Cathay Metal v. Laguna West, G.R. No.

172204, July 2, 2014 claims in an attempt to amicably settle what seemed then as a brewing
dispute. These letters were written on respondent’s letterheads indicating
petition under Rule45 the address, No. 167, Barangay Looc, Calamba, Laguna.
Topic: Rule 14,. Sec. 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity, Sec.
14. Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are unknown
RTC
Facts:
On September 15, 2000, petitioner filed a consolidated petition for
cancellation of adverse claims on its transfer certificates of title with the
Respondent Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative is a cooperative Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City.12
recognized under Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian
 It served a copy of the petition by registered mail to respondent's
Reform Law. It allegedly entered into a joint venture agreement with
alleged official address at “Barangay Mayapa, Calamba, Laguna.”
farmer-beneficiaries through Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) in
 The petition was returned to sender
Silang, Cavite. While respondent was negotiating with the farmer-
o because respondent could not be found at that address.
beneficiaries, petitioner Cathay Metal Corporation entered into Irrevocable
o The postman issued a certification stating that the reason
Exclusive Right to Buy (IERB) contracts with the same farmer-beneficiaries.
for the return was that the “cooperative [was] not existing.”
Under the IERB, the farmer-beneficiaries committed themselves to sell to
o Petitioner allegedly attempted to serve the petition upon
petitioner their agricultural properties upon conversion to industrial or
respondent personally. However, this service failed for the
commercial properties or upon expiration of the period of prohibition from
same reason.
transferring title to the properties.

In 1996, Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative caused the annotation of
its adverse claim on the farmer-beneficiaries’ certificates of title.
In 1999, Cathay Metal and the farmer-beneficiaries executed contracts of
sale of the properties. Transfer certificates of title were also issued in the
name of Cathay Metal.
Upon Cathay Metal’s motion, the Regional Trial Court issued an order on
December 15, 2000 declaring petitioner’s substituted service, apparently by
registered mail, to have been effected, thus Laguna West Multi-Purpose
Cooperative is hereby given a period of fifteen (15) days from the delivery of
said pleadings to the Clerk of Court within which to file their opposition to
the Consolidated petition for cancellation of adverse claim.
Respondent

Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, through its Vice President, Mr. dela  , through Mr. Orlando dela Peña, filed a manifestation and motion,
Peña, wrote two letters between March and April 2000 relative to its adverse alleging that respondent never received a copy of the summons and
the petition. It moved for the service of the summons and for a copy
 of the petition to be sent to No. 160, Narra Avenue, Looc, Calamba, respondent filed a motion for leave to admit attached opposition32 and
Laguna. opposition to petitioner’s motion for reconsideration

Regional Trial Court granted petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Respondent argued that petitioner was not being fair when it served appealed to the Court of Appeals
summons to respondent’s old address despite knowledge of its actual
address. Court of Appeals granted respondent's appeal

Issue:

Petitioner argued that summons could only be validly served to respondent’s

official address as indicated in its registration with the Cooperative WON there is valid service of summons thru registered mail.
Development Authority. This is because respondent as a registered
cooperative is governed by Republic Act No. 6938, a substantive law that Ruling:
requires summons to be served to respondent’s official address. Substantive
Respondent was not validly served with summons.
law takes precedence over procedural rules.

