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ELECTRONICALLY FILED
2/20/2018 4:56 PM
03-CV-2018-900017.00
CIRCUIT COURT OF
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, ALABAMA
TIFFANY B. MCCORD, CLERK
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, ALABAMA
LEIGH CORFMAN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CIVIL ACTION NO. CV-2018-900017.00
ROY S. MOORE, and
JUDGE ROY MOORE FOR US SENATE,
Defendants.
“'The plaintiff’s choice of venue is generally given not just a little deference, but great
deference.” Ex parte Eng’g Design Grp., LLC, 200 So. 3d 634, 644 (Ala. 2016) (Moore, C.J.,
dissenting from result) (emphasis in original). To defeat that “great deference,” Defendants bear
the burden of showing that “transfer is justified, based on the convenience of the parties and
witnesses or based on the interest of justice.” Ex parte Elliott, No. 1160941, -- So. 3d --, 2017
WL 6546313, at *2 (Ala. Dec. 22, 2017); see also Ex parte Perfection Siding, Inc., 882 So. 2d
307, 312 (Ala. 2003) (“burden of proof in seeking a transfer under this doctrine rests squarely on
the shoulders of the defendant”) (citing Ex parte New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 663 So. 2d
1
Defendants do not challenge the propriety of venue in Montgomery County. To the contrary,
the doctrine of forum non conveniens (upon which Defendants base their motion) is predicated
upon the propriety of the plaintiff’s chosen venue. See Ala. Code § 6-3-21.1(a) (“With respect to
civil actions filed in an appropriate venue . . .”) (emphasis added).
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Defendants Roy Moore and Judge Roy Moore for US Senate (the “Moore Campaign
Committee”) have not met and cannot meet their burden of showing that the interests of justice
require a transfer of this case from the same Court in which they filed a lawsuit of their own less
than two months ago. See Roy S. Moore et al. v. John H. Merrill et al., 03-CV-2017-902015.00
(Cir. Ct. of Montgomery Cty., Ala., filed Dec. 27, 2017) (the “Election Fraud Lawsuit”).2
As an initial matter, Defendants tacitly concede, as they must, that Montgomery County
is more convenient for the parties and witnesses. Of the nine witnesses identified in the
Complaint, two live out of state and four live in Montgomery County or closer to Montgomery
County than Etowah County. Of the three remaining witnesses in Alabama, only Mr. Moore
prefers Etowah County; Plaintiff Leigh Corfman’s mother lives in Guntersville, but is willing to
testify in Montgomery, and Ms. Corfman filed suit in Montgomery County—a choice of forum
The interests of justice also support venue in Montgomery County because Montgomery
County has a strong connection to this lawsuit. At least two of the defamatory statements that
form the basis of the Complaint were made in Montgomery County; none were made in Etowah
County. Ex parte Windom, 840 So. 2d 885, 889 (Ala. 2002) (“[A]n individual who makes an
allegedly defamatory statement should be sued where the defamatory remark was made.”)
In these circumstances, Defendants’ preference for Mr. Moore’s home court cannot
2
The complaint in the Election Fraud Lawsuit is attached to the Complaint in this action as
Exhibit 11.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is a defamation action. Ms. Corfman alleges that Defendants repeatedly and
publicly accused her of lying and having improper motivations in responding to newspaper
reporters’ questions about Mr. Moore’s sexual abuse of her in 1979, when he was a 32-year-old
assistant district attorney and she was a 14-year-old high school freshman. Compl. ¶¶ 3-6.
Specifically, in the fall of 2017, near the end of Mr. Moore’s campaign for the United States
Senate, Ms. Corfman was approached by The Washington Post and truthfully told the reporters
about her experience with Mr. Moore. Id. ¶ 10. On November 9, 2017, The Post published an
From that moment forward, Defendants defamed Ms. Corfman no fewer than 14 times.
See id. ¶¶ 14, 45-93. The defamatory statements were made from November 10 to December 27,
2017 in Montgomery County and other counties in Alabama (but not in Etowah County). See id.
Defendants claimed, among other assertions, that Ms. Corfman’s account is “completely false,”
“malicious,” and “politically motivated,” that it reflects the “immorality of our time,” and that
The last defamatory act occurred on December 27, 2017 in Montgomery County.
