RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED

Before Criminal Prosecution: (before arraignment)

o Right to due process (Sec. 14(1))

o Custodial rights (Sec. 12)
o Right to be informed of his rights
o Right to remain silent
o Right to counsel
o Right to bail (Sec. 13)
o Right to speedy disposition of his case (Sec. 16)
o Right of free access to the courts

During Criminal Prosecution: (after arraignment up to promulgation of judgment)

o Right to presumption of innocence (Sec. 14(2))

o Right to be heard by himself and counsel (Sec. 14(2))
o Right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him (Sec. 14(2))
o Right to have speedy, impartial and public trial (Sec. 14(2))
o Right to confrontation (Sec. 14(2))
o Right to have compulsory process to secure attendance of witnesses and production of evidence on his
behalf (Sec. 14(2))
o Right against self-incrimination (Sec. 17)
o Right against double jeopardy (Sec. 21)
o 9.Right against ex-post facto law and bill of attainder (Sec. 22)

After Conviction:

o Right against excessive fines and cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment (Sec. 19)
 SECTION 12
Custodial Rights

Sec. 12: (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be
used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention
are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as
compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.

PURPOSE: To put the accused on equal footing with the State

"in custody" - includes deprivation or mere restriction on physical liberty

Custodial Investigation – investigation conducted by law enforcer immediately after arrest

The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine – all evidence (the fruit) derived from an illegal search (the
poisonous tree) must be suppressed, whether it was obtained directly through the illegal search itself, or
indirectly using information obtained in the illegal search

“But For” Test – or taint doctrine; the evidence would not have come to light but for the illegal action of
the police

WHEN CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION BEGINS:

1. Restrictive View - limited to in-custody interrogations as when the accused has been arrested and
brought to the custody of the police for questioning
2. Expanded View – contemplates two situations: (1) general inquiry as to identification, circumstances of a
crime without focus on any suspect; and (2) suspicion is focused on a person and questions are asked
from him to elicit admissions or information

**Under the expanded view, general inquiry as to identification, like in a police line-up, is not considered
part of “custodial investigation” hence the accused may be identified by a witness in a police line-up even
if made not in the presence of counsel

NOT PART OF CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION:

o Police line-up, or during process of identification

o Spontaneous statement not elicited through questioning, but given in an ordinary manner (spur-of-the-
moment statements) – res gestae
o Volunteered statements
o Extrajudicial admission to the prosecutor or a private person
o Investigation made by a citizen or private security officer

Miranda Doctrine: Rights Under Custodial Investigation

By custodial investigation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the
procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused
persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following
measures are required: Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has the right to
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he
has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive
effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If,
however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an
attorney before speaking, there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in
any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that
he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him
of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and
thereafter consents to be questioned. (Miranda vs. Arizona, 16 L. Ed 2d 694)

Extrajudicial Confessions to Mayor and Media Admissible

Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's confession before the mayor
is inadmissible. It is true that a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control" over the local
police and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1)
and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However, appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in
response to any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all. No police
authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and
voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that appellant was going to
confess his guilt to him. When appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law
enforcement officer, his uncounseled confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights.
Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary
manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the Constitution bars is
the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 are
guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit
something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Hence, we hold that
appellant's confession to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.

Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The confessions were made in
response to questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. We have held
that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed
voluntary and are admissible in evidence (People vs. Andan, G.R. No. 116437, March 3, 1997)
  RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT

Refers not only to testimonial confessions but also to acts but does not apply to acts that are merely
mechanical (does not require use of intelligence) or to general questions (e.g. What is your name?)

 RIGHT TO INDEPENDENT AND COMPETENT COUNSEL

-absolute, even if accused himself is a lawyer

Accused must be apprised of his rights under custodial investigation

Extrajudicial confessions are presumed voluntary, and, in the absence of conclusive evidence showing
the declarant’s consent in executing the same has been vitiated, such confession will be sustained.
xxx

But what renders the confession of accused-appellant inadmissible is the fact that accused-appellant
was not given the Miranda warnings effectively. Under the Constitution, an uncounseled statement,
such as it is called in the United States from which Art. III, §12(1) was derived, is presumed to be
psychologically coerced. Swept into an unfamiliar environment and surrounded by intimidating figures
typical of the atmosphere of police interrogation, the suspect really needs the guiding hand of counsel.

