Supervision Over and Discipline of Local Officials a. It held that a violation of Art.
a. It held that a violation of Art. 177 of the RPC involves fraud which in a
G.R. No. 154098 – Miranda vs Sandiganbayan
PUNO, J.
The Mayor of Santiago City, Isabella was placed under preventive suspension by the
Ombudsman for 6 months for alleged violations of the Code of Conduct for Public Officials.
Despite this preventive suspension, he still reassumed his position as Mayor. An
information for usurpation of authority was then filed before the Sandiganbayan. The SB
issued a preventive suspension order, which the Mayor now contests before the SC. The
SC upheld the propriety of the suspension order of the SB. In an obiter, the ponencia also
addressed the concern of the dissenting opinion that the Ombudsman’s power to issue
preventive suspension orders is limited to 60 days, as per the LGC (obiter because the
Mayor assails the order of the SB, not the Ombudsman). The ponencia held the
Ombudsman was not limited by the LGC (See doctrine).
DOCTRINE
The Ombudsman’s power to issue preventive suspension orders is not limited to 60 days
as per Section 63 of the LGC. The Ombudsman was not mentioned under said section and
was not meant to be governed by that provision. The provision was meant as a cap on the
discretionary power of the President, governor and mayor to impose excessively long
preventive suspensions. They are political personages. The possibility of extraneous
factors influencing their decision to impose preventive suspensions is not remote. The
Ombudsman on the other hand is not subject to political pressure given the independence
of the office which is protected by the Constitution
FACTS
1. Jose Miranda was the mayor of Santiago City, Isabella.
2. The Ombudsman placed him under preventive suspension for six months for
alleged violations of RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees).
3. A complaint for violation of Article 177 of the RPC (usurpation of authority or
official functions) was later filed with the Ombudsman, alleging that during the
time of his preventive suspension, he:
a. Issued a memorandum addressed to the Vice Mayor, adivisng her that he
was assuming his position as City Mayor;
b. Gave directives to heads of offices and other employees;
c. Issued an order authorizing certain persons to start work;
d. Insisted on performing the functions and duties of Mayor despite the Vice
Mayor’s requests to desist from doing so, without a valid court order, and in
spite of the order of the DILG Undersec directing him to cease from
reassuming the position.
4. Mayor Miranda argued that:
a. He reassumed office on the advice of his lawyer, in good faith.
b. Under Sec. 63 (b) of the LGC, local elective officials could not be
preventively suspended for a period beyond 60 days.
c. He immediately complied with the DILG Undersec’s directory.
5. The Ombudsman then filed an information against Mayor Miranda for violation of Art.
177 of the RPC before the Sandiganbayan (SB).
6. The prosecution filed before the SB a motion to suspend Mayor Miranda pendente
lite.
7. The SB preventively suspended Mayor Miranda from office for 90 days.
general comprises anything calculated to deceive.
b. This includes all acts, omissions, and concealment involving a breach of
legal or equitable duty, trust or confidence justly reposed, resulting in
damage to another or by which an undue and unconscious advantage is
taken of another.
c. Miranda’s act also fell within the catch-all provision “any offense involving
fraud upon government.”
8. Hence this present petition before the SC, assailing the preventive suspension orders.
Miranda argues that:
a. The offense of usurpation of authority/official functions under Art. 177 of the
RPC is not embraced by Sec. 13 of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act) which only contemplates offenses enumerated under RA
3019, or which involve fraud upon government or public funds or property.
b. Usurpation of authority is not fraud upon government or public funds or
property.
ISSUE with HOLDING
1. WoN Sec. 13 of RA 30191 applies only to fraudulent acts involving public funds or
property. NO.
a. Section 13 of RA 3019 covers two types of offenses:
i. Any offense involving fraud on the government; and
ii. Any offense involving public funds or property.
b. Nothing in RA 3019 limits sec. 13 only to acts involving fraud on public funds
or property. The phrase “any offense involving fraud upon government or
public funds or property” is clear and categorical.
c. The interpretation of Miranda that “government” only serves to qualify the
nature of the funds or property is erroneous.
d. A statute should be construed reasonably with reference to its controlling
purpose and its provisions should not be given a meaning that is
inconsistent with its scope and object.
2. WoN the crime of usurpation of authority or official functions involves fraud upon
government or public funds or property found in Sec. 13 of RA 3019. YES.
a. The phrase fraud upon government means any instance or act of trickery or
deceit against the government.
b. It cannot be read restrictively so as to be equivalent to malversation of funds
as this is already covered by the preceding phrase “any offense involving . .
. public funds or property.”
c. Assuming the duties and function of the Office of the Mayor despite his
suspension from said office resulted in a clear disruption of office and worst,
1 Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any incumbent public officer against whom any
criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or
property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and
mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be
convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if
he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he
failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have
been filed against him.
In the event that such convicted officer, who may have already been separated from the service,
has already received such benefits he shall be liable to restitute the same to the Government.
1
 a chaotic situation in the affairs of the government as the employees, as well IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is DISMISSED there being no showing that the
as the public, suffered confusion as to who is the head of the Office. Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in issuing its Resolution of 4 February 2002,
preventively suspending the petitioner for 90 days.
3. WoN Miranda reassumed office under an honest belief he was no longer under
preventive suspension. NO. SO ORDERED.
a. In his own affidavit, he refused to leave his position despite the
memorandum of the DILG Undersec, and left only a few days after its OTHER NOTES
receipt due to coercion of the PNP. This is contrary to his claim that he
immediately complied with the memorandum.
DIGESTER: Xave Libardo
4. WoN the Ombudsman has the authority to preventively suspend local elective
officials for 6 months. NO.
a. Firstly, the issue in this case is the propriety of the preventive suspension of
the SB, not the Ombudsman’s.
b. In any case, the Ombudsman is not mentioned in Section 63 of the LGC and
was not meant to be governed by that provision.
c. The provision was meant as a cap on the discretionary power of the
President, governor and mayor to impose excessively long preventive
suspensions. They are political personages. The possibility of extraneous
factors influencing their decision to impose preventive suspensions is not
remote.
d. The Ombudsman on the other hand is not subject to political pressure given
the independence of the office which is protected by the Constitution.
e. The 6 month period of preventive suspension imposed by the Ombudsman
was within the limit provided by RA 6770 (i.e. not more than 6 months).
f. Contrary to the dissent, giving a 6 month limit for the Ombudsman but only
giving 60 day limit for executive officials does not violate the Equal
Protection clause.
i. As pointed out, there is a substantial distinction between
preventive suspensions handed down by the Ombudsman and
those imposed by executive officials.
ii. The Constitution has given the Ombudsman unique safeguards to
ensure immunity from political pressure (e.g. fiscal autonomy, fixed
term of office, classification as an impeachable officer).
iii. The Ombudsman Act of 1989 (RA 6770) also requires stricter
safeguards for the imposition of preventive suspension. The
Ombudsman must determine:
1. That the evidence of guilt is strong
2. That any of the following circumstances are present:
a. Charge involves dishonesty, oppression, or
grave misconduct or neglect in the performance
of duty;
b. The charges would warrant removal from
service; or
c. Continued stay in office may prejudice the case
filed against him.
g. Yes, there is possibility of abuse by the Ombudsman as the dissenting
opinion fears but all powers are susceptible of abuse. That is no reason to
strike down the grant of power. The proper remedies against abuse are a
petition for certiorari under R. 65 or amendment of RA 6770 by the
legislature, not a contortionist statutory interpretation by the Court.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION