UM_SPECPRO_2017-18_CaseDigest 1 of 34
such property may be made. The procedure by which the escheated
RULE 91
#1
G.R. No. 143483 January 31, 2002
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF PASAY CITY vs. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FORMER
3RD DIVISION) AND AMADA H. SOLANO, assisted by her husband
ROMEO SOLANO
BELLOSILLO ,J.:
Case Digest by: Cherry Tempongko
For more than three (3) decades (from 1952 to 1985) private
respondent Amada Solano served as the all-around personal
domestic helper of the late Elizabeth Hankins, a widow and a
French national. During Ms. Hankins' lifetime and most especially
during the waning years of her life, respondent Solano was her
faithful girl Friday and a constant companion since no close
relative was available to tend to her needs.
In recognition of Solano's faithful and dedicated service, Ms.
Hankins executed in her favor two (2) deeds of donation involving
two (2) parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 7807 and 7808 of the
Registry of Deeds. Private respondent alleged that she misplaced
the deeds of donation and were nowhere to be found.
While the deeds of donation were missing, the Republic filed a
petition for the escheat of the estate of Elizabeth Hankins before
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City.
During the proceedings, a motion for intervention was filed by
Romeo Solano, spouse of private respondent, and one Gaudencio
Regosa, but on 24 June 1987 the motion was denied by the trial
court for the reason that "they miserably failed to show valid
claim or right to the properties in question."
Since it was established that there were no known heirs and
persons entitled to the properties of decedent Hankins, the lower
court escheated the estate of the decedent in favor of petitioner
Republic of the Philippines.
In the meantime, private respondent claimed that she accidentally
found the deeds of donation she had been looking for a long time.
In view of this development, respondent Amada Solano filed on
28 January 1997 a petition before the Court of Appeals for the
annulment of the lower court's decision.
Finding no cogent reason to justify the dismissal of the petition for
annulment, the Court of Appeals issued on 12 November 1998 the
first of its assailed Resolutions giving due course to the petition
for annulment of judgment and setting the date for trial on the
merits.
ISSUE:
WON the lower court had jurisdiction to declare the same escheated
in favor of the state.
HELD:
We rule for the petitioner. Escheat is a proceeding, unlike that of
succession or assignment, whereby the state, by virtue of its
sovereignty, steps in and claims the real or personal property of a
person who dies intestate leaving no heir. In the absence of a lawful
owner, a property is claimed by the state to forestall an open
"invitation to self-service by the first comers."Since escheat is one of
the incidents of sovereignty, the state may, and usually does,
prescribe the conditions and limits the time within which a claim to
property may be recovered is generally prescribed by statue, and a
time limit is imposed within which such action must be brought.
In this jurisdiction, a claimant to an escheated property must file his
claim "within five (5) years from the date of such judgment, such
person shall have possession of and title to the same, or if sold, the
municipality or city shall be accountable to him for the proceeds,
after deducting the estate; but a claim not made shall be barred
forever."6 The 5-year period is not a device capriciously conjured by
the state to defraud any claimant; on the contrary, it is decidedly
prescribed to encourage would-be claimants to be punctilious in
asserting their claims, otherwise they may lose them forever in a
final judgment.
Incidentally, the question may be asked: Does herein private
respondent, not being an heir but allegedly a donee, have the
personality to be a claimant within the purview of Sec. 4, Rule 91, of
the Revised Rules of Court? In this regard, we agree with the
Solicitor General that the case of Municipal Council of San
Pedro,Laguna v. Colegio de San Jose, Inc.,is applicable at least insofar
as it concerns the Court's discussion on who is an "interested party"
in an escheat proceeding -
In a special proceeding for escheat under sections 750 and 751
the petitioner is not the sole and exclusive interested party.
Any person alleging to have a direct right or interest in the
property sought to be escheated is likewise an interested party
and may appear and oppose the petition for escheat. In the
present case, the Colegio de San Jose, Inc. and Carlos Young
appeared alleging to have a material interest in the Hacienda
de San Pedro Tunasan; the former because it claims to be the
exclusive owner of the hacienda, and the latter because he
claims to be the lessee thereof under a contract legally entered
with the former.
In the instant petition, the escheat judgment was handed down by
the lower court as early as 27 June 1989 but it was only on 28
January 1997, more or less seven (7) years after, when private
respondent decided to contest the escheat judgment in the guise of
a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals.
Obviously, private respondent's belated assertion of her right over
the escheated properties militates against recovery.
In the mind of this Court the subject properties were owned by the
decedent during the time that the escheat proceedings were being
conducted and the lower court was not divested of its jurisdiction to
escheat them in favor of Pasay City notwithstanding an allegation
that they had been previously donated. We recall that a motion for
intervention was earlier denied by the escheat court for failure to
show "valid claim or right to the properties in question."Where a
person comes into an escheat proceeding as a claimant, the burden
is on such intervenor to establish his title to the property and his
right to intervene. A fortiori, the certificates of title covering the
subject properties were in the name of the decedent indicating that
no transfer of ownership involving the disputed properties was ever
made by the deceased during her lifetime. In the absence therefore
of any clear and convincing proof showing that the subject lands had
been conveyed by Hankins to private respondent Solano, the same
still remained, at least before the escheat, part of the estate of the
decedent and the lower court was right not to assume otherwise.

#2
G.R. No. L-44347 September 29, 1988
VICENTE TAN vs. CITY OF DAVAO
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
Case Digest by: Cherry Tempongko
The spouses Cornelia Pizarro and Baltazar Garcia, during their
lifetime, were residents of Davao City. As they were childless, they
adopted a three-year old girl whom they named Dominga Garcia
and brought up as their own.
At the age of nineteen years, Dominga Garcia married a Chinaman,
Tan Seng alias Seng Yap, with whom she had three children,
named Vicente, who was born in 1916, Mariano who was born in
1918, and Luis who was born in 1921. In 1923, Dominga Garcia
and her three children emigrated to Canton, China. In less than a
year, Tan Seng followed his family to his country of origin.
According to the petitioner, Dominga Garcia died intestate in 1955
(Extra-judicial Settlement of the Estate of Dominga Garcia dated
May 27, 1966). She left in the Philippines a 1,966-square-meter lot
on Claveria Street, Townsite of Davao, District of Davao,
registered in her name under T.C.T. No. 296 (T-2774) of the
Registry of Deeds of Davao City. Since her departure for China
with her family, neither she, nor her husband, nor any of their
children has returned to the Philippines to claim the lot.
Dominga's adoptive parent, Cornelia Pizarro, died in May 1936. In
1948, her nephew, Ramon Pizarro, occupied a part of Dominga's
property and collected the rentals from the owners of other
houses occupying the land.
Another nephew of Cornelia, Segundo Reyes, in a burst of civic
spirit, informed the Solicitor General about the property. The City
Fiscal and NBI agents, Antonio Gonzaga and Felix Valencia,
investigated Segundo Reyes, Ramon Pizarro and Aurelio Pizarro
regarding the whereabouts of Dominga Garcia, Tan Seng, and
their children.
On September 12,1962, the City of Davao filed a petition in the CFI
of Davao, to declare Dominga Garcia's land escheated in its favor.
It alleged that Dominga Garcia and her children are presumed to
be dead and since Dominga Garcia left no heir person by law
entitled to inherit her estate, the same should be escheated
pursuant to Rule 92 of the Rules of Court.
Ramon Pizarro opposed the escheat petition on the ground that
courts are not authorized to declare that a person is presumed to
be dead and that Dominga Garcia's being in Red China is not a
sufficient ground to deprive her of her property by escheat
proceedings.
At the trial, the petitioner's evidence on the Identity of the land;
the fact that the registered owner, Dominga Garcia, and her
children and husband had left for China in 1923; that she died
intestate in 1955; and that none of her heirs is found in the
Philippines, were not seriously disputed.
The controversy centers on whether Dominga's daughter, Vicenta
Tan, is alive in China or in Hongkong, as alleged by Pizarro.
On March 23, 1972, the trial court rendered judgment whose
dispositive portion is quoted below:
WHEREFORE, the land in the name of Dominga Garcia covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 296 (T-2774) of the Register of
Deeds of Davao City, as well as the rentals thereon, shall escheat
UM_SPECPRO_2017-18_CaseDigest 2 of 34
and the same are hereby assigned to the City of Davao for the
benefit of public schools and public charitable institutions and
centers in the said city.
On August 19,1975, a certain Luis Tan, alias Chen YekAn claiming
to be the long missing son of Dominga Garcia, filed a motion for
intervention in the Court of Appeals.
The City of Davao opposed the motion for intervention for
tardiness.
The Court of Appeals disallowed it because the trial had long been
terminated, and the intervention, if allowed, would unduly delay
the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.
On April 2, 1976, the Court of Appeals affirmed the appealed
decision of the trial court. Vicenta Tan and/or her attorney-in-fact,
Ramon Pizarro, appealed by petition for certiorari to this Court.
We find no merit in the petition for review.
ISSUE:
WON the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-
General, may file the escheat petition under Section 1, Rule 91 of
the Revised (1964) Rules of Court.
HELD:
The Appellate Court correctly ruled that the case did not come
under Rule 91 because the petition was filed on September 12,1962,
when the applicable rule was still Rule 92 of the 1940 Rules of Court
which provided:
Sec. 1. When and by whom,petition filed.—When a person dies
intestate, seized of real or personal property in the Philippines,
leaving no heirs or person by law entitled to the same, the
municipality or city where the deceased last resided, if he
resided in the Philippines, or the municipality or city in which he
had estate if he resided out of the Philippines, may file a petition
in the court of first instance of the province setting forth the
facts, and praying that the estate of the deceased be declared
escheated.
Rule 91 of the Revised rules of Court, which provides that only the
Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, may
commence escheat proceedings, did not take effect until January 1,
1964. Although the escheat proceedings were still pending then, the
Revised Rules of Court could not be applied to the petition because
to do so would work injustice to the City of Davao. Rule 144 of the
1964 Rules of Court contains this "saving" clause:
These rules shall take effect on January 1, 1964. They shall
govern all cases brought after they take effect, and also all
further proceedings in cases pending, except to the extent that in
the opinion of the court, their application would not be feasible
or would work injustice, in which event the former procedure
shall apply.
The Court of Appeals should have dismissed the appeal of Vicenta
Tan and Ramon Pizarro earlier because the records show that
Vicenta was never a party in the escheat proceedings. The trial
court's order dated February 4, 1972 ordering that she be
substituted for Ramon Pizarro as oppositor was set aside by the
same court in its Order of March 23, 1972, which was not appealed.
Vicenta Tan, if she still exists, was never served with summons extra-
territorially under Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. She
never appeared in the trial court by herself, or counsel and never
filed a pleading therein, hence, she never submitted to the court's
jurisdiction.
 UM_SPECPRO_2017-18_CaseDigest 3 of 34

Every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the

real party-in-interest (Sec. 2, Rule 3, Rules of Court; Ferrer vs.
Villamor, 60 SCRA 106; Filipinas Industrial Corp. vs. San Diego, 23
SCRA 706; 1 Moran 144). Ramon Pizarro, the alleged administrator
of Dominga Garcia's property, was not a real party in interest. He
had no personality to oppose the escheat petition.
The Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the trial court's ruling
that Dominga Garcia and her heirs may be presumed dead in the
escheat proceedings as they are, in effect, proceedings to settle her
estate. Indeed, while a petition instituted for the sole purpose of
securing a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead
cannot be entertained if that were the only question or matter
involved in the case, the courts are not barred from declaring an
absentee presumptively dead as an incident of, or in connection
with, an action or proceeding for the settlement of the intestate
estate of such absentee. Thus ruled this Court in In re Szatraw 81
Phil 461:
... This presumption ... may arise and be invoked and trade in a
case, either in an action or in a special proceeding, which is tried
or heard by, and submitted for-decision to, competent court.
Independently of such an action or special proceeding, the
presumption of death cannot be invoked, nor can it be made the
subject of an action or special proceeding.
Direct evidence proving that Dominga Garcia, her husband and her
children are in fact dead, is not necessary. It may be presumed
under Article 390 of the New Civil Code which provides:
ART. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown
whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead
for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of
opening his succession till after an absence of ten years ...

