BRUSSEL S FORU M PAPER SER IE S

Will America’s Image

Recover in Europe?
Understanding public opinion since 9/11

John K. Glenn
Director of Foreign Policy
The German Marshall Fund of the United States
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 Will America’s Image Recover in Europe?
Understanding public opinion since 9/11

Brussels Forum Paper Series

March 2008

John K. Glenn
Director of Foreign Policy
The German Marshall Fund of the United States

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
A Gap Between European Publics and Elites? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Anti-Americanism? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Do We See the World Differently? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Difference in Values? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Scenarios for the Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1 Introduction

“Mending America’s image in the world” has
become one of the overarching foreign policy
themes of the U.S. presidential campaigns in 2008.
On the Democratic side, U.S. Senator Hillary
Clinton’s presidential campaign web site declared,
“The next president’s most urgent task will be to
restore America’s standing in the world to promote
our interests, ensure our security, and advance our
values.” 1 U.S. Senator Barack Obama defines his
foreign policy platform in similar language as a
plan “to secure America and restore our standing.” 2
U.S. Senator John Edwards observed: “Our
standing in the world has been badly tarnished
in recent years. America must once again be
looked up to and respected around the world.” 3
This is not simply Democratic criticism. Among
Republican candidates, U.S. Senator John McCain
called to “replenish the world’s faith in our nation
and our principles,” saying that U.S.–European
relations “have frayed.” “As president, one
of my top foreign policy priorities will be to
revitalize the transatlantic partnership.” 4 Former
Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee declared
that the “Bush administration’s arrogant bunker
mentality has been counterproductive at home
and abroad.” 5 And former New York City Mayor
Rudy Giuliani’s “12 commitments” to voters
included his commitment to “strengthening
After a sharp drop in 2003, these figures reversed
and have remained largely unchanged since
2004, with 58% of Europeans who now view U.S.
leadership in world affairs as “undesirable” and
36% who view it as “desirable.”7 (See Chart 1:
Reversal in views of the United States)
Over this time, public debate on both sides of the
Atlantic has wrestled with allegations of secret
CIA prisons in Europe, continued violence in
Iraq, and concerns about human rights in the U.S.
Guantánamo Bay detention facility in Cuba. The
stubbornly negative views of the U.S. leadership
since 2004 deserve concern and attention. How
should we understand the decline in the image of
the United States over this time? Has disagreement
over Iraq transformed into deeper, more enduring
views of the United States? What are the prospects
for recovery under a new U.S. president in 2009?
Chart 1: Reversal In Views
of the United States
80
Desirable
70 Undesirable
64
60
59 59
58 58
Percent

our reputation around the world.” 6

50 49
Public opinion data shows that the image of the 45 39
United States in the world has not recovered 40 36 36
37
from its steep decline following the war in Iraq.
31
For example, 64% of Europeans viewed U.S. 30
leadership in world affairs as “desirable” in 2002,
compared with 31% who saw it as “undesirable.” 20
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
1 
http://www.hillaryclinton.com/issues/security
2 
http://www.barackobama.com/issues/foreign policy
3 
http://www.johnedwards.com/issues/ 7 
All charts in this report, unless otherwise noted, reflect data
4 
McCain, 2007. provided by Transatlantic Trends, 2007.
5 
Huckabee, 2008.
6 
http://www.joinrudy2008.com/issues/view/16

Will America’s Image Recover in Europe? 3

 While the presidential candidates rally supporters
with calls for “change,” many observers warn
against hopes for a quick recovery in the image
of the United States. Richard Haass, president
of the Council on Foreign Relations, has argued
transatlantic relations are unlikely to improve
not because of how we feel about each other but
Managing because of changes in the world. “Alliances require
expectations for predictability: of threat, outlook, and obligations,”
change may be Haass writes. “But it is precisely this characteristic
the foremost task that is likely to be in short supply in a world
for policymakers defined by shifting threats, differing perceptions
in the coming and societies with widely divergent readiness to
maintain and use military force” (Haass, 2007).
administration.
Others warn against unrealistic expectations for
transatlantic relations after the elections. Kori
Schake, former research fellow at the Hoover
Institution, argues that a new president, Democrat
or Republican, is likely to experience a new crisis in
transatlantic relations, “one of rising expectations
unfulfilled.” While Europeans are likely to expect
a more multilateral United States, Americans
are likely to expect Europe to contribute more to
solving common problems, and these expectations
may not be met in either case. This could lead to a
new bitterness or disappointment, at a time when
common challenges remain ever more pressing.
Managing expectations for change may be the
foremost task for policymakers in the coming
administration. European media coverage of the
U.S. election has at times reflected a fascination
with various candidates, leading one observer to
declare, “Germany’s got a crush on Obama.” 8 This
paper grounds these hopes and fears by analyzing
the public opinion data of Transatlantic Trends,
an annual survey of foreign policy attitudes in
8 
Nicholas Kulish, http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.
com/2008/01/06/germanys-got-a-crush-on-obama
4 The German Marshall Fund of the United States
the United States and Europe conducted by the
German Marshall Fund of the United States and
its partners since 2002.9 The findings suggest a
more nuanced view than found in current debates
about anti-Americanism, arguing that fears of great
expectations and renewed disappointment are
exaggerated. American and European publics have
a more sober view of the future of U.S.–European
relations, and the foundation for cooperation can
be seen in similar attitudes on many issues on the
transatlantic agenda. While there continues to be
differences over the use of force, American and
European views on international terrorism, Russia,
and Iran suggest that they do not look at the world
so differently. The new U.S. president will surely
have a chance for a fresh start in transatlantic
relations, but the publics also recognize the
common challenges on the global agenda and
expect more continuity than dramatic change.
9 
Transatlantic Trends is a project of the German Marshall
Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo,
with additional support from the Fundação Luso-Americana,
Fundación BBVA, and the Tipping Point Foundation. The sixth
annual survey is based on a representative sample of public
opinion of 1,000 people in the United States and 12 European
countries: Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, and the
United Kingdom. The survey was conducted from June 4-23,
2007. The polling is conducted by a professional survey research
firm, TNS Opinion, using Computer-Assisted Telephone Inter-
views (CATI) in all countries except Bulgaria, Poland, Slovakia,
Romania, and Turkey, where lower telephone penetration neces-
sitated the use of face-to-face interviews. For results based on
the national samples in each of the 13 countries surveyed, one
can say with a 95% confidence rating that the margin of error at-
tributable to sampling and other random effects is plus or minus
three percentage points. For results based on the total European
sample, the margin of error is plus or minus one percentage
point. Europe-wide figures are weighted on the basis of the size
of the adult population in each country.
2 A gap between European
publics and elites?
In contrast to stubbornly negative views of the
United States among the publics, current U.S.
and European leaders tend to emphasize that
relations have improved significantly in the
Bush administration’s second term. Cooperation
between the United States and the European
Union (led by France, Germany, and the United
Kingdom) to prevent Iran from developing nuclear
weapons is perhaps the most prominent example
of greater consultation and policy coordination,
but the United States and the European Union
have also closely coordinated their diplomacy
over the war in Lebanon, the United Nations
resolution on Kosovo in the Balkans, support for
the democratic opposition in Belarus, and seeking
a solution to the humanitarian crisis in Sudan.
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited
Paris in February 2005 in an effort to change the
tone and improve relations with Europe, and
President Bush traveled to Europe three times in
the first six months of his second term. He became
the first American president to officially visit
the European Union, declaring in Brussels, “The
alliance of Europe and North America is the main
pillar of our security.” 10 European Commission
President José Manuel Barroso observed in 2006,
“EU–U.S. relations have strengthened considerably
over the last year, and we are working together
systematically to address common economic,
political, and environmental challenges.” 11 In
2007, the United States hosted the annual U.S.–EU
Summit in Washington, DC, where American and
European leaders sought to demonstrate improved
relations at the working level with agreements
on economic cooperation and climate change.
President Bush declared, “The closer that the
United States and the European Union become,
February, 2005, remarks by U.S. President Bush in Brussels,
10 
Belgium during his first trip abroad of his second term in office.
11 
EU-U.S. Summit, Vienna 2006. http://ec.europa.eu/comm/
external_relations/us/sum06_06/index.htm
the better off our people become.” 12 German
Chancellor Angela Merkel observed that a “very
close, very strategically oriented transatlantic
partnership is in our mutual interest.” 13
More positive views among European policymakers
can be found beyond their public statements at
summits. A companion survey to Transatlantic
Trends has found that European parliament
members and EU officials have significantly more
positive feelings about the United States than the
European publics on a range of attitudes toward
transatlantic relations. Seventy-four percent
of MEPs and 77% of EU officials feel that U.S.
leadership is desirable, compared with only 36%
of the European publics. Seventy percent of MEPs
and 78% of EU officials believe that NATO is still
essential to their countries security, compared
with 55% of the European publics. More than
twice as many MEPs (35%) and European officials
(34%) believed that U.S.–European relations
improved over the past year, compared with the
European publics (16%).14 (See Chart 2: Views
of European elites on transatlantic relations)
Notably, European publics have elected leaders
in recent years who have sought closer rather
than more distant relations with the United
States. Merkel defeated Gerhard Schröder to
become chancellor of Germany in 2005, despite
Schröder’s efforts to remind voters of his popular
refusal to participate in the Iraq war. Nicolas
Sarkozy was elected president of France after a
campaign proclaiming his admiration for the
United States and desire for closer relations.
Even in the United Kingdom, where the
public has been increasingly critical of British
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/eusummit/2007/index.
12 
html
13 
April 30, 2007, remarks to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
14 
European Elite Survey, 2007. See http://www.gips.unisi.it/
circap/ees_overview for full data and analysis.
Will America’s Image Recover in Europe? 5
 Chart 2: Views of European Elites on Transatlantic Relations

U.S. LEADERSHIP IS DESIRABLE NATO IS ESSENTIAL U.S.-EU RELATIONSHIPS

IMPROVED OVER THE LAST YEAR
100
■ EU Public ■ MEPs ■ EU Officials

80
77 78
74
70
60
Percent

55

40

36 35 34

20

16

Source: European Elite Survey

involvement in Iraq, Prime Minister Tony Blair
was re-elected to a third term in 2006 and his
successor, Gordon Brown, has maintained a
policy of supporting close U.S.–British relations.
Yet despite this, European public views of the
United States remain critical. Asked in June 2005,
Europeans appeared to have been unmoved by
the Bush administration’s efforts to improve
relations, with 52% of Europeans who said that
relations had stayed the same. Americans agreed,
with 50% saying relations had stayed the same.15
15 
Transatlantic Trends, 2005.