Mere Perfunctory Reading of Miranda Warnings not Enough

There was thus only a perfunctory reading of the Miranda rights to accused-appellant without any effort
to find out from him whether he wanted to have counsel and, if so, whether he had his own counsel, or he
wanted the police to appoint one for him. This kind of giving of warnings, in several decisions of this
Court, has been found to be merely ceremonial and inadequate to transmit meaningful information to the
suspect. Especially in this case, care should have been scrupulously observed by the police investigator
that accused-appellant was specifically asked these questions considering that he only finished the fourth
grade of the elementary school.

xxx

Independent Counsel

Moreover, Art. III, §12(1) requires that counsel assisting suspects in custodial interrogations be
competent and independent. Here, accused-appellant was assisted by Atty. De los Reyes, who, though
presumably competent, cannot be considered an "independent counsel" as contemplated by the law
because he was station commander of the WPD at the time he assisted accused-appellant. (People vs.
Obrero, G.R. No. 122142, May 17, 2000)
 SECTION 13
Right to Bail

Sec. 13: All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence
of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

 Available whether the case has already been filed for as long as the person has been denied his
liberty or otherwise deprived thereof
 A mode to ensure the attendance of the accused at his trial

2 KINDS OF BAIL:

o Bail Bond
o Cash – money, not check
o Property – real property, not personal property (because value depreciates
o Surety – similar to insurance

o Recognizance

GENERAL RULE: Available to all persons, not exclusively to those already formally charged of a
crime. Any person who is under detention and custody and deprived of his liberty may avail himself of
this right.

EXCEPTIONS:

o Reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, and death when evidence of guilt is strong
o Military men facing charges before court martial
o Recidivists, habitual delinquents, quasi-recidivists, person who violated his probation or parole, even if
penalty is less than six years
o Extradition or deportation proceedings
o Contempt in legislative inquiry

RIGHTS INCLUDED:

1. Right to a hearing, which may be summary and does not have to be separate and distinct from the trial
itself
2. Prosecution has right to present evidence – if this is denied, the grant of bail is void

WHEN A MATTER OF RIGHT:

o MTC - before and after conviction (less than 6 years imprisonment)

o RTC - before conviction, below reclusion perpetua and even if evidence of guilt is strong
o Minority - even if reclusion perpetua or death and evidence of guilt is strong; a privileged mitigating
circumstance (lower by two degrees, the highest penalty that can be imposed is only reclusion temporal)
o Reclusion Perpetua or higher if evidence of guilt is not strong
 NOTA BENE:

o If the accused is convicted and penalty of more than 6 years imprisonment is imposed, the trial court
should cancel the bail, if he has been provisionally released. It becomes discretionary only upon the court
whether to grant the accused provisional liberty on the same bail bond.
o When the charge is punishable by reclusion perpetua or higher, hearing for grant of bail is mandatory to
comply with due process of law. The prosecution should also be allowed to present evidence.

WHEN A MATTER OF DISCRETON:

o RTC - after conviction, below reclusion perpetua but more than 6 years imprisonment
o Reclusion Perpetua or death - before conviction
o Minority - after conviction for more than 6 years imprisonment
o CA - accused was charged with murder but was convicted with homicide, which conviction was appealed
to the CA; the trial court should deny bail, but the CA has discretion whether to let the accused out on
provisional liberty

WHEN BAIL SHALL BE DENIED:

o MTC - recidivist, habitual delinquent, quasi-recidivist, violated parole or probation

o RTC - charged with reclusion perpetua and evidence of guilt is strong, even if convicted of lesser penalty;
or after conviction for offense punishable by death or reclusion perpetua