#3
G.R. No. L-44658 January 24, 1936
EMILIA DIVINO, as guardian of the minors Bienvenido Esperanza
and Narciso surnamed Loo Tan y Divinovs. CEFERINO HILARIO,
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao and THE
MUNICIPALITY OF GUIANGA
IMPERIAL, J.:
Case Digest by: Cherry Tempongko
This petition for certiorari was filed by the petitioner, as guardian
of the minors Bienvenido, Esperanza and Narciso, surnamed Loo
Tan y Divino, to the end that this court should set aside and nullify
the order issued by the respondent judge on August 24, 1935,
that the respondent municipality with the clerk of court the sum
of P5,000, that the above-named minors should be declared heirs
of the deceased Tan Chay entitled to inherit in equal share said
amount of money, and that they should be granted such other
remedy as may be just and equitable.
In the CFI of Davao, Tan Kui Sing began the intestate of the
deceased Tan Chay, special proceeding No. 314, stating in the
petition filed by him that the deceased was a party in civil case
No. 1147 of the same CFI the Judgment of which was appealed to
this court, and asking that, while his properties are yet unknown,
a special administrator be appointed to duly represent said
deceased in the appeal.
In an order of November 5, 1932, the court appointed Ang Liongto
special administrator. The latter qualified and on April 9, 1934, he
filed an inventory of the properties left by the deceased Tan Chay
wherein he stated that he had left P5,000 in cash in the
possession of the Philippine Foreign Trading & Company and P390
as rents of a house.
On July 6, 1935, the respondent judge ordered that the petition of
Tan Kui Sing be set for trial. On the 9th of the same month the
clerk of court set the trial of the petition on August 24, 1935, at
8:30 a. m., and ordered that the notice of trial be published in the
newspaper El Magindanaw, published in Davao, once a week for
three consecutive weeks.
It does not appear that the notice was actually published.
On August 24, 1935, the court called the petition for hearing, and
after the presentation of the evidence declared that Tan Chay,
had died intestate, that he left no legal heirs, that he left as his
only estate the sum of P5,000 deposited with the Philippine
Foreign Trading & Company, and decreed the escheat of said
funds to the municipality of Guianga, Province of Davao.
On October 16, 1935, the petitioner, in the same capacity as
guardian, appeared in the case and through her attorneys filed a
motion to set aside the decree escheating the P5,000 to the
municipality of Guianga, to declare the minors the only heirs of
Tan Chay, and, finally, to adjudicated to them share and share
alike the sum of P5,000.
ISSUE:
WON the respondent judge was right when he decreed the escheat
of the P5,000 estate of the decedent to the municipality of Guianga.
HELD:
Sections 750 and 752 of the Code of Civil Procedure, applicable to
case, provide as follows:
UM_SPECPRO_2017-18_CaseDigest 4 of 34
SEC. 750. Procedure when persons dies intestate without heirs.
— When a person dies intestate, seized of real or personal by
law entitled to the same, the president and municipal council of
the municipality where the deceased last resided, if he was an
inhabitant of these Islands, or of the municipality in which he
had estate, if he resided out of the Islands, may, on behalf of
the municipality, file a petition with the Court of First Instance
of the province for an inquisition in the premises; the court
shall thereupon appoint a time and place of hearing, and
deciding on such petition, cause a notice thereof to be
published in some newspaper of general circulation in the
province of which the deceased was last an inhabitant, if within
the Philippine Islands, and if not, in some newspaper of general
circulation in the province in which he had estate. The notice
shall recite the substance of the facts and request set forth in
the petition, the time and place at which persons claiming the
estate may appear and be heard before the court, and shall be
published at least six weeks successively, the last of which
publications shall be at least six weeks before the time
appointed by the court to make inquisition.
SEC. 752. Right of heir, and so forth subsequently appearing. —
If a devise, legatee, heir, widow, husband, or other person
entitled to such estate, within seventeen years from the date of
such decree, appears and files a claim with the court to such
estate, he shall have possession of the same, or if sold, the
municipality shall be accountable to him for the avails, after
deducting reasonable charges for the care of the estate; but if a
claim is not made within the time mentioned, it shall be forever
barred.
Section 750 provides how the Court of First Instance may acquire
jurisdiction over the properties left by s deceased who resided in the
Philippine Islands and may decree its escheat to the municipality
where he resided. It provides that the municipal president and the
municipal council may file a petition to that effect, whereupon the
court shall set the same for hearing and shall cause the latter to be
published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province
where the deceased had resided, or in default thereof, in some
newspaper of general circulation in the province in which he had
estate, for a period of six successive weeks, the last of which
publications shall be at least six weeks before the time appointed for
the trial. Section 752 provides that any heir or legatee may appear in
the proceeding within 17 years, and after establishing his hereditary
right, it shall be the duty of the court to order the municipality to
which the estate was escheated to return the same for adjudication
to the former, and in case it had been sold the municipality shall
return its avails after deducting charges for its care.
In the case under consideration, the procedure fixed by section 750
has neither been followed nor complied with, wherefore, we hold
that the respondent judge and the CFI of Davao did not acquire
jurisdiction either to take cognizance of the escheat case or to
promulgate the order of August 24, 1935, whereby the sum of
P5,000 was escheated or adjudicated the municipality of Guianga.
No petition was filed either by the required publication made which
was the essential step which should have conferred jurisdiction.
As the special proceeding No. 314 has been instituted, neither could
the petitioner resort to the remedy granted by section 752, because
if the respondent judge and the Court of First Instance of Davao
never acquired jurisdiction to take cognizance of the escheat case, it
is clear and logical that they neither have jurisdiction to grant the
aforesaid remedy. As we have seen, the only petition which
conferred jurisdiction over the state of the deceased Tan Chay was
that filed by Tan Kui Sing, which was for the sole purpose of
 UM_SPECPRO_2017-18_CaseDigest 5 of 34

appointing a special administrator to represent the deceased in the

appeal interposed in civil cause No. 1147 of the Court of First
Instance of Davao. If another petition for the appointment of a
regular administrator had been filed, it should have been incumbent
on the court to follow the entire procedure in intestacy in order to
determine the heirs and to distribute finally the estate among them.
 UM_SPECPRO_2017-18_CaseDigest 6 of 34

G.R. No. L-30381 August 30, 1988
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH XIII, HON. JESUS
P. MORFE, PRESIDING JUDGE, AND PRES. ROXAS RURAL BANK INC.,
respondents.
Case Digest by: Eula Maye Celaine Perturbos
Pursuant to Section 2 of Act No. 3936, otherwise known as the
Unclaimed Balance Law, some 31 banks including herein private
respondent Pres. Roxas Rural Bank forwarded to the Treasurer of
the Philippines in January of 1968 separate statements under oath
by their respective managing officers of all deposits and credits held
by them in favor, or in the names of such depositors or creditors
known to be dead, or who have not been heard from, or who have
not made further deposits or withdrawals during the preceding ten
years or more. In the sworn statement submitted by private
respondent Bank, only two (2) names appeared: Jesus Ydirin with a
balance of P126.54 and Leonora Trumpeta with a deposit of P62.91.
Thereafter, or on July 25, 1968, the Republic of the Philippines
instituted before the CFI of Manila a complaint for escheat against
the aforesaid 31 banks, including herein private respondent.
On October 5,1968, private respondent Bank filed before the CFI a
motion to dismiss the complaint as against it on the ground of
improper venue.
It is petitioner's contention that private respondent bank, being a
mere nominal party, could not file a motion to dismiss on the
ground of improper venue, the real party in interest being the
depositors themselves; that the avowed purpose of Act No. 3936 is
to benefit the government by escheating unto itself dormant bank
deposits and that this purpose will be defeated if escheat
proceedings will have to be instituted in each and every province or
city where a bank is located because of the publication expense;
that the convenience or inconvenience of the depositors is not the
determining factor as to venue of action, but that in view of Rule
144 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that all cases
brought after the effectivity of the Rules on January 1, 1964 shall be
governed by the provisions of the Rules of Court, Section 2(b) of
Rule 4 on venue is made applicable and available to the Republic in
the instant case.
would not be legally feasible in view of the venue prescribed for
such action under the same section, i.e., the province where the
bank is located. Thus, the addition of the last sentence, which the
lower court had correctly interpreted to mean "that for escheat of
unclaimed bank balances all banks located in one and the same
province where the Court of First Instance concerned is located may
be made parties defendant "in one action" 2 was clearly intended to
save on litigation and publication expenses, but certainly not as
authority for the lumping together of all banks wherever found in
the Philippines in one single escheat proceedings.
Anent the third issue raised, suffice it to say that Section 2(b) of Rule
4 of the Revised Rules of Court cannot govern escheat proceedings
principally because said section refers to personal actions. Escheat
proceedings are actions in rem which must be brought in the
province or city where the rem in this case the dormant deposits, is
located.
We note that while private respondent bank's motion to dismiss was
granted, the trial court in a subsequent order dated November 16,
1968 declared private respondent bank's depositors and co-
defendants Jose Ydirin and Leonora Trumpeta in default for failure
to file their answers. Considering that the complaint in Civil Case No.
73707 states a common cause of action against private respondent
bank and its depositors-co-defendants, and considering further that
the motion to dismiss filed by private respondent bank alleged facts
3 that would warrant dismissal of the complaint against said co-
defendants, we apply by analogy Section 4 of Rule 18 of the Rules of
Court, 4 thereby decreeing the benefits of the dismissal of the
complaint to extend to private respondent bank's co-defendants
Jose Ydirin and Leonora Trumpeta and their successors- in-interest.

We find these contentions unmeritorious.

A "real party in interest" has been defined as the party who would
be benefitted or injured by the judgment of the suit or the party
entitled to avail of the suit. 1 There can be no doubt that private
respondent bank falls under this definition for the escheat of the
dormant deposits in favor of the government would necessarily
deprive said bank of the use of such deposits. It is in this sense that
it stands to be "injured by the judgment of the suit;" and it is for this
reason that Section 3 of Act No. 3936 specifically provides that the
bank shall be joined as a party in the action for escheat.

Anent the second issue, the first sentence of Section 3 of Act No.
3936 directs the Attorney General, now Solicitor General, to
commence an action or actions in the name of the People of the
Philippines in the Court of First Instance of the province where the
bank is located. The phrase "or actions" in this section is very
significant. It manifests awareness on the part of the legislators that
a single action to cover all banks wherever located in the Philippines

G.R. Nos. L-43697 and L-442200 March 31, 1938
In re Liquidation of the Mercantile Bank of China,
GOPOCO GROCERY (GOPOCO), ET AL., claimants-appellants,
vs.
PACIFIC COAST BISCUIT CO., ET AL., oppositors-appellees.
Case Digest by: Eula Maye Celaine Perturbos
On petition of the Bank Commissioner who alleged to have found,
after an investigation, that the Mercantile Bank of China could not
continue operating as such without running the risk of suffering
losses and prejudice its depositors and customers; and that with the
requisite approval of the corresponding authorities, he had taken
charge of all the assets thereof; the Court of First Instance of Manila
declared the said bank in liquidation; approved all the acts
theretofore executed by the commissioner; prohibited the officers
and agents of the bank from interfering with said commissioner in
the possession of the assets thereof, its documents, deed, vouchers,
books of account, papers, memorandum, notes, bond, bonds and
accounts, obligations or securities and its real and personal
properties; required its creditors and all those who had any claim
against it, to present the same in writing before the commissioner
within ninety days; and ordered the publication, as was in fact done,
of the order containing all these provisions, for the two consecutive
weeks in two news-papers of general circulation in the City of
Manila, at the expenses of the aforesaid bank.
After these publications, and within the period of ninety days, the
following creditors, among others, presented their presented their
claims: Tiong Chui Gion, Gopoco Grocery, Tan Locko, Woo & Lo &
Co., Sy Guan Huat and La Bella Tondeña.
To resolve these claims, FulgencioBorromeo was appointed by the
lower court as commissioner and referee to receive the evidence
which the interested parties may desire to present. Borromeo
resolved the claims by
recommending that the same be considered as an ordinary credit
only, and not as a preferred credit as Gopoco Grocery, Et Al wanted,
because they were at the same time debtors of the bank. The lower
court upheld Borromeo’s recommendations. Gopoco Grocery, et. al.
contended that their claims are preferred credits because they are
deposits in contemplation of law, and as such, should be returned
with the corresponding interest thereon.
Gopoco Grocery, et. al., themselves, admit that the bank owes them
interest which should have been paid to them before it was declared
in a state of liquidation. This fact undoubtedly destroys the
character which they nullifies their contention that the same be
considered as irregular deposits, because the payment of interest
only takes place in the case of loans. The so-called current account
and savings deposits have lost their character of deposits and are
convertible into simple commercial loans
because, in cases of such deposits, the bank has made use thereof
in the ordinary course of its transactions as an institution engaged in
the banking business, not because it so wishes, but precisely
because of the authority deemed to have been granted to it by
Gopoco Grocery, Et Al to enable them to collect the interest which
they had been and they are now collecting, and by virtue further of
the authority granted to it by Corporation Law and Banking Law.
Wherefore, it is held that the deposits on current account of the
appellants in the bank under liquidation, with the right on their right
on their part to collect interest, have not created and could not
UM_SPECPRO_2017-18_CaseDigest 7 of 34
create a juridical relation between them except that of creditors and
debtor, they being the creditors and the bank the debtor.
It is proper that set-offs be made, inasmuch as the appellants and
the bank being reciprocally debtors and creditors, the same is only
just and according to law (art. 1195, Civil Code), particularly as none
of the appellants falls within the exceptions mentioned in section 58
of the Insolvency Law (Act No. 1956), reading:
SEC. 58. In all cases of mutual debts and mutual credits between the
parties, the account between them shall be stated, and one debt set
off against the other, and the balance only shall be allowed and
paid. But no set-off or counterclaim shall be allowed of a claim in its
nature not provable against the estate: Provided, That no set-off on
counterclaim shall be allowed in favor of any debtor to the insolvent
of a claim purchased by or transferred to such debtor within thirty
days immediately preceding the filing, or after the filing of the
petition by or against the insolvent.
It has been said with much basis by Morse, in his work on Bank and
Banking (6th ed., vol. 1, pages 776 and 784) that:
The rules of law as to the right of set-off between the bank and its
depositors are not different from those applicable to other parties.
(Page 776.)
Where the bank itself stops payment and becomes insolvent, the
customer may avail himself in set-off against his indebtedness to the
bank of any indebtedness of the bank to himself, as, for example,
the balance due him on his deposit account. (Page 784.)
But if set-offs are proper in these cases, when and how should they
be made, considering that the appellants ask for the payment of
interest? Are they by any chance entitled to interest? If they are,
when and until what time should they be paid the same?
The question of whether they are entitled to interest should be
resolved in the same way that we resolved the case of the claimant
Tan Tiong Tick in the said case, G. R. No. 43682. The circumstances in
these two cases are certainly the same as those in the said case with
reference to the said question. The Mercantile Bank of China owes
to each of the appellants the interest claimed by them,
corresponding to the year ending December 4, 1931, the date it was
declared in a state of liquidation, but not which the appellants claim
should be earned by their deposits after said date and until the full
amounts thereof are paid to them. And with respect to the question
of set-off, this should be deemed made, of course, as of the date
when the Mercantile Bank of China was declared in a state of
liquidation, that is, on December 4, 1931, for then there was already
a reciprocal concurrence of debts, with respect to said bank and the
appellants.
 UM_SPECPRO_2017-18_CaseDigest 8 of 34

Rule 91: RCBC vs. H—Tri courts shall determine whether the credit or deposit should pass to
the claimants or be forfeited in favor of the State.
Case Digest by: Grecel Paclipan
We emphasize that escheat is not a proceeding to penalize
Facts: depositors for failing to deposit to or withdraw from their accounts.
It is a proceeding whereby the State compels the surrender to it of
Luz Bakunawa and her husband Manuel, now deceased unclaimed deposit.
(Spouses Bakunawa) are registered owners of six parcels of land
registered in Quezon City and Marikina. These lots were In the case at bar, the mere issuance of a Manager’s Check
sequestered by the PCGG. Sometime in 1990, a certain does not ipso facto work as an automatic transfer of funds to the
TeresitaMillan, through her representative, Jerry Montemayor, account of the payee. In case the procurerof the Manager’s Check
offered to buy said lots for Php 6,724,085.71, with the promise that retains custody of the instrument (as had in this case), does not
she will take care of clearing whatever preliminary obstacles there tender it to the intended payee, or fails to make an effective
may be to effect a completion of the sale. The Spouses Bakunawa delivery, presentment of the check to the bank for payment did not
gave to Millan the owner’s copies of the TCTs, and in turn Millan occur and, in this case, an order to debit the account of respondents
made a donwpayment of Php 1,019,514.29 for the intended was never made. As a result, the assigned fund is deemed to remain
purchase. However, for one reason or another, Millan was not able part of the account of Hi-Tri, which procured the Manager’s Check.
to clear said obstacles. As a result, the Spouses Bakunawa rescinded Hence, respondents should have been informed that the deposit
the sale and offered to return to Millan her downpayment. had been left inactive for more than 10 years, and that it may be
However, Millan refused to accept the downpayment. subjected to escheat proceedings if left unclaimed.
Consequently, the Spouses Bakunawa, through their company, Hi-Tri
Dev’t Corp., took out on October 28, 1991 a Manager’s Check from
RCBC-Ermita for the amount of the downpayment payable to
Millan’s Company, Rosmil Realty and Development Corporation c/o
TeresitaMillan, and used this as one of their basis for a complaint
against Millan and Montemayor which they filed in the RTC of
Quezon City. On January 31, 2003, during the pendency of the
abovementioned case and without the knowledge of Hi-Tri and
Spouses Bakunawa, RCBC reported the Php 1,019,514.29 credit
existing in favor of Rosmil to the Bureau of Treasury as among its
unclaimed balances as of January 31, 2003. Allegedly, a copy of the
Sworn Statement executed by Florentino Mendoza, Manager and
Head of RCBC’s Asset Management, Disbursement, & Sundry
Department (AMDSD) was posted within the premises of RCBC-
Ermita.

