BLO UMPAR ADIONG v.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992, Gutierrez, Jr., J.
COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private
except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself unduly infringes on the citizen's
fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution since there is no public interest
substantial enough to warrant this kind of restriction.
Facts:
The COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its powers granted by the Constitution, the
Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws. The resolution
prohibits the posting of decals and stickers not more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches in width and
fourteen (14) inches in length in any place, including mobile places whether public or private except in
areas designated by the COMELEC. Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11,
1992 elections now assails the COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and
stickers in "mobile" places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is
violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646. In
addition, the petitioner believes that with the ban on radio, television and print political advertisements, he,
being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition.
The posting of decals and stickers on cars and other moving vehicles would be his last medium to inform
the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections. Finally, the petitioner states
that as of February 22, 1992 (the date of the petition) he has not received any notice from any of the Election
Registrars in the entire country as to the location of the supposed "Comelec Poster Areas."
Issue:
Whether the prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the
Constitution.
Ruling:
YES. The COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or
private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional
grounds. First — the prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech enshrined
in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of
restriction involved in this case. All of the protections expressed in the Bill of Rights are important but the
Court has accorded to free speech the status of a preferred freedom. Second — the questioned prohibition
premised on the statute and as couched in the resolution is void for overbreadth. A statute is considered
void for overbreadth when "it offends the constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to control or
prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." The posting of decals and
stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does not endanger any substantial government
interest. There is no clear public interest threatened by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the
cherished citizen's right of free speech and expression. Under the clear and present danger rule not only
must the danger be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must be so
substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled. Significantly, the
freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the
political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by
displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by a candidate
but once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his private vehicle, the expression becomes a statement
by the owner, primarily his own and not of anybody else.

ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 133486, January 28, 2000, Panganiban, J.
The absolute ban on conducting exit surveys imposed by the Comelec cannot be justified. It does not
leave open any alternative channel of communication to gather the type of information obtained through
exit polling.
Facts:
COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No. 98-1419 dated April 21, 1998 which reads: "RESOLVED to
approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or any other groups, its agents or
representatives from conducting such exit survey and to authorize the Honorable Chairman to issue the
same."
The Resolution was issued by the COMELEC allegedly upon "information from [a] reliable source that
ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the
elections x x x and to make [an] exit survey of the x x x vote during the elections for national officials
particularly for President and Vice President, results of which shall be [broadcast] immediately." The
electoral body believed that such project might conflict with the official COMELEC count, as well as the
unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL). It also noted that it had
not authorized or deputized petitioner ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey.
Issue:
Whether COMELEC acted with grave abuse of when it approved the issuance of a restraining order
enjoining the petitioner or any [other group], its agents or representatives from conducting exit polls during
the May 11 elections.
Ruling:
YES. COMELEC’S arguments are purely speculative and clearly untenable. First, by the very nature of a
survey, the interviewees or participants are selected at random, so that the results will as much as possible
be representative or reflective of the general sentiment or view of the community or group polled. Second,
the survey result is not meant to replace or be at par with the official Comelec count. It consists merely of
the opinion of the polling group as to who the electorate in general has probably voted for, based on the
limited data gathered from polled individuals. Finally, not at stake here are the credibility and the integrity
of the elections, which are exercises that are separate and independent from the exit polls. The holding and
the reporting of the results of exit polls cannot undermine those of the elections, since the former is only
part of the latter. If at all, the outcome of one can only be indicative of the other.
In Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, the US Supreme Court held that a statute, one of the purposes of which was
to prevent the broadcasting of early returns, was unconstitutional because such purpose was impermissible,
and the statute was neither narrowly tailored to advance a state interest nor the least restrictive alternative.
Furthermore, the general interest of the State in insulating voters from outside influences is insufficient to
justify speech regulation. Just as curtailing election-day broadcasts and newspaper editorials for the reason
that they might indirectly affect the voters' choices is impermissible, so is regulating speech via an exit poll
restriction. The absolute ban imposed by the COMELEC cannot, therefore, be justified. It does not leave
open any alternative channel of communication to gather the type of information obtained through exit
polling. On the other hand, there are other valid and reasonable ways and means to achieve the COMELEC
end of avoiding or minimizing disorder and confusion that may be brought about by exit surveys.

SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INCORPORATED and KAMAHALAN PUBLISHING

CORPORATION, doing
business as MANILA STANDARD v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001, Mendoza, J.
Under O’Brien test, even if a law furthers an important or substantial governmental interest, it should
be invalidated if such governmental interest is not unrelated to the suppression of free expression.
Facts:
The COMELEC sought to enforce 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides: Surveys
affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys
affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before an election. Petitioners brought this
action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections from enforcing 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 (Fair
Election Act).
Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint
on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint. They
claim that SWS and other pollsters conducted and published the results of surveys prior to the 1992, 1995,
and 1998 elections up to as close as two days before the election day without causing confusion among the
voters and that there is neither empirical nor historical evidence to support the conclusion that there is an
immediate and inevitable danger to the voting process posed by election surveys. They point out that no
similar restriction is imposed on politicians from explaining their opinion or on newspapers or broadcast
media from writing and publishing articles concerning political issues up to the day of the election.
Consequently, they contend that there is no reason for ordinary voters to be denied access to the results of
election surveys which are relatively objective.
Respondent Commission on Elections justifies the restrictions in 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 as necessary to
prevent the manipulation and corruption of the electoral process by unscrupulous and erroneous surveys
just before the election.
Issue:
Whether 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech, expression,
and the press.
Ruling:
YES. The Supreme Court held that 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of
freedom of speech, expression, and the press. The Supreme Court applied the O’Brien Test in the case at
bar. Under this test, even if a law furthers an important or substantial governmental interest, it should be
invalidated if such governmental interest is not unrelated to the suppression of free expression. Moreover,
even if the purpose is unrelated to the suppression of free speech, the law should nevertheless be invalidated
if the restriction on freedom of expression is greater than is necessary to achieve the governmental purpose
in question.
Thus, using the aforementioned test, the Supreme Court ruled that 5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a
prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of
expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest
sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than the suppression of freedom of expression.
Thus, contrary to the claim of the Solicitor General, the prohibition imposed by 5.4 cannot be justified on
the ground that it is only for a limited period and is only incidental. The prohibition may be for a limited
time, but the curtailment of the right of expression is direct, absolute, and substantial. It constitutes a total
suppression of a category of speech and is not made less so because it is only for a period of fifteen (15)
days immediately before a national election and seven (7) days immediately before a local election.