WHICH KINDS OF

FRIGATES FOR
EUROPEAN NAVIES ?

2003 -2014
T T U
 French La Fayette-class frigate (DCN)

E D I T O R I A L
After a TTU special issue in 2002 devoted to the threat of theatre bal-
listic missiles, another exceptional topic warranted a new supplement.
S U M M A R Y

The vast frigate and destroyer renewal phase, which mainly involves ON THE EVE OF
the British, French and Italian navies, with some 70 ships planned over A MAJOR ERA OF RENEWAL P3
the next 20 years, gives rise to many questions.
THE WORLD HAS CHANGED P4
What is the best way to manage such an undertaking, given very
tight budgets? How to benefit from this window of opportunity for
OPPOSING CONCEPTIONS P6
multinational collaboration, knowing that such an opportunity will not
come along again before at least another 30 years? And how to CHALLENGE OF COOPERATION P8
design these frigates, the mainsprings of modern navies, while taking
into account the redefinition of the navy’s role since the end of the FINANCING A SHIP P11
Cold War?
CHALLENGE OF INTEROPERABILITY P14
Today, discussions seem more geared around the way of designing
frigates, which play a very different role now than they did during the VERTICAL LAUNCHERS P16
Cold War. As ships are increasingly “systems of systems,” a new
global approach appears more appropriate. CONTROLING ACCESS
Technologically speaking, onboard data processing and modern wea-
TO THEATRE OPERATIONS P18
pon systems offer a modularity and a versatility that was until now uni-
LAND ATTACK OPERATIONS P20
maginable, but which is essential in order to face unpredictable
threats. Moreover, a new fact is that the choice of specific systems has
an impact on the overall architecture of the ships. Fitting a multi- Supplement of TTU International
function radar on the mast or vertical launchers on the bridge has Bimonthly Newsletter on Defence and Strategy
published by Certes capital : 40 155 €
consequences on a ship’s design. Should we not take advantage of this Head Office - 25, rue du Louvre - 75001 Paris
forced breakaway in the definition of frigates to rethink the process of Phone : +33 1 40 26 03 03 - Fax :+33 1 40 26 18 59 -
E-mail : ttuw@newedge.fr
design, construction, repair and modernisation during the overall Editor : Guy Perrimond - Publishing Director : Clément Ménascé
life span of a ship? Only concrete possibilities for cost reduction can Staff writers : Paul Merlon, Charles Maisonneuve
Lay out by : Adeline Prévost
allow the acquisition of important classes of ships as planned. Printed in France by : Quebecor World
N° Commission paritaire 0902I79878
Guy Perrimond © TTU - Certes 2003 - All rights reserved

2
On the eve
of a major era of renewal
European navies have recently resumed
major investments in large air defence
ship programmes. These include 12 Type
45 destroyers for the Royal Navy, eight The Limburg is destroyed by fire. This attack underlines
the need to protect maritime routes, on which 80 per cent
Horizon/Orizzonte frigates for the French of commercial trade is transported.(AFP)
and Italian navies as well as the entry into
service of the first German (F-124) and
Dutch (LCF) anti-air warfare (AAW) fri-
gates. Still, behind these emblematic pro-
grammes, it appears that European
nations will need no less than 87 multi-mis-
sion frigates over the period 2008-2020.
The British, French and Italian navies
account for the lion’s share of these
renewal orders, with total requirements
for 47 frigates, i.e. one-half of the
European forecast. Of these, France and
Italy are driven by a strong desire to
cooperate, as revealed by the FREMM
European multi-mission frigate program-
me (a new name bringing together the
French FMM and the Italian FNG desi-
gnations). The British FSC programme
will certainly offer some opportunities for
cooperation with regards to systems, but
on a slightly different schedule.
Regarding other European countries,
Germany and the Netherlands have also
expressed a need for multi-mission ves-
sels equipped with ATBM capabilities. industrials in the Spanish naval sector tries, most of them appear to have a
These are expected to be based on the over the past year considerably lighter tonnage compared with the FMM,
American doctrine, and a cooperation decreases the feasibility of any coope- FNG and FSC. However some technical
between the two countries sounds pos- ration with Spain. As for the 27 remai- parts, such as systems or sub-systems,
sible. The strong implantation of American ning frigates in other European coun- could be jointly developed.

Needs within Europe

Number Name Principal Missions Service Date
Among European
GERMANY 8 F 125 SS + ATBM > 2014
BELGIUM 4 - ASW - navies there will be
DENMARK 6 - 2 GP & 4 ASW - a need for
SPAIN 5 F 100 AD > 2009
FRANCE 17 FREMM 8 ASW, 9 DS > 2008 87 frigates over the
GREECE 4 - - - 2008-2020 period
ITALY 10 FREMM 4 ASW, 6 GP > 2008
NETHERLANDS 4 Q ASW + ATBM > 2010
PORTUGAL 3 - 2 AD, 1 ASW -
UNITED KINGDOM 20 FSC DS > 2013
SWEDEN 2 - - -
TURKEY 4 FS 2000 AD -
SS (surface-surface), ATBM (anti ballistic missile)
TOTAL = 87 ASW (anti-submarine warfare), DS (deep strike), AD (air defence),
GP (general purpose)

3
 The world
has changed...
A new role
One of the consequences of the end of the Cold War is the appearance throughout the world of
endemic crises, which call for close monitoring before they turn into armed conflicts.

The new vocation of European navies is to shift
from the Cold War scheme of fighting in open
seas to “green water operations” and, in particu-
lar, air-land operations. For the world’s major
80 per cent of the navies, this involves shifting from preparation of
world’s industries engagements in the high seas to a littoral warfa-
re environment.
are located within
100 nautical miles In a changing world with rapidly evolving threats,
the best starting point for “attacking land,” appears
of a coast to be the sea and its international waters, which
cover three quarters of the earth. It should be
noted that 75 per cent of the world’s population
lives less than 300 nautic miles from the coast
and 80 per cent of the world’s industries are loca-
ted within 180 km of a shore.
Naval platforms have the advantage of offering
mobile launching pads, less vulnerable to air
attacks than land bases and not burdened by
diplomatic complications such as overflight and
access authorisations. Combat ships are both a
valuable means of gathering information for situa-
tion analysis (radar monitoring, COMINT...) and an
effective means of command offering the possibility
of immediate action with onboard armaments.
Naval platforms can be pre-stationed in high risk
zones or be quickly deployed, with the benefit of
considerable flexibility and strong political and
military significance. The Afghan and the Gulf
experiences underline the need for naval forces
capable of carrying out long-term operations any-
where in the world on short notice, since today a
crisis can very quickly escalate into a conflict that
is costly both in resources and in human terms.
The redirecting of naval missions to coastal water
operations entails a change in the type of threats
they may face. Although different from threats
faced on the open sea these new threats are
nonetheless dangerous. Finally, engagement in
land attack actions requires embarked capabilities.