In this case, petitioner served summons upon respondent by registered mail

Petitioner argued that respondent was sufficiently served with summons and
and, allegedly, by personal service at the office address indicated in
a copy of its petition for cancellation of annotations because it allegedly sent
respondent’s Certificate of Registration. Summons was not served upon
these documents to respondent’s official address as registered with the
respondent’s officers. It was also not published in accordance with the
Cooperative Development Authority.
Rules of Court. As a result, respondent was not given an opportunity to
present evidence, and petitioner was able to obtain from the Regional Trial
Court an order cancelling respondent’s annotations of adverse claims.
Petitioner further argued that the Rules of Procedure cannot trump the
Cooperative Code with respect to notices. This is because the Cooperative
Code is substantive law, as opposed to the Rules of Procedure, which pertains
Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides the rule on service of
only to matters of procedure.
summons upon a juridical entity. It provides that summons may be served
RTC: Regional Trial Court granted respondent's manifestation and motion on upon a juridical entity only through its officers. Thus:
March 16, 2001.24 It ordered that respondent be furnished with a copy of
the petition at its new address.
Sec. 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. – When the defendant
MR denied. Respondent failed to appear at the hearing
is a corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the
Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be made on the
president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer, or in-house counsel.
We have already established that the enumeration in Section 11 of Rule 14 is
EXCLUSIVE. Service of summons upon persons other than those officers
enumerated in Section 11 is invalid. If summons may not be served upon
these persons personally at their residences or offices, summons may be
served upon any of the officers wherever they may be found.
The Rules of Court provides that notices should be sent to the enumerated
officers. PETITIONER FAILED TO DO THIS. No notice was ever sent to any of
the enumerated officers.
Court governs court procedures, including the rules on service of notices and
summons. The Cooperative Code on notices cannot replace the rules on
summons under the Rules of Court. Rule 14, Section 11 of the Rules of Court
provides an-exclusive enumeration of the persons authorized to receive
summons for juridical entities. These persons are the juridical entity's
president, managing partner, general 1 manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer, or in-house counsel.
The Cooperative Code provisions may govern matters relating to
cooperatives’ activities as administered by the Cooperative Development
Authority. However, they are not procedural rules that will govern court
processes. A Cooperative Code provision requiring cooperatives to have an
official address to which all notices and communications shall be sent cannot
take the place of the rules on summons under the Rules of Court concerning
a court proceeding.
Petitioner insists that it should not be made to inquire further as to the
whereabouts of respondent after the attempt to serve the summons by
registered mail to respondent’s address as allegedly indicated in its Articles
of Incorporation. The Rules does not provide that it needs to do so. However,
it provides for service by publication. Service by publication is available when
the whereabouts of the defendant is unknown.
Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 14. Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are
unknown. – In any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown
owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be
ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected
upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation and in such
places and for such time as the court may order.
This is not a matter of acquiring jurisdiction over the person of respondent
since this is an action in rem. In an action in rem, jurisdiction over the person
is not required as long as there is jurisdiction over the res. This case involves
the issue of fair play and ensuring that parties are accorded due process.
AM No. 11-3-6-SC; new rule on service of summons on foreign juridical
entities.
AM. No. 11-3-6-SC
AMENDMENT OF SECTION 12, RULE 14 •
OF THE RULES OF COURT ON SERVICE UPON
FOREIGN PRIVATE JURIDICAL ENTITY b) B y publication once in a newspaper of general

Section 12, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court is hereby amended to read circulation in the country where the defendant may be

as follows: found and by serving a copy of the summons and the

court order by-registered mail at the last known address

"SEC. 12. Service upon foreign private juridical entity. — of the defendant;

When the defendant is a foreign private juridical entity which

has transacted business in the Philippines, service may be made c) B y facsimile or any recognized electronic

on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that means that could generate proof of service; or

purpose, or, i f there be no such agent, on the government

official designated by law to that effect, or on any of its officers d) B y such other means as the court may in its

or agents within the Philippines. discretion direct."

If the foreign private juridical entity is not registered in This rule shall take effect fifteen (15) days after publication in a

the Philippines or has no resident agent, service may, with leave newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.

of court, be effected out of the Philippines through any of the

following means: RTC RAPID CITY VS. VILLA (petition for review on certiorari)

FACTS:

a) B y personal service coursed through the Sometime in 2004, Rapid City Realty and Development Corporation
(petitioner) filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of subdivision plans .
appropriate court in the foreign country with the . . mandamus and damages against several defendants including Spouses
assistance of the Department of Foreign Affairs; Orlando and Lourdes Villa (respondents).

