0
Property, net 100,0 111,4 124,5 132,0
Intangible assets, net 100,0 82,8 63,7 47,2
Other assets 100,0 96,5 80,8 79,7
Deferred income taxes 100,0 94,0 3 260,8 5 809,4
Accounts and notes receivable 100,0 115,1 125,5 116,7
Inventories 100,0 119,0 130,6 129,3
Equipment on operating leases, net 100,0 95,0 80,2 78,9
Other current assets and deferred income taxes 100,0 83,0 75,5 89,3
Deferred income taxes 100,0 1 889,2 3 752,9
Other liabilities an deferred income taxes 100,0 96,8 97,4 100,8
GM, Days Turnover of Invested Capital FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013

PP&E 50,6 50,7 56,7 59,4
Investments 31,0 26,2 56,3 83,4
Inventory 29,7 31,7 34,9 34,1
118
Forecast
Appendix 6.1 – Forecast of Sales
The inputs and estimates used to forecast sales from 2014 to 2020 is presented in the tables below.
Automotive Sales FY 2013 EY 2014 EY 2015 EY 2016 EY 2017 EY 2018 EY 2019 EY 2020
Production Volume 31 000 50 000 73 390 107 722 158 114 232 079 340 646 500 000
Delivery lag 0,7 0,7 0,8 0,8 0,9 0,9 0,8 0,8
Vehicles delivered
Model S, Units 22 477 35 000 50 000 55 000 58 300 57 134 55 420 53 757
Growth 55,7 % 43 % 10 % 6% -2 % -3 % -3 %
Model X, Units 10 000 30 000 39 000 42 900 45 045 47 297

Growth 200 % 30 % 10 % 5% 5%
Gen 3, Units 50 000 100 000 180 000 297 000

Growth 100 % 80 % 65 %
Total 22 477 35 000 60 000 85 000 147 300 200 034 280 465 398 055
Avg. price per unit 1,000

Model S 78 92 90 88 86 84 83 81
Model X 92 90 88 86 84 83
Gen 3 45 44 43 42
Revenue, 1,000
Model S 3 203 077 4 484 308 4 834 084 5 021 647 4 822 789 4 584 544 4 358 067
Model X 915 165 2 690 585 3 427 805 3 695 174 3 802 334 3 912 602
Gen 3 2 250 000 4 410 000 7 779 240 12 579 031
Total Revenues 1 758 184 3 203 077 5 399 473 7 524 669 10 699 452 12 927 963 16 166 118 20 849 700
- I have applied a 46.6% CAGR to forecast production growth, based on management´s guidance and the
findings in the strategic and financial analysis.
- Sales growth and prices have been forecasted for each vehicle model, where prices decline at a rate of
2% annually.
119
Appendix 6.2 - Implied Market Share
The table below shows my expectations for the size of the total automotive market in 2020 by number og
vehicles sold. It have also illustrated the expected share of the premium segment and Tesla´s share of the
premium segment and total market. I expect Tesla to take 3.7% og the premium market in 2020 and 0.4% of
the total automotive market in 2020.
Total Premium Share of Share of

