CHAPTER IV D

P. VS VILLANUEVA
(hindi ko mahanap to, huhu. try ko hanapin, to follow nailing ….)

GREEN NOTES:
23. Is the judge bound by the findings of existence of ―probable cause by the Prosecutor as
indicated in his Certification in the information so that the issuance of a warrant of arrest is
only ministerial on his part? If not satisfied of the existence of probable cause, may the judge
require the Prosecutor to submit additional evidence?

The judge is not bound by the findings of the Prosecutor because the said finding is only
―probable cause that a crime was committed. Probable cause to justify the issuance of a
warrant of arrest is a judicial function vested only in the judge. In fact, he can require the
Prosecutor to submit additional evidence if he is not convinced of the existence of probable
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. (P. vs. Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465; Placer vs. Villanueva,
126 SCRA 463).
 PLACER VS VILLANUEVA

FACTS: The Congressman of the municipality of Masbate and his security escorts
(were attacked and killed by a lone assassin. One security escort survived the
assassination plot but suffered a gunshot wound. Vicente Lim et al. was accused
of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder. The Municipal Trial Court
of Masbate, concluded that a probable cause had been established for the issu-
ance of a warrant of arrest against the Lim, et.al. Therecommended amount for
bail of each of the accused was Php 200,000.00. Except for Cabarles, all of the
accused posted bail. The Fiscal issued a resolution which affirmed the finding of
a prima facie case against Lim, et.al. but differed in the designation of the crime.
He ruled that all of the accused should not only be charged with Multiple Murder
with Frustrated Murder, but for a case of murder for each of the killing of the four
victims and a physical injuries case for inflicting gunshot wound on the buttocks
of Siblante. Said Fiscal filed with the RTC of Masbate four separate in formations
of murder against the 12 accused with a recommendation of no bail.

Petitioners contended that under P.D. Nos. 77 and 911, they are authorized
to determine the existence of a probable cause in a preliminary examination/in-
vestigation, and that their findings as to the existence thereof constitute sufficient
basis for the issuance of warrants of arrest by the court.

ISSUE: Whether a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying
on the prosecution’s certification and recommendation that a probable cause
exists

HELD: NO. The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for
the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of the issuing magistrate. This is clear
from the following provisions of Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court:

“Warrant of arrest, when issued. – If the judge be satisfied from the preliminary
examination conducted by him or by the investigating officer that the offense
complained of has been committed and that there is reasonable ground to be-
lieve that the accused has committed it, he must issue a warrant or order for his
arrest.”

Under this section, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable
cause before issuing a warrant or order of arrest. If on the face of the information
the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s certification and
require the submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a con-
clusion as to the existence of a probable cause. This has been the rule since U.S.
vs. Ocampo and Amarga vs. Abbas. And this evidently is the reason for the issu-
ance by respondent of the questioned orders of April 13, 15, 16, 19, 1982 and July
13, 1982. Without the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and other evidence
which, as a matter of long-standing practice had been attached to the infor-
mations filed in his sala, respondent found the informations inadequate bases for
the determination of probable cause. For as the ensuing events would show, af-
ter petitioners had submitted the required affidavits, respondent wasted no time
in issuing the warrants of arrest in the cases where he was satisfied that probable
cause existed.

The obvious purpose of requiring the submission of affidavits of the com-

plainant and of his witnesses is to enable the court to determine whether to dismiss
the case outright or to require further proceedings.
 TOLENTINO VS. VILLALUZ (1987)

FACTS: On or about January 25, 1973, private respondent Fiscal Mojica filed a
complaint against petitioners Bayot, Parra and Castillo, presided by respondent
Judge, for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for their alleged
refusal to pay his salary as City Fiscal of Tagaytay City since June, 1969.

After conducting a preliminary examination and investigation of the com-

plaint, Judge Villaluz on January 29, 1973, issued in open court a resolution: (a)
ruling that under existing law, the City Fiscal was entitled to receive the salaries
from the City under Section 3 of the Decentralization Act and ordering respond-
ent Fiscal to "conduct the preliminary examination and investigation in this case
to determine the criminal hability of all the members of said City Council and
thereafter to file the corresponding information in the court of competent jurisdic-
tion, if the evidence so warrants.

Respondent Fiscal Santos summoned all the members of the City Council
for preliminary investigation after which respondent Esperidion Manalastas filed
another complaint, dated March 30, 1973, against the three officials charged in
Criminal Case. This time, the complaint also included then incumbent City Mayor,
Atty. Isaac C. Tolentino and City Councilors Alfredo Ner and Efren Mendiola.

Simultaneous Urgent Motions for Reconsideration of the denial of their Mo-

tion to Quash which were likewise simultaneously denied by respondent Judge in
two resolutions.

