THE DUAL EXPANSION OF

EUROPE: EU AND NATO

ENLARGEMENT AND THE
ROLE OF EXTERNAL
ACTORS

A Review of Literature Submitted to

Dr. Noel M. Morada
Department of Political Science
University of the Philippines – Diliman

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements in

International Studies 290
(Theories of International Relations)

Celito Felizardo Arlegue

Masters in International Studies
March 2003

1
 Abstract

The dual enlargement of the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) is considered to be one of the principal issues characterizing European politics today.
For this reason, it should not come as a surprise that this topic has generated a steady stream of
studies from both academic and policy-making circles. The purpose of this review of literature is
to classify, integrate and analyze these works in order to disclose the research gaps, both at the
theoretical and empirical level. By so doing, this modest contribution hopes to provide a sketch
of a viable research agenda in the future pertaining to EU and NATO enlargements.

Introduction

The altered terrain brought about by the unforeseen demise of the Cold War moves the
cherished dream of uniting Europe through the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) closer to reality. The „return to Europe‟ of Central and Eastern European
countries (CEECs) via the EU and NATO is already in its final stages, and is expected to see its
conclusion in the next few years. 1 This prospect of EU and NATO membership for the former
Soviet states, however, has raised the possibility of laying down the new iron curtain in Europe –
between the „insiders‟ and the „outsiders‟. The insiders are composed of the current and
applicant states of the EU and NATO, while the outsiders are those which do not fall in any of
these two categories.

The dual expansion of Europe through EU and NATO has been the subject of analyses
and interpretations of both academic and policy-making circles, and there appears to be a lively
debate going on regarding what theoretical approach is more appropriate in addressing the issue.
The two sides of the debate can be roughly divided between those who subscribe to
neorealist/neoliberal explanations and those who adhere to constructivist interpretations. A
number of empirical works have also been pursued along the same theoretical lines.

This review of literature is an attempt to classify, integrate and analyze these burgeoning
studies on the issue of EU and NATO enlargements. It is divided into three inter-linked sections.
The first and second parts survey the theoretical and empirical works on the issue respectively.
The third part, which is the core of the discussion, identifies the research gaps in an attempt to
come up with a plausible research problem in the future. The concluding argument suggests that
the present literature on the topic glossed over the role of external actors, more specifically US
and Russia in facilitating or impeding this dual EU and NATO expansion.

Theoretical Approaches in the Study of EU and NATO Enlargement

Enlargement has emerged as one of the central issues (if not principal issue) that pervades
the EU as it faces the new century. 2 While it can be argued that enlargement has always been a

1
In the case of NATO, it has already started with the admission of three CEECs in 1999.
2
The other key issues that the EU faces aside from enlargement are the operation of the European Monetary Union
(EMU) and its alleged „democratic deficit.‟

2
permanent feature of the European regional project3 since its founding in the 1957, it was only
after the Cold War had ended that the prospect of a more unified Europe under the auspices of
the EU became closer to reality. That is, while enlargement was built into the original
conception of the European Council (EC)/EU, it was viewed in terms of Western European
integration only. The culmination of the superpower competition entailed that this narrow view
be cast aside and entertain the idea that CEECs could eventually be members of the EU.

EU enlargement has been proceeding with a parallel expansion of NATO. They are
distinct processes but there is a growing tendency among scholars and policy-makers to view
them as one and the same. Part of the explanation for this inclination is that the direction of both
enlargements is Central and Eastern Europe, and the CEECs tend to consider membership with
these two Western European (or Atlantic in the case of NATO) institutions as proof that they
have indeed returned back to Europe. Aside from this, important external actors 4 such as US and
Russia view the enlargement of EU and NATO as intricately linked, although they have different
reasons for such perception. As what will be noted in the latter part of this review, the role of
these countries in facilitating or impeding EU/NATO enlargement has been glossed over in the
literature, and therefore presents one important research agenda in the future.

The significance of the dual enlargement issue, however, failed to inspire theoretically-
grounded studies on the issue. As what was lamented by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2002:
501) “In light of its political relevance, it is striking that EU enlargement has been a neglected
issue in the theory of regional integration.” The same can be said with regard to NATO
enlargement (Wolff, 2001). For this reason, theorizing on enlargement has been embedded in
the broader international relations theoretical approaches. Among these approaches are
neorealism, neoliberalism and constructivism. For theoretical clarity, these approaches are
divided into the rationalist5 and constructivist camps (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2002). It
must be noted, however, that the differences between these approaches is a matter of degree
rather than principle, and should be viewed as “partially competing and partially complementary
sources of theoretical inspiration for the study of enlargement” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier,
2002: 508).

