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Administrative Law

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Question 1 …………………………………………………………. …Page 2 – 15.

Q. 1 Bibliography…………………………………………………… .. Page 16.

Question 2………………………………………………………… …..Page 17.

Ouster Clauses………………………………………………. ...Page 17- 20.

Locus Standi…………………………………………………... Page 21- 25.

Certiorari and Mandamus……………………………………... Page 26 – 30.

Q. 2 Bibliography ……………………………………………………. Page 31.

Question 3………………………………………………………………Page 32 - 45.

Q. 3 Bibliography………………………………………………………Page 46.

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Q.1

“There is much to be said for the proposition that many administrative decisions should be
accompanied by reasons for the decision made, however there is little to be said for the proposition
that the duty to give reason should extend to all administrative decisions.”

Professor Albert Fiadjoe observes that common law of the UK historically outlines that

there is no such duty to give reasons, nor does the requirements of natural justice demand it.1 The

duty of public officials to give reason has long been controversial, and if often dependent upon the

statute that outlines their function. The Court has been hesitant to out rightly state that there is a

duty of decision makers to give reason. However, through case law, it can be established that there

is a development in suggesting that administrators should give reason for their decisions.

The principle negating a duty to give reasons is reaffirmed in the case of R v Kensington

and Chelsea Royal London BC ex p Grillo. The court found that councils are not under a duty

to give reasons for insisting that accommodation offered to a housing applicant is suitable for their

needs. Also, that it would be it would be wrong to impose them except for exceptional

circumstances. 2In the Caribbean a similar mindset has been followed, such as seen in the case of

AG of Trinidad and Tobago v KC Confectionery3. Judgement delivered by Kelsick CJ. The

action brought was a constitutional motion where fundamental rights were alleged to have been

infringed. The Minister of Industry and Commerce functions in the restriction of imports so as to

protect local manufacturers from foreign competition as mandated in the Trade Ordinances Act.

This was done by placing the specific item of import on the negative list as stated in Regulation

3(1) of the aforementioned act. The respondents contend that in exercise of these functions, they

1
Professor Albert Fiadjoe, Commonwealth Caribbean Public law, ( Cavendish Publishing Ltd, 2nd
edition,1999,) pg. 55.
2
Commonwealth Caribbean Public law, pg. 55
3 (1985) 34. WIR 387

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have been denied approval to have the confectionary of their specific type to be entered on the

negative list, so as to safeguard their business from foreign competition. The Attorney General

argued that there was no legal right to have their goods placed on this list and that the Minister

acted in his discretion which is not subject to judicial review. In other words, they argue that his

reason for deciding to place an item on the Negative list, is not subject to scrutiny by the court.

The trial judge adopted this opinion, and it was held that there was no basis for the application. It

was stated by Kelsick CJ that “There is no obligation to give reasons for the decision where there

are no statutory or contractual requirements, but a simple discretion vested in the licensing body”.

Moreover, the only duty that is required, is to simply act fairly, honestly and without bias. Justice

Bernard was of the opinion that in a complaint of this nature the burden is on the applicant to prove

that the decision was mala fides, made in bad faith.

Similarly, in the case of Air Caribbean Ltd. v Air Transport Licensing Authority Et.

Al, it was established that the law did not recognize a duty that would compel decision makers to

give a reason for the decisions they make. In this case a committee was appointed by the

Trinidadian Government known as the Airbridge Committee. Their duty was to invite proposals

for the operation of passenger and cargo service between airport, evaluate the proposals, and then

make recommendations to the Cabinet. It was recommended that the applicant be the sole domestic

operator of the flights between airports. However, BWIA International Airways who was

concluded to be out of the running due to an improper proposal and poor financial position, was

to operate as their successor in the running of domestic flight services. The applicant argued that

the Cabinet had agreed that the applicant would be the sole domestic operator, and that BWIA was

unfit as they did not have they adequate equipment, they were involved in uneconomical

overlapping, and that they had no interest in the domestic route in 1991- 92. In application of

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Secretary of State for Trade and Industry Ex p Lonrho, Lord Keith states that “the absence of

reasons for a decision where there is not duty to give them cannot by itself provide any support for

the suggested irrationality of the decision.” However, if the circumstances overwhelmingly favor

a different decision the court has the right to draw inference that the decision maker has no rational

reason for his decision. Conclusively, Hosein J reiterated the principle that there is no inherent

right to give reasons, unless the rationality behind the reason can be questioned. In this case based

on BWIA’s lack of preparedness and generally being unfit for the service, the action of the

respondent was held to be illegal. Their decision was ultimately quashed in application of the

principle outlined in the Lonrho case.

As seen in the aforementioned cases there is no duty at the common law to give reasons

for administrative decisions. However, they also outline that in certain circumstances reasons

should be given. Such as in the public service. In the case of Williams v Public Service

Commission4, the applicant was denied the appointment of Inspector of Police after acting in the

position for almost two years. He sought a declaration that the appointment of the other person in

his stead was void, arguing that such an appointment was contrary to the provision of Section

84(14) of the Constitution which mandates that any decision of the commission shall require the

agreement of the majority of all its members. It was found that only two of the commission’s

members agreed to this appointment. He also argued that the appointment was “Wednesbury

unreasonable” and that no competent tribunal or body would have reasonable came to that

decision. He noted that because of the irrationality of the decision, a failure to give reason as to

why he was not appointed would also render the decision as unlawful. The Wednesbury principle

was explained in the case as an implication that a decision is so outrageous that no sensible person

4
Williams v Public Service Commission DM [2001] HC 1.

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would have arrived to it. Cenac J stated that “Although there is no general rule of law requiring

the giving of reasons, an administrative or quasi-judicial authority may be unable to show that it

acted lawfully unless it explains itself. If the authority states no reasons, even when asked for, the

court may infer that no lawful reason existed.” Therefore, the failure of the commission to give

reason upon the request of the court resulted in a nullity declaration. It was held that the decision

of the Commission lacked fairness and at best, can be seen arbitrary. Based on the circumstances,

it made a special case for natural justice to be employed and in the name of fairness and openness,

it demanded that reasons should be given. 5

Another case involving the public service and their position on giving reasons is the case

of Elwin v Public Service Commission where the applicant applied for an order certiorari. He

wanted to be appointed to the post of Principal Nursing Tutor which he both acted in on several

occasion and was qualified for the position, despite him being only a junior civil servant The Public

Service Commission Regulations, regarding Appointments, Promotions, and Transfers, provided

that the Commission shall consider the eligibility of all officers for promotion, and in considering

the claims of persons for promotion merit and ability shall be taken into account as well as

seniority, experience and official or special qualifications. The regulation indicates that a senior

person is expected to be appointed unless they are not qualified. Also, the regulation should take

into account recommendations by the Permanent Secretary (PS). The applicant argued that the

decision should be susceptible to judicial review, that the appointee never received a

recommendation by the PS, that the appointee indicated her disinterest in the position, and that the

applicant acted in the position more times than the appointee. The applicant also applied for a

reason to be given which was never satisfied. It was found, in reliance on Stephen v the General

5
Eddy Ventose, Commonwealth Caribbean Administrative Law, (Routlege Publishing, 2013) pg. 341.

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Medical Council by their Lordships, that the trend of law has shown an increased recognition of

the duty of decision makers of many different kinds to give reasons. Cenac J stated that “I am of

the view that the Commission should give reasons to the applicant, even succinct reasons, if only

to put her mind at rest.”, as the applicant was probably left which a burning sense of injustice. It

was subsequently held that the decision to appoint the senior civil servant was procedurally wrong

and grossly unfair. Ventose, also highlights the case of Ex p Robinson6, where a Permanent

Secretary directed the applicant to go on leave without reason. It was noted in this case that there

is no duty at the common law to give reasons. And that the absence of reasoning at the request of

the applicant does not automatically render the decision void, rather it only can allow the court to

infer that the decision was irrational.7 The Permanent Secretary gave the applicant a memorandum

indicating his recommendation of the applicants retirement. This was accepted by the court as

adequate reasoning for the decision which was already communicated to him. This the application

was dismissed.

The nature of the duty to give reasons by administrative bodies stem from decisions that

normally affect a person's livelihood. The court in cases such as these look at the fairness which

may demand the need for reasons regarding their decisions. In the case of Stennett v Attorney

General 8, the Minister of Finance and Planning was granted Stennett, a duty concession which

allowed her to pay 20% of the amount due on a motor vehicle which she had shipped. The license

was however revoked and seized. She applied for an order of certiorari to quash the Minister’s

decision and a declaration that the Minister in seizing the claimants motor vehicle is unlawful. The

attorney for the defendant argued that Stennett was bound to challenge the decision promptly

6
Ex p Robinson JM 2007 SC 84.
7
Commonwealth Caribbean Administrative Law, pg. 342.
8
Stennett v Attorney General JM 2005 SC 100.

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within 3 months and was made a day after the period has expired. Bestwick J applied the approach

of Cooke J in R v Minister of Finance and Planning who said that a concession was a privilege

and that the Minister in fairness is not obliged to give any reasons for his inevitable decision.

Despite this, the court held that since the minister gave no reason to the applicant nor the court for

his decisions, the applicant was indeed entitled to the concession by virtue of her job. Bestwick

stated that in this case there was a prima facie unfairness that arose and that if the cession is being

taken away, reasons should be given.

Also, the nature of the duty to give reason is rooted in natural justice. Ventose outlines that

Natural Justice demands that the person be informed as to what information and law were being

considered and that there be an opportunity to challenge wrong information and comment on its

law9. In the case of Saga Trading Limited v The Comptroller of Customs and Excise10,

the applicant argued that the decision of the Comptroller in refusing to allow the applicant to take

delivery of its goods despite the assessment and payment of duties and taxes is illegal,

unreasonable and irrational. The applicant relied on section 22 of the Customs Act Chapter 78:01.

