wl. 4 INBINIFY I saTRMarICS AxD Lost INFINITY IN MATHEMATICS AND. LOGIC ‘The notion of infinity, and the problems, both philo- sophical and mathematical, that arise from it have been @ central concern for over two millennia. Any serious ‘thought about the nature of space, time, God (oF gods}, mathematics, and motion quickly Ieade to more general concerns regarding the notion, oF notions, of infinity intimately tied up with such ieeues. Aza cebulyitis unsut- prising that philosophers throughout history have thought deeply about wha infinity is whether thenotion 's coherent, whether there are infinite entities (or inf- nitely many entities), and how we can know about such entities if they exist. This entry focuses en two aspects of the infinite, The first is inflaie divisibliy, the ies that an ebjest can, in some sence (and perhaps only idelly), be divided inco an infinite collection of smaller and smaller parts, The puz- ‘ales that arise from such division are central both to philosophical thinking about notions sich at part end whole and to the mathematical enalysis of lines, surfaces, and other continuous objects The secand aspect to be dressed is already implici: in the fust—the iden that there can be infinitely large collections at all, Mach of the history of mathematics and philosophy can be seen as an (often indirect) inquiry into the coherence of such collec ‘ons and how they éifer from finite colecioas, AS a result, this entry will for the most part ignore ‘other interesting but less central, isis within the liera- ‘ure on infinity, including infintesimals, mereological theories containing guak, unrestrctedly general quastif- ‘ation, nonstandard set theories, and nonmathematica use of the term “inGrite” (eg, theological understare ings of the infinite). The discussion below, then, is not rant (0 be @ comprehensive survey of all aspects of infinity (or even all aspects of thie notion as i appears within, mathematics, logic, and metaphysis), but is instead intended to provide a basic understanding of two important themes underlying hundreds of years of ‘thought on the topic. INFINITE DIVISIBILITY: ARISTOTLE AND ZENO Given the long pedigree of thought regarding infinity, ft seems apropos to begin at (or near) the beginaing, with the ancient Greeks. While mathematics in general, and geometry in particala, was conteal to Plate'e philosophy, 654° 2nd edition ENCYCLOFEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY he has lite to say regarding the nature ofthe infinite, His few comments on the topic eccur in the Philebus, where he equates the infinite with the arlimited, unbounded, excessive, and indefinite ‘entifjing the infinite with such notions isn hind sight, less helpful than one might hope: The surface of a sphete, which in a certain sense has no boundaries or limits, nevertheless has Gnite area. Extremely large collections can be thought of 2s excessive yet finite. Indef- initencas has, recently, been associated more with vague phenomenon (such as the boundary between colors) ‘han with the infinite. Thus, Plato’ discussion, while ‘interesting, file to provide clear criteria for distinguish~ ing between finkte ané infinite collections relying rather 1 the idea that we can ell the diference wien we see i Plato's star pupil, Aristo, fellows his teacher in neglecting t0 provide » clear definition of the infinite (and in equating it with suspect notions sich os ‘unboundedness. Even so, he made an influential contr bution by distinguishing between two different types of infinity oF two different ways of conceiving infinite col- Jections. This contribution was due to Aristotle's need to respond to Zeno of Ess poredoxes Zeno presented four paradoxes that, through dever uses of infinity, demonstrated (so i¢ was claimed) that impossible. Here we consider only twer the paradox of Achilles and the paradox of the runner (an adequate response to either can likely be generalized to the others). The parnéox of Achilles perhaps the best known of Zenc's purles. Swift Achilles isto ran race against stor toise, end the tortoise is given a head stat. Zeno anges that.no matier how fast Achilles rune, he can never over take the tortoise, Tis Achilles mast reich the point at ‘hich the tortoise started, calli P,, By the time be does so, however, the tortoise will have traveled some short distance further, to + point we can call P,. So Achilles’ next task isto run from P, to P,. By the time he achieves thin the cortoie will ave travcled a bit further, t0 P, So ‘chiles’ next taskisto run to P, Bur by then the tortoise will have eached Py and s0 of. Thus, according to Zeno, Achilles can never pass the Tortoise and win the race, because, no matter how fast he runs, each time he reaches a point where the tortoise was, the tortoise will have moved a bit father on. Stating the ‘conclusion more carefully, Zeno's argument does not (Gand was most likely not intended te) show that Achilles cannot overtake the tortoise: rather, it demonstrates that there isa coneeprual puzzle regaiding how he does so Donald M Borchert (ed) ALY. Thow.se n | 2006‘Zeno's paradox of the runner is similay, lightly less well known, bat mathematically abic more elegant. may ing a runner who must run from point 0 t point 1. Before reaching 1, he must reach the midpoint between O and 1 (Ley point 1/2). Onee he bes reached 1/2, however hhe must, before he can reich 1, run to the midpoint beeween W/2 and 1, (Le, 3/4). Then he must run to the ‘midpoint between 3/4 and 1 (ie, 1/8), and then ran to 15/16, and 31/32, and so on. a 1 M4 Wen 2 ‘Zeno concluded that, in traveling from 0 to 1,the runner traverses an infinite namber of distinct distances. tis worth noting that this paradox depends on 2 by now well-known mathematical fact Some infinitely ong Tiss of aumbers (or infinite serie) have a nite eam. In particular, the consiruction of the paradox demonstrates ‘am acleast implicit awareness that 2+ A+ 8+ 6 + 132 + 05 in moze modern notation: Sips i We can provide an intuitively compelling (although not ‘mathematical rigorous) argument demonstrating this as follows. Sethe infinite sim equal tox, J+ UE URE NG + 324+ Multiply both sides by 2: ea 1412414 + 118 +N + 32+ Subtinct the frst line from the second, and we obtain the desired result: 1 ‘As Arletole realized, there are swo puzaes lung within Zeno’s paradoxes, and only one of them is di ‘alt, Brat, the worry mightbe that Zeno’ arguments sug, ‘ges that we can accomplish infinitely many tasks in 2 Fite amount of time (for example, traveling through the infinite sequence of distances 0 t0 1/2, 2 to 1, 1/4 to 18 ... oF inhabiting the infiaite sequence of points 112, 114, 118...) This, howeves, as Aristotle noted, i # mis leading way of characterizing the situation, because if we can divide distances in the way envisioned by Zeno, then ‘we can divide time in the same way (so