The USS Stark, severely damaged by an Iraqi Exocet. This demonstrates the need for escort ships to be equipped with
protection against all kinds of air threats. (AFP)

4
A quantitative
and qualitative
problem
This redefinition of naval missions towards force
projection operations affects the size of combat
fleets.
The diversification of missions such as long-term
embargo or surveillance missions, pre-positio-
ning in high-risk zones, relief units... requires
having a significant number of ships.
This implies halting “structural disarmament,” a
phenomenon due to the exponential increase in
costs which, in Western countries, made it impos-
sible during the Cold War to replace entire arse-
nals of weapons with newer versions, considering
the higher costs of successive generations of
equipment. Today, navies must find a way to
replace the older generation equipment with the
same number of newer ships, without having to
dramatically increase their budgets.
Moreover, the only reasonable answer to the unpre-
dictability of threats lies in the acquisition of means
offering the most versatility and modularity pos-
sible. The flexibility and the adaptability of ships
General remarks
on frigate development
Almost all cooperation projects undertaken to develop
completely identical ships fitted with the same systems
have failed (notably NATO’s NFR 90 frigate and the
tripartite Horizon project) due to the difficulty of rea-
ching an agreement between the various industrials
involved regarding their differing operational needs. On
the other hand, cooperation projects based on the
definition of a standard “propelled hull” built in each
country have been successful, with each participant
choosing its own systems and equipment. Examples
of these are the tripartite mine hunter programme
(France, Belgium and the Netherlands) and the
German-Dutch frigate programme.
Consideration must also be given to the method used
in designing ships. Upstream integration, i.e. the defi-
nition of ships, as well as operating, maintenance,
repair and modernisation constraints, represent vast
opportunities for possible savings over the life of the
according to need must enable them to meet The cargo liner Winner,
transporting drugs,
requirements that differ from one conflict to ano-
is apprehended by
ther. Their multi-purpose aspect also permits a French navy aviso.
This success, thanks
regular adaptation to evolving threats throughout to international
the ships’ lifespans. But how do you build more cooperation,
illustrates a new role
ships with increasingly powerful and versatile for the French navy.
(AFP)
weapon systems with limited budgets? This is a
challenge faced by all European navies.
vessels. However this presupposes a concerted poli-
cy allowing the navy to jointly redefine the planned
lifespan, midlife updates and the number of times a
vessel must undergo modernisation to determine the
initial military capabilities necessary and plan those
required over time.
Similarly, the development and ownership costs for
new weapon systems are so high that it is much
more favourable to have a maximum of multi-pur-
The damaged
pose systems, declined in joint-forces and European hull of the USS
variations. The British, French and Italian navies Cole, in Aden.
This terrorist
have clearly paved the way with SAAM and PAAMS attack illustrates
the need to
naval systems of the Aster family of systems. These reinforce security
have been jointly developed by three European measures for
ships in high risk
nations and have the possibility of declining the Scalp seaports.
EG/Storm Shadow into a family of air-to-ground (AFP)
missiles, already in service in the three air forces,
which have a naval land attack missile version.
5
 Opposing
conceptions
Three different classes of ships
for the U.S. navy
Regarding surface combat, the U.S. navy today
plans to build its future around three new classes
It is via stealth, of ships: CG(X), DD(X) and LCS. Future class
cruisers CG(X) or CG21 will ensure the replace-
land attack operation
ment of the current Ticonderoga-class Aegis crui-
and the integration of sers, i.e. both for area air defence and anti-ballistic
all of its ships in missile theatre defence. Regarding the DD(X) of
the Zumwalt class, they will ensure land attack
a real time missions (against coastal areas), now considered
communications essential. Finally, the LCS, will handle battles in lit-
toral zones. The current schedule gives a priority
network benefiting
to the DD(X) programme. This programme will
all that the U.S. navy provide a 12,000-tonne multi-mission ship prima-
hopes to maintain its rily developed for blue- to green-water operations
(the vessel’s weight is 25 per cent less than the
operational advantage initial DD21 project abandoned few months ago).
over all potential The ship also features electric propulsion (pods
enemies are inside the hull) with a speed of 30 knots.
Fitted with an integrated underwater warfare sys-
tem, DD(X) will be capable of receiving an AGS
(Advanced Gun System) of 1,200 shells for the
support of land troops, as well as some 128 ver-
tical cruise missile launching cells. These tubes
will be scattered around the hull in order to redu-
ce the degree of destruction in case the ship is hit.
In addition, the hull will be designed to strongly
reduce EM and IR signatures.
The DD(X) will be simultaneously capable of car-
rying on its quarterdeck two helicopters or drones.
The studies and development phase has been
underway since 29 April, under the responsibility
of Northrop Grumman Ship Systems, assisted
by Raytheon. However, the contract provides that
Bath Iron Works, the competitor which lost the
invitation to tender, will participate as a major
subcontractor. This choice was made in order to
maintain a competition for the attribution of the
The future
CG(X), DD(X)
and LCS of the
U.S. navy.
This illustration
shows the
technological
leap that will be
made by the U.S.
with this new
class of ship.
6
next phases of construction. For now, the
construction of a first section of eight DD(X) is
planned by 2005. The first will be delivered by
2009 and brought into service in 2011. The current
studies refer to a total series of 32 ships.
By 2014, about 30 CG(X) are expected to be
ordered. Thus, the U.S. acquisition is expected to
involve almost 70 ships between 2005 and 2025.
The third unit of the “family,” the Littoral Combat
Ship (LCS), is expected to be ordered in the
longer run, with the acquisition of 30 to 60 units.
The similarities among the LCS and the European
corvettes of the Visby and Skjold classes are
obvious. Last summer these ships took part, along
with the American catamaran HSV-X1 and
Lockheed Martin’s Sea Slice, in experiments
organised on the behalf of the U.S. navy near
San Diego.
The LCS, according to the U.S. navy’s wishes,
should be a fast combat ship (between 50 and
60 knots in order to improve its survivability and to
reduce its transfer times to the theatre of opera-
tions) weighing between 1,500 and 4,000 tonnes.
Stealthy, highly automated and of small dimensions,
it is designed to handle operations close to shore,
which are risky for heavier ships. Among the mis-
sions planned for the LCS, American admirals have
mentioned the war against mines in shallow water
(remotely-piloted machines), surveillance/recon-
naissance (underwater drones) and the fight against
small vessels carrying out offensive actions using
rapid fire gun radar-guided Phalanx. The LCS
will constitute the advanced units of the C4ISR
information and command network of a land attack
naval force or even of a joint-theatre command.
For now, a prototype
is scheduled to be ma-
nufactured by 2005.
The LCS programme,
like the JSF, is a sort
of Trojan horse, attrac-
ting various European
investments. With the
risk of seeing the U.S.
resolve European diver-
gences regarding the
LCS concept, thus killing
other programmes.
The requirement for modularity in Europe
The trend towards greater ship tonnages has beco-
me generalised alongside the move towards leng-
thening vessels, in particular to allow ships to be
equipped with a hangar as well as a bridge for
helicopters. This explains why future 12,000-tonne
U.S. DD(X) destroyers are classified in the crui-
ser category. Regarding the 7,000-tonne Horizon fri-
gates, they are, according to NATO standards,
considered destroyers, similar to former light crui-
sers. Although an increase in a ship’s weight
—which affects the organisation of the internal
volume—comes at a higher cost, it is compensated
by easier repairs and subsequent modernisation.
The second important trend lies in the new platform
design (FREMM, DD(X), K-130, F-125…) with new
deep strike capabilities. Within this framework, the
challenge for naval armament is to combine defen-
sive systems designated to establish a “protection
sphere” against enemy weapons capable of rea-
ching the ships, and offensive systems capable of
taking part in ground operations, based on naval
artillery, ground attack missiles, UAV monitoring…
in addition to aircraft carrier capabilities. The concept
of use of future frigates, cornerstones of the navy,
can be declined over a broad spectrum going from
the use of a single ship to a complete air and sea
force deployment. In addition, France and the U.K.
have the additional task of supporting Strategics
SSBN (FOST) missions. To meet the needs of
these different scenarios, several kinds of res-
ponses are necessary.
The first solution is to come up with several
classes of ships adapted to each scenario.
However, this choice does not allow any large
scale production benefits and presents difficulties
in sizing each class.
On the other hand, it is possible to design only
one class of general-purpose ship, by equipping
them with all the weapons systems they need
to fulfil any kind of mission during a single ope-
ration. This solution leads to ships greater than
10,000-tonnes, such as the American DD(X),
which far exceeds European budgets.
The option of smaller ships, with the same hull
and combat system, and which can be reconfigured
thanks to specific mission “kits” according to different
scenarios is feasible. Although interesting, this
option entails many difficulties in terms of advance
planning required according to the time needed
for reconfiguration time as well as the storage and
maintenance of unused capabilities…
The solution chosen by France and Italy with the A French
Lafayette frigate.
FREMM is the result of the balance between stan- Its radar
dardisation and specialisation, with the design of a signature is
equivalent to that
single class of ship of the 5,000-tonne class, based of a trawler.
on the same hull and having as many common (Marine nationale)
elements as possible regarding the combat system,
and declined in only two versions: “Anti-Submarine-
Warfare” (ASW) on one hand, and “Deep Strike”
(DS), or “General Purpose” (GP), to use the Italian
term, on the other. The clear intention, in particular
for the French navy, is to benefit from a rapid deve-
lopment of major series, and to move away from the
costly mistakes made with ships of former classes,
built in small series that were more or less suc-
cessful, prototypes, or series that were reduced to
only two ships.
This new concept of industrialisation in series will
allow, regarding French-Italian cooperation, the
construction of 27 units, including 17 French
FREMMs (eight ASW and nine DS) and 10 Italian
FREMMs (eight ASW and six GP), to replace five
classes of ships: two F-67s, six F-70s and nine
A-69s in France, two Lupos and eight Maestrales
in Italy. It is logical to think for the FREMM design,
that maximum use will be made of development
studies already carried out on the ambitious Horizon
programme, from its origins as a British-French-
Italian programme —before the Royal Navy decided
to develop its Type 45 destroyer.
In the same way, for the post-2015 British Future
Surface Combatant (FSC) programme, studies
also plan to take advantage of developments on
the Type 45 destroyer, itself inspired from Horizon
studies, and decline around a “common core” a
shortened general purpose version with ASW
specialisation, and a lengthened land attack
version with additional vertical launchers, a
large–calibre gun as well as more space to
embark helicopters and UAVs.
7
 Challenge of
cooperation
European navies, faced
with reality, appear today
more open to the idea of acquiring ships and weapons systems within the framework of
international cooperation. With programmes such as Horizon or the future FMM, this
is now a reality. Nevertheless, multilateral cooperation presents certain challenges.
European navies : cloning or organ bank ?
The advantages of European cooperation in the
development of combat ships are obvious and
well known (major differences with regards to
missions and technological choices makes a
European-American cooperation in this field high-
ly unlikely) . In fact, conceiving of and building with
several partners a single class of ships allows the
Within the context sharing of both complementary skills and the
financing of development costs. It also allows
of a multinational partners to benefit from economies of scale due to
naval action, larger series. Beyond that, one could even ima-
gine, for future programmes, decreases in ope-
having ships of rating costs made possible by common training of
the same class, crews and support personnel. Finally, within the
context of a multinational naval action, having
as opposed to
ships from the same class, rather than having
having to align to align diversified forces, is obviously a major
diverse forces, operational advantage. However, even if coope-
ration is likely easier in the naval field than in
is obviously other areas, it is often risky, especially in terms of
a major operational schedule differences. The potential partners might
have different schedule priorities, either for bud-
advantage
getary reasons or for reasons to do with a ship’s
lifespan, For example, the British FSC programme
lags the FMM programme by seven to eight
years. In addition, on-board life is frequently dif-
ferent from one navy to another as a result of cen-
turies-old traditions, especially in Europe. Another
factor is the availability or not of conscript
resources. While the Italian navy would like to
have a crew of 130 men for its future
multi-mission frigates
The Horizon frigate programme, which
began with three countries, has been declined in a
Franco-Italian version and a British version. It reveals the
pitfalls of cooperation in developing similar ships. (DCN)
8
(FMM), its French partner, whose human
resources have become rare since conscription
was abandoned, wants only 90 men in its crew.
Furthermore, for the same class of ships, the
missions and concepts of use can vary signifi-
cantly from one navy to another. Taking the FMM
as an example, the Italian navy aims to use it in
the Adriatic Sea while the French navy plans to
use it in seas and oceans worldwide. This is not
without consequence on the end product.
The Italian navy would prefer from the start a
strongly armed ship whereas the French, to gua-
rantee the acquisition of the number of requested
vessels, would be satisfied with reduced wea-
pon systems, with allowances for upgrades
(volumes, wiring, etc), to be fitted with new sys-
tems later on during a mid-life modernisation
operation. Obviously, these differences in approa-
ch are not without impact. They influence the
design of the ship’s interior and the volumes assi-
gned to each function. This obliges the partners to
reach a more or less satisfactory compromise...!
Nevertheless, these differences in approach exist
and weigh heavily on the success or failure of
potential cooperation projects. This explains, for
instance, the British withdrawal from the Horizon
programme or the incompatibility of Franco-Italian
FMM and British FSC programmes. In this case,
the incompatibility was both in terms of schedule
as well as capabilities: the British consider, for
example, naval support for land operations to an
inland distance of 180 km instead of 100 km by
the French. Finally, even when cooperation is
successful, such as the Franco-Italian
Horizon/Orizonte programme, the implementa-
tion of common state and industrial structures
(which does not facilitate a simplification, and
obviously increases the costs) and learning
how to work together despite different
methods and industrial traditions still remain.
The challenge for this specific program-
me appears likely to be won.
French and Italian
 French and Italian cooperation on the same ship programme will allow a 27- ship class of frigate. (DCN)
anti-aircraft frigates will be very similar.
Nevertheless, in the longer term, it could end up
being more judicious to take into greater account
the concept of modular cooperation, i.e. structured
around certain systems or major subsystems
without resulting in identical ships in terms of
hulls, interior installations and capabilities. This is,
for example, the case of the PAAMS anti-aircraft
system, core of the Horizon/Orizzonte frigates but
also of the future British Type 45, in spite of their
significant differences regarding the hull, instal-
lations, capabilities and missions. It is also the
Electric Propulsion:
Following the path of the civil sector
Electric propulsion, which has only recently
appeared in the naval military field (it originated
in the civil sector with large cruise liners at the end
of the 1980s), breaks away from the traditional
architectural design of combat ships. Electric pro-
pulsion allows the mechanical division of the
energy generation and propulsion functions, and
thus the removal of the long shaft, which takes up
a lot of space and is noisy. While energy gene-
ration (thermal engine) remains in the centre of
the hull, the “steering” function can be integrated
with external moving pods fixed to the hull which
include the electric engine as well as the propel-
ler. Consequently, naval architects can more
easily organise the hull’s inside volume. Moreover,
energy efficiency appears much better. For the
route chosen by Berlin, Madrid and The Hague, Fortunately,
for their new anti-aircraft frigates (4 LCF for the
the trend towards
Netherlands, 3 F-124 for Germany and 4 F-100
for Spain). Having a common “bank” of systems an increase in
and equipment in which each could pick and tonnage offers a
choose what they need to build a ship best suited
to its national needs, offers interesting prospects better adaptation,
for the future. The respect of traditions and needs making it easier
of each partner would thus be ensured while
guaranteeing the division of development costs for
to satisfy the
many systems and the undeniable benefits of contradictory needs
series production. of navy partners
same quantity of fuel, electric propulsion allows a
higher autonomy compared with traditional pro-
pulsion. Other advantages: improved security
and a reduction in the size of the crew. Naturally,
this technology transfer was first fitted on amphi-
bious ships (Dutch LPD Rotterdam-class, British
ALSL Albion-class and American LHD), which
have an architecture similar to civil steamers.
France will adopt electric propulsion for the first
time on the BPC (batiment de projection et de
commandement) Mistral and Tonnerre, which
will enter in service in 2005 and 2006 respectively.
Requiring no particular reinforcement in terms of
sound proofing or shock resistance, civilian pods
need to be adapted only slightly. However milita-
ry forces are currently studying the adaptation
9
 Challenge
of cooperation

