J. Bersamin - Legal Ethics PDF

LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS
J. BERSAMIN
Legal Ethics
The Code of Professional Responsibility
EMBIDO vs. PE, JR.

A.C. No. 6732, EN BANC, October 22, 2013, Bersamin, J.
A lawyer who forges a court decision and represents it as that of a court of law is guilty of
the gravest misconduct and deserves the supreme penalty of disbarment.
Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Code of Professional Responsibility; Lawyers are required by Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral
or deceitful conduct.—In light of the established circumstances, the respondent was guilty of
grave misconduct for having authored the falsification of the decision in a nonexistent court
proceeding. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that all lawyers should
uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the Legal Profession. Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility states that “a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.” Lawyers are further required by Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Same; Same; Disbarment; Suspension; Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving

moral turpitude, or fraudulent transactions can justify a lawyer’s disbarment or suspension from the
practice of law.—Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent
transactions can justify a lawyer’s disbarment or suspension from the practice of law. Specifically,
the deliberate falsification of the court decision by the respondent was an act that reflected a high
degree of moral turpitude on his part. Worse, the act made a mockery of the administration of
justice in this country, given the purpose of the falsification, which was to mislead a foreign
tribunal on the personal status of a person. He thereby became unworthy of continuing as a
member of the Bar.
FACTS:
A written communication from Mr. Ballam Hunt, the solicitor in the United Kingdom was
received by the clerk of court of the RTC, requesting a copy of the decision rendered by Judge
Rafael Penuela in Special Proceedings Case No 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of
Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna whose petitioner was one Shirley Quioyo.
Judge Penuela tried retrieve the records but it was then discovered that no record of
Special Proceedings No. 084 wherein Shirley Quioyo was the petitioner exist. Instead, the court
files revealed that Judge Penuel had decided Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of
the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rolando Austria, whose petitioner was one Serena
Austria.
Upon informing Mr. Hunt that the requested decision and case records did not exist, Mr.
Hunt sent a letter attaching a machine copy of the purported decision that had been presented by
Shirley Quioyo in court proceedings in the UK. After comparing the two documents and
ascertaining that the document attached was a falsified document, Judge Penuela wrote to Mr.
Hunt to apprise him of the situation.
Dy Quioyo, brother of Shirley Quiyo executed an affidavit stating that it was Atty. Pe who
had falsified the issuance of the falsified decision for a fee of P60 000.00. The NBI invited Atty. Pe
to explain his side but he invoked his constitutional right to remain silent.
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After conducting investigation, the NBI recommended that Atty. Pe be prosecuted for
falsification of public document and for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Likewise, it was recommended that disbarment proceedings be commenced against the
respondent.
Upon being required to submit his counter affidavit, he denied any participation in the
falsification. Instead, he insisted that Dy Quioyo sought his opinion on Shirley’s petition for
annulment of her marriage and that he had given advice on the pertinent laws involved and the
different ground for the annulment of marriage.
The court then rendered its resolution treating his counter-affidavit as his comment and
raised the matter to the IBP for investigation. The IBP then found Atty. Pe guilty of serious
misconduct and violations of Attorney’s Oath and Code of Professional Responsibility and
recommended his suspension from the practice of law for one year.
The investigating commissioner found out that the falsified decision obtained in Recto,
Manila, was almost a verbatim reproduction of the authentic decision on file in Judge Penuela’s
branch except for the names and dates, and Atty. Pe did not attend the NBI investigation and
merely invoked his right to remain silent. Lastly, there is no plausible reason why Dy Quioyo and
his sister, Mary Rose Quioyo would falsely implicate him in this incident.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the
investigating commissioner by suspending Atty. Pe from the practice of law but modified the
same by suspending him for six years.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Pe is guilty of grave misconduct for falsifying a court decision which would
warrant his disbarment.
HELD:
Yes. A lawyer who forges a court decision and represents it as that of a court of law is
guilty of the gravest misconduct and deserves the supreme penalty of disbarment.
Atty. Pe’s main defense consisted in blanket denial of the imputation. He insisted that he
had had no hand in the falsification, and claimed that the falsification had been the handiwork of
Dy Quioyo. He implied that Dy Quioyo had resorted to the shady characters in Recto Avenue in
Manila to resolve the problems he had encountered as an OFW, hinting that Dy Quioyo had a
history of employing unscrupulous means to achieve his ends.
However, the Atty. Pe’s denial and his implication against Dy Quioyo in the illicit
generation of the falsified decision are not persuasive. Dy Quioyo’s categorical declaration on
Atty. Pe’s personal responsibility for the falsified decision, which by nature was positive evidence,
was not overcome by the latter’s blanket denial, which by nature was negative evidence.
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that all lawyers should
uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the Legal Profession. Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession." Lawyers are further required by Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or
deceitful conduct.
The act made a mockery of the administration of justice in this country, given the purpose
of the falsification, which was to mislead a foreign tribunal on the personal status of a person. He
thereby became unworthy of continuing as a member of the Bar.
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It then becomes timely to remind all members of the Philippine Bar that they should do
nothing that may in any way or degree lessen the confidence of the public in their professional
fidelity and integrity. The Court will not hesitate to wield its heavy hand of discipline on those
among them who wittingly and willingly fail to meet the enduring demands of their Attorney’s
Oath.
No lawyer is immune from the disciplinary authority of the Court whose duty and
obligation are to investigate and punish lawyer misconduct committed either in a professional or
private capacity. The test is whether the conduct shows the lawyer to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, and whether the conduct renders the lawyer
unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court.
BENJAMIN Q. ONG vs. ATTY. WILLIAM F. DELOS SANTOS

A.C. No. 10179, EN BANC, March 4, 2014, BERSAMIN, J.
A lawyer’s issuance of a worthless check renders him in breach of his oath to obey the
laws. To accord with the canon of professional responsibility that requires him to uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for the law and legal processes, he
thereby becomes administratively liable for gross misconduct.
Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Good moral character is not only a condition precedent relating to
his admission into the practice of law, but is a continuing imposition in order for him to maintain
his membership in the Philippine Bar.—Every lawyer is an officer of the Court. He has the duty and
responsibility to maintain his good moral character. In this regard, good moral character is not
only a condition precedent relating to his admission into the practice of law, but is a continuing
imposition in order for him to maintain his membership in the Philippine Bar. The Court
unwaveringly demands of him to remain a competent, honorable, and reliable individual in whom
the public may repose confidence. Any gross misconduct that puts his moral character in serious
doubt renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law.
Same; Same; In issuing the dishonored check, Atty. Delos Santos put into serious question
not only his personal integrity but also the integrity of the entire Integrated Bar.—In issuing the
dishonored check, Atty. Delos Santos put into serious question not only his personal integrity but
also the integrity of the entire Integrated Bar. It cannot be denied that Ong acceded to Atty. Delos
Santos’ request for encashment of the check because of his complete reliance on the nobility of
the Legal Profession.
FACTS:
Benjamin Ong was introduced to respondent Atty. William F. Delos Santos by Sheriff
Fernando Mercado of the MTC of Manila. After several calls and personal interactions between
them, Ong and Atty. Delos Santos became friends.
According to Ong, Atty. Delos Santos asked him to encash his postdated check inasmuch
as he was in dire need of cash. To reassure Ong that the check would be funded upon maturity,
Atty. Delos Santos bragged about his lucrative practice and his good paying clients. Convinced of
Atty. Delos Santos’ financial stability, Ong handed to Atty. Delos Santos on January 29, 2008 the
amount of P100,000.00 in exchange for the latter’s Metrobank Check No. 0110268 postdated
February 29, 2008.
However, the check was dishonored upon presentment for the reason that the account
was closed. Ong relayed the matter of the dishonor to Atty. Delos Santos, and demanded
immediate payment, but the latter just ignored him. When efforts to collect remained futile, Ong
brought a criminal complaint for estafa and for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against Atty.
Delos Santos. Ong also brought this disbarment complaint against Atty. Delos Santos in
the IBP.
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ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Delos Santos violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by issuing the
worthless check.
RULING:
Yes. Every lawyer is an officer of the Court. He has the duty and responsibility to maintain
his good moral character. In this regard, good moral character is not only a condition precedent
relating to his admission into the practice of law, but is a continuing imposition in order for him
to maintain his membership in the Philippine Bar. The Court unwaveringly demands of him to
remain a competent, honorable, and reliable individual in whom the public may repose
confidence. Any gross misconduct that puts his moral character in serious doubt renders him
unfit to continue in the practice of law.
BP 22 has been enacted in order to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the
legitimate public checking account users. The gravamen of the offense defined and punished by
BP 22, according to Lozano v. Martinez, is the act of making and issuing a worthless check, or any
check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment and putting it in circulation; the law
is designed to prohibit and altogether eliminate the deleterious and pernicious practice of issuing
checks with insufficient funds, or with no credit, because the practice is deemed a public
nuisance, a crime against public order to be abated.
Being a lawyer, Atty. Delos Santos was well aware of the objectives and coverage of BP 22.
If he did not, he was nonetheless presumed to know them, for the law was penal in character and
application.
His issuance of the unfunded check involved herein knowingly violated BP 22, and exhibited
his indifference towards the pernicious effect of his illegal act to public interest and public order.
He thereby swept aside his Lawyer’s Oath that enjoined him to support the Constitution and obey
the laws. He also took for granted the express commands of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, specifically Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03, viz:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS

OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A Lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND

DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF
THE INTEGRATED BAR.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
A lawyer must conduct himself with great propriety, and his behavior should be beyond
reproach anywhere and at all times. For, as officers of the courts and keepers of the public's faith,
they are burdened with the highest degree of social responsibility and are thus mandated to
behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and honor.
That his act involved a private dealing with Ong did not matter. His being a lawyer invested
him – whether he was acting as such or in a non- professional capacity – with the obligation to
exhibit good faith, fairness and candor in his relationship with others. There is no question that
a lawyer could be disciplined not only for a malpractice in his profession, but also for any
misconduct committed outside of his professional capacity. His being a lawyer demanded
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that he conduct himself as a person of the highest moral and professional integrity and probity in
his dealings with others.
JESSIE R. DE LEON v. ATTY. EDUARDO G. CASTELO

A.C. No. 8620, January 11, 2011, THIRD DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)
Their being officers of the Court extends to attorneys not only the presumption of
regularity in the discharge of their duties, but also the immunity from liability to others for as
long as the performance of their obligations to their clients does not depart from their
character as servants of the Law and as officers of the Court.
On January 2, 2006, the Government brought suit for the purpose of correcting the transfer
certificates of title (TCTs) covering two parcels of land located in Malabon City. These parcels
of land were then registered in the names of defendants Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu
(defendant- spouses) due to their encroaching on a public callejon, and on a portion of the
Malabon-Navotas River shoreline to the extent of an area of 45 square meters and of about 600
square meters, respectively. Two years later, Jessie R. De Leon (De Leon) joined the said civil
case as a voluntary intervenor.
De Leon now accuses Atty. Castelo, the counsel of record of the defendants in the said case,
with the serious administrative offenses of dishonesty and falsification warranting his
disbarment or suspension as an attorney. Atty. Castelo’s sin was allegedly committed by his
filing for defendant- spouses of various pleadings (that is, answer with counterclaim and cross-
claim in relation to the main complaint; and answer to the complaint in intervention with
counterclaim and cross-claim) despite said spouses being already deceased at the time of filing.
In his comment, Atty. Castelo explained, among others, that the persons who had engaged
him as attorney in the said case were William and Leonardo Lim, the children of the
defendant- spouses and the present co-owners the properties by virtue of the deed of absolute
sale their parents executed in their favor; that he prepared the initial pleadings based on his
honest belief that defendant-spouses were then still living; and that he had no intention to
commit either a falsehood or a falsification.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Castelo violated the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
RULING:
NO. Atty. Castelo did not misrepresent that the defendant-spouses were still living. On the
contrary, Atty. Castelo directly stated in the answer to the complaint in intervention with
counterclaim and cross-claim, and in the clarification and submission, that the defendant-
spouses were already deceased.
Their being officers of the Court extends to attorneys not only the presumption of
regularity in the discharge of their duties, but also the immunity from liability to others for as
long as the performance of their obligations to their clients does not depart from their character
as servants of the Law and as officers of the Court.
Even granting, for the sake of argument, that any of Atty. Castelo’s pleadings might have
created any impression that the defendant-spouses were still living, the Court still cannot hold
Atty. Castelo guilty of any dishonesty or falsification.
For one, Atty. Castelo was acting in the interest of the actual owners of the properties when
he filed the answer with counterclaim and cross-claim. As such, his pleadings were privileged
and would not occasion any action against him as an attorney. Secondly, having made clear at
the start that the defendant-spouses were no longer the actual owners of the affected properties
due to the transfer of ownership even prior to the institution of the action, and that the actual
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owners (i.e., Leonardo and William Lim) needed to be substituted in lieu of said spouses,
whether the defendant- spouses were still living or already deceased as of the filing of the
pleadings became immaterial. And, lastly, De Leon could not disclaim knowledge that the
defendant-spouses were no longer living. His joining in the action as a voluntary intervenor
charged De Leon with notice of all the other persons interested in the litigation. De Leon
also had an actual awareness of such other persons, as his own complaint in intervention bear
out in its specific allegations against Leonardo Lim and William Lim, and their respective
spouses. Thus, De Leon could not validly insist that Atty. Castelo committed any dishonesty or
falsification in relation to him or to any other party.
The Court, therefore, dismissed the complaint for disbarment or suspension against
Atty. Castelo.
SAMSON vs. ERA

A.C. No. 6664, EN BANC, July 16, 2013, Bersamin, J.
An attorney who wittingly represents and serves conflicting interests may be suspended from
the practice of law, or even disbarred when circumstances so warrant.
Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Code of Professional Responsibility; Conflict of Interests; A lawyer

shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.―Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that: “A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts.” Atty. Era thus owed to Samson and his group entire
devotion to their genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of their rights.
He was expected to exert his best efforts and ability topreserve the clients’ cause, for the
unwavering loyalty displayed to his clients likewise served the ends of justice.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease
with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the client’s ceasing to employ the attorney
and retaining another, or by any other change of relation between them.―The lawyer’s highest and
most unquestioned duty is to protect the client at all hazards and costs even to himself. The pro
tection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation,
nor is it affected by the client’s ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any
other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.
FACTS:
Ferdinand A. Samson and his relatives were among the investors who fell prey to the
pyramiding scam perpetrated by ICS Exports, Inc. Exporter, Importer, and Multi-Level Marketing
Business (ICS Corporation), a corporation whose corporate officers were led by Sison.
Samson engaged Atty. Era to represent and assist him and his relatives in the criminal
prosecution of Sison and her group. Pursuant to the engagement, Atty. Era prepared the demand
letter dated July 19, 2002 demanding the return or refund of the money subject of their
complaints. He also prepared the complaint-affidavit that Samson signed and swore to on July 26,
2002.
In April 2003, Atty. Era called a meeting with Samson and his relatives to discuss the
possibility of an amicable settlement with Sison and her cohorts. He told Samson that they could
settle the cases with Sison and her group, with him guaranteeing the turnover to them of a certain
property located in Antipolo City belonging to ICS Corporation in exchange for their desistance.
They acceded and executed the affidavit of desistance he prepared, and in turn they received a
deed of assignment covering land registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. R-4475
executed by Sison in behalf of ICS Corporation.
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Samson and his relatives later demanded from Atty. Era that they be given instead a deed
of absolute sale to enable them to liquidate the property among themselves. It took some period
of negotiations between them and Atty. Era before the latter delivered to them five copies of a
deed of absolute sale involving the property. However, Atty. Era told them that whether or
not the title of the property had been encumbered or free from lien or defect would no
longer be his responsibility. He further told them that as far as he was concerned he had
already accomplished his professional responsibility towards them upon the amicable
settlement of the cases between them and ICS Corporation.
When Samson and his co-complainants verified the title of the property at the Registry of
Deeds and the Assessor’s Office of Antipolo City, they were dismayed to learn that they could not
liquidate the property because it was no longer registered under the name of ICS Corporation but
was already under the name of Bank Wise Inc. Upon their urging, Atty. Era negotiated as their
counsel with ICS Corporation.
During the hearings in the RTC, Atty. Era did not anymore appear for Samson and his
group. This forced them to engage another lawyer. They were shocked to find out later on,
however, that Atty. Era had already been entering his appearance as the counsel for Sison
in her other criminal cases in the other branches of the RTC in Quezon City involving the
same pyramiding scam that she and her ICS Corporation had perpetrated.
Samson executed an affidavit alleging the foregoing antecedents, and praying for Atty.
Era’s disbarment on the ground of his violation of the trust, confidence and respect reposed in
him as their counsel.
Upon being required by the Court to comment on the complaint against him within 10
days from notice, Atty. Era several times sought the extension of his period to file the comment to
supposedly enable him to collate documents relevant to his comment. The Court granted his
request and allowed him an extension totaling 40 days. But despite the lapse of the extended
period, he did not file his comment.
Atty. Era alleged that the conclusion on April 23, 2002 of the compromise settlement
between Samson and his group, on one hand, and Sison and her ICS Corporation, on the other,
had terminated the lawyer-client relationship between him and Samson and his group; and that
on September 1, 2003, he had been appointed as counsel de officio for Sison only for purposes of
her arraignment.
The Investigating Commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBPCBD)

found Atty. Era guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests, for failing to serve his
clients with competence and diligence, and for failing to champion his clients’ cause with
wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion.
ISSUE:
Whether conflict of interest exist when Atty. Era started appearing as counsel for ICS
Corporation.
HELD:
Yes. There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or
more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to
fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues
for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This
rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also
those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used.
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Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation
will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his
client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.
The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was fashioned to prevent situations wherein a
lawyer would be representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or
former clients. In the same way, a lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving the
same or a substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the former client only if the
former client consents to it after consultation.
Contrary to Atty. Era’s ill-conceived attempt to explain his disloyalty to Samson and his
group, the termination of the attorney-client relationship does not justify a lawyer to
represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The spirit
behind this rule is that the client’s confidence once given should not be stripped by the mere
expiration of the professional employment. Even after the severance of the relation, a lawyer
should not do anything that will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which the
lawyer previously represented the client. Nor should the lawyer disclose or use any of the client’s
confidences acquired in the previous relation.
In this regard, Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly declares that:
"A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him."
TERESITA T. BAYONLA v. ATTY. PURITA A. REYES