Rationalism and Constructivism: Main Assumptions and Hypotheses for Enlargement

Rationalism

As what was noted above, rationalism in this study pertains to neorealism and
neoliberalism. The purpose here is not to delineate the differences between the two theoretical
approaches but to highlight their main rationalist (choice-theoretic) assumptions. Reus-Smit
2001: 213) identifies three assumptions that stand out:

3
The European Union Treaty of 1992 has just echoed the Treaty of Rome, which established European Economic
Council (EEC), in affirming that „Any European State may apply to become a Member of the Union.‟
4
In this review, external actors should mean non-EU members or applicants and non-European countries in the case
of NATO.
5
Neorealism and neoliberalism are approaches explicitly informed by the assumptions of rational choice theory, so
in this study, they will be subsumed under the label rationalism/rationalist.

3
 (1) Political actors, be they individuals or states, are assumed to be atomistic, self-
interested and rational;
(2) Actors‟ interests are assumed to be exogenous to social interaction;
(3) Society is understood as a strategic realm, a realm in which individuals or states come
together to pursue their pre-defined interests.

The first assumption means that states or individuals are assumed to be pre-social,
concerned primarily with their own interest and act in accordance with the most effective and
efficient way to realize their self-interests. The second assumption, on the other hand, stresses
that political actors have already pre-determined self-interests when they enter social relations,
and interaction with other actors will not affect these interests. Finally, the third assumption
emphasizes that individuals or states are atomistic, rational entities whose primary goal in
entering social relations is to maximize their interests (Reus-Smith, 2001: 213).

These assumptions have shaped the way rationalists view international/regional

organizations. For them, these organizations are “instrumental associations designed to help
states pursue their interests more efficiently” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2002: 509).
Organizations then do not determine the interests and consequently, actions of political actors.
As what was mentioned above, these were already pre-determined when states engaged in social
relations. Entering an organization therefore is viewed a strategic move for maximization of
self-interest of the state concerned.

With regard to the issue under consideration, the rationalists would argue that the EU and
NATO will expand their membership when the member states calculated that the marginal
benefits of enlargement exceed the marginal costs (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2002: 512).
6

Constructivism

The end of the Cold War, aside from increasing the significance of enlargement in the EU
and NATO agenda, also led to the rise of the constructivist theoretical approach in international
relations. This is primarily due to the fact that the rationalists failed to provide an explanation
for the systemic transformations reshaping the global order following the demise of the
superpower competition.

In response to the rationalist approach, the constructivists hold three core ontological
propositions which, they claim, can better explain the Post-Cold War political configuration:
(1) Normative or ideational structures are just as important as material structures in
shaping the behavior of individuals and states;
(2) Non-material structures condition actors‟ identities which, in turn, inform their
actions;
(3) Agents and structures are mutually constituted (Reus-Smit, 2001: 216-218).

6
It is interesting to note, however, that there are also differences among the rationalists as regards this hypothesis.
The neorealists for example, would claim that enlargement is desirable if it is perceived as a means of balancing a
superior power or other perceived threats. The neoliberals, on the other hand, would argue that enlargement is
advantageous if the member states expect net absolute gains from expansion.

4
 With regard to the first assumption, constructivists claim that systems of shared ideas,
beliefs and values also have structural characteristics and can also affect social and political
action. The second assumption notes the importance of social identities of political and social
actors because the constructivists believe that identities are the basis of interest. Lastly, the
constructivists contend that while normative and ideational structures can affect the identities and
subsequently, the interests of actors, actors can also exert influence on these structures (Reus-
Smit, 2001: 216-219).

As what can be observed from these assumptions, constructivists differ from the
rationalists in three important respects:
(1) where rationalists assume that actors are atomistic egoists, constructivists threat them
as deeply social;
(2) where rationalists treat actors‟ interests as exogenously determined, as given prior to
social interaction, constructivists treat interests as endogenous to such interaction, as
a consequence of identity acquisition, as learnt through processes of communication,
reflection on experience, and role enactment;
(3) where rationalist view society as a strategic realm, a place where actors rationally
pursue their interests, constructivists see it as a constitutive realm, the site that
generates actors as knowledgeable social and political agents (Reus-Smit, 2001: 219).