After one failed attempt at personal service of summons, court process

server resorted to substituted service by serving summons upon
respondents’ househelp who did not acknowledge receipt thereof and
refused to divulge their names.
Despite substituted service, respondents failed to file their Answer,
prompting petitioner to file a "Motion to Declare Defendants[-herein
respondents] in Default" which the trial court granted by Order of May 3,
2005.
More than eight months thereafter respondents filed a Motion to Lift Order
of Default,3 claiming that on January 27, 2006 they "officially received all
pertinent papers such as Complaint and Annexes. And they denied the
existence of two women helpers who allegedly refused to sign and
acknowledge receipt of the summons. In any event, they contended that
assuming that the allegation were true, the helpers had no authority to
receive the documents.4
By Order the trial court set aside the Order of Default and gave herein
respondents five days to file their Answer. Respondents just the same did
not file an Answer, drawing petitioner to again file a Motion to declare them
in default, which the trial court again granted..
So, respondents filed an Omnibus Motion for reconsideration of the second
order declaring them in default and to vacate proceedings, this time claiming
that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons due to
invalid service of summons.
The trial court denied respondents’ Omnibus Motion by Order and
proceeded to receive ex-parte evidence for petitioner.
CA – annulled TC’s orders
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate
court by Resolution of August 12, 2008, it comes to the Court via petition for
review on certiorari, arguing in the main that respondents, in filing the first
Motion to Lift the Order of Default, voluntarily submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the court.
ISSUE: W/n the court acquires jurisdiction over the persons of the
defendants [respondents].
RULING: YES
The petition is impressed with merit.
It is settled that if there is no valid service of summons, the court can still
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by virtue of the latter’s
voluntary appearance. Thus Section 20 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance. – The defendant’s voluntary appearance in
the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a
motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the
person shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.
And Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Wilson Dy Hong Pi
and Lolita Dy, et al. enlightens:
Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either
by the coercive power of legal processes exerted over his person, or his
voluntary appearance in court. As a general proposition, one who seeks an
affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.
It is by reason of this rule that we have had occasion to declare that the filing
of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for
reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion
for reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the court’s
jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional
appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge,
among others, the court’s jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered
to have submitted to its authority.
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:
(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on
voluntary appearance;
(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of
the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal
manner; and
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of
the court, especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking
affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court for resolution.
Respondents did not, in said motion, allege that their filing thereof was a
special appearance for the purpose only to question the jurisdiction over
their persons. Clearly, they had acquiesced to the jurisdiction of the court.
G.R. No. L-68037 July 29, 1992
PARAMOUNT INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MAXIMO M. JAPZON, Presiding Judge, Br. 36, RTC, Manila; City Sheriff
and Deputy Sheriffs Nestor Macabilin & Teodoro Episcope, public
respondents, JOSE LARA and ARSENIO PAED, private respondents.
 petition for certiorari and prohibition
Jose Lara contracted the services of a passenger jeepney
 operated by Garcia
 Ford truck driven by Manuel hit and sideswept the said passenger
jeepney then driven by Macasieb
 (2) passengers of the jeepney, sustained physical injuries
The insurer of said truck is herein petitioner Paramount Surety and Insurance
Co. Inc.
Lara and Paed filed a criminal case against Manuel for Reckless Imprudence
resulting in Damage to Property
Lara and Paed filed on September 17, 1978 a civil case for damages docketed
as Civil Case No. 82-4416 against Garcia, Macasieb, Manuel, Natividad, and
impleaded Paramount,
a fire gutted the City Hall of Manila, reconstitution
the court reiterated its order before the reconstitution of the judicial records
declaring defendants Natividad, Manuel and Paramount in default in view of
their continued failure to appear during the trial of the case and allowed the
plaintiffs (Lara and Paed) to make a formal offer of exhibits and considered
the case submitted for decision. 1
Regional Trial Court of Manila – in favor of plaintiffs
copy of the said decision was served on the petitioner's counsel, Atty.
Segundo Gloria
NO appeal – final and exec
Paramount, now petitioner, filed a motion to set aside the Decision
Issue: w/n court validly acquired jurisdiction over petitioner despite the
appearance of Atty. Segundo M. Gloria who allegedly was not retained or
authorized to file an answer for it.
