ASTURIAS SUGAR CENTRAL, INC. v.
By reason
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and CTA
September 30, 1969CASTRO, J.
Facts:
Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. is engaged in the production and
milling of centrifugal sugar, the sugar so produced being
placed in containers known as jute bags. In 1957, It made
two importations of jute bags, free from customs duties and
special import tax upon the Petitioner’s filing of re-
exportation and special import tax bond, conditioned upon
the exportation of the jute bags within one year from the
date of importation.
However, out of the 44,800 jute bags imported first, only
8,647 were exported and only 25,000 were exported out of
the 75,200 jute bags imported on the second shipment. In
other words, of the total number of imported jute bags only
33,647 bags were exported within one year after their
importation. The remaining 86,353 bags were exported
after the expiration of the one-year period but within three
years from their importation.
Petitioner requested the Commissioner of Customs for a
week's extension of Re-exportation and Special Import Tax
Bond no. 6 which was to expire the following day, citing
reasons for its failure to export the remaining jute bags
within the period of one year. However, this request was
denied by the Commissioner.
Due to the petitioner's failure to show proof of the
exportation of the balance of 86,353 jute bags within one
year from their importation, the Petitioner was required to
pay the amount of p28,629.42 representing the customs
duties and special import tax due thereon, which the
petitioner paid under protest and later on demanded the
refund of the amount it had paid.
Issues:
a.) Whether or not the Commissioner of Customs is vested
with discretion to extend the period of one year provided
for in section 23 of the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909.
b.) Whether or not interpretation or construction of an
ambiguous or uncertain statute by the Executive
Department or other Administrative Agencies be given
consideration? In the case at bar, the Bureau of Customs.
Held:
a.) Section 23 of the Philippine Tariff Act Of 1909 and the
superseding sec. 105(x) of the Tariff and Customs Code,
while fixing at one year the period within which the
containers therein mentioned must be exported, are silent
as to whether the said period may be extended.
of this silence, the Bureau of Customs Issued Administrative
Orders 389 and 66 to eliminate confusion and provide a
guide as to how it shall apply the law, and, more specifically,
to make officially known its policy to consider the one-year
period mentioned in the law as non-extendible.
b.) Considering that the statutory provisions in question
(Section 23 of the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909 and Sec.
105(x) of the Tariff and Customs Code) have not been the
subject of previous judicial interpretation, then the
application of the doctrine of "judicial respect for
administrative construction (in the case at bar the Bureau
of Customs issued Administrative Orders 389 and 66 to
eliminate confusion and provide a guide as to how it shall
apply the law, and, more specifically, to make officially
known its policy to consider the one-year period mentioned
in the law as non-extendible., " would, initially, be in order.
Only where the court of last resort has not previously
interpreted the statute is the rule applicable that courts will
give consideration to construction by administrative or
executive departments of the state.
The formal or informal interpretation or practical
construction of an ambiguous or uncertain statute or law by
the executive department or other agency charged with its
administration or enforcement is entitled to consideration
and the highest respect from the courts, and must be
accorded appropriate weight in determining the meaning of
the law, especially when the construction or interpretation
is long continued and uniform or is contemporaneous with
the first workings of the statute, or when the enactment of
the statute was suggested by such agency.
Considering that the Bureau of Customs is the office
charged with implementing and enforcing the provisions of
our Tariff and Customs Code, the construction placed by it
thereon should be given controlling weight.
In applying the doctrine or principle of respect for
administrative or practical construction, the courts often
refer to several factors which may be regarded as bases of
the principle, as factors leading the courts to give the
principle controlling weight in particular instances, or as
independent rules in themselves. These factors are the
respect due the governmental agencies charged with
administration, their competence, expertness, experience,
and informed judgment and the fact that they frequently
are the drafters of the law they interpret; that the agency is
the one on which the legislature must rely to advise it as to
the practical working out of the statute, and practical
application of the statute presents the agency with unique
opportunity and experiences for discovering deficiencies,
inaccuracies, or improvements in the statute.
PEREZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
PETITIONER: Salvador Perez and Juanita Apostol
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Sandiganbayan (2nd Div), and the
People of the Philippines, represented by Office
of the Special Prosecutor
SUMMARY: Salvador and Juanita are Mayor and Treasurer
of San Manuel, Pangasinan, respectively. They “willfully,
unlawfully, and criminally caused the purchase of 1
computer unit costing P120,000
acquisition by personal canvass,” violating Sec. 362 and 367
of the LGC. No public bidding occurred and
no Committee of Awards was constituted to approve the
procurement Salvador and Juanita gave Mobil
Link Enterprises/Starlet Sales Center undue advantage or
preference through manifest partiality,
showing evident bad faith and gross, inexcusable
negligence, but this was not included in the original
information, so it was recommended by the Special
Prosecutor that the information be amended to show
the manner of the commission of the offense, based on the
Ombudsman’s margin notes in the original
information. The amended information was admitted. The
petitioners challenge this, saying that the
Sandiganbayan committed GAD in accepting the amended
information, which had no approval from the Ombudsman,
amounting to denial of due process. The SC granted the
petition.
DOCTRINE: The Ombudsman may delegate powers to the
Office of the Special Prosecutor, but such
delegation must be shown by clear intent. T
he Ombudsman’s power of control would be seriously
hampered if the former were authorized to file
informations in the first instance. This is because while the
Ombudsman has full discretion to determine whether or
not a criminal case should be filed in the Sandiganbayan.
Once the case has been filed with said court, it is the
Sandiganbayan, and no longer the Ombudsman, which has
full control of the case so much so that the informations
may not be dismissed, without the approval of the said
court.
FACTS:
1.We took up this case before. That is a fact.
ISSUES: Whether or not the Office of the Special
Prosecutor has the power to file informations
without delegation from the Ombudsman.
HELD/RATIO:
NO. The Ombudsman’s margin
notes order was to "study whether the accused,
assuming arguendo that there was no overprice,
gave unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference to the
seller of the subject computer”
and “submit your recommendation soonest.”
It is clear that the recommendation must
be submitted to one who has authority to
implement such recommendation. The
Ombudsman has the power to file informations,
as well as the power to delegate his powers.
Office Order No. 40-05 delegates the disposition
of administrative and criminal cases (filing
informations) to the Deputy Ombudsman, but
NOT the Special Prosecutor (which is included in
the Office of the Ombudsman). All that is
delegated to the Special Prosecutor is the
discretional authority to review and modify the
Deputy Ombudsman-authorized information, but
without departing from the basic resolution.
Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor are given the same rank and salary
(RA 6770), but they do NOT have the same
functions.
Since there is no express delegation, the
Court looked into whether or not there was an
implied delegation. RA 6770 provides that the
powers of the OSP include: conducting
preliminary investigations and prosecute
criminal cases w/in jurisdiction of
Sandiganbayan, enter into plea-bargaining
agreements, and perform other duties assigned
by Ombudsman. Respondents argue the doctrine
of Qualified Political Agency, saying that since
the amended information has not been
disapproved by the Ombudsman, it has his tacit
approval. The SC said no. This doctrine does not
apply to the Office of the Ombudsman, which is
an apolitical agency.
Granted, this is a procedural defect and
the OSP’s Memorandum (amended info) may
later be approved by the Ombudsman.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for
Certiorari is GRANTED.
UNIVERSITY OF NUEVA CANCERES VS.
MARTINEZ
On June 17, 1969, respondent University of Nueva
Caceres Guardians Union filed with the Bicol
branch of respondent Court of Industrial Relations
(CIR) an unfair labor practice charge against
petitioners accompanied by the joint affidavit of
Benito de la Paz and George Offemaria. At the
hearing of said charge before the prosecutor of
the CIR, petitioners moved to dismiss the same on
the grounds: (1) it is not verified; (2) it does not
specify the particular provisions of Section 4 (a) of
the Industrial Peace Act, RA 875, as amended,
supposed to have been violated, and (3) the
supporting joint affidavit contains "falsities,
misstatements and improbabilities on points
otherwise material to the charge." Instead of
dismissing the charge, the prosecutor, although
finding the grounds of the dismissal motion to be
more or less plausible, granted respondent Union
five (5) days "to file an amended charge and
amended affidavit," which said Union did on July
8, 1969. On July 14, 1969, petitioners moved to
reconsider the ruling of the prosecutor, but on
July 30, 1969, respondent Presiding Judge denied
the same, admitted the amended charge and
directed the Court Prosecutor to set the said
amended charge for preliminary investigation. On
August 16, 1969, petitioners moved again for
reconsideration of the order of July 30, 1969.