As regards the main subject of inquiry of this review, the constructivist view would claim
that there will be less variation among the enlargement preferences of EU and NATO member
states because of strong institutional and cultural effects at the systemic level (Schimmelfennig
and Sedelmeier, 2001: 514). Hence, where the rationalists claim that international/regional
organizations are just instruments of the states in pursuing their respective interests, the
constructivists argue that these organizations are “autonomous and powerful actors with
constitutive and legitimacy-providing functions” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2001: 509).
As regards its main enlargement hypothesis, the constructivist perspective would argue
perspective that the presence or absence cultural or normative match between EU/NATO and the
applicant states is the most critical factor for enlargement to proceed.

Table 1: Theoretical Approaches in EU and NATO Enlargements

Rationalist Rationalist-Constructivist Constructivist

Bevan et al, 2001; Brennan, 2000; Lanx, 2000; Lewis, 2001; Light et Haukkala, 2001; O‟Brennan, 2002;
Dehousse and Coussens, 2002; al, 2000; Lowenhardt, 2000; Noe, Schimmelfennig, 2001
Dent, 1997; De Witte, 2002; Dyker, 2002; Rupnik, 2000; Sjursen and
2000; Friis and Murphy, 1999; Smith, 2001; Stefanova, 2002
George and Bache, 2001; Glenn,
2002; Gowan D., 2000; Gowan
P.,1998; Grabbe, 2002; Kydd, 2001;
Mattli, 2000; Nello, 2002;
Rontoyanni, 2000; Uvalic, 2002;
Wallace and Sedelmeier, 2000;
Wolff, 2001

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 Table 1 categorizes the literature surveyed in this review in terms of their theoretical
approaches. It must be noted, however, that most of them were not explicit in the theoretical
underpinnings of their work, and the categorization employed here is based on the reviewer‟s
analysis.

As what was noted above, the rationalists and the constructivists have distinct hypotheses
pertaining to EU and NATO enlargement. The rationalists‟ claim is that enlargement will
proceed if the member states‟ perceive that their marginal benefits exceeded the marginal costs.
On the other hand, the constructivist argument is that enlargement will take place if there is a
cultural or normative match between the organization and the applicant states. These hypotheses
served as the basis, to a certain extent, for the theoretical categorization in the table above.

It is evident that the bulk of the studies fall into the rationalist category. While all of
them are concerned with the costs and benefits or opportunities or threats of enlargement, they
differ on their subject of analysis – EU/NATO (Dehousse and Coussens, 2002; De Witte, 2002;
Friis and Murphy, 1999; Gowan D., 2000; Gowan P.,1998; Kydd, 2001; Nello, 2002; Uvalic,
2002; Wallace and Sedelmeier, 2000), applicant states (Brennan, 2000; George and Bache, 2001;
Mattli, 2000; ) member states (George and Bache, 2001; Grabbe, 2002; Wolff, 2001), and
impact of enlargement (Bevan et al, 2001; Brennan, 2000; Dent 1997; Dyker, 2000; George and
Bache, 2001; Glenn, 2002).

Only three articles are categorized as constructivist, and they also have different focus of
analysis (Please refer to Table 2). It must be noted, however, that the articles raised serious
theoretical issues that the rationalists cannot afford to ignore. Haukkala (2001), focusing on EU-
Russia relations, observed that the relationship between EU and Russia is only of cooperative
nature as there is an absence of a genuinely shared normative base for the relationship. This lack
of normative fit can serve as an explanation for EU‟s refusal to offer Russia any prospect of
membership. This is not to say, however, that this particular issue is not amenable to rationalist
analysis, as the costs of admitting Russia to the EU may far outweigh the benefits also. This
issue manifests that the two dominant theoretical approaches should be viewed as
complementary rather than as competing. As what will be noted later, a number of authors
already combined these approaches in their studies. O‟ Brennan (2002), on the other hand,
argues that EU enlargement, especially as its latter stage can be better explained by the
constructivist theoretical approach. He claimed that while the rationalists can account the initial
stages of the process, they cannot explain why the EU eventually decided to open negotiations
with all the candidate countries at the Helsinki summit. This decision definitely questions the
basic assumptions of the rationalist concerning enlargement:
1) The neo-realist assumption that enlargement is desirable if it balances the superior
power or other threats doesn‟t hold because there‟s no power to balance. Russia is weak
both economically and military.
2) The neo-liberal assumption that enlargement will happen if the member states expect
net absolute gains from expansion also has to confront the reality that EU enjoys
asymmetrical advantage over the CEECs, and therefore, and absolute gains cannot be
guaranteed.