our minute of time can be divided into the first half of « minute, then the next quarter of a minute, thea the next eighth of a and edition ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY INAINITY IY MATH EMATICS AND LOGIC minute, ..), Rather, according to Aristotle, the puzzle conceins the idea that we can ever complete infiaitely nny tasks (no matter how they are described). In other words, i the infinite division of either spsce or time that Zeno envisioned legitimate? ‘The enswer for Aristotle had to bec,” because, as already noted, he equeted the infinite with the unbounded or unlimited. As a result it shoul be impos- sible wo complete infinitely many tsk because it is ‘impossible to reach the bound of imi of tamathing that, by its nature, is unlimited, Arisiode had ltde cholee but to conchide tha there is « mistake lurking within Zenc’s argumeat, and it isn his explanation ofthis mistake that his potentialy/actually infinite distincion makes its appearance Zencis puredones resuk from the fact that line 19g- ments are (oratleast seem tbe) infinitely divisible. Con- sider an arbitrary (Gnite) line segment. We can easly divide the line into two halves, producing two perts ‘Additional divisions, of cours, ate aso possible. The eru- ‘ial question now srisce: How many dissin! parts does the line segment coatain? In some sense, at leas, the cor- rect answor is infinitely many, since for eny pert we ean further subdivide it into two halves, obtaining two more ‘puts, Thus, for any inte number of parts we divide the Tine into, we can further subdivide these segments 10 ‘obtain more parts. Aristotle distinguished this sort of unbounded- ness—the potentillyinfinite—from actually infiaitecol- Jeetions, On the one hand, a collection is poteatialy Infinite if we can continue wo ad 1 it without limit. On the other hand, the actual infinite i, for Arsotle a com pleted totality, that is, an unbounded collection that is neverthelew preset all st once. fn considering the divi sion of aline segment Aristotle writes tast "Its always possible o think of a larger number: for the aumber of times a magnitude can be bisected is infinite, Hence the Infinite is potential, never actual; he number of parts that can be taken alvaye surpatses any sesigned number” (Physics 20708). In understanding Aristoe's potential/acual distine- tion its useful to distinguish between three distinct the- (1) Any part ofa line can be divided inzo distinet subparts, (2) A line contain infinitely many distinct pats (9) A line contains infinitely small pars + 655The first aim, according to Aristotle (end most thinkers since) is undeniable. The third, which assert the exis- ‘ence of so-called in niesimals, would be af greatimpor- tance in the development of the calculus during the Seventeenth century. The second claim i, for our pur- poses, the eucial one. According to Arettle, claim (2) is ambiguous, having both 2 true anda false reading. Aristotle understood the frst ofthese three chims as something sach at: given time fy any partof@ line that exists att, can be divided into distinct subparts st some Faure time Once we recognize the temporal lagredient of claim ({), two distinct readings of (2) are then appar- ent (2a) For any number m there is «time ¢ such that a Tine has been (or ean be) divided into (at least) paris at, (2b) There isa time © such that line has infinitely ‘many paris at timer Although (2b) implies (2a), Aristotle argusd, in effec, ‘hat (2a) does not imply (2b): Imagine that we have line segment infront of us, and each hour we divide up exch ‘of is parts into two subparts ‘Then (28) istrue (assuming ‘we live foreverand never forge to carry ovt the divisions) yet (2b) falls because there is never a particular time at which we have finished dividing. The collection of parts ofa line segment is potentially infinite if (2a) is true, and is actualy infinite f (2b) holds, Ie is important to note that Aristoles distinction contains both 2 constructive aspect and s temporal ‘spect. First lines (and other objects) ste not presented £9 us already divided into their parts, rather, the division of ‘sn object into its components is somehow a construction that we perform on it, Second, these constructions cannct Ye cattied outall at once, but must be carried out one by, ‘one in time, This aspect of Aristotle's view is what pre vents the potential infinite from collapsing into the actual infinite, because it allows us to distinguish between 2 series of ever increasing finite collections spread out through time and an infinite collection existing ata par tlealar time, Aristotle applied the potential versus actual dstine- tion, not just to pars of line segments, but to the natural (counting) nambers0 1,23... aswell (ws include 0 and There because they are now considered tobe the first v0 natural numbers although Aristotle would not have ree ‘ognized 9, and perhaps not even 1, as ¢ number at all). ‘The natural nombers, for Aristotle, are potentially inf nite, because for any number we have counted to, we can always count one (or ten, or one huncred) mumbers fur 656 + and edition ther. Nevertheless, we will never reach a time when we will hve counted ontall the numbers. Aristotle's final contribution lies in is insistence that ‘aot only some but all infnties are potential, not acta. ‘Thus, theve are no infinitely long line segments, oniy a potential series of ever longer finite line segments, and no Infinitely lage collections, only series of larger and larger te ones, ‘The denial of absolute infinity provided Aristoue with @ solution to Zeno's pusales: If space and time are only potentially infinite, then the sort of division of space and time necessary for Zene'sconsteuction ist In the paradox of the runner, the runner does not pass through infinitely many differnt distances (nor docs he occupy infinitely many different points, because Aristotle thought that peints only exist ifa line Ia in fact been divided into two parts that meet at that point). Rather, siren any particular dime, chere are only finitely many Parts into which the distance between 0 and 1 will have ‘been divided Into, Ofcourse, a a ater time we might fur- ther subdivide the distance ito a lager (bat ell finite) collection of parts, tt does not follow, however, that we have therefore traveled aver infinitely many distances, because the parts of the path from 0 to 1 are merely potentially infinite. For epproximately two thousand years Arisode view remained unckallenged—philosophert and mathe- ‘maticians both (forthe mos: part) denied the existence of| actual, completed infnitiss, arguing that the notion of Potential infinity could, within both philosophy end mathematics, fll any rele thatthe infinite might need to pay RIGOR AT LAST: DEDEKIND INFINITY DDoring the development end rigarization ofthe calculus (a long torturous period stretching from the beginning of the seventecnth century to the end of the nineteenth century) it became evident that the farther development of chssical mathematics required actual infinles. (The details need not detain us here. Suffice it to say at least some infinite collections needed (0 be viewed as com- plete, beause it became necessary to study arbitcary sub- collections of these Infinite structures) If Arlsolle and his followers were correct, however, and the only vieble Understanding ofthe infinite was the potential one, then classical mathematics was facing «cts, Fortunately, a number of philosophers and mathe- imaticians steppel into the breach, They vere faced with ‘wo main mathematical tasks and one philosophical one: ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHYfrst to provide a rigorous definition of “infinite second, ‘oprovidea mathematical theory of the infinite that clar- ified how the behavior of infinite collections differed {rom the well-known behavior of finite collections: and third, and perhaps most importantly, to provide a philo- topkical account of the actual infinite that defended ite ‘nteligibilty. The first two tasks were successfully caried out during the nineteenth century, by Richerd Dedekind (1901) and Georg Cantor (1955) respectively [Before considering definitions of infinity i is useful reintroduce some terminology, The existence of an actu> ally infinite callection involve the ides that such a collec- tion can be presented all at once, as a completed fotality—that is, in some sense, asa single thing. Such totalties, consicered és single objects, are called sts. The central idea behind set dheor'ia that, given any collection lof objects (or almost any, see the discussion of ussells paradox below), there exists ancther cbjeet-—the set con taining exactly the original objects. Thus, if we start out With three distinet persons, Alan, Bob, and Carl we obtain the following sets: {Alan}, (Bob), (Carl, (Alan, Bobs, (Alan, Car), (Bob, Cal}, (Alan, Bob, Car) Note thatthe one-membered set {Alaa}, called the single- fon of Alan, isnt the same thing a Alan himself, because {Alan} is ast, yet Alan, who ita person, i not. At this point ft should be noced, as wel that the collection con twining no objects. the so-called empty ser | } or 0, altbough somewhat puzzling (how can there exist a col- lection formed out of nothing?) is nevertheless accepted as eset and thus an abject, in most accounts of se the~ ory: Sets are objects, 90 there is nothing to prevent us from forming collections of these (Le, sets of set), obtaining, for example: {Alan}, {Hob}, [Alan, Bob}) This expression names a single object, @ set collecting together four other ets ‘There are two important relations that ean held between sets and other objects: membership and subset- Ihoed. The memabers of «sot are those objacts that ere collected together to form the set. Using "x € y" to express the dim that x isa member of y (and “€* for ‘nonmemibership), we have Alan € {Alan} {Alsa}e (0, {Alan|, [Bob], fAles, Bob|} and: 2nd edition ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY INFINICY IW MATHEMATICS AND LOGIC {Alan} € {Alen} ‘Alan € (6, {Alan}, (Bob), (Alen, Bob} Our second notion, subsethood, can be defined in terms cofmembership. Given two sets A end 3, Aisa subset of 3 ‘f and only if every member of A isa member of B. This “plies shat every set subset of ise and, using" S ("to express the claim that x iss subset of, we have: {Alan, Bob} C (Alan, Bob, Carl) {Alan, Bob} ¢ (0, (Alan) {Bcb], [Alan, Bob}} lly, ution from a set A toa set B, symbolized by: FASB is a mapping that assigns to cach member of A exactly ‘one member of B. For example, there isa function: 4: (Alan, Bob} ~ (Alan, Bob, Car) ‘which mape Alan to Bob and Bob to Carl f docs not map anyone to Alan), We can express this symbolically a ‘(Alen) = Bob {fBob) = Cart ‘Another example is: 4s ‘Alan, Bob, Carl! ~ (Alan, Bob) _mapping Alan t9 Rob, Bob to Alan, and Carl to Bob: fi(Alan) = Bob Bob) = Alan f(a) = Bob “There are two conditions on functions that will be crucial in what follows. First, function is from A to Bis injective (or one-to-one) fand only ifno two dstinet members of ‘A get mapped onto the same member of B In the exam- ples above fs injective, but fis not, because both Alan ‘and Carl both get mapped onto Bob. Second, 2 function from A to B is surjective (or om) if and only if every ‘member of B gets mapped onto by some member of Af. above is surjective whereas fis not because neither of ‘lan of Rob gete mapped onto Alan. A function tht is ‘both one-to-one aud oato is bectve ‘We can now consider posible defiations of infinite One obvious approach euggete iss To define Finite in terms of counting, that isa set is finite if and only if we can assign Othe fist member of these, Ito the escond, 2 to the third, .. and at some point we reach the last rember of the st, to which we astign eome natural num. bet. Using the terminology introduced above:INFINITY 18 MamitENarics ax toate Aset Ais initeif,and only fj there isa natural aum- bern and a bijective function: FADD unl) ‘Yhus, on this definition a se is finite if there i « number 8 and a bijective function from A wo the set of natural ‘numbers les than n. A set i infinite if there is no such function, For example, the set {Alan, Bob, Carl} i¢ Gnite because: {5 (NlaD, Bob, Carl} = f0, 1,2 (Alin) =0 filBob) = ical) =2 is bijective, whereas the set of natural numbers (9,152, 3 } 8.0n this definition, infinite While this definition provides the desired results there is « problem. The definition works by determining whether a etisfinite or infinite in terens of whether iecan ‘be mapped bijectively onto the naar nambers less than 1 for some n. The reason this works is that we know, for any number that theset of umber love than ms finite. ‘What could be more obvioust The problem, however is thatthe definition lacs the sort of generality required in both mathematics and philosophy. What we want i ci terion tha tll us which sets are infinite and which sets are finite. What we have it + criterion that tells us this assuming that we already know that certain sets of nati ral nurnbers are finite, An appropriately general definition of infinite set ‘was procliced by Richerd Dedekind in 1R88, The defini tion is based on an insight into infinite collections that traces back to Galileo Galilei (and probably tothe ancient Greeks). Galileo noticed that there isa bijective mapping between the natural numbers and the even natural num- ber $10,452,303) 10,2.4.64 provided by mopping each number om its double: f0)=0 fy=2 faa f0)=6 €e 658 2ud edition ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY Galileo argued that this provided further evidence against the notion of actual infinity, becouse if both the natural ‘numbers and the even numbers were completed infni- ies then the