1. ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Letter of Tony Valenciano, Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice in QC
What our non-establishment clause calls for is government neutrality in religious matters.
Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of
neutrality.
Facts: Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of persons who identify themselves as lesbians,
gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Ang Ladlad applied for registration with
the COMELEC. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization
had no substantial membership. Ang Ladlad again filed a petition for registration with the
COMELEC. Petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and under-represented
sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity;
that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal
attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied
with the 8-point guidelines enunciated in jurisprudence. Ang Ladlad laid out its national
membership base consisting of individual members and organizational supporters, and outlined
its platform of governance. After admitting the petitioners evidence, the COMELEC Second
Division dismissed the petition on moral grounds.
Issue: Whether COMELEC violated the non-establishment clause of the Constitution in
dismissing the petition.
Ruling: YES. COMELEC mistakenly opines that the Court’s ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. Commission on Elections (412 Phil. 308, 2001) stands for the proposition that only
those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. The
enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element
is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies
with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated
its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELECs moral
objection and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent
ever found that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the
requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that no law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our non-
establishment clause calls for is government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly, governmental
reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. The Court found that
it was a grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and
the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Rather than relying on religious belief, the
legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able
to advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine.
Otherwise stated, government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily
secular effects.
2.
Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests
but at the same time strives to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within
flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular,
benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it
does not offend compelling state interests.
Facts: This controversy originated from a series of letters written by Valenciano and addressed to
the Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno reporting that the basement of the Hall of Justice of Quezon City
had been converted into a Roman Catholic Chapel, complete with Catholic religious icons and
other instrument for religious activities. He believed that such practice violated the constitutional
provisions on the separation of Church and State and the constitutional prohibition against the
appropriation of public money and property for the benefit of a sect, church, denomination, or any
other system of religion. He further averred that the holding of masses at the basement of Hall of
Justice showed that it tended to favor the Catholic litigants; that the rehearsals and other activities
caused great disturbance to the employees; and that court functions are affected due to the masses
that is being held from 12:00 to 1:15 in the afternoon.
Issue: WON the holding of masses at the basement of the Quezon city Hall of Justice violates the
constitutional principle of separation of Church and State as well as the Constitutional prohibition
against appropriation of public money or property for the benefit of any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian institution or system of religion
Ruling: NO. The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the OCA and denies the
prayer of Valenciano that the holding of religious rituals of any of the world's religions in the QC
Hall of Justice or any halls of justice all over the country be prohibited. The Holding of Religious
Rituals in the Halls of Justice does not Amount to a Union of Church and State. The Separation
of Church and State Shall be inviolable. In the case at bar, the Catholic believers were only
practicing or acting on their beliefs and to stop such practices is tantamount to depriving them on
the constitutional right to act on their beliefs. The Hall of Just is merely accommodating the
believers in their practice of their religion. It is not the same to establishing a religion or the unity
of the Church and State as the State itself allows the practices of different sects, religions or beliefs
to continue and to be done even during office hours in respect to the teachings of the respective
religions as long as it can be shown that the exercise of the right does not impair the public welfare,
the attempt of the State to regulate or prohibit such right would be an unconstitutional
encroachment. Father Bernas explained in detail the intent of the non-establishment of a state
religion "In effect, what non-establishment calls for is government neutrality in religious matters.
Such government neutrality may be summarized in four general propositions: (1) Government
must not prefer one religion over another or religion over irreligion because such preference would
violate voluntarism and breed dissension; (2) Government funds must not be applied to religious
purposes because this too would violate voluntarism and breed interfaith dissension; (3)
Government action must not aid religion because this too can violate voluntarism and breed
interfaith dissension; [and] (4) Government action must not result in excessive entanglement with
religion because this too can violate voluntarism and breed interfaith dissension." The prohibition
contemplates a scenario where the appropriation is primarily intended for the furtherance of a
particular church. The aforecited constitutional provision “does not inhibit the use of public
property for religious purposes when the religious character of such use is merely incidental to a
temporary use which is available indiscriminately to the public in general. Thus, the basement of
the Quezon City Hall of Justice has remained to be a public property devoted for public use because
the holding of Catholic masses therein is a mere incidental consequence of its primary purpose.

3. Gerona v. Secretary of Education
Facts: On 1955, RA 1265 took effect which makes flag ceremonies compulsory to all
educational institutions. The Sec. of Education issued Dept. Order No. 8 prescribing the
rules and regulations for the proper conduct of the flag ceremony. The said order
mandates that a proper salute must be given, or at least standing still with arms and
hands straight at sides along with the singing of the National Anthem and recital of the
pledge.