A.C. No. 4808, November 22, 2011, EN BANC (Bersamin, J.)
Conformably with these canons of professional responsibility, the Court has held that
a lawyer is obliged to render an accounting of all the property and money she has collected
for her client. This obligation includes the prompt reporting and accounting of the money
collected by the lawyer by reason of a favorable judgment to his client.
Teresita T. Bayonla (Bayonla) and her uncle, Alfredo Tabada (Alfredo) were the
compulsory heirs of Paz Durban (Paz). The land which Paz co-owned was expropriated for
the construction of the Bancasi Airport. An expropriation compensation amounting to
P2,453,429.00 was to be paid to Bayonla and Alfredo. Thus, they engaged the legal services
of Atty. Reyes to collect their share in the expropriation compensation from the Air
Transportation Office (ATO), Cagayan De Oro City. They agreed that Atty. Reyes’
attorneys fees would be 10% of whatever amount would be collected. In November 1993,
Atty. Reyes had collected P1 million from the ATO. Bayonla’s share, after deducting Atty.
Reyes’ attorneys fees, would have been P75,000.00, but Atty. Reyes had delivered to her
only P23,000.00, and had failed to deliver the balance of P52,000.00 despite repeated
demands. Thereafter, on June 5, 1995, Atty. Reyes had collected the amount of P121,119.11 from
the ATO. Bayonla's share, after deducting Atty. Reyes’ attorneys fees, would have been
P109,007.20, but Atty. Reyes had handed her only P56,500.00, and had failed to deliver the
balance of P52,507.20.
Consequently, Bayonla charged Atty. Reyes with gross dishonesty, deceit, conversion,
and breach of trust. Bayonla alleged that Atty. Reyes should be disbarred for depriving
her of her just share in the expropriation compensation. In her comment, Atty. Reyes
admitted that Bayonla and Alfredo had engaged her legal services for the purpose of
collecting their share in the expropriation compensation; and that as consideration for her
services, Bayonla and Alfredo had agreed upon a 40% contingent fee for her.
Upon investigation, IBP Commissioner Navarro found and recommended that Atty.
Reyes be required to render an accounting or inventory of all the collected shares due the
Bayonla and remit to the latter the said amount of P44.582.66; and that until such time
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that Atty. Reyes had complied with the aforementioned, she is suspended from the practice
of her legal profession. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved Commissioner
Navarro’s report.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Reyes is guilty of violating Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of Canon 16
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
RULING:
YES. Conformably with the said canons of professional responsibility, the Court has
held that a lawyer is obliged to render an accounting of all the property and money she has
collected for her client. This obligation includes the prompt reporting and accounting of the
money collected by the lawyer by reason of a favorable judgment to his client.
Based on the records, Bayonla and Alfredo would each receive the amount of P84,852.00
out of the first release, and the amount of P121,119.11 out of the second release. Bayonla’s total
share from the two releases was P205,971.11. With Atty. Reyes being entitled to P82,388.44 as
attorneys fees, the equivalent of 40% of Bayonla’s share, the net share of Bayonla was
P123,582.67. Yet, Atty. Reyes actually delivered to her only P79,000.00, which was short by
P44,582.67. Despite demands by Bayonla and despite the orders from the IBP Board of
Governors for her to remit the shortage, Atty. Reyes refused to do so.
By not delivering Bayonla’s share despite her demand, Atty. Reyes violated the aforestated
canons. The money collected by Atty. Reyes as the lawyer of Bayonla was unquestionably money
held in trust to be immediately turned over to the client. The unjustified withholding of money
belonging to the client warrants the imposition of disciplinary sanctions on the lawyer.
Without doubt, Atty. Reyes failure to immediately account for and to deliver the money upon
demand was deceit, for it signified that she had converted the money to her own use, in
violation of the trust Bayonla had reposed in her. It constituted gross misconduct for which the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law became justified pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court.
The proper penalty for Atty. Reyes is suspension from the practice of law for two years,
with warning that a similar offense by her will be dealt with more severely. Atty. Reyes is further
obliged to pay to Bayonla the amount of P44,582.67, which the IBP Board of Governors found to
be still unpaid, by way of restitution. In addition, Atty. Reyes is liable for interest of 12% per
annum reckoned from June 22, 1997, the date when she was formally charged with disbarment.
ANGELITO RAMISCAL and MERCEDES ORZAME v. ATTY. EDGAR S. ORRO

A.C. No. 10945, February 23, 2016, BERSAMIN, J., EN BANC
The fiduciary duty of every lawyer towards his client requires him to conscientiously act in
advancing and safeguarding the latter’s interest. His failure or neglect to do so constitutes a serious
breach of his Lawyer’s Oath and the canons of professional ethics, and renders him liable for gross
misconduct that may warrant his suspension from the practice of law.
Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Lawyer’s Oath; Every lawyer, upon becoming a member of the
Philippine Bar, solemnly takes the Lawyer’s Oath, by which he vows, among others, that: “I will
delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients.”—Every
lawyer, upon becoming a member of the Philippine Bar, solemnly takes the Lawyer’s Oath, by
which he vows, among others, that: “I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct
myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as
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well to the courts as to my clients.” If he should violate the vow, he contravenes the Code of
Professional Responsibility, particularly its Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18, viz.:
CANON 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him. CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence. x x x x Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the
client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s
request for information.
Attorney-Client Relationships; As an essential part of their highly fiduciary relationship, the

client is entitled to the periodic and full updates from the lawyer on the developments of the case.—
It is beyond debate that the relationship of the lawyer and the client becomes imbued with trust
and confidence from the moment that the lawyer-client relationship commences, with the lawyer
being bound to serve his clients with full competence, and to attend to their cause with utmost
diligence, care and devotion. To accord with this highly fiduciary relationship, the client expects
the lawyer to be always mindful of the former’s cause and to be diligent in handling the former’s
legal affairs. As an essential part of their highly fiduciary relationship, the client is entitled to the
periodic and full updates from the lawyer on the developments of the case. The lawyer who
neglects to perform his obligations violates Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Attorneys; Legal Ethics; His unexplained disregard of the orders issued to him by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) to comment and to appear in the administrative investigation
of his misconduct revealed his irresponsibility as well as his disrespect for the IBP and its
proceedings.—We further underscore that the respondent owed it to himself and to the entire
Legal Profession of the Philippines to exhibit due respect towards the IBP as the national
organization of all the members of the Legal Profession. His unexplained disregard of the orders
issued to him by the IBP to comment and to appear in the administrative investigation of his
misconduct revealed his irresponsibility as well as his disrespect for the IBP and its proceedings.
He thereby exposed a character flaw that should not tarnish the nobility of the Legal Profession.
He should always bear in mind that his being a lawyer demanded that he conduct himself as a
person of the highest moral and professional integrity and probity in his dealings with others. He
should never forget that his duty to serve his clients with unwavering loyalty and diligence carried
with it the corresponding responsibilities towards the Court, to the Bar, and to the public in
general.
Same; Misconduct; There can be no question that a lawyer is guilty of misconduct sufficient
to justify his suspension or disbarment if he so acts as to be unworthy of the trust and confidence
involved in his official oath and is found to be wanting in that honesty and integrity that must
characterize the members of the Bar in the performance of their professional duties.—There can be
no question that a lawyer is guilty of misconduct sufficient to justify his suspension or disbarment
if he so acts as to be unworthy of the trust and confidence involved in his official oath and is
found to be wanting in that honesty and integrity that must characterize the members of the Bar
in the performance of their professional duties. Based on all the circumstances in this case, we
approve the recommendation of the IBP for the respondent’s suspension from the practice of law
for a period of two years. Although the Court imposed a six-month suspension from the practice
of law on lawyers violating Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
recommended penalty is condign and proportionate to the offense charged and established
because his display of disrespectful defiance of the orders of the IBP aggravated his misconduct.
FACTS:
Complainants spouses Ramiscals engaged the legal services of respondent Atty. Edgar S.
Orro to handle a case in which they were the defendants seeking the declaration of the nullity of
title to a parcel of land situated in the Province of Isabela. Upon receiving the P10,000.00
acceptance fee from them, the respondent handled the trial of the case until the RTC decided it in
their favor. As expected, the plaintiffs appealed to the CA, and they ultimately filed their
appellant’s brief. Upon receipt of the appellant’s brief, the respondent requested from the
Page 10 of 46
J. BERSAMIN
complainants an amount of P30,000.00 for the preparation and submission of their appellees’
brief in the CA. They obliged and paid him the amount requested.
Later on, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The respondent did not inform the
Ramiscals of the adverse decision of the CA which they only learned about from their neighbors.
They endeavoured to communicate with the respondent but their efforts were initially in vain.
When they finally reached him, he asked an additional P7,000.00 from them as his fee in filing a
motion for reconsideration in their behalf, albeit telling them that such motion would already be
belated. Even so, they paid to him the amount sought. To their dismay, they later discovered that
he did not file the motion for reconsideration, hence, the decision attained finality, eventually
resulting in the loss of their property with a probable worth of P3,391,600.00.
Consequently, the Ramiscals brought this administrative complaint against the

respondent.
The IBP found that the respondent had violated Canon 18, Rule 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Edgar S. Orro is guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
RULING:
YES. The respondent did not competently and diligently discharge his duties as the lawyer
of the Ramiscals.
Every lawyer, upon becoming a member of the Philippine Bar, solemnly takes the Lawyer’s
Oath, by which he vows, among others, that: “I will delay no man for money or malice, and will
conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients.” If he should violate the vow, he contravenes the Code
of Professional Responsibility, particularly its Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18.
It is beyond debate, therefore, that the relationship of the lawyer and the clients becomes
imbued with trust and confidence from the moment that the lawyer-client relationship
commences, with the lawyer being bound to serve his clients with full competence, and to attend
to their cause with utmost diligence, care and devotion. To accord with this highly fiduciary
relationship, the client expects the lawyer to be always mindful of the former’s cause and to be
diligent in handling the former’s legal affairs. As an essential part of their highly fiduciary
relationship, the client is entitled to the periodic and full updates from the lawyer on the
developments of the case. The lawyer who neglects to perform his obligations violates Rule 18.03
of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
As a member of the Law Profession in the Philippines, the respondent had the foregoing
professional and ethical burdens. But he obviously failed to discharge his burdens to the best of
his knowledge and discretion and with all good fidelity to his clients. By voluntarily taking up
their cause, he gave his unqualified commitment to advance and defend their interest therein.
Even if he could not thereby guarantee to them the favourable outcome of the litigation, he
reneged on his commitment nonetheless because he did not file the motion for reconsideration in
their behalf despite receiving from them the P7,000.00 he had requested for that purpose. He
further neglected to regularly update them on the status of the case, particularly on the adverse
result, thereby leaving them in the dark on the proceedings that were gradually turning against
their interest. Updating the clients could have prevented their substantial prejudice by enabling
them to engage another competent lawyer to handle their case. As it happened, his neglect in that
respect lost for them whatever legal remedies were then available. His various omissions
manifested his utter lack of professionalism towards them
Page 11 of 46
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ACCORDINGLY, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. EDGAR S. ORRO guilty
of violating Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and
SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a period for TWO YEARS EFFECTIVE UPON
NOTICE, with the STERN WARNING that any similar infraction in the future will be dealt with
more severely.
GABRIELA CORONEL v. ATTY. NELSON A. CUNANAN

A.C. No. 6738, AUGUST 12, 2015, BERSAMIN, J., FIRST DIVISION
A lawyer who proposes to his client a recourse or remedy that is contrary to law, public
policy, public order and public morals, or that lessens the public confidence in the legal system is
guilty of gross misconduct, and should be suspended from the practice of law, or even disbarred.
An administrative case proceeds independently from the interest, or lack thereof, of the
complainant, who only sets the case in motion through the filing of the complaint. Upon her doing
so, she becomes a witness to testify against the respondent lawyer. The disciplinary proceedings
against the lawyer do not involve private interests, but only how the lawyer conducts himself in his
public and private lives.
Attorneys; Legal Ethics; A lawyer should not recommend to his client any recourse or
remedy that is contrary to law, public policy, public order, and public morals.—A lawyer shall
uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes. He shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct; or counsel or
abet activities aimed at a defiance of the law or at a lessening of confidence in the legal system. He
should advise his client to uphold the law, not to violate or disobey it. Conversely, he should not
recommend to his client any recourse or remedy that is contrary to law, public policy, public
order, and public morals.
Same; Administrative Cases; An administrative case proceeds independently from the

interest, or lack thereof, of the complainant, who only sets the case in motion through the filing of
the complaint.—An administrative case proceeds independently from the interest, or lack thereof,
of the complainant, who only sets the case in motion through the filing of the complaint. Upon
her doing so, she becomes a witness to testify against the respondent lawyer. The disciplinary
proceedings against the lawyer do not involve private interests, but only how the lawyer conducts
himself in his public and private lives. Accordingly, neither the affidavit of desistance nor the Joint
Motion To Dismiss should bear any weight, or be relevant in determining whether or not the
respondent was fit to remain as a member of the Law Profession. The desistance by the
complainant was a matter that was the concern only of the parties, and was nonbinding on the
Court. What will be decisive in this administrative proceeding are the facts borne out by the
evidence competently adduced herein.
FACTS:
Gabriela Coronel engaged the services of Atty. Nelson A. Cunanan to transfer to her name
and her coheirs the parcels of land which certificated of title are both registered under the name
of their deceased grandparents. Atty. Cunanan advised Coronel that for the registration of TCT,
the transfer may be effected by two means namely: first by way of “ordinary procedure”; and
second, by way of “direct registration.” Ordinary procedure involves transfer by way of execution
of Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement, publication, payment of capital gains tax, etc., and
registration with the register of Deeds. Transfer by this means will cost Coronel an estimate of
Php56,000.00 with the amount of Php50,000.00 more or less to be spent for the payment of taxes.
Transfer by this means may take a period of at least five (5) months. Direct registration, on the
other hand, involves preparing documents upon advise of the Register of Deeds and will involve
an estimated cost to be negotiated with the officials or employees of the Register of Deeds to a flat
amount of Php50,000.00. Transfer by this means will take only one (1) month or less.
Page 12 of 46
J. BERSAMIN
Coronel and Atty. Cunanan agreed on the direct registration approach. Coronel paid Atty.
Cunanan Php70,000.00.
Coronel thereafter tried to contact Atty. Cunanan but the latter cannot be contacted.
When her request for a call from Atty. Cunanan was not heeded, Coronel wrote Atty. Cunanan
demanding that the amount of Php70,000.00 be returned to her as well as the owner’s duplicate
copy of TCT. When Atty. Cunanan refused, Coronel filed the instant disbarment case charging the
former with deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct.
The IBP Board of Governors found Atty. Cunanan guilty of malpractice and negligence;
recommending his suspension from the practice of law for 6 months; and requiring his return of
the P70,000.00.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not Atty. Cunanan is guilty of malpractice and negligence.

