LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY V CA, GR NO.

110120 (MARCH 16, 1994)

FACTS:

The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City Government of Caloocan was maintaining
an open dumpsite at the Camarin area without first securing an Environment Compliance Certificate from
the Environmental Management Bureau of the DENR, as required by law (PD 1586) and clearance from
the LLDA as required under Republic Act No. 4850 and issued a CEASE and DESIST ORDER (CDO) for
the City Government of Caloocan to stop the use of the dumpsite.

ISSUES:

1. Does the LLDA and its amendatory laws, have the authority to entertain the
complaint against the dumping of
garbage in the open dumpsite in Barangay Camarin authorized by the City Government of Caloo
can?
2. Does the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a "cease and desist" order?

RULING:

1. YES, LLDA has authority. It must be recognized in this regard that the
LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4
850 and its amendatory law s to carry out and make effective the declared national policy
of promoting and accelerating the
development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Ri
zal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan with due
regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the
quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances,
deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant and power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its
special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the
Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of w
astes from the surrounding areas.

2. YES, pursuant to EO 927 Section 4. While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has
only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law , it is likewise a settled rule that an
administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its ex
press powers. In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter as a
regulatory and quasijudicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the
authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied. NOTE: HOWEVER,
writs of mandamus and injunction are beyond the power of the LLDA to issue.

Doctrine:

It is presumed that an administrative agency if afforded an opportunity to pass upon a matter,

would decide the same correctly, or correct any previous error committed in its forum.
UNION BANK VS. CA

FACTS:

On September 16, 1997, private respondents EYCO Group of Companies (EYCO),[1] Eulogio O.
Yutingco, Caroline Yutingco-Yao, and Theresa T. Lao (the Yutingcos), all of whom are controlling
stockholders of the aforementioned corporations, jointly filed with the SEC a Petition for the Declaration of
Suspension of Payment[s], Formation and Appointment of Rehabilitation Receiver/Committee, Approval
of Rehabilitation Plan with Alternative Prayer for Liquidation and Dissolution of Corporations[2] alleging,
among other things, that, the present combined financial condition of the petitioners clearly indicates that
their assets are more than enough to pay off the credits but that due to factors beyond control and
anticipation of the management xxx the inability of the EYCO Group of Companies to meet the obligations
as they fall due on the schedule agreed with the [creditors] has now become a stark reality.[3] In a
footnote to said petition[4] the Yutingcos justified their inclusion as co-petitioners before the SEC on the
ground that they had personally bound themselves to EYCOs creditor under a J.S.S. Clause (Joint
Several Solidary Guaranty).

Upon finding the above petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the SEC Hearing Panel then
composed of Manolito S. Soller, George P. Palmares and Rommel G. Olivia issued an order[5] dated
September 19, 1997 setting its hearing on October 22, 1997. At the same time, said panel also directed
the suspension of all actions, claims and proceedings against private respondents pending before any
court, tribunal, office, board and/or commission.

Meanwhile, some of private respondents creditor, composed mainly of twenty-two (22) domestic banks
(the consortium)[6] including herein petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines,[7] also convened on
September 19, 1997 for the purpose of deciding their options in the event that private respondents invoke
the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 902-A, as amended.

Without notifying the members of the consortium, petitioner, however, decided to break away from the
group by suing private respondents in the regular courts.

In the meantime, the SEC issued an order[11] on October 3, 1997, appointing (a) Amelia B. Cabal of SGV
& Co., as common representative; (b) Inoncencio Deza, Jr., of the Philippine National Bank as
representative of the creditor-banks; and (c) Atty. Florencio B. Orendain as representative of the EYCO
Group and the Yutingcos, to act collectively as interim receivers of the distressed corporations.

Aside from commencing suits in the regular courts, petitioner also vehemently opposed private
respondents petition for suspension of payments in the SEC by filing a Motion to Dismiss on October 22,
1997.[12] It contended that the SEC was bereft of jurisdiction over such petition on the ground that the
inclusion of the Yutingcos in the petition cannot be allowed since the authority and power of the
Commission under the (sic) virtue of [the] law applies only to corporations, partnership[s] and other forms
of associations, and not to individual petitioners who are not clearly covered by P.D. 902-A as amended.
According to petitioner, what should have been applied instead was the provision on suspension of
payments under Act No. 1956, otherwise known as the Insolvency Law, which mandated the filing of the
petition in the Regional Trial Court and not in the SEC. Finally, petitioner disputed private respondents
recourse to suspension of payments alleging that the latter prejudiced their creditors by fraudulently
disposing of corporate properties within the 30-day period prior to the filing of such petition.