France
will adopt
electric
propulsion
for the A Royal Navy Type 45 AAW destroyer (DR)

first time
on the PBC (LHD) of this sort of propulsion for combat ships. Hence,
Mistral and the future British Type 45 Daring-class navy des-
Tonnerre troyers will be equipped with it (Alstom engine
providing 20 MW). In France, it could equip-
ped on the FREMM. However, this kind
of pod raises several problems. The
first one concerns the pod’s mass. On
the FREMM frigate, in order to reach a
speed of 30 knots, the pod must provi-
de 20 MW and weigh 250 tonnes.
Hence the ratio between the pod’s mass
and the ship’s speed is very different
between a LPD and a frigate. In addition, pod
design must be well adapted to the hull, and the
pod needs to have good shock resistance. In
other words, while electric propulsion
undoubtedly offers many advantages
and constitutes a true technological
breakthrough that military naval archi-
tecture must take into consideration,
the specific use of warships prevents
the simple transposition of civil pods to
frigates. Significant adaptation work
must first be realised.

Illustration showing
the rear view of a
The Dutch navy’s multi-mission frigate.
De Zeven An electric propulsion pod
Provincien would have an impact
frigate. Whereas on the hull design.
this class was (DCN)
initially a joint
programme
with Germany,
in the end,
cooperation dealt
only with
common systems.

10
 Financing
a ship
Budgetary issues are at
the heart of the major
navies’ concerns. Once the expression of need has been made,
the budgetary aspect remains the most determining factor in
the development of a combat ship. This will certainly be the
case for multi-mission frigates.

The French
Motte-Piquet
frigate returning to
Toulon from the

The truth about prices! Herakles mission,

at the beginning of
July 2002.
Built over a
15-year period,
The French navy often encounters difficulties in the The other lesson lies in the need to quickly com- production of the
F-70 did not allow
production of complete series because of poor plete the ship series in order to minimise produc- cost reduction.
financial estimates regarding the true manufactu- tion costs and to ensure a maximum of commu- (DR)

ring costs or because of budgetary cuts arising
during the course of the programme. A review of
escort ship classes launched during the last
30 years is very revealing. The only series com-
pleted is the A-69 with 17 vessels. Proof of this
recurring difficulty is the fact that the last class of
La Fayette frigates was reduced to five ships ins-
tead of six as initially planned.
The impoverishment of a class of ships, in terms of
equipment, due to budgetary reasons, is the other
danger faced by the major frigate programmes.
The case of the La Fayette frigates is a particularly
good example. Whereas the Saudi La Fayettes
are equipped with Aster missiles and vertical
launchers, French ships do not have even one.
Even if the plan is to fit this combat system at
mid-life, the high cost of such a modernisation is
likely to push it aside.
nality. A closer look at the F-70 class (seven units
brought into service between 1979 and 1990)
shows that due to a long production time (more
than 10 years), even the major systems fitted on
these vessels are different. Taking the radar as an
example, George Leygues, as well as the three
ships which followed it, are equipped with a DRBV
26 A, whereas the next three in the series, starting
with the Primauguet, are equipped with a DRBC Today, 50 per cent
33 A. It is possible to save nearly 5 per cent on the
of the overall cost
overall manufacturing price if the 17 FMM are
built over ten years. In addition, DCN, the French of a ship lies in
shipbuilder, and its partners, associated
its operations.
in the definition of this programme study, are
The cost of
currently preparing proposals for the staffs on
this subject. The defence allocation plan over manpower is high
2003-2008 provides for the delivery of these fri-
for modern navies
gates from 2008 until 2017. DCN’s capability to
produce between three and four ships per year is
however limited by budgetary constraints.

The French navy is not the only one to suffer

from this phenomenon. During the Falklands war,
the Royal Navy stressed that budgetary cuts expe-
rienced over several years had reduced the defen-
sive capabilities of its ships. The Sheffield class
(Type 42) thus saw its tonnage go from 3,500 tonnes
to 3,880 tonnes in order to be able to offer a better
stability but also to embark and store more Sea Dart
missiles.

Today, 50 per cent of the overall cost of a ship lies

in its operations: the cost of manpower is high
for modern navies. The French navy has already
made significant efforts in this field, having fewer
men aboard its preceding generation ships than
Royal Navy vessels of the same tonnage. The
type 42 had a crew of 280 men, against 230 for
the F-70. This effort was reinforced for the next
generation of ships: the Horizon, which will weigh
5,500 tonnes, will have only 190 men aboard, The Sheffield destroyer, hit in a deadly strike by an Exocet missile during
whereas equivalent ships, such as Tourville, had the Falklands war in May 1982. The British navy issued a statement
saying that budgetary cuts on this programme had a detrimental effect
a crew of nearly 300. on the Type 42’s self defence capabilities. (AFP)

11
 Financing
a ship
The French navy has also chosen to improve the
management of its ships in terms of revalorization.
Previously, the ships underwent a complete refit of
their equipment at mid-life. This is very expensive,
Combat systems though, particularly considering the regular upgra-
ding of data processing, which resulted in entire
represent parts of the combat system architecture being
50 per cent of completely transformed. Combat systems repre-
a ship’s total sent 50 per cent of the total manufacturing costs
of a ship, which gives a fairly accurate idea of
manufacturing the mid-life revalorization costs. A visit to the
costs command centre of a Tourville frigate class, and
then a La Fayette, is enough to realise the impact
of the revolution in telecommunications and data
processing. As a result of this rapid progress,
some ships cannot be updated sufficiently to meet
the new standards, the obsolescence of a system
condemning the entire platform. This is notably the
case of the two anti-aircraft Cassard-class fri-
gates, whose SM1 MR surface-to-air system will
12
not be modernised, following an American deci-
sion. As a result, since they cannot be adequate-
ly upgraded, the ships will end up being quickly
withdrawn from service, even though they only
have about twenty years of service in the navy.
Thus, because it was not planned during the
construction phase, it is economically impossible
to fit a PAAMS system with the A50 vertical laun-
cher due to lack of space. This example illus-
trates the need to provide for modularity in the
ships during their development. This is the only
way to manage technologies which have much
faster improvement cycles. Whereas the hulls
and the propulsion system are generally opera-
tional over more than 30 years, the combat sys-
tem’s elements must be changed every ten years
in order to remain interoperable with other navies.
The only solution, inspired from the British model
of "incremental approach", is to provide at the
beginning of the ship’s development, for conti-
Cassard, an air defence frigate,
on its way back to Toulon
from the Herakles mission
in July 2002.
The non-revalorization
of the U.S. SM1MR missile,
will considerably reduce
the life span of this class.
(DR)
nuous innovations and to take care in choosing Overall cost of ownership (in %)
systems and not effectively rule out too many
future options so as to be able to adapt new solu- 1%
tions. This approach presupposes the integra-
tion, from the very beginning of the project, of 5% 3%
major equipment suppliers in industrial 9%
studies. Renault’s technical centre in Guyancourt 29%
is a reference regarding the dialogue between a
system architect and its suppliers. This model is
undoubtedly serving as inspiration for the partners
of the multi-mission frigates definition study: 53%
several workshops have been set up between
Armaris, which brings together Thales and DCN,
and the Orrizzonte joint venture, regrouping
Finmeccanica and Fincantieri. The Paris work-
shop is in charge of managing the project, while
that of Lorient is elaborating the design.
Concerning the Italian part of the project, Genoa
Contactorship and development Upgrading
is working on the platform while Rome is Logistic support
Design
dealing with the combat systems. Development Exploitation