II. Whether or not the affidavit of desistance executed by the complainant will be considered
in the respondent’s favor.
RULING:
I. YES.
A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and legal processes. He shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct;
or counsel or abet activities aimed at a defiance of the law or at a lessening of confidence in the
legal system. He should advise his client to uphold the law, not to violate or disobey it.
Conversely, he should not recommend to his client any recourse or remedy that is contrary to law,
public policy, public order, and public morals.
Atty. Cunanan assured that he could enable the direct transfer with the help of his
contacts in the Office of the Register of Deeds and other relevant agencies of the Government,
which meant that he would be bribing some officials and employees of those offices. The proposal
of “direct registration” was unquestionably unlawful, immoral and deceitful all at once.
II. NO.
An administrative case proceeds independently from the interest, or lack thereof, of the
complainant, who only sets the case in motion through the filing of the complaint. Upon her
doing so, she becomes a witness to testify against the respondent lawyer. The disciplinary
proceedings against the lawyer do not involve private interests, but only how the lawyer
conducts himself in his public and private lives. Accordingly, neither the affidavit of desistance
nor the Joint Motion To Dismiss should bear any weight, or be relevant in determining whether
or not the respondent was fit to remain as a member of the Law Profession. The desistance by
the complainant was a matter that was the concern only of the parties, and was nonbinding on
the Court. What will be decisive in this administrative proceeding are the facts borne out by the
evidence competently adduced herein.
NATIONAL TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION v. CASTILLO

G.R. No. 154124, 4 August 2010, THIRD DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)
The legal profession demands of a lawyer that degree of vigilance and attention
expected of a good father of a family; such lawyer should adopt the norm of practice expected
of men of good intentions. Moreover, a lawyer owes it to himself and to his clients to adopt
Page 13 of 46
J. BERSAMIN
an efficient and orderly system of keeping track of the developments in his cases, and should
be knowledgeable of the remedies appropriate to his cases.
The National Tobacco Administration prays before the Court to review the decision
in their previously decided case and the resolution which denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by the NTA.
The NTA was the losing party in a case decided by the Civil Service Commission
(CSC) which mandated the former to reinstate the cashier who they dismissed due to the
abolition of his position in the Isabela branch. The NTA filed a motion for reconsideration
which the CSC denied for lack of merit. Subsequently they filed a second motion for
reconsideration which the CSC automatically denied since their rules of procedure only
prescribes a filing of a motion for reconsideration once.
The NTA persisted and filed a “petition for admission of the second motion for
reconsideration and of herein supplemental manifestation” citing excusable negligence and
the lack of manpower and resources and the massive workload the counsel has to hurdle in
defending cases, to which the CSC denied immediately. Undaunted still, the NTA filed a
petition for relief before the CSC to which the latter vehemently denied since a petition
for relief is not contemplated within its rules, and is within the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals (CA).
The Court of Appeals denied the petition of the NTA and likewise noted that the
defense of excusable negligence and others is not to be merited.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defense of the National Tobacco Administration of excusable

negligence is tenable.
RULING:
NO. Notwithstanding the herculean task that surrounds the counsel of the NTA,
the fact alone that he resorted to the erroneous application of remedies is unjustifiable.
The counsel ought to have known what legal recourse should the Administration take in
pursuing its claim.
Moreover, the defense of excusable negligence is not merited as the NTA caused its
own counsel to be overburdened with work and mere volume of cases is not a valid
excuse the court recognizes in complying with the period to appeal.
NENITA SANCHEZ v. ATTY. ROMEO G. AGUILOS

A.C. No. 10543, March 16, 2016, BERSAMIN, J., FIRST DIVISION
The Rules of Court mandates members of the Philippine Bar to “abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness,
unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. This duty of lawyers is further
emphasized in the Code of Professional Responsibility, whose Canon 8 provides: “A lawyer shall
conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall
avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.” Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 specifically demands that:
“A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
Page 14 of 46
J. BERSAMIN
FACTS:
In March 2005, Nenita Sanchez sought the legal services of the respondent to represent
her in the annulment of her marriage with her estranged husband. The respondent accepted the
engagement, fixing his fee at P150,000.00, plus the appearance fee of P5,000.00/hearing. Sanchez
gave the respondent the initial amount of P90,000.00. She had gone to the respondent’s residence
in May 2005 to inquire on the developments in her case, but he told her that he would only start
working on the case upon her full payment of the acceptance fee. She learned then that what the
respondent had contemplated to file for her was a petition for legal separation, not one for the
annulment of her marriage. The respondent further told her that she would have to pay a higher
acceptance fee for the annulment of her marriage. She subsequently withdrew the case from him,
and requested the refund of the amounts already paid, but he refused to do the same as he had
already started working on the case.
Nenita Sanchez sent the respondent a letter, through Atty. Isidro S.C. Martinez, to
demand the return of her payment less whatever amount correspond to the legal services he had
already performed. The respondent did not heed her demand letter despite his not having
rendered any appreciable legal services to her and that his constant refusal to return the amounts
prompted her to bring an administrative complaint against him in the IBP on March 20, 2007.
In his answer, the respondent alleges that based on his evaluation of Nenita’s situation,
the more appropriate case would be one for legal separation anchored on the psychological
incapacity of her husband. The respondent admits that he received the demand letter from Atty.
Martinez, but stated that he dismissed the letter as a mere scrap of paper because the demand
lacked basis in law. It is noted that he wrote in the last part of his answer in relation to the
demand letter the following:
“Hence, respondent accordingly treated the said letter demand for refund ...as a mere scrap of
paper or should have been addressed by her counsel ATTY. ISIDRO S.C. MARTINEZ, who
unskilfully relied on unverified information furnished him, to the urinal project of the MMDA
where it may serve its rightful purpose.”
Findings of IBP
The IBP declared that the respondent’s insistence that he could have brought a petition
for legal separation based on the psychological incapacity of the complainant’s husband was
sanctionable because he himself was apparently not conversant with the grounds for legal
separation.
The IBP also observed that the respondent’s statement in the last part of his answer, to the
effect that the demand letter was sent by Atty. Martinez in behalf of the complainant should be
treated as a scrap of paper, or should have been addressed “to the urinal project of the MMDA
where it may serve its rightful purpose,” was uncalled foe and improper. Such offensive and
improper language uttered by the respondent against a fellow lawyer violated 8.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the respondent should be held administratively liable for misconduct.
II. Whether or not he should be ordered to return the attorney’s fees pad.
III. Whether or not the respondent violated Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
RULINGS:
I. Yes. Respondent was liable for misconduct.
Page 15 of 46
J. BERSAMIN
The respondent misrepresented his professional competence and skill to the complainant.
He did not know the distinction between the grounds for legal separation and for the annulment
of marriage. Such knowledge would have been basic and expected of him as a lawyer accepting a
professional engagement for either causes of action. As such, the respondent failed to live up to
the standards imposed on him as an attorney. He thus transgressed Canon 18 and Rules 18.01,
18.02 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
II. Yes. He should be ordered to return the amount received from the client.
The attorney’s fees shall be those stipulated in the retainer’s agreement between the client
and the attorney, which constitutes the law between the parties for a long as it is not contrary to
law, good morals, good customs, public policy or public order. The underlying theory is that the
retainer’s agreement between them gives to the client reasonable notice of the arrangement on
the fees. Once the attorney has performed the task assigned to him in a valid agreement, his
compensation is determined on the basis of what he and the client agreed. In the absence of the
written agreement, the lawyer’s compensation shall be based on quantum meruit, which means
“as much as he deserved.” The determination of attorney’s fees on the basis of quantum meruit is
also authorized “when the counsel, for justifiable cause, was not able to finish the case to its
conclusion. Moreover, quantum meruit becomes the basis of recovery of compensation by the
attorney where the circumstances of the engagement indicate that it will be contrary to the
parties’ expectation to deprive the attorney of all compensation.
Nevertheless, the court shall determine in every case what is reasonable compensation
based on the obtaining circumstances; provided that the attorney does not receive more than
what is reasonable, in keeping with the Section 24 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
The court’s supervision of the lawyer’s compensation for legal services rendered is not
only for the purpose of ensuring the reasonableness of the amount of attorney’s fees charged, but
also for the purpose of preserving the dignity and integrity of the legal profession.
The respondent should not have accepted the engagement because as it was later
revealed, it was way above his ability and competence to handle the case for annulment of
marriage. As a consequence, he had no basis to accept any amount as attorney’s fees from the
complainant. He did not even begin to perform the contemplated task he undertook for the
complainant because it was improbable that the agreement with her was to bring the action for
legal separation. His having supposedly prepared the petition for legal separation instead of the
petition for annulment of marriage was either his way of covering up for his incompetence, or his
means of charging her more. Either way did not entitle him to retain the amount he had already
received.
The attorney who fails to accomplish the tasks he should naturally and expectedly perform
during his professional engagement does not discharge his professional responsibility and ethical
duty toward his client. The respondent was thus guilty of misconduct, and may be sanctioned
according to the degree of the misconduct. As a consequence, he may be ordered to restitute to
the client the amount received from the latter in consideration of the professional engagement,
subject to the rule on quantum meruit, if warranted.
III. Yes. Respondent did not conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards
his professional colleague.
The Rules of Court mandates members of the Philippine Bar to “abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness,
unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. This duty of lawyers is
further emphasized in the Code of Professional Responsibility, whose Canon 8 provides: “A lawyer
shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and
shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.” Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 specifically demands
that: “A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
Page 16 of 46
J. BERSAMIN
The Court recognizes the adversarial nature of our legal system which has necessitated
lawyers to use strong language in the advancement of the interest of their clients. However, as
members of a noble profession, lawyers are always impressed with the duty to represent their
clients’ cause, or, as in this case, to represent a personal matter in court, with courage and zeal
but that should not be used as license for the use of offensive and abusive language. In
maintaining the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer’s language – spoken or in
his pleadings – must be dignified. As such, every lawyer is mandated to carry out his duty as an
agent in the administration of justice with courtesy, dignity and respect not only towards his
clients, the court and judicial officers, but equally towards his colleagues in the Legal Profession.
The respondent’s statement in his answer that the demand from Atty. Martinez should be
treated “as a mere scrap of paper or should have been addressed by her counsel x x x to the urinal
project of the MMDA where it may service its rightful purpose” constituted simple misconduct
that this Court cannot tolerate.
In his motion for reconsideration, the respondent tried to justify the offensive and
improper language by asserting that the phraseology was not per se uncalled for and improper.
He explained that he had sufficient cause for maintaining that the demand letter should be
treated as a mere scrap of paper and should be disregarded. However, his assertion does not
excuse the offensiveness and impropriety of his language. He could have easily been respectful
and proper in responding to the letter.
As penalty for this particular misconduct, he is reprimanded, with the stern warning that a
repetition of the offense will be severely punished.
Suspension, disbarment and discipline of lawyers
THE CHRISTIAN SPIRITISTS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., PICO LOCAL CENTER v. ATTY.
DANIEL D. MANGALLAY
A.C. No. 10483, March 16, 2016, BERSAMIN, J., FIRST DIVISION
However, the referral to the IBP is not compulsory when the administrative case can be
decided on the basis of the pleadings filed with the Court, or when the referral to the IBP for the
conduct of formal investigation would be redundant or unnecessary, such as when the protraction of
the investigation equates to undue delay.
FACTS:
Atty. Daniel Mangallay filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Maria Omiles and
all persons staying with and/or acting in her behalf, including all Officers and/or patrons of the
Church of the Christian Spiritists in the Philippines, represented by Pastor Maliked. Atty.
Mangallay claimed ownership of the land where the church of CSP-PLC had been erected. MTC
later on decided the case by declaring Atty. Mangallay to have the better right of possession. MTC
further declared that the CSP-PLC was a builder in good faith, without prejudice to the
respondent exercising his option to appropriate the building n accordance with Article 448 of the
Civil Code.
After receiving the decision of the MTC, the parties entered into a compromise agreement
by virtue of which the CSP-PLC withdrew its appeal and promised to voluntarily vacate and
surrender the disputed premises in consideration of P300,000.00 to be paid by Atty.Mangallay.
Despite his having paid the same, the CSP-PLC did not vacate the premises even within the grace
period given to them. Atty. Mangallay sought and obtained the writ of execution from the MTC.
The CSP-PLC did not comply with the writ of execution to remove or demolish its structures on
the premises. Atty. Mangallay consequently sought from the MTC the writ of demolition and the
MTC issued the writ of demolition.
Page 17 of 46
J. BERSAMIN
The demolition impelled the CSP-PLC, represented by its local Minister, Edwin A. Pante,
to bring the disbarment complaint against the respondent based on his allegedly gross
misconduct and deceit in causing the demolition of the structure without the demolition order
from the court, violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, and disobedience to a lawful order of the court,
positing that he thereby abused his legal knowledge.
ISSUE:
Whether or not referral of the complaint to the IBP for the conduct of the formal
investigation is compulsory.
RULING:
No. Proceedings for disbarment, suspension or discipline of an attorney may be taken by

the Court, motu proprio, or by the IBP itself upon the verified complaint of any person. (Section 1,
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court)
Should the disciplinary complaint against the attorney be filed directly with the Court, the
complaint is referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. The reference to
the IBP is resorted to whenever the factual basis for the charge may be contested or disputed, or
may require the reception of the evidence of the complainant and the respondent attorney. After
the referral and hearings, the IBP renders its findings and recommendations on the complaint,
subject to the review by the Court. Yet, the Court may dispense with the referral to the IBP and
resolve the charge without delay. This happens particularly when the charge is patently frivolous,
or insincere, or unwarranted, or intended only to harass and spite the respondent attorney.
The Court has not enunciated any rule that prohibits the direct filing with it of
administrative complaints against attorneys in order to emphasize its role as the guardian of the
legal profession with the ultimate disciplinary power over attorneys. The disciplinary power of the
Court is both a right and a duty. Quite recently, the Court has revised Rule 139-B to eliminate any
ambiguity about the authority of the Court to directly receive administrative complaints against
attorneys.
Under the revisions of Rule 139-B, the administrative complaints against attorneys are
generally not dismissed outright but are instead referred for investigation, report and
recommendation either to the IBP, or the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC), or any office of the
Court or even a judge of a lower court. Such referral ensures that the parties’ right to due process
is respected as to matters that require further inquiry and which cannot be resolved by the mere
valuation of the documents attached to the pleadings. Consequently, whenever the referral is
made by the Court, the IBP, the OBC or the authorized office or individual must conduct the
formal investigation of the administrative complaint, and this investigation is a mandatory
requirement that cannot be dispensed with except for valid and compelling reasons because it
serves the purpose of threshing out all the factual issues that no cursory evaluation of the
pleadings can determine.
However, the referral to the IBP is not compulsory when the administrative case can be
decided on the basis of the pleadings filed with the Court, or when the referral to the IBP for the
conduct of formal investigation would be redundant or unnecessary, such as when the protraction
of the investigation equates to undue delay. Dismissal of the case may even be directed at the
outset should the Court find the complaint to be clearly wanting in merit. Indeed, the Rules of
Court should not be read as preventing the giving of speedy relief whenever such speedy relief is
warranted.
It is upon this that we dispense with the need to refer the complaint against the
respondent to the IBP for the conduct of the formal investigation. The documents he submitted
to substantiate his denial of professional wrongdoing are part of the records of the trial court,
and, as such, are sufficient to establish the unworthiness of the complaint as well as his lawful
entitlement to the demolition of the structures of the defendants in Civil Case.
Page 18 of 46
J. BERSAMIN
Notarial Practice (A.M. No. 01-8-13-SC, as amended)
IMELDA BIDES-ULASO v. ATTY. EDITA NOE-LACSAMANA

A.C. No. 7297, 29 September 2009, FIRST DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)
The admitted precedence by the word “for” of the signature on the amended
verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping was an indicium that the respondent-notary
did not intend to misrepresent the signature as that of the person executing the document.
Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana (Atty. Lacsamana) was the counsel of Irene Bides (Bides)
in a civil action filed by the latter against Imelda Bides-Ulaso (Ulaso). Bides amended the
complaint to demand the declaration of nullity of the deed of sale pertaining to the parcel
of land of which Bides was the registered owner. The amended complaint also contained a
so-called amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping, on which a signature was
preceded by the word “for” above the printed name “IRENE BIDES". The signature bore a
positive resemblance to Atty. Lacasamana's signature as the notary on the jurat of the
amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping.
Ulaso filed a motion to dismiss, citing the defective execution of the amended
verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping as one of his grounds. Atty.
Lacsamana and Bides opposed the motion to dismiss, claiming that the signing was
caused by an inadvertent mistake, as the amended verification and affidavit of
non-forum shopping was only a "sample-draft" intended to instruct Irene Mallari
(Mallari), Atty. Lacsamana's new secretary, on where Bides should sign. The Regional Trial
Court (RTC) denied the motion to dismiss and ultimately decided in favor of Bides.
Bides and Atty. Lacsamana also brought other proceedings against Ulaso, among
which is a criminal charge for falsification of a public document. In the interim, Ulaso also
initiated disbarment proceedings against Atty. Lacsamana due to her act of signing the
amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping and notarizing the signature of
Bides despite her non-appearance before her. However, Bides and Ulaso subsequently
entered into a compromise agreement to settle the criminal case for falsification, whereby
it was also agreed that Ulaso will withdraw the disbarment complaint against Atty.
Lacsamana.
Notwithstanding the withdrawal of the disbarment complaint, the Integrated Bar of

the Philippines (IBP) Commissioner recommended the suspension of Atty. Lacsamana from
the practice of law for two years due to her violation of the notarial law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Lacsamana violated notarial law.
RULING:
YES. The Court emphasized that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary
act, and the faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the oath in
the jurat are sacrosanct. The jurat indicated both the necessity for the physical presence of
Bides as the affiant and the fact that he signing was done in the presence of Atty.
Lacsamana as notary. Therefore, by signing as notary even before Bides herself could appear
before her, Atty. Lacsamana failed to give due observance and respect to the solemnity.
Page 19 of 46
J. BERSAMIN
However, contrary to the finding of IBP, the Court found that malice and bad faith
did not attend the signing of Atty. Lacsamana. The admitted precedence by the word "for"
on the signature on the amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping was an
indicium that the respondent did not intend to misrepresent the signature as that o f Bides.
The apparent resemblance of the signature after the word "for" with Atty. Lacsamana's
signature rendered it improbable that she had intended to deceive, considering that she
could have instead have forged Bides' signature had she wanted to pass the signature off as
that of Bides. Therefore, even if she did violate notarial law, bad faith was not attendant.
Judicial Ethics
SPOUSES CESAR and THELMA SUSTENTO v. JUDGE FRISCO T. LILAGAN

A.M. No. RTJ-11-2275, March 8, 2016, BERSAMIN, J., EN BANC
A judge is mandated to resolve with dispatch the cases and matters in his court, mindful that
any delay in their disposition erodes the faith of the people in the judicial system.
FACTS:
Spouses Cesar and Thelma Sustento concurrently appear as the “Defendants” in an

Unlawful Detainer case before MTC, Branch 1, Tacloban City, Leyte as well as the “Plaintiffs” in a
Specific Performance and Damages case before the RTC Branch 6, Tacloban City, Leyte. In the
Unlawful Detainer case, the Spouses Sustento alleged violation of non-forum-shopping rule by
the plaintiff for their failure to disclose the pending case for Specific Performance in the RTC
Branch 6, involving the same property subject matter of the ejectment case. Judge Sylvia Z.
Pocpoc-Lamoste issuedan Order decreeing inter alia that it is not the plaintiff’s duty to disclose
the pendency of the case for Specific Performance since it was not she who filed the case and that
the issues and cause of action of the cases are different. The Spouses Sustento filed an Omnibus
Motion for reconsideration, however, Judge Pocpoc-Lamoste denied the Omnibus Motion.
The spouses Sustento filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the RTC, Branch 34,
Tacloban City, Leyte, praying for annulment of the Orders issued by Judge Pocpoc-Lamoste.
Almost six (6) months had already elapsed before Judge Lilagan issued an Order
dismissing the Petition for Certiorari. The spouses Sustento filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
Respondent Judge Lilagan issued an Order deeming the Motion for Reconsideration
submitted for resolution. However, up to the date of the instant administrative matter was filed,
respondent Judge Lilagan has still yet to resolve the Motion for Reconsideration.
The Spouses have charged the respondent judge with undue delay in the resolution of the
petition for certiorari they had filed to assail the adverse order issued by Judge Pocpoc-Lamoste
and undue delay in the resolution of their motion for reconsideration beyond the prescribed 90-
day period in violation of the Administrative Circular No. 38-98 and Section 15, Article VIII of the
Constitution.
Judge Lilagan denied liability and contended that the petition for certiorari subject of the
complaint was a prohibited pleading for being brought against the interlocutory order issued by
MTCC Judge Pocpoc-Lamoste; that, as such, he was not obliged to rule on the petition for
certiorari; that his failure to seasonably resolve the motion for reconsideration within the
prescribed 90-day period did not amount to gross incompetence on his part because several
reasons justified the delay.
OCA recommended that the respondent be held guilty of undue delay in resolving the
motion for reconsideration; and that he be meted the penalty of suspension from office for six
Page 20 of 46
J. BERSAMIN
months without pay and without other benefits, with warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts would be dealt with more severely.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT Judge Lilagan is guilty of undue delay in rendering an order by not
resolving the motion for reconsideration within the prescribed period.
RULING:
YES. Judge Lilagan is guilty of gross inefficiency for his undue delay in resolving the
pending motion for reconsideration.
Decision-making is primordial among the many duties of judges. The speedy disposition
of cases thus becomes the primary aim of the Judiciary, for only thereby may the ends of justice
not be compromised and the Judiciary may be true to its commitment of ensuring to all persons
the right to a speedy, impartial and public trial. To pursue this aim, the Court, through the Rules
of Court and other issuances, has fixed reglementary periods for acting on cases and matters. In
respect of decisions, judges are given 90 days from the time the cases are submitted for
determination within which to render their judgments. Also, Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct admonishes all judges to promptly dispose of the court’s business and to decide
cases within the required periods. Failure to render a decision within 90-day period from the
submission of a case for decision is detrimental to the honor and integrity of the judicial office,
and constitutes a derogation of the speedy administration of justice. Accordingly, any judge who
delays the disposition of any case or matter beyond the prescribed period without the Court’s
express clearance is liable for gross inefficiency and must be administratively sanctioned.
SIMPLECIO A. MARSADA v. ROMEO M.MOTEROSO, SHERIFF IV, RTC, BRANCH 34,

CABADBARAN, AGUSAN DEL NORTE
A.M. No. P-10-2793, March 8, 2016, BERSAMIN, J., EN BANC
A sheriff should enforce a writ of execution strictly according to its terms and in the manner
provided in the Rules of Court. He is administratively liable if he deliberately contravenes the terms
thereof, like having the judgment creditor accept an amount less than that stated in the writ of
execution as the full and entire satisfaction thereof.
FACTS:
On October 23, 2001, the judge in Branch 34 of RTC Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte
rendered judgment in a civil case in favor of Marsada whereby the defendant in such civil case
was ordered to pay Marsada the amount of P151,708.30 representing the unpaid obligation to
defendant plus interest, attorney’s fees of P35,000.00, litigation expenses in the amount of
P5,000.00 and costs.
Judge Doyon issued the writ of execution only “as far as the amount of P35,000.00 is
concerned.” However, Monteroso, the sheriff, delivered only P25,000.00 to Marsada, but he
requested the latter to sign a prepared typewritten acknowledgment receipt indicating that he
received the amount of P25,000.00 as “FULL AND ENTIRE SATISFACTION” of the defendant’s
obligation.
Marsada later asked Monteroso for the balance, but the latter informed him that the
defendant no longer had any property or money with which to fully satisfy the judgment. Thus,
Marsada went to see Judge Doyon to seek another writ of execution for the full satisfaction of the
judgment, showing the receipt he had signed at Monteroso’s request. At this, Judge Doyon
blamed Marsada for signing the receipt as the full and entire satisfaction of the judgment debt.
Page 21 of 46
J. BERSAMIN
Based on the foregoing circumstance, Marsada brought his administrative complaint

against Monteroso.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT Monteroso is guilty of misconduct.
RULING:
YES. Monteroso is guilty of simple misconduct.
Under the provision of Section 8, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, Monteroso could enforce
the writ of execution only “according to its terms, in the manner herein after provided.” However,
he was remiss in his duty to enforce the writ by collecting only P25,000.00. Even assuming that he
had only been successful in collecting P25,000.00 from the defendant, he still exceeded his
authority in requesting Marsada to sign the typewritten acknowledgment receipt reflecting the
P25,000.00 as full and complete satisfaction of the writ of execution. He had neither basis nor
reason to have Marsada sign the receipt in that tenor because the text and tenor of the writ of
execution expressly required the recovery of P35,000.00 from the losing party.
Also, Marsada claimed that Monteroso had represented to him that the defendant could
no longer pay the balance. The representation, even if true, did not justify Moteroso’s unilateral
decision to discontinue the effort to recover the balance. It clearly devolved upon him as the
sheriff to levy upon the execution debtor’s properties, if any, as well as to garnish the debts due to
the latter and the credits belonging to the latter. The duty to exhaust all efforts to recover the
balance was laid down in Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Thus, Monteroso was guilty of
misconduct.
SUGNI REALTY HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. JUDGE BERNADETTE

S. PAREDES-ENCINAREAL
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2102, OCTOBER 14, 2015, BERSAMIN, J., FIRST DIVISION
This administrative case relates to the action of an appellate judge on the plaintiff’s
motion for immediate execution filed in an ejectment case. Our disposition herein should remind
all trial and appellate judges dealing with ejectment cases about their responsibilities and
limitations in acting on the motions for immediate execution of the judgments.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Ejectment; Writs of Execution; This case presents the
opportune occasion to remind judges of the first level courts to always adhere to the mandate of
Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, by issuing writs of execution upon motion of the plaintiffs
in actions for ejectment whenever the defendants have failed to stay execution.—Gross ignorance of
the law or procedure is a serious charge. Such offense may be penalized with dismissal from the
service, or suspension from office without pay for more than three months but not exceeding six
months, or a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. As penalty, therefore,
respondent Judge is fined in the amount of P21,000.00, and, in addition, she is warned against a
similar offense, or else she will be more sternly dealt with. This case presents the opportune
occasion to remind judges of the first level courts to always adhere to the mandate of Section
19, supra, by issuing writs of execution upon motion of the plaintiffs in actions for ejectment
whenever the defendants have failed to stay execution. They should not leave to the appellate
courts the action on the motions for execution because that action would be too late in the
context of Section 19. The trial and appellate judges should constantly be mindful of the summary
nature of the ejectments actions, and of the purpose underlying the mandate for immediate
execution, which is to prevent the plaintiffs from being further deprived of their rightful
possession. Otherwise, they stand liable for gross ignorance of the law or procedure.
Page 22 of 46
J. BERSAMIN
Administrative Law; Judges; The basic postulate is for all judges to follow the guidelines set
by the Supreme Court (SC) to ensure the just, speedy and inexpensive administration of justice. The
nonobservance of the guidelines inevitably results in unfairness and inefficiency.—We would readily
join the recommendation of Justice Lloren. The basic postulate is for all judges to follow the
guidelines set by the Court to ensure the just, speedy and inexpensive administration of justice.
The nonobservance of the guidelines inevitably results in unfairness and inefficiency. Respondent
Judge had been definitely aware of her relief as the detailed Presiding Judge of the issuing court
since October 6, 2005, the date she received via fax the copy of Administrative Order 159-2005
dated October 3, 2005 revoking her designation as the Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 10 of the
RTC. She actually conceded in the order of November 8, 2005 that she had ceased “to hold the
position” of Acting Presiding Judge by October 6, 2005. Under the aforequoted guidelines, she
could no longer competently act in the case once relieved as the Acting Presiding Judge. Her
correct course of action would have been to desist from taking any further action in the case,
including denying the complainant’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal through the order of November 8,
2005, until the specific guidelines set under items 5 and 6 of A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC were first
complied with.
FACTS:
This administrative case relates to the action of an appellate judge on the plaintiff’s
motion for immediate execution filed in an ejectment case.
Sugni Realty Holdings and Development Corp. (the complainant), represented by its
chairman and president, has charged respondent Judge Bernadette S. Paredes-Encinareal, in her
capacity as the Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Dipolog
City (respondent Judge) with gross ignorance of the law or procedure, bias, and prejudice for
issuing two orders during the appeal of the decision rendered in its favor as the plaintiff in an
ejectment case in contravention of the rule on staying the immediate execution of the judgment
and in disregard of the guidelines on the conduct of the proceedings by detailed judges. By her
first order, dated September 26, 2005, respondent Judge extended the defendants’ periods for
posting the supersedeas bond and for paying or depositing the monthly rentals despite her lack of
authority for doing so. Respondent Judge issued the second order, dated November 8, 2005,
despite her having meanwhile been relieved as the Acting Presiding Judge of the issuing court.
The complainant has further charged respondent Judge with bribery for having received
large sums of money from one Peter Tan on two occasions prior to issuing the orders in question.
ISSUE:
I. WHETHER OR NOT the respondent Judge disregarded the pertinent rule on the filing of
the supersedeas bond and monthly deposits in issuing the order of September 26, 2005.
II. WHETHER OR NOT the respondent Judge was not guilty of unreasonable delay in
resolving the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal.
III. WHETHER OR NOT respondent Judge acted without authority in issuing the order of
November 8, 2005.
IV. WHETHER OR NOT charges of corruption, bias and partiality were substantiated.
RULING:
I. YES. In issuing the order of September 26, 2005, the respondent Judge disregarded the
pertinent rule on the filing of the supersedeas bond and monthly deposits. The issuance of
the order of September 26, 2005 did not accord with the law and jurisprudence.
Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same. —If
judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon
motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files
Page 23 of 46
J. BERSAMIN
a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in
favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time
of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he
deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the
contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court.
Respondent Judge issued her order of September 26, 2005 to enable the posting of the
supersedeas bond by the Falames during the pendency of their appeal in her court in order to
prevent the immediate execution of the adverse decision of the MTCC. She thereby disregarded
Section 19, which allowed the filing of the supersedeas bond only with the MTCC as the trial
court. She should have instead granted the complainant’s Motion for Execution Pending Appeal
for it had become her ministerial duty to do so upon the failure of the Falames to move stay the
immediate execution of the decision in accordance with Section 19.
Respondent Judge could not sincerely insist that the order of September 26, 2005 was
regular. The actions she could or could not take as an appellate judge in an ejectment case were
fully outlined in Section 19. A rule as plain and explicit as Section 19 is not liable to be misread or
misapplied, but should only be implemented without hesitation or equivocation. Her issuance of
the order of September 26, 2005 thus constituted gross ignorance of the law or procedure, for she
was not a trial judge bereft of pertinent experience on dealing with issues on immediate execution
in ejectment cases.
Gross ignorance of the law or procedure is a serious charge. Such offense may be penalized
with dismissal from the service, or suspension from office without pay for more than three
months but not exceeding six months, or a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding
P40,000.00. As penalty, therefore, respondent Judge is fined in the amount of P21,000.00, and in
addition, she is warned against a similar offense, or else she will be more sternly dealt with.
This case presents the opportune occasion to remind judges of the first level courts to
always adhere to the mandate of Section 19, by issuing writs of execution upon motion of the
plaintiffs in actions for ejectment whenever the defendants have failed to stay execution. They
should not leave to the appellate courts the action on the motions for execution because that
action would be too late in the context of Section 19. The trial and appellate judges should
constantly be mindful of the summary nature of the ejectments actions, and of the purpose
underlying the mandate for immediate execution, which is to prevent the plaintiffs from being
further deprived of their rightful possession. Otherwise, they stand liable for gross ignorance of
the law or procedure.
II. YES. Respondent Judge was not guilty of unreasonable delay in resolving the Motion for
Execution Pending Appeal.
The failure of respondent Judge to resolve in a timely manner the Motion for Execution
Pending Appeal constituted delay. However, she could not be held to account for the delay
because July 18, 2005, the day on which the motion would be heard, had coincided with Law Day,
an event that the Court had required the entire Judiciary to observe. She thus felt constrained to
cancel not only the hearing of the complainant’s motions but also the hearings in other cases set
on said date.
If the delay could not be attributed to respondent Judge on the basis of her plausible
explanation, she was not guilty of unreasonable delay.
III. YES. In issuing the order of November 8, 2005, respondent Judge acted without authority;
but she could not be held accountable without proof of her malice, bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty and corrupt motives.
Although respondent Judge supposedly relied on item 2 of A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC to justify
her issuance of the order of November 8, 2005 despite her being no longer the Acting Presiding
Page 24 of 46
J. BERSAMIN
Judge of the issuing court, she shall be fined in the amount of P11,000.00 for violating the
guidelines for relieved detailed judges set under items 5 and 6 of A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC.
The basic postulate is for all judges to follow the guidelines set by the Court to ensure the
just, speedy and inexpensive administration of justice. The nonobservance of the guidelines
inevitably results in unfairness and inefficiency. Respondent Judge had been definitely aware of
her relief as the detailed Presiding Judge of the issuing court since October 6, 2005, the date she
received via fax the copy of Administrative Order 159-2005 dated October 3, 2005 revoking her
designation as the Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 10 of the RTC. She actually conceded in the
order of November 8, 2005 that she had ceased “to hold the position” of Acting Presiding Judge by
October 6, 2005. Under the guidelines, she could no longer competently act in the case once
relieved as the Acting Presiding Judge. Her correct course of action would have been to desist
from taking any further action in the case, including denying the complainant’s Motion to
Dismiss Appeal through the order of November 8, 2005, until the specific guidelines set under
items 5 and 6 of A.M. No. 04-5- 19-SC were first complied with. But she ignored these guidelines,
particularly that which required that —
x x x the judge conducting the inventory shall cause the issuance to the parties of a notice of
transfer/detail/assignment of the judge to which the case had been assigned, with a directive for the
plaintiff/s to manifest, within five (5) days from receipt of such notice, whether or not he/she desires
that the transferred judge should decide the case. The desire of the plaintiff, who may opt to have the
case decided by the new judge, shall be respected.
Nonetheless, Respondent Judge’s issuance of the order of November 8, 2005 should not be
considered as censurable conduct in the absence of the substantial showing of her having done so
with malice, or in bad faith, or with fraud or dishonesty, or with a corrupt motive. Considering
that her good faith was presumed, the complainant carried the burden to establish her having
acted with malice, or bad faith, or with fraud, or with dishonesty, or with a corrupt motive. Yet,
the complainant did not discharge its burden. Moreover, her denial of the complainant’s Motion
to Dismiss Appeal through the order of November 8, 2005 could have also been characterized as
an error of judgment on her part. That characterization was far from improbable because, after
all, she was not an infallible functionary of the Judiciary. Accordingly, she should not be
disciplined.
IV. NO. Charges of corruption, bias and partiality were not substantiated.
The complainant did not substantiate the charge of corruption against respondent Judge
after its lone witness did not appear at the scheduled hearings. The complainant did not also
substantiate its charge of bias and partiality against her.
Mere allegation of corruption, bias and partiality is insufficient to establish the accusation.
Dismissal of the accusation should follow.
CORAZON D. PADERANGA v. HONORABLE RUSTICO D. PADERANGA