Vehicle segment Premium premium total
Year Sales growth segment sales Tesla sales market market
FY 1999 44 003 697
FY 2000 45 383 002
FY 2001 47 314 990
FY 2002 48 729 394
FY 2003 50 904 331
FY 2004 52 963 670
FY 2005 54 992 161
FY 2006 57 225 642
FY 2007 60 801 848
FY 2008 57 196 717
FY 2009 57 781 575
FY 2010 65 909 343
FY 2011 68 324 165
FY 2012 72 643 162
FY 2013 76 280 279 9,8 % 7 475 467 22 477 0,3 % 0,0 %
EY 2014 79 331 490 10,1 % 8 012 481 35 000 0,4 % 0,0 %
EY 2015 82 504 750 10,3 % 8 497 989 60 000 0,7 % 0,1 %
EY 2016 85 804 940 10,5 % 9 009 519 85 000 0,9 % 0,1 %
EY 2017 89 237 137 10,8 % 9 637 611 147 300 1,5 % 0,2 %
EY 2018 92 806 623 10,7 % 9 930 309 200 034 2,0 % 0,2 %
EY 2019 96 518 888 10,7 % 10 327 521 280 465 2,7 % 0,3 %
EY 2020 100 379 643 10,7 % 10 740 622 398 055 3,7 % 0,4 %
Expected CAGR 4%
2013-2020
120
Appendix 6.3 - Cost Forecast
Key cost drivers FY 2013 EY 2014 EY 2015 EY 2016 EY 2017 EY 2018 EY 2019 EY 2020
Fixed COGS (2%) (35 164) (64 062) (107 989) (150 493) (213 989) (258 559) (323 322) (416 994)
Variable COGS
Warranty Provision (61 401) (91 000) (156 000) (221 000) (382 980) (500 085) (701 162) (995 137)
Per vehicle 2,7 2,6 2,6 2,6 2,6 2,5 2,5 2,5
Freight and other (104 983) (26 250) (45 000) (63 750) (110 475) (150 026) (210 349) (298 541)
Per vehicle (0,8) (0,8) (0,8) (0,8) (0,8) (0,8) (0,8)
Material costs ex.
battery (790 895) (1 258 159) (2 142 105) (3 015 075) (4 330 058) (5 284 253) (6 673 914) (8 693 528)
% of vehicle sales -39,3 % -39,3 % -39,7 % -40,1 % -40,5 % -40,9 % -41,3 % -41,7 %
Battery Pack (551 436) (816 011) (1 329 383) (1 789 736) (2 651 637) (3 241 583) (4 106 603) (5 327 957)
Per vehicle
Model S (24,5) (23,3) (22,2) (21,1) (20,0) (19,0) (18,1) (17,2)
Model X (22,2) (21,1) (20,0) (19,0) (18,1) (17,2)
Gen 3 (14,1) (13,4) (12,7) (12,1)
Per kWh 320,0 304,1 289,0 274,6 261,0 248,0 235,7 224,0
Total variable COGS (1 508 714) (2 191 419) (3 672 488) (5 089 561) (7 475 149) (9 175 947) (11 692 029) (15 315 163)
Total vehicle COGS (1 543 878) (2 255 481) (3 780 478) (5 240 055) (7 689 138) (9 434 506) (12 015 351) (15 732 157)
Per vehicle (68,7) (64,4) (63,0) (61,6) (52,2) (47,2) (42,8) (39,5)
Gross profit ex. D&A 27 % 30 % 30 % 30 % 28 % 27 % 26 % 25 %
- The components of variable costs are estimated based on observed levels among peers and historical
numbers.
- In order to isolate the the impact of battery costs, all variable costs are measured on a per vehicle basis.
- Material costs excluding batteries are estimated to ~40% in the first year based on the 2013 level.
Hereinafter, material costs rises 1% assuming rising raw material costs. An increase above this level is
expected to be offset by the relative bargaining power over suppliers.
- A negative CAGR of 4.97% has been applied to estimate the year-over-year decrease in battery costs.
The choice of growth rate stems from the assumption that battery prices are currently USD 320 per kWh
and that the estimated cost wil decline by 30% in 2020.
- Total battery cost is estimated for each vehicle model, and assumes a equal distribution between the the
60 kWh and 85 kWh battery pack for Model S/X and the 48 kWh and 60 kWh battery pack for Gen 3.
121
Appendix 6.4 Historical development of value drivers
The historical development of value drivers is summarized in the table below.
Drivers EY '10 EY '11 EY '12 EY '13 Avg. Hist.

Revenue Growth 4% 75 % 102 % 387 % 142,2%
Gross-margin 35 % 38 % 14 % 28 % 26,2%
SG&A as a percentage of revenue 72 % 51 % 36 % 14 % 42,3%
R&D as a percentage of revenue 80 % 102 % 66 % 12 % 55,4%
Net borrowing rate -0,9% 0,4% 0,0% 23,3% -0,2%