latter would be a part of the former, The existence of the bijective mapping, however, seemed to imply that there was just as much “stuf” in each infinite collection, violating the (at the time sacrosanct) dictum that the part must be less than the whole, ‘Dedekind, however, embraced the puzzling nature of this diseovery,and proposed an alternative deinition thet does not rely om prior knowledge that certain sts of nat. sural nambers are nite. Instead, ase is infinite, according to Dedekind, ifit can be mapped bijectvely oto a proper subset of itself (a subset of a set A is proper if itis not identical ta ite) A set A is Dedekind infiite if, and ouly if there isa function: AAA ‘function from a setA to self) chat is injective but not surjective, A set is (Deiekind-) fnire I there s no such mapping. With this definition in place, ctual, completed infnities ‘rca last partially vindicated, insofar as mathemeticians and philosophers now have a general, formal criterion for distinguishing between finite and infinite sets, [At roughly the same time Bernard Bolzana (2004) produced « competing definition of infinite set A set Ais infinite if there is a noncerminating eerie of sete By By ‘yy. such tha each et inthe eves sa subset of A, eech setin the series is 2 subsot ofall ets that follow it in the series, and no setin the serles sa subset of any set in the series that precedes i. In other worde, a sets infinite iit contains a series of subsets that get “bigger” and “bigger” without end, While Bolzano’ definition is expecially {interesting in light of is obvious connection to Aristotle's ideas regarding the infinite, there ase legitimste worries regarding whether the detintion is of any help, since “nonterminating series” seems synonymous with “inf nite series’ Thus, this definition, lke the one we began (but unlike Dedekind’), 2ssumes an understanding Of the concept that we are trying to define, With a rigorous definition of infinite st in hand the ‘next step in securing the notion of actully infinite fam, Aristotelian worries would bea well worked out theory of the existence and “behavior” of infinite sets. Much of this, theory wes worked out by Cantos, end will be the subject of the next section. Before examining Cantor's work, however, it should be noted that, even after the work ofDedekind and Cantor; not everyone accepted that infinite tovalites exited. A number of influential thinkers denied ‘hat Dedekine's defniton, interesting or not, applied to any complete collections, returning te Aristotle's distine- tion between potential and actual infinity (although most took Aristotle ides of the potentially infiite as being potentially extendable in time to be litle more than a metaphor). Fost-Dedekind/Cantor views of this sort inelade Keonecker’ fnitiem, Brouwer’ intuitionism, Weyl’ constructivism, and the ler Wittgenstein. SIZES OF INFINITY: CANTOR'S INFINITE NUMBERS Georg Cantor began with the idea that infinite sets, like finite sets, have a corresponding number, Such numbers, ‘which measure how many things are contained in ast, ane called cnrdinal numbers (oF cardinals). We repre- sent the eandinel numberof s set A as Card(A) “The idea that bers, or, ecuvalenty, that there ave “infinite” numbers coming after the natural numbers 0, 1, 2,3 a. » was ‘ejected prior tothe nineteenth century on the grounds thar infinite numbers requlsed actual infinite toualities, ‘and this in turn (go the story went) implied a contradic- tion, For example, the great seventeenth-century philoso- pher, logician, end mathematician Gottfried Leibniz ‘wrote that “I proved beyond aay doubt thatthe number (or mulkitude of all numbers implies « contradiction, if taken es sanitary whole. Ithink thatthe same is true of the largest auinber” (1849, p.535)-One notable aspect of this line of ought the assumption that the existence of infnive umbers implies the existence ofa largest infinite ‘number, or a number of all numbers finite collections have cardinal num- ‘This aesomption teaces to a rather basic intuition: wont any two “unbounded” or “unlimited” collections, ‘whether complete or potential, contain the same number of elements (or members), because both just keep going and going? Cantor’ great contsbution to both mathe: matics and philosophy was his discovery that the answer to this question is“no” (Cantor begins, not by asking which number should be attached to a particular eet, ut by athing whet criteria can be given for deciding when two sets have the same number (independently of which particular number or numbers are involved). To illustrate the difference beoween the two approaches, consider the following sit ation: you heve two baskets of fruit, one containing apples, the other containing oranges; and you need to Aeterrnine whether the numberof apples in the first bas- INFINITY IN MATHEMATICS AND LOGIC itis the same a¢ the number of oranges in the second basket. ‘Tere are bvo strategies. First, you oulé count the apples count the oranges, and then determine if the to ‘numbers are the same, This strategy corresponds to the fist approach, where we Bist assign particalar numbers tosete and then compare them. On the second zpproach, you repeatedly remave one apple from the Asst basket tnd one orange from the eecond, until you run cut of either apples or oranges. When you reach 1 stage where you cennot remove a pair consisting of one apple and one orange, there ae thee options: Either there are apples eft in the fist basket, in which case there are more apples than oranges: or there are cranges left in the second bas~ ket, n which case theve are more oranges than apples or both baskets are empty. in which case the number of apples isthe same as the number of oranges. (The second strategy, while perhaps more affcient, i less informative, ‘because you do notin the end, know how many apples oF ‘oranges were in the baskete, but only whetheror not here ‘was more of one than the other. similar difculy arises swith regerd 10 the contin hypothesi, which will be cliscussed below,) The second “pairing” sirtegy amounts to nothing more or lets than attempting to construct @ bijective mapping between the st of apples and these of ‘oranges Cantor's insight was Jn noticing thet, although cectending the fist strategy (counting and comparing ‘numbers obtained) t infinite sets isnot vieble until we have a well-worked-out theory of infinite cardinal num ber (hich was exactly wht he was attempting to formu: late), the second strategy can be applied to infin sets (almost) as easly a9 10 finite ones ‘The following principle a version of what bas come to be called Hume's Principle and which we cin cal ‘Hure’s Principle for Ses, sur up Cantor's approack: HIPS: For any seis Nand B: Card(a) = Card) ifLand only ifthereis a bijective function i A~* B. ‘We supplement this with the following defisition of ess than’ for cardinal numbers: Def: For any sets A and B: Card(A) < Cardi) if, and only if there isan injective fanction A~* 3 bbut no surjective function g AB. ‘This definition ogres withthe intuitive one for finite sos or example, we can verify that Carc( (Alaa, Bob) < INCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOTHY 2nd edition + 659INFINITY PY MATHEMATICS AND Locte Cardf(Alan, Bob, Cart) (ie, two is less than thres) by ting that there isan injective mapping from the first 10 the second (f, above provides one of the six possible injective mappings) but there is no surjective mapping, because one of the three members of the latter set will always be “missed” Consider Galileo's puzle again, Galileo showed that ‘here was a bijective mapping between the set of natural numbers (0,1, 2,3 swe] and the set of even natural num= bers (0, 2.4,6...), Thus, Card (0, 1,2, 3 ...