A.M. No. RTJ-14-2383, AUGUST 17, 2015, BERSAMIN, J., FIRST DIVISION
PATRICIA PADERANGA DIAZ v. HON. RTC JUDGE RUSTICO D. PADERANGA

A.M. No. RTJ-07-2033, AUGUST 17, 2015, BERSAMIN, J., FIRST DIVISION
A judge owes it to his judicial office to simply apply or obey a law or rule that is basic.
Otherwise, he is guilty of gross ignorance of the law or rule.
Administrative Law; Judges; New Code of Judicial Conduct; Canon 2 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct provides that conduct above reproach is essential not only in the proper discharge
of the judicial office but also in the personal life of judges.
Page 25 of 46
J. BERSAMIN
Same; Same; Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge; The appropriation of Lot 12910 by the
respondent was really prejudicial to Dra. Corazon because he erected a fence around the property
and introduced improvements thereon without the conformity of the latter. He did so at a time when
he was still an active member of the Bench, and despite knowing that he was expected to uphold the
legal rights of others in their exclusive property, whether the rights were under litigation in his court
or elsewhere. Such conduct on his part was unbecoming of any judge like him.
Same; Same; Inhibition and Disqualification of Judges; Compulsory Disqualification of

Judges; The Supreme Court (SC) has been clear about the compulsory disqualification of judges
related by consanguinity or affinity to a party being a duty designed to free the adjudication of cases
from suspicion as to its fairness and integrity; The respondent’s issuance of the warrant of arrest
against his own sister was an outright violation of the stringent rules on compulsory
disqualification.
Same; Same; Same; Same; His eventual self-disqualification from the criminal case did not
render his liability any less. He still did not act in good faith in issuing the warrant of arrest against
Patria. Worthy of note is that he inhibited himself only after Patria filed her Motion for
Disqualification.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Gross Ignorance of the Law or Rule; The rules on the
disqualification of judges, particularly compulsory self-disqualification, are basic legal guidelines
that must be at the palm of every judge’s hands; That the respondent disobeyed them should render
him fully accountable for gross ignorance of the law or rule.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Gross ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious
charge under Section 8(9), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, which
took effect on October 1, 2001.
Same; Same; Penalties; Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge; Conduct unbecoming of a judge,

classified as a light offense under Section 10, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, is penalized under
Section 11(C) of Rule 140 by: (1) a fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00; or (2)
censure; or (3) reprimand; or (4) admonition with warning.
Same; Public Officers; Penalties; Section 17 of the Omnibus Rules implementing the Civil
Service Law states that if the respondent official or employee is found guilty of two (2) or more
charges or counts, the penalty imposed should be that corresponding to the most serious charge or
counts and the rest may be considered aggravating circumstances.
FACTS:
Prior to his compulsory retirement from the Judiciary, Hon. Rustico D. Paderanga
(respondent judge) served as the Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 28, in Mambajao, Camiguin.
He is now administratively charged based on two separate complaints. The first complaint was to
charge him with conduct unbecoming of a judge and grave misconduct. The second, to charge
him with ignorance of the law, disregard of the New Code of Judicial Conduct and abuse of
authority.
In A.M. No. RTJ-14-2383
The five Complainants and Respondent Judge are siblings of full blood. The Complainants
aver that Respondent Judge, being a magistrate, failed to exert any effort to mediate the
differences and misunderstandings between his siblings (between Barciso, Jr. and Corazon
culminating in the filing of charges and counter-charges against each other in five different cases).
The complainants also allege that Respondent Judge compounded the trouble between his
siblings when he instigated, encouraged and advised Narciso, Jr. to file charges against his sister,
Dra. Corazon.
Page 26 of 46
J. BERSAMIN
They further assert that the Respondent Judge abused his power as a judge by
continuously trying to harass and oppress his female siblings by threatening to file Civil and
Criminal cases against Carmencita and Dulce for not giving him his share of the fruits of the land
held in common by the three of them.
Dra. Corazon alleges that Respondent Judge took advantage of his powerful position and
unjustly enriched himself by encroaching on Lot 12910. According to her, she and Respondent
Judge agreed to share equally on Lot 9817; that his share on said lot is designated as Lot 12910-B
while her shares are designated as Lots 12910 and 12912; that per Subdivision Sketch Plan prepared
by Geodetic Engineer Antonio Ranara (with the apparent conformity of respondent Judge), Lot
12910 belongs to her; however, without asking for her consent or approval, Respondent Judge
fenced and introduced improvements therein.
In an certain date, an Information for Violation of R.A. 7610 was filed against Patria
(respondent judge’s sister) before the sala of Respondent Judge. The following day, he issued a
Warrant for the arrest of Patria. Patria surrendered and posted a cash bond. Subsequently, she
filed a motion for disqualification against respondent Judge on the ground that respondent Judge
is related to her and the complainant, Michelle P. Carilo, within the sixth degree of consanguinity.
The Respondent Judge denies that he instigated and advised, coached and sided with
Narciso, Jr. in filing cases against his sisters. He also vehemently denies that he did not even lift a
finger to settle or mediate the disputes between his siblings.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) referred A.M. No. RTJ-14-2383 to then CA
Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo for investigation, report and recommendation. In his
report, Justice Del Castillo recommended that the Respondent Judge be suspended from the
service without compensation and benefits for a period of two(2) months for the following acts:
a. One month for unilaterally appropriating a parcel of land belonging to another; and
b. One month for acting on a case where his sister is a party-litigant in contravention of the
prescribed compulsory or mandatory prohibition enunciated in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules
of Court and Section 5, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2033
Patria averred, among others, that that the respondent had loudly and angrily uttered the
following remarks at her: “Ikaw bugok, iduot taka, epapreso taka anang imong caso naa sa fiscal!”
(“You idiot, I will send you to prison in that case against you pending now in the fiscal’s office!”);
that he did issue an order of arrest against her in violation of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of
Court and Rule 3.12 of the Code of Judicial Conduct; that he intentionally caused the warrant of
arrest to be served against her in her school to humiliate her; and that he had been pressuring her
and their sisters to execute an affidavit of desistance in relation to the charges they brought
against him in A.M. No. RTJ-14-2383.
CA Associate Justice Michael O. Elbinias recommended in his report that the instant case
Administrative Matter No. RTJ-07- 2033 is referred to the OCAD, with the recommendation that
the result of this case be dependent on the outcome of OCA [P] No. 05-2301- RTJ, which in turn,
may likewise be considered as the full determination of the issues in the instant case.
ISSUES:
I. WHETHER OR NOT the acts of the respondent Judge constituted conduct unbecoming of
a judge.
II. WHETHER OR NOT the issuance of the warrant of arrest against Patria amounted to
gross misconduct, ignorance of the law, disregard of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
and abuse of authority.
Page 27 of 46
J. BERSAMIN
RULING:
I. NO. The respondent Judge was not guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge or of
grave misconduct under the first complaint except for his appropriation for
himself of Lot 12910 in order to unjustly enrich himself.
Based on the findings of Justice Del Castillo, the appropriation of Lot 12910 by the
respondent was really prejudicial to Dra. Corazon because he erected a fence around the property
and introduced improvements thereon without the conformity of the latter. He did so at a time
when he was still an active member of the Bench, and despite knowing that he was expected to
uphold the legal rights of others in their exclusive property, whether the rights were under
litigation in his court or elsewhere. Such conduct on his part was unbecoming of any judge like
him. He thereby disregarded the sworn obligation of every judge to observe respect for the rights
of others at all times if he expected others to respect the courts and its judges, as well as the
Judiciary as an institution. His failure in this regard merited him the condign administrative
penalty.
Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct provides that conduct above reproach is
essential not only in the proper discharge of the judicial office but also in the personal life of
judges.
A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity,
independence and respect for himself/herself, the Court and the Judiciary as a whole. He must
exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint. He should choose
his words and exercise more caution and control in expressing himself. In other words, a judge
should possess the virtue of gravitas.
However, the other imputations against the respondent were baseless, or were not subject
to administrative sanction. While it is true that it is morally right for siblings to settle things
among themselves, there is nothing in law that compels or obliges a Judge to settle disputes
between his family members. A Judge is still but a man and not God who can dictate the actions
of people around him. Furthermore, in administrative proceedings, the complainant has the
burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint. Charges based on
mere suspicion or speculation cannot be given credence. In the instant case, the suspicion of
complainants that respondent Judge encouraged Narciso, Jr. to file cases against his siblings
remains unsubstantiated.
With respect to the alleged threats of the Respondent Judge to file cases against his
siblings, it should be noted that to date, he has not filed any case against them. On the contrary,
the records disclose that it is the Complainants who have filed cases against the Respondent
Judge. “Threats” of filing civil and criminal cases remain to be empty threats and not actionable
wrongs. In any event, an administrative case is not the remedy for such threats. The Complainants
have other remedies in law, which is the proper course of action against the alleged threats.
The same is true with respect to the malicious utterances allegedly made by the
Respondent Judge against Patria. An administrative complaint is not the proper remedy for such
utterances. The proper remedy is to file a criminal case for slander against the Respondent Judge.
II. YES
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court governs the disqualifications of judicial officials,
including the Members of the Court.
The Court has been clear about the compulsory disqualification of judges related by
consanguinity or affinity to a party being a duty designated to free the adjudication of cases from
suspicion as to its fairness and integrity.
Page 28 of 46
J. BERSAMIN
The rule on compulsory disqualification of a judge to hear a case where, as in the instant
case, the respondent judge is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or
affinity rests on the salutary principle that no judge should preside in a case in which he is not
wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. A judge has both the duty of rendering a
just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness
and as to his integrity. The law conclusively presumes that a judge cannot objectively or
impartially sit in such a case and, for that reason, prohibits him and strikes at his authority to
hear and decide it, in the absence of written consent of all parties concerned. The purpose is to
preserve the people’s faith and confidence in the courts of justice.
The respondent’s issuance of the warrant of arrest against his own sister was an outright
violation of the stringent rules on compulsory disqualification. For him, self-disqualification was
absolute and should have been immediate. It did not matter that he presided in a single-sala
station. Neither was it an excuse that the private complainant in the criminal case against his
sister could protest unless he acted as promptly as he did on the case. No protest would be
justified should self-disqualification be mandatory. Consequently, he was not exempt from
administrative liability for acting upon the criminal case involving his own sister, and issuing the
warrant of arrest against her.
The rules on the disqualification of judges, particularly compulsory self-disqualification,

are basic legal guidelines that must be at the palm of every judge’s hands. They are as basic as a
rule of thumb. That the respondent disobeyed them should render him fully accountable for gross
ignorance of the law or rule.
As public servants, judges are appointed to the judiciary to serve as the visible
representation of the law, and more importantly, of justice. From them, the people draw their will
and awareness to obey the law.” If judges, who have sworn to obey and uphold the Constitution,
shall conduct themselves as respondent did, in wanton disregard and violation of the rights of the
accused, then the people, especially those who have had recourse to them shall lose all their
respect and high regard for the members of the Bench and the judiciary itself shall lose the high
moral ground from which it draws its power and strength to compel obedience to the laws.
GEORGE T. CHUA vs. JUDGE FORTUNITO L. MADRONA

A.M. No. RTJ-14-2394, September 1, 2014, J. Bersamin
This administrative complaint against Judge Madrona is disallowed and should be

summarily dismissed. To start with, no administrative recourse could supplant or pre-empt the
proper exercise by the CA of its certiorari jurisdiction. Furthermore, not every error or mistake by a
judge in the performance of his official duties as a judge renders him administratively liable. Indeed,
no judge can be held administratively liable for gross misconduct, ignorance of the law, or
incompetence in the adjudication of cases unless his acts constituted fraud, dishonesty or
corruption; or were imbued with malice or ill-will, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an
injustice. These exceptions did not obtain here, for, as Justice Tijam rightly observed, MBDC did not
adduce convincing evidence showing that Judge Madrona’s acts were so gross or patent, deliberate
and malicious; or imbued with evident bad faith; or tainted with bias or partiality.
FACTS:
Manila Bay Development Corporation (MBDC) leased for a period of 20 years about 10
hectares of reclaimed land along Roxas Boulevard in Parañaque City to Jimmy Gow. A year later,
Gow, who was the president of Uni wide Holdings, Inc. (Uni wide), assigned the lease to Uniwide.
MBDC and Uniwide then entered into a supplemental agreement over the lease in 1996.
Subsequently, Uniwide filed an action for reformation of contract against MBDC in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC). The complaint, raffled to Branch 274 under respondent Presiding
Judge Fortunito L. Madrona, essentially alleged that MBDC had reneged on its promise to develop
Page 29 of 46
J. BERSAMIN
the area into a commercial and business center; that the construction of what later came to be
known as Macapagal Avenue had cut through the leased area, greatly affecting Uniwide’s
construction plans; and that subsequent changes in circumstances had gone beyond the
contemplation of the parties at the time they entered into the lease contract.
Summons and a copy of the complaint were served upon MBDC and on the last day for
the filing of its responsive pleading, MBDC moved for the dismissal of the complaint instead of
filing its answer, claiming prescription and failure to state a cause of action. MBDC also stated in
its motion that the action for reformation was merely a ploy by Uniwide to forestall the ejectment
case against it. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. MBDC received a copy of the order and
filed its motion for reconsideration 11 days thereafter. Judge Madrona then directed Uniwide and
MBDC to file their comment and reply, respectively, after which the motion for reconsideration
would be deemed submitted for resolution.
Before MBDC could file its reply, Uniwide filed a motion to declare MBDC in default.
Thereafter, Judge Madrona issued another order resolving the two pending motions declaring
MBDC in default, and declaring its motion for reconsideration moot. Aggrieved, complainant
George T. Chua, as the president of MBDC, filed a complaint-affidavit dated February 13, 2012 to
charge Judge Madrona with manifest partiality, gross misconduct, and gross ignorance of the law.
The Court referred the administrative case to the Court of Appeals (CA) for investigation
and recommendation. The CA raffled the administrative case to Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam.
In due course, Justice Tijam submitted his Report and Recommendation to the Court dismissing
the administrative complaint against Judge Madrona.
ISSUE:
Whether Judge Madrona is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law, manifest
partiality and gross misconduct.
RULING:
The Court agrees with the recommendation of the CA dismissing the administrative
complaint against Judge Madrona.
The complainant’s allegations against Judge Madrona arose from the following orders he
had issued as the judge trying the civil case involving MBDC, namely: (1) denying MBDC’s motion
to dismiss; (2) denying MBDC’s motion for reconsideration; and (3) granting Uniwide’s motion to
declare defendant in default. Yet, it is clear that such orders were Judge Madrona’s resolutions of
the motion to dismiss, motion for reconsideration, and motion to declare MBDC in default, and
thus involved the exercise of his judicial functions. Assuming that Judge Madrona thereby erred,
his errors were correctible only through available judicial remedies, not by administrative or
disciplinary actions.
The records show that MBDC already availed of its rightful judicial remedies. On January
24, 2012, MBDC moved to have the order of default set aside and to have its answer admitted. On
February 10, 2012, it filed a motion for the inhibition of Judge Madrona and for the suspension of
the proceedings. After Judge Madrona adversely resolved each of the motions, it assailed the
adverse resolutions in the Court of Appeals through certiorari (i.e., CA-G.R. SP No. 126858 and
CA-G.R. SP No. 126938), the proceedings thereon being still pending.
This administrative complaint against Judge Madrona is disallowed and should be

summarily dismissed. To start with, no administrative recourse could supplant or pre-empt the
proper exercise by the CA of its certiorari jurisdiction. Furthermore, not every error or mistake by
a judge in the performance of his official duties as a judge renders him administratively liable.
Indeed, no judge can be held administratively liable for gross misconduct, ignorance of the law, or
incompetence in the adjudication of cases unless his acts constituted fraud, dishonesty or
Page 30 of 46
J. BERSAMIN
corruption; or were imbued with malice or ill-will, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an
injustice. These exceptions did not obtain here, for, as Justice Tijam rightly observed, MBDC did
not adduce convincing evidence showing that Judge Madrona’s acts were so gross or patent,
deliberate and malicious; or imbued with evident bad faith; or tainted with bias or partiality.
EDUARDO OLAGUER v. JUDGE ALFREDO AMPUAN, et al.