6 The German Marshall Fund of the United States

3 Anti-Americanism?

The famous banner headline in the British Daily
Mirror, “How could 59,054,087 people be so
dumb?” on the day after President Bush’s re-
election in 2004 embodied the views of some in
Europe that Bush’s re-election would transform
what had previously been anti-Bush feelings
into anti-Americanism. Recent years have seen a
small growth industry in academic research and
media debate on anti-Americanism (see edited
volumes by Judt and Lacorne, 2007; and Keohane
and Katzenstein, 2006). Despite considerable
attention, the concept and its measurement remain
ambiguous in the scholarly literature. Much of the
recent research has sought to develop typologies of
anti-Americanism to capture significant differences
in sentiment and their expression in different
parts of the world and times. Despite media
attention to the issue, academics have concluded
that “the direct and immediate consequences
of anti-Americanism are surprisingly hard to
identify” (Keohane and Katzenstein, 2006:273).
Public opinion scholars have analyzed the striking
decline in views of the United States in recent
years, but have come to different conclusions.
Andrew Kohut and Bruce Stokes in America
Against the World suggest that what we have seen
is “the growing depth of disenchantment and
discontent with the United States and widening
rift with old allies.” Anti-Americanism, they argue,
is driven in large part by differences in values.
These include a dislike for American foreign
policy, but also for the United States as a symbol
Dutch political scientist Philip Everts has also
observed that the current drop in views of the
United States is deeper than in past periods. Yet
deep-rooted anti-Americanism, he argues, “does
not explain why the virulence of this disposition
can be so different according to time and place
(2007:18).” Analyzing correlations between
views on U.S. policy and Iraq and a range of
indicators, Italian political scientist Pierangelo
Isernia concludes that the results “shed some
doubts on the argument according to which anti-
Americanism is the ground swell of the present
source of tension between Europe and the United
States.” Anti-Americanism, measured by people’s
affective feelings toward the United States, appears
to play no systematic role across the countries
analyzed (France, Germany, Italy, and the United
Kingdom), nor over time. Preferences for “soft
power” or for working closely with allies also do
not correlate systematically with people’s attitudes
toward U.S. policy in Iraq. Rather, the variable that
correlates most closely is people’s attitudes toward
President Bush’s handling of international affairs.
Chart 3: European Views of U.S. Leadership
vs. Views of President Bush
70
64
Desirability of U.S. leadership
60 Approval of President Bush
50
45
40
Percent

of globalization, represented by American popular 36 39 37

38 36
culture and international businesses, such as 30
30 24
McDonald’s or Starbucks. Unlike past episodes 21
of anti-Americanism, Kohut and Stokes argue 20
that current anti-Americanism “runs broader 18 17
10
and deeper.” The 2007 Pew Global Attitudes
Project continues this line: “In much of the
0
world there is a broad and deepening dislike of
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
American values and a global backlash against
the spread of American ideas and customs.”

Will America’s Image Recover in Europe? 7

 The trend data in Transatlantic Trends suggests
Europeans continue to distinguish between
their views of President Bush and their views
of the United States more generally. While
European attitudes toward President Bush’s
handling of international affairs have fallen
from 38% positive in 2002 to 17% in 2007,
Europeans there is a 19-point gap between this figure and
continue to their evaluation of U.S. leadership in world
distinguish affairs. (See Chart 3: The gap between views
between their of the United States and President Bush)
views of President
If these two lines were to converge—that is, if
Bush and their Europeans evaluated the desirability of U.S.
views of the global leadership at the same level as President
United States Bush’s handling of international affairs—the
more generally. data would suggest that anti-Bush sentiment
had become anti-Americanism. The persistence
of this gap, however, suggests that what we are
seeing is not anti-Americanism, per se, so much
as strong disagreement with what America is
doing in the world today. Views of the United
States are strongly influenced by views of the
foreign policies of its president, but they remain
distinct in the minds of many Europeans.
To pursue this question further, the Transatlantic
Trends survey asked Europeans in 2007 to
choose the most important factor behind the
decline in relations between the United States
and Europe—the management of the war in Iraq,
8 The German Marshall Fund of the United States
the treatment of prisoners at Guantánamo Bay,
the non-participation of the United States in the
Kyoto treaty on global warming, and President
Bush himself. Europeans were divided between
the management of the war in Iraq (38%) and
President Bush himself (34%), with very small
percentages who chose the treatment of prisoners
at Guantánamo (4%), an issue embodying the
concern over a decline in America’s legitimacy
or failure to live up to its political ideals, or the
non-participation in the Kyoto treaty (11%),
an issue embodying a concern about broader
differences in values. (See Chart 4: European
views on the reasons for the decline in relations)
It has been widely observed that Europeans viewed
the U.S. decision to go to war in Iraq negatively.
Asked in 2004, the Transatlantic Trends survey
found that 80% of Europeans felt that the war in
Iraq was not worth the loss of life and other costs of
attacking Iraq. Seventy-three percent of Europeans
felt that the war in Iraq increased the threat of
terrorism around the world. There is little reason
to believe that European attitudes have become
more positive. Yet European public opinion on
the decline in U.S.–European relations suggests
that, while European views of President Bush are a
key factor driving their views of the United States,
their views of the war in Iraq carry equal weight.
 Chart 4: Main Reason for Decline in U.S.–European Relations

MANAGEMENT TREATMENT OF U.S. NOT PARTICIPATING PRESIDENT BUSH

OF THE WAR IN IRAQ PRISONERS AT IN THE KYOTO TREATY HIMSELF
GUANTANAMO BAY
40
39
38 38
■ Europe ■ United States
34
30
Percent

20

10 11

5
4
2
0

Will America’s Image Recover in Europe? 9

 4 Do we see the world differently?

Regardless of how Europeans and Americans view
each other, attitudes toward the United States may
be shaped by other factors, such as differences in
ways we see the world or the way we understand
the issues on the global agenda. The United States
and Europe continue to confront ongoing violence
in the Middle East, as well as new challenges in
Cumsan hendio energy security and rising powers such as Russia
con vullaorem and China. Beyond the attacks in Madrid in 2004
zzrilit laorting and London in 2005, failed plots have highlighted
el do exer si tin the threat of international terrorism in Europe,
ulputem iure even among those who felt themselves to be
velendrer sequat. immune from the threat because their countries
were not part of the war in Iraq. The 2007 car bomb
Ummy nissis eum
attack at the airport in Glasgow, Scotland, as well
dolummy nullaor
as recurrent arrests of terror suspects in Italy and
amconsecte Spain, have prompted ongoing debate about the
exercilisl ut threat of terrorism on both sides of the Atlantic.
vullandio odo
Transatlantic Trends has asked every year how
Americans and Europeans view likely threats
over the next ten years. The findings suggest that
American and European threat perception is
similar, perhaps surprisingly so given widespread
debate about transatlantic differences. Large
majorities—topping 70% of Americans and
Europeans—continue to agree on the importance
of a wide range of international threats in the
next ten years, including international terrorism,
Islamic fundamentalism, immigration, the
global spread of disease such as avian flu, global
warming, and the growing power of China.
(See Chart 5: Threat perceptions in 2007)
Overall, Americans reported a higher threat
perception than Europeans on every threat
other than global warming; however, there is a

Chart 5: In the Next Ten Years, How Likely are You to be

Personally Affected by the Following Threats?

ENERGY MAJOR INTER- IRAN IMMIGRANTS/ ISLAMIC GLOBAL EFFECTS

DEPENDENCE ECONOMIC NATIONAL ACQUIRING REFUGEES FUNDAMEN- SPREAD OF GLOBAL
DOWNTURN TERRORISM NUCLEAR TALISM OF DISEASE WARMING
WEAPONS
100

■ Europe ■ United States

88
80 85
80
78
74
72 71 70
65 66
60 63
59 59
Percent

57 57
54

40

20

10 The German Marshall Fund of the United States

striking overlap in two of the three threats by
which Americans and Europeans felt most likely
to be personally affected in 2007. Americans felt
most likely to be personally affected by energy
dependence (88%), an economic downturn (80%),
and international terrorism (74%). Europeans
felt most likely to be personally affected by
global warming (85%), energy dependence
(78%), and international terrorism (66%).
While Americans reported overall higher threat
perceptions, Europeans reported larger changes
since 2005.16 On international terrorism, the
European average rose 16 percentage points. On
Islamic fundamentalism, the European average
increased 15 percentage points. On immigration,
the European average rose 14 percentage points. On
global warming, the European average increased
12 percentage points. The most dramatic rises
in threat perceptions have occurred in Germany,
where some felt themselves to be an “island”
safe from international terrorism since Germany
did not participate in the war in Iraq. Foiled
attacks such as the train bombing in 2006 and
the arrest of a terrorist cell in 2007, however,
provoked vigorous debate about terrorism
and the powers of governments to respond.
German Minister of the Interior Wolfgang
Schäuble sparked controversy by warning that
his country was not immune from attack and
calling for greater governmental authority.
In 2007, 70% of Germans (+32 percentage points
since 2005) felt likely to be personally affected
by international terrorism. Fifty-seven percent
of Germans (+28 percentage points since 2005)
felt likely to be personally affected by Islamic
fundamentalism, and 74% (+26 percentage points
16 
The comparison of this year’s data with 2005 rather than 2006
is because it is the last year in which this question was asked
in the survey. Other years have asked respondents about the
“importance” of global threats.
since 2005) felt likely to be personally affected by
immigration. These changes brought German views
closer to the European averages than in 2005, when
threat perceptions in Germany on international
terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism were
the lowest among the countries surveyed.
These changes in threat perceptions suggest a
Threat perceptions
possible convergence, despite vigorous public
suggest a possible
debate over how to respond. Threat perceptions
raise questions about how to respond, especially convergence,
concerning civil liberties, a complex issue despite vigorous
involving different traditions, institutions, and public debate over
policies. Issues such as government access to the how to respond.
records of public libraries that are controversial
in the United States have no parallel in Europe,
while differences in traditions of data privacy
have led to disagreement over cooperation on
transatlantic travel. Comparison across the
Atlantic is not straightforward as a result, but,
notably, the Transatlantic Trends survey found
broad agreement on where to draw the line on
several aspects of civil liberties in 2006. (See Chart
6: European and U.S. views on civil liberties)
In that survey, 59% of both Americans and
Europeans opposed greater governmental
authority to monitor citizens’ telephone calls as
part of the effort to prevent terrorism. Americans
and Europeans also agreed that governments
should have greater authority to monitor
communications on the Internet (54% of both
Americans and Europeans in favor) and to install
surveillance cameras in public places (71% of
Americans and 78% of Europeans in favor). They
disagreed about greater authority to monitor
banking transactions, with 58% of Americans
opposed and 50% of Europeans in favor.
Beyond public opinion toward international
threats, Transatlantic Trends has analyzed
American and European attitudes toward a
range of foreign policy issues on the transatlantic
Will America’s Image Recover in Europe? 11
 Chart 6: European and U.S. Views on Civil Liberties

INSTALL SURVEILLANCE MONITOR INTERNET MONITOR MONITOR BANKING

CAMERAS COMMUNICATION PHONE CALLS TRANSACTIONS

80
Cumsan hendio
78
con vullaorem ■ Europe ■ United States
zzrilit laorting 71

el do exer si tin 60
ulputem iure
Percent

velendrer sequat. 54 54
50
Ummy nissis eum
dolummy nullaor 40
39 39 39
amconsecte
exercilisl ut
vullandio odo
20

Source: Transatlantic Trends, 2006.

agenda. As noted above, cooperation over
preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons
has been one of the most prominent arenas for
U.S.–European cooperation and coordination.
The United States and the European Union have
maintained a common position toward Iran using
targeted economic sanctions administered by
the UN Security Council, which has previously
passed two resolutions and is considering a third.
Although there have been disputes about the
extent and progress of Iran’s nuclear program,
Barroso has said, “We share the same views,
basically, about how to deal with Iran.” 17
U.S.–EU Summit, April 30, 2007, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
17 
news/releases/2007/04/20070430-2.html
Seventy-two percent of Americans and 59% of
Europeans felt likely to be personally affected
by Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. When
asked what is likely to happen should Iran
acquire nuclear weapons, large majorities of
Americans and Europeans shared a concern with
proliferation, believing that other countries in
the Middle East would decide that they should
have nuclear weapons as well. Large majorities
of Americans and Europeans also worried about
terrorism, believing that Iran would supply
nuclear weapons to terrorists. In contrast,
fewer Americans than Europeans believed that
Iran would use nuclear weapons for defensive
purposes only. (See Chart 7: If Iran were to
acquire nuclear weapons, how likely is that…?”)

