SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 159302. February 6, 2008.]

CITIBANK, N.A., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ROSITA TAN
PARAGAS, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO-MORALES, J p:

Subject of this petition for review is the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Resolution dated
October 24, 2001 granting the MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION of respondent Rosita Tan
Paragas (Rosita) relative to her appeal in an illegal dismissal case, which the Court of Appeals affirmed in
toto by Decision of January 24, 2003 and Resolution of July 29, 2003.

Rosita was found by Labor Arbiter Geobel Bartolabac to be an employee of petitioner Citibank, N.A. for
around eighteen (18) years from August 8, 1979 to September 4, 1997. At the time her employment was
terminated by petitioner for serious misconduct, willful disobedience, gross and habitual neglect of duties
and gross inefficiency, she was occupying the position of filing clerk.

The relevant facts pertaining to respondent's employment history may be gleaned from the following salient
portions of the labor arbiter's Decision of June 29, 1998:

On 8 August 1979, complainant Paragas joined respondent Citibank as Secretary to the Premises
Administration (up to 1981): Corporate Teller (1981-1982): Secretary to Assistant Vice Presidents Ed
Katigbak and Z.P. Molina (up to 1987); Secretary to Vice-President-Legal Counsel, Atty. Renato J.
Fernandez (up [to] 1988); Secretary to the Employer/Employee Relations Officer, Atty. Beatriz Alo and later
to the Public Affairs Director Vice President, Maximo J. Edralin, Jr. When the latter retired in 1992,
complainant was assigned to Cash Management Services as Remittance Processor.

Sometime in the early part of 1993, as a result of the reorganization, respondent bank declared certain
officers and employees, or their positions/functions, redundant. Among these affected was complainant
Paragas. However, to accommodate the union officers' request, complainant's employment was not
terminated but was assigned to Records Management Unit of the Quality Assurance Division as bank
statement retriever, a filing clerk job described by complainant as "non-brainer job."

In the latter part of July 1994, complainant was assigned to file Universal Account Opening Forms (UAOF) in
file boxes and retrieving such UAOFs from the file boxes upon internal customers' request from time to time.
In the same month, she was also assigned to process or develop microfilms. However, on 20 February
1995, she complained that the processing of microfilms was proving to be harmful to her health. Thus, the
job was reassigned to another clerk. Accordingly, beginning 21 February 1995, complainant's job in the bank
was to file and retrieve UAOFs. . . .
xxx xxx xxx

On 11 December 1996, complainant was assigned to undertake the special project of reorganizing the
UAOF's from 13 December 1996 to 15 May 1997. The work to be done are as follows:

a. Review of existing files in order to verify misfiles

b. Pull-out of misfiles and file them in their proper places
c. Interfile new/incoming UAOFs received for the day
d. Add new file boxes and make an allowance of at least 3/4 inch for each file box for incoming
UAOFs and for future explasion [sic]
e. Labelling of all file boxes and Corporate UAOFs and their actual contents
f. Transfer of the UAOFs from the Citicenter basement to the new compactors at the third floor
g. Submit a status report (accomplishment for the week) every Monday

On 10 January 1997, AVP Narciso Ferrera issued a Memo to complainant calling her attention on the
following, to wit:

10 January 1997
TO Rosita T. Paragas
CC: Randy J. Uson
SUBJECT: REORGANIZATION OF THE
UNIVERSAL ACCOUNT OPENING
FORMS (UAOF's)

In connection with the Reorganization of the Universal Account Opening Forms (UAOF's), I would like to call
your attention on the following, viz.:

a. Various misfiling on the reorganized UAOF file I had the reorganized file counter-checked by your
co-employees and they came out with the following misfiling, e.g.