Effective tax rate -0,1% -0,2% 0,0% -3,6% -1,0%
Depreciation as a percentage of PP&E 9,3% 5,7% 5,2% 14,4% 8,6%
CAPEX as a percentage of Revenue -154 % -79 % -50 % -12 %
PP&E as a percentage of Revenue 98 % 146 % 134 % 37 % 103,7%
Inventories as a percentage of Revenue 38,7% 24,5% 65,0% 16,9% 36,3%
Notes and accounts receivable as a percentage of Revenue 5,7% 4,7% 6,5% 2,4% 4,8%
Operational liabilities as a percentage of Revenue 79,6% 95,4% 122,7% 43,2% 85,2%
NIBD as a percentage of Invested Capital -79,8% -8,4% 67,3% 3,6% -4,4%
122
Appendix 6.5 Expected Profit Margin Drivers
The table below show the factors that are expected to affect the development of EBITDA from 2014 – 2020.
EBITDA Vehicle business EY 2014 EY 2015 EY 2016 EY 2017 EY 2018 EY 2019 EY 2020
Raw material prices
Decreasing battey cell costs
Integrated distribution model and Superchargers
Low marketing expenses
Development of Gen 3
Production ramp-up of Model S/Model X
∆ EBITDA
- Raw material prices will increase the cost of materials in all years.
- The decrease in battery cell costs will increase margins in all years.
- The integrated distrubution model and Superchargers will reduce margins in the first years due to high
expenses and capital investmnets, but will be profitable over time as Tesla can take the margin that other
manufacturers pay to franchise dealerships.
- Low marketing expenses will reduce SG&A expenses
- The development og Gen 3 will require investment in the first years, but will increase margins as sales
offset fixed costs.
123
Appendix 6.6 Forecasting: Pro forma Income Statement and Balance Sheet
USD 1,000
Tesla Motors - Income Statement EY 2014 EY 2015 EY 2016 EY 2017 EY 2018 EY 2019 EY 2020
Total revenues 3 203 077 5 399 473 7 524 669 10 699 452 12 927 963 16 166 118 20 849 700
Gross profit, adjusted 947 596 1 618 996 2 284 615 3 010 313 3 493 457 4 150 767 5 117 543
Research and development (480 462) (674 934) (902 960) (1 069 945) (1 163 517) (1 131 628) (1 250 982)
Selling, general and administrative (416 400) (593 942) (677 220) (855 956) (904 957) (808 306) (833 988)
EBITDA 50 735 350 119 704 434 1 084 412 1 424 983 2 210 833 3 032 573
Depreciation (132 223) (232 177) (323 561) (460 076) (544 784) (653 434) (824 814)
EBIT (81 488) 117 942 380 873 624 336 880 199 1 557 398 2 207 759
Net financial expenses (2 475) (3 545) (34 224) (71 541) (144 245) (190 222) (255 841)
EBT (83 964) 114 397 346 650 552 795 735 953 1 367 176 1 951 918
Effective tax rate 25 % 25 % 25 % 25 % 25 % 25 % 25 %
Tax on EBIT 20 372 (29 486) (95 218) (156 084) (220 050) (389 350) (551 940)
NOPAT (61 116) 88 457 285 655 468 252 660 149 1 168 049 1 655 819
Tax shield 619 886 8 556 17 885 36 061 47 556 63 960
Net income (62 973) 85 798 259 987 414 596 551 965 1 025 382 1 463 939
USD 1,000
Tesla Motors - Income Statement EY 2021 EY 2022 EY 2023 EY 2024
Total revenues 23 977 155 26 374 871 27 693 614 28 801 359
Gross profit, adjusted 5 885 175 6 473 692 6 797 377 7 069 272
Research and development (1 438 629) (1 582 492) (1 661 617) (1 728 082)
Selling, general and administrative (959 086) (1 054 995) (1 107 745) (1 152 054)
EBITDA 3 487 459 3 836 205 4 028 015 4 189 136
Depreciation (948 536) (1 043 390) (1 095 559) (1 139 382)
EBIT 2 538 923 2 792 815 2 932 456 3 049 754
Net financial expenses (319 809) (367 781) (404 559) (424 786)
EBT 2 219 114 2 425 035 2 527 897 2 624 968
Effective tax rate 25 % 25 % 25 % 25 %
Tax on EBIT (634 731) (698 204) (733 114) (762 439)
NOPAT 1 904 192 2 094 611 2 199 342 2 287 316
Tax shield 79 952 91 945 101 140 106 197
Net income 1 664 335 1 818 776 1 895 923 1 968 726
124
Tesla Motors - Balance Sheet EY 2014 EY 2015 EY 2016 EY 2017 EY 2018 EY 2019 EY 2020
Assets
Property, plant and equipment 1 537 477 2 699 737 3 762 335 5 349 726 6 334 702 7 598 075 9 590 862
Inventory 544 523 917 910 1 279 194 1 818 907 2 197 754 2 748 240 3 544 449
Accounts receivable 144 138 242 976 338 610 481 475 581 758 727 475 938 237
Total Assets 2 226 139 3 860 623 5 380 138 7 650 108 9 114 214 11 073 791 14 073 548
Total Operational Liabilities 1 345 292 2 159 789 3 009 868 4 065 792 4 912 626 5 819 802 7 505 892
NWC (656 631) (998 903) (1 392 064) (1 765 410) (2 133 114) (2 344 087) (3 023 207)
∆ NWC (164 566) (342 272) (393 161) (373 346) (367 704) (210 973) (679 119)
Invested Capital 880 846 1 700 834 2 370 271 3 584 316 4 201 588 5 253 988 6 567 656
Net Interest Bearing Debt 35 234 340 167 711 081 1 433 727 1 890 715 2 542 930 3 178 745
Total Equity 845 612 1 360 667 1 659 190 2 150 590 2 310 873 2 711 058 3 388 910
Invested Capital (NIBD + E) 880 846 1 700 834 2 370 271 3 584 316 4 201 588 5 253 988 6 567 656
Tesla Motors - Balance Sheet EY 2021 EY 2022 EY 2023 EY 2024