The could found that this particular statute did not provide that reasons be given by the Comptroller

in their contemplation of the process. It was held in application of R v Trade and Industry Secretary

which states “"The absence of reasons for a decision where there is no duty to give them cannot

of itself provide any support for the suggested irrationality of the decision.”, the court held that if

the Comptroller declined to give further reasons, then the risk of irrationality would be assumed.

In consideration of natural justice, the court was prepared to hold that there has been a breach of

the rules of natural justice by a denial of the right to be heard.

9
Commonwealth Caribbean Administrative Law, pg. 343.
10
Saga Trading Limited v The Comptroller of Customs and Excise TT 1998 HC 132.

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A duty for administrators to provide reasons may extend to courts and tribunals. The courts

have made it clear that 1st instance tribunals should provide adequate reasons for their decisions

in general. This is seen in the case of James v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago.11 In

this case the sole issue was whether the learned judge wrongly exercised his discretion not to award

damages to the appellant for the breach of his constitutional right to equality before the law and

protection under the law as outlined in S.4(d) of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago. It was

held by Kangaloo JA, that the trial judge did err in assessing whether damages should have been

awarded or not. Kangaloo also noted that the appeal decision was made difficult as the judge failed

to give sufficient reasons for his exercise of discretion in only granting declarations. He stated “I

am of the view that where no reasons or no sufficient reasons are given by a judge exercising a

discretion, upon appeal, the Court of Appeal is entitled to look at the matter afresh and come to its

own conclusion as to how the discretion ought to have been exercised.” therefore, the court held

that because no reasons were given, it was of the view that declarations were not sufficient. 12
13
Similarly, in the case of Alexander v Williams , Alexander was the Chief

Administrative Officer of Nariva/Mayara County Council. He was charged with Williams for

corruptly receiving a bribe of 3,000$ via check from Ramsahai. The magistrate charged and

sentenced him to 2 years’ imprisonment and Alexander appealed this decision on that very day. At

the time of his hearing the appeal motion had not been heard. The court in this case has to consider

whether the applicant was denied a fair trial due to the magistrate’s failure to give reasons and the

undue delay. The court applied dictum in Sylvan v Rapoonath which stated “It is quite true that a

Magistrate is a creature of statute and that there is no statutory enjoinder in the act which requires

11
James v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago TT 2009 CA 9.
12
Commonwealth Caribbean Administrative Law, pg. 345.
13
Alexander v Williams TT 1984 CA 33

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him to state any reasons for any decision that he gives. However, in this jurisdiction the necessity

for a Magistrate to give reasons for his decision in the first place where an appeal has been lodged

in the matter and secondly to do so in such a manner that his reasons reflect a basis for consensus

that there has been a proper adjudication of the matter by him has been echoed from time to time

by this court”. Therefore, while there is no statutory provision that mandates that a tribunal give

reasons for their decisions, the nature of their jurisdiction imposes that a reason be given in the

name of proper adjudication. The court observes that any other way would jeopardize the

confidence and respect of the court's authority and majesty of the law. 14It was stated quite spritely

by Bernard J in this case that “Surely a convicted person today is entitled to know the basis upon

which a magistrate has arrived at the conclusion that the case against him has been proved and that

thereby he should be deprived of his liberty!”

Another category that the law may consider it necessary for its administrators to give a

decision is that of Professions. This is seen in the case Re Hanoman15. In this Guyanese Case,

issues arose over the appointments of the Medical Council which was an entity established under

the Medical Practitioners Act of 1991 that functions in registering medical practitioners and

maintaining the proper standards of professional conduct. After the six practitioners were named

and submitted to the Minister of Health, the Minister expressed concern over the methodology of

choice used in deciding on the six persons. The Minister conclusively rejected Dr. Ramsahoye and

Dr. Hanoman from the selected six, substituting them without giving any reason behind his

decision. The respondent contended that there was no statutory requirement for the Minister to

give reasons for his choice or rejection of names submitted by the Medical Association. The

applicant sought a request for the reasons behind the Ministers decision and also the criteria that

14
Commonwealth Caribbean Administrative Law, pg. 346.
15
Re: Hanoman GY 1999 HC 1.

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he used in coming to his conclusion. In application of Ex parte Institute of Dental Surgery, they

highlighted that in this case there was no duty to give reasons, even on grounds of fairness. Rather,

if such a duty existed it would be reliant on the particular circumstances and where it fell on the

spectrum of decisions that required reasons.

The case also inserted commentary of a more liberal view in regard to reasons for decisions

as see in the case of Ex p Doody.16 In this case, Lord Mustill referred to fairness as an “insistence

on greater openness or transparency”. He also further observed that fairness will require that the

person who is adversely affected by the decision will have an opportunity to make representation

on his behalf either before the decision is solidified, or after so as to allow modifications. He states,

“Since the person affected usually cannot make worthwhile representations without knowing what

factors may weigh against his interest’s fairness will very often require that he is informed of the

gist of the case which he has to answer.” This mandates that in order to achieve fairness, it is

necessary to weigh in on all of the reasons and or interest regarding the situation, which is a major

argument for there being a need for the duty to give reasons by administrative bodies. The

argument of fairness as a proponent for giving reasons has been seen throughout the relevant case

law. The UK case of Doody, has formulated a fairness test that would allow the court to inquire

on the reason behind administrative or procedural decisions. Justice Bernard applied Doody in the

present case by stating that in absence of specific legislation, the modern trend is that of openness,

fairness and transparency, regarding administrative decisions. He outlined that this fairness and

openness is with direct focus on the discretion used by administrative authorities., Justice Bernard

held that, “If the Minster was of the view that the nominees did not reflect what he had in mind,

16
Ex p Doody (1993) 3 All ER 92.

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he ought to have laid down criteria for selection initially and so informed the association”,

ultimately granting prerogative orders.

Application of the principle that administrators should give reasons can be seen in relation

to planning decisions. This is seen in the case of Hamilton v Attorney General of Belize.17 The

application made to the court in this case relates to parcels of land in the Caribbean Shores

subdivision in Belize City. All parties agree that the land would be subject to the provision of the

Registered Land Act of Belize. The claimants contended that the Registrar of lands should have

informed them beforehand that they were putting caution signs on their land and the reasons for

which they were doing so. The sought certiorari to quash the Registrar’s decision. However, it was

argued by the respondents that the letter supplied by the Acting Registrar of Land was sufficient

in satisfying the section 131(1) of the statute. The question of whether the claimants were entitled

to be informed before the cautions were put up and theirs reasons was discussed. It was held that

there was no warrant for the claimant’s contention that the Registrar ought to have given notice

before the signs were put up. The trial judge relied on the dictum of Rose, LJ in R v Secretary of

State for the Home Department Ex parte Duggan who stated, “the authorities show an ever-

increasing variety of situations where depending on the nature of the decision and the process by

which it is reached, fairness requires that reasons be given”. Conteh CJ in this case believed that

fairness would be relying on the correct application of the statute. He stated that he is satisfied that

there is no duty placed on the Registrar to state of give reasons to the persons affected before

putting a caution on the Land. It was concluded that the affected person only needs to go the Land

Registry and examine the relevant entry. However, in the interest of fairness, it would be best if

the notice contains a reason for the caution, even if it is brief. From the judgment one can extract

17
Hamilton v Attorney General of Belize BZ 2008 SC 4.

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two principles. One, that the claimants are not entitled to be told beforehand if caution are going

to be placed on their property. And two, that the information on the letter that supposedly gave the

“reasons” was unsustainable and unavailing. the authorities show an ever-increasing variety of

situations where depending on the nature of the decision and the process by which it is reached,

fairness requires that reasons be given.18

Alternatively, the contrary can be said in the case of Financial institutions. In Re

Clegghorn which concerned the decision made by Minister of Finance through the Central Bank

of Trinidad and Tobago that permitted the transfer of the entire undertaking of the Workers’ Bank

of Trinidad and Tobago to Worker’s Banks 1989. The applicant sought an order of certiorari to

quash the decision. The question arose whether the bank had a duty to give reasons for making

this decision. It was held by Warner J that the common law did not recognize a general duty for

decision- makers to give reasons. It was established that only in situations of fraud reason would

be required and evidence had not proven fraud. Subsequently the court held that the bank had no

duty to give reasons.

The Director of Public Prosecutions is not required to give reasons for his decisions as well.

In the case of Tappin v Lucas,19 it was held by Khan CJ that the DDP had not duty to give reason

for his decision to discontinue the murder proceedings against Lucas as it was not mandated by

the constitution. In Mohit v DPP20, as outlined in Ventose, the DPP gave reason for discontinuing

the court proceedings, but did not provide reason in other occasion. Goureit v Union of Post Office

Workers was cited by the Privy Council, where Viscount Dilhorne states that the “AG in England

need not give any reasons for his decision to discontinue prosecution. Despite this the court did

18
Commonwealth Caribbean Administrative Law, pg 352.
19
Tappin v Lucas GY 1973 HC 2
20
Mohit v DPP of Mauritus [2005] UKPC 20.

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not that they will consider all the evidence of a particular case including the reasons of the DDP,

if he chooses to give any. 21

Some of the aforementioned cases push the envelope of fairness and strongly suggest that

reasons should be given for administrative decisions such as in the cases of employment, or

livelihood. However, in the cases that involve a statutory or even a constitutional function, such in

the case of Financial institutions or the job of DPP respectively, the court is hesitant to make any

strong suggestions towards the disclosing of their reasons in decision they make. This can be said

to be because of the court does not want to impose a duty within a case so as to create a right or a

law concerning reasons.22 However, even in cases like these, the court can be seen to encourage

the giving of reasons. Such as in the case of the DPP, the court in Mohit while negating there was

a duty to give reason, encourages that they would assess reasons if give. Or as in the case of

Hamilton v Attorney General of Belize, the court while denying that the respondent acted outside

his authority in not giving reason, they observed that in the required affidavit of caution notice that

it would be best if a reason be stated. These suggestions are evidence that the court often denies

the duty of administrators to give reason but will either strongly suggest that there should be

reasons or carefully assert that it is better to give reason. This can be evidence of a changing culture

regarding the duty to give reasons.

Recent Statutory provisions in Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago can also be seen as

evidence of this changing culture in relation to this duty. The two are of the First Caribbean

countries to codify a duty for administrators to give reasons within an Act of Parliament. The

Barbados Administrative Justice Act of 1980, section 13 provides that there is now a duty to state

21
Commonwealth Caribbean Administrative Law, pg 357
22
Jamela Ali, Duty to Give Reasons - The Way Forward, (The New Guyana bar Review,1998, Vol 2,
Issue 1)

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reasons which is imposed on any person or body who is making a decision.23 Subsection 2 outlines

that this will be applied to any decision that is required by law or by contract in application of the

principles of natural justice. It further outlines in Section 14 that a request for reasons is time

stipulates and the applicant only have 14 days from the date of notification to submit a request for

reasons. Section 14(2) states also that “A request must be made in writing, except that where an

oral hearing is held, the request may be made orally before the conclusion of the oral proceedings.”

Most interestingly Section 16, outlines that natural justice must be applies in all cases concerning

“A request must be made in writing, except that where an oral hearing is held, the request may be

made orally before the conclusion of the oral proceedings;” and further outlines that the application

of natural justice is not restricted to just these types of cases as well. When Ventose spoke about

natural justice in relation decision making, he described that it was the very nature of the duty.

Similar provisions are set out in the Judicial Review Act of Trinidad and Tobago. Article 16

mandates that “Where a person is adversely affected by a decision to which this Act applies, he

may request from the decision-maker a statement of the reasons for the decision”. In this Act it

gives the applicant 21 days to make the request for reason in writing24. This statute does not give

the same regard to natural justice as did the Barbados Administrative Justice Act.

In the case of Sparman v Greaves25, the rules of the AJA were applied where the applicant

was refused a license to practice as cardiologist. The court noted section 13(2) of the

aforementioned that mandates that one could be exempted from the requirement if it was specified

in the First Schedule, which in this case regards the applicant’s nationality. The court however

23
Barbados Administrative Justice Act, 13,14,16.
24
Judicial Review Act Trinidad and Tobago, 16(2), Where a person makes a request under subsection (1),
he shall make the request— (a) on the date of the giving of the decision or of the notification to him
thereof; or (b) within twenty-eight clear days after that date,
25
Sharma v Greaves BB 2004 HC 21.

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ruled that this exemption was mere instructive and shows cased that the draftsman was mindful of

the provisions in the Immigration Act. They observed that the they would still have to imply the

principle of natural justice in any event so as to be in accordance with the AJA. It was held that

the decision to revoke the applicants license to work and reside in Barbados made by the Chief

Immigration officer, was null and void.

It can be recommended that the principle of the duty to give reasons should not be left to
26
the whims of courts that can justify decisions based on it circumstances. Law reform can be

suggested so that legislation can clearly express that this right or duty cover all administrative and

judicial decisions. Lord Denning in Breen v AEU 27 stated that giving of reasons is considered to

be inextricably bound up with natural justice or the right to be fairly heard and is fundamentally

important as a public law principle. Denning describes it as ‘one of the fundamentals of good

administration’. In the Elwin v Public Service Commission, dictum by Cenac J, concludes that the

there is a consistent and current trend towards the development of an increased openness in matters

of government and administration. The Bahamas, should follow the current trend of modern law,

and codify the right to reason within a statute as well. Judges value the reasoning behind

administrative decisions in the name of fairness and natural justice. Thus, the trend should continue

to fully protect persons from irrational decisions made by their superiors. Justice Bernard in the

case of Re Hanoman states that their parliament should consider implementing legislation such as

Barbados that requires statutory bodies to give reasons. He believes that it will lead to greater

efficiency and remove the cloud of suspicion which oft engulf executive authority in the execution

of its administrative functions. The Bahamas should heed to his advice so as ensure transparency

and fairness among all administration.

26
Duty to Give Reasons - The Way Forward
27
Breen v AEU [1971] 1 All ER 1148.

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Bibliography
Alexander v Williams TT 1984 CA 33
Barbados Administrative Justice Act, 13,14,16.
Breen v AEU [1971] 1 All ER 1148.
Eddy Ventose, Commonwealth Caribbean Administrative Law, (Routlege Publishing, 2013) pg.
341.
Ex p Doody (1993) 3 All ER 92.
Ex p Robinson JM 2007 SC 84.
Hamilton v Attorney General of Belize BZ 2008 SC 4.
Jamela Ali, Duty to Give Reasons - The Way Forward, (The New Guyana bar Review,1998, Vol
2, Issue 1)
James v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago TT 2009 CA 9.
Judicial Review Act Trinidad and Tobago, 16(2)
Mohit v DPP of Mauritus [2005] UKPC 20.
Professor Albert Fiadjoe, Commonwealth Caribbean Public law, (Cavendish Publishing Ltd, 2nd
edition,1999,) pg. 55.
Re: Hanoman GY 1999 HC 1.
Saga Trading Limited v The Comptroller of Customs and Excise TT 1998 HC 132.
Sharma v Greaves BB 2004 HC 21.
Stennett v Attorney General JM 2005 SC 100.
Tappin v Lucas GY 1973 HC 2
Williams v Public Service Commission DM [2001] HC 1.

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Q.2
(i) Ouster clauses.

Ouster clauses, as defined by Professor Fiadjoe are confusing clauses that attempt to deny

courts the power of final adjudication over the exercise of a particular power. 28This can be seen

administratively or legislatively. In essence, ouster clauses attempt to protect public bodies from

judicial review by basically ousting the jurisdiction of the courts. However, many question

whether these clauses are simply there to shield the abuse of power by administrators. 29 One can

first consider the case Anisminic v Foreign Compensation Commission 30. In this case Anisminic

sought to challenge a decision of the Foreign Compensation Commission who decide that the

company was not entitled to any compensation in respect of its sequestered property in Egypt.

The legislation in this case mandated that the decisions of the commission “shall not” be

questioned in any court. The question in the case was whether such an administrative body had

the jurisdiction to decide on whether the court has jurisdiction over its decisions. The view that

was adopted what that the decision of an administrational tribunal could be set aside on

jurisdictional grounds if it made and error of law which took it outside it jurisdiction. As such it

was held that the ouster clause would not protect a decision of the commission from being

challenged by the court. More importantly, Ventose observes that the principle to be highlighted

in this case is that where the matter concerns a head of state, the ouster clause made is seen as a

complete block to judicial review.31 Still, if the ouster clause concerns other administrative

bodies, this will not prevent the courts from questioning the bodies merits concerning the breach

28
Prof. Albert Fiadjo, Commonwealth Caribbean Public Law, (Cavendish Publishing, 2nd edition, 1999),
pg. 63
29
Eddy Ventose, Commonwealth Caribbean Administrative Law, (Routledge Publishing, 2013), pg. 113
30
Anisomeric v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147.
31
Commonwealth Caribbean Administrative Law, pg 114.

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of rights, freedoms, and natural justice. Ouster clauses are categorized into two groups,

constitutional ouster clauses and statutory ouster clauses.

Constitutional ouster clauses provide that the discretions or decision made by a head of

state may not be reviewed judicially. An example of this is seen in Section 80 (2) of the

Trinidadian Constitution. It states that “whereby by this constitution the President is required to

act in accordance with the advice of, or after consultation with, any person or authority, the

question whether he has in any case so acted shall not be inquired into in any court”. In the case

of Harrikisoon v AG of Trinidad and Tobago, the appellant was a teacher in the Ministry of

Education and occupied a public office in the Teaching Service that was subject to the

constitution. He was however transferred to a local primary school without reason and sought an

order declaring that transfer was unconstitutional, illegal and void. Section 102 (4)(a) of the

constitution ousts the jurisdiction of the court to question the validity of the commission in its

function. The question before the court was whether this ouster clause should be upheld in light

of the cases circumstance. The trial judge stated, “I am firmly of opinion that a Court would be

acting improperly if a perfectly clear ouster provision in the Constitution, of a country which is

its supreme law, is treated with little sympathy, or scant respect, or is ignored without strong and

compelling reasons.” He applied the reasoning of Dr. Basu in his Commentary on the

Constitution of India, who argued that ouster clause be viewed at face value and where the

Constitution excludes such questions, the courts will lose their jurisdiction to entertain these

questions because the court have no power to override the Constitution. It was held in this case

by Hyatali CJ that the court was of a firm opinion that it was not the place of the court to review

a perfectly clear ouster clause. His appeal was dismissed with costs.

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Such a scenario is also seen in the case of Re: Bain32, where the court was asked to

inquire as to whether there was a consultation with the President of the Republic with the Prime

Minister regarding Mr. Bain’s appointment as chairman of the Public Service Commission.