However, petitioners’ children attending the Buenavista Community School in Uson,
Masbate refused to do the required solemnities. The reason for their refusal was founded
in their beliefs as members of Jehova's Witnesses. they believe that the obligation
imposed by law of God is superior to that of laws enacted by the State. They are literal
believers of Exodus 20, They consider that the flag is an “image” within this command
and thus refuse to salute it. Because of this, they were expelled from the school. The
counsel of petitioners wrote to the Sec. of Education explaining their reasons and asking
that the children be allowed to just remain silent and stand still with their arms and hands
straight at their sides. This was, however, denied along with the children’s reinstatement.
An action was then filed before the CFI with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
but the complaint was dismissed. Hence, the present petition with the SC issuing a
temporary writ subject to the result of the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not DO no 8 is constitutional
RULING: Yes. First, there was no question with the act of saluting since the
department order allows that students can just stand still with their arms and hands
straight at their sides. The issue was focused on the singing of the national anthem and
the recital of pledge.
Second, according to the Court: "the realm of belief and creed is infinitive and
limitless bounded only by one's imagination and though. So is the freedom of belief,
including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most
anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to others,
even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But
between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of
road to travel. If the exercise of said religious belief clashes with the established
institutions of society and with the law, then the former must yield and give way to the
latter. The Government steps in and either restrains said exercise or even prosecutes the
one exercising it." The reasons are:
a. the flag is not an image nor the flag ceremony a religious rite; the flag is a
symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of national sovereignty, unity and
cohesion and of freedom and liberty.
b. the wordings of the patriotic pledge or the national anthem does not have
anything that is religiously objectionable as they speak only of love of country,
patriotism, liberty and the glory of suffering and dying for it.
c. the State was merely carrying out its constitutional duty to supervise and
regulate educational institutions and see to it that all schools aim to develop
civic conscience and teach the duties of citizenship. (Art. XIV, section 5 of the
Constitution).
d. considering the separation of the State and Church, the flag does not have any
religious significance.
e. also, the determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a religious
ceremony must rest with the court; it cannot be left to a religious group or sect or
to its follower as there would be confusion and misunderstanding for there might be as
many interpretations and meaning to be given as there are religious groups or sects or
followers.
g. also, exempting the children will disrupt school discipline and demoralize
the rest of the school population which by far constitutes the great majority;
other pupils would naturally ask for the same privilege because they might want to do
something else such as play or study; if this exemption is extended, then the flag ceremony
would soon be a thing of the past or perhaps conducted with very few participants, and
the time will come when we would have citizens untaught and uninculcated in and not
imbued with reverence for the flag and love of country, admiration for national heroes,
and patriotism — a pathetic, even tragic situation, and all because a small portion of the
school population imposed its will, demanded and was granted an exemption.
4. Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu
Facts: The State moves for reconsideration of the SC decision Dated March 1. 1993 on the
grounds that such decision accords special treatment in favor of a minority sect and violates the
non establishment guarantee provision of the Constitution as it favors the religious beliefs of the
said sect. The public respondents insist that the Court adopt a neutral stance by reverting to its
ruling in Gerona case.
The Court issued a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
commanding the respondents to immediately readmit the petitioners to their respective classes
until further orders from this Court. He annulment of their expulsion was granted in the previous
decision.
Issue: Won Jehovah's witnesses may be expelled for not following flag ceremony solemnities
Held: The MR is denied. The Court finds no cogent reason to disturb its earlier ruling. The
religious convictions and beliefs of the members of the religious sect JW, are widely known and
are equally disseminated in numerous books, magazines, brochures and leaflets distributed by their
members in their house to house distribution efforts and in many public places.
Their religious assumptions, while “bizarre” to others is firmly anchored in several biblical
passages. Jehova’s Witnesses aver that they show their respect through less demonstrative methods
manifesting their allegiance, by their simple obedience to the country’s laws, by not engaging in
antigovernment activities of any kind, and by paying their taxes and dues to society as self-
sufficient members of the community.
While they refuse to salute the flag, they are willing to stand quietly and peacefully at attention,
hands on their side, in order not to disrupt the ceremony or disturb those who believe differently.
The government’s interest in molding the young into patriotic and civic spirited citizens is not
totally free from a balancing process when it intrudes into other fundamental rights such as those
specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the constitutional right to education and the
unassailable interest of parents to guide the religious upbringing of their children in accordance
with the dictates of their conscience and their sincere religious beliefs.
In the context of the instant case, the freedom of religion enshrined in the Constitution
should be seen as the rule, not the exception. To view the constitutional guarantee in the manner
suggested by the petitioners would be to denigrate the status of a preferred freedom and to relegate
it to the level of an abstract principle devoid of any substance and meaning in the lives of those
for whom the protection is addressed. As to the contention that the exemption accorded by our
decision benefits a privileged few, it is enough to re-emphasize that the constitutional protection
of religious freedom terminated disabilities, it did not create new privileges. It gave religious
equality, not civil immunity.