1. Belo, Jose; Belo, Matilde, Belo William interfiled with BELLO

2. BARRAGER, RAYMOND misfiled with BARANGAN and BARANUELO Box (BARBARO)
3. EUGENIO BARAOIDANs interfiled with BARNUEVO AND BARRAMEDA
4. VICTOR AGIUS filed with the AGUIRREs
5. Several AGUILAs interfiled with File box ALF-ALI
6. LETICIA AMANSEC filed with AMAR and AMARGO HTCIcE
7. Several BARON interfiled between BARROGA AND BARRON
8. AMANDA CAMELLO interfiled between CAMERO and CAMERON
9. PETER CARSON interfiled between CARR and CARRAD

They went thru 9 files boxes only and found 9 misfiles. This level of errors is not acceptable. Remember a
misfiled document is considered LOST and you will have to go through the file one by one to be able to
retrieve it.

b. Submission of a weekly status report every Monday. As per our agreement, report every Monday
effective January 6, 1997. As of February 10, 1997; I have not received a single report from you.
c. Trimming/cutting of edges of attached documents like xerox copies of Ids, Passports, Drivers
license, etc. I would like to reiterate my previous instructions to do away with the trimming and cutting of
attached documents as it only consumes valuable time and will prolong the reorganization process. We
started the reorganization last December 13, 1996 and as today 10 February 1997, you are still in letter C
for a total of 163 file boxes. There are still 348 file boxes to reorganize TSADaI

d. Accumulation of incoming newly received UAOFs. I have noticed that you have accumulated two
(2) boxes full of personal UAOFs at the basement and at the third floor. Arce and Sammy are complaining on
the retrieval of these files. It is taking them more time and efforts. In the monthly meeting we had last
December, 1996, interfiling incoming UAOFs is your responsibility.
In view of the above, please concentrate on the filing process and stop trimming the attachments. Our goal
in the reorganization of the UAOFs is ACCURATE FILING so that these documents could be located when
requested. I hope you exhaust all means and efforts to finish the project within the given time frame.
Please be guided accordingly.
(Sgd.) Narciso M. Ferrera
Assistant Vice President

Again, on 2 April 1997, complainant received another memo from AVP Ferrera called her attention (a) to the
same nine (9) cases misfiled UAOF's in Annex 16, (b) to three (3) other cases of misfiled UAOFs (c) her
persistent failure to submit weekly report on the progress of her work under the Special Project, and (d) that
despite the lapse of three (3) months, she was still in letter D (or UAOFs covering clients whose surnames
begin with letter D).

As she failed to complete the project on 30 May 1997, complainant was given another 30 days to complete
it. However, by the end of June 1997, her accomplishment was only 30% of the total work to be done.

On 25 July 1997, AVP Ferrera directed complainant to explain in writing why her employment should not be
terminated on the ground of serious misconduct, willful disobedience, gross and habitual neglect of her
duties and gross inefficiency. Correspondingly, complainant was placed under Preventive suspension.
Complainant submitted her written explanation on 31 July 1997.

On 29 August 1997, an administrative conference took place with the complainant, her counsel and the
Union President in attendance.
Finally, on 4 September 1997, the respondent bank thru AVP Ferrera notified complainant that her written
explanation and those which she ventilated during the administrative conference held on 29 August 1997
were found self-serving, and consequently, terminating her employment on the ground of serious
misconduct, willful disobedience, gross and habitual neglect of duties and gross inefficiency. 2

Following the termination of her services, respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, praying for
reinstatement, backwages, damages and attorney's fees. 3 By the aforementioned Decision of June 29,
1998, the labor arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, finding that her dismissal on the ground of
work inefficiency was valid.

On appeal, the NLRC, by Resolution of October 24, 2000, affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter with the
modification that respondent should be paid separation pay "as a form of equitable relief" in view of her
length of service with petitioner.

Respondent filed a MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION of the NLRC Resolution. She no longer
challenged her dismissal on the ground of work inefficiency, but prayed that petitioner be ordered to pay her
the "Provident Fund" benefits under its retirement plan for which she claimed to be qualified pursuant to
petitioner's "Working Together" Manual, specifically the provision on page 12.5 thereof which states:

Should you (employee) resign or be discharged for reasons other than misconduct prior to your earliest
retirement date, you will be paid a percentage of your share in the Fund according to the following schedule:
Completed Years of Continuous Vesting
Service
20 or more years 100%
19 years 95%
18 years 90%
.... ....4
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Respondent, claiming that the labor arbiter upheld her dismissal on the ground of merely "work inefficiency"
and not for any misconduct on her part, asserted that she is entitled to 90% of the retirement benefits.