Blackman J held that section 80 of the Trinidadian Constitution leads to only one conclusion,

which is that the court is not to embark on an inquiry as to whether the President acted in the

instant case after consultation or with the Prime Minister or not. He further highlighted that when

the President carries out and administrative act within his capacity, the character of that action is

non-judiciable. He further observes that if the constitution ousts the jurisdiction of the court to

inquire in a matter such as this, that he must adhere to it and give effect to it. Similarly, in Re:

Blake33, the appellant alleged that the Governor General’s decision to appoint the Prime Minister

and establish a minority government was unconstitutional. Hylton J subsequently refuse the

application by stating “whether the Governor General has so exercised that function shall not be

inquired into in any court of law”. It was held by Floisac CJ that section 116 (2) of the

constitution was an unequivocally clear ouster clause, and that the courts would not entertain any

proceeding in relevance to the Governor Generals constitutional or prerogative powers.

In the case of statutory ouster clauses, the court considers that there is an inherent right of

the people to access the courts. An article by Dr. Sonia Richards outlines that citizens have a

constitutional right to quash the decision of an inferior court, if that court commits an error of

law. 34Simply put, no ordinary form of legislation can deny a citizen of this right to judicial

review. Fiadjoe outlines that an ouster clause can be dishonored if, there is an improper

composition of a tribunal, an exceeding of legitimate scope of functions, the absence of locus

32
Re: Bain 1987 No 3260 HC TT (unreported).
33
Re: Blake (1994) 47 WIL 174.
34
Richards S, The development of the judiciary in Barbados, 1989, unpublished PhD thesis, university of
the West Indies.

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standi, nonfulfillment of precedent, a deviation from prescribed procedure, a contravention of

natural justice and fraud.35 In the Bahaman case of AG of the Bahamas v Ryan,36 the claimant

was a resident of the islands since 1847. In 1966 he was given a certificate which indicated that

he belonged to the islands which was subject to the 1963 Immigration Act, subsequently gaining

Bahamian status. In 1974 he applied to be registered as a citizen under article 5(2) of the

constitution and attended an interview. In the interview, nothing was suggested as to why the

Minister would refuse the application. Nonetheless, his application was refused, and he applied

to the court for a declaration that stated that the in light true purpose of the constitution, he was

entitled to be registered as a citizen of the Bahamas. On appeal to the Privy council, the Board

discussed that to solidify an ouster clause the decision must be made by someone who functions

in superior judicial authority. It was stated by Lord Diplock that “a decision affecting the legal

rights of an individual which is arrived at by a procedure which offends against the principles of

natural justice is outside the jurisdiction of the decision-making authority”. He also outlined that

it was well established law that to fall within the prohibition of judicial review, the decision must

be one which the administrator has the jurisdiction to made and that since the decision was in

breach of natural justice it was observed to be outside of the Minister’s jurisdiction. It was held

in application of the Principle in Anismic that the executive authorities exercising quasi-judicial

powers, would be inappropriate and cause a declaration of nullity. It was concluded that the

ouster clause in the Bahamas Nationality Act which provided that the decision of the Minister

will not be subject to judicial review, did not prevent the court for inquiring on the validity of a

decision that was made without jurisdiction. Held that the decision was indeed ultra vires.

35
Commonwealth Caribbean Public Law, pg. 77
36
AG of the Bahamas v Ryan [1980] AC 718.

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(ii) Locus Standi.

Locus standi as a requirement for the granting of leave in judicial review is seen in both

case law and statute. In the Barbados Administrative Justice section 5(2)37, it mandates that the

court on an application may grant relief through an application of judicial review to a person

whose interests are adversely affected by a decision, or to a person or group of persons who has

justifiable public interest in the circumstances of the case. Section 6 of the Barbados

Administrative Justice Act also outlines that there is a requirement of locus standi in the granting

of the application for judicial review.38 It states that the court will not grant leave unless the

applicant is seen by the court to have sufficient interest in the action in which the application

relates. This is directly synonymous with the Trinidad and Tobago Judicial Review Act. This

principle surrounds the fact that the court has a right use its discretion in granting an application

for judicial review based on whether their interests were adversely affected by the

administrational decision. Considering these provisions, it can be said that locus standi simply

beg the question whether the claimant is directly involved in the matter so as to qualify an

audience by the court.

The question of whether a person has standing is often assessed on a case by case basis.

In the case of Pindling v Bahamas Electrical Corporation39, the plaintiff sought a declaration that

the purchase by BEC and Batelco of Shares in Cable Bahamas Ltd, was ultra vires the Electricity

Act. it was held in this case that the plaintiff lacked Standing as a private citizen. However, he

sought a declaration of special damages, costs for prosecuting his own action, loss of

opportunities to use recent technology in the telecommunication industry, and the loss of

37
Barbados Administrative Justice, Section 5(2).
38
Barbados Administrative Justice, Section 6.
39
Pindling v Bahamas Electrical Corporation BS 1996 SC 44.

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opportunity to have cost of communication reduced. In this case they cited of Boyce v

Paddington Borough Council to establish that where a plaintiff seeks a declaration, he must show

that some legal right of his is in issue actually and contingently, regardless of he is one of the

person affected. It was asked by the court can the applicant sue. It was mandated that one can

only sue where there is an interference with a public right and that interference is synonymous

with a private right of the claimant. Also, where no private right of P is interfered with but in

respect of his private right, he suffered special damages from the interference with the public

right. Basically, as stated by Strachan J, the applicant must show a sufficiency of interest that is

based on the relevance of the application. He states that “If he fails to shoe, when he applies for

leave, a prima facie case or reasonable grounds for believing that there has been a failure of

public duty, the court would be in error if it granted leave. It was ultimately held that it would be

inconceivable that of the many customers of Batelco and BEC there would riot be others to

whom injury, if any, would equal or exceed injury, if any, to the plaintiff. This it was held that

the plaintiff lacked locus standi and his case was dismissed.

In the case of Frank v AG of Antigua40, the appellant was the MP for the Barbuda

constituency. At the time he sought relief he was a senator. He sought the declaration that on the

island of Barbuda only Barbudans would be able to enjoy the system of land tenure on the island

that provided that land could only be passed on to or acquired by Barbudans. Also, that if land be

given to Non-Barbudans, it must be agreed upon in a village meeting. He also sought a declaration

to state that the customs and rights of Barbuda are bound by the crown. The Issue of Locus Standi

in this case is the fact the case did not deal with concrete rights. It was questioned whether the

applicant has sufficient interest on the matter to apply for judicial review. The judge outlined that

40
Frank v AG of Antigua AG 1994 CA 15

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in order for this to be established, the applicant must establish that the respondent has infringed or

threatened to infringe on the applicants present or future rights. Applicants argued that they wanted

to bring clear understanding of the rights of the people of Barbuda so as to avoid future conflict

with the central government. The court acknowledged that this was a want for a proprietary right

to be legally established which is not normally the function of the court. But through Judicial

review, the court can only make a declaration to establish those rights which mandates that there

was a previous infringement or threatened infringement of an established right or interest. As such

the claimant had no locus standi and his claim was also dismissed. This case showed that as the

MP of Barbuda, he did have interest in the matter. However, because the action in itself was outside

of the courts function, the MP had no locus standi in the action.

In Sharma v Manning et al41, the applicant was a member of parliament, former

government minister and a now member of member of the opposition. He was charged with the

responsibility of monitoring the Freedom of Informations Act (FOIA). This act outlined in section

11 of the FOIA that public authorities have a duty to have their information updated. Only 37, of

the 153 public authorities adhered to this provision. Therefore, the Minister brought an action

seeking an order of Mandamus directing the respondents to publish with 7 days the reasons for

their continued failure and refusal to comply with section 11 of the FOIA. he also wanted a

declaration to say that such a delay is illegal and unlawful. The judgment highlighted section 6(4)

of the Judicial Review Act that mandates that Leave not be granted unless it considers that the

applicant had a sufficient interest on the matter to which the application relates. The applicant

argued that every citizen has the necessary locus standi to bring the instant case and the member

of parliament vested with assuring that the FOIA is followed, he most certainly has locus standi.

41
Sharma v Manning TT 2005 HC 94.

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The court in this case applied the judgment seen in R V Monopolies and Mergers Commission ex

p Argile Group plc, where Justice Sedley stated 2 characteristics of locus standi. Firstly, that the

threshold of locus standi is only set at the height necessary to prevent abuse. Secondly, that is

someone were to have no interest whatsoever, is would not be the same as having no special

interest. Rather it is to interfere in something which one has no legitimate concern at all. The trial

judge stated that he is required to ensure that the applicant is not merely a meddlesome busybody,

holding that the applicant indeed has shown sufficient interest to apply for the judicial review

sought.

Interveners can also be seen to have standing before the court as well. The Judicial Review

Act of Trinidad and Tobago section (14) outlines that any person who has an interest in a decision

which is subject to review may apply to the court to become a party to the proceedings. 42 In the

case of Alleyne v Singh Agricultural Development Bank43, and appeal was made against the

decision of Reddy J,’who declined to permit the applicants leave to be heard in opposition to an

application for judicial, which was filed by Singh, the former CEO of ADB. In his separate appeal

he was challenging the bank’s decision to dismiss him for alleged misconduct. The Appellant's in

the present case were members of the bank’s Board of Directors. It was held that the fact that an

applicant has close tired or direct involvement with the public authority whose decision is under

scrutiny, does not automatically allow them to fall under order 54. Order 54 states that a person

who enters under the rule does not become a party to the suit. The applicant thought not directly

affected must however meet the requirement of being a proper person to be heard. The phrase

‘directly affected was settled to mean that the 3rd party is directly affected by the decision without

42
Judicial Review Act Trinidad and Tobago, section 14.
43
Alleyne v Singh Agricultural Development Bank TT 2005 HC 102

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the intervention of any immediate agency. Alleyne was seen to not be directly affected and the

appeal was dismissed.