Assets
Property, plant and equipment 11 029 491 12 132 440 12 739 062 13 248 625
Inventory 4 076 116 4 483 728 4 707 914 4 896 231
Accounts receivable 1 078 972 1 186 869 1 246 213 1 296 061
Total Assets 16 184 580 17 803 038 18 693 189 19 440 917
Total Operational Liabilities 8 631 776 9 494 953 9 969 701 10 368 489
NWC (3 476 687) (3 824 356) (4 015 574) (4 176 197)
∆ NWC (453 481) (347 669) (191 218) (160 623)
Invested Capital 7 552 804 8 308 084 8 723 488 9 072 428
Net Interest Bearing Debt 3 655 557 4 021 113 4 222 168 4 391 055
Total Equity 3 897 247 4 286 971 4 501 320 4 681 373
Invested Capital (NIBD + E) 7 552 804 8 308 084 8 723 488 9 072 428
125
Weighted Average Cost of Capital
Appendix 7.1 Beta Estimation
Implied credit rating based on Standard & Poor´s approach
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

EBIT interest coverage CCC CCC AAA AAA CCC
EBITDA interest coverage CCC CCC AAA AAA B
ROIC CCC CCC CCC CCC
Operating Income/Sales CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC
Long-term debt/Capital AAA BBB CCC CCC CCC
Total debt/Capital AAA AAA AAA AA AAA
Operating Cash Flow/Capital CCC CCC CCC CCC AA
Implied credit rating CCC CCC BBB BBB B-

Source: Petersen & Plenborg (2012)/S&P/Compiled by
author
126
Fundamental Beta estimation and Regression beta
Risk type Assessment Ability to manage risk
Operational risk
External Reasonable --> Insufficient
Battery price High Risk of battery prices remaining high
Economic cyclicality Medium Low risk in the short-term/high risk in the long-term
Will never be unfavourable, but incentives such as EV credits
Regulatory Medium will go to zero
Major part of battery cost is raw meterials. Highly affected by
volatility in material prices and dependece on scarce resources
Raw materials High such as lithium
Interest rates Low Low
Cost benefit analysis of EV vs. traditional vehicles may be
Oil prices Medium unfavourble if oil prices fall significantly
Strategic Reasonable
Rivalry among Competitors have more resources and the industry competition
competitors High is intense
Supplier power Medium Tesla relies on a single supplier of battery cells.
Customer power Low Demand is higher than supply
Substitutes Low No avaiable direct sustitures
Threat of entry Low Entry barriers are high due to the capital intesity of the industry
Growing market, but limited production capcity limit ability to
Market growth Medium gain market share
Operating Not sufficient

Utilization of production
facilities High Need to scale up to produce 500,000 vehicles annually.
R&D and innovation Low Proprietary technology and high quality vehicles
Highly qualified management, se appedix 1.1 - management
Quality of management Low team
Cost structure High High level of fixed costs
Novel technology and limited product portfolio. Product failures
Execution High will significantly hurt sales and stock price.
Quality of product porfolio Medium High quality but undiversified
Total operational risk: High