Subsequently, a creditors meeting was again convened pursuant to SECs earlier order dated September
19, 1997, wherein the matter of creating a management committee (the Mancom) was submitted for
resolution. Apparently, only petitioner opposed the creation of said Mancom as it filed earlier with the SEC
its Motion to Dismiss.
The SEC Hearing Panel composed of Hon. Fe Eloisa C. Gloria and Manolito S. Soller subsequently
issued an Omnibus Order[13] on October 27, 1997, directing this time the creation of the Mancom
consisting of seven (7) members; four (4) of whom shall come from the creditor banks, one (1) from the
non-bank creditors, one (1) from the petitioners and one (1) to be appointed by the SEC. Moreover, the
panel likewise granted an earlier Urgent Motion for Reconsideration filed by creditor banks which sought
to annotate the September 19, 1997 suspension order on the titles of the properties of the private
respondent corporations. In issuing said order, the panel resolved that the interest of private respondents
and their creditors could be best served if such Mancom is created. It is noteworthy, however, that this
directive expressly stated that the same was without prejudice to the resolution of petitioners Motion to
Dismiss whose scheduled hearing was set by petitioner itself on October 29, 1997.

Aggrieved, petitioner immediately took recourse to the Court of Appeals on October 29, 1997 by filing
therewith a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction[14] under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It imputed grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the SEC Hearing Panel in precipitately issuing the suspension order
dated September 19, 1997 and in prematurely directing the creation of the Mancom prior to the scheduled
hearing of its Motion to Dismiss on October 29, 1997. Petitioner lamented that these actions of the panel
deprived it of due process by effectively rendering moot and academic its Motion to Dismiss which
allegedly presented a prejudicial question to the propriety of creating a Mancom. Furthermore, it insisted
that jurisdiction over private respondents petition properly pertained to the Regional Trial Courts under
Act No. 1956 and that, in any event, private respondents were not entitled to suspension of payments
since they had already committed fraudulent dispositions of their properties.

Without giving due course to Union Banks petition, the appellate court issued a resolution[15] on October
31, 1997 directing private respondents to submit their comment on the petition while temporarily
restraining the SEC from appointing the members of Mancom, annotating the suspension orders on the
titles of the properties of private respondents, and taking further proceedings with regard to the
suspension of payments and/or rehabilitation.

Meanwhile, members of so-called steering committee of the consortium composed of the Philippine
National Bank, Far East Bank and Trust Company, Allied Bank, Traders Royal Bank, Philippine
Commercial International Bank, Bank of Commerce, and Westmont Bank (the Intervenors) filed with the
appellate court an Urgent Motion for Intervention[16] and a Consolidated Intervention and Counter-Motion
for Contempt and for the Imposition of Disciplinary Measures Against Petitioners Counsel[17] both dated
November 3, 1997 claiming that they were not impleaded at all by petitioner in its petition before the
appellate court when in fact they had actual, material, direct and legal interest in the outcome of said case
as owners of at least eighty-five percent (85%) of private respondents obligations. Moreover, they
opposed said petition because of petitioners ostensible failure to exhaust administrative remedies in the
consortium and in the SEC and for being guilty of forum-shopping in the appellate court as its Motion to
Dismiss in the SEC was yet to be resolved at the time.

Petitioner, however, countered intervenors motion in its Opposition to Urgent Motion for Intervention and
Reply to the Comment-in-Intervention,[18] vehemently challenging the existence of a consortium, its
membership therein, the intervenors ownership of at least eighty-five percent (85%) of private
respondents obligations and their due representation of the twenty-two (22) creditor banks, the existence
of an agreement drawn up during the September 19, 1997 meeting regarding the satisfaction of the
individual exposures of the creditor banks, and its consent to the creation of the Mancom. It also denied
intervenors accusation of forum-shopping and non-exhaustion of administrative remedies on the ground
that it was acting with a sense of urgency, the Hearing Panel having already created the Mancom and
was about to appoint the members thereof at the same time.