Habeas Corpus vis-à-vis Bail; When Bail may be Cancelled

Habeas Corpus: When it is available

Habeas corpus could be invoked by petitioner if he were able to show the illegality of his detention.
There is aptness and accuracy in the characterization of the writ of habeas corpus as the writ of liberty.
Rightfully it is latitudinarian in scope. It is wide-ranging and all-embracing in its reach. It can dig deep
into the facts to assure that there be no toleration of illegal restraint. Detention must be for a cause
recognized by law. The writ imposes on the judiciary the grave responsibility of ascertaining whether a
deprivation of physical freedom is warranted. This it must discharge without loss of time. The party who
is keeping a person in custody must produce him in court as soon as possible. What is more, he must
justify the action taken. Only if it can be demonstrated that there has been no violation of one's right to
liberty will he be absolved from responsibility. Unless there be such a showing, the confinement must
thereby cease.

Remedy of Habeas Corpus not available when there is Warrant of Arrest

Petitioner's deprivation of liberty is in accordance with a warrant of arrest properly issued after a
determination by the judge in compliance with the constitutional provision requiring the examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses produced. No allegation to the contrary
may be entertained. It cannot be denied that petitioner's co-accused, Nelso Unal, Hermogenes Lumanglas
and Leopoldo Trinidad, had previously come to this court to challenge the filing of one information where
there were three victims. Accordingly, this Court, in Unal v. People required three separate amended
information. There was no question, however, as to the legality of the warrants of arrest previously issued,
not only in the case of the parties in such petition, but likewise of petitioner. Habeas corpus, under the
circumstances, would not therefore lie."

Bail, concept, rationale

To be more matter of fact about it, there is this excerpt from de la Camara v. Enage "Before conviction,
every person is bailable except if charged with capital offense when the evidence of guilt is strong. Such
a right flow from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be
subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thereby a regime of liberty is honored in the observance and not in
the breach. A bail is intended as a guarantee that such an intent would be thwarted. It is, in the language
of Cooley, a mode short of confinement which would, with reasonable certainty, insure the attendance of
the accused for the subsequent trial. Nor is there anything unreasonable in denying this right to one
charged with a capital offense when evidence of guilt is strong, as the likelihood is, rather than await the
outcome of the proceeding against him with a death sentence, an ever-present threat, temptation to flee
the jurisdiction would be too great to be resisted."

Can bail be cancelled without violating the right to bail?

"'The constitutional mandate that all persons shall before conviction be bailable except those charged with
capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong, is subject to the limitation that the person applying for
bail should be in custody of the law, or otherwise deprived of his liberty. The purpose of bail is to secure
one's release and it would be incongruous as to grant bail to one who is free.'" Secondly, and what is
worse, the prosecution was never given a chance to present its evidence. The authoritative doctrine in
People v. San Diego is thus squarely in point: "Whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in
custody for a capital offense be resolved in summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the
prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may
desire to introduce before the Court should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in the criminal case involved
in the instant special civil action, the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a
violation of procedural due process, and order of the Court granting bail should be considered void."
(Mendoza vs. CFI, G.R. No. L-35612-14, June 27, 1973)

Exceptions to the “No Bail” Rule

After a potential extradite has been arrested or placed under the custody of the law, bail may be applied
for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted
bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist
special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those
cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition
cases therein.
 SECTION 14
Right to Due Process, to be Presumed Innocent, Speedy Trial

Sec. 14: (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and
shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face,
and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in
his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused
provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

DUE PROCESS

 Procedural, not substantive

 Procedure established by law for the prosecution of offenses must be followed

STEPS:

1. Preliminary examination by judge to determine probable cause for issuance of warrant of arrest
2. Arrest and interrogation by authorities
3. Preliminary investigation by the prosecutor to determine probable cause for purposes of filing information
4. Filing of information in court
5. Arraignment
6. Preliminary conference
7. Pre-trial conference
8. Presentation of evidence by prosecution
9. Presentation of evidence by defense
10. Rebuttal
11. Offer of evidence
12. Decision
13. Promulgation of judgment

NOTA BENE: The absence of preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of a criminal
information, nor does it otherwise render it defective, neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court
over the case.

PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE

 Burden of proof lies on his accusers to prove him guilty

 Equiponderance of Evidence (Equipoise Doctrine) – when preponderance of evidence is at
equipoise, court will find for the defendant; when the scale stand at an equipoise and there is
nothing in evidence to incline it either way, the court shall rule against the party who has the
burden of proof

Proof beyond reasonable doubt – not to be equated with absolute certainty; moral certainty, or
that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind

Prosecution has Burden of Proof

It is axiomatic that conviction should be made on the basis of a strong, clear and compelling evidence
(People v. Tulagan, 143 SCRA 107 [1986]. Thus, "if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable
of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other
consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the tests of moral certainty and is not sufficient
to support a conviction" (People v. Ale, 145 SCRA 64 [1986]; People v. Modesto, 25 SCRA 36 [1968]).

To overcome the presumption of innocence, proof beyond reasonable doubt is needed. Thus, in People v.
Dramayo, 42 SCRA 60 [1971], this Court held:

Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt; the prosecution must
overthrow the presumption of innocence with proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. To meet this
standard, there is need for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the state, both oral and
documentary, independently of whatever defense is offered by the accused. Only if the judge below and
the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the
person on trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required
that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must
survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. (People vs.
Austria, G.R. No. L-55109, April 8, 1991)

Presumption of Innocence vs. Presumption of Regularity of Performance of Official Duty

The foregoing circumstances militate against affirming appellant's conviction. For the same reason, we
cannot stamp with approval the trial court's undue reliance with the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty. While SPO1 Alilio is presumed to have regularly performed his official duty, this
presumption alone cannot by itself support a judgment of conviction. Indeed, under our Constitution,
an accused, no matter how despicable the crime for which he may have been charged, still enjoys
the presumption of innocence. And this presumption prevails over the presumption of regularity of
 the performance of official duty. Nor can it be overcome by just an ordinary proof to the contrary for to
convict an accused, no less and nothing more than proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary. In this
case, the threshold issue is whether or not the guilt of the appellant has been established by this required
quantum of proof? We rule in the negative. Accordingly, we reverse his conviction based on reasonable
doubt. (People vs. Briones, G.R. No. 113498, Jan. 16, 1997)

Equipoise Doctrine

The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is applicable only where the evidence of the parties is evenly
balanced, in which case the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the
accused. There is no such equipoise here. The evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming and has not
been overcome by the petitioner with his nebulous claims of persecution and conspiracy. The presumed
innocence of the accused must yield to the positive finding that he malversed the sum of P50, 310.87 to
the prejudice of the public whose confidence he has breached. His conviction must be affirmed. (Corpuz
vs. People, G.R. No. 74259, Feb. 14, 1991)

RIGHT TO BE HEARD

Right to be present at the trial

o Accused has an absolute right to be personally present during the entire proceedings from arraignment to
sentence, if he so desires.
o Limited only to trial court proceedings and only to the actual trial therein, not to appellate proceedings or
proceedings subsequent to the entry of final judgment, looking only to the execution of the sentence

GENERAL RULE: Accused may waive his right to be present during trial.

EXCEPTIONS: (Presence of Accused is Mandatory)

o Arraignment and plea – presence of lawyer is also indispensable

o during trial, for identification
o during the promulgation of sentence, unless for a light offense wherein the accused may appear by
counsel or a representative

NOTA BENE:

o If the judgment is one of acquittal, the accused need not be present.

o If the judgment is conviction but for a light offense, the accused need not be present.
o If the judgment is conviction and the offense is grave, the presence of the accused is mandatory.
o If trial in absentia and judgment is rendered, it will be promulgated even without presence of accused but
he will be furnished with copies sent to his last known address.
o If appeal, presence of the accused is not necessary. It is the duty of the appellate court to appoint counsel,
whose presence is indispensable.