Financial risk
Current and quick ratio is sufficient and cash burn rate has
Short-term liquidity risk Low improved
Long-term liquidity risk High Unable to cover interest expenses
Total financial risk Neutral
127
Appendix 8.1 Valuation
Discounted Cash Flow Valuation

Explicit Forecast
DCF Valuation FY 2013 FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 FY 2018 FY 2019 FY 2020
USD 1,000
31.03.14
WACC 8,1% 8,1% 8,1% 8,1% 8,1% 8,1% 8,1%
Discounted Cash Flow
FCFF (250 238) (731 531) (383 782) (745 794) 42 877 115 648 342 152
Growth in terminal period
Discount factor 0,92 0,86 0,79 0,73 0,68 0,63 0,58
PV of FCFF (231 454) (625 826) (303 680) (545 834) 29 025 72 411 198 149
Enterprise value 1/1-14 22 147 550
NIBD (136 802)
Fade period Terminal

DCF Valuation FY 2013 FY 2021 FY 2022 FY 2023 FY 2024
USD 1,000
31.03.14
WACC 8,1% 8,1% 8,1% 8,1%
Discounted Cash Flow
FCFF 919 044 1 339 331 1 783 938 1 938 376
Growth in terminal period 4%
Discount factor 0,54 0,50 0,46 11,13
PV of FCFF 492 289 663 563 817 494 21 581 413
Enterprise value 1/1-14 22 147 550
NIBD (136 802)
128
Economic Value Added Valuation
Explicit Forecast
EVA Valuation FY 2013 FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 FY 2018 FY 2019 FY 2020
Invested Capital 691 724 880 846 1 700 834 2 370 271 3 584 316 4 201 588 5 253 988 6 567 656
NOPAT (63 503) (61 116) 88 457 285 655 468 252 660 149 1 168 049 1 655 819
EVA (117 256) 16 968 147 617 275 883 369 250 827 053 1 229 412
Growth in terminal period
Discount factor 0,92 0,86 0,79 0,73 0,68 0,63 0,58
PV of EVA (108 454) 14 516 116 807 201 914 249 961 517 841 711 985
NIBD (136 802)
Fade period Terminal

EVA Valuation FY 2013 FY 2021 FY 2022 FY 2023 FY 2024
Invested Capital 691 724 7 552 804 8 308 084 8 723 488 9 072 428
NOPAT (63 503) 1 904 192 2 094 611 2 199 342 2 287 316
EVA 1 371 169 1 481 635 1 525 068 1 579 327
Growth in terminal period 4,0 %
Discount factor 0,54 0,50 0,46 11,13
PV of EVA 734 471 734 067 698 866 17 583 851
NIBD (136 802)
129
Cash Flow Statement
Tesla Motors - Cash