After several exchanges of pleadings between the parties, the Court of Appeals First Division finally
rendered its assailed decision[19] on December 22, 1997, granting intervention of the seven (7) creditor
banks named above while dismissing the petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and
forum-shopping. Nothing in the said decision, however, indicates that the appellate court squarely
confronted the issue of jurisdiction raised earlier by petitioner.

Without moving for reconsideration of the appellate courts decision, petitioner elevated the said matter to
this Court through a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction[20] filed on December 29 1997. Petitioner, however, seasonably
amended[21] the same on January 5, 1998.

Upon being notified by petitioner that the SEC Hearing Panel had already appointed members of the
proposed Mancom on January 5, 1998,[22] this Court issued a resolution[23] on January 6, 1998,
granting the temporary restraining order (TRO) prayed for in the petition and requiring all the respondents
to comment thereon.

Both EYCO and the Yutingcos duly filed their Comment[24] on January 14, 1998 asking the Court to cite
petitioner and its counsel for contempt because of deliberate forum shopping, assailing the propriety of
the temporary restraining order which we issued, and arguing that Union Banks petition should be
dismissed outright for (1) categorizing it as having been filed both under Rule 45 and Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) failing to move for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals; (3) failing to
implead indispensable parties; (4) raising factual allegations of fraud; (5) forum shopping; and (6) failing
to exhaust administrative remedies.

On January 27, 1998, the intervenors before the appellate court also came to as through an Urgent
Manifestation,[25] seeking the outright dismissal of the petition on grounds of forum-shopping and failure
to implead them as indispensable parties which allegedly violated Section 4, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure requiring that the petition should state the name of the appealing party as the petitioner
and the adverse party as respondent.

For their part, the interim receivers who are also impleaded as private respondents in the instant petition,
filed their own Comment[26] on January 30, 1998, likewise contending that petitioner failed to exhaust
administrative remedies when it leap-frogged to the Court of Appeals and that, in any case, the SEC had
jurisdiction to entertain private respondents petition for suspension of payments.

In response to the respective comments of private respondents and interim receivers, petitioner filed its
Consolidated Reply and Opposition[27] on February 5, 1998, reiterating its earlier position that (1) the
SEC had no jurisdiction to entertain private respondents petition for suspension of payments; (2) private
respondents are already bankrupt because of the alleged fraudulent disposition they have made and
hence, are no longer entitled to the remedy of suspension of payments; (3) prior motion for
reconsideration is not indispensable when, as in this case, there is an actual threat that the Mancom
members would soon be appointed; (4) intervenors are not indispensable parties; and (5) there is no
forum-shopping.

Complaining that daily interests on its outstanding debts continue mounting by the millions and that the
work of SEC-appointed interim receivers has been paralyzed for quite some time, private respondents
filed an Urgent Motion[28] on February 12, 1998 praying that the temporary restraining order be lifted for
the preservation of their assets and to pave the way for rehabilitation. They likewise asked, among other
things, that their motion to cite petitioner and its counsel for contempt be immediately resolved.

Petitioner, in turn, filed a Motion to Cite Yutingcos and Their Counsel in Contempt[29] for allegedly
misleading this Court in stating that Union Bank failed to pay the required deposit for costs, that they were
not served a copy of the Amended Petition, and that they never nominated Sycip, Gorres, Velayo & Co.
(the SGV) is rehabilitation receiver.
ISSUE:

Whether petitioner engaged in forum-shopping and failed to exhaust administrative remedies in taking
direct recourse to the Court of Appeals to challenge the assumption of jurisdiction by the SEC Hearing
panel over private respondents petition for suspension of payments.

HELD:

The underlying principle of the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies rests on the presumption that
the administrative agency, if afforded a complete chance to pass upon the matter, will decide the same
correctly. There are both legal and practical reasons for the principle. The administrative process is
intended to provide less expensive and more speedy solutions to disputes. Where the enabling statute
indicates a procedure for administrative review and provides a system of administrative appeal or
reconsideration, the courts --- for reason of law, comity, and convenience --- will not entertain a case
unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have
been given an opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum.