A regulation, neutral on its face, may in its application, nonetheless offend the
constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of
religion. The government has not shown that refusal to do the acts of conformity exacted by the
assailed orders, which respondents point out attained legislative cachet in the Administrative Code
of 1987, would pose a clear and present danger of a danger so serious and imminent, that it would
prompt legitimate State intervention.
The subsequent expulsion of members of the sect on the basis of the regulations assailed
in the original petitions was therefore clearly directed against religious practice. It is obvious that
the assailed orders and memoranda would gravely endanger the free exercise of the religious
beliefs of the members of the sect and their minor children.
While conceding to the idea, adverted to by the Solicitor General, that certain methods of
religious expression may be prohibited to serve legitimate societal purposes, refusal to participate
in the flag ceremony hardly constitutes a form of religious expression so offensive and noxious as
to prompt legitimate State intervention. Their absence from the ceremony hardly constitutes a
danger so grave and imminent as to warrant the state’s intervention.
The respondent’s insistence also misses the whole point of the test devised by the United
States Supreme Court in O’Brien, cited by respondent, because the Court therein was emphatic
in stating that the government interest (should be) unrelated to the suppression of free
expression. The interest in regulation in the case at bench was clearly related to the suppression
of an expression directly connected with the freedom of religion and that respondents have not
shown to our satisfaction that the restriction was prompted by a compelling interest in public
order which the state has a right to protect.
5. IGLESIA NI CRISTO (INC.) v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect: freedom to believe and
freedom to act on one’s beliefs. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the
realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external
acts that affect the public welfare.
FACTS: Iglesia ni Cristo, Inc. (INC), has a television program entitled “Ang Iglesia ni
Cristo” aired every Sunday. The program presents INC’s religious beliefs, often in
comparative studies with other religions. INC submitted to the respondent Board of
Review for Motion Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program. The Board
classified the series as X or not for public viewing on the ground that they offend other
religions. INC pursued two courses of action against the Board. It appealed to the Office
of the President the classification of its TV Series. The Office of the President reversed the
decision of the Board. Forthwith, the Board allowed the series to be publicly telecast. INC
also filed against the Board a civil case with the RTC. INC alleged that the Board acted
with grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its TV
program and in x-rating them. The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the trial court and held
that the Board did not abuse its discretion when it denied the permit for the exhibition on
TV of the three series of Ang Iglesia ni Cristo on the ground that the materials constitute
an attack against another religion. It also found the series indecent, contrary to law and
contrary to good customs.
Issue: Whether the Board gravely abused its discretion when it prohibited the airing of
INC’s religious program.
RULING: YES. Any act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of
invalidity. It is the burden of the Board to overthrow this presumption. It failed to do this
in the case at bar. An examination of the evidence show that the “attacks” are mere
criticisms of the tenets of other religions. The videotapes were not viewed by the CA yet
they were considered as indecent, contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be
prohibited from public viewing. This clearly suppresses petitioner’s freedom of speech
and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion.
The Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that gives
it no excuse to interdict such criticisms however unclean they may be. Under our
Constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it
against an attack by another religion. Religious beliefs are often at war and to preserve
peace among their followers, especially the fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom
of religion prohibits the State from leaning towards any religion. Neutrality alone is its
fixed and immovable stance. In fine, the board cannot squelch the speech of INC simply
because it attacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the most numerous
church in our country. In a State where there ought to be no difference between the
appearance and the reality of freedom of religion, the remedy against bad theology is
better theology. The bedrock of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best
served by encouraging the marketplace of dueling ideas. When the luxury of time permits,
the marketplace of ideas demands that speech should be met by more speech for it is the
spark of opposite speech, the heat of colliding
6. Wisconsin v. Yoder
The State's interest in universal education is not totally free from a balancing process when it
impinges on other fundamental rights, such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious
upbringing of their children.
Facts: Respondents, members of the Old Order Amish religion and the Conservative Amish
Mennonite Church, were convicted of violating Wisconsin's compulsory school-attendance law
(which requires a child's school attendance until age 16) by declining to send their children to
public or private school after they had graduated from the eighth grade. The evidence showed that
the Amish provide continuing informal vocational education to their children designed to prepare
them for life in the rural Amish community. The evidence also showed that respondents sincerely
believed that high school attendance was contrary to the Amish religion and way of life and that
they would endanger their own salvation and that of their children by complying with the law. The
State Supreme Court sustained respondents' claim that application of the compulsory school-
attendance law to them violated their rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Three Amish students from three different families stopped attending the New Glarus High School
in the New Glarus, Wisconsin, school district at the end of the eighth grade because of their
parents' religious beliefs. The three families were represented by Jonas Yoder (one of the fathers
involved in the case) when the case went to trial. They were convicted in the Green County Court
due to violation of Wisconsin’s compulsory school-attendance law requiring attendance until age
16. Each defendant was fined the nominal sum of $5. Thereafter the Wisconsin Supreme
Court found in Yoder's favor. At this point Wisconsin appealed that ruling in the U.S. SC.
The Amish did not believe in going to court to settle disputes but instead follow
the biblical command to "turn the other cheek." Thus, the Amish are at a disadvantage when it
comes to defending themselves in courts or before legislative committees. However, a Lutheran
minister, Reverend William C. Lindholm, took an interest in Amish legal difficulties from a
religious freedom perspective and founded The National Committee for Amish Religious Freedom
(partly as a result of this case) and then provided them with legal counsel.
Under Amish church standards, higher education was deemed not only unnecessary for their
simple way of life, but also endangering to their salvation. These men appealed for exemption
from compulsory education under the basis of these religious convictions. They sincerely held to
the belief that the values their children would learn at home would surpass the worldly knowledge
taught in school.
Issue: Whether or not Wisconsin's requirement that all parents send their children to school at
least until age 16 violate the First Amendment by criminalizing the conduct of parents who refused
to send their children to school for religious reasons
Ruling: State Supreme Court sustained respondents' claim that application of the compulsory
school-attendance law to them violated their rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The State's interest in universal education is not totally free from a balancing process when it
impinges on other fundamental rights, such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious
upbringing of their children. (Has connection to the 1987 Philippine Constitution provision,
Section 12 of Article II regarding the natural and primary right of parents in the rearing of their
children.) Respondents have amply supported their claim that enforcement of the compulsory
formal education requirement after the eighth grade would gravely endanger if not destroy the free
exercise of their religious beliefs
Aided by a history of three centuries as an identifiable religious sect and a long history as a
successful and self-sufficient segment of American society, the Amish have demonstrated the
sincerity of their religious beliefs, the interrelationship of belief with their mode of life, the vital
role that belief and daily conduct play in the continuing survival of Old Order Amish communities,
and the hazards presented by the State's enforcement of a statute generally valid as to others.
Beyond this, they have [406 U.S. 205, 206] carried the difficult burden of demonstrating the
adequacy of their alternative mode of continuing informal vocational education in terms of the
overall interests that the State relies on in support of its program of compulsory high school
education. In light of this showing, and weighing the minimal difference between what the State
would require and what the Amish already accept, it was incumbent on the State to show with
more particularity how its admittedly strong interest in compulsory education would be adversely
affected by granting an exemption to the Amish.
7. Estrada v. Escritor
To validly override a free exercise of religion claim, the compelling state interest test must be
satisfied. The State must articulate in specific terms the state interest, which must be compelling,
involved in preventing the free exercise of religion. It has to further demonstrate that the state
has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more
than necessary. Otherwise, the exercise of the freedom of religion must be respected.
Facts: Soledad Escritor was charged with immoral conduct for living with a man not her
husband, and having borne a child within this live-in arrangement. She admitted living
with another man without the benefit of marriage more than twenty years ago when her
husband was still alive but living with another woman. However, as a member of the
religious sect known as the Jehovah's Witnesses, she asserted that their conjugal
arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs and has the approval of her
congregation. In fact, she was able to secure a "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness,"
which allows members of the congregation who have been abandoned by their spouses to
enter into marital relations, and thus makes the resulting union moral and binding within
the congregation all over the world. In sum, therefore, insofar as the congregation is
concerned, there is nothing immoral about the conjugal arrangement between Escritor
and her common-law-husband.
Issue: Whether Escritor’s conjugal arrangement is not immoral in light of the freedom
of religion.
Ruling: YES. In this particular case and under these distinct circumstances, Escritor's
conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from
the law based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion. The Court recognizes that
state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms - including religious freedom - may
be enjoyed. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man stands
accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the state interest sought to be
upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode the very fabric of the state that
will also protect the freedom. In addition, it must also be shown that the state has used
the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than
necessary. Accordingly, in the absence of a showing that a compelling state interest exists
and the least intrusive means is employed, man must be allowed to subscribe to the
Infinite.
In this case, the state has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage
or bigamy charges against Escritor or her partner as it has never sought to prosecute
Escritor nor her partner. It cannot therefore assert that unbending application of a
criminal prohibition is essential to fulfill any compelling interest, if it does not, in fact,
attempt to enforce that prohibition. Thus, the State's asserted interest, in this case, is only
abstract. Nonetheless, even assuming that there is a compelling state interest, the state
failed to show that it used the least intrusive means possible. The records are bereft of
even a feeble attempt to procure any such evidence to show that the means the state
adopted in pursuing this compelling interest is the least restrictive to respondent's
religious freedom.