Petitioner : not having been validly served with summons and a copy of the
complaint nor did it actively participate in the said proceedings.
SC: The petition is devoid of merit.
Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases is acquired either
by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by
service of summons. The service of summons is intended to give notice to the
defendant or respondent that an action has been commenced against it. The
defendant or respondent is thus put on guard as to the demands of the
plaintiff or the petitioner.
although petitioner questioned the propriety of the service of summons, it
however failed to substantiate its allegation that it was not properly served
with summons. Hence, the disputable presumption that official duty has
been regularly performed prevails.
all the pleadings, including the answer with crossclaim and counterclaim filed
by Atty. Segundo Gloria stated that he represented the defendants
Natividad, Manuel and Paramount. In fact, he even filed a notice of
appearance informing the court that he is representing the said defendants.
this is not the first time petitioner raised the issue of warrant of jurisdiction
"the mere filling of the answer with crossclaim raised a presumption of
authority to appear for petitioner Paramount Insurance Corporation . . . in
accordance with Section 21, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Such presumption
is rebuttable, but only by clear and positive proof.
strains credulity that a counsel who has no personal interest in the case would
fight for and defend a case with persistence and vigor if he has not been
authorized or employed by the party concerned
took Paramount almost six years to question the jurisdiction of the lower
court.
Boticano vs Chu
petition for review on certiorar
Boticano owned a truck which was bumped by another truck owned by Chu.
Chuagreed to shoulder the repairs but he didn’t fulfill this obligation.
Boticano filed fordamages. ), filed a complaint at the Court of First Instance
of Nueva Ecija against private respondent Manuel Chu, Jr. (truck owner) and
Jaime Sigua (his driver) both as defendants i
Summons was issued on December 12, 1977 but was returned unserved for
defendant Jaime Sigua because he was no longer connected with San Pedro
Saw Mill, Guagua, Pampanga, while another copy of the summons for Manuel
Chu, Jr. was returned duly served on him thru his wife Veronica Chu at his
dwelling house.
On the trial, Chu failed to file a responsive pleading which prompted
Boticano to ask the Court to declare Chu in default.
The Trial Court rendered adecision against Chu and ordered him to pay
Boticano.
Chu filed an appeal alleginglack of jurisdiction for the failure to serve
summons. It turns out that the summons was given to his wife (substituted
service) and not to him personally.
CA - trial Court had no jurisdiction and declared the Trial Court declaration
void.
n. The bone of contention appears to be in the manner of service of said
summons on the wife of private respondent at their dwelling instead of on
private respondent himself personally.
The principal issue in this case is whether Chu can raise the issue of
jurisdiction(because of the alleged failure to serve summons) FOR THE FIRST
TIME ON APPEAL.
indicative of waiver - failure to raise the question of jurisdiction in the Court
of First Instance and at the first opportunity. I
The Court in here said that since Boticano presented himself on appeal, that
became summons for him and thus voluntary appearance worked as
summons. Inaddition to this, he filed many motions and pleadings(t. He filed
a Notice of Appeal, Appeal Bond, Motion for Extension of Time to File
Record on Appeal, Record on Appeal, Motion for Withdrawal of
Appearance, Notice of Appearance and Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to
Dismiss Appeal and for Issuance of a Writ of Execution.) in said appeal. It
was wrongfor the CA to say that the there was no jurisdiction over him given
all these
Section 23, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, the defendant's voluntary
appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service.
Default Issu:
if the defendant in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) has been declared in
default, may he appeal the default judgment that may subsequently be
rendered even if he has not asked the RTC to set aside the declaration of
default? The answer is in the affirmative.
However a distinction must be made as to the effects of such appeal.
(a) If an appeal is made without first asking the RTC to set aside the
declaration of default, and the appellate court sets aside on said declaration,
all he can get is a review of the RTC's default judgment without the
opportunity of having the higher court consider defense evidence (for the
simple reason that no evidence was even adduced by him in the RTC) (See
Rule 41, sec. 2, par. 3, Rules of Court).
(b) If upon the other hand, the defendant first asks the RTC to set aside
the declaration of default (See Rule 18, secs. 2 and 3, Rules of Court), and he
is able to prevail, the declaration win be set aside, and he will now have the
opportunity to present his evidence in the RTC. Thus, even if he finally loses
in the RTC's subsequent decision, his defense can be considered, when appeal
is made to the appellate tribunal. Of course, even if the default declaration is
not set aside despite his motion for the setting aside, he will be entitled to all
notices in the court proceedings, and can file any pleading he may wish to
file, including the notice of appeal. (See Rule 13, sec. 9, Rules of Court).
Finally in a last ditch effort, private respondent insists that there was no valid
service of summons because private respondent is a partner and general
manager in San Pedro Sawmill. Consequently the wife of private respondent