12 The German Marshall Fund of the United States

 Chart 7: If Iran were to Acquire Nuclear Weapons, How Likely is it that . . . ?

OTHER COUNTRIES IN IRAN WILL SUPPLY IRAN WILL THREATEN IRAN WILL ONLY USE
THE MIDDLE EAST WILL NUCLEAR WEAPONS EUROPE WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS
DECIDE THAT THEY SHOULD TO TERRORISTS NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES
HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS
100
Iriuscidunt verci
■ Europe ■ United States tinciduisi. Lis ad
80 83
elessi. Um alis
82
dolor si. Ing eum
dolorem nullaor
68 68 67 tionseq uipsum
60
ipsusto dolore
Percent

54 feum quiscil iscilis

52
er si et vent amcor
40 43
ad dio eum vel

20

Overwhelming majorities of Americans and
Europeans strongly support diplomatic efforts
to resolve the issue. When asked which strategy
they would most favor if diplomatic efforts fail,
majorities on both sides of the Atlantic agreed
that diplomatic pressure should be increased,
but differed on whether the option of military
force should be ruled out. (See Chart 8: Should
diplomatic efforts fail, which of the following
strategies would you most favor to prevent
Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons?)
Forty-seven percent of Americans felt that
diplomatic pressure should be increased and the
option of military force should be maintained,
compared with 32% who felt the option should
be ruled out. By contrast, only 18% of Europeans
felt the option of military force should be
maintained, compared with 47% of Europeans
who felt that the option should be ruled out.
Responding to rising powers such as Russia
and China has become a recurrent issue on the
transatlantic agenda in recent years. Although
President Bush has declared that the United States
has “strong working relationships” with Russia and
China, contentious issues remain on the agenda
on both sides of the Atlantic.18 Americans and
Europeans have questioned Russia’s role as an
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
18 
2007/06/20070605-8.html

Will America’s Image Recover in Europe? 13

 Chart 8: Should Diplomatic Efforts Fail, Which of the Following Strategies
Would You Most Favor to Prevent Iran from Acquiring Nuclear Weapons?

ACCEPT THAT IRAN MAINTAIN THE PRESENT INCREASE DIPLOMATIC INCREASE DIPLOMATIC
MAY DEVELOP LEVEL OF DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE ON IRAN PRESSURE ON IRAN
Cumsan hendio NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRESSURE ON IRAN BUT RULE OUT THE USE AND MAINTAIN THE OPTION
OF MILITARY FORCE OF USING MILITARY FORCE
con vullaorem
zzrilit laorting 60
el do exer si tin ■ Europe ■ United States
ulputem iure
velendrer sequat. 47 47
Ummy nissis eum
40
dolummy nullaor
amconsecte
Percent

exercilisl ut 32

vullandio odo
20
19 18

11
7
6
0

energy provider following a dispute that led Russia
to temporarily suspend the delivery of oil to Europe
through Belarus in January 2007, echoing a similar
dispute with Ukraine the year before. In response
to debates about a potential U.S. anti-missile
defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic,
Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov
surprised many when he declared that Russia
would consider targeting its nuclear missiles at
Europe. As members of the UN Security Council,
Russia and China have significant influence over
the issues on the transatlantic agenda, including
sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program,
final status for Kosovo, and action in Sudan.
Asked about Russia, majorities on both sides of
the Atlantic expressed concerns about recent
developments. Seventy-nine percent of Americans
and 65% of Europeans expressed concern about
Russia’s role in providing weapons to countries
in the Middle East. Three-quarters of Americans
expressed concern about the weakening of
democracy inside Russia (compared with 57%
of Europeans), and almost identical majorities
of Europeans and Americans expressed concern
about Russia’s role as an energy provider. Sixty-
nine percent of Americans and 56% of Europeans
expressed concern about Russia’s behavior toward
its neighbors. (See Chart 9: Concerns over Russia)

14 The German Marshall Fund of the United States

 Chart 9: Concerns about Developments in Russia

RUSSIA’S ROLE AS RUSSIA’S BEHAVIOR THE WEAKENING OF RUSSIA’S ROLE IN

AN ENERGY PROVIDER TOWARD ITS NEIGHBORS DEMOCRACY IN RUSSIA PROVIDING WEAPONS
TO THE MIDDLE EAST
80 Iriuscidunt verci
■ Europe ■ United States 79 tinciduisi. Lis ad
75
elessi. Um alis
69
dolor si. Ing eum
60 65
dolorem nullaor
59 58
56 57 tionseq uipsum
ipsusto dolore
feum quiscil iscilis
Percent

40
er si et vent amcor
ad dio eum vel

20

There are differences within Europe as well, with
the markedly higher concern about Russia in
Germany. Germans reported greater concerns than
the European average on all these issues, ranging
from +19 percentage points on the weakening
of democracy inside Russia and +11 percentage
points on Russia’s behavior toward its neighbors.
To summarize, public opinion data does not appear
to support the view that negative attitudes toward
the United States reflect underlying differences in
how we view international threats or pressing issues
on the transatlantic agenda such as the prospects
for a nuclear Iran or rising powers such as Russia.
While there are differences, the similarities and
even convergence in some attitudes challenge
the argument that the prospects for transatlantic
cooperation have been weakened by the war in Iraq.

Will America’s Image Recover in Europe? 15

 5 Difference in values?
Others have argued that negative views of the
United States reflect underlying differences in
values across the Atlantic—Americans are different,
and Europeans dislike them for those differences
(Kohut and Stokes, 2006). These arguments
usually rely on characterizations of Americans
as religious, while Europeans are secular;
Differences over Americans are individualistic, while Europeans
the use of force are collectively-minded; and Americans believe
can be found in in risk and the free market, while Europeans
believe in security and the welfare state. These
public opinion in
policy area after views, while perhaps useful as generalizations,
policy area as well. are difficult to sustain at closer analysis given the
diversity of attitudes among voters in the United
States and across countries in Europe. Other
observers such as historian Robert Kagan have
concentrated on differences in attitudes toward the
use of force, arguing that, as the sole superpower,
the United States has vastly different military
capacities and so will naturally see the world
differently from Europeans, making transatlantic
cooperation increasingly difficult (Kagan, 2004).
One of the most striking findings in Transatlantic
Trends is often noted in support of the argument
concerning the use of force (cited by Kohut and
Stokes, and Kagan). Europeans and Americans
were asked whether they would agree or
disagree with the following statement: “Under
some conditions, war is necessary to obtain
justice.” Remarkably, 74% of Americans agreed
with this statement, compared with 32% of
Europeans in 2007. (See Chart 10: Under some
conditions, war is necessary to obtain justice)
Differences over the use of force can be found
in public opinion in policy area after policy area
as well. In the previous section, we observed
differences in Americans and Europeans over how
to deal with Iran, with Americans much more
supportive than Europeans in keeping the option
of using force on the table. These differences
are also reflected in attitudes toward the current
16 The German Marshall Fund of the United States
Chart 10: Under Some Conditions,
War is Necessary to Obtain Justice
AGREE DISAGREE
■ Europe ■ United States
80
74
60 65
Percent
40
32
20 23
0
mission in Afghanistan. Although many European
countries contribute to the International Security
Assistance Force as part of NATO, debates over the
renewal of the mandate to commit troops provoked
a crisis within the Italian government and were
difficult for Chancellor Merkel in Germany last fall.
Countries like the United Kingdom and Denmark
are gradually increasing their troop presence in
Afghanistan following their redeployment from
Iraq. This has raised concerns that European views
over the use of force, which were so prominent
in the debate over the war in Iraq, have spread to
their views of the mission in Afghanistan, a mission
undertaken with the support of the UN Security
Council in response to the failure of diplomacy.
Public opinion data shows that, on the one
hand, large majorities of Europeans (64%) and
Americans (64%) continue to support contributing
troops to international reconstruction efforts in
Afghanistan. At the same time, Europeans and
Americans do not agree about committing troops
for combat operations against the Taliban, with
the approval of 68% of Americans on the one hand
and only 30% of Europeans on the other. Among
Europeans, the largest support came from the
United Kingdom (51%), the Netherlands (45%),
and France (36%). These findings are all the more
significant considering the debates surrounding
the mission in Afghanistan emphasizing
the difficulties of separating the missions of
reconstruction from combat in a simple manner.
(See Chart 11: Approval of troops in Afghanistan)
Transatlantic differences over the use of force
are real and compelling. Yet, beyond the failures
surrounding the war in Iraq, do Americans and
Europeans feel that we can still work together?
We asked Europeans and Americans in 2004,
one year after the war in Iraq, if they felt that
the United States and the European Union have
enough common values to be able to cooperate
on international problems and found that 60%
of Europeans and 71% of Americans felt that
we do share enough common values. (See
Chart 12: The U.S. and EU share enough values
to cooperate on international problems.)
These findings do not contradict the data over
the use of force, per se. Americans and Europeans
have multiple values that at times compete with
each other for priority in given circumstances. For
example, despite differences over the use of force,
83% of Europeans and 72% of Americans agreed
that economic power is more important in world
affairs than military power. Eighty-one percent Americans and
of Europeans and 89% of Americans agreed that, Europeans
when their country acts on a national security
have multiple
issue, it is critical that it does so together with
values that at
its closest allies. Fifty-four percent of Europeans
times compete
who agreed that the EU should take greater
with each other
responsibility for international threats in 2007
also felt that it should do so in partnership with for priority.
the United States, rather than independently.
Democracy promotion has been identified by
the United States and the European Union as a
shared value and strategic priority for transatlantic
cooperation. The two partners have recently

Chart 12: The U.S. and EU Share

Chart 11: Approval of Troops Enough Values to Cooperate on
in Afghanistan International Problems

TO CONTRIBUTE TO TO CONDUCT COMBAT SUCH DIFFERENT ENOUGH COMMON

INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS AGAINST VALUES THAT VALUES TO BE ABLE TO
RECONSTRUCTION THE TALIBAN COOPERATING COOPERATE
EFFORTS IS IMPOSSIBLE
80 80
■ Europe ■ United States ■ Europe ■ United States
71
68
60 64 64 60
60
Percent
Percent

40 40

34
30
20 20
21

0 0
Source: Transatlantic Trends, 2004.