Right to counsel

o If the accused appears without an attorney, he must be informed by the court of such right before being
arraigned, and must be asked if he desires to have the aid of counsel
o If he can’t afford one, a counsel de officio shall be appointed for him
o The indispensable aid of counsel continues even at the stage of appeal
o Not waivable
o The right to be represented by counsel is ABSOLUTE, but the option of the accused to hire one of his
own choice is LIMITED

Right to an impartial judge

o A judge who had conducted the preliminary investigation and made a finding of probable cause is not
disqualified from trying the case, in the absence of evidence of partiality

Right of confrontation

o Available only during trial, not during preliminary investigation

o REASON: so defendant may make objection to the witness or so witness may identify him
o Right to cross-examine
o If the defense counsel deferred cross-examination of the prosecution witness and then this witness dies,
accused cannot anymore ask the witness’ direct examination to be expunged from the records since the
denial of the right to confrontation is through no fault of plaintiff.

EXCEPTIONS:

1. Dying Declaration
2. Trial in absentia - REQUISITES: (1) accused has been arraigned; (2) accused has been duly notified of
the date of trial; (3) failure of the accused to appear is unjustified
3. Depositions - witness is dead, insane or otherwise cannot be found, with due diligence, in the Philippines

Right to compulsory processes

2 KINDS OF SUBPOENA:

1. Ad testificandum - to compel a witness to attend and testify

2. Duces Tecum - to compel a person having under his control documents or papers relevant to the case to
bring such items to court during trial

RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION

o presence of accused is indispensable during arraignment and promulgation of judgment of conviction

o after arraignment, only formal amendments to the Information may be granted by court
o not waivable
o description, not designation of the offense, controls
o all the attending aggravating and qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the Information and proved
during trial; EXCEPT: for purposes of proving moral damages only, then it is allowed to be proved even
if not alleged
 RIGHT TO SPEEDY, IMPARTIAL AND PUBLIC TRIAL

- Available in every criminal prosecution

“Speedy” - It means a trial free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. But justice and
fairness, not speed, are the objectives.

NOTA BENE: If the accused is acquitted on ground of denial of his right to speedy trial, it is a judgment
on the merits and therefore, first jeopardy attaches.

“Impartial” - absence of bias or prejudice

“Public” - open to the free observation of all

- EXCEPT: evidence to be adduced at the trial is of such character as to be offensive to decency and
public morals

SECTION 16
Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases

Sec. 16: All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-
judicial, or administrative bodies.

**Covers all phases of any judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative proceedings, including custodial and
preliminary investigation of an accused.

Inordinate Delay in Preliminary Investigation Violative, Exception to the Rule

We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the
instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial adherence
to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial
compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor,
is part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under
the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of "speedy
disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987
Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close to
three (3) years cannot be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the
case at bar. We are not impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by
indulging in the speculative assumption that "the delay may be due to a painstaking and gruelling scrutiny
by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation merited
prosecution of a former high ranking government official." In the first place, such a statement suggests a
double standard of treatment, which must be emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges
against the petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities
required by Republic Act No. 3019, which certainly did not involve complicated legal and factual issues
necessitating such "painstaking and gruelling scrutiny" as would justify a delay of almost three years in
terminating the preliminary investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged bribery and alleged
giving of unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more substantial legal and factual issues,
certainly do not warrant or justify the period of three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the
case.

It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary investigation should not be
deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a preliminary investigation does not warrant dismissal of
the information. True-but the absence of a preliminary investigation can be corrected by giving the
accused such investigation. But an undue delay in the conduct of a preliminary investigation cannot be
corrected, for until now, man has not yet invented a device for setting back time. (Tatad vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 72335-39, March 21, 1988)

Delay in Preliminary Investigation, Not Violative

Petitioner cannot complain that her constitutional rights to due process were violated by reason of the
delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation. According to her, while the offense was
allegedly committed "on or before October 17, 1988", the information was filed only on May 9, 1991 and
the amended information on December 8, 1992 (Rollo, p. 14).
Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70 [1988] is inapplicable to petitioner's case. In Tatad, there indeed
was an unexplained inaction on the part of the public prosecutors in spite of the simplicity of the legal and
factual issues involved therein.