Public Interest Litigants are those whose interests are adversely affected by the decision or

a group of persons whose application is justifiable in the public interest bases on the case’s

circumstances. This is outlined in section 5(2) of the Judicial Review Act. This is seen in the case
44
of Trinidad and Tobago Civil Rights Association v AG of Trinidad and Tobago. the applicant

were an incorporated body and an individual who together argued that the 2005 Judicial Review

Bill was inconsistent with the constitution. The respondent contended that because of the

prorogation of Parliament, there would not be any reason for the court to hear the application and

that the issues would be academic as the bill was no longer before Parliament. The court discredited

this line of reasoning and states that the issues made by the applicants were of great public

importance and that bill raised concerns that involve the separation of powers and the jurisdiction

of the court. Conclusively, the applicants were granted a leave to judicial because the litigants were

seen to be acting in the public interest.

44
Trinidad and Tobago Civil Rights Association v AG of Trinidad and Tobago TT 2005 HC 98

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(ii) Certiorari and Mandamus.

Both Certiorari and Mandamus can be Categorized by Ventose as a Public Law Remedy.45

He outlines that Certiorari is one of the most powerful remedies that is available to an applicant.

The definition of certiorari is outlined in the case of Ajit v Sankar46. The applicant was an employee

of the Ministry of Health as a maid attached to the public Hospital where she was charged by the

Permanent Secretary of the Ministry for working under the influence of alcohol. As such, she was

charged departmentally with an offence and was dismissed from public office. She applied for an

order of certiorari to quash the dismissal. The trial judge outlines that the writ of certioraris one of

the three prerogative waits; certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. This defined as the process in

which High Court of Justice exercises it higher jurisdiction over inferior tribunals or jurisdiction,

for examining in the legality of its proceeding or giving fuller effect to the proceeding that could

have been done by the lower court.

The discussion of certiorari is continued in the case of Boyce v Beckles47. The case

specifically highlights the remedy of certiorari. In this case the applicant filed an application for

Judicial Review of a decision made by Beckles who was a Magistrate. She committed the applicant

to stand trial for the unlawful killing of Cecilia Osborne-Forde. In this case, the applicant sought

both a declaration that the trial was unlawful and an order of certiorari to quash the committal

made by the respondent. The judge uses commentary from Wade & Forsyth’s Administrative Law

(8th edition) to highlight the nature of Certiorari. They state, “Certiorari thus performs a function

not unlike that of a declaratory judgment: by quashing the Court declares that some purported

decision or determination is irregular or futile and therefore of no effect in law. The question at

45
Eddy Ventose, Commonwealth Caribbean Administrative Law, (Routledge Publishing, 2013), pg.407.
46
Ajit v Sankar GY 1989 CA 9.
47
Boyce v Beckles BB 2004 HC 2.

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issue has not been lawfully determined, and the responsible authority must start again and

determine it properly”. This defines certiorari by comparing it to a declaration. Certiorari functions

by nullifying that decision so that it would have no binding effect at all leaving the decision to be

completely reevaluated. The court also asserts that this remedy is discretionary and that it will not

be given if no good will result. In other words, there is no guarantee that the order of certiorari

would be given, and it up to the court to decide based on the merits of the action. Blackman J also

further explained that the action certiorari’s role is to ensure that an inferior court or tribunal had

the jurisdiction to make the decision in question, and that they had not exceeded or wrongfully

executed its jurisdiction. The judge ultimately held that the issues raised on this application for

judicial was not substantive and his application was dismissed.

In the case of Ex p Schaper48, the applicants permit to visit Belize was revoked by the

Minister of Human Resources Youth, Women and Culture and he sought and order of certiorari to

quash this decision. The court relied on section 10(1) of the Immigration Act which gave the

Minister of Immigration or someone acting in his stead to uses his discretion to revoke a permit at

any time. Moe J states that “There can be no doubt that the last sentence in that section is additional

to the discretion given under the first sentence of the said section” It was held that the that the

decision made by the minister in his discretion was lawful. It also highlighted that one of the main

ground that would incite an order certiorari is a decision that is made in breach of natural justice.

It cannot function to quash a decision of a legislative character. This was the basis of the denial of

the appeal made by Schaper, as it challenged a legislative authority and the remedy of certiorari

cannot stop the function of legislation. It could also be noted that a characteristic of certiorari is

that it cannot be used in matters that concern the exercise of prerogative powers as seen in the Case

48
Ex Parte Schaper BZ 1995 SC 2.

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of HMB Holdings v Cabinet of Antigua and Barbuda49. Ultimately, the full scope of certiorari

extends to cases in which the decision of an administrator has been reached only after an inquiry

or process of judicial or quasi-judicial character as stated by Lord Parker in Ex p Lain50.

Mandamus on the other hand, is described by Ventose as the remedy that would compel

the performance of a public duty. In the case of Belize Institute for Environmental Law v Chief

Environmental Officer51 it concerns the enforcement of an Environmental Compliance Plan. The

claimant sought an order of mandamus against the defendant to enforce the Environmental

Compliance Plan for the Chalillo Dam. The court outlines the Supreme Court Civil Procedure

Rules of 2005, which defines mandamus as a remedy of judicial review that requires the

performance of a public duty. The discretionary nature of this remedy is also highlighted, and it

was stated that the court will only order this in a clear and appropriate case. The nature of this

remedy is commented on in application of quote made in Wade and Forsyth Administrative Law.

The textbook observes that the employment of the mandamus remedy is a weapon at the hand of

an ordinary citizen when the public authority fails to do it duty by him. The quote further explains

that the essence of the remedy is that is a command that order the performance of that failed duty,

however the court has the power to withhold or grant such remedy.

In Re Belize Telecommunication Ltd52 the applicant sought an order of mandamus so as to

impose a requirement that the Director of Telecommunication keep a register of

telecommunication licenses and to get him to prevent persons from operating telecommunication

services contrary to section 34 of the Telecommunications Act. The act mandates that the director

was indeed under a statutory duty to keep a register as seen in section 14. The statute also mandated

49
HMB Holdings v Cabinet of Antigua and Barbuda AG 2002 HC 19.
50
Ex p Lain [1967] 2 ALL ER 77.
51
Belize Institute for Environmental Law v Chief Environmental Officer BZ 2008 SC 13.
52
Re Belize Telecommunications Ltd BZ 2002 SC 1.

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that the register be open to inspection and to those who made payment for their license, they would

be entitled to a copy of the register. The court observed that a failure to perform this duty could be

challenged at any time. The Conteh provides a brief history of Mandamus and describes it as a

writ of grace within the three prerogative writs. He asserts that it became of high of importance to

enforce the performance of a public duty and is a valuable remedy of last resort. The availability

of this remedy however, is subject to the rules of the court. He also stated that while writs of

mandamus and certiorari are no longer issued, there availability as remedies, since Belize had no

rules of the court, are subject to the procedure of the high court of England. Conteh J ultimately

granted the order of mandamus to require the director to keep a register as this was the directors

statutory duty.

The remedy of mandamus can also extend to officers of the court. In the case of Re

Foulkes53, the complaint was made against a magistrate as the magistrate refused to draw up and

sign a formal charge for the applicant so as to hear and determine his complaint, as required in the

Criminal Procedure Code Act. This was contended by the applicant that the magistrate had failed

to perform his duties and violated the applicant’s rights under section 54 because of this failure.

He ultimately sought an order of mandamus to demand that the magistrate carry out his prescribed

duties as every citizen had the right have their complaints examined and to not be blown off with

excuses such as a large pipeline of cases that are already in the system, and that the court has more

important matters to hear with a weightier cause. He also argued that the magistrate over

complicated the process so as the applicants claim would vexatious and frivolous. Hall J, relied on

the case of Ex P Lloyd where applicant was refused an order of mandamus where the applicant

had requested to be moved by the court and to have her case heard in another county. However

53
RE Foulkes BS 1991 SC 25.

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medical reports stated that she was too ill to travel. The court stated in this case that it was a well-

established principle that mandamus must not be allowed unless there was no other effective

remedy. In this case it was concluded that she could have been effectively heard in the county

where she resided and her application for mandamus was refused. However, in the present case it

was held that the magistrate would not eventually hear the applicants case and that the only option

was to grant an order of mandamus in strict application of the Criminal Procedure Act.

A characteristic to note is that the two remedies can be given at the same time. In Re Elliot

Mottley54, the court stated that it was not unusual to include a request for both certiorari and

mandamus in the same originating motion. In the case it involved the application of an attorney

who was a member of the Barbados Bar association for special admission into the Bahamas Bar.

The Bahamas Bar Council refused the application, reconsidered and then came to the same

decision. The council did not indicate a reason for its decision, so it was contended that by the

applicant that the requirements of natural justice were not met. The respondents contended strongly

that an order of mandamus and an order of certiorari should not be made in the same originating

motion. Discussion by the Georges CJ indicated that the court could see no reason in principle

which could prevent the seeking of both certiorari and mandamus. However, in terms of procedure,

the order of mandamus would not be granted unless the order of certiorari was granted first. Still,

the court must look at the two remedies and its relevance to the circumstances separately. He

stated, “In my view the joinder of the prayers for the two orders of certiorari and mandamus is in

no way a technical irregularity”. The judge held that an order of certiorari would be made.

However, he saw no need to issue an order of mandamus as the claimant’s argument in this regard

had flaws.

54
Re Elliot Mottley BS 1987 SC 116

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Bioliography

AG of the Bahamas v Ryan [1980] AC 718.