Mr. Moore and the Moore Campaign Committee—the defendants in this defamation suit—filed
the separate Election Fraud Lawsuit against the Alabama Secretary of State and the Jefferson
County Probate Judge in Montgomery County, seeking to enjoin certification of Doug Jones’s
election to the Senate on the basis of alleged “systematic election fraud.” Id. ¶ 67; see also id.,
Ex. 11. The Election Fraud Lawsuit includes one out-of-context allegation that “Plaintiff Roy
Moore [had] successfully completed a polygraph test confirming that the representations of
misconduct made [by Ms. Corfman and other women] against him during the campaign are
completely false.” Id. ¶ 68. In support of that disconnected allegation, the complaint attaches an
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affidavit of Mr. Moore, in which Mr. Moore concludes with the untrue and defamatory
characterization of Ms. Corfman’s accounts as “false and malicious attacks.” Id. ¶ 73.
defamed Ms. Corfman in Montgomery County. On November 21, 2017, at a televised press
event held in Montgomery, Mr. DuPré accused Ms. Corfman of lying about the sexual abuse that
she experienced. See Ex. A, Roman Affidavit ¶ 23; see also Compl. ¶¶ 83-86. Mr. DuPré
offered five sham points that he claimed discredited Ms. Corfman’s account of Mr. Moore’s
Not only is Montgomery County where defamatory statements were made, but also it is
more convenient for the witnesses. The Complaint identifies one entity and nine persons by
name or relationship with relevant knowledge of the Defendants’ defamatory acts. Of the
individuals who reside in Alabama, all but three reside in Montgomery or closer to Montgomery
County than to Etowah County. The other three are Mr. Moore, Ms. Corfman’s mother (who
lives in Guntersville, but does not object to testifying in Montgomery), and Ms. Corfman (who
filed in Montgomery). Id. ¶¶ 33-34; see also Ex. A, Roman Affidavit ¶ 6. The Moore Campaign
Committee was registered as doing business or having an office in Montgomery County. Id. ¶
35. The remaining witnesses (and their cities of residence) are Richard Hobson (Montgomery,
Dean Young (Gulf Shores, Alabama), Janet Porter (Hinckley, Ohio), and Betsy Davis (Los
3
The Court may consider affidavits and facts outside the Complaint in determining proper
venue. See, e.g., Carson v. Carson, -- So. 3d --, 2017 WL 1534451, at *1-2 (Ala. Civ. App.
2017).
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“A trial court should not grant a motion for a change of venue unless the defendant’s
proffered forum is significantly more convenient than the forum in which the action is filed.” Ex
Defendants have not shown—and cannot show—that Etowah County is more convenient,
much less significantly more convenient, for the parties and witnesses. As the facts set forth
above demonstrate, see supra at 4, Defendants cannot credibly maintain their position that
Etowah County is the “situs for witnesses and evidence.” Mot. at 5. To the contrary, the only
factor weighing in Etowah County’s favor is Mr. Moore’s preference for his home forum.
The interest-of-justice analysis supports transfer only where the county from which
transfer is sought has “little, if any” connection to the action, whereas the county to which
transfer is sought has a “strong” nexus or connection to the lawsuit. Ex parte Elliott, 2017 WL
6546313, at *3.
Here, however, Montgomery County has a strong connection to the lawsuit because at
least two defamatory statements were made in Montgomery County. See supra at 3-4
(describing defamatory statements by Mr. Moore and by Mr. DuPré). This fact alone—where
the acts were made that give rise to a claim—is “often assigned considerable weight in an
In addition, at all times when the alleged defamatory statements were made by
representatives of the Moore Campaign Committee, the committee was based in Montgomery
County (as it was on the date suit was filed). See Ex. A, Roman Affidavit at ¶¶ 3-5.
Defendants’ arguments to the contrary are untethered to the law and the facts of this case.
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First, Defendants’ argument that “[m]ost of the acts that Ms. Corfman has alleged to have
occurred” took place in Etowah County, Mot. at 3, ignores that this is a civil action for
defamation, not a criminal prosecution for sexual abuse. Ms. Corfman’s Complaint alleges at
least 14 incidents of defamation between November 10 and December 27, 2017 in Montgomery
County and other counties in Alabama. Compl. ¶¶ 14, 45-93. Not one of those defamatory
Second, Defendants’ argument that the location of the defamatory statements should have
no bearing on venue because of the broad dissemination of those statements, Mot. at 5, is directly
contradicted by Alabama Supreme Court precedent. Alabama law is clear that “an individual
who makes an allegedly defamatory statement should be sued where the defamatory remark was
made.” Ex parte Windom, 840 So. 2d at 889 (quoting Ex parte Arrington, 599 So. 2d at 26).