Issue:

Whether or not the allocated funds may be escheated in

favor of the Republic of the Philippines.

Held:

No, the allocated funds may not be escheated in favor of

the Republic of the Philippines.

Notwithstanding that the CA committed reversible error

when it ruled that the issuance of individual notices upon
respondents was a jurisdictional requirement, nevertheless, we find
sufficient grounds to affirm the CA on the exclusion of the funds
allocated for the payment of the Manager’s Check in the escheat
proceedings.

Escheta proceedings refer to the judicial process in which

the State, by virtue of its sovereignty, steps in and claims
abandoned, left vacant, or unclaimed property, without there being
an interested person having a legal claim thereto. In the case of
dormant accounts, the State inquires into the status, custody, and
ownership of the unclaimed balance to determine whether the
inactivity was brought about by the fact of death or absence of or
abandonment by the depositor. If after the proceedings the
property remains without a lawful owner interested to claim it, the
property shall be reverted to the State, to forestall an open
invitationto self-service by the first comers. However, if interested
comers have come forward and lain claim to the property, the
 UM_SPECPRO_2017-18_CaseDigest 9 of 34

Rule 91: Republic vs. Register of Deeds of Roxas City

Case Digest by: Grecel Paclipan

Facts:

In March 1936, Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, bought Lot No.

398 with an area of 1,574 square meters from VicentaArcenas and
the Dinglasans. In February 1944, Lee Liong died intestateand was
survived by his widow, Ang Chia, and his sons, Lee Bing Hoo and Lee
Bun Ting. In June 1947, the surviving heirs extrajudicially settled the
estate of the deceased and partitioned among themselves Lot No.
398. When Lee Bing Hoo and Lee Bun Ting died, Lot No. 398 was
transferred by succession to their respective wives, Elizabeth Lee
and Pacita Yu-Lee (herein private respondents).

In September 1993, Elizabeth and Pacita filed a petition for

reconstitution of title of Lot No. 398 because the records of the
Register of Deeds of Roxas City were burned during the war.
Meanwhile, in January 1995, petitioner Republic of the Philippines,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed with the RTC
of Roxas City a complaint for reversion of title against private
respondents and the Register of Deeds of Roxas City, praying that 1.)
the sale of Lot No. 398 to Lee Liong be set aside for being null and
void ab initio; and 2.) Lot no. 398 be reverted to the public domain
for the State’s disposal in accordance with law. The RTC rendered a
decision ordering the reversion of Lot No. 398 to the State. The CA
reversed the RTC’s decision. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:

W/N Lot No. 398 should be reversed to the State.

Held:

No, Lot No. 398 should not be reversed to the State.

Private respondents are the lawful owners of the property.

While the vendee (Lee Liong) was an alien at the time of

the sale, the land has since become the property of Filipino citizens
who are constitutionally qualified to own land. Lot No. 398 in this
case was transferred by succession to the heirs (herein private
respondents). The OSG may initiate an action for reversion or
escheat of lands which were sold to aliens disqualified from
acquiring lands under the Constitution. However, in the case of Lot
No. 398, the fact that it was already transferred to Filipinos militate
against escheat proceedings. Thus, the subsequent transfer of the
property to qualified Filipinos may no longer be impugned on the
basis of invalidity of the initial transfer. The objective of the
Constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been
achieved. In short, the law disregards the Constitutional
disqualification of the buyer to hold land if the land is subsequently
transferred to a qualified party, or the buyer himself becomes a
qualified party.
 UM_SPECPRO_2017-18_CaseDigest 10 of 34

GENERAL GUARDIANS AND GUARDIANSHIP considered a purchaser in good faith of the one-half portion of the
land belonging to the minors;
G.R. No. L-23096 April 27, 1972
The failure of respondent Court of Appeals to give due weight to the
grave jurisdictional defect that tainted the guardianship proceeding
MARTIN NERY and LEONCIA L. DE LEON, petitioners,
resulted in its judgment suffering the corrosion of substantial legal
vs.
error. The rights of the children of Leoncio Lorenzo as upheld by the
ROSARIO, ALFREDO, MARIANO, PACIFICO, ONOFRE, TEOFILO,
lower court must, to repeat, be maintained.
LOLOY and TRINIDAD, all surnamed LORENZO, respondents.

What is indisputable in the light of the controlling legal doctrines is

G.R. No. L-23376 April 27, 1972
that it was the lower court and not the respondent Court of Appeals
that yielded obeisance to the applicable procedural rule. It is worded
DIONISIO, PERFECTO, MARIA REBECCA, ASUNCION, MAURO, and, thus: "When a petition for the appointment of a general guardian
LOURDES, all surnamed LORENZO, petitioners, is filed, the court shall fix a time and place for hearing the same,
vs. and shall cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the
MARTIN NERY and LEONCIA L. DE LEON, respondents. persons mentioned in the petition residing in the province,
including the minor if above 14 years of age or the incompetent
FERNANDO, J.: himself, and may direct other general or special notice thereof to
be given."8 The late Chief Justice Moran was quite explicit as to its
Case Digest by: Cloydie Mark Marcos jurisdictional character. These are his words: "Service of the notice
upon the minor if above 14 years of age or upon the incompetent,
is jurisdictional. Without such notice, the court acquires no
The point to be resolved in these two petitions for the review of a jurisdiction to appoint a guardian."
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated April 30, 1964 is
the extent of the rights acquired by the vendees, the spouses Martin
Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon1 arising from a sale of a parcel of land.
The vendor, Bienvenida de la Isla, was the widow of the deceased
Leoncio Lorenzo and guardian of their children, Dionisio, Perfecto,
Maria Rebeeca, Asuncion, Mauro and Lourdes,2 who thereafter
challenged the validity of such a transaction. It was their contention
that notwithstanding an order authorizing the sale from the probate
court on June 2, 1953, it could be, impugned as they were not
informed of such a move. Moreover, the guardianship proceeding,
instituted on December 7, 1950, was heard without the two elder
children, Dionisio and Perfecto Lorenzo being notified although they
were then more than 14 years of age. The rights of the Children of
Leoncio Lorenzo and Bienvenida de la Isla to one-half of the three-
fourths appertaining to such spouses were accorded recognition.

The matter was then elevated to the respondent Court of Appeals by

the spouses Martin Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon. Respondent Court
in its decision, declared valid the deed of sale executed by the
mother Bienvenida de la Isla in favor of the spouses Nery and de
Leon as to the whole three-fourths. It thus ignored the grave
jurisdictional defects that attended the challenged orders, starting
with the two elder children not being notified of the petition for
guardianship, even if they were already above 14, as pointed out
and stressed in their petition for review.

ISSUE: WON the notice to minor who is above 14 y.o. is

jurisdictional.

HELD: YES

The lower court was correct in finding that in the guardianship

proceedings, the court acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of
the minors who were not notified of the petition, at least 2 of
them being over 14 years of age; that as the inventory submitted by
the guardian stated that the minors had no real estate, the court did
not acquire jurisdiction over the real property of the minors and
could not have validly authorized its sale, and the total absence of
the requisite notice necessarily rendered the order of sale, ... null
and void, and the defendant, Martin S. Nery, a lawyer, could not be
 UM_SPECPRO_2017-18_CaseDigest 11 of 34

G.R. No. 151243 April 30, 2008
LOLITA R. ALAMAYRI, petitioner,
vs.
ROMMEL, ELMER, ERWIN, ROILER and AMANDA, all surnamed
PABALE, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Case Digest by: Cloydie Mark Marcos
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Lolita R. Alamayri
(Alamayri) seeking the reversal and setting aside of the
Decision,which upheld the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale,
executed by Nelly S. Nave (Nave) in favor of the Pabale siblings over
a piece of land.
The Pabale siblings intervened as appellants in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133
averring that the RTC erred in declaring in its 2 December 1997
Decision that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 20 February 1984
executed by Nave in their favor was null and void on the ground that
Nave was found incompetent since the year 1980.
Alamayri sought reconsideration of the Decision of the appellate
court, invoking the Decision, dated 22 June 1988, of the RTC in the
guardianship proceedings, docketed as SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C,
which found Nave incompetent, her condition becoming severe
since 1980; and thus appointed Atty. Leonardo C. Paner as her
guardian. Said Decision already became final and executory when no
one appealed therefrom. Alamayri argued that since Nave was
already judicially determined to be an incompetent since 1980, then
all contracts she subsequently entered into should be declared null
and void, including the Deed of Sale, dated 20 February 1984, which
she executed over the subject property in favor of the Pabale
siblings.
A guardian may be appointed by the RTC over the person and
estate of a minor or an incompetent, the latter being described as a
person "suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are
hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to
read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they
have lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but by
reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot,
without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their
property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and
exploitation."
A petition for appointment of a guardian is a special proceeding,
without the usual parties, i.e., petitioner versus respondent, in an
ordinary civil case. Accordingly, SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C bears the
title: In re: Guardianship of Nelly S. Nave for Incompetency, Verdasto
Gesmundo y Banayo, petitioner, with no named respondent/s.
Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 93 of the Rules of Court, though, require
that the petition contain the names, ages, and residences of
relatives of the supposed minor or incompetent and those having
him in their care, so that those residing within the same province as
the minor or incompetent can be notified of the time and place of
the hearing on the petition.
The objectives of an RTC hearing a petition for appointment of a
guardian under Rule 93 of the Rules of Court is to determine, first,
whether a person is indeed a minor or an incompetent who has no
capacity to care for himself and/or his properties; and, second,
who is most qualified to be appointed as his guardian. The rules
reasonably assume that the people who best could help the trial
court settle such issues would be those who are closest to and most
familiar with the supposed minor or incompetent, namely, his
relatives living within the same province and/or the persons caring
for him.

ISSUE: WON conclusiveness of judgment is applicable in special

proceedings.

HELD: NO

Conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-litigation in a second case of

a fact or question already settled in a previous case. The second
case, however, may still proceed provided that it will no longer
touch on the same fact or question adjudged in the first case.
Conclusiveness of judgment requires only the identity of issues and
parties, but not of causes of action.

Contrary to Alamayri’s assertion, conclusiveness of judgment has no

application to the instant Petition since there is no identity of
parties and issues between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C and Civil Case
No. 675-84-C.

SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C was a petition filed with the RTC for the
appointment of a guardian over the person and estate of his late
wife Nave alleging her incompetence.
 UM_SPECPRO_2017-18_CaseDigest 12 of 34

NILO OROPESA, guardianship is designed to further the wards well-being, not that of
Petitioner, the guardian. It is intended to preserve the wards property, as well
- versus - as to render any assistance that the ward may personally require. It
CIRILO OROPESA, has been stated that while custody involves immediate care and
Respondent. control, guardianship indicates not only those responsibilities, but
those of one in loco parentis as well.
April 25, 2012
We have held in the past that a finding that a person is incompetent
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: should be anchored on clear, positive and definite evidences. We
consider that evidentiary standard unchanged and, thus, must be
applied in the case at bar.
Case Digest by: Albert Bantan

In an analogous guardianship case wherein the soundness of mind of

Facts:
the proposed ward was at issue, we had the occasion to rule that
where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not
On January 23, 2004, the (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial necessary [and that] the observations of the trial judge coupled with
Court of Paraaque City, a petition for him and a certain Ms. Louie evidence establishing the persons state of mental sanity will suffice.
Ginez to be appointed as guardians over the property of his father,
the (respondent) Cirilo Oropesa.

In the said petition, it is alleged among others that the (respondent)

has been afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for over
ten (10) years already having suffered a stroke on April 1, 2003 and
June 1, 2003, that his judgment and memory [were] impaired and
such has been evident after his hospitalization; that even before his
stroke, the (respondent) was observed to have had lapses in
memory and judgment, showing signs of failure to manage his
property properly; that due to his age and medical condition, he
cannot, without outside aid, manage his property wisely, and has
become an easy prey for deceit and exploitation by people around
him, particularly Ms. Ma. Luisa Agamata, his girlfriend.

In an Order dated January 29, 2004, the presiding judge of the court
a quo set the case for hearing, and directed the court social worker
to conduct a social case study and submit a report thereon.

RTC dismissed the case considering that the Court record shows that
petitioner-movant has failed to provide sufficient documentary and
testimonial evidence to establish that Gen. Cirilo Oropesa is
incompetent to run his personal affairs and to administer his
properties.

The same decision is affirmed by the CA.

Issue:

WHETHER RESPONDENT IS CONSIDERED AN INCOMPETENT PERSON

AS DEFINED UNDER SECTION 2, RULE 92 OF THE RULES OF COURT
WHO SHOULD BE PLACED UNDER GUARDIANSHIP

HELD:

After considering the evidence and pleadings on record, we find the

petition to be without merit.