to whom summons and complaint were allegedly served not being
partnership, cannot receive the same under Section 13 of Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court.
It has however been settled that actions must be brought by the real parties
in interest and against the persons who are bound by the judgment obtained
therein. (Salmon and Pacific Commercial Company v. Tan Cueco, 36 Phil. 557-
558 [1917]).
The title of the case both in the trial court, in the Court of Appeals and in this
Court shows that the partnership is not a party. On the contrary, as
previously stated private respondent himself assumed the responsibility of
the accident and is now estopped to disclaim the liabilities pertaining thereto.
From what has been discussed the following conclusions are hereby made:
jurisdiction was properly acquired by the trial court over the person of
respondent thru both service of summons and voluntary appearance in
court; he was therefore properly declared in default for not having filed any
answer; despite respondent's failure to file a motion to set aside the
declaration of default, he has the right to appeal the default judgment but
in the appeal only the evidence of the petitioner may be considered,
respondent not having adduced any defense evidence; We agree with the
findings of fact by the trial court, the same being unrebutted.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are
REVERSED a
PAN-ASIATIC TRAVEL CORP., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. AMANTE S. PURISIMA, as Presiding Judge, Court
of First Instance of Manila, Branch VII, CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA, and
DESTINATIONS TRAVEL PHIL., INC.
DESTINATIONS) filed a complaint against Pan-Asiatic Travel Corp.
 refund of the price of alleged unutilized airplane tickets
DESTINATIONS filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default.
PAN-ASIATIC, by way of special appearance, filed a Motion to Dismiss for the
sole purpose of objecting to the trial court's jurisdiction over its person on
the ground that it was not properly served with summons.
, DESTINATIONS filed on June 25, 1980 an amended complaint increasing its
claim
Subsequently, a copy of the amended complaint and summons were served
on PAN-ASIATIC. PAN-ASIATIC filed several motions for extension of time
within which to file its answer. However, instead of filing an Answer, it filed
a Motion for Bill of Particulars which was granted by the trial court.
DESTINATIONS did not file a Bill of Particulars. Instead, on May 9, 1981, it
served and filed a Motion to Admit attached "Second Amended Complaint"
 admitted by the trial judge in an order
o order served on petitioner
 no new summons was served on petitioner.
Motion to Declare Defendant in Default which was granted.
 trial was held ex parte
the trial court rendered judgment by default against PAN-ASIATIC
petitioner filed its Omnibus Motion to Lift Order of Default and to Vacate
Judgment by Default,
 alleging that the trial court's decision was rendered without
jurisdiction because petitioner was never served with summons on
the Second Amended Complaint, and that it was deprived of its day
 in court on account of fraud, accident, mistake and/or excusable
negligence.
TC – denied; MR – withdraw – notice of appeal instead
CA – dismissed appeal - final and executory and that the appeal was filed
beyond the reglementary period.
Petitioner: contends that the Second Amended Complaint introduced new
causes of action not alleged in the original nor in the first amended
complaint. Hence, it is argued that new summons had to be served on
petitioner, for the court to acquire jurisdiction over its (petitioner's) person.
SC: The Second Amended Complaint does introduce new causes of action.
 the total amount of the claims was the same
But was there need to serve new summons on PAN-ASIATIC?
Atkins Case: Rule on service of amended complaint (w/ new COA)
 if the defendant had appeared in the action, service of an amended
complaint (which introduces a new cause of action) in the same
manner as any other pleading or motion is sufficient, even if no new
summons is served.
o ordinary service of that pleading upon him, personally or by
mail, would be sufficient, and no new summons need be
served upon him.
 If he (defendant) had not yet appeared, a new summons must be
served upon him
CAB
-summons on the first amended complaint was properly served on PAN-
ASIATIC.
PAN-ASIATIC had effectively appeared in the case and voluntarily submitted
itself to the jurisdiction of the court. Hence, no new summons on the Second
Amended Complaint was necessary, ordinary service being sufficient.
trial court was correct in declaring the company in default, in holding trial ex
parte, and in eventually rendering judgment by default.
SANDOVAL V HRET
Petition for Certiorari
Was substituted service of summons validly effected on herein petitioner
Federico S. Sandoval II in the election protest filed by herein respondent
Aurora Rosario A. Oreta before the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET)?
Petitioner Sandoval and respondent Oreta were candidates for the lone
congressional district of Malabon-Navotas during the 14 May 2001 national
elections.
Oreta filed with HRET an election protest against petitioner, docketed as
HRET Case No. 01-027. The protest assailed the alleged electoral frauds and
anomalies in one thousand three hundred eight (1,308) precincts of the
Malabon-Navotas District.[3] On 4 June 2001 HRET issued the corresponding
summons for service upon petitioner.
HRET Process Server Pacifico Lim served the summons by substituted service
upon a certain Gene Maga who signed the process server's copy of the
summons and indicated thereon his position as "maintenance" along with
the date and time of his receipt