|) = Cardi (0, 24,6 «.1). More surprisingly, Cantor aso proved that the set of rational numbers (i.e. all numbers that can be writen asa fraction a/b where a and b are both natural numbers) has the same cardinal number asthe st of nat- ural numbers. Cantor called this ruber Nand a set is ‘countable if, and only if it is either finite or it cardinal umber Is ¥ (relecting the fact that such sets are the same size as some st of netural, or “couating” numbers). Dedekind’s definition of infinite set implies that X, is the srmllet infinite cardinal namber; in her words, ther is no infinite set that cannot he mapped surjectively onto ‘the natural numbers, Cantor used Ry, Ry, X5... a8 names forthe second, third, fourth... infinite numbers end seis with these cat inal numbers are called uncountable, Providing names for infinite cardinal numbers is one thing, however, showing that there are sets that have those numbers is something else. Thus, Cantor's next task was to demon- strate that there were infinite sete that do not receive X, ‘as their number, that is, that there are infinite sets “bigger than’ the set of natural numbers, He did this in two way ‘The first strategy depends on a sccond species of ‘amber, the ordinal nuonbers, Whereas cardinal numbers retsure how many members a set has, ordinal numbers are a measure of particular orderings on thet set (com- Pare onc, two, three ... with fits, second, thitd...). In other words, ordinal numbers attach, notte sets by thers selves, but (o a set plus an ordering on that set, and the same (invinite) set cin correspond to different ordinal ‘numbers if we consider diferent orderings on it. ‘More carefully an ordinal number attaches toa pair consisting of ¢ wet A and an ordering < on A. If a set/ordering pair (A, S) isto receive an ordinal number, then the reltion < must be a well-rdering (we cal such pairs well-ordered sts, and represent the atdinal number of a well-ordered set (A, s) as Ord(A,S)) ‘Wie begin with the notion of a otal ordered st An ordering < iba toal ordering om A (ie, (Ay) a oully ‘ordered set) if and only if it satisfies the fllosing three 660 - 2nd edition ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY conditions (here and below assume familiarity with the notation of first-order logic) Anrisymmeiry: (Wa) ¥ May nyS2) >x=y) Treansitviy: (eh VIN (xs yAyS2) 4 e<2) Comparability: (Ws\(Wy)lxsy vy Sx) More intuitively.a relation on. ser A is total ordering if and only if: (i) givea two distinct objets in A, it eannat be the cise thatthe fret islessthan or equal tothe second and the second is less than or equal tothe first (if so. then ‘hey would be the same object} (i) for any three objects im ifthe frst is ess than ar equal to the second, and the second is less than or equal to the thir, then the first s less than or equal to the third; and (i) given any two objects in A,either the firs is less than or equal ta the sec- ‘ond, or the second is less than or equal tothe fst (this implies that any object in the ordering is les than oF ‘qual 10 itself). Two examples of total orderings are the natural numbers (0,1,2,3...] om their standard ordering Gie,0S1S2S3S...), and the integers {...-3,-2,-1, 6,1,2,3 ..] om their standard ordering (Lem $-3S—2 <-1S0S1<253¢.,). A totally ordered set (Av) is 0 well-ordered set if and only ifthe fllowing additional condition holds Well foundedness: (VB C A\(ax € B)(¥y € B) Gsy) Loosely puts if < is a wel ordering on a set A, then there is no infinitely descending chain” in (A, S), that is, there is mo infinite sequence x; >, 2 35 2 x, >... (aldaough there canbe infinitely asceacing chains &, fo(A) be sn arbitrary function from A to ite powersel. Define the set Bas follows: for any object ,x © Bif, and only i x & Aaand x @ f(x). Ausume, for reducio, that there isc © A such that fle) = B. By the definition of B, we have c= Bi, sand only ic © A and e@ fc), which implies that ¢ © B ‘Gand only if, @ B. Contradiction, so Feannot be sur- ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHITOSOPHY + 661INFINITY IN MATHEMATICS AND LOGIC ‘Thus, the cardinality of any sets ess than the cari- nality of its powerset, and, as result, for any cardinal number 8. R, < 2%. We might wonder why anyone ‘would make all this fuss over powersets, however Haves"® we alreedy seem thet we can construct larger and larger Sets, and thus obtain larger an lrger cardinal nurmbers, lasing the ordinal numbers? ‘There are two aspects of Cantor's diagonalization result that are noteworthy. The fist conceras the import of cardinality results for ordinary mathematis, We might wonder why everyday mathematicians (and ordinary -aonmathematicians) shold worry about diferent “sizes” of infinity, because neither ordinary folk nor most pro- fessional mathematiclane run across infinite sets of oud hal numbers in their everyday business. Cantar’s result, however, connects the theory of cardinal numbers (0 ‘more intuitive, everyday mathematical concerns. because the cardinal nurmber of the set of real numbers (ie, the yh Ex) states that there isa set that contains the empty set and the singleton of every sec which it contains (ie, the set contains 0, (2). {10}. {10H}... Following these we have what we etn call conditional nce axioms, which tell us which sets can be “built up” from previously existing objects. The fist ofthese is he pairing aster Baiting (Wa) y\Ga) Vw kw © 2 (= ev w ” The pairing axiom asserts that, given any two objects, there isa set that containe exactly those two objects and ‘nothing else. The paising axiom guarantees thet the sin- ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHYsleton of any object exists (because we can just take the pair of an object and itself) Next we have the union Unions x)(GyN(V2)(2 Eyer w)iwe xn ze ™) which states thet given any set, there is second set that contains ecactly the members of the membersof the first. Unsurprisingly, we also have an axiom asserting the exis~ tence ofthe powertet of any set: Powerset: (Wa) Vane 