In Francisco v. Court of Appeals, we laid out the nature and purpose

of guardianship in the following wise:

A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in

which one person, called a guardian acts for another called the ward
whom the law regards as incapable of managing his own affairs. A
 UM_SPECPRO_2017-18_CaseDigest 13 of 34

G.R. No. 194366 October 10, 2012 The Issue

NAPOLEON D. NERI, ALICIA D. NERI-MONDEJAR, VISMINDA D.
NERI-CHAMBERS, ROSA D. NERI-MILLAN, DOUGLAS D. NERI,
EUTROPIA D. ILLUT-COCKINOS AND VICTORIA D. ILLUT-PIALA,
Petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF HADJI YUSOP UY AND JULPHA* IBRAHIM
UY, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Case Digest by: Albert Bantan
The Facts
Anunciacion Neri (Anunciacion) had seven children, two (2) from her
first marriage with Gonzalo namely: Eutropia and Victoria, and five
(5) from her second marriage with Enrique Neri, namely: Napoleon,
Alicia, Visminda, Douglas and Rosa. Throughout the marriage of
spouses Enrique and Anunciacion, they acquired several homestead
properties with a total area of 296,555 square meters located in
Samal, Davao del Norte.
On September 21, 1977, Anunciacion died intestate. Her husband,
Enrique, in his personal capacity and as natural guardian of his minor
children Rosa and Douglas, together with Napoleon, Alicia, and
Visminda executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with
Absolute Deed of Sale8 in favor of spouses Uy.
On June 11, 1996, the children of Enrique filed a complaint for
annulment of sale of the said homestead properties against spouses
Uy (later substituted by their heirs)before the RTC, assailing the
validity of the sale for having been sold within the prohibited period.
The complaint was later amended to include Eutropia and Victoriaas
additional plaintiffs for having been excluded and deprived of their
legitimes as children of Anunciacion from her first marriage.
The RTC Ruling
The RTC rendered a decision ordering, among others, the annulment
of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of
Sale. It ruled that while the sale occurred beyond the 5-year
prohibitory period, the sale is still void because Eutropia and Victoria
were deprived of their hereditary rights and that Enrique had no
judicial authority to sell the shares of his minor children, Rosa and
Douglas.
Whether or not Enrique, as guardian of Rosa and Douglas, has the
power to dispose their interest in the property in question.
The Ruling of the Court
The petitionis meritorious.
With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time of
the execution of the settlement and sale, their natural guardian and
father, Enrique, represented them in the transaction. However, on
the basis of the laws prevailing at that time, Enrique was merely
clothed with powers of administration and bereft of any authority to
dispose of their 2/16 shares in the estate of their mother,
Anunciacion.
Section 7, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 7. Parents as Guardians. – When the property of the child under
parental authority is worth two thousand pesos or less, the father or
the mother, without the necessity of court appointment, shall be his
legal guardian. When the property of the child is worth more than
two thousand pesos, the father or the mother shall be considered
guardian of the child’s property, with the duties and obligations of
guardians under these Rules, and shall file the petition required by
Section 2 hereof. For good reasons, the court may, however, appoint
another suitable persons.
Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property
and the receipt of fruits according to the natural purpose of the
thing. Any act of disposition or alienation, or any reduction in the
substance of the patrimony of child, exceeds the limits of
administration. Thus, a father or mother, as the natural guardian of
the minor under parental authority, does not have the power to
dispose or encumber the property of the latter. Such power is
granted by law only to a judicial guardian of the ward’s property and
even then only with courts’ prior approval secured in accordance
with the proceedings set forth by the Rules of Court.
Consequently, the disputed sale entered into by Enrique in behalf of
his minor children without the proper judicial authority, unless
ratified by them upon reaching the age of majority, is unenforceable
in accordance with Articles 1317 and 1403(1) of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The April 27, 2010
Decision and October 18, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The CA Ruling

The CA declared the extrajudicial settlement and the subsequent

sale as valid and binding with respect to Enrique and his children,
holding that as co-owners, they have the right to dispose of their
respective shares as they consider necessary or fit. While
recognizing Rosa and Douglas to be minors at that time, they were
deemed to have ratified the sale when they failed to question it
upon reaching the age of majority. It also found laches to have set in
because of their inaction for a long period of time.

RULE 96
G.R. No. L-19614 March 27, 1971
JESUS M. GABOYA, as Administrator of the Estate of DON
MARIANO CUI, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ANTONIO MA. CUI, MERCEDES CUI-RAMAS and GIL RAMAS,
defendants-appellees, JESUS MA. CUI, JOSE MA. CUI, SERAFIN MA.
CUI, JORGE MA. CUI, ROSARIO CUI DE ENCARNACION, PRECILLA C.
VELEZ, and LOURDES C. VELEZ, intervenors-appellants, VICTORINO
REYNES, defendant-in-counterclaim-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Case Digest by: Christine Faith Sabella
The antecedents facts:
Don Mariano Cui, widower, as owner of 3 lots in the City of Cebu. On
March 8, 1946, sold said three lots to three of his children named
Rosario C. de Encarnacion, Mercedes C. de Ramas and Antonio Ma.
Cui, pro indiviso for the sum of P64,000. Because Rosario C. de
Encarnacion for lack of funds was unable to pay her corresponding
share of the purchase price, the sale to her was cancelled and the
one-third of the property corresponding to her was returned to the
vendor. These three lots are commercial. The improvements
thereon were destroyed during the last Pacific War so there were no
buildings or any other improvements on them. Because of the sale
of these lots pro indiviso and because of the cancellation of the sale
to one of the three original vendees, Don Mariano and his children
Mercedes and Antonio became co-owners of the whole mass in
equal portions. In the deed of sale vendor Don Mariano retained for
himself the usufruct of the property.
Subsequently, a building was erected on a portion of this mass
facing Calderon street and was occupied by a Chinese businessman
for which he paid Don Mariano P600 a month as rental. The date
when the building, was constructed and by whom do not appear in
the record.
Mercedes and Antonio the two applied to the Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation (RFC) for a loan to construct a 12-door commercial
building presumably on a portion of the entire parcel corresponding
to their share. In order to facilitate the granting of the loan and
inasmuch as only two of the three co-owners applied for the loan,
Don Mariano executed an authority to mortgage authorizing his two
children co-owners to mortgage his share, the pertinent portion of
said authority reading thus:
The loan was eventually granted and was secured by a mortgage on
the three lots in question, Don Mariano being included as one of the
three mortgagors and signing the corresponding promissory note
with his two co-owners. He did not however, join in the construction
of the 12-door commercial building.It was agreed among the three
co-owners to assign to Don Mariano that one-third of the whole
mass facing Calderon street and on which was erected the building
already referred to as being occupied by a Chinese businessman and
for which he was paying Don Mariano P600 a month rental.
The 12-door commercial building was eventually constructed and
the builder-owners thereof Mercedes and Antonio received and
continued to receive the rents thereof amounting to P4,800 a month
and paying therefrom the installments due for payment on the loan
to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation.
UM_SPECPRO_2017-18_CaseDigest 14 of 34
Rosario C. Encarnacion, that daughter of Don Mariano who was one
of the original vendees, filed a petition to declare her father
incompetent and to have a guardian appointed for his property. In
May 1949 the petition was granted and Don Mariano was declared
incompetent and Victorino Reynes was appointed guardian of his
property.
Guardian Victorino Reyes filed a motion in the gurdianship
proceedings seeking authority to collect the rentals from the three
lots in question and asking the Court to order Antonio and Mercedes
to deliver to him as guardian all the rentals they had previosly
collected from the 12-door commercial building, together with all
the papers belonging to his ward. This motion was denied by Judge
Piccio. On August 1, 1951, after the rendition of judgment in civil
case No. 599-R upholding the sale, guardian Victorino Reynes again
presented of filed a motion in the guardianship proceedings No.
481-R asking for the delivery of the rentals of the 12-door
commercial building to him and for authority to collect future
rentals thereon. On September 5, 1951, respondent Judge Piccio,
the same Judge who had denied a similar motion about two years
before, that is, on July 12, 1949, granted the motion in his order of
the same date directing Antonio and Mercedes to deliver to the
guardian the rentals of the building they had so far collected, at the
same time authorizing the guardian to collect future rentals. The
motion to reconsider the order filed by Antonio and Mercedes was
denied in an order dated October 1, 1951. The present petition for
certiorari with preliminary injunction was filed in this court for the
purpose of annulling said order of September 5, 1951 and the order
of October 1, 1951 denying the motion for reconsideration, on the
ground that the trial court in the guardianship proceedings lacked
jurisdiction to issue the order.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent Judge had jurisdiction to issue the
orderdirecting the petitioners herein to deliver to the guardian
Victorino Reynes the rentals collected by them from the building and
authorizing said guardian to collect future rentals.
Ruling:
We must first determine the nature and status of said rentals in
relation with the guardianship proceedings. Said determination
requires an interpretation of section 6, Rule 97 of the Rules of Court
which reads as follows:
SEC. 6. Proceedings when person suspected of embezzling or
conceling property of ward. — Upon complaint of the guardian or
ward, or of any person having an actual or prospective interest in
the estate of the ward as creditor, heir, or otherwise, that anyone is
suspected of having embezzled, concealed, or conveyed away any
money, goods, or interest, or a written instrument, belonging to the
ward or his estate, the court may cite the suspected person to
appear for examination, touching such money, goods, interest, or
instrument, and make such orders as will secure the estate against
such embezzlement, concealment, or conveyance.
This provision is similar to the procedure in the settlement of the
estate of a deceased person and its purpose is merely to elicit
information or secure evidence from the person suspected of having
embezzled, concealed or conveyed any personal property of the
ward. In such proceeding the court has no authority to determine
the right of the property or to order delivery thereof. If after the
examination the court finds this sufficient evidence showing
 UM_SPECPRO_2017-18_CaseDigest 15 of 34

ownership on the part of the ward, it is the duty of the guardian to In the present case, is the right of the ward, Don Mariano, to the
bring the proper action. rentals of the 12-door building, clear and indisputable? The answer
is definitely in the negative. Without any attempt or desire to
Section 573 of Act 190 referred to above is now embodied in Rule determine the rights or lack of right of the ward to said rentals and
88, section 6 of the Rules of Court, and under said rule, Moran has prejudge the civil action No. R-1720 brought by the guardian in the
practically the same comment as that reproduced above. In other Court of First Instance of Cebu to recover said rentals, on the basis
words in his opinion neither in guardianship proceedings nor in only of the documents involved or presented in this certiorari
administration proceedings may the court determining the proceedings and without any additional evidence, these are reasons
ownership of property claimed by the guardian or administrator to to believe that the scales of title instead of favoring the ward, incline
belong to the ward or to the estate of the deceased, and order its more in favor of and point to the owners of the building. We need
delivery to them. We believe that the purpose of these two rules, not estate those reasons here.
Rule 97, section 6 and Rule 88, section 6 of the Rules of Court is
merely to secure evidence from persons suspected of embezzling, In conclusion, we hold that the respondent Judge had no jurisdiction
concealing or conveying away any property of the ward or of the to issue his order of September 5, 1951, in the guardianship
deceased so as to enable said guardian or administrator to proceedings requiring the petitioners to deliver the rentals collected
institute the appropriate action to obtain the possession of and by them to the guardian and authorizing the latter to collect rentals
secure title to said property, all for the protection of the interests in the future, for the reason that the jurisdiction of the court
of the ward and of the estate of the deceased. guardianship proceedings, ordinarily, is to cite persons suspected of
having embezzled, concealed or conveyed property belonging to the
Counsel for respondents invite our attention to several cases ward for the purpose of obtaining information which may be used in
purporting to support the theory that the court in guardianship an action later to be instituted by the guardian to protect the right
proceedings may actually order the delivery of the property of the of the ward; and that only in extreme cases, where property clearly
ward found to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed. Out of the belongs to the ward or where his title thereto has already been
cases cited, the only one we find to have some relevancy in that of judicially decided, may the court direct its delivery to the guardian.
Castillo vs. Bustamante, 64 Phil., 839. In this case, the court made a
distinction between the provisions of sections 709 and 593 of the In view of the foregoing, the petition is granted and the order of
Code of Civil Procedure which now correspond to section 6, Rule 88 respondent Judge of September 5, 1951, and his order of October 1,
and section 6 of Rule 97 of the Rules of Court. This Court in that 1951, are hereby set aside. The writ of preliminary injunction is
case said in effect that while in admission proceedings the court hereby made permanent. The respondent-guardian, Victorino
under section 709 may only question the person suspected of Reynes, will pay the costs."
having embezzled, concealed or conveyed away property
belonging to the estate, section 593 of the same Code of Civil
Procedure authorizes the Judge or the court to issue such orders as
may be necessary to secure the estate against concealment,
embezzlement and conveyance, and this distinction is now given
emphasis by respondents' counsel. The way we interpret section
573 of the Code of Civil procedures as now embodied in Rule 97,
section 6 of the Rules of Court in the light of the ruling laid down in
the case of Castillo vs. Bustamante, supra, is that the court may
issue an order directing the delivery or return of any property
embezzled, concealed or conveyed which belongs to a ward, where
the right or title of said ward is clear and indisputable. Such was the
case of Castillo vs. Bustamante where husband and wife, parties in
litigation, arrived at a compromise whereby they donated their
conjugal property to their only child and this donation was duly
accepted. This compromise was approved by the court and
embodied in the decision and the parties were directed to comply
with the terms of the compromise. Later, the husband refused to
deliver the property donated. This court affirmed the order of the
trial court requiring the husband to deliver said property to the
guardians of the minor child because the title of the ward of res
judicata. "We believe, however, that where title to any property said
to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed is in question as in the
present case, the determination of said title or right whether in
favor of the ward or in favor of the persons said to have embezzled,
concealed or conveyed the property must be determined in a
separate ordinary action and not in guardianship proceedings.
Incidentally it may be here stated that about a month after the filing
of the present case of certiorari, or rather on November 1, 1951,
guardian Victorino Reynes filed an ordinary action, civil case No. R-
1720, in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against Antonio and
Mercedes to recover all the rentals of the 12-door building collected
by them

RULE 97
G.R. No. L-57438 January 3, 1984
FELICIANO FRANCISCO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PELAGIO FRANCISCO, respondents.
Case Digest by: Christine Faith Sabella
Facts:
Petitioner is the duly appointed guardian of the incompetent
Estefania San Pedro.Respondent Pelagio Francisco, claiming to be a
first cousin of Estefania San Pedro, together with two others, said to
be nieces of the incompetent, petitioned the court for the removal
of petitioner and for the appointment in his stead of respondent
Pelagio Francisco.
The petitioner was supposed to render an accounting of the
properties of his ward but failed to submit an inventory. The
courtgave petitioner ten (10) daysto submit which the latter
thereafter submitted the inventory.Respondent Pelagio Francisco
filed an objection on the ground that petitioner actually received
P14,000.00 for the sale of a residential land and not P12,000.00 only
as stated in the deed of sale in his inventory. Thereafter, the
respondent Judge believed the contention of the Pelagio and
relieved the petitioner from his duty as a guardian and also on the
ground of advanced age.
The court a quo appointed respondent Pelagio Francisco as the new
guardian of the person and property of the incompetent Estefania
San Pedro. 7
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that he was
only 72 years of age and still fit to continue with the management of
the estate of his ward as he had done with zeal for the past twelve
years and that "advanced age" was not one of the, grounds raised by
private respondent in the court below; that the court a quo abuse its
discretion in appointing respondent as guardian despite the fact that
private respondent is five (5) years older than petitioner.9
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this
petition.
Issue: W/N old age can be considered as a ground for removal as
guardian.
Ruling:
The Rules of Court authorizes executions pending appeal "upon
good reasons to be stated in a special order." (Rule 39, Sec. 2). In the
case at bar, the retirement of petitioner was ordered on the ground
of old age. When this ground is considered in relation to the delay of
the petitioner in the making of an accounting and the submission of
an inventory, the order amounts to a finding that petitioner,
considering his "rather advanced age," was no longer capable of
managing the estate of his ward. Rule 97, Sec. 2). Given this finding,
it is clear that petitioner's continuance in office would not be in the
best interest of the ward.
A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in
which one person, called a "guardian" acts for another called the
"ward" whom the law regards as incapable of managing his own
affairs. A guardianship is designed to further the ward's well-being,
UM_SPECPRO_2017-18_CaseDigest 16 of 34
not that of the guardian, It is intended to preserve the ward's
property, as when as to render any assistance that the ward may
personally require. It has been stated that while custody involves
immediate care and control, guardianship indicates not only those
responsibilities, but those of one in loco parentis as well.
Having in mind that guardianship proceeding is instituted for the
benefit and welfare of the ward, the selection of a guardian must,
therefore, suit this very purpose. Thus, in determining the selection
of a guardian, the court may consider the financial situation, the
physical condition, the sound judgment, prudence and
trustworthiness, the morals, character and conduct, and the present
and past history of a prospective appointee, as wen as the
probability of his, being able to exercise the powers and duties of
guardian for the full period during which guardianship will be
necessary.
A guardian is or becomes incompetent to serve the trust if he is so
disqualified by mental incapacity, conviction of crime, moral
delinquency or physical disability as to be prevented from properly
discharging the duties of his office. A guardian, once appointed may
be removed in case he becomes insane or otherwise incapable of
discharging his trust or unsuitable therefor, or has wasted or
mismanaged the estate, or failed for thirty (30) days after it is due to
render an account or make a return.
We agree with the trial court and the appellate court that there is
need for petitioner Feliciano Francisco to be retired from the
guardianship over the person and property of incompetent
Estefania San Pedro. The conclusion reached by the trial court
about the "rather advanced age" of petitioner at 72 years old
(petitioner is now 76 years old) finding him unfit to continue the
trust cannot be disturbed. As correctly pointed out by the
appellate court, this finds direct support in the delay of the
accounting and inventory made by petitioner. To sustain petitioner
as guardian would, therefore, be detrimental to the ward. While
age alone is not a control criterion in determining a person's fitness
or qualification to be appointed or be retained as guardian, it may
be a factor for consideration.
Considering the difficult and complicated responsibilities and duties
of a guardian, We sustain the immediate retirement of petitioner
Feliciano Francisco as guardian, affirming thereby the rulings of both
the trial court and the appellate court.
With respect to the issue of execution pending appeal in appointing
respondent Pelagio Francisco as guardian to succeed petitioner
while the latter's appeal was still pending, We hold and rule that
respondent appellate court correctly sustained the propriety of said
execution pending appeal. Upon urgent and compelling reasons,
execution pending appeal is a matter of sound discretion on the part
of the trial court.
Inasmuch as the primary objective for the institution of guardianship
is for the protection of the ward, there is more than sufficient
reason for the immediate execution of the lower court's judgment
for the replacement of the first guardian. We agree with the reason
given by the appellate court in sustaining execution pending appeal
that "an indefinite continuance in office would defeat the intent and
purpose of the order of September 12, 1980, relieving the present
guardian (Feliciano Francisco)."
 UM_SPECPRO_2017-18_CaseDigest 17 of 34