In this case, petitioner was actually not without remedy to correct what it perceived and supposed was an
erroneous assumption of jurisdiction by the SEC without having recourse immediately to the Court of
Appeals.

DOCTRINE:

Whenever there is an available administrative remedy provided by law, no judicial recourse can
be made until all such remedies have been availed of and exhausted.
CABALLES VS. SISON

FACTS:

On December 1, 1994, the Samahan ng Mga Optometrist sa Pilipinas (SOP), through its President,
Charlie L. Ho, filed a Letter-Affidavit[2] with the Board of Optometry of the Professional Regulations
Commission (PRC), charging Emma Emperado-Dreyfus, Ma. Teresita C. Caballes, Filemon P. Esquivel,
Jr. and Vladimir L. Ruidera, all employees of Vision Express Philippines, Inc. (VEPI), with unethical and/or
unprofessional conduct. Thus:

The undersigned, as President of the Samahan ng mga Optometrist sa Pilipinas (SOP), is writing in behalf of the
association to bring to your attention and proper action possible violations of certain provisions of the Code of
Ethics for Optometrists.

Under Section 3 (e), article III of the Code of Ethics for Optometrists, it is considered unethical and unprofessional
conduct to xxx (hold) oneself to the public as an optometrist under the name of any corporation, company,
institution, clinic, association, parlor, or any other name than the name of the optometrist.

Applying said provision to the subject of this letter, please be informed that the following duly licensed optometrists

1. Emma Emperado-Dreyfus PRC Lic. No. 4433

2. Ma. Teresita C. Caballes PRC Lic. No. 4189
3. Filemon P. Esquivel, Jr. PRC Lic. No. 5629
4. Vladimir L. Ruidera 1994 Board passer

may have possibly committed an infraction considering the following circumstances:

1. They have been employed by a corporation named Vision Express Phils., Inc. since September 1994 up to the
present;

2. Vision Express Phils., Inc. is a corporation that has been charged with illegally engaging in the practice of
optometry before the Securities and Exchange Commission under SEC PED Case No. 94-1732;

3. Since they have been employed by the corporation, it is inevitable that they associate themselves with and
represent themselves to the public as part of the corporation, thus, adopting the name of the corporation instead of
their own in practicing their profession;

4. By consenting to the present arrangement, and knowing that the corporation is engaging in activities solely
reserved for optometrists, they have allowed themselves to be part of the corporations illegal practice of
optometry.[3]

The complaint was supported by affidavits executed by Charlie Ho, [4] Emelito Tecson,[5] and Digna
Marcelo.[6] In his affidavit, Ho averred as follows:

2. Sometime in September 1994, an establishment under the name of Vision Express (VEPI henceforth) opened at
the 4th level-Annex-B Building of the SM Megamall in Mandaluyong.

3. On or about October 1994, I personally visited the said establishment and was able to talk to Dr. Emma
Emperado-Dreyfus, store manager, in connection with the optometrists employed by the corporation who render
optometric services to the public, to wit:

a. Emma Emperado-Dreyfus PRC Lic. No. 4433

b. Ma. Teresita C. Caballes PRC Lic. No. 4189
 c. Filemon P. Esquivel, Jr. PRC Lic. No. 5629
d. Vladimir L. Ruidera 1994 Board passer

4. On said occasion, it was admitted to me by said Dr. Dreyfus, but without disclosing their identities, that there are
several optometrists employed by the corporation.

5. As optometrists employed by the corporation, I saw Dr. Dreyfus and Dr. Esquivel in the establishment rendering
services for the corporation in furtherance of the practice of optometry.