HRET issued Resolution No. 01-081 which took note of petitioner Sandoval's
failure to file an answer to the election protest within ten (10) days from
date of service of the summons on 7 June 2001 and entered in his behalf a
general denial of the allegations set forth in the protest.[7] The HRET also
ordered the parties to proceed to preliminary conference.[8] On 18 July 2001
the HRET ordered both petitioner and respondent to file their respective
preliminary conference briefs.[9] Petitioner received the order on 20 July
2001 as shown by the rubber stamp bearing his name and his district office
in Navotas and indicating the time and date of receipt as well as the person
with corresponding position, i.e., administrative staff, who received the
order.[10] Initially, on 1 August 2001, it was only respondent Oreta who filed
the required preliminary conference brief.[11]
instead of filing a preliminary conference brief, petitioner moved for
reconsideration of Resolution No. 01-081 and prayed for the admission of
his answer with counter-protest.[12] He argued that the substituted service
of summons upon him was improperly effected upon a maintenance man
Gene Maga who was "neither a regular employee nor responsible officer at
[petitioner's] office."[13] In Resolution No. 01-118, the HRET denied
reconsideration of the assailed resolution and admission of petitioner's
answer with counter-protest.[14]
Solicitor General found that the substituted service of summons upon
petitioner was faulty and thus recommended favorable action on the
petition.
SC: agree with the Solicitor General.
1. hat this Court may very well inquire into jurisdictional issues
concerning the HRET
 he delicate nature and the gravity of the charge, the
observance of the HRET Rules of Procedure, in conjunction
with our own Rules of Court, must be taken seriously
Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide -
Sec. 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable, the summons
shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if
he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
Sec. 7. Substituted service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot
be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section,
service may be effected
(a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence
with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or
(b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of
business with some competent person in charge thereof.
We find no merit in respondent Oreta's austere argument that personal
service need not be exhausted before substituted service may be used since
time in election protest cases is of the essence. Precisely, time in election
protest cases is very critical so all efforts must be realized to serve the
summons and a copy of the election protest by the means most likely to
reach the protestee.
Based on the records of the case, summons was received by a Gene Maga of
the Maintenance, District Office on June 7, 2001 at 1:25 p.m. On July 27,
2001, an Affidavit of Service, attached to the Tribunals receiving copy of the
summons, was jointly executed by Process Server Pacifico Lim and
Accounting Clerk Aurora Napolis. This Affidavit of Service states that Pacifico
Lim found a certain Gene Maga at Protestees district office who identified
himself as a member of the staff of Protestee and thus, Pacifico Lim left the
summons with him (Maga). This Affidavit likewise stated that after Pacifico
Lim left the Tribunal premises to serve the summons to Protestee, Aurora
Napolis talked to Primitivo P. Reyes, a congressional staff of Protestees
father, Rep. Vicente A. Sandoval, who came to the HRET and who assured
that there was somebody at Protestees district office who could receive the
summons. On June 16, 2001 or on the 9th day from June 7, 2001, the Chief
of Staff of Protestee at the House of Representatives inquired by telephone
with the Office of the Secretary of the Tribunal as to the last day for Protestee
to file his answer x x x x There was valid service of summons effected on
Protestee. Pacifico Lim attested to the fact that he found Gene Maga at
Protestees district office during office hours, i.e., 1:25 p.m., who presented
himself as Protestees staff at said office. The tribunal finds no fault on the
part of its process server in effecting substituted service through Gene Maga.
Affid- gives only barren details
The HRET findings were instead based on the 27 July 2001 joint affidavit of
Process Server Pacifico Lim and Accounting Clerk Aurora Napolis executed
long after the summons was served on 7 June 2001. The joint affidavit is
clearly not the officer's return referred to in the rules on substituted service
of summons but a specie of evidence aliunde generally inadmissible to prove
compliance with the requirements of substituted service unless under
exceptional circumstances, which were nowhere in this case.
It is truly unfortunate that the purported substituted service of summons
upon petitioner Sandoval was irregularly executed. Except for the time and
place of service and the signature of the "maintenance" man who received
the summons, there is absolutely nothing in the process server's affidavit of
service indicating the impossibility of personal service of summons upon
petitioner within a reasonable time. We can take judicial notice of the fact
that petitioner is a very visible and active member of Congress such that to
effect personal service upon him, all it would have taken the process server
was a few hours more of a little extra work. Regrettably, the affidavit of
service, indeed the entire record of this case, does not specify the efforts
exerted to serve the summons personally upon petitioner. Upon this ground
alone, the assailed service of summons should already fail miserably.