CASE DIGEST 2: RULE 97 – TERMINATION OF GUARDIANSHIP

IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OF THE INCOMPETENT JOSE R. DE
INCHAUSTI, MARIA CONSUELO RICO VDA. DE INCHAUSTI VS.
MANUEL SOLER, G.R. NO. L-15119, JANUARY 19, 1920, STREET, J.:
Case Digest by: Gretchin Cinco
FACTS OF THE CASE:
• On January 18, 1915, an ORDER was entered in the Court of First
Instance of the City of Manila, upon the application of Maria
Consuelo Rico, viuda de Inchausti, APPOINTING HER GUARDIAN of
the person and property of her son Jose R. de Inchausti, on the
GROUND that the latter had become demented and incapable of
properly caring for himself and estate.
• Soon after this step had been taken, the WARD was, upon the
advice of physicians, sent to Barcelona, Spain, where he has
continued to reside.
• On August 30, 1915, MANUEL SOLER, a resident of the city of
Manila, in the character of friend to the incapacitated person, filed a
PETITION IN THE GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDINGS, asking the court to
rehabilitate him and bring the guardianship to an end.
• This MOTION was opposed by the mother of the incapacitate, in
her character as guardian, on the GROUNDS (1) that the ward had
not been given sufficient notice of the hearing and (2) that it had not
been satisfactorily shown that he is now capable of taking care of
himself and property.
• The TRIAL JUDGE overruled both of these objections and adjudged
the ward, Jose R. de Inchausti, to be of sound mind. A further order
was made requiring the GUARDIAN to render her account within the
period of thirty days from the date upon which the order should
become final. From this decision the guardian appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the termination of guardianship is proper in
the case at bar. YES
RULING:
• Upon the question of the PROPRIETY OF THE ORDER DECLARING
THE WARD TO BE OF SOUND MIND and requiring the guardian to
submit her accounts, we are of the opinion that the proof fully
sustains the action taken by the court. In this connection it appears
that the VIOLENT ACCESS OF DEMENTIA which manifested itself
prior to the original appointment of the guardian passed off after
Inchausti was taken away from Manila in 1915 and the same
extreme manifestations of derangement have not reappeared.
Furthermore, the evidence shows that at the TIME THE PETITION
FOR HIS REHABILITATION was heard, the ward was in normal mental
state and had been in this condition for a period sufficiently long to
justify the belief that he is permanently restored. Under these
circumstances it would be highly improper to prolong the
guardianship.
• ***The OPPOSITION TO THE TERMINATION OF THE
GUARDIANSHIP seems to be based chiefly on the fear, entertained
by his mother, that Inchausti, if placed in control of the large
property to which he is heir, will prove to be a spendthrift. Even
though this fear should be well-founded, it affords NO REASON FOR
MAINTAINING A GUARDIANSHIP which had its origin in his mental
incapacity. Of course if he is, or should hereafter PROVE TO BE, A
SPENDTHRIFT, proper proceedings can be instituted to protect him
from wasteful proclivities. But PRESENT MENTAL CAPACITY being
proved, he is entitled to be discharged from tutelage.
 UM_SPECPRO_2017-18_CaseDigest 18 of 34

CASE DIGEST 3: RULE 97 - TERMINATION OF GUARDIANSHIP THE COURT when it appears, upon the application of the ward or
LORENZO DE GUZMAN, petitioner vs. HONORABLE FLORENDO otherwise, that the guardianship is no longer necessary.
AQUINO, AURORA, BELEN and ERNESTO, all surnamed DE • As to the claim that the action is already barred by to say that
GUZMAN, REYES, J.B.L., J.:
since the proceedings prescription suffice it were never really
Case Digest by: Gretchin Cinco closed, the STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS could not apply. Anyway, the
GUARDIANSHIP was an express trust, and no limitation could
FACTS OF THE CASE:
possibly run EXCEPT from and after the repudiation thereof was
• On 12 September 1941, PETITIONER DE GUZMAN was APPOINTED driven home to the wards, as cestuis que trustent. NO REPUDIATION
JUDICIAL GUARDIAN of the persons and property of his three minor is here proved since no adequate showing is made that the wards
children, Aurora, Belen and Ernesto, all surnamed de Guzman, upon were ever notified by their father and guardian that he considered
the filing of a P2,000.00 bond, which was duly complied with. himself liberated from the trust imposed upon him by the Court. The
• In 1943, the GUARDIAN submitted partial accounts, which were FACT THAT THE GUARDIAN IS THE FATHER OF THE WARDS all the
approved. In 1947 he was authorized to mortgage to the Philippine more demands that the alleged repudiation of his trust be clearly
National Bank some lands of the minors to secure a P2,000.00 loan proved, since it is unconscionable and contrary to morals that a
without objection from the wards. In September of 1947, the COURT parent should deprive his children of what lawfully belongs to them.
authorized the guardian anew to execute another mortgage, this
time to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, to guarantee a loan
for P5,000.00.
• The COURT issued an order closing and terminating the case for
lack of prosecution. It ruled that the INTERESTED PARTIES have not
taken any step in this case during the last EIGHT (8) years, and
considered that the guardianship proceeding has been pending in
this Court since September 1, 1941.
• The CHILDREN OF PETITIONER, AURORA BELEN AND ERNESTO
applied to have the aforequoted 1955 order reconsidered and set
aside, claiming that they had not been given notice thereof. They
prayed that the GUARDIAN be ordered to deliver to them three (3)
parcels of riceland described in the guardian's inventory, and that
the latter be made to account for the crops of the said parcels.
• The PETITION was at first denied, but, subsequently, the denial
was reconsidered. The GUARDIAN'S opposition and motion to
reconsider were overruled.
ISSUE: Whether or not a court can motu propio order the closure
and termination of a minor’s guardianship. NO
RULING:
• ESTANISLAO GOTANGCO was the party upon whose petition the
guardian was appointed. But he did not represent the wards, either
as curator ad litem or as counsel. NOTICE TO HIM, therefore, was
not notice to the wards. Consequently, so far as the WARDS ARE
CONCERNED, the order of closure never became final and executory;
hence, the, matter remained pending and the said order could be
still reconsidered and set aside by the court that issued it.
• ***This case comes within the purview of the rule set by this Court
in JUNQUERA VS. VAÑO, 72 Phil. 293, 302, to the effect that the
COURT cannot, motu propio order the closure or termination of a
minor's guardianship case, UNLESS he should ask for it, nor without
granting him a hearing, or receiving evidence of some kind to
determine is such a step should be taken or not.
• The MARRIAGE OF A MINOR WARD terminates the guardianship of
the person of such ward, but not of the estate; the GUARDIAN OF
AN INSANE OR OTHER PERSON MAY BE DISCHARGED BY THE COURT
when it appears, upon the application of the ward or otherwise, that
the guardianship is no longer necessary.
• ***The DOCTRINE OF THE JUNQUERA CASE accords with SECTION
3 OF RULE 98 OF THE ORIGINAL RULES OF COURT in force when
Judge Montesa improvidently issued his order of closure: SEC. 3.
OTHER TERMINATION OF GUARDIANSHIP — The MARRIAGE OF A
MINOR WARD terminates the guardianship of the person of the
ward; and the GUARDIAN OF ANY PERSON MAY BE DISCHARGED BY

CASE DIGEST 4: RULE 97 – TERMINATION OF GUARDIANSHIP
BONIFACIA P. VANCIL, petitioner, vs. HELEN G. BELMES, G.R. No.
132223. June 19, 2001, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Case Digest by: Gretchin Cinco
FACTS OF THE CASE:
• PETITIONER, BONIFACIA VANCIL, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil,
a Navy serviceman of the United States of America who died in the
said country on December 22, 1986. During his lifetime, REEDER had
two (2) children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law
wife, Helen G. Belmes.
• Sometime in May of 1987, BONIFACIA VANCIL commenced before
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City a GUARDIANSHIP
PROCEEDINGS over the persons and properties of minors Valerie
and Vincent. At the time, VALERIE was only 6 years old while
VINCENT was a 2-year old child. It is claimed in the petition that the
MINORS are residents of Cebu City, Philippines and have an estate
consisting of proceeds from their fathers death pension benefits
with a probable value of P100,000.00.
• PETITIONER, BONIFACIA VANCIL was appointed legal and judicial
guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie Vancil and Vincent
Vancil Jr.
• The NATURAL MOTHER OF THE MINORS, HELEN BELMES,
submitted an OPPOSITION TO THE SUBJECT GUARDIANSHIP
PROCEEDINGS asseverating that she had already filed a similar
petition for guardianship before the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian
City. Thereafter, she followed her opposition with a MOTION FOR
THE REMOVAL OF GUARDIAN and APPOINTMENT OF A NEW ONE,
asserting that she is the natural mother in actual custody of and
exercising parental authority over the subject minors at Maralag,
Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur where they are permanently residing;
that the petition was filed under an improper venue; and that at the
time the petition was filed Bonifacia Vancil was a resident of 140
Hurliman Court, Canon City, Colorado, U.S.A. being a naturalized
American citizen.
• The TRIAL COURT rejected and denied Belmes motion to remove
and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr.
and instead ordered petitioner Bonifacia Vancil to enter the office
and perform her duties as such guardian upon the posting of a bond
of P50,000.00.
• The COURT OF APPEALS reversed the decision of the RTC and held
that our Civil Code considers PARENTS, THE FATHER, OR IN THE
ABSENCE, THE MOTHER, as natural guardian of her minor children.
The law on parental authority under the Civil Code or P.D. 603 and
now the New Family Code, (Article 225 of the Family Code) ascribe
to the same legal pronouncements. Section 7 of Rule 93 of the
Revised Rules of Court confirms the DESIGNATION OF THE PARENTS
as ipso facto guardian of their minor children without need of a
court appointment and only for good reason may another person be
named. Considering that Valerie is already of major age, this petition
has become moot with respect to her.
ISSUE: Who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent
should be his guardian. (Mother)
RULING:
• We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that
RESPONDENT, BEING THE NATURAL MOTHER OF THE MINOR, has
the preferential right over that of petitioner to be his guardian. This
ruling finds support in Article 211 of the Family Code which provides:
Art. 211. The FATHER AND THE MOTHER shall jointly exercise
parental authority over the persons of their common children. In
UM_SPECPRO_2017-18_CaseDigest 19 of 34
case of disagreement, the fathers decision shall prevail, unless there
is a judicial order to the contrary.
• Indeed, being the NATURAL MOTHER OF MINOR VINCENT,
respondent has the corresponding natural and legal right to his
custody.
• PETITIONERS CLAIM TO BE THE GUARDIAN OF SAID MINOR can
only be realized by way of substitute parental authority pursuant to
Article 214 of the Family Code, thus: ART. 214. In case of DEATH,
ABSENCE OR UNSUITABILITY OF THE PARENTS, substitute parental
authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent.
• In Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled: The law vests
on the FATHER AND MOTHER joint parental authority over the
persons of their common children. In case of ABSENCE OR DEATH OF
EITHER PARENT, the parent present shall continue exercising
parental authority. Only in case of the PARENTS DEATH, ABSENCE OR
UNSUITABILITY may substitute parental authority be exercised by
the surviving grandparent.
• PETITIONER, AS THE SURVIVING GRANDPARENT, can exercise
substitute parental authority only in case of death, absence or
unsuitability of respondent. Considering that RESPONDENT is very
much alive and has exercised continuously parental authority over
Vincent, petitioner has to prove, in asserting her right to be the
minors guardian, respondents unsuitability. PETITIONER, however,
has not proffered convincing evidence showing that respondent is
not suited to be the guardian of Vincent. Petitioner merely insists
that respondent is morally unfit as guardian of Valerie considering
that her (respondents) live-in partner raped Valerie several times.
But VALERIE, BEING NOW OF MAJOR AGE, is no longer a subject of
this guardianship proceeding.
• Even assuming that RESPONDENT IS UNFIT AS GUARDIAN OF
MINOR VINCENT, still petitioner cannot qualify as a substitute
guardian. It bears stressing that she is an American citizen and a
resident of Colorado. Obviously, she will not be able to perform the
responsibilities and obligations required of a guardian. In fact, in her
petition, she admitted the difficulty of discharging the duties of a
guardian by an expatriate, like her. To be sure, she will merely
delegate those duties to someone else who may not also qualify as a
guardian.
• Moreover, we observe that respondents allegation that petitioner
has not set foot in the Philippines since 1987 has not been
controverted by her. Besides, petitioners old age and her conviction
of libel by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City filed by one Danilo R.
Deen, will give her a second thought of staying here. Indeed, her
coming back to this country just to fulfill the duties of a guardian to
Vincent for only two years is not certain. Significantly, this Court has
held that courts should NOT APPOINT PERSONS AS GUARDIANS who
are not within the jurisdiction of our courts for they will find it
difficult to protect the wards.
 UM_SPECPRO_2017-18_CaseDigest 20 of 34