7 # (Ww)(w e 2 wey) Cur next principle the axiom of choice, sates tat, given any set of nonempty painwise disjoint set, there exists a second cet that contains exactly one member from each of the sets contained in the originl set The axiom of choice isoten replaced with a mare eaily understood, but prov- ably equivalent, principle cabled the well-ontering princi= ple: Well-Order:(8)(2R)(€x RO ise well-ondering) ‘The well-otdering priveiple guarantees that for any st, rho matter how large there is elation that well-orcesits ‘members. During the Sst half of the twentieth century the status ofthe axiom of choice was highly controversial; since then it hes become a standard part of the everyday rathematician’s toolkit. ur iaal wo conditional existential principles take the form, notof single axioms, but axiom schemes, witch Ihave infinitely many instances, The fret i the avons) of separation, Given any condition © expressible inthe lan iguige of tt theory: Separation: (WxVSyi(YaNle Ey (E24 02)) “This axiom stats that, given any et and any condition on objects, there exists a set that contains exactly the mem: bers of the original set that stiythe condition in ques tion, The second schematic principle is the axioms) of wplacerent, which consists of all instances of Replacomone: (¥=) Ay) (Wale Eyer Gu)(we x afi) =2)) where fis any Function definable in the language of set theory. Put loosey, given any set and) any function, replacement insures that there ie set containing exactly the objects obtained by applying the function to the members of the original set. ‘The final axiom of Zermelo Freenkal eet theory does ot assert the existence of any sets but instead imposes a restriction on wit sort of sets exist. The aciom of four= desion: 2nd edition 1 MATHEMATICS AND Lote Foundation, (73)(G)ly €x)= QEx75 Bw)(w xe w 2) asserts that any nonempty set (Le, any set other than @) contains as a member some second set thet hes no mae ‘hers in common with the original set. Although its dif- ficult wo sum up the consequences of this xiom in simple terms it maia purpore it to rule out the existence of tete that contain themselves, such as the (potential) set that has itself a its only member that i, = |G). ‘When confronted with such lst a number of ques tions naturally erse, including: (1) Might there bez sim- pler set of principles that does the same jabt; (2) Why have we chosen these principles: (3) Might there beaddi- tional principles that we have overlooked? Complete answers to all ofthese questions are beyond the scope of, the present artic, but partal answers can a least be given Tegaeding the first question, we can rule out one ii tially promising simplified theory, Naive Set Theory, ‘which has one exiom scherea. The principle in question is the naive comprehension principle. Naive Comp: Gy)(WeNiz © y= @(2)) ‘which states that, fOr any condition whateoever (as long as we can expressitin our set theoretic language), there is set containing exactly the objects that sets thet condi tion (note the similarity to separation above). The naive ‘comprehension principle entails all of the axioms given above, Unfortunately, however, it als entails a contradic: tion, as was famously proved by Bertrand Russell (1996), The reasoning, which has come to be known as Rus sells parador, proceeds as follows, Given nsive compre tension, some sets will be members of themselves (such 18 the el ofl sets) and some will not (such as the empty se, Because a ser’s not being a member of Isls a co dition expressible in the language of et theory (ie. @ _njif the following instance of naive comprehension. BplWe\(e € pox ead ‘were true then there would be a set that contains exactly those seis that are not members of themselves. Call this (supposed) set the Russell Class or R (collections t09ill~ Debived to form a set are called proper clays, although this terminology obscures the fact that such “cases” can- aot be object at all). To obiain the contradiction, we need only ask whether R is « member of itself. By the cri- tetla Jus. stated, we can conclude that Risa meraber of ‘elf and only if it isnot a member of itself. The con tradiction is evident, (Similor arguments demonstrate TNCVCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY + 663INFINITY IN MATHEMATICS AND Logie that there cannot be aset ofall odinels «set of all cacc nals, or a se ofall sets) ‘Thus, we must reject naive comprehension, and with ‘tany conception of et that allows for the existence ofthe ‘Ruste Class, ZFC provides us with one means lo achieve this, The next question, however, is why we have chosen these axioms, because presumably there ae other collec tions of principles that would do the same job. The answer is that the axioms were not chesen at random, oor was thet selection based merely on thei individual pl sibility, instead, there axioms were selected because they, correspond to natural thoughts regerding how one should separate the legitimate sets from those “collec- tions,'such as the Russell Class, that are nt well-behaved ‘enough to correspond to sets ‘Thereacc, roughly speaking, two intuitive pictures of the universe of sets that have mativated the formslation of ZC, The first, and more influential, i founded on the dea that each set is buile up from other sets or objects that are simpler, or atleast prior to, the st in question, ‘This notion of st is knoven ae the iterative conception of sand is summarized by George Boolos ‘According to the iterative, or cumulative, con- ception of sets, sets are formed at stages indeed, very set is formed at soane stage of the folow. ing"process’:atstage Dall posible calections of individuals are formed ... The sets formed at stage 1 are all possible collections of sets formed at stage 0, ... The sets formed at stage 2 are all Possible collections of sets formed at stages 0 and 1. ‘The sets formed at stage 3 are all possible collestions of ets formed at stages 0, 1, and 2 The sets formed at staged ... In genera, for any satural number nthe sets formed at stage n are all possible collections of sete formed at stages cater than me stages 0,1... 