Documentos de Académico
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Ronald Coase
The Nature of Firms and Their Costs
One of my favorite philosophers—Yogi Ronald Harry Coase was born in a
London suburb in 1910. He was edu-
Berra—once said “You can observe a lot just
cated at the London School of Eco-
by watching.” Economist Ronald Coase did nomics from 1929 through 1932, study-
ing industrial law with the intention of
just that, and it earned him a Nobel Prize.
becoming a lawyer. But that changed
Coase has always asked economists to be keen after his exposure to Professor of Com-
merce Arnold Plant, who came to the
observers, trying to understand why things
London School of Economics from a
nomic outcome because the parties created a strong pro-market bias in cases remains Clifton R. Musser Professor
will bargain their way to the same out- where prior theorists—most notably Emeritus at Chicago’s law school.
come regardless of how property rights Pigou—had crafted regulatory respon- Coase’s study of positive transac-
are assigned, that is, regardless of who ses to perceived examples of market tion costs in economic exchange led
gets to sue whom. (See the box titled failure. him, and by extension the entire eco-
“A New Approach to Understanding After his successful presentation to nomics field, to a remarkable conclu-
Social Cost.”) Chicago’s top social theorists, Coase was sion:
Coase’s analysis of the theory and offered a position at the University of I explained in “The Problem of Social
history of torts, combined with his as- Chicago, where he edited the Journal Cost” that what are traded on the mark-
sumptions about what the legal system of Law and Economics from 1964 to et are not, as is often supposed by eco-
ought to do in cases of conflict over 1982. Under his editorship, the journal nomists, physical entities but the rights
resource use—maximize economic effi- became one of the economics profes- to perform certain actions, and the
ciency and thus societal wealth rather sion’s most influential forums. He was rights which individuals possess are
than punish specific conduct—created the first president of the International established by the legal system.2
a huge boost for the then-young field Society for New Institutional Econom- For our understanding of why firms
we now call law and economics. It also ics, which was founded in 1996, and he exist, why institutions have evolved as
How Much Government Intervention is Appropriate? Theories and Reality:
What is the general view that I will be completely beyond the reach of government reg- Making the Data Talk
examining? It is that, in the market for goods, ulation…. Economists, or at any rate enough of
government regulation is desirable whereas, in My argument is that we should use the them, do not wait to discover whether a the-
the market for ideas, government regulation is same approach for all markets when deciding on ory’s predictions are accurate before making
undesirable and should be strictly limited. In the public policy. In fact, if we do this and use for the up their minds. Given that this is so, what part
market for goods, the government is commonly market for ideas the same approach which has does testing a theory’s predictions play in eco-
regarded as competent to regulate and properly commended itself to economists for the market nomics? First of all, it very often plays either
motivated. Consumers lack the ability to make for goods, it is apparent that the case for gov- no part or a very minor part….
the appropriate choices. Producers often exercise ernment intervention in the market for ideas is I remarked earlier on the tendency of
monopolistic power and, in any case, without much stronger than it is, in general, in the mar- economists to get the result their theory tells
some form of government intervention, would not ket for goods…. them to expect. In a talk I gave at the University
act in a way which promotes the public interest. [C]onsider the question of consumer ig-
of Virginia in the early 1960s, … I said that if
In the market for ideas, the position is very dif- norance which is commonly thought to be a jus-
you torture that data enough, nature will
ferent. The government, if it attempted to regu- tification for government intervention. It is hard to
always confess, a saying which, in a somewhat
late, would be inefficient and its motives would, believe that the general public is in a better posi-
altered form, has taken its place in the statisti-
in general, be bad, so that, even if it were suc- tion to evaluate competing views on economic and
cessful in achieving what it wanted to accomplish, social policy than to choose between different cal literature. Kuhn puts the point more ele-
the results would be undesirable. Consumers, on kinds of food. Yet there is support for regulation in gantly and makes the process sound more like
the other hand, if left free, exercise a fine dis- the one case but not in the other. Or consider the a seduction: “nature undoubtedly responds to
crimination in choosing between the alternative question of preventing fraud, for which govern- the theoretical predispositions with which she
views placed before them, while producers, ment intervention is commonly advocated. It is approached by the measuring scientist.” ■
whether economically powerful or weak, who are would be difficult to deny that newspaper articles — “How Should Economists Choose?”
found to be so unscrupulous in their behavior in and the speeches of politicians contain a large 72, 74
other markets, can be trusted to act in the public number of false and misleading statements—in-
interest, whether they publish or work for the New deed, sometimes they seem to consist of little
York Times, the Chicago Tribune or the Columbia else. Government action to control false and mis- ——— (1988), “The Problem of Social Cost,”
Broadcasting System. Politicians, whose actions leading advertising is considered highly desir- in The Firm, the Market, and the Law
sometimes pain us, are in their utterances beyond able. Yet a proposal to set up a Federal Press
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 5–156,
reproach. It is an odd feature of this attitude that Commission or a Federal Political Commission
commercial advertising, which is often merely an modeled on the Federal Trade Commission orig. pub. 1960.
expression of opinion and might, therefore, be would be dismissed out of hand. ■
thought to be protected by the First Amendment, ——— (1991), “The Institutional Structure of
is considered to be part of the market for goods. —“The Economics of the First Amendment: Production,” Nobel Prize Lecture to the
The result is that government action is regarded The Market for Goods and Memory of Alfred Nobel, December 9, 1991,
as desirable to regulate (or even suppress) the the Market for Ideas,” www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1991/
expression of an opinion in an advertisement 384 – 85, 389 – 90
coase-lecture.html
which, if expressed in a book or article, would be