Petitioner did not move to reconsider the NLRC October 24, 2000 Resolution.

Finding that respondent's dismissal was "for causes other than misconduct," the NLRC, by the above-
mentioned October 24, 2001 Resolution granted respondent's motion for partial reconsideration. 5 Petitioner
moved to reconsider this Resolution, but the same was denied by the NLRC.

Petitioner thereupon filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals to set aside and nullify the
October 24, 2001 NLRC Resolution. The appellate court, by Decision dated January 24, 2003, dismissed
petitioner's petition for lack of merit and affirmed in toto the challenged NLRC Resolution. Its motion for
reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court by Resolution of July 29, 2003, the present
petition 6 was filed, petitioner asserting as follows:

1. The NLRC has no authority to pass upon and resolve issues and grant claims not pleaded and
proved before the Labor Arbiter.

2. The NLRC acted without authority or without or in excess of jurisdiction when it granted the entirely
new/subsequent claim (for payment of retirement benefits) of Paragas.

3. In any case, (a) the actuations of Paragas narrated in petitioner's motion for reconsideration [of the
NLRC Resolution dated October 24, 2001] for which petitioner had dismissed her on the ground of Serious
Misconduct, among other grounds and (b) the decision of the Labor Arbiter dismissing Paragas' complaint
for illegal dismissal for lack of merit, which the NLRC affirmed, show that Paragas is not entitled to her new
claim for retirement benefits; for as Paragas herself has shown in her motion for partial reconsideration,
under the Retirement Plan of the bank a bank employee who has been dismissed for misconduct is not
entitled to retirement benefit. CIDaTc

4. In any event, even assuming that Paragas was entitled to retirement benefit, her claim therefor is
already time-barred.

5. Thus, the Court of Appeals erred when it dismissed petitioner's petition in CA-G.R. No. SP 69642. 7
The petition is impressed with merit.

That respondent did not expressly claim retirement benefits in the proceedings before the labor arbiter is not
disputed. Indeed, she admits that the first time she explicitly prayed for such benefits was in her Motion for
Partial Reconsideration filed with the NLRC. She argues, nonetheless, that the grant thereof by the NLRC
was warranted based on the principle that rules of procedure and evidence should not be applied rigidly and
technically in labor cases. Moreover, she alleges that her claim for retirement benefits was implicit in her
general prayer in her position paper for "such other reliefs as may be just and equitable."

While it is established that technical rules of procedure may be relaxed in labor cases, Mañebo v. NLRC 8
instructs

We wish, however, to stress some points. Firstly, while it is true that the Rules of the NLRC must be liberally
construed and that the NLRC is not bound by the technicalities of law and procedure, the Labor Arbiters and
the NLRC itself must not be the first to arbitrarily disregard specific provisions of the Rules which are
precisely intended to assist the parties in obtaining just, expeditious, and inexpensive settlement of labor
disputes. One such provision is Section 3, Rule V of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC which
requires the submission of verified position papers within fifteen days from the date of the last conference,
with proof of service thereof on the other parties. The position papers "shall cover only those claims and
causes of action raised in the complaint excluding those that may have been amicably settled, and shall be
accompanied by all supporting documents including the affidavits of their respective witnesses which shall
take the place of the latter's testimony." After the submission thereof, the parties "shall . . . not be allowed to
allege facts, or present evidence to prove facts, not referred to and any cause or causes of action not
included in the complaint or position papers, affidavits and other documents." (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Respondent indeed prayed for "other just and equitable relief," but the same may not be interpreted so
broadly as to include even those which are not warranted by the factual premises alleged by a party. Thus
the January 24, 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals correctly stated: "It has been ruled in this jurisdiction
that the general prayer for 'other reliefs' is applicable to such other reliefs which are warranted by the law
and facts alleged by the respondent in her basic pleadings and not on a newly created issue." 9
(Underscoring supplied) Particularly in People v. Lacson, 10 this Court held:

. . . Case law has it that a prayer for equitable relief is of no avail, unless the petition states facts which will
authorize the court to grant such relief. A court cannot set itself in motion, nor has it power to decide
questions except as presented by the parties in their pleadings. Anything that is resolved or decided beyond
them is coram non judice and void. (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent's assertion that she mentioned the matter regarding the Provident Fund even prior to her
Motion for Partial Reconsideration — on page 14 of her position paper and again on pages 2 and 7 of her
"Notice of Appeal and Appeal Memorandum" — is unavailing.