ADOPTION executor, which was in 1967. A no less important

argument against the petitioners is that their challenge to
the validity of the adoption cannot be made collaterally, as
ADOPTION in their action for partition, but in a direct proceeding
frontally addressing the issue. A finding that the requisite
CASE NO. 1: SAYSON VS CA jurisdictional facts exists, whether erroneous or not,
cannot be questioned in a collateral proceeding, for a
Case Digest by: Remle Anne Estacio presumption arises in such cases where the validity of the
judgment is thus attacked that the necessary jurisdictional
Facts: facts were proven
 Eleno and Rafela Sayson begot five children, namely,  The SC likewise upheld the legitimacy of Doribel, whose
Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is one
and Rafaela died in 1952 and 1976, respectively. Teodoro, of the prescribed means of recognition under Article 265
who had married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code. In
His wife died nine years later. Their properties were left in Legaspi vs CA, it was held that the evidentiary nature of
the possession of herein respondents who claim to be public documents must be sustained in the absence of
their children. strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or
 Petitioners in this case filed a complaint for partition and nullity."
accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel  As such the respondents were adjudged to be the
Sayson (Civil Case No. 1030). The action was resisted by exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the deceased
Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who alleged couple. However, the SC ruled that CA is correct in ruling
successional rights to the disputed estate as the that only Dorible has the right of representation in the
decedents' lawful descendants. Respondents filed their inheritance of her grandparent’s estate. While it is true
own complaint (Civil Case No. 1042) asserting that Delia that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate
and Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was child and have the same right as the latter, these rights do
the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, not include the right of representation. The relationship
they were entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his created by the adoption is between only the adopting
parents' estate by right of representation. In both cases, parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the
the court decided in favor of private respondents. blood relatives of either party.
 The court ruled that Delia and Edmundo were the legally
adopted children of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson by virtue of
the decree of adoption dated March 9, 1967. As such, they
were entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right of
representation. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed with
modification such that Delia and Edmundo Sayson are
disqualified from inheriting from the estate. Hence, this
petition.
 According to petitioners, Delia and Edmundo were not
legally adopted because Doribel had already been born on
February 27, 1967, when the decree of adoption was
issued on March 9, 1967 disqualifying her parents from
adopting. Article 335 of the Civil Code, named among
those who cannot adopt "(1) Those who have legitimate,
legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural
children by legal fiction." They also contend that Doribel
herself is not the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and
Isabel but was in fact born to one Edita Abila, who
manifested in a petition for guardianship of the child that
she was her natural mother.

Issue: Whether or not CA is correct that Delia and Edmundo,

adopted children of Teodoro and Isabel, are disqualified from
inheriting from the estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson.

Ruling:
 YES. The inconsistency of this position is immediately
apparent. The petitioners seek to annul the adoption of
Delia and Edmundo on the ground that Teodoro and Isabel
already had a legitimate daughter at the time but in the
same breath try to demolish this argument by denying that
Doribel was born to the couple.
 The SC also questioned the timeliness of the present
controversy saying that it is too late now to challenge the
decree of adoption, years after it became final and

Case No. 2: OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR VS GINES
Case Digest by: Remle Anne Estacio
Facts:
 The present was initiated by the the Office of the Court
Administrator with the filing of an administrative
complaint against herein respondents for Dishonesty;
Violation of par. (e), Sec. 3 of R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act) as amended; and Violation of AO
No. 6, Circular No. 7, and AO No. 1 , by virtue of their
collective illegal acts involving deliberate and surreptitious
assignment of cases at the Docketing and Receiving
Section, Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC, San Fernando, La
Union.
 In a report submitted by Atty. Sanglay, she averred that
about 80 cases were directly assigned to the RTC, Branch
26, San Fernando, La Union, without passing through the
mandatory, raffling procedure, of cases. In the affidavit-
complaint of Ma. Concepcion Diaz, she blamed
respondents for applying pressures and intimidations to
her in order that the cases of their choice may no longer
be forwarded to the proper Officer-in-Charge. She also
asserted that several petitions were prepared by Judge
Gines and court stenographer and interpreter including
Special Proceeding No. 1967 where the Office of the
Solicitor General and other parties were not furnished
with copies of the petition upon the instruction of Judge
Gines.
 In an investigation conducted by Justice de Pano, a total of
136 cases from 1986 to 1988 went from filing/docketing
direct to two branches without undergoing the mandated
raffle by the raffle committee. Justice de Pano further
stated that it is therefore, beyond cavil, that under the
rules governing the administration of courts, all cases filed
in court must go through the raffle committee for
assignment. No case must be assigned, in multi-branch
courts, unless it is raffled by the Raffle Committee.
Respondent Judge Gines must know, under the above
Supreme Court acts, at a simple glance on the cover of the
rollo and the first page of every such record, whether a
case was assigned to him after going through raffle or not.
Cases assigned to his branch, after going through the
required raffle, show on the face of the rollo, in words and
in figures, the branch to which the case is assigned,
authenticated by the initials of the Executive Judge and
the two other members of the Committee. Judge Gines
was found guilty of the charges in the administrative
complaint, who was recommended to be appropriately
penalized, and other respondents, suspended.
 In Special Proceeding No. 1967, petitioner therein filed a
petition for the "judicial confirmation of the de facto
adoption" of Cecilia Averion on October 1990. She alleged
that she and her late husband adopted Cecilia Averion in
1967; only 1 year and 3 months old at that time. Together,
they reared the child and gave her all their love, attention,
care and understanding. They also provided her with an
education and considered her as their own child. Hence,
the petition was filed "for the purpose of judicially
confirming the de facto adoption of Cecilia Averion by
herein petitioner and her late husband." The said petition
was not accompanied by the written consent of Cecilia
Averion who, at the time of filing, was already of legal age.
From the so-called Minutes of the proceedings of 31
UM_SPECPRO_2017-18_CaseDigest 21 of 34
October 1990, as prepared by respondent, Flores, it
appears that the exhibits were offered to establish the
jurisdiction of the court including affidavit of the Editor of
the North Tribune, clippings of published order, and entire
issues of the North Tribune on October 10, 17, and 24. On
November 6, 1990, respondent judge granted the petition
and confirmed de facto the adoption of Cecilia Averion.
Issue: Whether or not the decision of respondent Judge Gines was in
accordance with the prevailing rules on adoption.
Ruling:
 NO. The remedy pursued in Special Proceeding No. 1967 is
certainly unusual as we are not aware of any prescribed
action that may be instituted for the judicial confirmation
of a de facto adoption. Nor do our adjective and
substantive laws on adoption provide for such a
proceeding. In fact, the only proper and authorized
procedure relative to adoption is outlined in the rule on
adoption itself.
 The fact that Cecilia Averion had been treated by the
petitioner and her husband as their own child during the
former's minority may only provide compelling reasons to
grant the decree of adoption notwithstanding her
(Cecilia's) having attained the age of majority. This is one
of the exceptions provided by the Family Code to the rule
that a person of legal age cannot be adopted.
 In "confirming" the so-called de facto adoption and
decreeing the same to be "retroactive to the year 1967,"
respondent Judge has carved a name for himself in history
for, as already pointed out, no action or proceeding for
judicial confirmation of a de facto adoption is authorized in
this jurisdiction. Furthermore, by its very nature and
purpose, a decree of adoption can never be made to
retroact. Lastly, considering that the petitioner's husband
had died in 1987, or three years before the petition was
filed, he could not now be resurrected for purposes of the
adoption, be in fact declared an adopter and be
subsequently bound by the decree to the prejudice of his
heirs.
 Then too, respondent Judge completely disregarded the
fact that Cecilia Averion had submitted no written consent
to the adoption at the time of the filing of the petition or
at any subsequent date — a manifest infirmity. Nor was
Cecilia called to testify in the case. Moreover there seems
to be an irregularity in the publication of the notice of
hearing. It is to be observed that as indicated in the upper
right hand corner of the first page of the petition, the
proceeding was instituted on 11 October 1990. If this were
so, the notice of hearing which was issued by the
respondent Judge on that same date could not have been
published in the North Tribune in its 10 October 1990
issue. In his affidavit, the Editor of the said newspaper
disclosed that the notice was indeed published on 10
October 1990.
 All told, respondent Judge completely ignored the
procedural rules on adoption and promulgated guidelines
for himself to suit his own purpose and design
 UM_SPECPRO_2017-18_CaseDigest 22 of 34

CASE NO. 3: REYES VS SOTERO
Case Digest by: Remle Anne Estacio
Facts:
 On September 15, 1998, respondent Corazon L. Chichioco
filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration
and settlement of estate of the late Elena Lising (SP No.
204), claiming that she was the niece and heir of Lising
who died intestate on July 31, 1998. Named as co-heirs
include private respondents herein, Chichioco claimed that
the deceased left real properties and assorted pieces of
jewelry and money allegedly in the possession of
petitioner, a grandniece of the deceased.
 Petitioner opposed the petition, claiming that she was an
adopted child of Lising and the latter’s husband, Serafin
Delos Santos, who died on November 30, 1970. She
asserted that the petition should be dismissed and that
the appointment of an administrator was unnecessary,
since she was the only heir of Lising who passed away
without leaving any debts. She submitted Certification
issued by Municipal Civil Registrar stating Reyes was
adopted by Elena Lising and Serafin Delos Santos pursuant
to a decision rendered in Spec. Proc. No. 1410 (1968),
Certification by RTC based on a judgment decreeing
petitioner’s adoption by Elena Lising and Serafin Delos
Santos, and Decree of Final Distribution issued by the
Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (PVAO) showing that,
upon the death of Serafin Delos Santos, death benefits
were paid to his widow, Elena Lising, and his "daughter",
Ana Joyce Delos Santos.
 For the meantime, Chichioco filed before CA a petition for
annulment of the adoption decree docketed as SP No.
53457, which was later on dismissed. They also filed a
criminal complaint against petitioner for alleged
falsification of the adoption decree and Judicial Form No.
43, which was also dismissed in two instances.
 RTC granted respondent’s motion for the appointment of a
special administrator and appointed its branch clerk of
court, Atty. Saguyod. In a resolution, petitioner was
likewise enjoined from conducting business activity in any
of the decedent’s properties. Petitioner then filed a special
civil action for certiorari before the CA claiming that as
sole heir, she had the right to possess and use the
decedent’s property, title over which automatically passed
on to her upon the latter’s death and that was likewise no
valid challenge to her adoption. CA nullified resolutions of
the court but refused to dismiss SP No. 204 as it was
incumbent upon petitioner to prove before the trial court
that she was indeed adopted by the Delos Santos spouses
since, according to the appellate court, "imputations of
irregularities permeating the adoption decree render its
authenticity under a cloud of doubt."
thus presumed to have been regularly issued as part of the
official duties that said public officers perform.
 An adoption decree is a public document required by law
to be entered into the public records, the official
repository of which, as well as all other judicial
pronouncements affecting the status of individuals, is the
local civil registrar’s office as well as the court which
rendered the judgment.
 Documents consisting of entries in public records made in
the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated. As such, the
certifications issued by the local civil registrar and the clerk
of court regarding details of petitioner’s adoption which
are entered in the records kept under their official
custody, are prima facie evidence of the facts contained
therein. These certifications suffice as proof of the fact of
petitioner’s adoption by the Delos Santos spouses until
contradicted or overcome by sufficient evidence. Mere
"imputations of irregularities" will not cast a "cloud of
doubt" on the adoption decree since the certifications and
its contents are presumed valid until proof to the contrary
is offered.
 Such contrary proof can be presented only in a separate
action brought principally for the purpose of nullifying the
adoption decree. The latter cannot be assailed collaterally
in a proceeding for the settlement of a decedent’s estate,
as categorically held in Santos v. Aranzanso. Accordingly,
respondents cannot assail in these proceedings the validity
of the adoption decree in order to defeat petitioner’s
claim that she is the sole heir of the decedent. Absent a
categorical pronouncement in an appropriate proceeding
that the decree of adoption is void, the certifications
regarding the matter, as well as the facts stated therein,
should be deemed legitimate, genuine and real.

Issue: W/N the CA erred in holding that petitioner had to prove the
validity of her adoption due to imputations of irregularities in view
of Section 47 of Rule 39.

Ruling:
 YES. To recall, petitioner submitted certifications from the
local civil registrar’s office and the clerk of court. Both
certifications were issued under the seal of the issuing
offices and were signed by the proper officers. These are

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 155733 January 27, 2006
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED
JOSEFA DELGADO
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Case Digest by: Lorvie Jun Vermon
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to reinstate
the May 11, 1990 decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 55,4 in SP Case No. 97668, which was reversed and
set aside by the Court of Appeals in its decision5 dated October 24,
2002.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado.6 The main issue in this case is
relatively simple: who, between petitioners and respondents, are
the lawful heirs of the decedents. However, it is attended by several
collateral issues that complicate its resolution.
The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
may be divided into two groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa
Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and
nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged
heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters,7 his nephews and
nieces,8 his illegitimate child,9 and the de facto adopted
10
child (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children. With
no children of their own, they took into their home the youngsters
Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children, never
legally adopted by the couple, were what was known in the local
dialect as ampun-ampunan.
During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to
father an illegitimate child,19 the intervenor-respondent Guillerma
Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria. According to Guillerma,
Guillermo Rustia treated her as his daughter, his own flesh and
blood, and she enjoyed open and continuous possession of that
status from her birth in 1920 until her father’s demise. In fact, Josefa
Delgado’s obituary which was prepared by Guillermo Rustia, named
the intervenor-respondent as one of their children. Also, her report
card from the University of Santo Tomas identified Guillermo Rustia
as her parent/guardian.20
Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit that Guillerma
Rustia has no interest in the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia as
she was never duly acknowledged as an illegitimate child. They
contend that her right to compulsory acknowledgement prescribed
when Guillermo died in 1974 and that she cannot claim voluntary
acknowledgement since the documents she presented were not the
authentic writings prescribed by the new Civil Code.21
On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death of Josefa
Delgado, Guillermo Rustia filed a petition for the adoption22 of
their ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia. He stated under oath
"[t]hat he ha[d] no legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural
children or natural children by legal fiction." 23 The petition was
overtaken by his death on February 28, 1974.
UM_SPECPRO_2017-18_CaseDigest 23 of 34
Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He was
survived by his sisters Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and
Hortencia Rustia-Cruz, and by the children of his predeceased
brother Roman Rustia Sr., namely, Josefina Rustia Albano, Virginia
Rustia Paraiso, Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio Rustia, Francisco Rustia and
Leticia Rustia Miranda.24
On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis
Delgado, filed the original petition for letters of administration of
the intestate estates of the "spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo
Rustia" with the RTC of Manila, Branch 55.25 This petition was
opposed by the following: (1) the sisters of Guillermo Rustia,
namely, Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-
Cruz;26 (2) the heirs of Guillermo Rustia’s late brother, Roman Rustia,
Sr., and (3) the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia. The
opposition was grounded on the theory that Luisa Delgado vda.
de Danao and the other claimants were barred under the law from
inheriting from their illegitimate half-blood relative Josefa Delgado.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia is a
lawful heir of the decedent.
RULING:
The Lawful Heirs Of Guillermo Rustia.
Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate
child58 of Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be entitled to
successional rights only upon proof of an admission or recognition of
paternity.59 She, however, claimed the status of an acknowledged
illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia only after the death of the
latter on February 28, 1974 at which time it was already the new
Civil Code that was in effect.
Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29, 1950),
illegitimate children absolutely had no hereditary rights. This
draconian edict was, however, later relaxed in the new Civil Code
which granted certain successional rights to illegitimate children but
only on condition that they were first recognized or acknowledged
by the parent.
Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or
voluntary.60 Recognition is compulsory in any of the following cases:
(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the
period of the offense coincides more or less with that of
the conception;
(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of
a child of the alleged father (or mother)61 by the direct
acts of the latter or of his family;
(3) when the child was conceived during the time when
the mother cohabited with the supposed father;
(4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof
that the defendant is his father. 62
On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the record
of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any
authentic writing.63
 UM_SPECPRO_2017-18_CaseDigest 24 of 34

Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first,
compulsory recognition through the open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child and second,
voluntary recognition through authentic writing.
There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an
illegitimate child from her birth until the death of her putative father
Guillermo Rustia. However, this did not constitute acknowledgment
but a mere ground by which she could have compelled
acknowledgment through the courts.64 Furthermore, any (judicial)
action for compulsory acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the
lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the putative parent.65 On the
death of either, the action for compulsory recognition can no longer
be filed.66 In this case, intervenor Guillerma’s right to claim
compulsory acknowledgment prescribed upon the death of
Guillermo Rustia on February 28, 1974.
are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving
spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of
the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the
remaining claimants, consisting of his sisters,69 nieces and
nephews.70
It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the
persons of Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and a nominee of the
nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia. They are the next of kin of
the deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia,
respectively.
WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11,
1990 decision of the RTC Manila, Branch 55) is hereby DENIED. The
assailed October 24, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillerma’s second ground) must

likewise fail. An authentic writing, for purposes of voluntary
recognition, is understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of the
parent (in this case, Guillermo Rustia). This includes a public
instrument or a private writing admitted by the father to be
his.67 Did intervenor’s report card from the University of Santo
Tomas and Josefa Delgado’s obituary prepared by Guillermo Rustia
qualify as authentic writings under the new Civil Code?
Unfortunately not. The report card of intervenor Guillerma did not
bear the signature of Guillermo Rustia. The fact that his name
appears there as intervenor’s parent/guardian holds no weight since
he had no participation in its preparation. Similarly, while witnesses
testified that it was Guillermo Rustia himself who drafted the notice
of death of Josefa Delgado which was published in the Sunday Times
on September 10, 1972, that published obituary was not the
authentic writing contemplated by the law. What could have been
admitted as an authentic writing was the original manuscript of the
notice, in the handwriting of Guillermo Rustia himself and signed by
him, not the newspaper clipping of the obituary. The failure to
present the original signed manuscript was fatal to intervenor’s
claim.

The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina

Rustia Rustia, who was never adopted in accordance with law.
Although a petition for her adoption was filed by Guillermo Rustia,
it never came to fruition and was dismissed upon the latter’s
death. We affirm the ruling of both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals holding her a legal stranger to the deceased spouses and
therefore not entitled to inherit from them ab intestato. We
quote:

Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which [created]

between two persons a relationship similar to that which results
from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an adoption made
through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down
under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is
not of natural law at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. To
establish the relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly
carried out, otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact
of adoption is never presumed, but must be affirmatively [proven]
by the person claiming its existence.68

Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the estate

of Guillermo Rustia, namely, intervenor Guillerma Rustia and
the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia, are not lawful heirs
of the decedent. Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004]
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO,
JR., petitioners, vs. The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.)
and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, respondents.
[G.R. No. 161634. March 3, 2004]
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, vs. RONALD ALLAN KELLEY
POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., respondent.
[G. R. No. 161824. March 3, 2004]
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO
KNOWN AS FERNANDO POE JR., respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Case Digest by: Lorvie Jun Vermon
Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the
state believes are deserving of the privilege. It is a precious
heritage, as well as an inestimable acquisition,[1] that cannot be
taken lightly by anyone - either by those who enjoy it or by those
who dispute it.
Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which
raise a single question of profound importance to the nation. The
issue of citizenship is brought up to challenge the qualifications of a
presidential candidate to hold the highest office of the land. Our
people are waiting for the judgment of the Court with bated
breath. Is Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one
of the main contenders for the presidency, a natural-born Filipino or
is he not?
The moment of introspection takes us face to face with
Spanish and American colonial roots and reminds us of the rich
heritage of civil law and common law traditions, the fusion resulting
in a hybrid of laws and jurisprudence that could be no less than
distinctly Filipino.
Antecedent Case Settings
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe,
also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his
certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic
of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino
(KNP) Party, in the forthcoming national elections. In his certificate
of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald
Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of
birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier initiated on 09 January 2004 a petition
docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the Commission on Elections
("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel
his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a
natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his
parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an
American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being
the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner
asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not
have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an
illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation
of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan
F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before
UM_SPECPRO_2017-18_CaseDigest 25 of 34
his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior
marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year
after the birth of respondent.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary
pieces of evidence, the more significant ones being - a) a
certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives Division
of the National Archives that there appeared to be no available
information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of
births for San Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the
Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives
that no available information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and
Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a certificate of birth of Ronald
Allan Poe, d) Original Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of
Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou,
e) copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643, No. 23477 and
No. 23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the certificate of
death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported marriage contract
between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification
issued by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan,
stating that the records of birth in the said office during the period
of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally destroyed during World
War II.
ISSUE:
Is Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one of
the main contenders for the presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is
he not?
Petitioner’s Arg:
Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation
(relationship or civil status of the child to the father [or mother]) or
paternity (relationship or civil status of the father to the child) of an
illegitimate child, FPJ evidently being an illegitimate son according to
petitioner, the mandatory rules under civil law must be used.
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines
from 08 December 1889 up until the day prior to 30 August 1950
when the Civil Code of the Philippines took effect, acknowledgment
was required to establish filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment was
either judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or compulsory
acknowledgment was possible only if done during the lifetime of the
putative parent; voluntary acknowledgment could only be had in a
record of birth, a will, or a public document.[32]Complementary to
the new code was Act No. 3753 or the Civil Registry Law expressing
in Section 5 thereof, that -
In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed
and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only by the
mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be
permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of the
father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein any
information by which such father could be identified.
In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove
voluntary acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificate
was required to be signed or sworn to by the father. The failure of
such requirement rendered the same useless as being an
authoritative document of recognition.[33]
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties,
nowhere in the document was the signature of Allan F. Poe
found. There being no will apparently executed, or at least shown to
have been executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only other proof

of voluntary recognition remained to be "some other public
document."
RULING:
Proof of Paternity and Filiation Under Civil Law.
The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition
of illegitimate children into voluntary, legal or
compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to be expressedly
made in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record or in any authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment took place
in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child who
was recognized or judicially declared as natural. Compulsory
acknowledgment could be demanded generally in cases when the
child had in his favor any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action
to claim legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of the child,
and might pass exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action to
claim acknowledgment, however, could only be brought during the
lifetime of the presumed parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument,
"authentic writing," so as to be an authentic writing for purposes of
voluntary recognition, simply as being a genuine or indubitable
writing of the father. The term would include a public instrument
(one duly acknowledged before a notary public or other competent
official) or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article
173, and Article 175 provide:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of
the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation
shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child
during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should
the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases,
the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute
the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive
notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.
Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals,[36] the Court has ruled:
"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural
child should be decided under Article 278 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Article 2260 of that Code provides that 'the voluntary
recognition of a natural child shall take place according to this Code,
even if the child was born before the effectivity of this body of laws'
or before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article 278 may be given
retroactive effect."
UM_SPECPRO_2017-18_CaseDigest 26 of 34
It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the
acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt
to break away from the traditional idea of keeping well apart
legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the family in favor
of the greater interest and welfare of the child. The provisions are
intended to merely govern the private and personal affairs of the
family. There is little, if any, to indicate that the legitimate or
illegitimate civil status of the individual would also affect his political
rights or, in general, his relationship to the State. While, indeed,
provisions on "citizenship" could be found in the Civil Code, such
provisions must be taken in the context of private relations, the
domain of civil law; particularly -
"Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the
organization of the family and the regulation of property. It has thus
[been] defined as the mass of precepts which determine and
regulate the relations of assistance, authority and obedience among
members of a family, and those which exist among members of a
society for the protection of private interests."[37]
The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is best
exemplified in Article 15 of the Civil Code, stating that -
"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad" -that explains the need to
incorporate in the code a reiteration of the Constitutional provisions
on citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant in civil relationships
found in different parts of the Civil Code,[39] such as on successional
rights and family relations.[40] In adoption, for instance, an adopted
child would be considered the child of his adoptive parents and
accorded the same rights as their legitimate child but such legal
fiction extended only to define his rights under civil law[41] and not
his political status.
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This
discriminatory attitude may be traced to the Spanish family and
property laws, which, while defining proprietary and successional
rights of members of the family, provided distinctions in the rights of
legitimate and illegitimate children. In the monarchial set-up of old
Spain, the distribution and inheritance of titles and wealth were
strictly according to bloodlines and the concern to keep these
bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was paramount.
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were
codified in the Spanish Civil Code, and the invidious discrimination
survived when the Spanish Civil Code became the primary source of
our own Civil Code. Such distinction, however, remains and should
remain only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or
impinge on the domain of political law.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his
citizenship status should thus be deemed independent from and
not inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil law
purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof of
filiation or paternity, although good law, do not have preclusive
effects on matters alien to personal and family relations. The
ordinary rules on evidence could well and should govern. For
instance, the matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded
from being applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code provisions.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -
 UM_SPECPRO_2017-18_CaseDigest 27 of 34

Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person
deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another
person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in
evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the
relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other
than such act or declaration. The word `pedigree includes
relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates
when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of
the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately
connected with pedigree.
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the
declarant is already dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a
person must be at issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative of the
person whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be made
before the controversy has occurred, and (e) the relationship
between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question
must be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas,
sister of Bessie Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20 before the
COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the acts of Allan F. Poe,
recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living
together with Bessie Kelley and his children (including respondent
FPJ) in one house, and as one family –
DNA Testing
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to
satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing,
which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the
illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent
could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or
paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals,[42] this Court has
acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing -
presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would
have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines
was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of
residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other
evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death,
such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the en
masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in
1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby
extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935
Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first
light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino
citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or
illegitimate.
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish
conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his
favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a
material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation
of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election
Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the
Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties
to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not
there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled
in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC,[48] must not only be material,
but also deliberate and willful.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS.

"Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless

we adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we
have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for
identification and parentage testing. The University of the
Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA
Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing
using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on
the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy
from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the
mother, the alleged father and the child are analyzed to establish
parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of
DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the
appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the
admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should
apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of
situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress."

In Sum

(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse

of discretion has been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to
take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-
born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father
of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino
citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged
illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the
Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the
Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 143989. July 14, 2003]
ISABELITA S. LAHOM, petitioner, vs. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO
(previously referred to as DR. MELVIN S.
LAHOM), respondent.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Case Digest by: Lorvie Jun Vermon
FACTS:
The bliss of marriage and family would be to most less than
complete without children. The realization could have likely prodded
the spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom to take into
their care Isabelitas nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo and to bring him up
as their own. At the tender age of two, Jose Melvin enjoyed the
warmth, love and support of the couple who treated the child like
their own. Indeed, for years, Dr. and Mrs. Lahom fancied on legally
adopting Jose Melvin. Finally, in 1971, the couple decided to file a
petition for adoption. On 05 May 1972, an order granting the
petition was issued that made all the more intense than before the
feeling of affection of the spouses for Melvin. In keeping with the
court order, the Civil Registrar of Naga City changed the name Jose
Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom.
A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in December
of 1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of
adoption before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, of Naga
City. In her petition, she averred - x-x-x 16. That in view of
respondents insensible attitude resulting in a strained and
uncomfortable relationship between him and petitioner, the latter
has suffered wounded feelings, knowing that after all respondents
only motive to his adoption is his expectancy of his alleged rights
over the properties of herein petitioner and her late husband,
clearly shown by his recent filing of Civil Case No. 99-4463 for
partition against petitioner, thereby totally eroding her love and
affection towards respondent, rendering the decree of adoption,
considering respondent to be the child of petitioner, for all legal
purposes, has been negated for which reason there is no more basis
for its existence, hence this petition for revocation.[1]
Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22 March 1998,
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8552, also known as the Domestic Adoption
Act, went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right
of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption. Section 19 of Article VI
of R.A. No. 8552 now reads:
SEC. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. Upon petition of the
adoptee, with the assistance of the Department if a minor or if over
eighteen (18) years of age but is incapacitated, as guardian/counsel,
the adoption may be rescinded on any of the following grounds
committed by the adopter(s): (a) repeated physical and verbal
maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone
counseling; (b) attempt on the life of the adoptee; (c) sexual assault
or violence; or (d) abandonment and failure to comply with parental
obligations.
Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be
subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s)
may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of
the Civil Code. (emphasis supplied)
UM_SPECPRO_2017-18_CaseDigest 28 of 34
Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition, contending
principally (a) that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case
and (b) that the petitioner had no cause of action in view of the
aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 8552. Petitioner asseverated, by
way of opposition, that the proscription in R.A. No. 8552 should not
retroactively apply, i.e., to cases where the ground for rescission of
the adoption vested under the regime of then Article 348 [2] of the
Civil Code and Article 192[3] of the Family Code.
Petitioner however, insists that her right to rescind long acquired
under the provisions of the Family Code should be
respected. Assuming for the sake of argument, that petitioner is
entitled to rescind the adoption of respondent granted on May 5,
1972, said right should have been exercised within the period
allowed by the Rules. From the averments in the petition, it appears
clear that the legal grounds for the petition have been discovered
and known to petitioner for more than five (5) years, prior to the
filing of the instant petition on December 1, 1999, hence, the action
if any, had already prescribed. (Sec. 5, Rule 100 Revised Rules of
Court)
ISSUES:
1. May the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972,
still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the
effectivity of R.A. No. 8552?
2. In the affirmative, has the adopters action prescribed?
RULING:
A brief background on the law and its origins could provide some
insights on the subject. In ancient times, the Romans undertook
adoption to assure male heirs in the family.[5] The continuity of the
adopters family was the primary purpose of adoption and all
matters relating to it basically focused on the rights of the
adopter. There was hardly any mention about the rights of the
adopted.[6] Countries, like Greece, France, Spain and England, in an
effort to preserve inheritance within the family, neither allowed nor
recognized adoption.[7] It was only much later when adoption was
given an impetus in law and still later when the welfare of the child
became a paramount concern.[8] Spain itself which previously
disfavored adoption ultimately relented and accepted the Roman
law concept of adoption which, subsequently, was to find its way to
the archipelago. The Americans came and introduced their own
ideas on adoption which, unlike most countries in Europe, made the
interests of the child an overriding consideration. [9] In the early part
of the century just passed, the rights of children invited universal
attention; the Geneva Declaration of Rights of the Child of 1924 and
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,[10] followed by
the United Nations Declarations of the Rights of the Child,[11] were
written instruments that would also protect and safeguard the rights
of adopted children. The Civil Code of the Philippines[12] of 1950 on
adoption, later modified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code[13] and
then by the Family Code of the Philippines,[14] gave immediate
statutory acknowledgment to the rights of the adopted. In 1989, the
United Nations initiated the Convention of the Rights of the
Child. The Philippines, a State Party to the Convention, accepted the
principle that adoption was impressed with social and moral
responsibility, and that its underlying intent was geared to favor the
adopted child. R.A. No. 8552 secured these rights and privileges for
the adopted. Most importantly, it affirmed the legitimate status of
the adopted child, not only in his new family but also in the society
 UM_SPECPRO_2017-18_CaseDigest 29 of 34

as well. The new law withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the
adoption decree and gave to the adopted child the sole right to
sever the legal ties created by adoption.