Apparently, petitioners assumed their motion for
reconsideration would be acted upon by the court
en banc, for when on October 6, 1969, respondent
Judge issued an order, signed by him alone,
denying it, the present petition was filed charging
said respondent with having acted in excess of
jurisdiction in acting on a matter addressed to and
within the jurisdiction of the CIR en banc and of
grave abuse of discretion in not ordering the
dismissal of the charge upon the grounds invoked
by them.
The assertion by respondent Judge, implicit in his
order of October 6, 1969, of jurisdiction, to the
exclusion of the court en banc, over the matter
herein involved cannot be sustained. It is Our
considered view that unlike the preliminary
investigation of criminal cases by fiscals which are
under the supervision and control of the Secretary
of Justice,1 the peculiar procedure prescribed by
law in unfair labor practices partakes of the nature
of judicial investigations, since they are
conducted, to quote the language of the law, by
"the Court or any agency or agent designated by
the Court", (Section 5 (b), Rep. Act 875) similarly
to the preliminary investigations undertaken by
courts of first instance in election cases2 and
charges of violation of the Anti-Subversion
Act.3 Surely, no one can pretend that in such
preliminary investigations, the courts of first
instance are performing administrative or non-
judicial functions. In such cases, the courts act in
the same judicial capacity as they do in trying the
cases on the merits and cannot, in any respect or
measure, be controlled by the Secretary of Justice.
The fact that the law authorizes the CIR to
delegate the investigation to "any agency or agent
designated by the Court" does not alter the nature
of the court's function in the premises, just as the
appointment of commissioners by the courts
under Rule 34 does not make the procedure
administrative or less judicial. Indeed, under the
provision aforementioned, the investigation could
very well be assigned to one of the judges of the
CIR, and in that event, how can it be maintained
that the function is administrative? Withal, it is
implicit in this procedure that the work of the
"agency or agent designated by Court" is as much
the responsibility of the court as if it were the
court itself that were acting directly.
The contention of respondent Judge that the
function of overseering the Prosecution Division
of the CIR in its work of filing and dismissing
charges of unfair labor practice is purely
administrative in nature and falls within his
exclusive competence is without merit. It is true
that reference to the court in the law must be
construed to mean the Presiding Judge and not
the court en banc when the action contemplated
is purely administrative in character, but,
precisely, the point missed is that, as already
explained, the Industrial Peace Act does not
consider the investigation by the CIR, either by
itself or thru an agent, as an administrative matter
but a judicial one like the preliminary
investigations in election and anti-subversion
cases.
Maybe the development in the United States
recounted by respondent Judge whereby the Taft-
Hartley Law transferred from the National Labor
Relations Board to its General Counsel the
exclusive function and power to determine with
finality whether or not an unfair labor practice
charge should be filed with the Board is good, in
the sense of avoiding that the Board be the
accuser, investigator and judge all rolled into one,
but there is nothing in either Commonwealth Act
103 or the Industrial Peace Act indicating that the
American experience has influenced the
enactment and phraseology of the pertinent
provisions of our laws. Quite on the contrary, as
already pointed out, Section 5(b) of RA 875 very
explicitly confers the function of investigating
unfair labor charges upon the CIR itself, albeit it
allows the court to designate any other agency or
agent for the purpose.
As regards the other impugned order of July 30,
1969, the result of the foregoing discussion and
ruling is that the same should first be submitted to
the CIR en banc for appropriate action. Much as
the writer of this opinion feels that the objections
thereto raised by petitioners are rather strained
and are not very consistent with the interests of
justice, which would not permit the throwing out
of an unfair labor practice charge merely because
of non-jurisdictional defects which can anyway be
corrected, the Court would not pre-empt the
power of the CIR en banc to make the
corresponding ruling relative thereto in the first
instance.
Before closing, it might be stated that, to be sure,
the creation of the National Labor Relations
Commission, may have altered the procedure in
cases involving alleged unfair labor practices, but
that point is not and cannot be raised anymore in
this proceeding and We do not consider it
necessary to pass on it now.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and
prohibition insofar as the assailed order of July 30,
1969 is concerned is denied, without prejudice to
the appropriate action on petitioners' motion for
reconsideration thereof by the CIR en banc, but
the petition for certiorari and mandamus relative
to the impugned order of respondent Presiding
Judge of October 6, 1969 is granted, the said order
is hereby declared null and void and set aside, as
in excess of jurisdiction, and respondent Presiding
Judge or whoever is acting in his stead is ordered
to refer the motion for reconsideration of
petitioners dated August 16, 1969 to the CIR en
banc for appropriate action. The writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the Court on
November 24, 1969 is made permanent, without
prejudice to the resolution by the CIR of
petitioners' motion for reconsideration just
referred to. The manifestation of Acting Presiding
Judge Ansberto Paredes to the effect that he has
desisted and continues to desist from following
the practice of former Presiding Judge Martinez
declared illegal in this decision is noted. Costs
against private respondents.