Will America’s Image Recover in Europe? 17

 Asked whether they would support one or more
policy options to promote democracy, Americans
Chart 13: Democracy Promotion
and Europeans showed strong support for less
intrusive options such as monitoring elections
EUROPE UNITED STATES and supporting independent groups such as trade
80 unions, human rights associations, and religious
■ Support groups. Support declined when asked about more
71 ■ Do not support
Cumsan hendio 60 intrusive or severe options, such as economic
Percent

con vullaorem 56 sanctions, supporting political dissidents, political

zzrilit laorting 40
el do exer si tin 37
ulputem iure
20 23
velendrer sequat.
Ummy nissis eum 0 The trend data in the United States shows
dolummy nullaor
amconsecte
exercilisl ut cooperated closely in the Western Balkans on the
vullandio odo final status of Kosovo, the contested presidential
election in Belarus, and efforts to relieve suffering
in Sudan. Yet developments in the Middle East
such as the elections of a Hamas-led government in
Palestine and a government in Lebanon including
Hezbollah have raised questions about whether
the United States and Europe continue to share the
values of democracy and its promotion abroad.
Interestingly, the data suggests that more
Europeans than Americans support democracy
promotion. Transatlantic Trends asked Europeans
if it should be the role of the European Union to
help establish democracy in other countries and
Americans if it should be the role of the United
States and, remarkably, more Europeans than
Americans supported the goal of democracy
promotion. Seventy-one percent of Europeans
agreed, compared with 37% percent of Americans
in 2007. (See Chart 13: Democracy promotion)
One might explain differences across the Atlantic
by suggesting that Americans and Europeans
mean different things by “democracy promotion,”
but Transatlantic Trends data suggest otherwise.
sanctions, and use of military force, which received
the lowest support among Americans (34%) and
Europeans (24%). (On following page, see Chart
14: How should we promote democracy?)
continued stronger support among Republicans
than Democrats, but a decline in the past three
years in both parties, suggesting that it is in the
United States where attitudes toward democracy
promotion have been negatively influenced
by continued instability in the Middle East.
The public opinion data suggests that negative
views of the United States do not simply reflect
differences in underlying values, even though the
views on the use of force will continue to shape
policy options for dealing with international
challenges. Kagan, in the afterward to the
paperback edition Of Paradise and Power, concedes
that the struggle for legitimacy, not power, may be
“among the critical contests of our time” (2004:108).
The question is not only what policies the United
States pursues, but how it pursues them. Support
for the United Nations is often invoked in this
debate. Transatlantic Trends shows that majorities
on both sides of the Atlantic (61% of Americans
and 71% of Europeans) view the United Nations
favorably. They differ, however, on the necessity
of the United Nations in providing legitimacy
to military force. When asked if it is justified to
bypass the United Nations when the vital interests
of their country are involved, 59% of Americans
agreed, compared with 44% of Europeans in 2004.

18 The German Marshall Fund of the United States

 Chart 14: How Should We Promote Democracy?

MONITORING SUPPORT ECONOMIC POLITICAL SUPPORT MILITARY

ELECTIONS INDEPENDENT SANCTIONS SANCTIONS POLITICAL FORCE
GROUPS DISSIDENTS
80
79
77
■ Europe ■ United States Iriuscidunt verci
71
tinciduisi. Lis ad
67
60
elessi. Um alis
61
dolor si. Ing eum
54
51 51
53 dolorem nullaor
tionseq uipsum
Percent

40 ipsusto dolore
39
feum quiscil iscilis
34
er si et vent amcor
24
ad dio eum vel
20

Source: Transatlantic Trends, 2006.

Will America’s Image Recover in Europe? 19

 6 Scenarios for the future

The candidates for U.S. president in 2008 are not
the only voices calling for the United States to
mend its image abroad and restore its standing.
Joseph Nye, dean of the Kennedy School of
Government at Harvard University and Richard
Armitage, former U.S. deputy secretary of state,
have also argued recently that the United States
The transatlantic must “reinvigorate the alliances, partnerships, and
agenda has institutions that allow us to address numerous
hazards at once without having to build a
become a global
consensus from scratch to respond to every new
agenda on which
challenge.” As this paper has shown, European
the United States
and Europe policymakers have already seen improvement
in transatlantic relations in the second term
are working
of the Bush administration. The transatlantic
together to deal
agenda has become a global agenda on which the
with a range of United States and Europe are working together
international to deal with a range of international threats and
threats and global global challenges, even if by bracketing the war
challenges, even in Iraq. The question is whether and how this
if by bracketing will translate into changes in European public
the war in Iraq.
opinion toward the United States. Anti-Bush
sentiment does not appear to have become anti-
Americanism, but do the persistent negative views
of the United States reflect broader structural
changes that will likely hinder future cooperation?
Whether attitudes toward the United States are
the result of broader, structural changes cannot be
answered by public opinion data alone and may be
definitively answered only in the future. It would
surely be a mistake to generalize too broadly
from a period of intense crisis in transatlantic
relations with one U.S. administration. The data
presented here is well-served by taking a historical
perspective. We know that views of the United
States have fluctuated over time with critical
attitudes toward the United States during the war
in Vietnam in the 1970s or over the deployment
of Pershing missiles in Europe in the 1980s. While
there have been deep drops, there have been
recoveries. Is the current situation different?

Chart 15: Is NATO Still Essential?

90

Average for Britain, France, and Germany

81 82
80

73 74
72
Percent

69 70 69 69
70
67 67 67 67
64 64 64 64 64 65 65 64 65
63 63
61 61
60 58 59 59
57 56

50
69
71
73
76
77

19 8
80
81
82
83
84
87
88
89
90
91
92

19 3
94
95
96
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
04

20 5
06
7

0
19
19
19
19
19
19

19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19

19
19
19
19
19
20
20
20
20
20
20

Source: Data provided by Professor Richard Eichenberg, Tufts University.

20 The German Marshall Fund of the United States

 Chart 16: Prospects for Transatlantic Relations After the 2008 U.S. Elections
WILL STAY THE SAME
50
45 46
40
35 37
30
Percent
25
20
15
10
5 7
While the first Transatlantic Trends survey
was conducted in 2002, there is considerable
longitudinal public opinion data on NATO,
often taken as an indicator of attitudes toward
the transatlantic relationship in general. Since
2002, Transatlantic Trends has seen a decline
in the percentage of Europeans who feel that
NATO is essential to their country’s security,
from 69% in 2002 to 52% in 2007. Chart 15 places
that question in historical perspective for four
countries: Germany, France, Italy, and the United
Kingdom.19 (See Chart 15: Is NATO still essential?)
As indicated in the chart, European attitudes
toward NATO dropped around the Pershing
missile crisis in 1981, the end of the cold war in
1989, and the wars in the Balkans in the mid-
1990s. But in each case, European attitudes
rebounded, and they may do so again.
19 
Data provided by Professor Richard Eichenberg, Tufts University.
WILL IMPROVE WILL GET WORSE
■ Europe ■ United States These findings
42
suggest likely
improvement
35
in views of the
United States
among some
Europeans, but
not a dramatic
upswing based
on expectations
of change.
6
Public opinion data on the future of transatlantic
relations after the elections suggest that Europeans
do not have unrealistic expectations. The
largest percentage of Europeans (46%) felt that
transatlantic relations will stay the same following
the 2008 U.S. presidential election regardless
of who is elected, compared with 35% who felt
relations will improve and 6% who felt relations
will get worse. (See Chart 16: Prospects for
transatlantic relations after the 2008 U.S. elections)
The highest percentage of respondents who
felt relations will improve was in France (51%),
and the highest percentages who felt relations
will remain the same were in Germany (54%)
and Spain (52%). The majority of Europeans
believed that relations either will improve or
could be mended, with only 21% who felt that
relations have simply become “too strained to
recover.” The highest percentages were found in
Portugal (33%), Spain (29%), and Poland (27%).
Will America’s Image Recover in Europe? 21
These findings suggest likely improvement in views
of the United States among some Europeans, but
not a dramatic upswing based on expectations of
change. These findings should not be cause for
concern but reflect a refreshing realism shared by
many European observers as well. As Dominique
Moisi, senior adviser at the Institut Français des
Relations Internationales in Paris, has argued,
“In foreign policy matters, the next president’s
room for maneuver will be very small.” The
largest percentage of Europeans, as noted earlier,
believe that the main reason for the decline is the
management of the war in Iraq, and so, while we
can expect a “honeymoon” period for a new U.S.
president simply because there is a new face in the
White House, prospects for the future will depend
in large part on how a new U.S. administration
22 The German Marshall Fund of the United States
deals with the situation in the Middle East. This
will not be easy, as there are no easy options for
“doing something different” that could mend
relations over the issue that caused the rift.
While Europeans appear unlikely to support a
major shift in their policies toward Iraq or the use
of force, the findings of this paper suggest a fairly
wide-ranging transatlantic agenda for a new U.S.
president, building on the cooperation initiated
in the second Bush administration. This agenda
includes international terrorism, Russia, Iran,
and even Afghanistan. In the election campaigns,
politics is inevitably personalized in hopes and
fears for new leaders, but a reading of the views
of the American and European publics suggest
a more sober, pragmatic view of the future.
7 References
European Elite Survey Key Findings Reports
(2006–2007), University of Siena, available
online at www. gips.unisi.it/circap/ees_overview.
Everts, Philip (2005), “Images of the U.S.—
Three theories of anti-Americanism,” paper
prepared for “Wielding Power: Agenda for
Strategy and Policy Planning,” Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars,
Washington, DC, February 14–15, 2005.
Haass, Richard (2007), “The Atlantic becomes a
little wider,” Financial Times, December 18.
Huckabee, Michael D. (2008), “America’s Priorities
in the War on Terror: Islamists, Iraq, Iran, and
Pakistan,” Foreign Affairs, January/February.
Isernia, Pierangelo (2006), “Anti-Americanism
and European public opinion,” in America
Contested: The limits and future of American
unilaterialism, Sergio Fabbrini, eds.
New York: Routledge, pp. 130–158.
Judt, Tony and Lacorne, Denis eds. (2007),
With Us or Against Us: Studies in global
anti-Americanism, Palgrave Macmillan.
Kagan, Robert (2004), Of Paradise and
Power: America and Europe in the new
world order, New York: Vintage Books.
Keohane, Robert and Katzenstein, Peter J. eds.
(2006). Anti-Americanism in World Politics,
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Kohut, Andrew and Stokes, Bruce (2006), America
Against the World: How we are different and
why we are disliked. New York: Henry Holt.
McCain, John. (2007), “An Enduring Peace Built Iriuscidunt verci
on Freedom: Securing America’s Future,” tinciduisi. Lis ad
Foreign Affairs, November/December. elessi. Um alis
dolor si. Ing eum
Moisi, Dominique (2007), “Barack Obama’s
dolorem nullaor
American Revolution,” Project Syndicate, www.
tionseq uipsum
project-syndicate.org/commentary/moisi25.
ipsusto dolore
Nye, Joseph and Armitage, Richard (2007), feum quiscil iscilis
“Stop Getting Mad, America, Get Smart,” er si et vent amcor
Washington Post, December 10. ad dio eum vel
Pew Global Attitudes Project (2007), Global
Unease with Major World Powers: 47-Nation
Pew Global Attitudes Survey, June 27.
Schake, Kori (2007), “The US and Europe: The
coming crisis of high expectations,” Centre
for European Reform Essays, November.
Transatlantic Trends Key Findings Reports
(2002–2007), German Marshall Fund
of the United States, available online
at www.transatlantictrends.org.
Will America’s Image Recover in Europe? 23
 Will America’s Image Recover in Europe?
Understanding public opinion since 9/11