Her "Notice of Appeal and Appeal Memorandum" was filed after she had already submitted her position
paper. Thus, any mention of the Provident Fund therein would fail to adhere to the above-ruling in Mañebo,
the thrust of which was precisely that all facts, evidence, and causes of action should already be proffered in
the position papers and the supporting documents thereto, not in any later pleading.

As to respondent's position paper, there was only the mere mention of "Provident A & C," with the
corresponding amount of P1,086,335.43, among the actual damages that she was allegedly suffering from
her continued severance from employment. 11 Respondent made no attempt to define what this "Provident
A & C" was, nor offer any substantiation for including it to be among her actual damages. She did not even
hint how "Provident A & C" had a bearing on retirement benefits. Thus, while respondent did refer to the
Provident Fund in her position paper, such reference was too vague to be a basis for any court or
administrative body to grant her retirement benefits.

Respondent justifies her failure to claim for retirement benefits before the labor arbiter by alleging that it
would be inconsistent with her prayer for reinstatement. Respondent, however, could have easily claimed
such benefits as an alternative relief.

In any event, respondent is not entitled to retirement benefits as this Court finds that she was validly
dismissed for serious misconduct and not merely for work inefficiency.
While findings of fact in administrative decisions such as those rendered by the NLRC are to be accorded
not only great weight and respect, but even finality, the rule only applies for as long as these findings are
supported by substantial evidence. 12 In the present case, the NLRC was absolutely silent on why it did not
give credence to petitioner's evidence on respondent's misconduct. It was content merely to state that "the
separation is not for reasons of misconduct but for other grounds" 13 without any substantiation and in total
disregard of the evidence proffered by petitioner. Colegio de San Juan de Letran-Calamba v. Villas 14
instructs:

Likewise, findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies which have acquired expertise
because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only great respect but
even finality. They are binding upon this Court unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion or
where it is clearly shown that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in utter disregard of the evidence on record.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

True, the NLRC adopted the findings of the labor arbiter, but the labor arbiter did not expressly rule on the
issue of respondent's alleged misconduct — which is not surprising, for a ruling thereon was not then strictly
necessary. At that stage, the main issue which had to be resolved was only whether respondent's dismissal
was valid, and not whether she was qualified for retirement benefits. Only when respondent raised the claim
of retirement benefits did it become crucial to determine whether she was validly dismissed on the specific
ground of serious misconduct, not only on the ground of poor work performance.

As reflected above, this Court, after a review of the NLRC finding that respondent did not commit serious
misconduct, finds otherwise.

While the labor arbiter did not explicitly rule that respondent committed serious misconduct, his decision
leads to that conclusion, for the documentary evidence which it cites as basis to prove her work inefficiency
shows, upon close examination, also her commission of serious misconduct.

In support of its ruling that respondent's dismissal was valid, the labor arbiter relied on the performance
appraisals of respondent from July to December 1994, from January to June 1995, and from July to
December 1996, all of which were submitted by petitioner's Assistant Vice-President, Narciso M. Ferrera.
The labor arbiter noted that Ferrera's evaluation of respondent was not lacking in objectivity.

These performance appraisals, however, did not merely show that respondent was not able to meet
performance targets. More relevantly, they also consistently noted significant behavioral and attitudinal
problems in respondent. In particular, respondent was found to be very argumentative; 15 she had difficulty
working with others; 16 she was hard to deal with; 17 and she never ceased being the subject of complaints
from co-workers. 18

Moreover, beyond the documents referred to in the labor arbiter's decision, there are other pieces of
evidence on record which further establish that respondent was validly dismissed not only for work
inefficiency but for serious misconduct. The Court sees no reason why these should not be accorded
credibility along with those cited by the labor arbiter.