8. Request of Muslim Employees in the Different Courts in Iligan City
Said requests are grounded on Section 5, Article 3 of the Constitution, particularly the free
exercise clause to one's religion. The court said that this clause is of two-fold, freedom to believe
which is absolute and freedom to act on one's beliefs as subject to regulation since it involves
matters affecting public welfare.
employees invoke sec. 2 of P.D. 322 which excuses them from reporting to office during
recognized Muslim holidays. Section 3 of the same decree substantially provides that
during Ramadan, Muslim employees shall observe office hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30
p.m. without breaks. Civil Service Commmission (CSC) then promulgated a resolution
granting the two privileges mentioned above and even clarified that Fridays referred
herein pertain to the calendar year. However, CSC prescribed a flexible working schedule
to accommodate Muslims' Friday prayer day and so as not to violate E.O. 292 requiring
civil servants to work not less then 40 hours a week. The Court Administrator favored the
said resolutions.
Issue: Whether or not Muslim employees be granted of their two requests above
mentioned
Ruling: No. Only the first request can be granted and not the second one. Said requests
are grounded on Section 5, Article 3 of the Constitution, particularly the free exercise
clause to one's religion. The court said that this clause is of two-fold, freedom to believe
which is absolute and freedom to act on one's beliefs as subject to regulation since it
involves matters affecting public welfare. The Court recognizes that the observance of
Ramadan and the Friday Muslim Prayer Day is integral to the Islamic faith. However,
only the first request finds support in Section 3 (a) of P.D. No. 291, as amended by P.D.
No. 322, there is no basis for the second request. In fact, allowing the second request
would mean diminution of 12 hours from the prescribed government working hours. The
performance of religious practices, whether by the Muslim employees or those belonging
to other religious denominations, should not prejudice the courts and the public. Indeed,
the exercise of religious freedom does not exempt anyone from compliance with
reasonable requirements of the law, including civil service laws.

Facts: Muslim employees sent a letter to Judge Salazar of the RTC of Iligan City
requesting him to grant them said privileges: 1) to hold office hours from 7:30 a.m. to
3:30 p.m. without lunch break or coffee breaks during the month of Ramadan; 2) to be
excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday (Muslim Prayer Day)
during the entire calendar year. Judge Salazar favored the first request but not the second.
He then forwarded the letter to the Office of the Court Administrator (COA). Muslim
9. Austria v. NLRC G.R. No. 124382 August 16, 1999
Relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee is purely
secular in nature because it has no relation with the practice of faith, worship or
doctrines of the church, such affairs are governed by labor laws. The Labor Code applies
to all establishments, whether religious or not.
FACTS: Pastor Dionisio V. Austria worked with the Seventh-Day Adventists (SDA) for
twenty-eight (28) years from 1963 to 1991. He started as a literature evangelist and
worked his way up until he became District Pastor of the Negros Mission of the SDA. In
January 1991, Austria was transferred to Bacolod City. He held the position of District
Pastor until his services were terminated on October 31, 1991. Before his termination,
Austria had received communications from Mr. Eufronio Ibesate, the treasurer of the
Negros Mission, asking Austria to admit accountability and responsibility for the church
tithes and offerings collected by his wife, Mrs. Thelma Austria, in his district which
amounted to P15,078.10, and to remit the same to the Negros Mission. Austria reasoned
in his written explanation dated October 11, 1991 that he should not be made accountable
for the unremitted collections since it was Pastor Gideon Buhat and Mr. Eufronio Ibesate
who authorized his wife to collect the tithes and offerings since Pastor Austria was very
sick to do the collecting at that time.
On October 16, 1991, Austria went to the office of Pastor Buhat, who was the president of
the Negros Mission, to persuade Buhat to convene the Executive Committee to settle a
dispute between Pastor Austria and Pastor David Rodrigo. But that meeting ended in a
heated altercation between Austria and Buhat. The next day, the Austria couple received
an invitation to attend the Executive Committee meeting on October 21, 1991 to discuss
the non-remittance of the church collection and the events that transpired on October 16,
1991. A fact-finding committee was created to investigate Austria.
Sensing that the investigation would be one-sided, Pastor Austria wrote to Pastor Rueben
Moralde, president of the SDA and chairman of the fact-finding committee, to request
that certain members of the fact-finding committee be excluded in the investigation and
resolution of the case. Out of the six (6) members requested to inhibit, only two (2) were
actually excluded, namely: Pastor Buhat and Pastor Rodrigo. On October 29, 1991,
Austria received a letter of dismissal citing misappropriation of denominational funds,
willful breach of trust, serious misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of duties, and
commission of an offense against the person of employer’s duly authorized representative
as grounds for the termination of his services.
Austria filed a complaint on November 14, 1991 before the Labor Arbiter for illegal
dismissal against the SDA and its officers and prayed for reinstatement with back wages
and benefits, moral and exemplary damages and other labor law benefits. On February
15, 1993, Labor Arbiter Cesar D. Sideo rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. The
SDA appealed the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC which vacated the findings
of the Labor Arbiter on August 26,1994 and dismissed the case for lack of merit. Austria
filed a motion for reconsideration but the NLRC issued a Resolution reversing its original
decision.