6
 Finally, the article of Schimmelfennig (2001) expands O‟Brennan‟s argument by
providing an explanation of why the EU decided to expand to the CEECs. Aside from the
„community‟ or „cultural match‟ that lies in the core of the constructivist claim, Schimmelfennig
argued that EU member states became rhetorically entrapped, that is, they can neither openly
oppose nor threaten to veto enlargement without damaging their credibility as community
members. This process highlights, to a certain extent, the importance of speech acts or
communication which is very significant for the constructivist theoretical approach.

The table above also includes a median category rationalist-constructivist. The works
that fall in this category utilized both theoretical approaches in their analysis of EU or NATO
enlargement. As what was hinted above, the combination of these two approaches can provide a
more comprehensive understanding of EU and NATO enlargement policy. The studies in this
category didn‟t deviate from the rationalist cost-benefit analysis but also highlighted the role of
norms and ideas. Lanx (2000), for example, dealt with the strategies employed by Western
countries to ensure normative and institutional compatibility between the CEECs and the global
political economy. Arguing that EU was used as a means to extend global governance to the
transition economies, the author emphasized the importance of (liberal-democratic) rules, norms
and procedures exemplified in the organization‟s criteria for membership in guaranteeing a
normative and institutional fit between the two. The significance of these criteria was also noted
by Rupnik (2000) and Lewis (2001) as responsible for stabilizing the CEECs‟ democratic
transformation. It must be noted, however, that the most interesting work in this category with
significant theoretical implications is that of Stefanova (2002). He argued for the use of security
community as a general analytical framework for regional security studies as it “explores the
possibility of processes changing the structural conditions, which in turn re-shape security
politics” (Stefanova, 2002: 7). By addressing both normative and material factors, Stefanova
claimed that the security community framework surmounts the rigidities of monocausal theories
of international relations. Other authors in this category (Light et al, 2000; Lowenhardt, 2000;
Noe, 2002) focused on the implications of enlargement for external countries, most notably, on
the former Soviet states which were not offered the prospect of EU membership, what is termed
as the „outsiders‟. Implicit in their analyses is the role of cultural and normative differences
between the EU and these countries in EU‟s denial of membership. As what was noted above,
however, EU‟s relations with the former Soviet states (most especially Russia) can also be
analyzed using a rationalist theoretical approach. For one, the incorporation of these troubled
countries in the EU would definitely impact negatively on the organizations decision-making
processes. Moreover, their accession would entail significant costs in terms of reforming EU
institutions and budget. And since EU has an asymmetrical advantage over these countries (more
than what it enjoyed over the CEECs), arrangements less than membership would best serve the
interests of EU member states.

As what can be gleaned above, the rationalist and constructivist theoretical approaches
appear to dominate the studies on EU and NATO enlargements. It is important to note, however,
that there are recent attempts to combine these two approaches based on the belief that such
fusion is needed if a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of the enlargement process
is desired.

7
Empirical Studies in EU and NATO Enlargements

This section surveys the empirical studies in EU and NATO enlargements. For this
purpose, the studies were grouped in terms of enlargement dimensions. Schimmelfennig and
Sedelmeier (2002: 507-507) identified basic research questions for each of the dimensions of
enlargement. With regard to applicant enlargement politics, the principal research question is,
why and under which conditions do non-members seek accession to a regional organization? On
member state enlargement politics, the main question is, under which conditions does a member
state of a regional organization favor or oppose enlargement to a particular applicant country?
As regards EU enlargement politics, the central question is under which conditions does the
regional organization admit a new member, or modify its institutional relationship with outside
states? Finally, on the impact of enlargement, the key questions pertain to the organization itself
and to new and non-members. With regard to the organization, the primary questions are: How
enlargement affects the distribution of power and interests in the organization, and how it
influences the identity, norms and goals as well as the effectiveness and efficiency of the
organization. On the impact on new and non-members, the central questions are: How does
enlargement change the identity, the interests, and the behavior of governmental and societal
actors? Under which conditions do they conform to the norms of the organization? Based on
these principal research questions, the categorization of the surveyed studies is presented in
Table 2.