In the case at bench, there was a continuum of the investigatory process but it got snarled because of the
complexity of the issues involved. The act complained of in the original information came to the attention
of the Ombudsman only when it was first reported in the January 10, 1989 issue of the Manila Standard.
Immediately thereafter, the investigatory process was set in motion. The investigation was first assigned
to Special Prosecutor Gualberto dela Llana but on request of petitioner herself the investigation was re-
assigned to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. The case was handled by a panel of four
prosecutors, who submitted a draft resolution for the filing of the charges on March 29, 1990. The draft
resolution had to undergo the hierarchy of review, normal for a draft resolution with a dissenting vote,
until it reached the Ombudsman in March 1991.

We note that petitioner had previously filed two petitions before us involving Criminal Case No. 16698
(G.R. Nos. 99289-99290; G.R. No. 107598). Petitioner has not explained why she failed to raise the issue
of delay in the preliminary investigation and the filing of the information against her in those petitions. A
piece-meal presentation of issues, like the splitting of causes of action, is self-defeating (Santiago vs.
Garchitorena, G.R. No. L-109266, Dec. 2, 1993)
 SECTION 17
Right Against Self-Incrimination

Sec. 17: No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

o Available both before or during criminal prosecution

o Accused is competent to testify in his behalf, but he is entitled to the right not to testify as a witness
against himself. He cannot be compelled to incriminate himself; that is, to say or do anything that can be
used against himself
o Accused can invoke this right from the beginning; however in case of witness, he can invoke this right
only when the questions start to become incriminating

RATIONALE:

1. Public policy
2. Humanity

GENERAL RULE: The accused cannot be compelled to testify against his co-accused under the theory
that the “act of one is the act of all.”

EXCEPTIONS:

o If he is discharged as a state witness

o After he is convicted or acquitted
o By trying him separately instead of jointly with his other co-accused
 SECTION 19
Right Against Excessive Fines and Cruel, Degrading or Inhuman Punishment

Sec. 19: (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted.
Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the
Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua.

(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or
detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be
dealt with by law.

Excessive fines – flagrantly disproportionate to the offense no matter what circumstances the offense was
committed

Cruel and unusual punishment – in its form; duration or amount; in flagrant disproportion between the
offense and the punishment

SECTION 21
Right Against Double Jeopardy

Sec. 21: No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished
by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.

Double Jeopardy – two perils or dangers of being tried and punished

2 KINDS:
1. Same Offense (First sentence of Sec. 21)

REQUISITES:

o First jeopardy
o A valid complaint and information
o A court of competent jurisdiction
o Arraignment and valid plea
o First jeopardy has been terminated
o Second jeopardy for the same offense – includes an attempt or frustration of the same offense or it
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the other

“Terminated” – either by conviction, acquittal or dismissal upon the merit without consent of the
accused

CONVICTION: a judgment declaring the accused guilty of the offense charged and imposing upon him
 the penalty provided by law; accused may appeal and this is not double jeopardy
ACQUITTAL: a termination of the case based upon the merits of the issue; prosecution cannot appeal
anymore
DISMISSAL: a termination of the case other than upon the merits thereof; first jeopardy only attaches if
dismissal without consent of accused

NOTA BENE:

o Consent means approval, acquiescence, conformity, agreement, etc. Mere silence of the accused should
not be construed as consent.
o Even if the motion to dismiss was filed by the accused, the dismissal is equivalent to acquittal if it is
grounded on (1) insufficiency of evidence (demurrer to evidence after prosecution has rested its case); (2)
denial of the right to speedy trial
o Supervening Facts – when the second offense was not in existence when the first offense was charged and
tried, then another information may be filed or the present information may be amended (substantial)

2.Act Punished by a Law and Ordinance (Second sentence of Sec. 21)

o this will only apply if the accused has been either convicted or acquitted
o if the case was only dismissed not upon the merits, the prosecution may re-file

Provisional Dismissal

Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:

Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. – A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express
consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.