1.dmmedi- ately ater all stages 0, 1,2... there isa stage, stage e, The seis formed a stage w are, similarly, all possible collections of collections of sets formed st stages earlier, Le. stages 0, 1,2, Afler siage comes stage als at which. In genera fr each athe sets formed at stage ware all possible collections of sts formed at stages eaulier than e, Theres no last stag: each stage is immediately followed by another Thus there are ‘iages @#2, 0-43... and so it goes (1989, p. 88) Another notion that hes ben eed to justly the partea- lar choice of axioms constinting ZC (ane whichis closer to what Cantor originally hain mind) isthe fini tation of ze conception of st. Thundering though is 664 « 2nd edition ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY ‘hat problematic collections, such as the Russell Class, are hot sets hecause they ar, in some sense, to big, Doulas Sums up the limitation of size conception as the view zhat “objects form a set if and only if they ave not in one-one correspondence with all the objects there are” (1988, p. 96), in other words,a collection forms ase if, and only if, itis smaller than the universe of al sets or all objets. ‘The exact role that such conceptions of set can, and should, play within the philosophy and practice of set theory is something of an epen question. One particular worry surrounding such intuitive pictures is thet the ssiome of ZFC do not all seer to follow from a single conception. For example. the powerset axiom seems basic ‘on the iterative conception of set But less obvious on a limitation of size understanding, schereas the axiom of replacement seems straightforward on the laiter approach but somewhat queetionsble on the iterative conception. Nevertheless, we can at last recognize that these conceptions played a significant roe in the sctual choice of axioms included within ZFC. ‘The final question fo ask is whether there mist he ‘dditional axioms that can be added 1 the basi theory. ‘The answer, of course, i “yes. We have already seen one ‘uch principle the continauin hypothesis, As we noted, ‘we can add either the continuusm hypothesis or itt nega, tion to ZFC, andin cither cae we obtain a consistent the- ory. [fone thinks there is a unique universe of sets (and debate rages over this question) then at mest one of these theories can be correct. Even 20, the Gidel/Cohen results are enough fo guarantee that ZEC alone leaves at least some set theoretic questions unanswered, There is another type of question to which ZFC pro- Vides only-a partial answer, namely determining how ‘many sets there ae. The axioms of ZEC imply that the ‘universe of sets is larger than any particular set, otherwise the axioms) of replacement would provide us with a set (of all sets that, using the axioms) of separation, would Provide us with the Russell Class and a contradiction. “Thus, we can aske How big must the universe be in order to satisfy the axioms of ZFCt Before providing the answer, we need a few more definitions. Frst,the supremum ofa set of caréinal nani- ‘bers A (Le sup(,)) Is the smallest cardinal greeter than ‘or equal to exch of the cardinal numbers in the se. Sec fond, a cardinal number is regular if and only if, given any set of cardinals A, ifcard{A) < sand, for every cardi- nal y © A,7<% then sup(A) gees a universe of sets thatin some sensei ever expund- ing. with no upper limit to the size or variety of sets themselves, As @ rat, Aristotle was ot lest partially right because there ae colections (suchas the collection ofall objects oral ets) that cannot, and should nos be thought of as completed, definite totais. Instead, the universe of sets. considered asa whole ‘what has come o be called indefinitely extensible Russel, ‘efecting on the parsdoxesthat arse when some intuitive “callecion are treael assets (uch a he paradox that bears ie mime) described the situation a follows: [A concept is indefinitely extensible if for any efate characterization oft there I natural txtention ofthis characterization, which yells a tore inclusive concept ths extension will be nade according to some geveral principle for fenerating such exensions, and, typical, the totended characterization wil be formulated by reference to the previous, unestended character- ization (1963, pp. 195-196) Understanding Russells “definite characterization” as the contents of a set any time we think we have collected togethar all the object, ot all of the set, cogether into 8 singe st there will wa out 10 be more objects or sets, ‘which we somehow missed, To pat the point loosely, Can- tors embrace of the actually infinite bas led us, in the 665INFINITY IN MATHEMATICS AND Lote ‘end, to the recognition that the set theoretic hierarchy ltsel (or is something very much like) potentially inf- ACTUAL INFINITY AND INFINITE DIVISIBILITY Asc we saw atthe begining of this entry, Atisode’s solu- tlon to Zeno’s paradoxes relied on the fact that we do not accomplish infinitely many things when we run from Doin O to point 1, because itis never the case that all of ‘he parts ofthis journey (including the infinite sequence oF distances to 1/2, 1209 1/4, /4 to 18, .,) are present atone time. This solution relied, in tura, on the dstinc- tion between potential and actual infinity and on Aristo- ‘Nes insistence that the actual infinite is alusory. 1, however, cur post-Cantorian mathematical view allows, and even embraces, actslly infinite colletions, then we sre lee with the possibility thatthe problematie parts of the runner's path from 0 to | ate actually present se a completed totality. 1f so, then, assuming that motion is possible, it follows that we can secomplish infinitely ‘many tasks (and we do so every time we wiggle our litle finger!) ‘The most tempting response to this line of thought is ‘So whait" We might be surprised to eam that anyaction (2 mater how light) involves infinitely men tasks, but this astonishing féct is litle more than the result of a clever (and pethaps misleading) description of the event. ‘The movernent rom Oto I might be, on one description, composed of infinitely many smaller motions, but it can also be viewed asa single cantinuous action, that of mow- {ng from Oto 1. [is this ater fact that explains how we can accomplish the movement, and furthermore do so in a finite amount of time, ‘task thar consisis of infinitely many subtasks ear Fed out ina finite srount of time (such as Zeno's sescription of the eunner traveling (com O to |) is alled a supertask, Once we admit that Zeno was tight, end we can sometimes carry out supertasks, problems emerge ‘There are other eusly describable supertesks that seem to lead 10 paradoxes. Two of the most famous ate Thomp- son's Lamp and Bemerdete's Parades, Imagine an ideal amp (indestructible, and able to be ‘itched on or off instantaneous) that, at exactly 12:00, is tured on, 1/2 minute lates itis switched off, then 1/4 ‘minute later itis switched back on, then 1/8 minste later it is switched off, and then 1/teth minute later it is switched on, ... The infinite series of ewitchings will be completed at exacily 12:01. The puzzling question that arises is Will the lamp be on or off once the supertaik is ‘completed There seems to be no good reason to answer fone way rather than another. Nevertheless lamp. ever, an ideal one, mus be either on or off “Thompsons Lamp issimilar to Zeno's paradox of the runner in that ic divides 2 unit of time ln the fist half the first half of the second hai, the frst hal? of the lst fourth, the first half of the ast eighth, ... Bernardete’s paradox, however, forces us to bizarre (if not outright contradictory) conclusions