The SDA filed a motion for reconsideration saying that the Labor Arbiter had no
jurisdiction over the complaint due to the constitutional provision on the separation of
church and state since the case allegedly involved an ecclesiastical affair to which the State
cannot interfere. The NLRC, without ruling on the merits of the case, reversed itself once
again, sustained the argument posed by SDA and, accordingly, dismissed the complaint
of Austria. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a manifestation and motion
saying it cannot sustain the resolution of the NLRC and submitting that the termination
of petitioner of his employment may be questioned before the NLRC as the same is secular
in nature, not ecclesiastical.
Issues: 1. Whether or not the termination of the services of the petitioner is an
ecclesiastical affair, and, as such, involves the separation of church and state.
2. Whether or not the Labor Arbiter/NLRC has jurisdiction to try and decide the
complaint filed by petitioner against the SDA.
Ruling:
1. No. The matter at hand relates to the church and its religious ministers but what is
involved here is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an
employee, which is purely secular because it has no relationship with the practice of faith,
worship or doctrines. The grounds invoked for petitioner’s dismissal are all based on Art.
282 of Labor Code.
An ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship between the church and its members and
relates to matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship and governance of the
congregation. Examples of so-called ecclesiastical affairs to which the State cannot
meddle are proceedings for excommunication, ordinations of religious ministers, and
administration of sacraments. While the matter at hand relates to the church and its
religious minister, it does not give the case a religious significance. What is involved is the
relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee. It is purely
secular and has no relation whatsoever with the practice of faith, worship or doctrines of
the church. Pastor Austria was not excommunicated or expelled from the membership of
the SDA but was terminated from employment.
2. Yes. SDA was exercising its management prerogative (not religious prerogative) to fire
an employee which it believes is unfit for the job. It would have been a different case if
Austria was expelled or excommunicated from the SDA.
10. Islamic Da’wah Court of the Philippines Inc. v. Office of Executive
Secretary
The act of certifying food products as halal is one considered to be a religious function
which can be performed only by practicing Muslims. Thus, the government cannot pass
a law vesting the exclusive authority to issue halal certificates to a government agency
without violating the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State.

Facts: Petitioner IDCP is a non-governmental organization that extends voluntary

services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim communities. One of the functions
IDCP carries out is to conduct seminars, orient manufacturers on halal food and issue
halal certifications to qualified products and manufacturers. Subsequently however,
respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 46 creating the Philippine Halal
Certification Scheme. Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to
issue halal certificates and perform other related regulatory activities. Finding EO 46 to
be in violative of the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State,
IDCP filed the present petition for prohibition praying that EO 46 be declared null and
void. According to IDCP, it is unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies
and guidelines on the halal certification scheme because said scheme is a function only
religious organizations, entity or scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the
Muslims. IDCP argues that a food product becomes halal only after the performance of
Islamic religious ritual and prayer. Thus, only practicing Muslims are qualified to
slaughter animals for food. A government agency like herein respondent OMA cannot
therefore perform a religious function like certifying qualified food products as halal.

Issue: Whether or not EO 46 is constitutional.

Ruling: NO. Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our
fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well
aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow
each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he
believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common
good."

Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the
standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the
exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious
freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims
what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task
of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own
interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food.

1. Marcos v. Manglapus
The request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be
considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and
the right to travel. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual
unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty
residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare.
Facts: President Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent
“people power” revolution and forced into exile in Hawaii. Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed,
has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die but Mrs. Aquino, considering the
dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government
is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move
forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.
The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the right of the Marcoses to
return to the Philippines is guaranteed under the Bill of Rights. The petitioners contend
that the President is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because
only a court may do so "within the limits prescribed by law.” Respondents argue for the
primacy of the right of the State to national security over individual rights.
Issue: Whether former President Aquino acted whimsically in denying the Marcos’s
return in the country.
Ruling: NO. To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and
the common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved
is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded
on the duty of the President, as steward of the people.
What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed
to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional
provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain
exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely
similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed
to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to
the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In
that context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion
on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.
The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not
besieged from within by a well-organized communist insurgency, a separatist movement
in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to grab power, urban terrorism, the murder with
impunity of military men, police officers and civilian officials, to mention only a few. The
documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the
country, as earlier narrated in the ponencia bolsters the conclusion that the return of the
Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against
the State and instigate more chaos.
As divergent and discordant forces, the enemies of the State may be contained. The
military establishment has given assurances that it could handle the threats posed by
particular groups. But it is the catalytic effect of the return of the Marcoses that may prove
to be the proverbial final straw that would break the camel's back. With these before her,
the President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in
determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national interest
and welfare and in prohibiting their return.