6. There were also other individuals in the establishment performing eye examinations on patients with the use of an
auto-refractor, whose identities are established by the affidavits of Emelito Tecson and Digna Marcelo, hereto
attached as Annexes A and B, respectively.[7]

The complaint was docketed as Adm. Case No. 157. The respondents therein submitted a Joint
Counter-Affidavit[8] where they admitted being employees of VEPI, but denied that they were engaged in
the practice of optometry. They alleged that Ho was guilty of unprofessional and unethical conduct, and
prayed that he be stripped of his professional license as optometrist. They averred that the complaint was
malicious and unfounded, and that Ho was moved by malice and bad faith in bringing forth the
complaint. They likewise accused Ho of trying to perpetuate a monopoly of the optical shop business.
Ho submitted his Reply-Affidavit,[9] while the respondents therein submitted their Rejoinder-
Affidavit.[10] Pre-trial then ensued. Thereafter, on August 14, 1995, Teresita Caballes and Valdimir Ruidera
filed a Motion to Dismiss[11] the complaint for its failure to state a cause of action. The petitioners made the
following averments:
1. During the last hearing of the instant case on July 20, 1995, plaintiff admitted before this
Honorable Commission that he did not see respondents Teresita Caballes and Vladimir
Ruidera rendering services for the corporation in furtherance of the practice of optometry;
2. The affidavits of plaintiffs witnesses Emil (sic) Tecson and Digna Marcelo do not indicate any
participation of the respondents to the incidents set forth by the said witnesses; neither are
the respondents identified in the said affidavits.
3. Since plaintiffs complaint failed to set forth distinctly, clearly and concisely the charge or
charges or the offense or offenses complained of against respondents Teresita Caballes and
Vladimir Ruidera, they should be discharged as respondents and the cases against them be
dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.[12]
The complainant Charlie Ho filed his opposition thereto.[13]
On September 26, 1995, the Board of Optometry issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss, thus:

Again, the Board of Optometry finds the motion to be without basis. The complainant has properly identified the
respondents as employees in the Vision Corporation, a fact which they themselves admitted in their counter-
affidavits. The only question now which is to be proven is, can they be held guilty for unethical and/or
unprofessional conduct by the nature of their employment in said optical clinic?

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Board of Optometry resolve[s] as it hereby resolves to:

a) Order the respondents to answer the request for admission made by the complainant dated July 31, 1995.

b) Deny the Motion To Dismiss filed by the respondents for lack of merit. [14]

The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration[15] of the said order which was, however, also denied
by the Board.[16] It ruled that a reading of the complaint-affidavit reveals that there was, indeed, a cause of
action, as the petitioners were charged with alleged violation of Section 6(e) and (j) of Article III of the Code
of Ethics of Optometrists. According to the Board, that the complaint-affidavit made no mention of the details
as to how the unprofessional or undesirable conduct was committed would not justify the dismissal of the
complaint. The Board stated that rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid or technical sense.
The petitioners, thereafter, filed a petition for certiorari with application for preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order with the Court of Appeals.
The petition was dismissed for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals held that a defendant who moves
to dismiss a complaint on the ground of failure to state a cause of action is deemed to have hypothetically
admitted the allegations therein. Invoking the test of sufficiency, the CA held that the sole element furnishing
the said test is usually the complaint itself, and no other. The absence of proof to substantiate an allegation
in the complaint does not mean that the complaint is insufficient, only that it is unsupported by
evidence. According to the CA, this could be the judgment of the Board in its decision after trial. At this
stage, the Board could not be said to have acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioners
motion to dismiss.
The appellate court also ruled that an order denying a motion to dismiss, being interlocutory in nature,
cannot be the subject of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The remedy of the losing party in such case
is to proceed to trial, and, in case an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal in due time, assigning the
denial of the motion to dismiss as an error. The appellate court added that it would not preempt the Board
of Optometry from deciding on the case.
Thus, the petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with
prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction and/or restraining order to enjoin the Board from further
proceeding with the case.
According to the petitioners, in dismissing their petition for certiorari, the CA relied on the fact that they
are employees of VEPI, on the presumption that it was engaged in the illegal practice of optometry. The
petitioners note that the SEC upheld the legality of VEPIs right to engage in its business, and further upheld
its right to engage the services of optometrists. The petitioners assert that a closer look at the
complaint/affidavit would show that it failed to state a cause of action. Nothing in the said affidavit mentioned
that the petitioners committed any act which would constitute unethical or professional conduct, and all that
was mentioned was that they were employees of VEPI.
The petitioners contend that the averment of the law they allegedly violated, Sections 6(e) and (j) of
Article III of the Code of Ethics for Optometrists, only appeared in a subsequent pleading. The
complaint/affidavit did not mention that the petitioners held themselves out to the public as optometrists
under the name of a corporation nor advertised and practiced under names other than their own. According
to the petitioners, the failure to state the above facts in the complaint/affidavit itself is fatal, and such defect
cannot be cured by alleging those facts in subsequent pleadings. The act or omission allegedly committed
by the petitioners, the very heart of the complaint, was missing.
The petitioners maintain that there is no law which provides that mere employment in a corporation by
an optometrist is prima facie evidence of illegal practice of optometry. The pronouncement made by the CA
that it is up to the Board to decide whether to punish an optometrist by mere employment in a corporation
would set a bad precedent, as it would imply that the Board has the authority to punish optometrists by the
fact of mere employment in a corporation. Furthermore, the petitioners assert that the ruling of the CA is a
bad precedent and is violative of the due process clause under Section 1, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. They likewise claim that they are entitled to the equal protection of laws, as there are a number
of professionals who are also employees of other corporations, but who have not been charged with
unethical or unprofessional conduct for simply being employees.
The petitioners contend that after the Board denied their motion for reconsideration, the plain,
adequate and speedy remedy available to them was a petition for certiorari, and that in the interest of
substantial justice, an order denying a motion to dismiss can be the subject of a petition for certiorari.
In their Comment, the private respondents aver that the petitioners should have availed themselves of
the remedy of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. They likewise insist that
a perusal of the complaint/affidavit of respondent Ho will reveal that the essential requisites of a cause of
action are present. The objection raised in the motion to dismiss is premature, because the parties were
only at the pre-trial stage. Moreover, according to the private respondents, the petitioners contradicted
themselves when they averred that the complaint/affidavit had no cause of action, but, instead of
immediately filing a motion to dismiss, they filed a joint counter-affidavit, which was actually an answer.
The petition is bereft of merit.