Hence, this petition for certiorari.

CONTENTIONS OF PETITIONERS:
1. Petitioners assail respondent Judge's giving due course to the two complaints
and proceeding with the preliminary investigation thereof as in violation of law
and the constitutional rights of the accused to due process which allegedly
constitute a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
2. Petitioners contend that Criminal Circuit Courts did not have the authority to
conduct preliminary investigations and citing Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 5179
allege that said special courts were created with limited jurisdiction, concur-
rent with regular courts of first instance, to try and decide only certain specific
criminal cases.

HELD: Petitioners' argument that the two complaints cannot be the subject of a
judicial inquiry is without basis. It is alleged that to compel petitioners to pay the
salaries of respondent fiscals is in effect an encroachment by the courts into the
council's power to legislate for it is necessary that the council should pass a reso-
lution to appropriate the amount sufficient to cover the salaries claimed by re-
spondent fiscals. Thus, respondent Judge in the exercise of his discretion, after
considering the evidence presented at the preliminary investigation and con-
cluding that the petitioners acted in bad faith in refusing to pay respondent fiscals'
salaries properly ordered the filing of the informations.

The Court dismisses the petition and upholds the validity of the preliminary
examination and investigation conducted by respondent Judge on the control-
ling authority of Collector of customs V. Villaluz and five other cases jointly de-
cided therewith, 71 SCRA 356,1 which held that judges of the special circuit crim-
inal courts are vested with the same authority as judges of the regular courts of
first instance to conduct preliminary investigation of offenses falling within their
jurisdiction.

Another contention of petitioners is improper venue. They alleged that "the

Criminal Circuit Court has no power, authority and jurisdiction to try and decide,
much less conduct the questioned preliminary investigations of cases over crimes
which allegedly were committed in the Province of Cavite, because of improper
venue. The rule, it is true, is that "the Circuit Criminal Courts may hold sessions an-
ywhere within their respective districts." This rule, however, is subject to the condi-
tion that "cases shall be heard within the province where the crime subject of the
offense was committed" (Section 4, RA 5179) However, the law also directs that
"when the interest of justice so demands with prior approval of the Supreme Court,
cases may be heard in a neighboring province within the district," which condi-
tions do not exist in the instant petition such as to justify the hearing in Pasig of an
offense committed in the Province of Cavite.”
 CRUZ VS GATAN

FACTS: On August 30, 1976, Serafin Cruz was arrested along Kennon Road at a
police checkpoint in Baguio City for being a member of a subversive organization
as ordered by Pres. Ferdinand Marcos in line with the Martial Law. He was brought
to Pampanga where he was held for custodial investigation by Gen. Romeo Ga-
tan.

A Petition for Habeas Corpus was made on his behalf claiming that he was
being held incommunicado, he was being held in custody without court order
and that he is not a member of any subversive organization covered by Procla-
mation No. 1081 and falls within the class of persons to whom the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus has not been suspended.

The Court issued the writ of habeas corpus returnable to the Court on Fri-
day, November 12, 1976 at 3:00 p.m. and required the respondent to make a
return of the writ not later than Wednesday, November 10, 1976.

Admitting that the petitioner has been arrested and detained, the respond-
ent justifies such arrest and detention as having been legally ordered by the Pres-
ident of the Philippines in the exercise of his powers under martial law claiming
that:

Serafin G. Cruz was arrested by virtue of Arrest, Search, and Seizure Order No.
4122, dated August 28, 1976, issued by the Secretary of National Defense, for vio-
lation of Art. 147 of the Revised Penal Code (Illegal Associations), Serafin G. Cruz
being the "Over-all Commander and Contractor General of the Bataan Defend-
ers Command," an unregistered veterans outfit, at the time of his arrest. It is further
claimed that his continued detention is the free will and volition of the petitioner
who expressed fears that he might be harmed or injured by some members of the
"Bataan Defenders Command" if he were free from custody while the mastermind
and legal counsel of the association, one Atty. Cecilio Baylon Buenafe, has not
yet been arrested.

Then, at the hearing of the case, Serafin G. Cruz manifested to the Court
that he prefers to stay under protective custody. Under the circumstances, there
is no other recourse but to dismiss the case.

ISSUE: Was the arrest justifiable?