The Maestrale Frigate is

a good example of the Italian
navy’s difficulties.
The Lupo-class had
to be completely revised
before it could be fitted with
more efficient equipment.
(AMS)

13
 The challenge
of interoperability
The setting-up of an efficient
data exchange network among
the various sensors of an air and sea force increases the operational effectiveness of the force.
However, with the current development of land attack missions, as well as the direct fire
support of land forces, more and more Western navies will express the need to integrate a land
component in their tactical situation’s real time presentation. It is an objective still far from
being achieved.
C4ISR’s interoperability challenge
The operational effectiveness of a combat ship
largely relies on the crew’s awareness of the tac-
tical situation in which it finds itself. A self-evident
Illustration
showing the truth worth recalling. However, this awareness
operational
room of a latest is obviously restricted by the performance of the
generation ship’s embarked sensors as well as by the earth’s
frigate.
These large roundness, and, —in particular within the frame-
screens are
revolutionary work of littoral operations—by the “masks” that
compared with islands and coasts can constitute. Admittedly,
current ones.
(Thales) for about 30 years, Link 11 allowed Western
ships to jointly operate and exchange tactical
data. But Link 11 (HF and UHF) suffers from vul-
nerability to jamming, reduced flow, positioning
errors of the detected studs generated as well as
the lack of capability allowing the setting up of a
real time network opened to a large number of
players. This is why Link 16 or JTIDS are currently
being considered within NATO. Less vulnerable to
jamming, this UHF data’s automatic transmis-
sion appears definitely more precise and, in par-
ticular, allows a more significant number of players
to operate in a common network. Equipped with
such a system, ships and aircraft are capable of
communicating the data collected by their sensors
to the network while at the same time benefiting
from information coming from other players.
14
The embarked data processing and fusion
system —SENIT on the French ships, CEC on
American ships and several British ships—allows
the on-board operations room —OR— to show a
tactical situation opened to the entire zone cove-
red by air and sea forces. In addition, target loca-
tions, thanks to the reshuffling of detection data
coming from various distributed sensors, offer
more precise configuration settings on OR
screens. The network is also less vulnerable to
jamming effects. It is even possible to carry out
interceptions of air and sea targets from a platform
(ship or aircraft) with sensors shut off so as to
avoid detection. However, the platform’s OR has
all the necessary fire data provided in real time by
the various sensors of other network players.
Although this concept does restrict the platform’s
own independence, it gives the force commander
a precise, real-time tactical vision, optimising
every means of the force. Moreover, the com-
mand of such a naval force could be carried out
from a ground-based OR located thousands of
kilometres from the operations zone, connected
by a high-speed satellite connection—a more
comfortable and efficient OR, with more numerous
staff and equipment, far from any military risk.
Moreover, this OR could be in the same loca-
tion as the joint theatre HQ. Here lies one of the
main future challenges. Although the current infor-
mation processing systems offer an air and sea
tactical situation, it will be necessary, on the lon-
ger run, within the framework of amphibious ope-
rations or ground forces support, to integrate the
air/land tactical situation on the coast and even
beyond, on land. However, this integration pre-
sents a danger: having a system overloaded by
too much data. The same problem will be rai-
sed with the digitalisation process underway in the
land forces. In France, two BPCs—ships designed
to allow an on-board joint HQ to ensure the force
command, even on land—, will soon enter in ser-
vice, raising the question of the compatibility with
the army CIS systems (SICF, SIR and SIT), even
with those of the air force (SCCOA). The major
challenge is to develop the connection between
these systems in order to enable them to com- Thales’s ARBB-36
on a Cassard-class
municate. The same kind of connection will need to frigate. Electronic
warfare plays an
be developed in order for a multinational naval increasingly
force to be able to reduce differences among the important role in
naval operations.
various information processing systems and thus to (Thales)
work in an optimised network. These challenges
are still far from being completely overcome.

London and Washington agreed CEC: Cooperative

Engagement

on the CEC network Capability,

the new embarked
The Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy reached an agreement in July 2000 to use the same
data processing
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), the new embarked data processing system
developed by Lockheed Martin. Considered by its architects as the most advanced sys- system developed by
tem of its kind in the world, CEC, which integrates all the targets of an air and sea task Lockheed Martin
force into a dense data exchange and processing network, allows a near real-time
presentation of an air and sea and air-surface tactical situation with a nearly perfect glo-
bal-positioning correlation of detected targets. In other words, CEC would eliminate a well-
known phenomenon: namely, that which results from the detection of the same target by
various sensors, each one having a sufficient margin of
error in the positioning so that a traditional system of
data processing shows an uncertainty with regards to
the actual numbers plotted. This can appear awkward
when the plotting board in question involves missiles or
planes... In addition, CEC offers the advantage of
being able to achieve tracking by amalgamating packets
of detection from various sensors, data which, consi-
dered individually, would not justify the presentation of
a tracking path. In April 2002, the Pentagon gave its
green light for the integration of CEC on approximate-
ly 250 ships, surveillance aircraft and testing bases.
A CEC Block 2 is being studied in order to allow col-
lected data regarding detection of ballistic missiles to be
integrated into the JCTN (joint communication theatre
network). Raytheon and Lockheed Martin are in com-
petition to obtain the prime contractorship of Block 2.
Frigate Lafayette’s
A decision is expected at the end of this year. The U.K. will fit CEC Block 1 on its OR allows a reduced
crew compared
Type 23 frigates by 2008, and on its Type 45 AAW destroyers four years later. The result with the preceding
is that British and American ships will be able to integrate within an allied operational net- generation of ships.
(Marine nationale)
work, well adapted for littoral operations and ground forces support, as well as within anti-
aircraft and antiballistic missions. In France, the DGA (French procurement agency) has
just launched a study on a cooperative combat system.