Table 2: Dimensions of EU and NATO Enlargements

Applicants’ Politics Member States’ Politics EU/NATO Enlargement Impact of Enlargement

Politics
George and Bache, 2001; George and Bache, 2001; Dehousse and Coussens,
Lewis, 2001; Mattli 2000; Kydd, 2001; Lewis, 2002; De Witte, 2002; Friis
Uvalic, 2002 2001; Wolff, 2001 and Murphy, 1999; George
and Bache, 2001; Gowan
D., 2000; Gowan P.,1998;
Haukalla, 2001; Lanx,
2000; Lewis, 2001; Nello,
2002; O‟ Brennan, 2002;
Rupnik, 2000;
Schimmelfennig, 2001;
Sjursen and Smith, 2001;
Wallace and Sedelmeier,
2000
Bevan et al, 2001;
Brennan, 2000; Dent
1997; Dyker, 2000;
George and Bache, 2001;
Glenn, 2002; Gowan D,
2000; Grabbe, 2002;
Light et al, 2000;
Lowenhardt, 2000; Noe,
2002; Rontoyanni, 2000;
Stefanova, 2002

As what can be seen from the table above, most of the studies in EU and NATO
enlargements are concentrated on EU/NATO enlargement politics and the impact of
enlargement. The emphasis on these dimensions is hardly surprising, as CEEC enlargement is
predicted to have the most far-ranging implications not only for the applicant and member states
but more importantly, for the EU/NATO themselves. The impact of enlargement to EU is
captured in the studies by Brennan (2002) and George and Bache(2001). These authors claimed
that EU should institute the appropriate policy, financial and institutional reforms in response to
enlargement. Specifically, they cited reforms pertaining to Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
and Structural Funds as well as decision-making rules and voting strengths in the Commission

8
and the Council. Dehousse and Coussens (2002) argued that while enlargement presents threats
to the EU, it also involves opportunities such as stabilizing the CEECs (and therefore enhancing
European security) and enhancing the global weight of the organization. With regard to impact
of enlargement on applicant countries, Glenn (2002) noted that the imposition of EU
conditionality creates pressures for convergence on the part of applicant countries. The works of
George and Bache (2001), Lewis (2001) and Uvalic (2002), while taking into account the impact
of enlargement, focused also on why the applicant states seek EU membership. Uvalic, in
particular, went farther by claiming that „new regionalism‟ among CEECs can be a factor for
successful enlargement. It cannot be denied, however, that even this regional initiative among
Central and Eastern European transition economies also revolved around the membership criteria
set by the EU in the 1993 Copenhagen European Council. These are:
(a) political criterion – An applicant must have stable institutions, guaranteeing
democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and the protection of minorities
(b) economic criterion – An applicant must have a functioning market economy and
capacity to cope with competitive pressures within the single market of the EU.
(c) criterion relating to acquis communautaire – An applicant must be able to take on the
obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic,
and monetary union.

These criteria brought significant political, economic and legal challenges for the
applicant states. With regard to the political challenge, the candidate countries need to establish
pluralist democracy with stable institutions. The economic challenge on the other hand, pertains
to the applicant countries‟ task to have a functioning market economy and to cope with the
European Monetary Union (EMU). Finally, the CEECs also have a daunting task to reform their
legal system in order to conform with the acquis communautaire.

Kydd (2001), on the other hand, dealt with the policy dilemma of NATO member states –
whether they will expand the community or forgo expansion. He argued that this dilemma
should be related to trust, mistrust and cooperation, which can be subjected to strategic analysis.
Utilizing a game theoretic model, this work is one of the very few works surveyed in this review
whose purpose is explanatory, or even predictive.

Lewis (2001) and Wolff (2001) studies dealt with the member states‟ enlargement
politics of the EU and NATO respectively. Lewis, for example, highlights the concerns of
agricultural member states (e.g. France) and relatively poor member states (e.g. Spain and
Portugal) with regard to CEEC enlargement. These countries feared that there would be
significant fund diversion from them to the new member states if ever enlargement proceeds.
Moreover, even wealthy member states (e.g. Sweden) also raised concerns over the possibility
of increase in the EU budget. Wolff‟s study focused on analyzing the German and American
views with regard to NATO enlargement. He argued that German and American advocacy for
NATO enlargement was a result of shared interests although these interests were driven by
different rationales.