VINZON-CHATO VS. FORTUNE TOBACCO
This is a case for damages under Article 32 of the Civil
Code filed by Fortune against Liwayway as CIR.
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which
provided that locally manufactured cigarettes which are
currently classified and taxed at 55% shall be charged an
ad valorem tax of “55% provided that the maximum tax
shall not be less than Five Pesos per pack.” Prior to
effectivity of RA 7654, Liwayway issued a rule,
reclassifying “Champion,” “Hope,” and “More” (all
manufactured by Fortune) as locally manufactured
cigarettes bearing foreign brand subject to the 55% ad
valorem tax. Thus, when RA 7654 was passed, these
cigarette brands were already covered.
In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune
contended that the issuance of the rule violated its
constitutional right against deprivation of property
without due process of law and the right to equal
protection of the laws.
For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to
dismiss that respondent has no cause of action against her
because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her
official function and within the scope of her authority. She
claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic
and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts.
She also contended that the complaint states no cause of
action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith.
The order denying the motion to dismiss was elevated to
the CA, who dismissed the case on the ground that under
Article 32, liability may arise even if the defendant did not
act with malice or bad faith.
Hence this appeal.
ISSUES:
 Whether or not a public officer may be validly
sued in his/her private capacity for acts done
in connection with the discharge of the
functions of his/her office
  Whether or not Article 32, NCC, should be legal right; that is, liability in tort in not precluded by the
applied instead of Sec. 38, Book I, fact that defendant acted without evil intent.
Administrative Code

HELD:

On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is
not liable for damages which a person may suffer arising
from the just performance of his official duties and within
the scope of his assigned tasks. An officer who acts within
his authority to administer the affairs of the office which
he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have been
caused to another, as it would virtually be a charge against
the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for
monetary claims without its consent. However, a public
officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her
personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being
outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected
by the mantle of immunity for official actions.
Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code,
civil liability may arise where there is bad faith, malice, or
gross negligence on the part of a superior public officer.
And, under Sec. 39 of the same Book, civil liability may
arise where the subordinate public officer’s act is
characterized by willfulness or negligence. In Cojuangco,
Jr. V. CA, a public officer who directly or indirectly violates
the constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued
for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his
acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.
Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer
may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts
done in the course of the performance of the functions of
the office, where said public officer: (1) acted with malice,
bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer
violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF
THE PHILIPPINES VS. COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioners were participating bidders questioning the
identity and eligibility of the awarded contractor Mega
Pacific Consortium (MPC) where the competing bidder is
Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc. (MPEI) as signed by Mr. Willy
Yu of the latter. Private respondent claims that MPEI is the
lead partner tied up with other companies like SK C&C,
WeSolv, Election.com and ePLDT. Respondent COMELEC
obtained copies of Memorandum of Agreements and
Teaming Agreements.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was an existence of a consortium.
RULING:
NO. There was no documentary or other basis for Comelec
to conclude that a consortium had actually been formed
amongst MPEI, SK C&C and WeSolv, along with
Election.com and ePLDT. The president of MPEI signing for
allegedly in behalf of MPC without any further proof, did
not by itself prove the existence of the consortium. It did
not show that MPEI or its president have been duly pre-
authorized by the other members of the putative
consortium to represent them, to bid on their collective
behalf and, more important, to commit them jointly and
severally to the bid undertakings. The letter is purely self-
serving and uncorroborated.

On the second issue, SC ruled that the decisive provision is

Article 32, it being a special law, which prevails over a
general law (the Administrative Code).

Article 32 was patterned after the “tort” in American law.

A tort is a wrong, a tortious act which has been defined as
the commission or omission of an act by one, without
right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or
indirectly, in person, property or reputation. There are
cases in which it has been stated that civil liability in tort is
determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of
the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which
the motive of the defendant has been rendered
immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is
that otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged
wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine
whether the act was wrongful. Presence of good motive,
or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not render
lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of another’s