Gene Maga, the recipient of the summons, was merely a "maintenance" man
who offered his services not only to petitioner but to anyone who was so
minded to hire his assistance.
freelance service contractor, not as employee of petitioner Sandoval,
Granting that Gene Maga was an employee of petitioner at his district office,
an assumption that we stress is contrary to the evidence on record, still it
cannot be said that he was qualified to receive the summons. To be a
"competent" person to receive the summons means that he should be "duly
qualified" and "having sufficient capacity, ability or authority."[31] In
Keister v. Navarro[32] we set out the qualifications of the persons designated
by the Rules of Court to whom copies of the process may be left: "The rule
presupposes that such a relation of confidence exists between the person
with whom the copy is left and the defendant and, therefore, assumes that
such person will deliver the process to defendant or in some way give him
notice thereof."
As "maintenance" man, it is reasonable to assume that Gene Maga was not
tasked to deal with or handle documents flowing in and out of petitioner's
office. He may have been very efficient in tinkering with the light bulbs of the
district office or plugging leaking water pipes, but it is also reasonable for
anyone to assume, especially the process server who must have been
oriented about the requirements of substituted service, that petitioner could
not have reposed such confidence in Maga to accept official documents for
the district office or to turn over as a matter of course documents that he
would have received. Clearly, in being assigned to do maintenance work and
by ordinary human understanding, Maga could not be presumed to
appreciate the importance of the papers delivered to him. With due diligence
which the process server ought to have exercised, he would not have been
oblivious to this delineation of tasks.
Moreover, by virtue of his functions and presumed expertise, the process
server could have easily discerned the absence of authority on the part of
Maga to receive documents from the very informal manner by which he
received the summons, i.e., he merely wrote his name and signed the
receiving copy of the summons and indicated therein his humble position.
This unceremonious receipt of the important summons is in stark contrast
with the manner by which the same process server secured the proof of
receipt by petitioner's district office of the HRET Order of 18 July 2001 which
was done by rubber stamp bearing the name of petitioner and his district
office in Navotas and indicating the time and date of receipt as well as the
person with corresponding position, i.e., administrative staff, who received
the order.
Not only was Gene Maga an incompetent person to receive the summons, he
was also, more plainly, not in charge of petitioners office. To be "in charge"
means to have "care and custody of, under control of, or entrusted to the
management or direction of."[35] Applied to the instant case, Maga had
obviously no control and management of the district office as noticeably
shown by his occupation as "maintenance" man. While it is not necessary that
the person in charge of a defendant's regular place of business be specially
authorized to receive summons, it being enough that he appears to be in
charge,[36] we do not think that anyone, more so the process server, would
be led to believe that Maga has been entrusted the management of office
records to ensure the smooth flow of important documents therein. As in Far
Corporation v. Francisco,[37] no one would think that Maga was so
"integrated" in the responsibilities and duties of petitioner as Congressman
for Malabon-Navotas to make it a priori supposable that he would realize and
know what should be done with any legal papers served on him. We would
not dare establish a precedent whereby any employee or anyone who
pretends to be an employee, although found in the office of his employer,
could validly receive summons for him.
We also do not find any evidence aliunde to prove the requisites of a valid
substituted service of summons. The process server or any other responsible
HRET employee did not present evidence confirming the necessity for such
method of serving the summons nor exhibiting the authority of Maga, the
"maintenance" man, to receive the document. There is also nothing in this
case to prove, under the rules of evidence consistently relied upon by
HRET,[38] that anyone with whom petitioner had a relationship of confidence
knew of the outstanding summons and pending election protest to have
ensured petitioner's receipt or at least notification thereof.
Oaminal vs Castillo
Oaminal vs Castillo : 152776 : October 8, 2003
FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for collection against respondents with
the RTC. The summons together with the complaint was served upon the
secretary of respondent. Respondents filed their ‘Urgent Motion to Declare
Service of Summons Improper and Legally Defective’ alleging that the
Sheriff’s Return has failed to comply on substituted service of summons but
said motion was not heard due to the Judge’s absence. Petitioner then filed
an Omnibus Motion to Declare [Respondents] in Default and to Render
Judgment because no answer [was] filed by [the latter]. The respondents filed
Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam to Admit Motion to Dismiss and Answer with.
The judge denied [respondents’] Motion to Dismiss, and admitted [their]
Answer. However six months after admitting their answer, the judge ruled
that [respondents’] ‘Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam to Admit Motion to
Dismiss and Answer with Counterclaim’ was filed outside the period to file