A.M. No. MTJ-10-1769, 6 October 2010, THIRD DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)
The ninety (90) day period for deciding the case shall commence to run from submission
of the case for decision without memoranda; in case the court requires or allows its filing, the
case shall be considered submitted for decision upon the filing of the last memorandum or
upon the expiration of the period to do so, whichever is earlier.
Judge Ampuan is accused of unduly delaying the case of Eduardo Olaguer since the
case of the Eduardo has been pending before the court for almost eight (8) years. Judge
Ampuan failed to dispose of the case despite the lapse of six (6) months and has failed
to act on Eduardo’s other motions submitted before the court.
Eduardo Olaguer filed different motions for the case to be decided but Judge
Ampuan failed to act accordingly. As a defense, Judge Ampuan interposed the heavy
burden he inherited from his predecessors and that the stenographic notes had been
transferred to other courts which contributed to the delay in the decision of the case.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) eventually found Judge Ampuan guilty
of gross inefficiency because of the transgression he committed in not disposing of the
already delayed case of Eduardo Olaguer.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Ampuan’s act constitutes gross inefficiency when he failed to
dispose of the case before him in due time.
RULING:
YES. The ninety (90) day period for deciding the case shall commence to run from
submission of the case for decision without memoranda; in case the court requires or
allows its filing, the case shall be considered submitted for decision upon the filing of the
last memorandum or upon the expiration of the period to do so, whichever is earlier. Lack
of transcript of stenographic notes shall not be a valid reason to interrupt or suspend the
period for deciding the case unless the case was previously heard by another judge not the
deciding judge in which case the latter shall have the full period of ninety (90) days for the
completion of the transcripts within which to decide the same.
What Judge Olaguer could have done is to mandate the handling stenographers to
submit the Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN) after Olaguer had manifested that the
defendants in his case had not complied with the submission of the memorandum. Also,
the defense that the burden he inherited from his predecessors will not fly as he could have
asked the OCA the remedy of extension which he did not avail of.
LOURDES B. FERRER and PROSPERIDAD M. ARANDEZ v.

JUDGE ROMEO A. RABACA
A.M. No. MTJ-05-1580, 6 October 2010, THIRD DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)
The perfection of an appeal by itself is not sufficient to stay the execution of the
judgment in an ejectment case. The losing party should likewise file a supersedeas bond
executed in favor of the plaintiff to answer for rents, damages and costs, and, if the judgment
Page 31 of 46
J. BERSAMIN
of the court requires it, he should likewise deposit the amount of the rent before the appellate
court from the time during the pendency of the appeal. Otherwise, execution becomes
ministerial and imperative.
Judge Romeo Rabaca in this case is accused of ignorance of law, disregard of law, and
dereliction of duty by Lourdes Ferrer and Prosperidad Arandez by not issuing a writ of
execution that is by law, ministerial and imperative in the first level courts. Ferrer and Arandez
are plaintiffs in another case in which they have Whether or not . Pursuant to such outcome,
they prayed before the court of a writ of execution so that they would claim and possess the
adverse property that has been favored to them. Judge Rabaca however, refused to issue such
executory order since the other party has appealed the case to the Regional Trial Court and
thus he claims to have lost jurisdiction over the case and hence, does not have to power to
issue such writ.
Due to Judge Rabaca’s judgment regarding the case, Ferrer and Arandez contended
that they have been prejudiced because they could not get hold of the premises and that
the said act greatly benefited the defendants in their case. On the other hand, Judge Rabaca
sternly believes that his court has no jurisdiction over the case due to it being appealed
before the Regional Trial Court and that he does not know personally either of the parties in
the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Rabaca’s act constitutes ignorance of law and should be held
punishable under the law.
RULING:
YES. The perfection of an appeal by itself is not sufficient to stay the execution of the
judgment in an ejectment case. The losing party should likewise file a supersedeas bond
executed in favor of the plaintiff to answer for rents, damages and costs, and, if the judgment
of the court requires it, he should likewise deposit the amount of the rent before the
appellate court from the time during the pendency of the appeal. Otherwise, execution
becomes ministerial and imperative.
Only the filing of the sufficient supersedeas bond and the deposit with the appellate
court of the amount of rent due from time to time, coupled with the perfection of the
appeal, could stay the execution.
First level courts must adhere always to the mandate under Section 19, Rule 70, of the
Rules of Court to issue writs of execution upon motion of the plaintiffs in actions for
forcible entry or unlawful detainer when the defendant has appealed but has not filed a
sufficient supersedeas bond.
The summary nature of the special civil action under Rule 70 and the purpose
underlying the mandate for an immediate execution, which is to prevent the plaintiffs from
being further deprived of their rightful possession, should always be borne in mind.
RE: CASES SUBMITTED FOR DECISION BEFORE JUDGE DAMASO A. HERRERA,

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 24, BIAN, LAGUNA
A.M. No. RTJ-05-1924, 13 October 2010, THIRD DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)
Every judge should decide cases with dispatch and should be careful, punctual, and
observant in the performance of his functions for delay in the disposition of cases erodes the
faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it into
disrepute.
Page 32 of 46
J. BERSAMIN
Judge Damaso Herrera filed an application for optional retirement effective April
2004. Pursuant to such application, the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) initiated an administrative matter which found conclusively that Judge Damaso’s
Branch 24 has a total of fifty- five (55) cases unresolved beyond the reglementary period
prescribed by law.
The Acting Clerk of Court cited in his defense the heavy case load and the lack of
required data in preparation of the monthly reports. In his defense, Judge Damaso stated
that the voluminous cashe inherited coupled with his poor health and subsequent
appointment of his Clerk of Court of as a Prosecutor rendered him helpless in disposing of
and deciding the cases assigned to him.
As such, the OCA recommended that the administrative complaint be re-docketed

and that a fine of eleven thousand (11,000) pesos be deducted from his retirement benefits.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Herrera exhibited gross inefficiency in the prompt disposition
of case.
RULING:
YES. Even before his early retirement, Judge Herrera has already forty-nine (49) pending
unresolved cases which was not even included in the period of prohibition pursuant to his
application for optional retirement. Even more, he could have filed a request from the OCA
for an extension of time to decide cases if his means and health do not permit him to do so.
Failure to act upon coupled with the voluminous work and repetition constitutes gross
inefficiency which is punishable under the law.
DANIEL G. SEVILLA v. JUDGE FRANCISCO S. LINDO

A.M. No. MTJ-08-1714, February 9, 2011, THIRD DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)
The strict judicial policy on postponements applies with more force and greater reason to
prosecutions involving violations of BP 22, whose prompt resolution has been ensured by their
being now covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
Daniel G. Sevilla (Sevilla) was the private complainant in a BP 22 case, which was
filed on June 10, 2003, and raffled to Metropolitan Trial Court of Malabon City Branch 55,
presided by Judge Francisco S. Lindo (Judge Lindo). Sevilla averred that he testified once in
the case, but his testimony pertained only to his personal circumstances; and that after he
gave such partial testimony, Judge Lindo adjourned the session for lack of material time,
and persistently reset the subsequent hearings for lack of material time. Further, Sevilla
alleged that Judge Lindo’s indifference was designed to force him to accept the offer of an
amicable settlement made by the accused; and that Judge Lindo’s coercion was manifested
in open court and in his chamber by telling Sevilla in the presence of the accused: Mr.
Sevilla, ang hirap mo namang pakiusapan. Konting pera lang yan. Bahala ka maghintay sa
wala.
On July 4, 2007, Sevilla charged Judge Lindo with delay in the disposition of the BP 22
case. He asserted that Judge Lindo violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
which requires that a judge should administer justice impartially and without delay; that
Judge Lindo also violated Section 1, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that justice
be impartially administered without unnecessary delay; that Judge Lindo’s unreasonable
resetting of the hearings 12 times rendered inconsequential his right to the speedy disposition of
his case; and that such resettings were made upon the instance of Judge Lindo, not upon
motion of the parties.
Page 33 of 46
J. BERSAMIN
In his comment, Judge Lindo refuted the charge, claiming that the postponements
were upon valid grounds.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in its report, found that the results of
the judicial audit conducted in Judge Lindo’s sala pursuant to his compulsory retirement
revealed that quite a number of cases that have been submitted for decision remained
unacted upon. The OCA recommended that Judge Lindo be found guilty of Delay in the
Disposition of Cases tantamount to Inefficiency and Incompetence in the Performance of
Official Duties. Moreover, the OCA reported that Judge Lindo mandatorily retired from the
service on July 24, 2007.
ISSUE:
Whether or not retired Judge Lindo is administratively liable for the numerous
postponements in the BP 22 case.
RULING:
YES. The strict judicial policy on postponements applies with more force and greater
reason to prosecutions involving violations of BP 22, whose prompt resolution has been
ensured by their being now covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
Yet, Judge Lindo postponed five hearings for lack of material time without bothering
to state the specific causes why his court lacked material time. He also reset four hearings
supposedly upon the agreement of the parties, which the complainant credibly denied
because that was prejudicial to his interest. He even cancelled the hearing of May 25, 2007
on the ground that he had to file on May 28, 2007 his application for compulsory retirement
and leave of absence until July 24, 2007, and set the next hearing on August 17, 2007, when
he could have set the hearing sooner either on May 26 or May 27 in view of his impending
long period of absence. Considering that the Court cannot discern any rationality for
Judge Lindo’s actions in the handling of a simple BP 22 case involving only P2,000.00, the
Court can only adjudge such actuations as smacking either of indolence and utter
inefficiency, or of bias, if not hostility, towards Sevilla, or both.
As can be seen, Judge Lindo made or allowed too many unreasonable

postponements that inevitably delayed the proceedings and prevented the prompt
disposition of the BP 22 case out of manifest bias in favor of the accused, to the prejudice of
Sevilla as the complainant. Thus, Judge Lindo flagrantly violated the letter and spirit both
of Rule 1.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which enjoined all judges to administer
justice impartially and without delay; and of Canon 6 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which
required him as a trial judge to be prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to him,
remembering that justice delayed is often justice denied.
That Judge Lindo’s conduct proceeded from his bias towards the accused in the BP 22
case rendered his acts and omissions as gross misconduct. Gross misconduct consisting in
violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct is a serious charge under Section 8 of Rule 140,
Rules of Court; and is punished under Section 11 of Rule 140, Rules of Court. With Judge Lindo
having earlier retired, only the sanction of fine can be a practical sanction. He is punished
with a fine in the amount of P21,000.00, to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
ASSISTANT SPECIAL PROSECUTOR III ROHERMIA J. RODRIGUEZ v. JUSTICES

GREGORY S. ONG, JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, and RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA,
SANDIGANBAYAN
A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J, 24 August 2010, EN BANC (Bersamin, J.)
Page 34 of 46
J. BERSAMIN
Even though the aim to expedite cases is laudable it should not be at the expense of
exposure to any procedural infirmity. The judges hearing the case should take cognizance that
procedural law is put into force to ensure that justice will be wielded by all who have heard
and debated the case and not at the mercy of one alone. Furthermore, the judges should refrain
from engaging in banter or behavior that lowers the confidence of the people in the Judiciary.
Special Prosecutor Rohermia Jasmani-Rodriguez alleges before the court that the
Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan is guilty of grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to
interest of public service, and manifest partiality.
With regard to the claim of grave misconduct, Special Prosecutor Jasmani-Rodriguez

substantiates that the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan hears its cases not as a collegial
body but instead divides it into two wherein the Chairman will hear some of the cases alone
and so will the other members of the division. They conduct hearings separately and
simultaneously. As such, she raised her objection to this procedural flaw as it can expose
the determination of the case to injustice. She claims that her repeated objections earned her
the ire of the Justices.
On the matter of her claim regarding the Justice’s conduct that is prejudicial to
interest of public services, her allegations state that the Justice’s uttered, berated, and made
discriminatory words during their hearings wherein Justice Ong is said to have had stated
that the case by one of the parties during the hearing will be futile as he will have been a
Supreme Court Justice by the time it is appealed, among others.
The facts stated by the Special Prosecutor regarding manifest partiality merely stated
that the Fourth Division failed to take cognizance and contravenes her findings about one
particular case which concluded that there is no perfected contract. The Fourth Division in
this case, she claims, went to dismiss it in light of such stark fact.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Fourth Division of Sandiganbayan engaged in practice that is

lamentable and violative of the procedural laws and ethical standards imposed upon the
Judiciary.
RULING:
YES. What is contemplated in the establishment of the Sandiganbayan and its

divisions is that in determining and hearing a case they shall do so as a collegial body, with
each member having equal power and authority. Under Presidential Decree 1606, the law
mandates that the Justices must be actually present during the course of such hearing to
constitute a quorum to conduct business and trial proceedings.
With regard to their conduct during the trial proceedings and manifest partiality, the
Court merely touched upon the issue that due to the absence of substantiated fact, the
Court presumes that their conduct and subsequent dismissal of one case is within the realm
of legality. The Justices admissions however regarding statements about law school
performances has been admonished by the Court for the continuous banter and unprofessional
conduct lowers the trust of the public in the Judiciary.
IN RE: REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED IN THE REGIONAL TRIAL