Flow Statement EY 2014 EY 2015 EY 2016 EY 2017 EY 2018 EY 2019 EY 2020
NOPAT (61 116) 88 457 285 655 468 252 660 149 1 168 049 1 655 819
Depreciation 63 510 132 223 232 177 323 561 460 076 544 784 653 434
Accounts receivable (95 029) (98 838) (95 634) (142 865) (100 283) (145 717) (210 761)
Inventories (204 168) (373 387) (361 283) (539 713) (378 847) (550 486) (796 209)
Operating liabilities 475 422 814 497 850 078 1 055 924 846 834 907 176 1 686 090
CF from operations 612 255 562 951 910 994 1 165 158 1 487 930 1 923 806 2 988 373
CF from investments (862 494) (1 294 483) (1 294 775) (1 910 952) (1 445 053) (1 808 158) (2 646 221)
FCFF (250 238) (731 531) (383 782) (745 794) 42 877 115 648 342 152
Changes in NIBD 10 630 304 933 370 914 722 645 456 988 652 216 635 815
Tax shield 619 886 8 556 17 885 36 061 47 556 63 960
Cash flow from
financing activities 8 773 302 274 345 247 668 990 348 804 509 549 443 934
FCFE (241 465) (429 257) (38 535) (76 804) 391 681 625 197 786 087
Dividends 241 465 429 257 38 535 76 804 (391 681) (625 197) (786 087)
Free reserves 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
USD 1,000
Tesla Motors - Cash Flow Statement EY 2021 EY 2022 EY 2023 EY 2024
NOPAT 1 904 192 2 094 611 2 199 342 2 287 316
Depreciation and amortization 824 814 948 536 1 043 390 1 095 559
Accounts receivable (140 735) (107 897) (59 343) (49 849)
Inventories and operating lease vehicles (531 667) (407 612) (224 186) (188 317)
Operating liabilities 1 125 884 863 178 474 748 398 788
Cash flow from operating activities 3 182 487 3 390 816 3 433 950 3 543 498
Cash flow from investment activities (2 263 443) (2 051 485) (1 650 012) (1 605 122)
FCFF 919 044 1 339 331 1 783 938 1 938 376
Changes in NIBD 476 812 365 556 201 056 168 887
Tax shield 79 952 91 945 101 140 106 197
Cash flow from financing activities 236 955 89 720 (102 363) (149 703)
Free cash flows to equity (FCFE) 1 155 999 1 429 051 1 681 575 1 788 673
Dividends (1 155 999) (1 429 051) (1 681 575) (1 788 673)
Free reserves 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Appendix 8.2 Bloomberg consensus comparison of multiples
2014 2015
EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/Sales EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/Sales
Bloomberg 80.4X 194.6X 7.4x 40.6X 70.0X 5.2x
My estimate 445.1x N/A 7.1x 64.5x 191.5x 3.2x
130

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Copenhagen Business School, August 2014

Supervisor: Peter Sehested

Nicoline Eeg Praem

Tesla Motors is an innovative manufacturer of premium electric

Multiples EV/Sales EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT

1.0 Introduction and Motivation .................................................................................................................... 5

TSLA GM F TM BMW Audi

Source: Compiled by author / Nasdaq

In this thesis, I will answer the following question:

Introduction to Tesla Motors and the Automotive Industry

1.3 Models and methodology

1.3.1 Data collection

made in the strategic analysis. The purpose here is to

follow a ”top-down” approach, where a macro- Forecast

environmental-, industry-, and internal analysis

1.3.2.1 External analysis: PEST(EL) Conclusion

1.3.2.2 Industry Analysis: Porters Five Forces of Competition

3 Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Environmental, Legislative

1.3.3 Financial Analysis

5 Barney, J. B. & Hesterly, W. (2012), Strategic Management and Competitive Advantage. p. 68

Discounted Cash Flow Model

Economic Value Added

2.0 Introduction to Tesla Motors and the Automotive Industry

8 Petersen & Plenborg (2012), Financial Statement Analysis, p. 180

15 Tesla Annual Report (2014), p. 4

Figure 2.1: Automotive Sales Growth

Asia Europe U.S. World

22 Bloomberg data (30.02.2014)

2.2.1 The Electric Vehicle Market

Electric vehicle segments

2.3 Historical Events and Share Price Developments

Figure 2.2: TSLA Share Price Development, USD 300

Source: Compiled by author / Nasdaq / teslamotors.com

2.4.1 Strategy and Business Model

2.5 Ownership Structure

2.6 Business Segments

37 Tesla Annual Report (2014), p. 13

2.6.1 Development and Sales of Powertrain Components

2.6.2 Emission credits

41 Tesla Annual Report (2014), p. 4

increases, and manufacturers conform to 10

2.6.4.1 Previous models

2.6.4.2 Current models

43 Tesla Annual Report (2014), p. 98

Battery Pack Table 2.1: Model S 85 kWh

2.6.4.3 Upcoming models

2.7 Geographical Segments

Figure 2.5: Geographical Segments

54 Tesla Annual Report (2014), p. 8

3.0 Strategic Analysis

3.1.1 Political and legislative drivers

3.1.2 Economic drivers

3.1.2.1 Economic development

World Vehicle Sales World GDP constant

Figure 3.2: Historical and Expected GDP Key Markets

World Europe U.S. Asia

66 Centre for American Progress (09.10.2012)

3.1.2.2 Commodity and energy markets

Figure 3.3: Crude Oil, avg spot, USD/bbl

71 IMF, World Economic Outlook - Database

3.1.2.3 Raw materials

competitive nature in the next