Brussels Forum Paper Series

March 2008

John K. Glenn
Director of Foreign Policy
The German Marshall Fund of the United States

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
A Gap Between European Publics and Elites? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Anti-Americanism? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Do We See the World Differently? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Difference in Values? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Scenarios for the Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1 Introduction

“Mending America’s image in the world” has
become one of the overarching foreign policy
themes of the U.S. presidential campaigns in 2008.
On the Democratic side, U.S. Senator Hillary
Clinton’s presidential campaign web site declared,
“The next president’s most urgent task will be to
restore America’s standing in the world to promote
our interests, ensure our security, and advance our
values.” 1 U.S. Senator Barack Obama defines his
foreign policy platform in similar language as a
plan “to secure America and restore our standing.” 2
U.S. Senator John Edwards observed: “Our
standing in the world has been badly tarnished
in recent years. America must once again be
looked up to and respected around the world.” 3
This is not simply Democratic criticism. Among
Republican candidates, U.S. Senator John McCain
called to “replenish the world’s faith in our nation
and our principles,” saying that U.S.–European
relations “have frayed.” “As president, one
of my top foreign policy priorities will be to
revitalize the transatlantic partnership.” 4 Former
Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee declared
that the “Bush administration’s arrogant bunker
mentality has been counterproductive at home
and abroad.” 5 And former New York City Mayor
Rudy Giuliani’s “12 commitments” to voters
included his commitment to “strengthening
After a sharp drop in 2003, these figures reversed
and have remained largely unchanged since
2004, with 58% of Europeans who now view U.S.
leadership in world affairs as “undesirable” and
36% who view it as “desirable.”7 (See Chart 1:
Reversal in views of the United States)
Over this time, public debate on both sides of the
Atlantic has wrestled with allegations of secret
CIA prisons in Europe, continued violence in
Iraq, and concerns about human rights in the U.S.
Guantánamo Bay detention facility in Cuba. The
stubbornly negative views of the U.S. leadership
since 2004 deserve concern and attention. How
should we understand the decline in the image of
the United States over this time? Has disagreement
over Iraq transformed into deeper, more enduring
views of the United States? What are the prospects
for recovery under a new U.S. president in 2009?
Chart 1: Reversal In Views
of the United States
80
Desirable
70 Undesirable
64
60
59 59
58 58
Percent

our reputation around the world.” 6

50 49
Public opinion data shows that the image of the 45 39
United States in the world has not recovered 40 36 36
37
from its steep decline following the war in Iraq.
31
For example, 64% of Europeans viewed U.S. 30
leadership in world affairs as “desirable” in 2002,
compared with 31% who saw it as “undesirable.” 20
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
1 
http://www.hillaryclinton.com/issues/security
2 
http://www.barackobama.com/issues/foreign policy
3 
http://www.johnedwards.com/issues/ 7 
All charts in this report, unless otherwise noted, reflect data
4 
McCain, 2007. provided by Transatlantic Trends, 2007.
5 
Huckabee, 2008.
6 
http://www.joinrudy2008.com/issues/view/16

Will America’s Image Recover in Europe? 3

 While the presidential candidates rally supporters
with calls for “change,” many observers warn
against hopes for a quick recovery in the image
of the United States. Richard Haass, president
of the Council on Foreign Relations, has argued
transatlantic relations are unlikely to improve
not because of how we feel about each other but
Managing because of changes in the world. “Alliances require
expectations for predictability: of threat, outlook, and obligations,”
change may be Haass writes. “But it is precisely this characteristic
the foremost task that is likely to be in short supply in a world
for policymakers defined by shifting threats, differing perceptions
in the coming and societies with widely divergent readiness to
maintain and use military force” (Haass, 2007).
administration.
Others warn against unrealistic expectations for
transatlantic relations after the elections. Kori
Schake, former research fellow at the Hoover
Institution, argues that a new president, Democrat
or Republican, is likely to experience a new crisis in
transatlantic relations, “one of rising expectations
unfulfilled.” While Europeans are likely to expect
a more multilateral United States, Americans
are likely to expect Europe to contribute more to
solving common problems, and these expectations
may not be met in either case. This could lead to a
new bitterness or disappointment, at a time when
common challenges remain ever more pressing.
Managing expectations for change may be the
foremost task for policymakers in the coming
administration. European media coverage of the
U.S. election has at times reflected a fascination
with various candidates, leading one observer to
declare, “Germany’s got a crush on Obama.” 8 This
paper grounds these hopes and fears by analyzing
the public opinion data of Transatlantic Trends,
an annual survey of foreign policy attitudes in
8 
Nicholas Kulish, http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.
com/2008/01/06/germanys-got-a-crush-on-obama
4 The German Marshall Fund of the United States
the United States and Europe conducted by the
German Marshall Fund of the United States and
its partners since 2002.9 The findings suggest a
more nuanced view than found in current debates
about anti-Americanism, arguing that fears of great
expectations and renewed disappointment are
exaggerated. American and European publics have
a more sober view of the future of U.S.–European
relations, and the foundation for cooperation can
be seen in similar attitudes on many issues on the
transatlantic agenda. While there continues to be
differences over the use of force, American and
European views on international terrorism, Russia,
and Iran suggest that they do not look at the world
so differently. The new U.S. president will surely
have a chance for a fresh start in transatlantic
relations, but the publics also recognize the
common challenges on the global agenda and
expect more continuity than dramatic change.
9 
Transatlantic Trends is a project of the German Marshall
Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo,
with additional support from the Fundação Luso-Americana,
Fundación BBVA, and the Tipping Point Foundation. The sixth
annual survey is based on a representative sample of public
opinion of 1,000 people in the United States and 12 European
countries: Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, and the
United Kingdom. The survey was conducted from June 4-23,
2007. The polling is conducted by a professional survey research
firm, TNS Opinion, using Computer-Assisted Telephone Inter-
views (CATI) in all countries except Bulgaria, Poland, Slovakia,
Romania, and Turkey, where lower telephone penetration neces-
sitated the use of face-to-face interviews. For results based on
the national samples in each of the 13 countries surveyed, one
can say with a 95% confidence rating that the margin of error at-
tributable to sampling and other random effects is plus or minus
three percentage points. For results based on the total European
sample, the margin of error is plus or minus one percentage
point. Europe-wide figures are weighted on the basis of the size
of the adult population in each country.
2 A gap between European
publics and elites?
In contrast to stubbornly negative views of the
United States among the publics, current U.S.
and European leaders tend to emphasize that
relations have improved significantly in the
Bush administration’s second term. Cooperation
between the United States and the European
Union (led by France, Germany, and the United
Kingdom) to prevent Iran from developing nuclear
weapons is perhaps the most prominent example
of greater consultation and policy coordination,
but the United States and the European Union
have also closely coordinated their diplomacy
over the war in Lebanon, the United Nations
resolution on Kosovo in the Balkans, support for
the democratic opposition in Belarus, and seeking
a solution to the humanitarian crisis in Sudan.
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited
Paris in February 2005 in an effort to change the
tone and improve relations with Europe, and
President Bush traveled to Europe three times in
the first six months of his second term. He became
the first American president to officially visit
the European Union, declaring in Brussels, “The
alliance of Europe and North America is the main
pillar of our security.” 10 European Commission
President José Manuel Barroso observed in 2006,
“EU–U.S. relations have strengthened considerably
over the last year, and we are working together
systematically to address common economic,
political, and environmental challenges.” 11 In
2007, the United States hosted the annual U.S.–EU
Summit in Washington, DC, where American and
European leaders sought to demonstrate improved
relations at the working level with agreements
on economic cooperation and climate change.
President Bush declared, “The closer that the
United States and the European Union become,
February, 2005, remarks by U.S. President Bush in Brussels,
10 
Belgium during his first trip abroad of his second term in office.
11 
EU-U.S. Summit, Vienna 2006. http://ec.europa.eu/comm/
external_relations/us/sum06_06/index.htm
the better off our people become.” 12 German
Chancellor Angela Merkel observed that a “very
close, very strategically oriented transatlantic
partnership is in our mutual interest.” 13
More positive views among European policymakers
can be found beyond their public statements at
summits. A companion survey to Transatlantic
Trends has found that European parliament
members and EU officials have significantly more
positive feelings about the United States than the
European publics on a range of attitudes toward
transatlantic relations. Seventy-four percent
of MEPs and 77% of EU officials feel that U.S.
leadership is desirable, compared with only 36%
of the European publics. Seventy percent of MEPs
and 78% of EU officials believe that NATO is still
essential to their countries security, compared
with 55% of the European publics. More than
twice as many MEPs (35%) and European officials
(34%) believed that U.S.–European relations
improved over the past year, compared with the
European publics (16%).14 (See Chart 2: Views
of European elites on transatlantic relations)
Notably, European publics have elected leaders
in recent years who have sought closer rather
than more distant relations with the United
States. Merkel defeated Gerhard Schröder to
become chancellor of Germany in 2005, despite
Schröder’s efforts to remind voters of his popular
refusal to participate in the Iraq war. Nicolas
Sarkozy was elected president of France after a
campaign proclaiming his admiration for the
United States and desire for closer relations.
Even in the United Kingdom, where the
public has been increasingly critical of British
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/eusummit/2007/index.
12 
html
13 
April 30, 2007, remarks to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
14 
European Elite Survey, 2007. See http://www.gips.unisi.it/
circap/ees_overview for full data and analysis.
Will America’s Image Recover in Europe? 5
 Chart 2: Views of European Elites on Transatlantic Relations

U.S. LEADERSHIP IS DESIRABLE NATO IS ESSENTIAL U.S.-EU RELATIONSHIPS

IMPROVED OVER THE LAST YEAR
100
■ EU Public ■ MEPs ■ EU Officials

80
77 78
74
70
60
Percent

55

40

36 35 34

20

16

Source: European Elite Survey

involvement in Iraq, Prime Minister Tony Blair
was re-elected to a third term in 2006 and his
successor, Gordon Brown, has maintained a
policy of supporting close U.S.–British relations.
Yet despite this, European public views of the
United States remain critical. Asked in June 2005,
Europeans appeared to have been unmoved by
the Bush administration’s efforts to improve
relations, with 52% of Europeans who said that
relations had stayed the same. Americans agreed,
with 50% saying relations had stayed the same.15
15 
Transatlantic Trends, 2005.