COURT, BRANCH 45, URDANETA CITY, PANGASINAN, AND REPORT ON THE
INCIDENT AT BRANCH 49, SAME COURT
A.M. No. 08-4-253-RTC, January 12, 2011, THIRD DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)
Page 35 of 46
J. BERSAMIN
Although the presiding judge and his or her staff share the duty of taking a continuing
and regular inventory of cases, the responsibility primarily resides in the presiding judge. The
continuity and regularity of the inventory are designed to invest the judge and the court staff
with the actual knowledge of the movements, number, and ages of the cases in the docket of
their court, a knowledge essential to the efficient management of caseload.
On September 18-19, 2007, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) conducted a
judicial audit of the caseload of Branch 45 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC Branch 45) in
Urdaneta City in view of the compulsory retirement of Presiding Judge Joven F. Costales
(Judge Costales) by November 21, 2007. The judicial audit team reported that RTC Branch
45’s caseload totaled 465 cases (i.e., 197 civil cases and 268 criminal cases). Further, the
judicial audit team concluded that the docket inventory of RTC Branch 45 was inaccurate.
In addition to being the Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 45, Judge Costales served as
the acting Executive Judge. In the course of the judicial audit of Branch 45, the team leader
of the judicial audit, visited RTC Branch 49 to remind the Branch Clerk of Court on the
monthly report of cases to be submitted to the OCA. After finding only two employees
actually present in Branch 49, he inspected the bundy cards and discovered that all of the
court personnel of Branch 49 had punched in on that day, except two employees. He
immediately referred the bundy-clock incident to the attention of Judge Costales for
investigation.
On November 19, 2007, the OCA, through then Deputy Court Administrator (DCA)
Jose P. Perez, issued a memorandum to Atty. Max Pascua (Atty. Pascua), the Branch Clerk
of Court of RTC Branch 45, directing him to comment on the inaccuracies of the docket
inventory report, among others. Atty. Pascua, in a letter, assured the OCA that he is
arranging the said inaccuracies.
When nothing was heard from Judge Costales about his action on the bundy-cards
incident, the OCA issued to him a memorandum on November 19, 2007 to remind him that
his report on the incident was already overdue, and to direct him to submit his report
within ten days from notice. However, Judge Costales still did not comply with the directive
of the OCA.
Later on, Judge Costales explained through letter dated January 8, 2008 that he had
instructed Atty. Pascua to advise the OCA of his forthcoming retirement, but that Atty.
Pascua had failed to so inform the OCA; that in the week prior to his retirement on
November 21, 2007, he had been too busy reading and signing decisions and resolutions to
conduct the investigation of the bundy-cards incident; and that his intervening retirement
had left to the new Executive Judge the duty to investigate and report on the bundy-cards
incident.
Court Administrator Elepao and DCA Perez recommended that Judge Costales be held
administratively liable for his omissions and insubordination; and Atty. Pascua be likewise held
administratively liable for his omissions and his failure to submit all the requirements in
connection with the evaluation of the findings during the judicial audit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Costales and Atty. Pascua are adminitratively liable.
RULING:
YES. The OCA uncovered the mismanagement of the records of Branch 45 of the
RTC in Urdaneta City, while still presided by Judge Costales, with Atty. Pascua as the Branch
Clerk of Court.
Page 36 of 46
J. BERSAMIN
Although the presiding judge and his or her staff share the duty of taking a
continuing and regular inventory of cases, the responsibility primarily resides in the
presiding judge. The continuity and regularity of the inventory are designed to invest the
judge and the court staff with the actual knowledge of the movements, number, and ages of
the cases in the docket of their court, a knowledge essential to the efficient management of
caseload.
As to Judge Costales, his sins consisted of omissions. To start with, he failed to act
on some cases from the time of their receipt at Branch 45 until the period of the audit. And,
secondly, he did not properly supervise the court personnel. Judge Costales
uncharacteristically ignored that he discharged judicial and administrative duties as the
Presiding Judge of Branch 45. He seemingly forgot that his responsibility of efficiently and
systematically managing his caseload was the inseparable twin to his responsibility of justly
and speedily deciding the cases assigned to his court. He should have remembered all too
easily that he had assumed both responsibilities upon entering into office as Presiding
Judge, and that he was bound to competently and capably discharge them from then on
until his compulsory retirement.
As with Judge Costales, omissions made up Atty. Pascua’s myriad faults. Atty.
Pascua bore the responsibility for the non-issuance of summonses or alias summonses in
some cases, for the failure to indicate the dates of receipt of case records by Branch 45, for
the failure to receive evidence ex parte despite the orders to that effect, for the failure to
prepare and submit (or cause the submission of) the monthly inventories, and for the
failure to report and update the records of the cases of the branch. Such omissions involved
matters that he should have routinely and regularly performed. His duty as the Branch
Clerk of Court of Branch 45 required him to receive and file all pleadings and other
papers properly presented to the branch, endorsing on each such paper the time when it
was filed.
Judge Costales and Atty. Pascua were really guilty of violating Supreme Court rules,
directives, and circulars, a violation that Section 9, Rule 140, of the Rules of Court treats as a
less serious charge. Accordingly, the fine to be imposed on Judge Costales is in the maximum
of P20,000.00, by reason of his higher and primary responsibility, and that on Atty. Pascua
is P8,000.00, in view of his subordinate but non-judicial position. For disobeying or ignoring
the directive to investigate the bundy-cards incident, Judge Costales was guilty of
insubordination, an omission that constituted simple misconduct, classified under Section 9,
no. 4, Rule 140, of the Rules of Court as a less serious charge, and is thus punished with a
fine of P12,000.00, conformably with Section 11, Rule 140, Rules of Court.
ASSISTANT SPECIAL PROSECUTOR III ROHERMIA J. RODRIGUEZ v. JUSTICES

GREGORY S. ONG, JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, and RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA,
SANDIGANBAYAN
A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J, 12 April 2011, EN BANC (BERSAMIN, J.)
It is of no consequence, then, that no malice or corrupt motive impelled respondent

Justices into adopting the flawed procedure. As responsible judicial officers, they ought to have
been well aware of the indispensability of collegiality to the valid conduct of their trial
proceedings.
Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez were charged as liable for simple misconduct for
failing to hear cases as a collegial body during the scheduled sessions of the Fourth Division
held in Davao City on April 24-28, 2006, with Justice Ong hearing cases by himself and
Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada hearing other cases together.
In their defense the Sandiganbayan Justices contends that they are not liable for simple
Page 37 of 46
J. BERSAMIN
misconduct despite the irregularity of their conduct for the simple reason that, as the
Decision has indicated, they "have not been ill-motivated or inspired by an intention to
violate any law or legal rules in adopting the erroneous procedure, but had been seeking,
instead, to thereby expedite their disposition of cases in the provinces;" their actions were
not willful in character or motivated by a "premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose;"
or even if their actions might be "irregular, wrongful, or improper," such could not be
characterized as simple misconduct necessitating administrative sanction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Justices were liable for misconduct for their failure to hear the
cases as a collegial body which is required by law.
RULING:
YES. Justices cannot lightly regard the legal requirement for all of them to sit
together as members of the Fourth Division "in the trial and determination of a case or cases
assigned thereto." The information and evidence upon which the Fourth Division would
base any decisions or other judicial actions in the cases tried before it must be made directly
available to each and every one of its members during the proceedings. This necessitates the
equal and full participation of each member in the trial and adjudication of their cases. It is
simply not enough, therefore, that the three members of the Fourth Division were within
hearing and communicating distance of one another at the hearings in question, as they
explained in hindsight, because even in those circumstances not all of them sat together in
session.
Indeed, the ability of the Fourth Division to function as a collegial body became
impossible when not all of the members sat together during the trial proceedings. The
internal rules of the Sandiganbayan spotlight an instance of such impossibility. Section 2,
Rule VII of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan expressly requires that rulings
on oral motions made or objections raised in the course of the trial proceedings or hearings
are be made by the Chairman of the Division. Obviously, the rule cannot be complied with
because Justice Ong, the Chairman, did not sit in the hearing of the cases heard by the
other respondents. Neither could the other respondents properly and promptly contribute to
the rulings of Justice Ong in the hearings before him.
Moreover, the respondent Justices’ non-observance of collegiality contravened the very

purpose of trying criminal cases cognizable by Sandiganbayan before a Division of all three
Justices. Although there are criminal cases involving public officials and employees triable
before single- judge courts, PD 1606, as amended, has always required a Division of three
Justices (not one or two) to try the criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, in view of
the accused in such cases holding higher rank or office than those charged in the former
cases. The three Justices of a Division, rather than a single judge, are naturally expected to
exert keener judiciousness and to apply broader circumspection in trying and deciding such
cases. The tighter standard is due in part to the fact that the review of convictions is elevated
to the Supreme Court generally via the discretionary mode of petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45, Rules of Court, which eliminates issues of fact, instead of via ordinary appeal
set for the former kind of cases (whereby the convictions still undergo intermediate review
before ultimately reaching the Supreme Court, if at all).
RE: FAILURE OF FORMER JUDGE ANTONIO A. CARBONELL TO DECIDE CASES

SUBMITTED FOR DECISION AND TO RESOLVE PENDING MOTIONS IN THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 27, SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION.
A.M. No. 08-5-305-RTC, EN BANC, July 9, 2013, Bersamin, J.
Page 38 of 46
J. BERSAMIN
Delay in the disposition of cases is a major culprit in the erosion of public faith and
confidence in the judicial system, as judges have the sworn duty to administer justice without undue
delay.—The Court cannot overstress its policy on prompt disposition or resolution of cases. Delay
in the disposition of cases is a major culprit in the erosion of public faith and confidence in the
judicial system, as judges have the sworn duty to administer justice without undue delay. Thus,
judges have been constantly reminded to strictly adhere to the rule on the speedy disposition of
cases and observe the periods prescribed by the Constitution for deciding cases, which is three
months from the filing of the last pleading, brief or memorandum for lower courts. To further
impress upon judges such mandate, the Court has issued guidelines (Administrative Circular No.
399 dated January 15, 1999) that would insure the speedy disposition of cases and has therein
reminded judges to scrupulously observe the periods prescribed in the Constitution.
Without a doubt, Judge Carbonell’s failure to decide several cases within the reglementary
period, without justifiable and credible reasons, constituted gross inefficiency, warranting the
imposition of administrative sanctions, like fines.—Without a doubt, Judge Carbonell’s failure to
decide several cases within the reglementary period, without justifiable and credible reasons,
constituted gross inefficiency, warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions, like fines.
The fines imposed have varied in each case, depending chiefly on the number of cases not decided
within the reglementary period and other factors, including the presence of aggravating or
mitigating circumstances like the damage suffered by the parties from the delay, the health
condition and age of the judge, etc. Thus, in one case, the Court mitigated the liability of a Judge
who had been suffering from illnesses and who had later retired due to disability, and imposed
upon him a fine of P20,000.00 for failure to decide 31 cases.
FACTS:
According to the Audit Team’s report, Branch 27 had a total caseload of 231 cases,
consisting of 147 criminal cases and 84 civil cases and Judge Carbonell failed to decide 41 criminal
cases (one is inherited) and 22 civil cases (four inherited). He was also reported to have failed to
resolve pending motions.
In a Memorandum, the OCA recommended to the court to imposed against him a fine of
P50,000.00 for gross inefficiency for failing to promptly decide the cases as well as resolve pending
motions.
The Clerk of Court furnished Judge Carbonell with a copy of the audit report and ordered
him to submit his comment within 10 days from notice. Not having received a comment form
Judge Carbonell despite the lapse of time given, the court resolved to require him to show cause
why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt.
Judge Carbonell replied stating that he had incorporated his comment in the letter he had
sent to Chief Justice Puno (Re: Very Urgent Request for Release of Disability Retirement Benefits
and Money Value of Accrued Leave Credits). He marked that the court had actually granted his
request for the payment of his disability retirements benefits subject to the retention of
P200,000.00 pending resolution of the pending administrative case against him.
Judge Carbonell surmised that the Audit Team might have overlooked the fact that he had
inherited some of the undecided cases from the predecessor judge; that said cases had no
transcripts of stenographic notes because of which he was impelled to require the parties to
submit their respective memoranda; that cases would only be considered submitted for decision
after the parties would have filed their respective memoranda and that he had undergone a
quadruple heart bypass operation in 2005 that had adversely affected his pace in deciding the
cases.
The OCA reiterated its recommendation to impose a fine of P50,000 on Judge Carbonell
noting he had failed to render any valid reason for his delay in deciding the cases submitted for
decision and in resolving the pending motions. It is also noted that only 5 cases submitted for
decision had been inherited and that the case records did not bear any requests for extension of
Page 39 of 46
J. BERSAMIN
time or any directive for the transcription of stenographic notes. It stressed that heavy caseload
would not justify the failure to promptly decide and resolved cases because he could have simply
asked for an extension of time.
ISSUE:
Whether Judge Carbonell’s failure to decide several cases without justifiable and credible
reasons constituted gross inefficiency, warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions.
HELD:
Yes. Delay in the disposition of cases is a major culprit in the erosion of public faith and
confidence in the judicial system, as judges have the sworn duty to administer justice without
undue delay. Thus, judges have been constantly reminded to strictly adhere to the rule on the
speedy disposition of cases and observe the periods prescribed by the Constitution for deciding
cases which is three months from the filing of the last pleading, brief or memorandum for lower
courts.
As a frontline official of the Judiciary, a trial judge should at all times act with efficiency
and probity. He is duty-bound not only to be faithful to the law, but also to maintain professional
competence. The pursuit of excellence ought always to be his guiding principle. Such dedication
is the least that he can do to sustain the trust and confidence that the public have reposed in him
and the institution he represents.
Nonetheless, the Court has been mindful of the plight of our judges and understanding of
circumstances that may hinder them from promptly disposing of their businesses. Hence, the
Court has allowed extensions of time to decide cases beyond the 90-day period. All that a judge
needs to do is to request and justify an extension of time to decide the cases, and the Court has
almost invariably granted such request.
Judge Carbonell failed to decide a total of 63 cases and to resolve 16 pending motions or
incidents within the 90-day reglementary period. He intimated that his poor health affected his
pace in deciding the cases. Had such been the case, then he should have explained his
predicament to the Court and asked for an extension of time to decide the cases. Unfortunately,
he failed to do so.
CONCERNED CITIZEN vs. CATENA

A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1321-P, EN BANC, July 16, 2013, Bersamin, J.
Gross dishonesty on the part of an employee of the Judiciary is a very serious offense that
must be severely punished. Dismissal may be meted on the employee, unless she had meanwhile
ceased to be an employee, in which case a high fine shall be imposed.
Administrative Law; Resignation; Cessation from office by virtue of her intervening

resignation did not warrant the dismissal of the administrative complaint against her, for the act
complained of had been committed when she was still in the service.—Let it be said at the outset
that Catena’s resignation from the service did not cause the Court to lose its jurisdiction to
proceed against her in this administrative case. Her cessation from office by virtue of her
intervening resignation did not warrant the dismissal of the administrative complaint against her,
for the act complained of had been committed when she was still in the service. Nor did such
cessation from office render the administrative case moot and academic. Indeed, the Court’s
jurisdiction at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost because the
respondent had ceased in office during the pendency of the case. Otherwise, exacting
responsibility for administrative liabilities incurred would be easily avoided or evaded.
Same; Dishonesty; Court Personnel; Considering that Catena’s misrepresentation of her

eligibility concerned a material fact that enabled her to secure her appointment equated to her
Page 40 of 46
J. BERSAMIN
deliberate fabrication of the truth concerning her eligibility, she was guilty of gross dishonesty.—
Considering that Catena’s misrepresentation of her eligibility concerned a material fact that
enabled her to secure her appointment equated to her deliberate fabrication of the truth
concerning her eligibility, she was guilty of gross dishonesty. She should not be allowed to remain
in the service of the Judiciary, because no other office in the Government exacted a greater
demand for mortal righteousness from an official or employee than a position in the Judiciary.
Same; Resignation; Catena’s intervening resignation necessarily means that the penalty of
dismissal could no longer be implemented against her. Instead, fine is imposed, the determination of
the amount of which is subject to the sound discretion of the Court.—Catena’s intervening
resignation necessarily means that the penalty of dismissal could no longer be implemented
against her. Instead, fine is imposed, the determination of the amount of which is subject to the
sound discretion of the Court. As earlier clarified, the resignation did not prevent this resolution
from being made, because resignation should not be used as a convenient means or strategy to
evade administrative liability.
FACTS:
The administrative case stemmed from an undated anonymous letter-complaint charging

Nonita Catena, a Court Stenographer III of Branch 50 of the Regional Trial Court in Puerto
Princesa City, Palawan with gross dishonesty she allegedly committed in connection with her
Civil Service Eligibility accusing her of having caused another person to take the Civil Service
Eligibility Examination in her stead.
Catena was ordered to file a comment within ten days regarding the anonymous
complaint. However, instead of filing a comment, she asked for a 30 day extension before the
Office of the Court Administrator within which to file a comment. Despite being granted the
extension, she still failed to submit a comment, causing the Court to issue a tracer letter but still
enjoining her to comply with the previous directive to file a comment within five days from
notice, or else the complaint would be resolved without her comment.
After such time, Judge Nelia Yap-Fernandez of the RTC formally informed the Court that
Catena had already resigned from her position. In view of this communication, the Court required
Judge Yap-Fernandez to provide Catena’s current and correct address within 15 days from notice
because Catena continued to ignore the previous resolutions.
Subsequently, the Court considered as served on Catena the previous resolutions because
of the return on the service at that address being "Return to Sender-unclaimed." The Court then
resolved anew to await Catena’s comment and decided to dispense with her comment only on and
to refer the complaint to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation.
The complaint was later on re-docketed as a regular administrative matter on the basis of
the recommendation made by Justice Perez, then already the Court Administrator, who
recommended that Catena be held liable for dishonesty and be dismissed from the service with
prejudice to re-employment in any branch, agency, instrumentality of the government, including
government owned and controlled corporations.
ISSUE:
Whether the rule that gross dishonesty of an employee of the Judiciary is tantamount to
dismissal from service is absolute
HELD:
No. Let it be stressed that all court employees of the Judiciary, being public servants in an
office dispensing justice, must always act with a high degree of professionalism and responsibility.
They should avoid any act or conduct that would diminish public trust and confidence in the
courts.
Page 41 of 46
J. BERSAMIN
In Civil Service Commission v. Macud, the penalty of dismissal was prescribed with the
accessory penalties against respondent who had been found guilty of making a false declaration in
her PDS that she had passed the Professional Board Examination for Teachers. In Cruz v. Civil
Service Commission and Civil Service Commission v. Sta. Ana, the employees found guilty of
similar offenses were dismissed. In Cruz, Zenaida Paitim had masqueraded as Gilda Cruz, and had
taken the Civil Service examination in lieu of Cruz. Both Paitim and Cruz were meted the penalty
of dismissal from the service. In Sta. Ana, another person had taken the Civil Service examination
for Sta. Ana, who was held guilty of dishonesty and dismissed from the service.
We do not deviate from such precedents. Catena’s dismissal from the service is the
appropriate penalty, with her eligibility to be cancelled, her retirement benefits to be forfeited,
and her disqualification from reemployment in the government service to be perpetual.
Nonetheless, we do not forfeit her accrued leave credits to accord with the ruling in Sta. Ana.
Catena’s intervening resignation necessarily means that the penalty of dismissal could no
longer be implemented against her. Instead, fine is imposed, the determination of the amount of
which is subject to the sound discretion of the Court. As earlier clarified, the resignation did not
prevent this resolution from being made, because resignation should not be used as a convenient
means or strategy to evade administrative liability.
Section 56 (e) of Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules provides that the penalty of fine
shall be in an amount not exceeding the salary for six months had respondent not resigned, the
rate for which is that obtaining upon at the time of her resignation.
Finally, even though her penalty is a fine, she should still suffer the accessory penalty of
perpetual disqualification from re-employment in the Government that the penalty of dismissal
carried. A contrary holding would have the undesirable effect of giving the erring employee the
means to avoid the accessory penalty by the simple expedient of resigning.
WILSON B. TAN v. JESUS F. HERNANDO