15
 Vertical
launchers Vertical launch systems (VLS) are increasingly
part of new programmes. Of equal tonnage,
they reinforce a frigate’s armament, help clear the bridges, improve stealth, flexibility and
adaptation to the mission, thanks to an assortment of missiles fitted.
Two approaches to vertical launching exist today.
The first is to design vertical single-missile laun-
ching modules to launch existing self-defence
anti-aircraft missiles by adapting them for vertical
firing. This formula was developed by Raytheon for
the Sea Sparrow (Mk 48 launcher), by MBDA for
the Sea Wolf and by IAI/Rafael for the Barak. It
relies on a specific technique, wherein the conduit
for outflow is integrated into each container-laun-
cher. This solution can be set up rapidly but does
not allow much versatility.
With the Mk 41 launcher, the U.S. was
the forerunner of this type of installation
The American Mk 41 launcher
Developed in 1977 by Lockheed Martin Naval
Electronics and Surveillance Systems (NE&SS),
the Mk 41 launcher is composed of eight cell
modules. The line includes three types of modules:
• A “Self-Defence” version, 5.2 metres tall,
to launch Sea Sparrow or ESSM (Evolved
Sea Sparrow Missile) anti-aircraft self-defence
missiles,
16
The other approach is to develop a multi-missile
launcher that is both modular and evolutionary,
and well adapted to the greatest possible number
of future missiles over the long term. Technically
based on a hot launch, it has a conduit for gases
consisting of, in the lower part, a receptacle for
gases common to all container-launchers (called
“plenum,”) and in the upper part, a centrally posi-
tioned chimney in the vertical launching module.
• A “Tactical” version, 6.7 metres long, well
adapted to the Standard medium-range surface-
to-air missile SM-2 Block III and to the ASROC
anti-submarine missile,
• The “Strike” version, 7.6 metres long,
designed to launch the Tomahawk cruise missile,
as well as preceding missiles.
The main customer is obviously the U.S. Navy,
which in 1986 began to equip its AEGIS
Ticonderoga class anti-aircraft cruise mis-
siles, then its DDG-51 Arleigh Burke-
class destroyers. Commercially manu-
factured for over 15 years, the Mk 41
has become a reference in the field.
According to Lockheed Martin, it is found
on nearly 160 ships in 16 different
classes. Production in Baltimore has rea-
ched a rate of 5 to 6 modules per month.
The Bundesmarine’s
Brandenburg frigate. Launched
in 1994, this ship is fitted with
Mk 41 missile launchers,
capable of firing
16 Sea Sparrow missiles.
 A50 launcher.
Fitted on Horizon
frigate, it will be
capable of firing
Aster 15 and
30 missiles .

A European alternative to the Mk 41

The Sylver family of launchers
The Aster 15 and 30 missile programmes allowed
the development of an alternative to the near-
monopoly of the American situation, thanks to
the development by DCN of the Sylver VLS with
eight missiles, very similar to the Mk 41. Since its
development, it has been provided in different
variants.
The first variants, known as A 43 (for missiles up
to 4.3 metres length), is dedicated to self-defence
of combat ships. Its development is closely rela-
ted to MBDA’s Aster 15 missile, intended for
close anti-aircraft and anti-missile defence. It is
thus part of the vast Franco-Italian cooperation
surrounding the SAAM surface-to-air anti-missile
system. The Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier is
equipped with four A 43 modules (each with eight
missiles). It embarked its first missiles on
1 December 2001 and carried out its first Aster 15
operational firing from an A 43 launcher on
30 October 2002, on its return from the Héraklès
mission in the Indian Ocean.
The A 43 launcher also equips the three F 3000 S
frigates in the Sawari 2 programme, built by DCN
for the Royal Saudi Naval Forces at a rate of
two modules per frigate (each with eight mis-
siles). The second Italian aircraft carrier, Andrea
Doria, will be equipped with four A 43 modules.
This launcher was selected for the PAAMS at the
end of a competition between various launchers.
Developed more recently than the Mk 41, the
Sylver benefits from a higher firing rate as well as
a lighter weight per module.
The design of the Sylver A 50—currently an Aster
15 and 30 twin-missile variant—, also takes into
consideration the capability to fire different types
of missiles, such as the Naval Polyphem or the The Aster 15 and 30
future Aster developments regarding the ATBM missile programmes
in Block 1 or Block 2 versions. The eight-missile
A 50 launcher already equips frigates already allowed the
ordered in the PAAMS programme. Upcoming development of an
orders will allow a faster rate of production. alternative to the
The Sylver family will soon be upgraded with the near-monopoly of the
new A 70 launcher, capable of firing a 7-metre American situation
long missile, while still being capable of laun-
ching munitions of the A 43 and A 50 launchers.
MBDA and DCN are currently studying the third
member of the Sylver family, notably intended
for future FREMM frigates, capable of launching
naval missiles such as Scalp Naval.

The new version of the Sylver A 50 is a lengthe-

ned variant intended to fire missiles of 5 meters in
length or less. It offers a dual missile capacity with
the Aster 15 and Aster 30. Its development is
related to the PAAMS programme (Principal Anti-
Air Missile System), a trilateral project intended for
the Royal Navy’s Type 45 AAW destroyers and
for the Franco-Italian frigates Horizon and Orizzonte.

The A 50 thus marks the extension of Franco-

Italian cooperation within the United Kingdom.

DCN’s corvette.
Vertical launchers can
even be adapted on ships
of small tonnage.

17
 Controling access
to theatre operations
Anti-aircraft defence
Implementing a Although the Falklands war is slowly fading from
total protection memory, its scenario is still relevant today. Even
though the Argentinean air force suffered tough
in circles, with:
losses, the Super Etendard, with air-to-sea Exocet
• in the first circle, missiles, sank two major ships: the AAW des-
the requirement for troyer HMS Sheffield, and the Atlantic Conveyor,
any combat ship a container ship transformed into an aircraft car-
rier, which went down with almost all the U.K.’s
being the capability
heavy transport helicopters. A preventive attack
for self defence
cannot guarantee the destruction of the entire
against both
enemy fleet either. Fired by some “courageous
missiles and captains” or coastal batteries, as the Falklands
aircraft also revealed with the surprise attack of the HMS
• in the second Glamorgan, anti-ship missiles represent a dan-
circle, “local area gerous residual threat.
defence” Lessons from the Falklands showed the pres-
• in the third circle, sing need to beef up anti-missile defences, by
implementing a total protection in circles, with, in
“naval area
the first circle, the requirement for any combat
defence”
ship being the capability for self defence against
both missiles and aircraft, either in isolated ope-
ration (crisis prevention mission or active mis-
sions) or within a group of vessels.
In the second circle, every frigate should have
the capability to ensure the anti-missile defence of
The Saudi navy’s Al Riyadh
frigate. This ship is the first
non-European vessel equipped
with an Aster system.
unarmed ships located nearby (which was the
case of the Atlantic Conveyor) according to the
concept known as “local area defence.” Finally, in
the third circle, the “naval area defence,” a mission
18
entrusted to AAW frigates, the capability to cover
the entire fleet within a medium- long-range must
absolutely be renewed.
Technically starting from a “clean slate,” the deve-
lopment of the Aster missile family, a tri-national
programme involving France, Italy and the United
Kingdom, allows a conceptual and technological
leap. Aster-based systems are optimised in their
design to intercept all kind of missiles and are
designed to destroy them by direct impact (“Hit-to-
Kill”) to ensure destruction of their warheads.
In addition, they can engage all types of aircraft.
With the SAAM “surface-to-air anti-missile” sys-
tem, based on the Naval Aster 15, the traditional
SHORAD mission, called “point defence” (Point
Defence Missile System, or PDMS), is having its
range extended up to 30 km (i.e. two or three
times the maximum range of preceding systems)
and widened by the possibility, for the first time
ever, of protecting neighbouring ships against
low-level anti-ship missiles in a 7-km circle around
the launching ship.
The SAAM system has been ensuring the pro-
tection of the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier
since December 2001. It will also
equip the second Italian aircraft
carrier, Andrea Doria by 2008. Its
installation is underway on three
F-1300S Sawari 2 frigates of the
Saudi naval forces, Al Riyadh,
Makkah et Al Dammal.
The Franco-Italian FREMM should
receive an Aster 15 missile system.
The dangers of littoral warfare
(coastal batteries of Chinese anti-
ship missiles in the Persian Gulf,
for instance) make “local area defen-
ce” missions imperative as they are
the only ones capable of protecting
commercial vessel convoys or lan-
ding ships in the closed waters of a
Gulf.
With the “Principal Anti-Air Missile
System” (PAAMS), based on the
Aster 15 and 30 missiles, the former medium-
range defence (“Medium Range-Surface-to-Air
Missile,” or MR-SAM) mission is strengthened
by a multi-layered defence, ensuring defence by
integrating Naval Aster 15’s additional capabilities
for “self-defence” and “local area defence” and
those of the Naval Aster 30 (navalisation of the
ground version of the Aster 30) for a “naval area
defence” exceeding 120 km range with a ceiling
of 20 km.