using the mirror image ofthis Givision, namely dividing unit of time ito the Inst half the ast half of the ist haf, the last half ofthe First fourth, the last half of the first eighth, ... (more intuitively, we can see itas having the structure... + 1/32 4 U16 + 18 41MM U2 instead of 1/2 + 1/4 + 118+ 1116-41132 + 0) Jost Dernardete constructs & numberof different yer~ sions of his paradox, hee we will considera particularly striking formulation. Imagine an object that exists up ‘anti 12.00, when an infinite eeties of gods take notice of ‘t, The gods are omnipotent and, additionally, they always carey out the actions they decide upon, The first god decides that if the object stl exists at 1/2 minute after 12:0 then he will annihilate it (he will do nothing other wise). The second god decides to annihilate the abject if it tll exists at 1/4 minute pest 12:00 (and again, do noth- ing otherwise). The third god decides to annihilate the objectat 1/8 minute after 12:09 i ic sill exists, and 0 on. There isno threst othe existence ofthe object other than the intentions of each of the intiaite series of zods. We «an conclude thatthe objet will suddenly cesas fo exis ot cxacily 12:00, yet nothing (and in partcslar,no god) will have caused its destraction, First of all, assume that the abject exists past 12:00 ‘The there must be some fraction of a minute I! such that the object existed for (atleast) shat long after 12:0. 1f 0, however, then one ofthe gods failed to live up ta his intentions, Beause there will be soime god in the list who ‘decided 10 desroy the objec ii sil existed at 1/y min. ‘tes past 1200 where Uy is less than L/s (because the Series 1/2, 1/4, 1/8 1/16... tends to zero). Bat this contra iets the fact that the gods always carry out thir inten: tons. Thus, the object wil case to exist at 12:00. ‘The natural assumption to make i that one or more ‘of the gods must have destroyed it, but we can see this is incorrect as well. Each of the gods decided to destioy the ‘object ata time ater 12:09 and to donathing otherwise) Because the object did not survive past 12:00, the gods did nothing. Thus, the object blinks out of existence at ‘exactly 12:00 yet nothing acted in such a way as ro cause its disnppearance. Fren if not exactly. parsdoxical, Bernardete's peradox is deeply puzzling ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 666 2nd edition(Of couise, unlike Zeno's runner, both of these paz- les begin with an absurd situation. Ga the one hand we have a lamp that can be turned on and off arbitrarily fast and infinkely many dines without malfunction, on the ther we have an infinite collection ef gods (most of us nowadays tll pursie over whether or not there is even ‘one goal). Itis tempting to conclude thatthe proper reac- ‘don to these puzzles should be mere amusement but not sorry, because they concern situations that are at such a clstance from our everyday experience ofthe world ‘This would be « mistake, Both Thomson's Lamp and Bernardete's paradox are intended to challenge our understanding of the infnie and infinite divisibility. To dodge such challenges by aoting that they require physi cally impossible situations or events i 1 miss the point. Surely nether an indestructible lamp noran infinite pan- ‘theon of gods is logically impossible, and if they are logi- cally possible then their behavior is relevant to our understanding ofthe infinite (which is.after all, logical, ff at least mathematical, concept). Thus, these puzzles, and others like them, are not mere curiosities bt instead ‘represent important nsolved problems confronting the coberence of, and our understanding of, the notion of infinity atthe beset of mathematics and philosophy “This entry ends in rougly the same way in which it ‘began, with a dscussion of infinite divisibiliy. This i the Aristotle focused on, and where his notion of the potentially infinite gained its greatest (albeit temporary) success. Even as we abandoned Avlstotl's proscription on the sctully infinite and embraced modern set theory, patales such as Russell’ paradox and the nonexistence of ‘set ofall sets prevented us from rejecting the potentially ‘but act actualy infinite aliogechor Finally, given our scceplance of atleast some actually infinite collections, paradoxes similar in structure to those that Aristotle first considered continue to plague our understanding of collesions that keep going and going and going and eoing See alto Aristote: Bolzano, Bernard; Brouwer, Luiten gheruus Jan; Cantos, Georg: Constructivism and Cun: veationalsm; Continuity; Galileo Galle; Gide, Kurt, Inuuitionism; Leibniz, Gotiried Wilhelm; Plato; Rus- sell, Berwand Archus Williams Set Theory; Weyl, (Claus Hugo) Hermann; Wittgenstein, Ladbig Josef Johan; Zeno of Ble, NFINTY IN MATHEMATICS AND LOI Bibliography Ariel. The Byer. ook 6. Tamdated by Dac! W. ‘Graham. Oxlorl, UK: Catendon Pres, 19, Beleano, ernhard, The Mathesrtcal Works of Bomar ‘elzare. Tiassated by Steve Russ. Oxford, VK: Oxford Univesity Pres, 2004 Cano, Georg. Cantributons ote Founding of the Theory of Tiare Numbers New Yok: Dover, 1955. Dedekind, Richard. Ess on the Theory of Nabe: New ‘York: Dover 1901 Lidimin, Gottied. Matheraniche Sch. 7 vl, edited by C, 1.-Gethard. Bein: A. Asher 1869-1663. Leibnir. Gottfried. Pllosophicl Papers and Lattrs 2nd ed. “Tansated by Leroy Locker. Dondrekt, Netherlands Kove, 1976. Plato, Plbus Tasted by Re Hockforth, Combsige Us ‘Cambridge University Hrs, 1972, Rane, Bertrand. The Principe of Mathematics New Yorke ‘Norton, 196. CONTEMPORARY VIEWS ON INFINITY AND SET THE Bools, George. “iteration Again” Philosophical Topics 42 (1989).3-21, Reprinted in logis Lagi, and Lagi edited by Richard Jtrey. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Fess, 1960, 64-108, Cohen, aul “The Independence f the Contzuum. Hypothesis! Proceding of he Matonal Acadamy of Secee USA 90(1989): 143-1108 (Coben, Paul “The Independence ofthe Continsum ‘Hypochess LI- Procerdings ofthe National Acedemyof Sciences USA 81 (964 108-110 -Encerton, Herbert. Heniens of Ser Theay. New York: ‘Academic Press, 1977 Gade: Kurt. Coiesed Papers ol 1, 1925-1936, Oxcoud, UK: Oxiord University Pres, 1986 Godel, Kut. Coliered rapes Vol 2, 1898-1974 Oxford, UK Oxford Universi Pres. 1988 sunea, Kenneth, Set Theory: An eraducson to fadependence Proof. Amsterdam: Nerth Helland, 1998 ‘Mote, A. The Init. New York: Routledge, 2001. ZENO'S PARADOXES AND SUPERTASKS. ‘Bemardete, J. nny: An Bey in Metaphysics, Oxforé, UK: (Clarendon Press, 1964 aims, Jobo, and John Norws, “faite Pains: The Toile with Supertass” in Benacerafand his Cris, edited by A. Morton end Steven Sih, Cambridge, MA. Bac, 1996. ‘it, Geofiey John Raven, aad Maken Schofidd. The Praceratie Plleophor. Cembridge, UK Cambridge ninersy res, 1983, Roy T.Cook (2003) ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY and edirion > 667