Analysis
February 18, 2009
Summary: Turkey’s pro-Hamas
position following the Israeli
assault on Gaza has strained its
relations with Israel. The most
dramatic instance of this was the
confrontation of Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan, Turkey’s prime minis-
ter, with Shimon Peres, Israel’s
president, at the World Economic
Forum in Davos.
Despite the theatrics and the
surge of anti-Israeli and anti-
Semitic sentiment in Turkey, the
government’s positions suggest
that Turkey still sees a role for itself
in Middle East peacemaking, wants
Israel to be more concerned about
regional instability, and wishes
to work with the United States if
and when the new administration
reengages with the region.
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Beyond Davos
by Soli Ozel*
ISTANBUL — The foreign policy
agenda of the U.S. administration under
President Barack Obama is daunting.
The expectations from the new
administration are exceptionally high.
A cursory look at the priorities of that
agenda would suggest that Turkey could
have an important, constructive, and at
times decisive role assisting Washington.
Following the debacle of the Bush years,
areas of convergence in the interests of
the two allies are expanding. The need
for cooperation is obvious and both
sides stand to benefit from it. There is yet
work to do in defining with more preci-
sion what the shared interests, common
values, and sought after objectives and
goals are. From the Turkish side there
is also a demand that Washington pay
more attention to the perspective and
the concerns of Ankara on matters and
problems related to Turkey’s neighbor-
hoods, all of which are troubled.
Moreover, Turkey also sees itself as an
important and constructive participant
in the developments that take place in
these regions. Over the past three years
in particular, partially taking advantage
of the void left by a disengaged United
States, Ankara took upon itself the role
of a facilitator between Israel and Syria.
Dissenting from the Western consensus,
it recognized Hamas as a legitimate
actor in Palestinian politics and argued
that no solution would be possible if
*
Soli Ozel teaches at Istanbul Bilgi University’s Department of International Relations and Political Science and is a columnist for the
Turkish daily Sabah. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the German
Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF).
the organization was isolated. Recently,
the former U.K. Prime Minister Tony
Blair, Quartet’s representative, made a
statement to that effect.
The increasing interest in and engage-
ment with the Middle East are a
function of structural forces that
imposed themselves on Turkey, and
emerged gradually in the wake of the
Cold War. Many of the rationalizations
of the current government for engaging
with the Middle East were already ex-
pressed, albeit with a different concep-
tual language, by the late Ismail Cem,
former minister of foreign affairs.
In the wake of the Iraq war, the main
parameters of the region’s strategic
equilibrium were altered. As a culmina-
tion of decades of old developments,
new non-state actors have made their
entry into the politics of the region.
Turkey’s interest went beyond the strictly
strategic and political though. Gradu-
ally Turkish foreign policy became less
belligerent and more trade oriented. As
a consequence, regional stability became
a primary objective of Turkish foreign
policy—as a precondition for economic
development and trade-induced
economic integration.
The ruling Justice and Development
Party’s (AKP) proclivity to have close
relations with the Middle East may have
intensified this engagement and led to
Analysis
closer Middle East institutional ties than would have been the
case otherwise. It is also true that the new elites who govern
Turkey have more affinity, and more social and cultural ties
with Middle Eastern societies. They feel more comfortable in
that setting partially because of shared religion that softens
the impact of confrontational nationalisms. Be that as it may,
Turkey’s involvement in the Middle East cannot be explained
by such subjective factors alone. Turkey, no matter who was
in power, could not be aloof to developments in the Middle
East when the region was being strategically reshaped.
With the formulation of the Advisor to the Prime Minister
Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkey’s goal is to assure security and free-
dom for all and rely on political dialogue and inclusiveness as
well as economic interdependence. The government favors
ethnic and cultural coexistence everywhere, so as to avoid
ethnic- or sectarian-based conflict and violence. The instru-
ments of choice to pursue these goals are: a) highest level bilat-
eral relations; b) reaching out to all communities in the region;
c) regional level initiatives; d) proactive policy for conflict
resolution; and e) strengthening relations with regional and in-
ternational organizations. The shift in Turkey’s age-old policy
toward the Kurds of Iraq, recognizing them as a legitimate
political interlocutor, is a function of this approach. If Turkey
can resolve its own domestic ethnic problems, this formulation
will remain the mantra of Turkish foreign policy.
The Turkish reaction to Israel’s assault on Gaza and the sub-
sequent outburst by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey’s prime
minister, in Davos as described by Amberin Zaman in her On
Turkey piece, “Turkey after Davos: Risks, Opportunities, and
an Unpredictable Prime Minister,” took place in this context.
All the elements Zaman notes in Erdoğan’s reactions, from
his emotional and ideological predispositions to the obvious
political investment in Turkey’s municipal elections, played a
part. This also included his feeling of betrayal by Ehud Olmert,
Israel’s prime minister, who had a five and a half hour meeting
with Erdoğan just five days before the country’s attack on Gaza.
There is also no doubt that the sharp tone of Erdoğan and the
popular mobilization in Turkey against Israel that too often
crossed the line between being anti-Israel and anti-Semitic
posed many question marks about Turkey’s genuine position.
If one were to go beyond the theatrics of the Gaza reaction,
the uncontrollable rhetoric of Erdoğan, and the extremely
disturbing manifestations of anti-Semitism in Turkish
society, a political analysis of the government’s position is
possible, and the strategic logic behind it can be discerned:
2
 The government sees Turkey as a pillar of stability in the
region. Because of historical and strategic reasons it
believes that Ankara can and does play a constructive role,
and by virtue of having good relations with all parties to
all conflicts it can be a facilitator and better still a mediator.
Relations with Israel are the stormiest of these, but one
that Turkey still cherishes. It was, after all, Erdoğan who said
that his words were not directed against the Israeli people,
which prompted the phone call from Shimon Peres,
Israel’s president, that underscored Israel’s desire to down-
play the incident. A statement by the general staff after the
Davos incident also highlighted the importance of bilateral
relations. The handling of the row that was caused by Israeli
Ground Forces Commander General Mizrahi, who
recommended that Turkey look in the mirror and reassess
its record with Armenians and Kurds, can also be seen in
this light.
 Beyond the moral arguments, Erdoğan faults Israel for
being insensitive to the regional destabilization its actions
cause. The unacceptable high loss of life in Gaza following
the assault by Israel pits the governments of conservative
Arab regimes against their angry but helpless populations.
Such a result is deemed inherently destabilizing. In a way,
the Turkish government shares the view of President
Obama, who said to Jeffrey Goldberg of The Atlantic
Monthly when he was still a presidential candidate,
“what I think is that this constant wound, that this constant
sore, does infect all our foreign policy. The lack of a resolu-
tion to this problem provides an excuse for anti-American
militant Jihadists to engage in inexcusable actions, and so
we have a national security interest in solving this, and I
also believe that Israel has a security interest in solving this
because I believe that the status quo is unsustainable.”
 The Turkish government did not see its pro-Hamas position
as taking sides in the Palestinian civil war. In defending
Hamas’ position that it won a parliamentary majority in
free and fair elections, the Turkish government wished
to break the resistance to recognizing the organization as a
legitimate actor in Israeli-Palestinian politics. There was
also a clear difference between the prime minister and both
the president and the foreign minister. Abdullah Gül and
Ali Babacan tried to clear the air after the prime minister,
and demanded that Hamas decide once and for all whether
it wanted to be a political party or continue to engage in
terrorism. On that issue, Erdoğan’s ill-advised statement on
the need to redefine what a terrorist organization in the
Analysis