PAAMS has been adopted by air defence ships of

the British, French and Italian navies. A PAAMS
(S) version with Sampson radar, will be fitted on
the Royal Navy’s 12 Type 45 Daring Class
destroyers. A PAAMS (E) version with the
EMPAR radar will equip the AAW horizon/
Orizzonte frigates.
Illustration showing a Type 45 destroyer
launching its Aster missiles. Cooperation with
the British on the PAAMS system
offers many further possibilities
for cooperation in this sector.

Anti-submarine action
confronted with a renewed threat
The French and Italian navies share the same meet SNA and SSK threats. Since the mid-
vision of a frigate version specialised in ASW. Their 1990s, low frequency active sonar (LF), which
main mission will be the protection of an air and sea are under development, appear particularly
group against the threat of the nuclear attack sub- adapted to shallow waters. Their energy benefits
marines (SSN) or even modern diesel propulsion from better propagation than high frequency
submarines (SSK), the main threat today. (HF), offering better remote echoes. However,
the definition, which allows the classification of
The problems of ASW action have changed a lot
echo, is better with HF and fake echoes with LF
since the Cold War. Submarine threats have
are more frequent. The perfect combination
decreased without totally disappearing in open
appears to be a passive sonar for panoramic
seas. On the other hand, today the prolifera-
monitoring and an active sonar for classifying the
tion of modern and silent SSKs are a major
detected subject.
threat: there are approximately 350 SSKs in
40 navies. The innovation lies in the fact that a
All French-Italian frigates are expected to be
growing number of countries are willing to acqui-
fitted with a hull-sonar, the ASW specific equip-
re SSKs, in particular among those wishing “to
ment being a towed LF sonar. ASW armament
control” a maritime area, such as a strait. The
results from long-standing cooperation between
most frequently exported models are those of
France and Italy. The light MU 90 Impact torpe-
Russia (Kilo class) and Germany (209 or 1700
do, which will equip embarked NH 90 helicop-
family). New technologies (anaerobic propul-
ters, was developed by the two countries within
sion AIP, acoustic and stealth radar) make their
the Eurotorp JV. The MILAS torpedo carrying
detection more difficult. Shallow coastal waters
missile is derived from the Otomat French-Italian
are acoustically difficult for passive means of
sea-to-sea missile, whose warhead and anti-
detection, mainly due to significant interference.
ship homing head have been replaced by a MU
Regarding active means, the propagation of
90 (or Mk 46 Mod 5). This weapon system pro-
waves varies from one place to another, depen-
duced by MBDA can strike from up to 30 nauti-
ding on the coastal environment: currents, varia-
cal miles (55 km) at Mach 0.89, with a very fast
tions in temperature and salinity, interference,
reaction time, while allowing the surface ship
sea-bed reverberation…
to remain out of the range of torpedoes from
ASW detection either in open seas or coastal the enemy submarine, offering protection and
waters, requires specific equipment in order to dissuasion.

19
 Land attack
operations A new dimension at the core of frigate
programmes is land attack operations. The coastal operation is divided between
naval support fire, where naval artillery and tactical missiles play a role, and
deep strikes with cruise missiles.
Tactical naval fire support
in littoral warfare
The first conceptual
debate relates to the
maximum range of
“naval fire support,”
as the Royal Navy
calls it. The figures
put forth run from 100 kilo-
Effect of Bonus metres to 100 nautical miles
shell on armoured
units. The interest
(180 km). On a technical level, naval fire
in having a 155-mm support in these littoral missions is twofold:
calibre is the
possibility to use naval artillery, for heavy saturating fires with
the wide variety future guided shells with a lengthened range
of existing
ammunitions. and the new sea-to-ground missiles, for specific
surgical strikes.
A renewed interest in artillery systems
The existing calibres are characterised by their
modest range (27 km for the 127-mm) in hori-
zontal direct shooting but have a rapid firing rate
(45 fires/minute for the 127-mm), as they are
mainly descendants of the anti-aircraft artillery
which equipped older ships.
The current debates relate to range, precision
and killing potential in order to optimise the current
naval artillery for a role in littoral fire support.
The U.S. Navy has adopted the most ambitious
path with the Advanced Gun System (AGS).
The 155-mm (AGS) is a unit which weighs nearly
300 tonnes—turret and 750-round magazine
included. Each DD(X) will be capable of embar-
king two AGSs! With regular ammunition, the
AGS will be able to strike from 40 km. By 2012,
the development of the Long-Range Land Attack
Projectile (LRLAP) should be able to reach 180 km,
featuring rocket propulsion and a GPS guidance
system. However, the AGS will not find its place
on ships other than 10,000-tonne DD(X)s.
20
This explains why a new version of the Mk45
127-mm turret, known as Mod4, is also under
development. Italy is the other large supplier of
127-mm turrets with OtoMelara, which is develo-
ping a new 127/64 LW with lengthened and
strengthened tube for the 10 Italian FREMM fri-
gates. Two new types of ammunition are under
development: an unguided one with a 70-km
range, plus a sub-calibre GPS guided ammunition
with 120-km range, called Vulcano. The latter is
the product of a cooperation with the Netherlands.
In addition, while Giat Industries has undertaken
a feasibility study for a naval version of its
155/52 mm-gun and is working on a GPS-guided
ammunition called Pelican, BAe Systems is
studying a naval version of the Braveheart AS90
self-propelled 155/52-mm gun for fitting aboard
Daring class (Type 45) destroyers. The 155-mm
calibre, however, appears difficult to implement on
European ships, mainly due to size. Hence, there
is little chance of a 155-mm gun being fitted on
the FREMM.
This renewal of naval artillery raises many techni-
cal questions, such as the overheating of chambers
due to the more powerful energy powders used or
tube wear caused by sub-calibre sabot ammunition.
Moreover, even with an inertial/GPS guidance,
the best CEP (Circular Error Probability) offered for
the next decade is about 20 m at 120 km, which
makes it necessary to use fragmentation shells
fitted with sub ammunitions. The need for long-
range precision (a CEP of 700 metres at 120 km
for a 127-mm calibre shell is too imprecise to be
efficient) has a strong impact on the system and
ammunitions. Upgrading the 127-mm gun to the
new standard seems more appropriate, considering
the high number of turrets and classic shells alrea-
dy in service to engage targets of lesser interest.
 The British navy’s HMS Iron Duke
frigate with its helicopter.
This tandem will be on the
front lines for littoral actions.