It is noticeable that the bulk of the surveyed literature are descriptive in nature and
utilized secondary data analysis as a methodology. While there are attempts to use more

9
sophisticated methodologies such as game theoretic analysis (Kydd, 2001) and rhetorical
analysis (Schimmelfennig, 2001), these are relatively rare and isolated cases.

Research Gaps: Theoretical and Empirical

The first and second parts of this review of literature surveyed a number of theoretical
and empirical studies on the dual enlargement of EU and NATO. On the theoretical aspect, it
appears that there is truth to the claim that this process has been characterized by a “theoretical
vacuum”. For this reason, enlargement theorizing has been embedded in international relations
theories. While there were attempts to come up with alternative approaches (Stefanova, 2002;
Friis and Murphy, 1999 ), it cannot be denied they were also derived from international relations
theories. This is not to say, however, that enlargement should produce distinctive theoretical
approaches. The use of international relations theories has indeed produced new research agenda
and deepened the understanding of the enlargement process. It must be noted, however, that
there have been few explicitly theoretical attempts to study EU and NATO enlargements. Apart
from Mattli (2000), O‟Brennan (2002) Schimmelfennig (2001) and Stefanova (2002) most of
the literature surveyed in this review either glossed over or entirely ignored the theoretical
implications of their works.

Mattli‟s (2000) work on the sovereignty bargains of EU applicant states definitely falls
within the rationalist framework. His argument, essentially, is that an outsider state decides to
apply for membership in regional organizations after considering the trade-offs in terms of
sovereignty. Since he defined sovereignty as multidimensional, with autonomy, control and
legitimacy elements, he claimed that an outsider state seeks membership if the costs in one
dimension of sovereignty is less than the benefits in other dimension/s. Since this study focused
on the EU, similar studies should also be done on enlargement of other international
organizations or alliances such as the NATO.

O‟ Brennan‟s (2002) constructivist account of EU enlargement, especially in its latter

stages is also instructive in analyzing NATO enlargement. Indeed, NATO persistence itself
defied rationalist predictions (McCalla, 1996). After the end of the Cold War, NATO was
predicted to break up, as the threat (Soviet Union) that has keep it together for four decades was
already gone. NATO, however, proved to be resilient and has even expanded its membership.
This decision to enlarge, similar with that of the EU, can be better understood under
constructivist lenses. No study in this literature review utilized such approach in analyzing
NATO enlargement.

Schimmelfennig‟s (2001: 48) work, like Brennan, also used the constructivist approach in
his study of EU enlargement. According to him, “The problem…is to explain how a rational
outcome (association) based on egoistic preferences and relative bargaining power was turned
into a normative one?” He proposed rhetorical action – the strategic use of norm-based
arguments – as the intervening mechanism. He began his analysis by saying that EU
enlargement has been legitimated by the ideology of a pan-European community of liberal-
democratic states. Since different actors within the EU were concerned with enhancing their
legitimacy, they used advocacy for enlargement process as a means to achieve this aim. In the

10
process, however, they became entrapped in their rhetorical commitments, that is, they could
neither openly oppose nor threaten to veto enlargement without damaging their credibility as
community members. This analysis of why EU decided to enlarge, can also be applied to NATO
enlargement. Since the latter continues to puzzle scholars, Schimmelfennig‟s rhetorical analysis
can be of great use in analyzing NATO expansion, similar to what it did in EU.

Stefanova‟s (2002) security community framework, on the other hand, lies in the middle
of rationalist and constructivist theoretical approaches. Arguing that this framework has already
proven its relevance in regional security studies, the author argued that it permitted an
assessment of the evolution of regional security, without having to analytically distinguish the
community from its institutional components, or assume an oversimplified dichotomous position.
While this framework is quite promising, Stefanova only applied this in the Balkan region.
Further studies therefore should look on the framework‟s utility in other EU bordering regions.
It is also interesting if this framework will still be useful after the first round of CEEC
enlargement in 2004.