A.C. No. P-08-2501, 28 August 2009, FIRST DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)
A court employee must comply with his valid contractual obligation, act fairly, and
adhere to high ethical standards to preserve the Judiciary's integrity and reputation.
Jesus F. Hernando (Hernando), then with the Office of the Clerk of Court, went to
the store of Wilson B. Tan (Tan) to borrow PhP3,000, promising that he will deliver his
October 1998 half- month salary check to him upon receiving it. The promise was reflected
by an acknowledgment receipt. However, Hernando reneged on his promise, prompting
Tan to file a criminal case for estafa against Hernando.
The administrative complaint against Hernando was held in abeyance until after
the criminal case is resolved. Hernando was subsequently absolved of criminal liability, but
he was ordered to pay Tan the amount of the loan, with interest at the rate of 12% per
annum from October 1, 1998 until the debt is fully satisfied.
Upon receiving the verdict in the criminal case, the Office of the Court
Administrator found Hernando guilty of "willful failure to pay just debts", and, in lieu of
a reprimand, fined him in the amount of PhP5,000 due to the fact that he reached the
compulsory retirement age.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Hernando may be found liable for “willful failure to pay just debts”.
Page 42 of 46
J. BERSAMIN
RULING:
YES. Just debts include (1) claims adjudicated by a court of law; or (2) claims the
existence and justness of which are admitted by the debtor. Hernando's obligation falls under
both classifications. Having incurred just debts, Hernando therefore had the moral and
legal duty to pay them when it became due.
As a court employee, he must comply with his valid contractual obligation, act
fairly, and adhere to high ethical standards to preserve the Judiciary's integrity and
reputation. Unfortunately, in this case, he failed to prove that he had adequately
discharged his obligation, thus, he must be administratively sanctioned. However, in
consideration of his age and the circumstances, the Court lowered the fine to only PhP1,000.
JUDGE JUANITA T. GUERRERO v. TERESITA V. ONG

A.M. No. P-09-2676, 16 December 2009, FIRST DIVISION (BERSAMIN, J.)
A court employee must not use her official position for personal considerations. The
judicial profession being vested with public interest, the trust and integrity of the people
must be maintained for the attainment of justice.
Reynaldo N. Garcia, a plaintiff in Civil Case No. 03-045, entitled Spouses Reynaldo
and Lydia Garcia v. Spouses Joselito and Merle Arevalo, brought an administrative complaint
against Judge Juanita T. Guerrero, Presiding Judge of Branch 204 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Muntinlupa City, charging her with bias and irregularities in relation to her
disposition of the application for a writ of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction
in said case. Answering Garcia’s administrative complaint, Judge Guerrero incorporated a
formal charge for improper conduct against Teresita V. Ong, Court Stenographer of Branch
260, RTC, in Paranaque City. Judge Guerrero insisted that any acts of impropriety relative to
Civil Case No. 03-045 had been committed by Ong, a tenant of Garcia, who had gone to her
chambers on several occasions in the guise of making a courtesy call on her, and had then
discussed the merits of the case with her; that Ong had engaged in name-dropping to urge
her to resolve in favor of Garcia; that Ong had attended the hearings of the case in her
Supreme Court uniform; and that Ong had told her Acting Branch Clerk of Court that Judge
Guerrero and Spouses Garcia ay nagkatapatan na, which Ong had implied to mean that
the Judge (had) received consideration from the defendants.
In turn, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that the
administrative matter against Ong be referred for investigation to a consultant of the
OCA in order to ascertain every act of impropriety imputed against her. Accordingly, the
Court referred the administrative matter against Ong to retired Justice Narciso T. Atienza
for investigation.
During the investigation, Ong explained that her attendance at the hearings and
ocular inspection had been made only upon the request of Garcia, whose plea for moral
support she could not refuse; that she had not filed applications for leave because her
superior had permitted her to attend the hearings and the ocular inspection; and that her
sole purpose for talking with Judge Guerrero had been only to inform the latter about the
case pending in her sala.
Justice Atienza regarded Ong's defense as incredible, and observed that Ong's real
intention in talking with Judge Guerrero in her chambers while in office uniform had been
to influence Judge Guerrero to resolve the pending incident in Garcia’s favor. He concluded
that Ong had attended several hearings and the ocular inspection in Civil Case No. 03-045
in her office uniform and during office hours; and that on those occasions, she had not filed
applications for leave and had not reflected her undertime in her daily time records
Page 43 of 46
J. BERSAMIN
(DTRs).
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ong is guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty.
RULING:
YES. Ong was guilty of grave misconduct, for using her official position as a court
employee to secure benefits for Garcia; and of dishonesty, for committing serious
irregularities in the keeping of her DTRs.
A court employee is not prohibited from helping individuals in the course of

performing her official duties, but her actions cannot be left unchecked when the help
extended puts under suspicion the integrity of the Judiciary. Indeed, she is strictly
instructed not to use her official position to secure unwarranted benefits, privileges, or
exemptions for herself or for others. The evident purpose of the instruction is precisely to
free the court employees from suspicion of misconduct.
Ong did not comply with the instruction. Instead, she used her official position as
an employee of the Judiciary to attempt to influence Judge Guerrero to rule in favor of
litigant Garcia, her landlord. She was thereby guilty of misconduct, defined as a
transgression of some established or definite rule of action; or, more particularly, an
unlawful behavior on the part of a public officer or employee. In grave misconduct, as
distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate
the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule must be manifest. Corruption as an
element of grave misconduct consists in the act of an official or employee who unlawfully
or wrongfully uses her station or character to procure some benefit for herself or for
another, contrary to the rights of others. It is established herein that Ong
knowingly and corruptly tried to influence Judge Guerrero to favor Garcia in the latter’s
pending civil action.
In addition, Justice Atienza found that Ong had made false entries in her DTRs by
indicating therein that she had been at work although she had been elsewhere. We sustain
the finding of Justice Atienza and pronounce Ong administratively liable for committing
irregularities in the keeping of her DTRs. Her false entries in the DTRs constituted
dishonesty, an act that Section 52, Rule IV, Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service, classifies as a grave offense for which the penalty of dismissal from the service
even for the first commission is imposable.
BENIGNO B. REAS v. CARLOS M. RELACION

A.M. No. P-05-2095, February 9, 2011, THIRD DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)
The court personnel must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the
performance of their official duties, but also in their private dealings with their co-employees and
with the public. Their professional and personal conduct must be free from any whiff of
impropriety.
Benigno B. Reas (Reas), Sheriff IV of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 23 in
Cebu City, charged Carlos M. Relacion (Relacion), Clerk III of the RTC Branch 15 in Cebu City,
with gross dishonesty and grave misconduct.
Reas alleged in his complaint that by prior arrangement, the Clerk of Court of the
RTC (COC) delivered to the Cebu CFI Community Cooperative (Cooperative) the salary
checks of court personnel with outstanding obligations with the Cooperative to pay for
Page 44 of 46
J. BERSAMIN
their loans. Reas’ salary check in the amount of P4,280.00 was delivered by the COC to the
Cooperative for the said purpose. When Reas asked for the receipt corresponding to his
payment, the Cooperative informed him that his salary check had been inadvertently
surrendered to Relacion after Relacion had harassed the Cooperative to a point of violence
to release Relacion’s own check. Relacion did not return the salary check to the
Cooperative despite repeated demands. When Reas confronted Relacion, Relacion admitted
taking Reas’ salary check. Relacion mauled Reas when Reas refused Relacion’s offer to pay
Reas’ salary check with Relacion’s Judicial Development Fund (JDF) check. It was only after
the Cooperative confronted Relacion that the latter paid Reas’ salary check.
In his comment, Relacion denied harassing or threatening the employees of the

Cooperative, explaining that he went to the COC to get his own salary check, and he
expressed his intention to get his own salary check because he needed the money to which
the Cooperative’s representative agreed. After signing the payroll, the Cooperative’s
representative handed to him a salary check. It was later on that Relacion realized that the
salary check handed to him was not his. Relacion further narrated that he informed Reas
that he would pay Reas when they meet at the bundy clock section. However, Reas then
punched him but missed. Thus, he dared Reas to a fistfight outside the building, but the
latter refused his dare. Both of them then entered the office of the COC. While they both
sat inside said office, Reas stood up and punched him on the left side of his neck, and he
retaliated by punching Reas.
Upon recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), the

complaint was re- docketed as a regular administrative case before the sala of the Executive
Judge of the RTC in Cebu City. RTC Executive Judge Simeon P. Dumdum, Jr. (Judge
Dumdum, Jr.) informed the Court that the parties had entered into a compromise agreement
calling for the dismissal of the administrative matter; and that the compromise agreement
had been reached after Relacion had apologized to Reas, and paid the latter the amount
of P100.00. Judge Dumdum, Jr. recommended to the Court the approval of the compromise
agreement and the dismissal of the administrative matter. Subsequently, the Court
referred the matter to the OCA. The OCA recommended that Relacion be fined in the
amount of P2,000.00 for simple misconduct.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the compromise agreement warrants the dismissal of the

administrative matter.
2. Whether or not Relacion is guilty of simple misconduct.
RULING:
1. NO. Three reasons justify the continuation of the administrative matter despite the
compromise agreement or the forgiveness. One, the Court’s disciplinary authority is not
dependent on or cannot be frustrated by the private arrangements entered into by the
parties; otherwise, the prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the
discipline of court personnel, will be undermined. Two, public interest is at stake in
the conduct and actuations of the officials and employees of the Judiciary. Accordingly,
the efforts of the Court in improving the delivery of justice to the people should not
be frustrated and put to naught by any private arrangements between the parties. And,
three, the Court’s interest in the affairs of the Judiciary is a paramount concern that bows
to no limits.
2. YES. The Code of Conduct for Court Personnel requires that the officials and employees of
the Judiciary serve as sentinels of justice, and declares that any act of impropriety on
their part affects the dignity of the Judiciary and the peoples faith in the Judiciary.
Thus, the court personnel must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not
only in the performance of their official duties, but also in their private dealings with
Page 45 of 46
J. BERSAMIN
their co-employees and with the public. Their professional and personal conduct must
be free from any whiff of impropriety.
Here, there is no sufficient proof showing that Relacion intentionally took Reas salary
check from the Cooperative. Lucino Q. Garcia, an employee of the Cooperative, admitted in
his certification that he had inadvertently surrendered Reas’ salary check to Relacion when
the latter had demanded his own salary check to a point of violence.
Even so, Relacion could not be exculpated because he did not immediately return the
salary check either to Reas or to the Cooperative upon realizing that the salary check handed
to him was not his. Moreover, Relacion’s excuse for not returning Reas’ check was lame and
implausible.
Relacion’s failure to immediately return Reas’ salary check was improper and
constituted misconduct. That Relacion did not maliciously or deliberately take Reas’ salary
check rendered him liable only for simple misconduct.
Considering that the misconduct was Relacion’s first offense, the penalty imposable on
him is suspension for one month and one day to six months. However, we should note that,
firstly, Reas already forgave him and Relacion indemnified Reas in the amount of P100.00,
as evidenced by their compromise agreement; secondly, the amount of the salary check was
only P4,280.00 and was already reimbursed to Reas; and, lastly, Relacion was contemplating
on retiring due to a lingering illness. The penalty of suspension would be too severe under the
circumstances. Instead, the imposition of a fine of P5,000.00 suffice.
Page 46 of 46

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J. Bersamin - Legal Ethics PDF

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LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS

The Code of Professional Responsibility

EMBIDO vs. PE, JR.

Same; Same; Disbarment; Suspension; Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving

BENJAMIN Q. ONG vs. ATTY. WILLIAM F. DELOS SANTOS

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND

JESSIE R. DE LEON v. ATTY. EDUARDO G. CASTELO

SAMSON vs. ERA

Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Code of Professional Responsibility; Conflict of Interests; A lawyer

The Investigating Commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBPCBD)

TERESITA T. BAYONLA v. ATTY. PURITA A. REYES

ANGELITO RAMISCAL and MERCEDES ORZAME v. ATTY. EDGAR S. ORRO

Attorney-Client Relationships; As an essential part of their highly fiduciary relationship, the

Consequently, the Ramiscals brought this administrative complaint against the

GABRIELA CORONEL v. ATTY. NELSON A. CUNANAN

Same; Administrative Cases; An administrative case proceeds independently from the

I. Whether or not Atty. Cunanan is guilty of malpractice and negligence.

NATIONAL TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION v. CASTILLO

Whether or not the defense of the National Tobacco Administration of excusable

NENITA SANCHEZ v. ATTY. ROMEO G. AGUILOS

I. Yes. Respondent was liable for misconduct.

Suspension, disbarment and discipline of lawyers

No. Proceedings for disbarment, suspension or discipline of an attorney may be taken by

Notarial Practice (A.M. No. 01-8-13-SC, as amended)

IMELDA BIDES-ULASO v. ATTY. EDITA NOE-LACSAMANA

Notwithstanding the withdrawal of the disbarment complaint, the Integrated Bar of

Whether or not Atty. Lacsamana violated notarial law.

SPOUSES CESAR and THELMA SUSTENTO v. JUDGE FRISCO T. LILAGAN

Spouses Cesar and Thelma Sustento concurrently appear as the “Defendants” in an

SIMPLECIO A. MARSADA v. ROMEO M.MOTEROSO, SHERIFF IV, RTC, BRANCH 34,

Based on the foregoing circumstance, Marsada brought his administrative complaint

WHETHER OR NOT Monteroso is guilty of misconduct.

YES. Monteroso is guilty of simple misconduct.

SUGNI REALTY HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. JUDGE BERNADETTE

Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:

CORAZON D. PADERANGA v. HONORABLE RUSTICO D. PADERANGA

PATRICIA PADERANGA DIAZ v. HON. RTC JUDGE RUSTICO D. PADERANGA

Same; Same; Inhibition and Disqualification of Judges; Compulsory Disqualification of

Same; Same; Penalties; Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge; Conduct unbecoming of a judge,

In A.M. No. RTJ-14-2383

In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2033

The rules on the disqualification of judges, particularly compulsory self-disqualification,

GEORGE T. CHUA vs. JUDGE FORTUNITO L. MADRONA

This administrative complaint against Judge Madrona is disallowed and should be

This administrative complaint against Judge Madrona is disallowed and should be

EDUARDO OLAGUER v. JUDGE ALFREDO AMPUAN, et al.

LOURDES B. FERRER and PROSPERIDAD M. ARANDEZ v.

RE: CASES SUBMITTED FOR DECISION BEFORE JUDGE DAMASO A. HERRERA,

As such, the OCA recommended that the administrative complaint be re-docketed

DANIEL G. SEVILLA v. JUDGE FRANCISCO S. LINDO

As can be seen, Judge Lindo made or allowed too many unreasonable

ASSISTANT SPECIAL PROSECUTOR III ROHERMIA J. RODRIGUEZ v. JUSTICES

With regard to the claim of grave misconduct, Special Prosecutor Jasmani-Rodriguez

Whether or not the Fourth Division of Sandiganbayan engaged in practice that is

YES. What is contemplated in the establishment of the Sandiganbayan and its

IN RE: REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED IN THE REGIONAL TRIAL

ASSISTANT SPECIAL PROSECUTOR III ROHERMIA J. RODRIGUEZ v. JUSTICES

It is of no consequence, then, that no malice or corrupt motive impelled respondent

Moreover, the respondent Justices’ non-observance of collegiality contravened the very

RE: FAILURE OF FORMER JUDGE ANTONIO A. CARBONELL TO DECIDE CASES

CONCERNED CITIZEN vs. CATENA

Administrative Law; Resignation; Cessation from office by virtue of her intervening