Ajit v Sankar GY 1989 CA 9.
Alleyne v Singh Agricultural Development Bank TT 2005 HC 102
Anisomeric v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147.
Barbados Administrative Justice, Section 5(2).
Barbados Administrative Justice, Section 6.
Belize Institute for Environmental Law v Chief Environmental Officer BZ 2008 SC 13.
Boyce v Beckles BB 2004 HC 2.
Commonwealth Caribbean Administrative Law, pg 114.
Commonwealth Caribbean Public Law, pg. 77
Eddy Ventose, Commonwealth Caribbean Administrative Law, (Routledge Publishing, 2013), pg. 113
Eddy Ventose, Commonwealth Caribbean Administrative Law, (Routledge Publishing, 2013), pg.407.
Ex p Lain [1967] 2 ALL ER 77.
Ex Parte Schaper BZ 1995 SC 2.
Frank v AG of Antigua AG 1994 CA 15
HMB Holdings v Cabinet of Antigua and Barbuda AG 2002 HC 19.
Judicial Review Act Trinidad and Tobago, section 14.
Pindling v Bahamas Electrical Corporation BS 1996 SC 44.
Prof. Albert Fiadjo, Commonwealth Caribbean Public Law, (Cavendish Publishing, 2nd edition, 1999), pg.
63
Re Belize Telecommunications Ltd BZ 2002 SC 1.
Re Elliot Mottley BS 1987 SC 116
RE Foulkes BS 1991 SC 25.
Re: Bain 1987 No 3260 HC TT (unreported).
Re: Blake (1994) 47 WIL 174.
Richards S, The development of the judiciary in Barbados, 1989, unpublished PhD thesis, university of
the West Indies.
Sharma v Manning TT 2005 HC 94.
Trinidad and Tobago Civil Rights Association v AG of Trinidad and Tobago TT 2005 HC 98

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Question 3

Under Section 8 of the Firearms Act, the Commissioner of Police has the power to grant
firearm licenses. Section 9 of the Firearms Act of The Bahamas provides that the COP may
revoke any license in any case, he thinks fit.

Keva receives a letter from the Superintendent of Police, denying her application for a
license. The COP denies Blossom’s application for a licence because she is a Muslim. The
COP denies Sheila’s application for a license but no reason is provided.

The COP is bribed into not revoking Angie’s license. The COP revokes Pablo’s license
because, while searching his premises, the officers claimed to have found an unlicensed
firearm. No evidence of this is presented to the COP.

James, a police officer, is charged with a disciplinary offence six (6) months after the COP
becomes aware of his unlawful conduct. The Police Service Regulations provide that such
charges shall be brought against a police officer within fourteen (14) days of the COP
becoming aware of the alleged act.

The Police Service Association (PSA) rules permit the Association to dispose of the land
held by the PSA in the interests of the members. Sam, the president of the PSA, who is also
a candidate in the upcoming general election decides to sell the land owned by the PSA in
order to increase the number of political party supports in his constituency.

Advise the parties.

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Q. 3

In the present scenario, the exercise of the Commissioner of Police’s (COP), discretionary power

is questioned. One can first look at the nature of discretion given to administrative bodies. In the case of

Camacho and Sons Ltd and Others v Collector of Customs55, the company and its two shareholders brought

an application to the court. They business was concerned with women and children’s clothing, which was

on the restricted goods list. In order to bring these items into the country, the male shareholder would

acquire a license to import the restricted items. On March 6th, 1971, the male appellant went to renew said

license and upon his inquiry on the license, he was informed by the custom collector that they were under

instruction by the Minister of Trade and Industry Commerce not to sign any licenses for the Camachos.

When asked for a reason, the female shareholder was told that she should go and see the Minister. On March

18th, 1871, the female appellant visited the Ministers office but was forcibly ejected and the Minister

slammed the door in her face. She then sought an appointment with the Premier but was told that he was

too busy to accommodate a meeting with her. The male appellant then sought another license in April of

the same year. This, time he applied for a license to import cabbages, grapes and carrots. He received no

reply until May and when he did, both of the application has been rejected. The Camachos faced similar

rejection when they went to receive good that they have already imported. The customs agent told the

Camachos that she had been instructed not to deliver any goods to them. During this time the male appellant

was informed that the Minister had proposed to cancel their company’s trade license. The appellants

brought a claim that the Collector of Customs and the Minister in refusing to grant of their licenses,

constituted discriminatory treatment in accordance to the constitution of Antigua bases on their political

affiliations. The trial judge held that discrimination had not been established and refused the appellants

application for a declaration that they had indeed been discriminated against. He did however grant them

an order of mandamus, as the statute mandated that that the customs collector grant or refuse license and

55
Camacho And Sons Ltd v Collector Of Customs (1971) 18 WIR 159.

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not the Minister. They appealed this decision and the question before the court was whether the order made

by the trial judge was the proper one.

Lewis CJ held that section 4 of the Ordinances entrust to the Collector of Customs alone the power

to authorize by license the importation of restricted goods and in this power, he must exercise it in such a

manner to ensure an equitable distribution of licenses. The Ordinance also allows that the Collector

considers the Minister’s policy on the importation of goods in granting licenses. However, the discretion to

refuse them is vested in him alone and is entrusted to not allow himself to be influenced by political

propaganda or other factors. The court established that the Minister did indeed misconceive his powers as

he indicated through his actions to the female appellant that he had the power to grant or refuse licenses, or

to control the Custom Collector. The court further established that if the Customs Collector, granted or

refused application solely at the dictation of the Minister, he is guilty of unlawful behavior, which renders

his decision ultra vires void. The Customs Collector also did not deny that he knew the real reason for the

Minister's instruction, which was concluded to be because of the Camachos political opinions. Conclusively

the finding of the trial judge that the appellant was not treated in a discriminatory manner was reversed.

However, the court could not grant a judgement that would force their Customs Collector to grant the

Camachos a license. Lewis CJ stated “In my opinion there is no way of compelling a person who has a

discretionary power (not coupled with a duty) to exercise it in a particular manner. The authority of the

court is limited, in such a case, to ensuring that the discretion is exercised according to law”. Therefore,

this aspect of the appeal was dismissed. In this scenario, the general question to be asked is whether the

Commissioner is using his power of discretion, to grant firearms according to the law.

It can be firstly assessed whether Keva can make a claim of judicial review against the

Superintendent of Police’s decision to revoke her application for a firearms license. In the case of Ex p

Thompson56, the motor vehicles were intercepted by customs officers, one Honda generator, three used

56
Ex p Thompson JM 1984 SC 6.

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Mercedes Benz, and one BMW all listed under Peter Thompson, the applicant’s name. Hunter, the head of

the investigation unit stated that Thompson has been in breach of Sections 209,210, and 211 of the Customs

Act as his license used for importing goods had expired. Applicant then was informed that the breaches

would be referred to that court or an alternative option of having the matter referred to the Collector General

so that he could exercise his powers of mitigation over the matter. The applicant chose the alternative option

where in his affidavit he admitted to the breaches. After this, he complained that he was induced to confess

to the breaches. He then appeared before the Collector General where he was informed that a fine of over

150,000 dollars was imposed. The Applicant argued that the good were brought in through the services of

a Broker. The Trade Administrator Refused to extend the license to the applicant. He then brought an

application for order of certiorari to quash the decision of the collector general who decided that due to

illegal importation, the motor parts and vehicles brought in by the applicant would be confiscated and a

penalty be imposed.

Downer J stated that Collector General in his administrative capacity has the power to impose a

penalty and provided that he acted fairly within his jurisdiction there would be no good reason to quash his

decision. The court applied dictum from Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury

Corporation, which states that the court can only interfere with an act of executive authority if it be shown

that the authority has contravened the law and that discretion can only be challenged in a limited amount

of cases as the principles of discretion are absolute and cannot be questioned in any court of law. It was

held that Customs Act mandated that good imported without a valid license be liable for forfeiture. The

court also held that the good were seized in the applicant’s presence, in accordance with section 215 of the

Act. It was then questioned by Downes, that how then can it be said that the Collector General has exceeded

his power of abused them, in the light of the applicant admitting that the goods were imported without a

license? Conclusively it was held that the applicant’s appeal be dismissed as there was no evidence that the

Collector General had exceeded or abused his power. In the present scenario, Keva’s license is revoked by

the Commissioner of Police. Further facts in the scenario make it a point to indicate when procedure by the

Commissioner was not followed. In this case of Kate, no evidence or facts were mentioned that would

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indicate that the Commissioner acted outside of his discretion or power in rejecting her Firearms license.

Therefore, in application of Ex p Thompson, once there is no contravention of the law on the part of the

administrator in exercising his discretion, the court will not intervene and Keva will have to accept the

Superintendent's decision.