In summary, it is evident that while enlargement has generated substantial scholarly and
policy-oriented studies, there are still important theoretical and empirical gaps in the literature
that must be filled up by future studies. Most studies, judging on the basis of this review, are
descriptive in nature and not do not have explicit theoretical framework. For this reason,
explanatory (and even predictive) studies should be encouraged in the future. Most of them also
relied on secondary data and there are very few attempts to use more sophisticated
methodological techniques. Schimmelfennigs and Sedelmeier‟s (2002) review on the
enlargement process is particularly instructive for future researches. These studies also ignored
one significant dimension of the enlargement process – the role of external actors such as the US
and Russia. This will be the subject of the next section.

The Role of External Actors: US and Russia

The primary aim of this literature review is to come up with a plausible research problem
with regard to EU and NATO enlargement. Based from the survey done above, it is clear that
the role of external actors such as the US and Russia in facilitating or impeding the enlargement
process has received scant attention. Although some authors hinted on the role of the US
(Brennan, 2000; Lewis, 2001, Noe, 2002) and Russia (P. Gowan, 2000, Noe 2002) in EU
enlargement, their analyses considered these two actors as part of external relations and
therefore, not that significant when it comes to enlargement policy. It should not come as a
surprise, therefore, that most of the studies on them fall in impact of enlargement dimension. It
must be noted, however, that these two actors have been active participants in the enlargement
process.

As what was noted above, EU and NATO enlargement are intricately linked because the
CEEC‟s consider membership in these Euro-Atlantic structures as the “defining characteristic of
their societal transformations” (Stefanova, 2002: 3). This view is echoed by Rupnik (2000: 121),
who claimed that membership in EU and NATO is the “prime foreign-policy goal of the

11
transition”. This literature review argues that the linkage between EU and NATO expansion is
also a result of external actors such as US and Russia.

US, for example, has been advocating for EU enlargement as this is viewed as an
alternative to NATO enlargement. This policy has been a result, to a certain extent, by the
predominant belief in the US policy circles that EU enlargement is less disruptive that NATO
enlargement. As what was noted by George and Bache (2001: 418), “The United States was
concerned not to expand NATO membership too precipitately for fear of alarming Russia, so it
put pressure on the EC to offer membership as a sort of second-order guarantee of independence
to the states most affected.” Aside from this, EU enlargement is also viewed by the US (and
Russia also) as a way to ensure European political stability and security, which therefore creates
a more peaceful international system (Brennan, 2000). EU expansion, therefore, has the support
of US and Russia and both preferred it over NATO enlargement. While this should not be taken
to mean that US disagreed over the latter (Wolff, 2001), it is evident that it wants to prioritize EU
enlargement first. One of the explanation for this, as what was mentioned by George and Bache
above, is the perception of Russia.

Russia has been consistent in its stand regarding NATO enlargement. It viewed the
enlargement of the alliance as a threat to its security and therefore has been quite vocal in its
opposition to process. In the study of Light et al (2000: 6), they noted that “At all levels of
Russian society and across political spectrum there was opposition to further round of NATO
expansion” . Part of the explanation for this convergence of opinion is the NATO attacks on
Serbia which were carried out without UN Security Council backing. For this reason, the
Russians feel that NATO may also do the same to Russia, especially as the Chechnya war is
threatening to spill over Western Europe. As a matter of fact, “Russia clearly preferred to see
NATO dissolved and …rely on the pan-European Organization for Security and Cooperation
(OSCE) (Lanx, 2000: 267)” Similar with the US, it also favors EU enlargement better than
NATO expansion. This is because the latter is viewed as one of the ways of the US to enhance
its hegemonic position in Europe. As what Dmitri Trenin (quoted in Light et al, 2000: 7) points
out, Russia tend to contrast “the good West of Europe/EU” with the “bad West of
America/NATO.” Russian foreign ministry describes the country‟s position in the following
terms:
If the entry of the Central and East European (CEE) countries into NATO was regarded as being
unambiguously negative and therefore categorically opposed by Russia, then their entry into the
EU appeared to be almost a benefit, another brick in the foundation of the “common European
process.” (quoted in D. Gowan, 2000: 15)

As what is evident from the discussion above, the role of external actors such as the US
and Russia can be one possible research agenda in the future. While their role has been hinted in
the literature, no extensive study has been conducted on how they facilitated or impeded the dual
enlargement of EU and NATO.

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