2. Gudani v. Senga
Mobility of travel is another necessary restriction on members of the military. A soldier cannot
leave his/her post without the consent of the commanding officer.
Facts: The petitioners are high-ranking officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
tasked with the maintenance of peace and order during the 2004 elections. Senator
Rodolfo Biazon invited them to appear at a public hearing before the Senate. The hearing
was scheduled after topics concerning the conduct of the 2004 elections emerged in the
public eye, particularly allegations of massive cheating.
However, an instruction from the President barred them from attending the hearing.
Nonetheless, both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were present as the hearing started, and
they both testified as to the conduct of the 2004 elections. They were then charged with a
violation of Article of War on wilfully disobeying a superior officer.
Issue: Whether petitioners’ right to travel may be impaired.
Ruling: YES. The principle that mobility of travel is another necessary restriction on
members of the military. A soldier cannot leave his/her post without the consent of the
commanding officer. The reasons are self-evident. The commanding officer has to be
aware at all times of the location of the troops under command, so as to be able to
appropriately respond to any exigencies. For the same reason, commanding officers have
to be able to restrict the movement or travel of their soldiers, if in their judgment, their
presence at place of call of duty is necessary. At times, this may lead to unsentimental,
painful consequences, such as a soldier being denied permission to witness the birth of
his first-born, or to attend the funeral of a parent. Yet again, military life calls for
considerable personal sacrifices during the period of conscription, wherein the higher
duty is not to self but to country.
Petitioners seek to be exempted from military justice for having traveled to the Senate to
testify before the Senate Committee against the express orders of Gen. Senga, the AFP
Chief of Staff. If petitioners position is affirmed, a considerable exception would be carved
from the unimpeachable right of military officers to restrict the speech and movement of
their juniors. The ruinous consequences to the chain of command and military discipline
simply cannot warrant the Courts imprimatur on petitioner’s position.
3. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. HEUSDENS
Regulation is necessary for the orderly administration of justice. If judges and court personnel
can go on leave and travel abroad at will and without restrictions or regulations, there could be
a disruption in the administration of justice.
Facts: Heusdens, a staff clerk of MTC Tagum, left abroad without waiting for the results
of her leave application. It turned out that no travel authority was issued in her favor.
Heusdens explained that it was not her intention to violate the rules (OCA Circular) as
her leave was approved by her superior judge.
Issue: Whether the circular issued by the OCA can restrict a citizen’s right to travel as
guaranteed by the Constitution.
Ruling: YES. The exercise of ones right to travel or the freedom to move from one place
to another, as assured by the Constitution, is not absolute. There are constitutional,
statutory and inherent limitations regulating the right to travel. Section 6 itself provides
that neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security,
public safety or public health, as may be provided by law.
With respect to the power of the Court, Section 5 (6), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
provides that the Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and
the personnel thereof.
As earlier stated, with respect to members and employees of the Judiciary, the Court
issued OCA Circular No. 49-2003 to regulate their foreign travel in an unofficial capacity.
Such regulation is necessary for the orderly administration of justice. If judges and court
personnel can go on leave and travel abroad at will and without restrictions or regulations,
there could be a disruption in the administration of justice. A situation where the
employees go on mass leave and travel together, despite the fact that their invaluable
services are urgently needed, could possibly arise. For said reason, members and
employees of the Judiciary cannot just invoke and demand their right to travel.
1. Tanada v. Tuvera
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is
mandated by law.
Facts: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern,
petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish,
and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters
of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation
and administrative orders. The respondents argued that petitioners have no legal
standing to bring the petition in the absence of any showing that petitioners are
prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances. Upon the other
hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right
and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any
specific interest for their petition to be given due course.
Issue: Whether the petitioner may file a petition for mandamus as against the the
respondents to compel them to publish the unpublished laws on the basis of their right to
be informed on matters of public concern.
Ruling: YES. The clear object of Article 2 of the Civil Code is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as
citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application
of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish
or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one. Without publication, the people have no means
of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a
definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines,
forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people,
such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances
which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and
executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned. It is needless to add that the publication of presidential
issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process.
It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents.
2. Bengzon v. Drilon
7. IN RE: PRODUCTION OF COURT RECORDS AND DOCUMENTS AND THE
ATTENDANCE OF COURT OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES AS WITNESSES UNDER
THE SUBPOENAS OF FEBRUARY 10, 2012 AND THE VARIOUS LETTERS FOR THE
IMPEACHMENT PROSECUTION PANEL DATED JANUARY 19 AND 25, 2012
As far as the Court is concerned, its Members and officials involved in all proceedings are duty-
bound to observe the privileged communication and confidentiality rules if the integrity of the
administration of justice were to be preserved.