6 The German Marshall Fund of the United States

3 Anti-Americanism?

The famous banner headline in the British Daily
Mirror, “How could 59,054,087 people be so
dumb?” on the day after President Bush’s re-
election in 2004 embodied the views of some in
Europe that Bush’s re-election would transform
what had previously been anti-Bush feelings
into anti-Americanism. Recent years have seen a
small growth industry in academic research and
media debate on anti-Americanism (see edited
volumes by Judt and Lacorne, 2007; and Keohane
and Katzenstein, 2006). Despite considerable
attention, the concept and its measurement remain
ambiguous in the scholarly literature. Much of the
recent research has sought to develop typologies of
anti-Americanism to capture significant differences
in sentiment and their expression in different
parts of the world and times. Despite media
attention to the issue, academics have concluded
that “the direct and immediate consequences
of anti-Americanism are surprisingly hard to
identify” (Keohane and Katzenstein, 2006:273).
Public opinion scholars have analyzed the striking
decline in views of the United States in recent
years, but have come to different conclusions.
Andrew Kohut and Bruce Stokes in America
Against the World suggest that what we have seen
is “the growing depth of disenchantment and
discontent with the United States and widening
rift with old allies.” Anti-Americanism, they argue,
is driven in large part by differences in values.
These include a dislike for American foreign
policy, but also for the United States as a symbol
Dutch political scientist, Philip Everts, has also
observed that the current drop in views of the
United States is deeper than in past periods. Yet
deep-rooted anti-Americanism, he argues, “does
not explain why the virulence of this disposition
can be so different according to time and place
(2007:18).” Analyzing correlations between
views on U.S. policy and Iraq and a range of
indicators, Italian political scientist, Pierangelo
Isernia, concludes that the results “shed some
doubts on the argument according to which anti-
Americanism is the ground swell of the present
source of tension between Europe and the United
States.” Anti-Americanism, measured by people’s
affective feelings toward the United States, appears
to play no systematic role across the countries
analyzed (France, Germany, Italy, and the United
Kingdom), nor over time. Preferences for “soft
power” or for working closely with allies also do
not correlate systematically with people’s attitudes
toward U.S. policy in Iraq. Rather, the variable that
correlates most closely is people’s attitudes toward
President Bush’s handling of international affairs.
Chart 3: European Views of U.S. Leadership
vs. Views of President Bush
70
64
Desirability of U.S. leadership
60 Approval of President Bush
50
45
40
Percent

of globalization, represented by American popular 36 39 37

38 36
culture and international businesses, such as 30
30 24
McDonald’s or Starbucks. Unlike past episodes 21
of anti-Americanism, Kohut and Stokes argue 20
that current anti-Americanism “runs broader 18 17
10
and deeper.” The 2007 Pew Global Attitudes
Project continues this line: “In much of the
0
world there is a broad and deepening dislike of
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
American values and a global backlash against
the spread of American ideas and customs.”

Will America’s Image Recover in Europe? 7

 The trend data in Transatlantic Trends suggests
Europeans continue to distinguish between
their views of President Bush and their views
of the United States more generally. While
European attitudes toward President Bush’s
handling of international affairs have fallen
from 38% positive in 2002 to 17% in 2007,
Europeans there is a 19-point gap between this figure and
continue to their evaluation of U.S. leadership in world
distinguish affairs. (See Chart 3: The gap between views
between their of the United States and President Bush)
views of President
If these two lines were to converge—that is, if
Bush and their Europeans evaluated the desirability of U.S.
views of the global leadership at the same level as President
United States Bush’s handling of international affair—the data
more generally. would suggest that anti-Bush sentiment had
become anti-Americanism. The persistence of
this gap, however, suggests that what we are
seeing is not anti-Americanism, per se, so much
as strong disagreement with what America is
doing in the world today. Views of the United
States are strongly influenced by views of the
foreign policies of its president, but they remain
distinct in the minds of many Europeans.
To pursue this question further, the Transatlantic
Trends survey asked Europeans in 2007 to
choose the most important factor behind the
decline in relations between the United States
and Europe—the management of the war in Iraq,
8 The German Marshall Fund of the United States
the treatment of prisoners at Guantánamo Bay,
the non-participation of the United States in the
Kyoto treaty on global warming, and President
Bush himself. Europeans were divided between
the management of the war in Iraq (38%) and
President Bush himself (34%), with very small
percentages who chose the treatment of prisoners
at Guantánamo (4%), an issue embodying the
concern over a decline in America’s legitimacy
or failure to live up to its political ideals, or the
non-participation in the Kyoto treaty (11%),
an issue embodying a concern about broader
differences in values. (See Chart 4: European
views on the reasons for the decline in relations)
It has been widely observed that Europeans viewed
the U.S. decision to go to war in Iraq negatively.
Asked in 2004, the Transatlantic Trends survey
found that 80% of Europeans felt that the war in
Iraq was not worth the loss of life and other costs of
attacking Iraq. Seventy-three percent of Europeans
felt that the war in Iraq increased the threat of
terrorism around the world. There is little reason
to believe that European attitudes have become
more positive. Yet European public opinion on
the decline in U.S.–European relations suggests
that, while European views of President Bush are a
key factor driving their views of the United States,
their views of the war in Iraq carry equal weight.
 Chart 4: Main Reason for Decline in U.S.–European Relations

MANAGEMENT TREATMENT OF U.S. NOT PARTICIPATING PRESIDENT BUSH

OF THE WAR IN IRAQ PRISONERS AT IN THE KYOTO TREATY HIMSELF
GUANTANAMO BAY
40
39
38 38
■ Europe ■ United States
34
30
Percent

20

10 11

5
4
2
0

Will America’s Image Recover in Europe? 9

 4 Do we see the world differently?

Regardless of how Europeans and Americans view
each other, attitudes toward the United States may
be shaped by other factors, such as differences in
ways we see the world or the way we understand
the issues on the global agenda. The United States
and Europe continue to confront ongoing violence
in the Middle East, as well as new challenges in
Cumsan hendio energy security and rising powers such as Russia
con vullaorem and China. Beyond the attacks in Madrid in 2004
zzrilit laorting and London in 2005, failed plots have highlighted
el do exer si tin the threat of international terrorism in Europe,
ulputem iure even among those who felt themselves to be
velendrer sequat. immune from the threat because their countries
were not part of the war in Iraq. The 2007 car bomb
Ummy nissis eum
attack at the airport in Glasgow, Scotland, as well
dolummy nullaor
as recurrent arrests of terror suspects in Italy and
amconsecte Spain, have prompted ongoing debate about the
exercilisl ut threat of terrorism on both sides of the Atlantic.
vullandio odo
Transatlantic Trends has asked every year how
Americans and Europeans view likely threats
over the next ten years. The findings suggest that
American and European threat perception is
similar, perhaps surprisingly so given widespread
debate about transatlantic differences. Large
majorities—topping 70% of Americans and
Europeans—continue to agree on the importance
of a wide range of international threats in the
next ten years, including international terrorism,
Islamic fundamentalism, immigration, the
global spread of disease such as avian flu, global
warming, and the growing power of China.
(See Chart 5: Threat perceptions in 2007)
Overall, Americans reported a higher threat
perception than Europeans on every threat
other than global warming; however, there is a

Chart 5: In the Next Ten Years, How Likely are You to be

Personally Affected by the Following Threats?

ENERGY MAJOR INTER- IRAN IMMIGRANTS/ ISLAMIC GLOBAL EFFECTS

DEPENDENCE ECONOMIC NATIONAL ACQUIRING REFUGEES FUNDAMEN- SPREAD OF GLOBAL
DOWNTURN TERRORISM NUCLEAR TALISM OF DISEASE WARMING
WEAPONS
100

■ Europe ■ United States

88
80 85
80
78
74
72 71 70
65 66
60 63
59 59
Percent

57 57
54

40

20

10 The German Marshall Fund of the United States

striking overlap in two of the three threats by
which Americans and Europeans felt most likely
to be personally affected in 2007. Americans felt
most likely to be personally affected by energy
dependence (88%), an economic downturn (80%),
and international terrorism (74%). Europeans
felt most likely to be personally affected by
global warming (85%), energy dependence
(78%), and international terrorism (66%).
While Americans reported overall higher threat
perceptions, Europeans reported larger changes
since 2005.16 On international terrorism, the
European average rose 16 percentage points. On
Islamic fundamentalism, the European average
increased 15 percentage points. On immigration,
the European average rose 14 percentage points. On
global warming, the European average increased
12 percentage points. The most dramatic rises
in threat perceptions have occurred in Germany,
where some felt themselves to be an “island”
safe from international terrorism since Germany
did not participate in the war in Iraq. Foiled
attacks such as the train bombing in 2006 and
the arrest of a terrorist cell in 2007, however,
provoked vigorous debate about terrorism
and the powers of governments to respond.
German Minister of the Interior Wolfgang
Schäuble sparked controversy by warning that
his country was not immune from attack and
calling for greater governmental authority.
In 2007, 70% of Germans (+32 percentage points
since 2005) felt likely to be personally affected
by international terrorism. Fifty-seven percent
of Germans (+28 percentage points since 2005)
felt likely to be personally affected by Islamic
fundamentalism, and 74% (+26 percentage points
16 
The comparison of this year’s data with 2005 rather than 2006
is because it is the last year in which this question was asked
in the survey. Other years have asked respondents about the
“importance” of global threats.
since 2005) felt likely to be personally affected by
immigration. These changes brought German views
closer to the European averages than in 2005, when
threat perceptions in Germany on international
terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism were
the lowest among the countries surveyed.
These changes in threat perceptions suggest a
Threat perceptions
possible convergence, despite vigorous public
suggest a possible
debate over how to respond. Threat perceptions
raise questions about how to respond, especially convergence,
concerning civil liberties, a complex issue despite vigorous
involving different traditions, institutions, and public debate over
policies. Issues such as government access to the how to respond.
records of public libraries that are controversial
in the United States have no parallel in Europe,
while differences in traditions of data privacy
have led to disagreement over cooperation on
transatlantic travel. Comparison across the
Atlantic is not straightforward as a result, but,
notably, the Transatlantic Trends survey found
broad agreement on where to draw the line on
several aspects of civil liberties in 2006. (See Chart
6: European and U.S. views on civil liberties)
In that survey, 59% of both Americans and
Europeans opposed greater governmental
authority to monitor citizens’ telephone calls as
part of the effort to prevent terrorism. Americans
and Europeans also agreed that governments
should have greater authority to monitor
communications on the Internet (54% of both
Americans and Europeans in favor) and to install
surveillance cameras in public places (71% of
Americans and 78% of Europeans in favor). They
disagreed about greater authority to monitor
banking transactions, with 58% of Americans
opposed and 50% of Europeans in favor.
Beyond public opinion toward international
threats, Transatlantic Trends has analyzed
American and European attitudes toward a
range of foreign policy issues on the transatlantic
Will America’s Image Recover in Europe? 11
 Chart 6: European and U.S. Views on Civil Liberties

INSTALL SURVEILLANCE MONITOR INTERNET MONITOR MONITOR BANKING

CAMERAS COMMUNICATION PHONE CALLS TRANSACTIONS

80
Cumsan hendio
78
con vullaorem ■ Europe ■ United States
zzrilit laorting 71

el do exer si tin 60
ulputem iure
Percent

velendrer sequat. 54 54
50
Ummy nissis eum
dolummy nullaor 40
39 39 39
amconsecte
exercilisl ut
vullandio odo
20

Source: Transatlantic Trends, 2006.

agenda. As noted above, cooperation over
preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons
has been one of the most prominent arenas for
U.S.–European cooperation and coordination.
The United States and the European Union have
maintained a common position toward Iran using
targeted economic sanctions administered by
the UN Security Council, which has previously
passed two resolutions and is considering a third.
Although there have been disputes about the
extent and progress of Iran’s nuclear program,
Barroso has said, “We share the same views,
basically, about how to deal with Iran.” 17
U.S.–EU Summit, April 30, 2007, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
17 
news/releases/2007/04/20070430-2.html
Seventy-two percent of Americans and 59% of
Europeans felt likely to be personally affected
by Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. When
asked what is likely to happen should Iran
acquire nuclear weapons, large majorities of
Americans and Europeans shared a concern with
proliferation, believing that other countries in
the Middle East would decide that they should
have nuclear weapons as well. Large majorities
of Americans and Europeans also worried about
terrorism, believing that Iran would supply
nuclear weapons to terrorists. In contrast,
fewer Americans than Europeans believed that
Iran would use nuclear weapons for defensive
purposes only. (See Chart 7: If Iran were to
acquire nuclear weapons, how likely is that…?”)

12 The German Marshall Fund of the United States

 Chart 7: If Iran were to Acquire Nuclear Weapons, How Likely is it that . . . ?

OTHER COUNTRIES IN IRAN WILL SUPPLY IRAN WILL THREATEN IRAN WILL ONLY USE
THE MIDDLE EAST WILL NUCLEAR WEAPONS EUROPE WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS
DECIDE THAT THEY SHOULD TO TERRORISTS NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES
HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS
100
Iriuscidunt verci
■ Europe ■ United States tinciduisi. Lis ad
80 83
elessi. Um alis
82
dolor si. Ing eum
dolorem nullaor
68 68 67 tionseq uipsum
60
ipsusto dolore
Percent

54 feum quiscil iscilis

52
er si et vent amcor
40 43
ad dio eum vel

20

Overwhelming majorities of Americans and
Europeans strongly support diplomatic efforts
to resolve the issue. When asked which strategy
they would most favor if diplomatic efforts fail,
majorities on both sides of the Atlantic agreed
that diplomatic pressure should be increased,
but differed on whether the option of military
force should be ruled out. (See Chart 8: Should
diplomatic efforts fail, which of the following
strategies would you most favor to prevent
Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons?)
Forty-seven percent of Americans felt that
diplomatic pressure should be increased and the
option of military force should be maintained,
compared with 32% who felt the option should
be ruled out. By contrast, only 18% of Europeans
felt the option of military force should be
maintained, compared with 47% of Europeans
who felt that the option should be ruled out.
Responding to rising powers such as Russia
and China has become a recurrent issue on the
transatlantic agenda in recent years. Although
President Bush has declared that the United States
has “strong working relationships” with Russia and
China, contentious issues remain on the agenda
on both sides of the Atlantic.18 Americans and
Europeans have questioned Russia’s role as an
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
18 
2007/06/20070605-8.html

Will America’s Image Recover in Europe? 13

 Chart 8: Should Diplomatic Efforts Fail, Which of the Following Strategies
Would You Most Favor to Prevent Iran from Acquiring Nuclear Weapons?

ACCEPT THAT IRAN MAINTAIN THE PRESENT INCREASE DIPLOMATIC INCREASE DIPLOMATIC
MAY DEVELOP LEVEL OF DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE ON IRAN PRESSURE ON IRAN
Cumsan hendio NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRESSURE ON IRAN BUT RULE OUT THE USE AND MAINTAIN THE OPTION
OF MILITARY FORCE OF USING MILITARY FORCE
con vullaorem
zzrilit laorting 60
el do exer si tin ■ Europe ■ United States
ulputem iure
velendrer sequat. 47 47
Ummy nissis eum
40
dolummy nullaor
amconsecte
Percent

exercilisl ut 32

vullandio odo
20
19 18

11
7
6
0

energy provider following a dispute that led Russia
to temporarily suspend the delivery of oil to Europe
through Belarus in January 2007, echoing a similar
dispute with Ukraine the year before. In response
to debates about a potential U.S. anti-missile
defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic,
Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov
surprised many when he declared that Russia
would consider targeting its nuclear missiles at
Europe. As members of the UN Security Council,
Russia and China have significant influence over
the issues on the transatlantic agenda, including
sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program,
final status for Kosovo, and action in Sudan.
Asked about Russia, majorities on both sides of
the Atlantic expressed concerns about recent
developments. Seventy-nine percent of Americans
and 65% of Europeans expressed concern about
Russia’s role in providing weapons to countries
in the Middle East. Three-quarters of Americans
expressed concern about the weakening of
democracy inside Russia (compared with 57%
of Europeans), and almost identical majorities
of Europeans and Americans expressed concern
about Russia’s role as an energy provider. Sixty-
nine percent of Americans and 56% of Europeans
expressed concern about Russia’s behavior toward
its neighbors. (See Chart 9: Concerns over Russia)

14 The German Marshall Fund of the United States

 Chart 9: Concerns about Developments in Russia

RUSSIA’S ROLE AS RUSSIA’S BEHAVIOR THE WEAKENING OF RUSSIA’S ROLE IN

AN ENERGY PROVIDER TOWARD ITS NEIGHBORS DEMOCRACY IN RUSSIA PROVIDING WEAPONS
TO THE MIDDLE EAST
80 Iriuscidunt verci
■ Europe ■ United States 79 tinciduisi. Lis ad
75
elessi. Um alis
69
dolor si. Ing eum
60 65
dolorem nullaor
59 58
56 57 tionseq uipsum
ipsusto dolore
feum quiscil iscilis
Percent

40
er si et vent amcor
ad dio eum vel

20

There are differences within Europe as well, with
the markedly higher concern about Russia in
Germany. Germans reported greater concerns than
the European average on all these issues, ranging
from +19 percentage points on the weakening
of democracy inside Russia and +11 percentage
points on Russia’s behavior toward its neighbors.
To summarize, public opinion data does not appear
to support the view that negative attitudes toward
the United States reflect underlying differences in
how we view international threats or pressing issues
on the transatlantic agenda such as the prospects
for a nuclear Iran or rising powers such as Russia.
While there are differences, the similarities and
even convergence in some attitudes challenge
the argument that the prospects for transatlantic
cooperation have been weakened by the war in Iraq.

Will America’s Image Recover in Europe? 15

 5 Difference in values?
Others have argued that negative views of the
United States reflect underlying differences in
values across the Atlantic—Americans are different,
and Europeans dislike them for those differences
(Kohut and Stokes, 2006). These arguments
usually rely on characterizations of Americans
as religious, while Europeans are secular;
Differences over Americans are individualistic, while Europeans
the use of force are collectively-minded; and Americans believe
can be found in in risk and the free market, while Europeans
believe in security and the welfare state. These
public opinion in
policy area after views, while perhaps useful as generalizations,
policy area as well. are difficult to sustain at closer analysis given the
diversity of attitudes among voters in the United
States and across countries in Europe. Other
observers such as historian Robert Kagan have
concentrated on differences in attitudes toward the
use of force, arguing that, as the sole superpower,
the United States has vastly different military
capacities and so will naturally see the world
differently from Europeans, making transatlantic
cooperation increasingly difficult (Kagan, 2004).
One of the most striking findings in Transatlantic
Trends is often noted in support of the argument
concerning the use of force (cited by Kohut and
Stokes, and Kagan). Europeans and Americans
were asked whether they would agree or
disagree with the following statement: “Under
some conditions, war is necessary to obtain
justice.” Remarkably, 74% of Americans agreed
with this statement, compared with 32% of
Europeans in 2007. (See Chart 10: Under some
conditions, war is necessary to obtain justice)
Differences over the use of force can be found
in public opinion in policy area after policy area
as well. In the previous section, we observed
differences in Americans and Europeans over how
to deal with Iran, with Americans much more
supportive than Europeans in keeping the option
of using force on the table. These differences
are also reflected in attitudes toward the current
16 The German Marshall Fund of the United States
Chart 10: Under Some Conditions,
War is Necessary to Obtain Justice
AGREE DISAGREE
■ Europe ■ United States
80
74
60 65
Percent
40
32
20 23
0
mission in Afghanistan. Although many European
countries contribute to the International Security
Assistance Force as part of NATO, debates over the
renewal of the mandate to commit troops provoked
a crisis within the Italian government and were
difficult for Chancellor Merkel in Germany last fall.
Countries like the United Kingdom and Denmark
are gradually increasing their troop presence in
Afghanistan following their redeployment from
Iraq. This has raised concerns that European views
over the use of force, which were so prominent
in the debate over the war in Iraq, have spread to
their views of the mission in Afghanistan, a mission
undertaken with the support of the UN Security
Council in response to the failure of diplomacy.
Public opinion data shows that, on the one
hand, large majorities of Europeans (64%) and
Americans (64%) continue to support contributing
troops to international reconstruction efforts in
Afghanistan. At the same time, Europeans and
Americans do not agree about committing troops
for combat operations against the Taliban, with
the approval of 68% of Americans on the one hand
and only 30% of Europeans on the other. Among
Europeans, the largest support came from the
United Kingdom (51%), the Netherlands (45%),
and France (36%). These findings are all the more
significant considering the debates surrounding
the mission in Afghanistan emphasizing
the difficulties of separating the missions of
reconstruction from combat in a simple manner.
(See Chart 11: Approval of troops in Afghanistan)
Transatlantic differences over the use of force
are real and compelling. Yet, beyond the failures
surrounding the war in Iraq, do Americans and
Europeans feel that we can still work together?
We asked Europeans and Americans in 2004,
one year after the war in Iraq, if they felt that
the United States and the European Union have
enough common values to be able to cooperate
on international problems and found that 60%
of Europeans and 71% of Americans felt that
we do share enough common values. (See
Chart 12: The U.S. and EU share enough values
to cooperate on international problems.)
These findings do not contradict the data over
the use of force, per se. Americans and Europeans
have multiple values that at times compete with
each other for priority in given circumstances. For
example, despite differences over the use of force,
83% of Europeans and 72% of Americans agreed
that economic power is more important in world
affairs than military power. Eighty-one percent Americans and
of Europeans and 89% of Americans agreed that, Europeans
when their country acts on a national security
have multiple
issue, it is critical that it does so together with
values that at
its closest allies. Fifty-four percent of Europeans
times compete
who agreed that the EU should take greater
with each other
responsibility for international threats in 2007
also felt that it should do so in partnership with for priority.
the United States, rather than independently.
Democracy promotion has been identified by
the United States and the European Union as a
shared value and strategic priority for transatlantic
cooperation. The two partners have recently

Chart 12: The U.S. and EU Share

Chart 11: Approval of Troops Enough Values to Cooperate on
in Afghanistan International Problems

TO CONTRIBUTE TO TO CONDUCT COMBAT SUCH DIFFERENT ENOUGH COMMON

INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS AGAINST VALUES THAT VALUES TO BE ABLE TO
RECONSTRUCTION THE TALIBAN COOPERATING COOPERATE
EFFORTS IS IMPOSSIBLE
80 80
■ Europe ■ United States ■ Europe ■ United States
71
68
60 64 64 60
60
Percent
Percent

40 40

34
30
20 20
21

0 0
Source: Transatlantic Trends, 2004.