Fire support missiles confirm the identification

of the target on “sight” via
The immediate suppression of an enemy’s means the optical fibre.
of command is a powerful way to paralyse an
enemy force and to change the local forces ratio. The Polyphem system
In this respect it appears particularly necessary to was selected by the
be able to engage widely differing targets with a German navy to equip its
single weapon . five K130 corvettes, optimised for littoral war. A
programme was launched to study the possibility
To meet these operational requirements, of integrating the Polyphem launcher aboard the
Germany, France and Italy are jointly elabora- FREMM.
ting a project concerning a fibre-optic missile sys-
tem called Polyphem, intended for both naval The installation of GPS guidance on next-gene-
and ground missions. ration anti-ship missiles (Exocet Block III, Harpoon
2000, RBS 15 Mk3...) will give these missiles a lit-
Polyphem’s ability to strike a target from a dis- toral striking capability against ships or targets
tance of 60 km largely exceeds the capabilities of located in seaports, roads or targets along the
current naval artillery (27 km for a 127-mm gun). coast (such as radars or coastal batteries) as
The decimetre precision is obtained thanks to well as against fixed inland-based installations.
navigation by hybridisation of both the inertial
and GPS guidance. The operator at the ground
station receives infrared images made by a came-
ra in the tip of the missile via the optical fibre
located behind the missile. Its purpose is to moni-
tor the engagement phase as well as to validate
target identification before impact in order to
confirm or modify the target. Contrary to what is
commonly thought, the operator does not control
the missile—its flight is completely automatic.
Finally, the warhead can be adapted depending
on the “selected target.” This extreme precision
allows the size of the warhead to be reduced,
while guaranteeing its efficiency for a wide range
of targets, thanks to its multiple effects (hollow-
Illustration showing
charge and blast-fragmentation). the Polyphem missile.
Its main advantage
lies in its extreme
precision, which
For navies, Polyphem offers an identical system allows the disarming
that can fulfil two missions: littoral fire support of an enemy holed up
in a bunker,
from ships as well as new generation light anti- for instance.
ship missiles fired from helicopters. In this latter
role, Polyphem is capable of destroying or neu-
tralising small and medium naval targets in littoral
water (fast attack ships, patrol vessels...) even
within intense sea traffic, thanks to its ability to

21
 Land attack
operations
Europe on time for “Deep Strike”
Europe has been slower than the United States
in embarking on the revolution taking place in
long distance precision strike capabilities, main-
ly for budgetary reasons, but also because the
Cold War focused European countries on tac-
tical problems. New dimensions of conflicts,
The most advanced either operative or strategic, have been pro-
gressively discovered in the various crises
European cruise
throughout the 1990s. But their implications
missile programme have not yet given birth to well-adapted pro-
is undoubtedly grammes and realities. Cruise missiles have
been identified as a capability need within the
the Franco-British
framework of a European Fast Reaction Force
Scalp-EG/ laid out in the European Capability Action Plan.
Storm Shadow
The most advanced European cruise missile
programme is undoubtedly the Franco-British
Scalp-EG/Storm Shadow, with nearly 2,000
units acquired by the United Kingdom, France,
Italy and Greece in the airborne version.
Conflicts such as the Gulf war, Kosovo,
Afghanistan, have confirmed the interest in a
programme for cruise missile with a lengthe-
ned range and a military charge. Already in ser-
vice within the Royal Air Force, this missile has
begun its entry in service in the French air force.
With the Scalp EG, MBDA has reached a key
position in this strategic missile segment and
The Scalp Naval will
enter service within the
French navy in 2011.
22
appears as the only one offering a European
choice as an alternative to the U.S. offer.
Recent conflicts have also emphasised the
need to be able to launch cruise missiles from
naval platforms. This capability gives those
countries which have it a major political and
military role in key areas, such as planning
and targeting functions in commanding an
allied operation—from the start of operations to
completion. As the key point of the future
French navy programmes (FREMM, Barracuda
submarine) the need for a navy cruise missile
was expressed in 2001. The Scalp Naval fea-
sibility study was thus launched in February
2002 by the French minister of defence.
The Scalp Naval is a very long-range cruise
missile with autonomous cruise capability
thanks to the combination of inertial guidance,
terrain following system and GPS. Its main
asset is to offer a very high terminal accuracy,
independent of the GPS system, thanks to a
homing head with infrared imagery. Its warhead
enables it to neutralise various types of tar-
gets. This missile is based on technologies
developed for the airborne version Scalp-EG/
Storm Shadow. It has the same key functiona-
lities, such as infrared final
guidance, the warhead,
motorisation, mission prepa-
ration... These functions are
fitted in an airframe within a
circular segment well adap-
ted to firing from naval plat-
forms, i.e. vertical launching
from frigates as well as fire
from torpedo tubes for
Barracuda submarines.
The feasibility phase is
underway (over the period
2002-2004), with a demons-
tration and risks reduction
programme (PDRR) geared
toward new aspects: verti-
cal firing from both a multi-
missile Sylver A70 launcher
and a submarine’s torpedo
tube. MBDA benefits from the experience of
both the Aster 15 and 30 for the vertical laun-
ching and from the Exocet SM 39 for firing
from submarines. Technical demonstrations
are expected to take place during this risk
reduction phase.
The full development will follow this phase and
is expected to give FREMM deep strike capa-
bilities by 2011. The Naval Scalp will equip all
FREMM frigates, (8 F-ASM and 9 F-AVT).
However only the F-AVT will be equipped with
mission preparation systems. The acquisition of
250 Scalp Navals, including 50 adapted to
firing from a submarine, is provided by the
Defence allocation plan, with an entry in servi-
ce by 2011 for the FREMM and 2013/2015 for
the Barracuda.
Considering the similarities between the French
and Italian capabilities need, as well as the
cooperation on the FREMM, the same naval
cruise missile should equip all frigates. In this
The evolution of the TACTOM
concept of use
The Tactical Tomahawk (TACTOM), or the
TLAM Block IV is expected to enter in service
within the U.S. Navy by 2004 (1343 missiles
over 5 years). This new version is aimed at
reducing the cost as well as offering more flexi-
bility in its tactical use, thanks to a data link,
which allows the TACTOM to change its target
during flight, allowing it to engage “time-critical
targets,” i.e. mobile target. The first demons-
tration flight took place from the ground in
August 2002, after the programme experienced
some problems with the propulsion, resulting in
the replacement of the Teledyne J402 turbojet
by a Williams F-122.
Another objective of TACTOM is cost reduction.
Multi-mission
respect, the Scalp is open to international frigate firing a
cooperation. Scalp Naval
cruise missile.
This armament
gives a strategic
The Royal Navy is looking for a long-range dimension to this
cruise missile to equip its FSC, in a slightly class of ship.
delayed schedule compared with the Franco-
Italian FREMM. At the same time, it will also
seek to replace the Tomahawks equipping its
submarines. Hence, the selected cruise missi-
le could meet both needs.
Within this context, the U.S. Navy decided to
limit the submarines capacity to the vertical
launching of TACTOM. But this unilateral
American decision effectively prevented the
United Kingdom from acquiring additional
Tomahawks, the British submarines being
capable of firing only Tomahawk Block IIIs
horizontally from a torpedo tubes. Under pres-
sure from the British MoD, the American DoD
granted a contract to Raytheon to validate a
Torpedo-Tube Launch version (TTL) that could
be fired from Los Angeles- and Seawolf-class
submarines of the U.S. Navy, as well as the
British SSN Trafalgar and Astute. This valida-
tion of a horizontal launcher will undoubtedly
increase the cost.
23
Type 45

La Fayette

La Fayette

Corvette C1200

Corvette C1800
© TTU - Certes 2003
Photos : AFP - DCN - AMS - D.R -

Sawari 2