The question can be discussed further in reference to whether the power to grant licenses which is

entrusted to the Commissioner of police can be delegated to the Superintendent of Police. The case of

Ramdat v Public Service Appeal Board57 can be assessed. The applicant in this case decided to question the

decision of the Public Service Appeal Board to dismiss this appeal and to reaffirm the order of the Police

Service Commission. The Service Appeal board was noted by the court to be the body entrusted with the

authority to exercise disciplinary control over police officers by the constitution, and not the Police Service

Commission. Also, the appointment of the investigating officer had been signed by the Assistant

Commissioner of Police and not the Commissioner of Police. This was contended to be contrary to the

section 84 of the Police Regulations, as the power to investigate was vested in the Commissioner and not

his Assistant. It was held by the court that the Assistant Commissioner could not be seen as the alter ego of

the Commissioner. Despite this, it was held that the Commissioner had an implied a delegated authority to

his Assistant, which would give him the power to act on his behalf regarding to this authority. Consequently,

it was permissible for the Service Board to hold that the Assistant Commissioner was acting under the

implied delegated authority of the Commissioner of Police, when he signed the warning notice. In Maharaj

v Teaching Service Commission, it was noted that if there was due delegation to subordinate officers the

powers of the office, the functions of the Public Service Commission can be lawfully exercised. In the

present scenario concerning Keva, there is no clear indication whether there was any formal delegation of

the Commissioner’s powers to the Superintendent, in the granting of firearms licenses. However, since the

Superintendent of Police is also a prestigious and high-ranking position within the Police force, there can

57
Ramdat v Public Service Appeal Board TT 2007 HC 112

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be an implied delegation of the Commissioner’s powers to grant or deny licenses as seen in the case of

Ramdat.

It can then be questioned whether the COP is denying Sheila’s application for a firearm without

reason can be voided on application of judicial review. In the case of Burroughes v Katwaroo58, this

questioned can be answered and applied. The Commissioner of Police revoked the respondents Firearm

license under section (21) (d) of the firearms act. This gives the Commissioner the authority to revoke a

license íf “he thinks fit”, which gives him a wide discretionary power. This was an appeal made by the

Attorney General and the commissioner of Police against the decision of the High Court who found that

the Commissioner had acted improperly revoking the respondent’s license (Katwaroo), in exercise of his

powers under the Firearms Act. The judge granted an order of certiorari, deeming the decision of the

Commissioner null and void as no reasons for the revocation were given making it contrary to natural

justice. The trial judge also declared that Katwaroo was entitled to be given reasons for the revocation of

the licence, and that because no reasons were given, the license should be restored. Katwaroo was an

agriculturalist and had applied for firearm for the purpose of killing pest that would ravage his farm. This

had been approved approximately two years from the date of his application. He was instructed to pick up

his license within a month or it would be cancelled. In compliance with this instruction, her attended the

station where he made mention of Nandrah, another firearms owner, who wished to dispose of his firearm

due to his failing health. He was told to bring Nandrah to the station, where he would drop off his weapon

and prepare a letter to the Commissioner seeking his permission to dispose of his gun. The following

November Katwaroo received a letter from the Commissioner, informing him that his firearms licence had

been cancelled. No reasons were given for this decision. Katwaroo replied indicating that the pest problem

had increased. The Commissioner replied stating that he was unprepared to vary his decision.

Bernard J was under the same opinion of the trial judge that because the Commissioner gave no

reasons, it was reasonable to infer that he had no valid reason for his decision. He stated, “The trial judge

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Burroughes v Katwaroo TT 1985 CA 76.

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was, therefore, right in making the declarations and orders which he made.” Bernard J observed that if the

principles of natural justice are violated in respect of any decision it would not matter whether the dame

decision would have been arrived at in absence of the essential principles of justice. He also made mention

of the nature of review in regard to discretion. He cited Lord Wilberforce in Secretary of State for Education

and Science v. Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council who observed that there is no one principle or

universal rule that the exercise of discretion may be reviewed. He mandates that each type of statute must

be individually assessed. Bernard J, also concluded that while the language of the present scenario gives

the Commissioner wide discretion, it does not exempt him from review or the exercise of proper discretion.

He quotes Professor Wade in his book on Administrative Law, “For more than three centuries it has been

accepted that the discretionary power conferred upon public authorities is not absolute, even within its

apparent boundaries, but is subject to general legal limitations. These limitations are expressed in a variety

of different ways as by saying that discretion must be exercised reasonably and in good faith, that relevant

consideration only must be taken into account, that there must be no malversation of any kind or that the

decision must not be arbitrary or capricious” Conclusively, there are limitations to the use of discretionary

powers by authorities in which they were vested to. Therefore, in Sheila’s case, if no reason is given the

court will assume that there is an absurdity behind the decision. Therefore, Sheila should request reasoning

from the COP. If none is given in a timely fashion, then she would have every right to pursue the granting

of leave for judicial review of the decision made by the COP.

It can be discussed whether in denying Blossoms application for a firearm license a breach of her

fundamental rights and freedoms. In the case of Ali v AG of Trinidad and Tobago59, we see the courts

willingness to grant leave for judicial review if the court can establish a breach of a fundamental right or

freedom. The case surrounded a high-profile trial, where the trial judge made a declaration preventing any

press from commenting on the trial. The applicants, a local newspaper company, was alleged to have

59
Ali v Attorney General TT 2002 CA 47.

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violated the order and was fined $1,000. The two applicants sought redress for the alleged the violation of

their constitution for their restriction of publication. It was held by De la Bastide that to concede to a Judge

to make an unchallengeable order abridging Freedom of expression and press, so as to compromise the

principle of open justice, is to create an anomaly that disfigures the constitution. This shows the laws

readiness in defending a breach of a constitutional right or freedom.

It can now be assessed the laws position on a public authority breaching a right or freedom. In the

case of Bellot v AG of Dominica60, the applicant challenged the Commissioner of Police refusal to give the

claimant permission to hold a protest march alleging that the Public Order Act was unconstitutional. The

Deputy Commissioner, acting as the Commissioner of Police refused permission as the application had

failed to comply with s. 4 of the Public Order. The claimant however, held the protest march as planned.

Subsequently, the claimant was charged with the offences or organizing and taking part in a public

procession without the permission of the Commissioner contrary to the Public Order Act. the Claimant then

alleged that sections 5, (1), (2), (3) and 4(a)are in contravention to the constitutional rights to freedom of

expression, freedom of assembly, association and freedom of movement. These sections provided that

permission ought to be requested at least 3 days before the procession, and that the Commissioner has the

right to refuse such request. The applicant, argued that the issue is not with the decision of the

Commissioner, rather the unconstitutional nature of the provisions. The court applied dictum in Francis v

Chief of Police where it states that “that in cases where a discretionary power is granted to an executive

authority the mere fact that the power may possibly be arbitrarily exercised is no ground for declaring the

law granting such power unconstitutional, for there is no presumption that the power will in fact be so

exercised.” Henry-Wason J noted that the claimant was not alleging any abuse of discretion. Ultimately, it

was deemed that the Commissioner of Police performed their administrative functions correctly. Therefore,

because no cases were cited by the claimant involving the the failed exercise of judicial power and the fact

that case for the contravention of Constitution was seemingly abandoned, the court found it difficult to

60
Bellot v AG of Dominica DM 2004 HC 14.

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provide that the section of public order were unconstitutional. It is important to note that when dealing with

the breach of fundamental rights regarding administrative decision, the court is keen on evaluated the

constitutionality of the action of the administrator rather than the constitutionality of the provision.

Similarly, in the case of Francis v Chief of Police61, the appellants were charged with using a noisy

instrument during the course of a public meeting without obtaining permission from the Chief of Police

contrary to section 5 of the Public Meeting and Processions Act. they contended that this law contravened

with the constitution and their right to meet publicly. It was held that the appellant failed to establish that

he suffered a loss of a fundamental right reserved to him by the constitution and as such the act was not

deemed to contravene the constitution. It can be noted that the applicant must establish that their

fundamental right had been infringed upon due to the administrator’s decision. As previously mentioned in

the Camacho case, the appellant established with evidence that the Customs Collector had politically

discriminated against her. She ultimately won her claim as the court will not allow an administrative

decision to be made on the basis of discrimination or a breach of a fundamental right or freedom.

Conclusively, in the present scenario, refusing to grant a license of a firearm can be seen as a contravention

of the constitutional right to non-discrimination on the basis of religion. Thus, more than likely Blossom

would be given redress of this decision, as it would go against her fundamental right and freedom.

The question of whether the Commission in accepting a bribe from Angie for the granting of her

Firearms license was acting in Bad Faith can be assessed. Discretionary powers have fiduciary duty to use

their powers in accordance with the statute, in honesty, and without bias. Ventose observes that the court

will interfere on decisions made by public authorities if it can be shown that there was bad faith or a

manifestation of an absurdity. In the case of Marcano v AG of Trinidad and Tobago62, it is stated that “ The

existence of bad faith in the exercise of any administrative function is sufficient warrant for the Court to

say that that is an improper exercise and so is unlawful.63 The onus rests upon the applicant to show bad

61
Francis v Chief of Police 1970 CA 1.
62
Marcano v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago TT 1985 HC 63.
63
Eddy Ventose, Commonwealth Caribbean Administrative Law.

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faith, and that in the absence of anything to the contrary, the Authority must be presumed to be acting

properly”. In other word, the burden would be on blossom to prove that the Commissioner was acting in

bad faith. The case of Benjamin v Minister of Information and Broadcasting64 can be applied. In this case

the appellant, Benjamin, was the political head of broadcasting for the current Anguilla government

administration. In October of 1994, he secured sponsorship from a company owned by the leader of the

opposition for a radio programme called “Talk Your Mind”. The judge noted that the radio program had

become an integral part of life in Anguilla, as the show enjoyed a wide listening audience and many persons

would make it a point to listen in. the show implemented a call-in segment, where many callers would

criticize or comment on the government. Shortly after this implementation, the Minister of Information

directed that the interactive part of the show be discontinued. When this was challenged by Benjamin, the

Minister outright directed that the show be cancelled. No particular reason was given for the abrupt

termination. After receiving public flack for the show's cancellation, the show was coming back on the air.

However, after talks concerning the legality of the Anguilla’s Lottery and the threat of a lawsuit against

Radio Anguilla, from Anguilla Lottery Gaming Company Ltd, the Ministers collectively agreed that the

radio show be suspended.