Middle East is undermined the conciliators. Yet, the visit
by Mahmud Abbas, Palestine’s president in Ankara last
week suggests that, despite the ill-feelings the prime
minister’s pro-Hamas position must have caused, the
Palestinian Authority sees Turkey as a relevant, if not
consequential, party. Similarly, the visit by Hosni Mubarak,
Egypt’s president, suggests that Turkey will be a party to the
efforts to sustain relative calm in Gaza.
 Turkey’s intent in supporting Hamas was to give the
message that it could deliver the organization if and when
the relevant parties would be ready to accept it as an
interlocutor. Related to this, Turkey was also proposing
that by championing Hamas, it could overshadow Iran
and reduce Tehran’s influence on the organization. The
fact that Hamas leader Khaled Meshal has not returned
a single favor of Turkey’s to date, however, makes this
calculation of dubious validity.
 The government also believes that Israel’s security is
bolstered by its relations with Turkey. Therefore, the Israeli
government should be more attentive to Turkey’s concerns.
Similarly, the Turkish government’s position during the
Gaza assault meant to convey a message to the United States
as well. Ankara believes that Turkey is a significant actor in
Middle East peacemaking and the diplomatic space it
created for itself during American absence from the
region should not be discarded when the administration re-
engages. Furthermore, the government believes that
Erdoğan’s immense popularity among the region’s
Muslim populations may help in the legitimation of any
future peace deal.
member of the Atlantic alliance with particular strengths in the
region. Given the premium placed on Turkey’s Westernness,
the answer to this question is indeed of utmost importance.
Soli Ozel, Lecturer, Bilgi University; Columnist, Sabah
Soli Ozel teaches at Istanbul Bilgi University’s Department of
International Relations and Political Science. He is a columnist for the
national daily Sabah and is senior advisor to the chairman of the
Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association. Additionally, he
is the editor of TUSIAD’s magazine Private View.
About GMF
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between North America and Europe. GMF does this by supporting
individuals and institutions working on transatlantic issues, by
convening leaders to discuss the most pressing transatlantic themes,
and by examining ways in which transatlantic cooperation can
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supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded
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GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In
addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has seven offices
in Europe: Berlin, Bratislava, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, and
Bucharest.

Erdoğan obviously did not articulate these goals in such ways.

In fact, his style and verbosity created problems for Turkish
diplomacy that, after all is said and done, will have to be busy
“picking up the pieces and doing extra time in the months
ahead,” as stated by former Turkish ambassador to the United
States, Faruk Loğoğlu. Moreover, given the fact that all of
Turkey’s allies are wondering where Turkey is going, the gov-
ernment needs to clearly communicate its messages and share
the logic of its policies with close allies.

Turkish engagement with the Middle East is dictated almost

entirely by the country’s geography, the strategic realities of
the region in the wake of the Iraq war, and the shifting balance
of power. The important question here is whether Turkey will
engage in the region as a member of the Middle East or as a
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