ISSUE:
Whether the respondent Board committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed orders?
HELD:

Rep. Act No. 8050 specifically vests in the Board of Optometry the power to conduct hearings and
investigations to resolve complaints against practitioners of optometry for malpractice, unethical and
unprofessional conduct, or violation of any of the provisions of the Act or any of its regulations and
authorizes the said Board to render a decision thereon as long as the vote of three (3) members is obtained.
Thus, the Board may, after giving proper notice and hearing to the party concerned, revoke an optometrists
certificate of registration or suspend his license to practice on the foregoing grounds, or upon the conviction
of the optometrist of a crime involving moral turpitude. The revocation of a certificate or suspension of a
professional license by the Board shall become final, unless appealed to the PRC within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the decision.

The petitioners premature resort to the courts necessarily becomes fatal to their cause of action. It
is presumed that an administrative agency, in this case, the Board of Optometry, if afforded an opportunity
to pass upon a matter, would decide the same correctly, or correct any previous error committed in its
forum. The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that the courts must allow the
administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized
areas of their respective competence. Furthermore, reasons of law, comity and convenience prevent the
courts from entertaining cases proper for determination by administrative agencies.

The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file an answer to the complaint and to interpose as defenses
the objections raised in his motion to dismiss, proceed to trial, and in case of an adverse decision, to elevate
the entire case by appeal in due course. However, the rule is not ironclad. Under certain situations, recourse
to certiorari or mandamus is considered appropriate, that is, (a) when the trial court issued the order without
or in excess of jurisdiction; (b) where there is patent grave abuse of discretion by the trial court; or, (c)
appeal would not prove to be a speedy and adequate remedy as when an appeal would not promptly relieve
a defendant from the injurious effects of the patently mistaken order maintaining the plaintiffs baseless
action and compelling the defendant needlessly to go through protracted trial and clogging the court dockets
by another futile case.

The petitioners failed to show that the instant case falls under any of the recognized exceptions to
the rule. Furthermore, they failed to show that the respondent Board committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed orders.

DOCTRINE:

It is presumed that an administrative agency, in this case, the Board of Optometry, if afforded an
opportunity to pass upon a matter, would decide the same correctly, or correct any previous error
committed in its forum. The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that the courts
must allow the administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities
within the specialized areas of their respective competence.