The appellant then brought an action alleging that the decision of the Minister to suspend his radio

programme infringed on his right to freedom of expressing that was enshrined in the Angolan constitution.

The court decided that even though there might be facts to raise such an inference, it is a serious thing to

allege that the decision of the minister was made in dishonesty and out of spite of the applicant. It was

concluded that without any evidence, the court cannot make a finding of mala fides (bad faith), on the part

of the minister. This case shows that there is a general hesitation of the court to rule that an administrator

has acted in bad faith, unless there is convincing evidence to prove it. However, if it could have been proven

that the Minister was acting in bad faith, and in violation of the appellant’s constitutional right, the

conclusion would have been different. In the present scenario, if it can be proven that the Minister accepted

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Benjamin v Minister of Information and Broadcasting AI 1998 HC 3.

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a bribe for the granting of Angie’s firearms license, it can be seen as a decision made in bad faith and be

subject to a nullity under judicial review.

The question of Angie’s Bribery can also be assessed in regard to the principles of improper

purpose. A public officer who has discretionary power can also act outside of their proper purpose. This is

explained in the case of Adams v Commissioner of Police65. In this case the appellant was charged with

assaulting a police officer, threatening to kill with a knife. The appellant denied this, but at trial the

magistrate chose to believe the testimony of the Police officer rather than the appellants. The appellant then

made an action against the magistrate's decision, contending that her approach was contrary to proper

judicial practice, alleging bias and prejudice on her part. The court concluded that since the impression

given by the appellant was deemed as shifty, there was nothing in the evidence to justify holding the

magistrate had formed the wrong impression of the appellant so as to warrant a reversal of the decision. In

this case the rule to be extracted is that the decision- maker must take into account only the factors that are

relevant and material for the purpose of those exercising jurisdiction. If any other factor is considered and

can be proven by the appellant, it will be deemed by the decision made outside of the proper purpose. In

the present scenario, a bribe is can be considered a factor that should not be considered in the granting of a

firearms license. In fact, this is considered an illegality in accordance with the Bahamas Prevention of

Bribery Act Section 3(2), which mandates that any public servant who solicits or accepts any advantage as

the inducement of a reward in assisting or hindering or favoring a person directly in relation to the

performance of his duties as a public servant, he would be guilty of an offence. It is public servant’s purpose

and certainly the law to engage in any form of bribe.

The next issue to be discussed is whether the COP act unlawfully in revoking Pablo’s license

without proper evidence being given? In the case of Naraynsingh v Commissioner of Police66, the appellant

was an 85-year-old police officer and was the manager of two petrol stations. He was also a holder of a

firearms license under which he was authorized to keep his shotgun for personal protection. He later varied

65
Adams v Commissioner of Police AI 2009 HC 19.
66
Naraynsingh v Commissioner of Police TT 2004 PC 6

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his license so that he may maintain a Taurus 38 revolver instead of a shotgun. His license was revoked by

the Commissioner of Police on December 28th, 1998. The basis of the revocation was that in execution of

a civil debt at the appellant’s home, a second firearm was allegedly found on the premises. The Appellant

by way of judicial review commenced proceeding against the Commissioner on the basis that his decision

was reached unfairly and without sufficient investigation. Such an allegation was also out rightly denied by

the appellant from the very beginning. Article 21 of the Trinidad and Tobago Firearms Act outlined that

the commissioner may revoke a firearm, if the licensee is convicted of an offence, if the Commissioner is

satisfied that the licensee is unfit to be entrusted with a firearm, if the licensee does not pay his fees and if

in any other case the Commissioner thinks it fit. Both the respondent and his wife were subsequently

charged with possession of an unlicensed firearm, charged of which were dropped 19 months later. After

the dismissal, the appellant wrote the Commissioner seeking to have his license restored. The

Commissioner replied concluding that while the charges were dismissed the ammunition was still found in

his possession. The appellant solicitor in reply stated that the firearm found at his home did not belong to

him, nor was he aware that the firearm was on the premise which was determined by the magistrate. The

Commissioner in response stated, “it is cancelled for the reason outlined in the first letter”.

Lord Brown of Eaton-Under-Heywood outlined that the Commission was required to act fairly in

exercise of this administrative power and that this fairness extends procedural fairness. The correct

procedure as outlined by their Lordships were that further inquiries could and should have been made. Lord

Brown questioned whether the Commissioner was entitled to reject the appellant’s allegation solely on a

material basis. The answer to this was no. More investigation was required that initially undertaken as it

would go against logic for the appellant to need a second weapon when he already had a licensed firearm

there. The Lordships did not hold that in every circumstance inquires must be made. However, where further

information is available, and inquiries can be made, a fair procedure demands that they be made especially

in the abandonment of criminal prosecution. It was held that the decision of the Commission be quashed.

In the present scenario, similar facts apply. Pablo, who was a licensed firearm owner, was allegedly found

to be in possession of a unlicensed firearm. The facts clearly outline that no evidence as presented to the

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Commissioner of Police. Therefore, as outline in the aforementioned case, in the absence of evidence the

correct procedure of the commissioner is to inquire and investigate the matter before revoking the firearm

license.

The question of whether the COP can bring charges against James when the Police Act mandates

charges be brought within 14 days of the COP’s knowledge, and the charges were brought 6 months after

the COP’s knowledge. In the case Evelyn v Petersen67, the claimant filed an application for leave to apply

for judicial review, for a declaration that the defendant’s failure to fix a date for the hearing of the claimants

review of his sentence from February 2009 to September 2009 is unreasonable and unlawful. He also sought

order of mandamus directing the defendant to hear the claim within the next 7 days. The claimant was

charged with the murder of two people that resulted from a fire he had set. He was found to be guilty of

manslaughter and was ordered to be detained “until the President’s pleasure is known”. The claimant argued

that this sentence was not valid on the basis that it was in breach of the separation of powers principle.

Section 11 of the Judicial Review Act mandates that an application of judicial review shall be heard

promptly within 3 months from when the application first arose. Judge Vinges stated “the existence of a

continuing duty on the defendant to comply with the Order of Mr. Justice Smith and the delay of eight

months by the defendant in listing the claimant’s sentencing review provided good reason to extend the

time for making of the application for leave.” It was held that leave ought to be granted. In this case we see

how delay can affect an application for review. The claimant’s application was almost thrown ought due to

that fact that it had exhausted the 3-month stipulation provision set out in the Order. However, it was

established that this was only because of the 8-month delay on the part of the defendant and as such he was

entitled to leave. The court of judicial review hold procedure in high regard. In a case of a delay of more

than 3 months, the court will not hear the appeal. Similarly, this principle can apply to all procedures

mandated in any statute or administrative set of rules. In the case of James, the COP needed to charge him

with a disciplinary offence 14 day after he become aware. The Commissioner decided to bring disciplinary

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Evelyn v Peterson TT 2009 HC 270.

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charges 6 months after he became aware, which is outside of the proper procedure. The court will an action

that is made outside of the proper procedure as void. In this case the Commissioner delay will invalidate

his decision to bring charges against James. Subsequently, James will have a good claim for judicial review

against the decision made by the Commissioner to bring charges against him.

The final issue to be assessed is whether Sam went against the rules of the Public Association in

selling the land owned by the PSA for a political advantage. In the case of Francois v AG of St Lucia 68,

Francois alleged that both the Minister of Finance and the Government of St. Lucia, acted unlawfully in

connection with the withdrawal of monies from the consolidated Fund to guarantee the developer of the

Hyatt Hotel. Francois’ claim was ultimately dismissed on the ground that he did not have sufficient interest

in the matter to establish locus standi. However, it was also established that Parliament only had the power

to approve a resolution submitted to it by the Minister independently of the cause or from a financial

obligation incurred by the government but did not have the requisite power to authorize borrowing under

the Finance Act in respect of financing obligations concerning the Hyatt Hotel. They concluded that the

only logical conclusion to be made was that the Finance Act had been breached by the Government.

Saunders J, in the Court of Appeal concluded that the Prime Minister was doing nothing wrong in giving

the guarantee. However, Parliamentary approval was required before the guarantee could be made binding

on the Government as it involved a financial liability. Therefore, this was seen as Parliament not following

the correct procedure and acting outside of its proper purpose. In advising Sam, it would have to be

established that selling the land owned by the PSA for his own personal benefit, would go against the rules

of the PSA which permit the land only to be disposed of in the interest of the members. This action would

go against the purpose of the rules as it would not be disposed of for the interest of its members. Rather, he

is acting in distorting the rules so as to benefit his political campaign. This would leave Sam’s decision as

president of the PSA, susceptible to judicial review and remedy.

68
Francois v Attorney General of Saint Lucia LC 2003 HC 54.

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Bibliography

Adams v Commissioner of Police AI 2009 HC 19.


Ali v Attorney General TT 2002 CA 47.
Bellot v AG of Dominica DM 2004 HC 14.
Benjamin v Minister of Information and Broadcasting AI 1998 HC 3.
Burroughes v Katwaroo TT 1985 CA 76.
Camacho and Sons Ltd v Collector Of Customs (1971) 18 WIR 159.
Eddy Ventose, Commonwealth Caribbean Administrative Law, (Cavadish Publishing, 2013).
Evelyn v Peterson TT 2009 HC 270.
Ex p Thompson JM 1984 SC 6.
Francis v Chief of Police 1970 CA 1.
Francois v Attorney General of Saint Lucia LC 2003 HC 54.
Marcano v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago TT 1985 HC 63.
Naraynsingh v Commissioner of Police TT 2004 PC 6
Ramdat v Public Service Appeal Board TT 2007 HC 112

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