The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of
any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case
having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years,
their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the
case having been revived.
Having invoked said rule before the petitioners-panel of prosecutors and before the Court of Appeals, the
respondent is burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first paragraph thereof, namely:

1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin
perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal
of the case;
2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;
3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally;
4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case.

The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second
paragraph of the new rule. The raison d’ etre for the requirement of the express consent of the accused to
a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is to bar him from subsequently asserting that the revival of the
criminal case will place him in double jeopardy for the same offense or for an offense necessarily
included therein.
Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of dismissal shall become permanent
one year after the issuance thereof without the case having been revived, the provision should be
construed to mean that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after service of the order
of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of the prosecution without the criminal case having
been revived. The public prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served
with a copy of the order of dismissal.
Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in writing. It is a positive, direct,
unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to supply its meaning. Where the accused
writes on the motion of a prosecutor for a provisional dismissal of the case No objection or with my
conformity, the writing amounts to express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of the case.
The mere inaction or silence of the accused to a motion for a provisional dismissal of the case or his
failure to object to a provisional dismissal does not amount to express consent.

A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an express consent to such provisional
dismissal. If a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused, the case
may be revived only within the periods provided in the new rule. On the other hand, if a criminal case is
provisionally dismissed without the express consent of the accused or over his objection, the new rule
would not apply. The case may be revived or refiled even beyond the prescribed periods subject to the
right of the accused to oppose the same on the ground of double jeopardy or that such revival or refiling
is barred by the statute of limitations.

The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar either by the refiling of the Information or by the
filing of a new Information for the same offense or an offense necessarily included therein. There would
be no need of a new preliminary investigation. However, in a case wherein after the provisional dismissal
of a criminal case, the original witnesses of the prosecution or some of them may have recanted their
testimonies or may have died or may no longer be available and new witnesses for the State have
emerged, a new preliminary investigation must be conducted before an Information is refiled or a new
Information is filed. A new preliminary investigation is also required if aside from the original accused,
other persons are charged under a new criminal complaint for the same offense or necessarily included
therein; or if under a new criminal complaint, the original charge has been upgraded; or if under a new
criminal complaint, the criminal liability of the accused is upgraded from that as an accessory to that as
a principal. The accused must be accorded the right to submit counter-affidavits and evidence. After all,
“the fiscal is not called by the Rules of Court to wait in ambush; the role of a fiscal is not mainly to
prosecute but essentially to do justice to every man and to assist the court in dispensing that justice.”

In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that the first and second requisites of the first paragraph
of the new rule were present when Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-
81689. Irrefragably, the prosecution did not file any motion for the provisional dismissal of the said
criminal cases. xxx

xxx

Since the conditions sine qua non for the application of the new rule were not present when Judge Agnir,
Jr. issued his resolution, the State is not barred by the time limit set forth in the second paragraph of
Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The State can thus revive or refile
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or file new Informations for multiple murder against the
respondent. (People vs. Lacson, G.R. No. 149453, April 1, 2003)
 SECTION 22
No Ex Post Facto Law or Bill of Attainder

Sec. 22: No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.

Ex post facto law – one that punishes an act which was not punishable when committed; or aggravates a
crime or makes it greater than when committed; or changes the laws on evidence so that lesser evidence is
needed for conviction than when the act was done

Bill of Attainder – a law which inflicts punishment without benefit of judicial trial

ELEMENTS OF EX POST FACTO LAW:

1. Penal
2. Retroactive
3. Disadvantageous to the accused
4. Must take from the accused any right that was regarded, at the time of the adoption of the constitution as
vital for the protection of life and liberty and which he enjoyed at the time of the commission of the
offense charged against him

ELEMENTS OF BILL OF ATTAINDER:

1. There is a law
2. The law imposes a penal burden on a specified individual or an easily ascertainable members of a group
3. The penal burden is imposed directly by the law without judicial trial