answer, hence he (1) denied the Motion to Admit Motion to Dismiss and
Answer; (2) declared [respondents] in default; and (3) ordered [petitioner] to
present evidence ex-parte within ten days from receipt of [the] order, [failing]
which, the case will be dismissed.
ISSUE: WON respondents were properly declared in default?
HELD: NO. Respondents herein were declared in default by the trial court on
May 22, 2001, purportedly because of their delay in filing an answer. Its
unexpected volte face came six months after it had ruled to admit their
Answer on November 16, 2000. Indiana Aerospace University v. Commission
on Higher Education held that no practical purpose was served in declaring
the defendants in default when their Answer had already been filed — albeit
after the 15-day period, but before they were declared as such. Applying that
ruling to the present case, we find that respondents were, therefore,
imprudently declared in default.
Oaminal vs Castillo
Oaminal vs Castillo : 152776 : October 8, 2003
Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for collection against respondents with
the RTC. The summons together with the complaint was served upon the
secretary of respondent. Respondents filed their ‘Urgent Motion to Declare
Service of Summons Improper and Legally Defective’ alleging that the
Sheriff’s Return has failed to comply on substituted service of summons but
said motion was not heard due to the Judge’s absence.
Petitioner then filed an Omnibus Motion to Declare [Respondents] in
Default and to Render Judgment because no answer [was] filed by [the
latter].
The respondents filed Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam to Admit Motion to
Dismiss and Answer with.  denied [respondents’] Motion to Dismiss, and
admitted [their] Answer.
However six months after admitting their answer, the judge ruled that
[respondents’] ‘Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam to Admit Motion to Dismiss
and Answer with Counterclaim’ was filed outside the period to file answer,
hence he (1) denied the Motion to Admit Motion to Dismiss and Answer; (2)
declared [respondents] in default; and (3) ordered [petitioner] to present
evidence ex-parte within ten days from receipt of [the] order, [failing] which,
the case will be dismissed.
respondents filed with the CA a Petition for certiorari
CA- CA ruled that the trial court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over
respondents, because the summons had been improperly served on them.
- sheriffs Return, which did not contain any averment that effort had been
exerted
ISSUE: WON proper subs SOS?
HELD:
For substituted service of summons to be valid, it is necessary to establish the
following circumstances:
(a) personal service of summons within a reasonable time was impossible;
(b) efforts were exerted to locate the party; and
(c) the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion
residing at the partys residence or upon a competent person in charge of the
partys office or regular place of business.[8] It is likewise required that the
pertinent facts proving these circumstances are stated in the proof of service
or officers return.
present case, the Sheriffs Return[9] failed to state that efforts had been made
to personally serve the summons on respondents. Neither did the Return
indicate that it was impossible to do so within a reasonable time.
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on the 30th day of May 2000, copies of the
summons together with the complaint and annexes attached thereto
were served upon the defendants Pablito M. Castillo and Guia B.
Castillo at their place of business at No. 7, 21st Avenue, Cubao,
 Quezon City thru MS. ESTER FREGINAL, secretary, who is authorized
to receive such kind of process. She signed in receipt of the original as
evidenced by her signature appearing on the original summons.
That this return is submitted to inform the Honorable x x x Court that
the same was duly served.[10]
volte face came six months after it had ruled to admit their Answer on
November 16, 2000. Indiana Aerospace University v. Commission on Higher
Education held that no practical purpose was served in declaring the
defendants in default when their Answer had already been filed — albeit after
the 15-day period, but before they were declared as such. Applying that
ruling to the present case, we find that respondents were, therefore,
imprudently declared in default.

The defendants actual receipt of the summons satisfied the requirements

of procedural due process

x x x x x x x x x[16]

Verily, respondents did not raise in their Motion to Dismiss the issue of
jurisdiction over their persons; they raised only improper venue and litis
pendentia. Hence, whatever defect there was in the manner of service should
be deemed waived.

Voluntary Appearance and Submission

Assuming arguendo that the service of summons was defective, such flaw
was cured and respondents are deemed to have submitted themselves to
the jurisdiction of the trial court when they filed an Omnibus Motion to
Admit the Motion to Dismiss and Answer with Counterclaim, an Answer
with Counterclaim, a Motion to Inhibit, and a Motion for Reconsideration
and Plea to Reset Pre-trial. The filing of Motions seeking affirmative relief --
to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a
default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration
-- are considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.[18]
Having invoked the trial courts jurisdiction to secure affirmative relief,
respondents cannot -- after failing to obtain the relief prayed for -- repudiate
the very same authority they have invoked.

Respondents herein were declared in default by the trial court on May 22,
2001, purportedly because of their delay in filing an answer. Its unexpected