HELD: YES. The petitioner in the instant case was arrested and detained by virtue
of an Arrest, Search, and Seizure Order issued by the Secretary of National De-
fense for violation of Article 147 of the Revised Penal Code pursuant to the a fore-
quoted General Order No. 2-A, as amended; hence, his arrest and continued
detention is legal. The declaration of martial law and the consequent suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus with respect to persons reasonably
believed or charged to be engaged in the disorder or in fomenting it having been
settled in the case of Aquino, Jr. vs. Ponce Enrile etc., et al., 5 any inquiry by this
Court into the continued detention of the petitioner would be purposeless.
 OLAES VS PEOPLE

FACTS: Adolfo Olaes and Linda Cruz were arrested and presented with a search
warrant. The caption of the search warrant states that it is in connection with "Vi-
olation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Acts of 1972," it is
clearly recited in the text thereof that "There is probable cause to believe that
Adolfo Olaes alias "Debie" and alias "Baby" of No. 628 Comia St., Filtration, Sta.
Rita, Olongapo City, has in their possession and control and custody of marijuana
dried stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes and other regulated/prohibited and exempt
narcotics preparations which is the subject of the offense stated above.”

In their petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, the
petitioners challenge the admission by the respondent judge of evidence seized
by virtue of an allegedly invalid March warrant and of an extrajudicial confession
taken from them without according them the right to assistance of counsel. They
seek to restrain further proceedings in the criminal case against them for violation
of the Dangerous Drugs Act and ask that they be acquitted with the setting aside
of the questioned orders.

The petitioners claim that the search warrant issued by the respondent
judge is unconstitutional because it does not indicate the specific offense they
are supposed to have committed. There is, therefore, according to them, no valid
finding of probable cause as a justification for the issuance of the said warrant in
conformity with the Bill of Rights. In support of this argument, they cite Stonehill v.
Diokno, 6 where Chief Justice Concepcion struck down the search warrants is-
sued therein for being based on the general allegation that the petitioners had
committed violations of "Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Rev-
enue Code and Revised Penal Code.”

The petitioners also fault the admission of the extrajudicial confessions

which they had given without the assistance or advice of counsel and cite Sec-
tion 20 of the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution providing that "any confession
obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence."

ISSUES:
1. Whether there was a finding of a valid probable cause in the issuing of search
warrants to the petitioners?
2. Should their extrajudicial confessions be inadmissible in evidence?

HELD:

1. YES. Although the specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Act is not pinpointed
in the search warrant there is no question at all of the specific offense alleged to
have been committed as a basis for the finding of probable cause. The search
warrant also satisfies the requirement in the Bill of Rights of the particularity of the
description to be made of the "place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized."

2. YES. In the separate sworn statements taken from Adolfo Olaes and Linda Cruz
on September 24, 1982, it appears that both petitioners were, before being ex-
amined, specifically informed of their right to the assistance of counsel, which
would be provided them by the investigating office at their request. Asked if they
understood, they said "Opo" and affixed their signatures opposite their answer.
This was followed by a statement entitled "Pagpapatunay" or Verification in which
they said inter alia that they did not need the assistance of counsel ("Hindi ko na
kailangan and tulong ng isang manananggol.") which they also signed.

The requirements were made even stricter under Article III, Section 12 of the
1987 Constitution, providing as follows:

Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferally of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof

shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

Applying the above rules, we reach the conclusion that the extrajudicial confes-
sions should be declared inadmissible as evidence against the herein petitioners.
The extrajudicial confessions are excluded but the articles seized under the chal-
lenged search warrant may be admitted in evidence.
 GERONIMO V RAMOS

FACTS: Meliton Geronimo and Bayani Ferrera were candidates in the mayoralty
elections in 1980. Geronimo was elected as mayor of Baras, Rizal with 2,695 votes
as against Ferrera’s 2,370 votes (325 margin). He was subsequently disqualified
based on the petition filed by Julian Pendre to disqualify him in January 19,
1980 on the ground that he was a political turncoat which the COMELEC affirmed.
On January 28, 1980 (2 days before election), Geronimo filed a petition for certi-
orari to restrain the COMELEC and was granted. On September 26, 1981,
the SC ruled that Geronimo was disqualified for being a political turncoat. And he
COMELEC then proclaimed Ferrera as the mayor.

On May 3, 1982, the Geronimo together with some of his political followers
of more than fifty persons entered en masse the Municipal Hall of Baras, occupied
its premises and continued to do so until May 13, 1982, causing a paralyzation of
official business in the municipality. During this period, Ferrera held office in his own
house. Parenthetically, Geronimo did not enter the office of the mayor but stayed
in another room in the municipal building.

On May 4, 1982, Pendre filed with the COMELEC a motion to cite and de-
clare Geronimo in contempt. On May 12, 1982, the COMELEC after hearing, is-
sued Resolution No. 82-605, finding Geronimo guilty of contempt and sentencing
him to suffer an imprisonment of five (5) months and to pay a fine of P1,000.00. In
said resolution, the COMELEC simply "noted" Geronimo's urgent motion because
of its previous denial of his motion for reconsideration. At about 2:00 o'clock in the
early morning of May 14, 1982, Geronimo and his followers, mostly women were
forcibly taken out of the municipal hall of Baras, Rizal by the military with tile use
of teargas grenades. Gun shots were also fired by the Philippine Constabulary.
Some of Geronimo's followers retaliated with empty bottles when they heard the
breaking of the glass windows of the room where Geronimo was staying. The pe-
titioner was seized, handcuffed, and brought to the National Penitentiary in Munt-
inglupa, Rizal.