The assessment of respondent's performance by Randy Uson, another superior of respondent, was given
weight by the labor arbiter who noted that Uson was "described as [a] very professional and fair person by
complainant [herein-respondent] herself." 19 Significantly, Uson later commented on respondent's behavior
as follows:

"Less tangible but none the less real, are the common concerns raised by her peers and supervisor, on the
stress and tension created when Rose is around. The conscious effort to 'get out of her way' and avoid
conflict, hinders productivity and efficiency and has adversely affected the morale of the entire unit. . . ." 20
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
More. For the appraisal period from June to December 1995, respondent's performance appraisal report
stated that her attitude towards her work, the bank, and superiors needed reformation. 21 The report for
January to June 1996 made the same observation, 22 indicating that there was no improvement on her part.
TacSAE
The performance appraisal report of respondent for the period of January to June 1997, besides stating that
she was still "hard to deal with," described her as "belligerent," one who had "a negative presence which
affects the morale of the entire unit," and who "pick[ed] fights with peers and other employees even without
provocation." 23
The evaluation of respondent cited above finds corroboration in her admission that "she may have been
tactless and insolent in dealing with her superior but it does not allegedly warrant the supreme penalty of
dismissal." 24

Finally, even the NLRC, its later ruling that respondent was not guilty of misconduct notwithstanding, was
aware that the problem with respondent was not merely her poor work output, but her unreasonable
behavior and unpleasant deportment. Thus, as its Resolution of October 24, 2000 drew to a close, it stated
that petitioner was "correct" in invoking Cathedral School of Technology v. NLRC, 25 specifically the
following portion of this Court's decision therein:

An evaluative review of the records of this case nonetheless supports a finding of a just cause for
termination. The reason for which private respondent's services were terminated, namely, her unreasonable
behavior and unpleasant deportment in dealing with the people she closely works with in the course of her
employment, is analogous to the other "just causes" enumerated under the Labor Code. (Emphasis
supplied)

It bears noting that petitioner cited Cathedral School of Technology in its Comment/Reply to Complainant-
Appellant's Appeal Memorandum precisely to show that its dismissal of complainant on the ground of "gross
inefficiency and unreasonable behavior" (emphasis supplied) was correctly upheld by the labor arbiter. 26
EIAScH

When an employee, despite repeated warnings from the employer, obstinately refuses to curtail a bellicose
inclination such that it erodes the morale of co-employees, the same may be a ground for dismissal for
serious misconduct.

As this Court held in National Service Corp. v. Leogardo, Jr., 27 "[a] series of irregularities when put together
may constitute serious misconduct, which under Article 283 of the Labor Code, is a just cause for
termination." And as it held in Asian Design and Manufacturing Corporation v. Deputy Minister of Labor, acts
destructive of the morale of one's co-employees may be considered serious misconduct. 28
It is respondent's obstinate refusal to reform herself which ultimately persuades this Court to find that her
dismissal on the ground of serious misconduct was valid. Clearly, the following statement of Jaime R.
Paraiso, head of petitioner's Records Management Unit, quoted with approval both by the labor arbiter and
the NLRC, relates not only to respondent's inefficiency but also to her admittedly tactless and insolent
dealings with her superior.

While we all have strengths and good points we also have weaknesses and shortcomings. However, the first
step towards self-improvement is acknowledging and accepting one's weaknesses and shortcomings. This
is followed by a resolve to change for the better, in turn followed by appropriate action. These elements are
not evident in the responses given [by respondent to the performance appraisal report] and there is no clear
indication of a desire for self-improvement or any plans in that direction. There continues to be a need to
address this situation. 29 (Emphasis supplied) HADTEC

Having been validly dismissed on the ground of serious misconduct, respondent is thus disqualified from
receiving her retirement benefits pursuant to the provision of petitioner's "Working Together" Manual quoted
earlier.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision of January 24, 2003 and
Resolution of July 29, 2003 are SET ASIDE. The NLRC Resolution dated October 24, 2001 granting private
respondent's MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION is thus VACATED.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Carpio, Tinga and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.