Will America’s Image Recover in Europe? 17

 Asked whether they would support one or more
policy options to promote democracy, Americans
Chart 13: Democracy Promotion
and Europeans showed strong support for less
intrusive options such as monitoring elections
EUROPE UNITED STATES and supporting independent groups such as trade
80 unions, human rights associations, and religious
■ Support groups. Support declined when asked about more
71 ■ Do not support
Cumsan hendio 60 intrusive or severe options, such as economic
Percent

con vullaorem 56 sanctions, supporting political dissidents, political

zzrilit laorting 40
el do exer si tin 37
ulputem iure
20 23
velendrer sequat.
Ummy nissis eum 0 The trend data in the United States shows
dolummy nullaor
amconsecte
exercilisl ut cooperated closely in the Western Balkans on the
vullandio odo final status of Kosovo, the contested presidential
election in Belarus, and efforts to relieve suffering
in Sudan. Yet developments in the Middle East
such as the elections of a Hamas-led government in
Palestine and a government in Lebanon including
Hezbollah have raised questions about whether
the United States and Europe continue to share the
values of democracy and its promotion abroad.
Interestingly, the data suggests that more
Europeans than Americans support democracy
promotion. Transatlantic Trends asked Europeans
if it should be the role of the European Union to
help establish democracy in other countries and
Americans if it should be the role of the United
States and, remarkably, more Europeans than
Americans supported the goal of democracy
promotion. Seventy-one percent of Europeans
agreed, compared with 37% percent of Americans
in 2007. (See Chart 13: Democracy promotion)
One might explain differences across the Atlantic
by suggesting that Americans and Europeans
mean different things by “democracy promotion,”
but Transatlantic Trends data suggest otherwise.
sanctions, and use of military force, which received
the lowest support among Americans (34%) and
Europeans (24%). (On following page, see Chart
14: How should we promote democracy?)
continued stronger support among Republicans
than Democrats, but a decline in the past three
years in both parties, suggesting that it is in the
United States where attitudes toward democracy
promotion have been negatively influenced
by continued instability in the Middle East.
The public opinion data suggests that negative
views of the United States do not simply reflect
differences in underlying values, even though the
views on the use of force will continue to shape
policy options for dealing with international
challenges. Kagan, in the afterward to the
paperback edition Of Paradise and Power, concedes
that the struggle for legitimacy, not power, may be
“among the critical contests of our time” (2004:108).
The question is not only what policies the United
States pursues, but how it pursues them. Support
for the United Nations is often invoked in this
debate. Transatlantic Trends shows that majorities
on both sides of the Atlantic (61% of Americans
and 71% of Europeans) view the United Nations
favorably. They differ, however, on the necessity
of the United Nations in providing legitimacy
to military force. When asked if it is justified to
bypass the United Nations when the vital interests
of their country are involved, 59% of Americans
agreed, compared with 44% of Europeans in 2004.

18 The German Marshall Fund of the United States

 Chart 14: How Should We Promote Democracy?

MONITORING SUPPORT ECONOMIC POLITICAL SUPPORT MILITARY

ELECTIONS INDEPENDENT SANCTIONS SANCTIONS POLITICAL FORCE
GROUPS DISSIDENTS
80
79
77
■ Europe ■ United States Iriuscidunt verci
71
tinciduisi. Lis ad
67
60
elessi. Um alis
61
dolor si. Ing eum
54
51 51
53 dolorem nullaor
tionseq uipsum
Percent

40 ipsusto dolore
39
feum quiscil iscilis
34
er si et vent amcor
24
ad dio eum vel
20

Source: Transatlantic Trends, 2006.

Will America’s Image Recover in Europe? 19

 6 Scenarios for the future

The candidates for U.S. president in 2008 are not
the only voices calling for the United States to
mend its image abroad and restore its standing.
Joseph Nye, dean of the Kennedy School of
Government at Harvard University and Richard
Armitage, former U.S. deputy secretary of state,
have also argued recently that the United States
The transatlantic must “reinvigorate the alliances, partnerships, and
agenda has institutions that allow us to address numerous
hazards at once without having to build a
become a global
consensus from scratch to respond to every new
agenda on which
challenge.” As this paper has shown, European
the United States
and Europe policymakers have already seen improvement
in transatlantic relations in the second term
are working
of the Bush administration. The transatlantic
together to deal
agenda has become a global agenda on which the
with a range of United States and Europe are working together
international to deal with a range of international threats and
threats and global global challenges, even if by bracketing the war
challenges, even in Iraq. The question is whether and how this
if by bracketing will translate into changes in European public
the war in Iraq.
opinion toward the United States. Anti-Bush
sentiment does not appear to have become anti-
Americanism, but do the persistent negative views
of the United States reflect broader structural
changes that will likely hinder future cooperation?
Whether attitudes toward the United States are
the result of broader, structural changes cannot be
answered by public opinion data alone and may be
definitively answered only in the future. It would
surely be a mistake to generalize too broadly
from a period of intense crisis in transatlantic
relations with one U.S. administration. The data
presented here is well-served by taking a historical
perspective. We know that views of the United
States have fluctuated over time with critical
attitudes toward the United States during the war
in Vietnam in the 1970s or over the deployment
of Pershing missiles in Europe in the 1980s. While
there have been deep drops, there have been
recoveries. Is the current situation different?

Chart 15: Is NATO Still Essential?

90

Average for Britain, France, and Germany

81 82
80

73 74
72
Percent

69 70 69 69
70
67 67 67 67
64 64 64 64 64 65 65 64 65
63 63
61 61
60 58 59 59
57 56

50
69
71
73
76
77

19 8
80
81
82
83
84
87
88
89
90
91
92

19 3
94
95
96
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
04

20 5
06
7

0
19
19
19
19
19
19

19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19

19
19
19
19
19
20
20
20
20
20
20

Source: Data provided by Professor Richard Eichenberg, Tufts University.

20 The German Marshall Fund of the United States

 Chart 16: Prospects for Transatlantic Relations After the 2008 U.S. Elections
WILL STAY THE SAME
50
45 46
40
35 37
30
Percent
25
20
15
10
5 7
While the first Transatlantic Trends survey
was conducted in 2002, there is considerable
longitudinal public opinion data on NATO,
often taken as an indicator of attitudes toward
the transatlantic relationship in general. Since
2002, Transatlantic Trends has seen a decline
in the percentage of Europeans who feel that
NATO is essential to their country’s security,
from 69% in 2002 to 52% in 2007. Chart 15 places
that question in historical perspective for four
countries: Germany, France, Italy, and the United
Kingdom.19 (See Chart 15: Is NATO still essential?)
As indicated in the chart, European attitudes
toward NATO dropped around the Pershing
missile crisis in 1981, the end of the cold war in
1989, and the wars in the Balkans in the mid-
1990s. But in each case, European attitudes
rebounded, and they may do so again.
19 
Data provided by Professor Richard Eichenberg, Tufts University.
WILL IMPROVE WILL GET WORSE
■ Europe ■ United States These findings
42
suggest likely
improvement
35
in views of the
United States
among some
Europeans, but
not a dramatic
upswing based
on expectations
of change.
6
Public opinion data on the future of transatlantic
relations after the elections suggest that Europeans
do not have unrealistic expectations. The
largest percentage of Europeans (46%) felt that
transatlantic relations will stay the same following
the 2008 U.S. presidential election regardless
of who is elected, compared with 35% who felt
relations will improve and 6% who felt relations
will get worse. (See Chart 16: Prospects for
transatlantic relations after the 2008 U.S. elections)
The highest percentage of respondents who
felt relations will improve was in France (51%),
and the highest percentages who felt relations
will remain the same were in Germany (54%)
and Spain (52%). The majority of Europeans
believed that relations either will improve or
could be mended, with only 21% who felt that
relations have simply become “too strained to
recover.” The highest percentages were found in
Portugal (33%), Spain (29%), and Poland (27%).
Will America’s Image Recover in Europe? 21
These findings suggest likely improvement in views
of the United States among some Europeans, but
not a dramatic upswing based on expectations of
change. These findings should not be cause for
concern but reflect a refreshing realism shared by
many European observers as well. As Dominique
Moisi, senior adviser at the Institut Français des
Relations Internationales in Paris, has argued,
“In foreign policy matters, the next president’s
room for maneuver will be very small.” The
largest percentage of Europeans, as noted earlier,
believe that the main reason for the decline is the
management of the war in Iraq, and so, while we
can expect a “honeymoon” period for a new U.S.
president simply because there is a new face in the
White House, prospects for the future will depend
in large part on how a new U.S. administration
22 The German Marshall Fund of the United States
deals with the situation in the Middle East. This
will not be easy, as there are no easy options for
“doing something different” that could mend
relations over the issue that caused the rift.
While Europeans appear unlikely to support a
major shift in their policies toward Iraq or the use
of force, the findings of this paper suggest a fairly
wide-ranging transatlantic agenda for a new U.S.
president, building on the cooperation initiated
in the second Bush administration. This agenda
includes international terrorism, Russia, Iran,
and even Afghanistan. In the election campaigns,
politics is inevitably personalized in hopes and
fears for new leaders, but a reading of the views
of the American and European publics suggest
a more sober, pragmatic view of the future.
7 References
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(2006–2007), University of Siena, available
online at www. gips.unisi.it/circap/ees_overview.
Everts, Philip (2005), “Images of the U.S.—
Three theories of anti-Americanism,” paper
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Wilson International Center for Scholars,
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Haass, Richard (2007), “The Atlantic becomes a
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Huckabee, Michael D. (2008), “America’s Priorities
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Judt, Tony and Lacorne, Denis eds. (2007),
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dolorem nullaor
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tionseq uipsum
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ipsusto dolore
Nye, Joseph and Armitage, Richard (2007), feum quiscil iscilis
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Will America’s Image Recover in Europe? 23
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