Third, Defendants’ argument that Etowah County is the proper venue because Ms.
cases, the word injury commonly refers not to the damage allegedly suffered by the plaintiff, but
to the wrongful act or omission allegedly committed by the defendant.” Ex parte Windom, 840
So. 2d at 889 n.2 (emphasis in original). As Mr. Moore himself has recognized, in a defamation
lawsuit, that means that venue is proper where the defamatory statement is made. See, e.g., id. at
890 (“[H]ad the action been filed in Montgomery County, the site of the press conference, venue
would have been proper because Montgomery County was ‘the county in which the act or
omission complained of may have been done or may have occurred.’”) (Moore, C.J.,
concurring).
Fourth, as discussed more fully in the opposition to Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(3) motion,
Defendants’ argument that the defamatory statement in the Election Fraud Lawsuit is protected
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by the litigation privilege ignores that the privilege does not apply because the statement is
irrelevant to that lawsuit. O’Barr v. Feist, 296 So. 2d 152, 156–57 (Ala. 1974) (privilege “does
not protect slanderous imputations plainly irrelevant and impertinent, voluntarily made, and
which the party making them could not reasonably have supposed to be relevant”). The Election
Fraud Lawsuit alleges “systemic election fraud,” including a statistical discrepancy between
votes, anomalous voter turnout, conflicts between election results and exit polls, unlawful
participation of out-of-staters, and voter intimidation. See Compl., Ex. 11. The complaint
includes one out-of-context allegation that “Plaintiff Roy Moore [had] successfully completed a
polygraph test confirming that the representations of misconduct made [by Ms. Corfman and
other women] against him during the campaign are completely false,” Compl. ¶ 68, supported by
an affidavit by Mr. Moore characterizing the accounts of Ms. Corfman and two other women as
“false and malicious attacks” that likewise has nothing to do with the claims in that lawsuit. See,
e.g., Blevins v. W.F. Barnes Corp., 768 So. 2d 386, 393 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999) (litigation
privilege not applicable where comments were not relevant or material to litigation, but rather
premature and should not inform the venue analysis. Plainly on the facts alleged in her
Complaint, the defamatory statements in the Election Fraud Lawsuit were made by Mr. Moore
“[w]ithout any relevance to his claims of election fraud or to the relief that he [was] seeking.”
Compl. ¶ 18; see also id. ¶ 68 (“This allegation has no relevance to the relief that Defendants
seek for the purported ‘election fraud.’”). Although Defendants can try to articulate a plausible
connection between the affidavit and the Election Fraud Lawsuit in discovery under oath, at this
juncture, the Court must take as true each allegation in the Complaint, including that the
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defamatory statements made in the Election Fraud Lawsuit had “no relevance” to that litigation,
and assess only whether Ms. Corfman “could prove any set of facts in support of [her] claim
which would entitle [her] to relief.” Tibbetts v. Tibbetts, 762 So. 2d 856, 858 (Ala. Civ. App.
1999); see also Ex parte Scannelly, 74 So. 3d 432, 438 (Ala. 2011) (Rule 12 dismissal based on
affirmative defense is appropriate only “[w]hen the plaintiff’s own factual allegations
Fifth, Defendants’ arguments based on two out-of-state federal cases fail because they do
not even relate to venue. Mot. at 3. In Calder v. Jones, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
California had personal jurisdiction over the defendants in a defamation action because their
conduct in Florida was calculated to injure the plaintiff in California. 465 U.S. 783, 790-91
(1984). In McKee v. Cosby, the Massachusetts district court applied a choice of law analysis to
conclude that application of the substantive law where the plaintiff was domiciled at the time of
the alleged conduct was appropriate in a defamation lawsuit. 236 F. Supp. 3d 427, 436 (D.
Mass. 2017).
The only argument advanced by Defendants that has merit is their assertion that “[t]he
drama should properly play out where the underlying events at issue are alleged to have
occurred.” Mot. at 5. This is a defamation lawsuit, and as the Alabama Supreme Court has held,
the “drama” should play out “where the defamatory remark was made.” Ex parte Windom, 840
So. 2d at 889 (quoting Ex parte Arrington, 599 So. 2d at 26). Defendants defamed Ms. Corfman
Finally, because Montgomery County has a strong connection to the lawsuit, it will not
be burdened by the lawsuit. To the contrary, citizens of Montgomery County have an interest in
having this case tried in their county. See, e.g., Ex parte Elliott, 2017 WL 6546313, at *3 (“[I]n
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examining whether it is in the interest of justice to transfer a case, we consider ‘the burden of
piling court services and resources upon the people of a county that is not affected by the case
and . . . the interest of the people of a county to have a case that arises in their county tried close
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for change of venue should be denied.
Respectfully Submitted,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that, on this 20th day of February, 2018, I filed the foregoing with the Clerk of
Court using this Court’s electronic filing system, which will provide a copy to all counsel of
record.