A series of criminal charges were filed against Geronimo and his 75 follow-
ers: : Usurpation of Authority [Art. 177, Revised Penal Code (RPC)]; Violation of
Usurpation of Authority of Official (sic) [Art. 177, Revised Penal Code
(RPC)]; Tumultous Affray [Art. 153, RPC]: Sedition (Art. 139, RPC); Illegal Possession
of Firearms; Disobedience to a Person in Authority or the Agent of such Person
(Art. 151, RPC) and Alarm and Scandal (Art. 155, RPC). Geronimo filed a petition
for habeas corpus with the allegation that his arrest and detention was done with
grave abuse of discretion and without jurisdiction.

ISSUE: WON charges against Geronimo and his followers were issued with grave
abuse and discretion
HELD: There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent COME-
LEC when it held the petitioner guilty of contempt. However, we find the penalty
of five (5) months imprisonment to be harsh. Time and again, this Court has held
that the power to punish for contempt should be exercised on the preservative
and not on the vindictive principle, on the corrective and not on the retaliatory
Idea of punishment. The thirteen (13) days during which the petitioner was con-
fined in the National Penitentiary at Muntinglupa, Rizal more than suffice for the
purpose of serving his sentence for contempt.

The charges were filed almost successively: one on March 20; one on April
12; one on April 14; two on May 4, two on May 14, and one on May 19,— and with
the same court and presided over by the same judge of the Municipal
Trial Court of Teresa, Rizal . In one of the criminal complaints wherein about 75
people were charged, the warrants of arrest were issued on the same day that
the preliminary examination was conducted. Such a hasty and manifestly hap-
hazard manner of conducting the preliminary examination to determine proba-
ble cause for the issuance of the warrants of arrest and eventually for the filing of
the necessary information cannot be sanctioned by this Court. A judge must first
satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant or order
of arrest. The requirements are strict. (See Placer v. Villanueva, 126 SCRA 463). The
examination must be legitimate and not a feigned one intended to justify a
course of action already predetermined.

The SC ruled that it was highly improbable for the judge to be able to de-
termine the existence of reasonable grounds to believe that the offenses have
been committed and that each and everyone of the seventy-six (76) persons are
probably guilty thereof in a matter of a few hours and to proceed with the issu-
ance of the warrants of arrest also on the same day. There was grave abuse on
the part of the judge on the issuance of the warrants of arrests.
 ENRILE v SALAZAR G.R. No. 92163 June 5, 1990

FACTS: In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan
Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim
of the National Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon.
Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal
Case No. 9010941.

The warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed
by a panel of prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C.
Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor
Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda
Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multi-
ple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed
coup attempt against then President Corazon Aquino from November 29 to De-
cember 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI head-
quarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having been recommended
in the information and none fixed in the arrest warrant. The following morning,
February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where
he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the Northern Police
District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.

On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel,
filed the petition for habeas corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental
petition filed on March 2, 1990), alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional
rights. He questioned the regularity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest against
him. He claimed that it only took Judge Salazar one hour and twenty minutes from
the raffling of the case to him to issue the warrant. Enrile claimed that such period
is so short that it was impossible for the judge to have been able to examine the
voluminousrecord of the case from the prosecution’s office.

Enrile also claimed that the crime charged was non-existent. He insists that
there is no such crime as rebellionwith murder and multiple frustrated murder cit-
ing the landmark case of People vs Hernandez where it was ruled that rebellion
cannot be complexed with common crimes such as murder; as such, the proper
crime that should have been charged against him is simple rebellion – which is
bailable. For the prosecution, the Solicitor General argued that the Hernandez
ruling should be abandoned and that it should be ruled that rebellion cannot
absorb more serious crimes like murder.

ISSUE: WON not Judge Salazar personally determined probable cause in the case
at bar
HELD: This Court has already ruled, however, that it is not the unavoidable duty of
the judge to make such a personal examination, it being sufficient that he follows
established procedure by personally evaluating the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the prosecutor. Petitioner claims that the warrant of ar-
rest issued barely one hour and twenty minutes after the case was raffled off to
the respondent Judge, which hardly gave the latter sufficient time to personally
go over the voluminous records of the preliminary investigation. Merely because
said respondent had what some might consider only a relatively brief period
within which to comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had not,
or could not have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to over-
come the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.