Facts: During the impeachment proceedings against Chief Justice Corona, the
Prosecution Panel manifested in a COMPLIANCE that it would present about 100
witnesses and almost a thousand documents, to be secured from both private and public
offices. The list of proposed witnesses included Justices of the Supreme Court, and Court
officials and employees who will testify on matters, many of which are, internal to the
Court.
Atty. Vidal, Clerk of the Supreme Court, brought to SC’s attention the Subpoena Ad
Testificandum et Duces Tecum and Subpoena Ad Testificandum she received,
commanding her to appear at 10:00 in the morning of the 13th of February 2012 with the
original and certified true copies of the documents listed above, and to likewise appear in
the afternoon at 2:00 of the same day and everyday thereafter, to produce the listed
documents and to testify. In light of the subpoenas served, the urgent need for a court
ruling and based on the Constitution, the pertinent laws and of the Court's rules and
policies, there should be a determination of how the Court will comply with the subpoenas
and the letters of the Prosecution Impeachment Panel.
Issue: What is the policy of the Court with regard to the access to its records?
Ruling: In line with the public's constitutional right to information, the Court has
adopted a policy of transparency with respect to documents in its possession or custody,
necessary to maintain the integrity of its sworn duty to adjudicate justiciable disputes.
The Members of the Court may not be compelled to testify in the impeachment
proceedings against the Chief Justice or other Members of the Court about information
they acquired in the performance of their official function of adjudication, such as
information on how deliberations were conducted or the material inputs that the justices
used in decision-making, because the end-result would be the disclosure of confidential
information that could subject them to criminal prosecution. Such act violates judicial
privilege (or the equivalent of executive privilege) as it pertains to the exercise of the
constitutional mandate of adjudication.
Jurisprudence implies that justices and judges may not be subject to any compulsory
process in relation to the performance of their adjudicatory functions.
With respect to Court officials and employees, the same rules on confidentiality that apply
to justices and judges apply to them. They are barred from disclosing (1) the result of the
raffle of cases, (2) the actions taken by the Court on each case included in the agenda of
the Court's session, and (3) the deliberations of the Members in court sessions on cases
and matters pending before it. They are subject as well to the disqualification by reason
of privileged communication and the sub judice rule. As stated above, these rules extend
to documents and other communications which cannot be disclosed.
These privileges, incidentally, belong to the Judiciary and are for the Supreme Court (as
the representative and entity speaking for the Judiciary), and not for the individual
justice, judge, or court official or employees to waive. Thus, every proposed waiver must
be referred to the Supreme Court for its consideration and approval.
To state the rule differently, Justices of the Court cannot be compelled to testify on
matters relating to the internal deliberations and actions of the Court, in the exercise of
their adjudicatory functions and duties. This is to be differentiated from a situation where
the testimony is on a matter which is external to their adjudicatory functions and duties.
8. RE: REQUEST FOR COPY OF 2008 STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND
NET WORTH [SALN] AND PERSONAL DATA SHEET OR CURRICULUM VITAE OF
THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT AND OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF
THE JUDICIARY
The information disclosed in the Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) is a
matter of public concern and interest. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the
constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the public service.
Facts: The Research Director and researcher-writer of Philippine Center for
Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) sought copies of the Statement of Assets, Liabilities and
Net Worth (SALN) of the SC Justices for the year 2008 for the purpose of updating their
database of information on government officials. Meanwhile, several requests for copies
of SALN and other personal documents of SC, CA and Sandiganbayan Justices were also
filed. The requests were made for different purposes. Although no direct opposition to the
disclosure of SALN and other personal documents is being expressed, it is the uniform
position of the said magistrates and the various judges’ associations that the disclosure
must be made in accord with the guidelines set by the Court and under such
circumstances that would not undermine the independence of the Judiciary.
Issue: Whether the SALNs of the Justices have to be disclosed for being matters of
public concern and interest.

Ruling: YES. Section 17, Article XI, has classified the information disclosed in the SALN
as a matter of public concern and interest. The right to information goes hand-in-hand
with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the public service.
The public has the right to know the assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and
business interests of public officials and employees including those of their spouses and
of unmarried children 18 years of age living in their households.
Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information, with its companion
right of access to official records, is not absolute. While providing guaranty for that right,
the Constitution also provides that the people’s right. Jurisprudence has provided the
following limitations to that right: (1) national security matters and intelligence
information; (2) trade secrets and banking transactions; (3) criminal matters; and (4)
other confidential information such as confidential or classified information officially
known to public officers and employees by reason of their office and not made available
to the public as well as diplomatic correspondence, closed door Cabinet meetings and
executive sessions of either house of Congress, and the internal deliberations of the
Supreme Court.
This could only mean that while no prohibition could stand against access to official
records, such as the SALN, the same is undoubtedly subject to regulation.