It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein
petitioner filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted
in 1975. By then, the new law,[22] had already abrogated and
repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family
Code to rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently with its earlier
pronouncements, the Court should now hold that the action for
rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by
petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could
be pursued.

Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to

set aside the adoption is subject to the five year bar rule under Rule
100[23] of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the
right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period.
The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition
that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to
protection. It must also be acknowledged that a person has no
vested right in statutory privileges.[24] While adoption has often
been referred to in the context of a right, the privilege to adopt is
itself not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely
created by statute.[25] It is a privilege that is governed by the states
determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and
welfare of the child.[26] Matters relating to adoption, including the
withdrawal of the right of an adopter to nullify the adoption decree,
are subject to regulation by the State.[27] Concomitantly, a right of
action given by statute may be taken away at anytime before it has
been exercised.[28]

While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a

consequential right to rescind the adoption decree even in cases
where the adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable, it
remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply the
law. Dura lex sed lex would be the hackneyed truism that those
caught in the law have to live with. It is still noteworthy, however,
that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of
adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain
benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For instance,
upon the grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an
adopted child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely
exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his
estate.

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is

AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
 UM_SPECPRO_2017-18_CaseDigest 30 of 34

ADOPTION CASE DIGEST #7

In Re Adoption of Stephanie Garcia, GR No. 148311

March 31, 2005

Case Digest by: Roita Amon Valles

Facts: Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor

illegitimate child Stephanie Astorga Garcia. He averred that
Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that Stephanie had been
using her mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is now a
widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that
Stephanie’s middle name be changed to Garcia, her mother’s
surname, and that her surname “Garcia” be changed to “Catindig”
his surname.

The RTC granted the petition for adoption, and ordered that
pursuant to article 189 of the Family Code, the minor shall be known
as Stephanie NathyCatindig.

Honorato filed a motion for classification and/or reconsideration

praying that Stephanie be allowed to use the surname of her natural
mother (Garcia) as her middle name. The lower court denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law
or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his
biological mother as his middle name.

Issue: Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of

her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted
by her natural father.

Held:
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a
legitimate child of the adapter for all intents and purposes pursuant
to Article 189 of the Family Code and Section 17 of Article V of RA
8557.

Being a legitimate by virtue of her adoption, it follows that

Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate
child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear
the surname of her father and her mother. This is consistent with
the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname
of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the
father.
 UM_SPECPRO_2017-18_CaseDigest 31 of 34

ADOPTION CASE DIGEST #8

Landingin vs. Republic

GR No. 164948, June 27, 2006

Case Digest by: Roita Amon Valles

(Special Proceedings – Adoption: Consent and Abandonment)

Facts:Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage

filed a petition for the adoption of 3 minors, natural children of
Manuel Ramos, the former’s brother, and Amelia Ramos. She
alleged in her petition that when her brother died, the children were
left to their paternal grandmother for their biological mother went
to Italy, re-married there and now has 2 children by her second
marriage and no longer communicates from the time she left up to
the institution of the adoption. After the paternal grandmother
passed away, the minors were being supported by the petitioner
and her children abroad and gave their written consent for their
adoption.

A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending for

the adoption and narrated that Amelia, the biological mother was
consulted with the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of
adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented.

However, petitioner failed to present the said social worker as

witness and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia
Ramos to the adoption. Petitioner also failed to present any
documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assent to the adoption.

Issue: WON a petition for adoption be granted without the written

consent of the adoptee’s biological mother.

Held: No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of
the biological parent(s) of the child, if known is necessary to the
adoption. The written consent of the legal guardian will suffice if the
written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained.

The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural

parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship from
unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the
opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the
manner of the proposed adoption.

The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the

validity of the decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a
parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before
his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-establish in
adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written
consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.

Moreover, abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the

filial and legal obligations of love and support. Merely permitting the
child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not
such abandonment. To dispense with the requirements of consent,
the abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of
adoption.
 UM_SPECPRO_2017-18_CaseDigest 32 of 34

ADOPTION CASE DIGEST #9

Madrinan vs. Madrinan

527 SCRA 487, GR No. 159374, July 12, 2007

Case Digest by: Roita Amon Valles

(Special Proceedings – Court of Appeals and Supreme Court has

concurrent jurisdiction with the family courts of Habeas Corpus
involving custody of minors)

Facts: Petitioner and respondent were married, and after a bitter

quarrel, petitioner left the conjugal abode bringing with him their
three sons (2 of which are minors) to Albay and to Laguna
subsequently.

Respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Court of

Appeals for their their 2 minor sons on the ground that petitioner’s
act disrupted their education and deprived them of their mother’s
care.

Petitioner filed a memorandum alleging that respondent was unfit

to take custody of their children and questioned the jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals claiming that under Section 5(b) of RA 8369,
family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide
the petition for habeas corpus filed by respondent.

The Court of Appeals rendered a decision asserting its authority to

take cognizance and ruling, that under the Family Code, respondent
was entitled to custody of the minors.

Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over

the petition for habeas corpus and insists that jurisdiction over the
case is lodged in the family courts under RA 8369.

Issue: WON the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over habeas corpus
cases involving custody of minors.

Held: Yes.The Supreme Court ruled in a previous jurisprudence that

The Court of Appeals should has cognizance of this case since there
is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of
habeas corpus involving the custody of minors. RA 8369 did not
divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their
jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of
minors.

The concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme

Court with family courts in said cases was further affirmed by A.M.
No. 03-03-04-SC (April 22, 2004) in Re: Rule on Custody of Minors
and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors which
provides that:

Section 20.Petition for writ of habeas corpus. – A verified petition

for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed
with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its
judicial region to which the Family Court belongs.

x xxxxxxxx

The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall
be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.
 UM_SPECPRO_2017-18_CaseDigest 33 of 34

ADOPTION CASE DIGEST #10 petitioner and respondent to take custody of their children. Pending
the final disposition of this case, custody shall remain with
REYMOND B. LAXAMANA, petitioner, vs. MA. LOURDES respondent but subject to petitioner’s visitation rights in accordance
with the December 7, 1999 order of the trial court.
D.LAXAMANA, respondent.
G.R. No. 144763. September 3, 2002
FIRST DIVISION
PARENTAL AUTHORITY
Case Digest by: Kristina Marie Clavero
Facts: Petitioner Reymond B. Laxamana and respondent Ma.
Lourdes D. Laxamana met sometime in 1983. Petitioner, who came
from a well-to-do family, was a graduate of Bachelor of Laws, while
respondent, a holder of a degree in banking and finance, worked in a
bank. They got married and the union blesses with three children.
All went well until petitioner became a drug dependent. Despite
several confinements, respondent claimed petitioner was not fully
rehabilitated. His drug dependence worsened and it became difficult
for respondent and her children to live with him. Petitioner allegedly
became violent and irritable, thus, respondent and her 3 children
abandoned petitioner and transferred to the house of her relatives.
Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
107, and the instant petition for habeas corpus praying for custody
of his three children. Respondent opposed the petition, citing the
drug dependence of petitioner. RTC ordered to remain the custody
under the respondent and parties are enjoined to comply with the
terms and condition stated in the visitation arrangement.
Issue: W/N THE COURT A QUO HAS RESOLVED THE ISSUE OF
CUSTODY IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT
WHEN IT RESOLVED THE ISSUE OF CUSTODY WITHOUT
CONSIDERING THE PARAMOUNT INTEREST AND WELFARE OF
HEREIN PARTIES’ THREE (3) MINOR CHILDREN.
Ruling: Petitioner is not estopped from questioning the absence of a
trial considering that said psychiatric report, which was the court’s
primary basis in awarding custody to respondent, is insufficient to
justify the decision. The fundamental policy of the State to promote
and protect the welfare of children shall not be disregarded by mere
technicality in resolving disputes which involve the family and the
youth. While petitioner may have a history of drug dependence, the
records are inadequate as to his moral, financial and social well-
being. The results of the psychiatric evaluation showing that he is
not yet “completely cured” may render him unfit to take custody of
the children, but there is no evidence to show that respondent is
unfit to provide the children with adequate support, education, as
well as moral and intellectual training and development. Moreover,
the children in this case were 14 and 15 years old at the time of the
promulgation of the decision, yet the court did not ascertain their
choice as to which parent they want to live with. In its September 8,
1999 order, the trial court merely stated that: “The children were
asked as to whether they would like to be with petitioner but there
are indications that they entertain fears in their hearts and want to
be sure that their father is no longer a drug dependent.” There is no
showing that the court ascertained the categorical choice of the
children. These inadequacies could have been remedied by an
exhaustive trial probing into the accuracy of Dr. Ocampo’s report
and the capacity of both parties to raise their children. The trial
court was remiss in the fulfillment of its duties when it approved the
agreement of the parties to submit the case for decision on the basis
of sketchy findings of facts.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant case is
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 107,
for the purpose of receiving evidence to determine the fitness of
 UM_SPECPRO_2017-18_CaseDigest 34 of 34

ADOPTION CASE DIGEST #11 children should now be as follows: Enrique — 11, Maria Teresa —
10, Gerrard — 9, and Ramon — 5. Therefore, the issue regarding the
Lacson vs Lacson
award of the custody of Enrique and Maria Teresa to the petitioner
24 SCRA 837 spouse has become moot and academic. The passage of time has
Facts: removed the prop which supports the respondent spouse's position.

On Feb 14, 1953, when they got married, Jan 9, 1963 is when Nonetheless, this Court is loath to uphold the couple's agreement
Carmen (respondent) left home in Bacolod to go to Manila. On regarding the custody of the children.
March 12, 1963 Carmen filed a complaint for custody of children as Article 356 of the new Civil Code provides:
well as support in Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila.
Before it pushed through though they reached a settlement where Every child:
the two eldest kids would go to petitioner Alfonso and the youngest (1) Is entitled to parental care;
would stay with Carmen, This was affirmed by the CFI. And on May
(2) Shall receive at least elementary education;
7, 1963 respondent filed a motion for the custody of all children be
given to her in JDRC since, she said she only entered into agreement (3) Shall be given moral and civic training by the parents or guardian;
to gain custody of her younger children and thus should be given (4) Has a right to live in an atmosphere conducive to his physical,
custody of the older ones as well who are all below 7 years old. CA moral and intellectual development.
ruled that compromise agreement as relating to custody of children
should be declared null and void and as such the execution of said It is clear that the abovequoted legal provision grants to every child
judgment is void too. rights which are not and should not be dependent solely on the
wishes, much less the whims and caprices, of his parents. His
ISSUE: welfare should not be subject to the parents' say-so or mutual
Whether or Not support should be awarded to the wife. agreement alone. Where, as in this case, the parents are already
separated in fact, the courts must step in to determine in whose
HELD:
custody the child can better be assured the right granted to him by
Yes, should have but was filed out of time, Older children at that law. The need, therefore, to present evidence regarding this matter,
time were 5 and 6 so agreement should have been declared null and becomes imperative. A careful scrutiny of the records reveals that
void since no compelling reasons were stated otherwise, however no such evidence was introduced in the CFI. This latter court relied
the children are now 11 and 10 and thus the 11 year old may choose merely on the mutual agreement of the spouses-parents. To be sure,
which parent they want to live with and Court may also award this was not a sufficient basis to determine the fitness of each
custody to who they deem more fit through evidence. parent to be the custodian of the children.
We agree with the Court of Appeals, however, that the CFI erred in Besides, at least one of the children — Enrique, the eldest — is now
depriving the mother, the respondent spouse, of the custody of the eleven years of age and should be given the choice of the parent he
two older children (both then below the age of 7). wishes to live with. This is the clear mandate of sec. 6, Rule 99 of the
The Civil Code specifically commands in the second sentence of its Rules of Court which, states, inter alia:
article 363 that "No mother shall be separated from her child under ... When husband and wife are divorced or living separately and
seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for apart from each other, and the question as to the care, custody, and
such measure." The rationale of this new provision was explained by control of a child or children of their marriage is brought before a
the Code Commission thus: Court of First Instance by petition or as an incident to any other
proceeding, the court, upon hearing testimony as may be pertinent,
The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy
where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her. No man can shall award the care, custody and control of each such child as will
be for its best interest permitting the child to choose which parent it
sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of
tender age. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for prefers to live with if it be over ten years of age, unless the parent so
chosen be unfit to take charge of the child by reason of moral
"compelling reasons" for the good of the child: those cases must
indeed be rare, if the mother's heart is not to be unduly hurt. If she depravity, habitual drunkenness, incapacity, or poverty... (Emphasis
supplied).
has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and
the (relative) divorce decree will ordinarily be sufficient punishment
for her. Moreover, her moral dereliction will not have any effect
upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand the situation."
(Report of the Code Commission, p. 12).
The use of the word shall2 in article 363 of the Civil Code, coupled
with the observations made by the Code Commission in respect to
the said legal provision, underscores its mandatory character. It
prohibits in no uncertain: terms the separation of a mother and her
child below seven years, unless such separation is grounded upon
compelling reasons as determined by a court.
The order dated April 27, 1963 of the CFI, in so far as it awarded
custody of the two older children who were 6 and 5 years old,
respectively, to the father, in effect sought to separate them from
their mother. To that extent therefore, it was null and void because
clearly violative of article 363 of the Civil Code.
It might be argued — and correctly — that since five years have
elapsed since the filing of these cases in 1963, the ages of the four