THE ETHICS

idea beforehand of what some of the main theses and lines of

thought are. It is a main task of this work to provide that.

Spinoza�s vocabulary is best discussed and clarified in context,

where it is needed. The meaning of his terms, even when familiar to
us, like �idea�, is also tied to disputes with his contemporaries. So
they are not fully understood except in relation to divergent uses of
the terms.

The second obstacle

The virtues of the geometrical order are many. It emphasizes the

importance of argument, that is, of reasons for accepting a claim,
and thus it seems especially well suited for the presentation of philosophical
and scientific results. For the provision and examination of
reasons is what marks out philosophy and science from mere dogma.

By its nature, however, the geometrical order cannot provide

reasons for its most basic claims, which in theory are found only in
the axioms. In addition, it does not exhibit the thought that has led
to the selection of some claims rather than others as axiomatic, nor
does it speak informally about the problems and perplexities that
surround every important philosophical issue. It does not, in short,
exhibit the process of discovery, in which so much of philosophical
thinking consists.

So in this respect it is often thought to be most inappropriate for

philosophy. But if philosophy is conceived not just as a process, but
as a process that can and does result in solutions to problems, or
answers to questions, then the geometrical method represents the
pinnacle of the endeavour. This, ideally, is a comprehensive and
unified theory that exhibits the most basic concepts at issue and sets
out fundamental claims from which all others are derived.

The problem for readers consists primarily in its apparent lack of

direction, although in mathematics there is also often a nagging
question about its utility. Spinoza�s theory speaks of how it is best
to live, however, and of what is of most value in life, so the second
of these problems does not seem to arise. The first, however, is solved
by providing readers with a clear statement of what Spinoza�s most
important claims are. This I will try to do in the introductory sections
on each part of the Ethics.

34
CHAPTER 5

THE ETHICS, PART I: GOD

BACKGROUND

Introduction to metaphysics

Metaphysics is concerned with fundamental questions about what is

real. Are there different kinds or types of reality? If so, what are they
and how are they related to each other? Are some things more real
than others? Is there anything that is most real?

The original source of our word �metaphysics� is Andronicus of

Rhodes, who edited Aristotle�s works in the first century bc.
Andronicus uses the expression ta meta ta phusika to refer to works
that were located after (meta) Aristotle�s Physics (phusika) in the
collection of Aristotle�s writings. The expression, which is a
transliteration of the Greek, means literally �the (things) after the
physics�.

The word is also sometimes taken to indicate that the subject deals
with what is �beyond� or �above� physical objects. In Book III of the
Metaphysics, Aristotle characterizes the subject as the science of
�being qua being�. In contrast to this is physics or philosophy of
nature, which studies physical things as physical, not merely as
beings or as things that have being. Aristotle also describes his
subject as �theology� (in Book XI) and as the study of the first causes
and principles of things (in Book I).

Most of the classical issues in metaphysics are still of contemporary

concern and they are typically called �problems�. Thus we have
the problem of universals, the problem of the external world and of
other minds, and the mind�body problem.

The problem of universals deals with questions about the existence

or ontological status of Platonic forms, that is, the alleged correlates

35
THE ETHICS

of general terms. If we grant there are or even may be many triangles,

for example, does it follow that there must be something else, triangularity,
that is mind-independent and common to all triangles?
Although debated extensively in the Middle Ages, and almost uniformly
resolved in the negative in the seventeenth and eighteenth-
centuries, this is still an issue.

The problem of the external world was set out in its most acute
form, and most famously, by Descartes. Is there an �external world�,
that is, a world of bodies that exist independently of our experiences,
and if so, how can we have knowledge of it? The general question of
the existence of an objective world is often designated now simply as
the issue of �realism�. But this word is also used for the same set of
issues regarding other alleged objects, such as universals and moral
properties.

The problem of other minds and the mind�body problem are two
other metaphysical problems. How can you really know that there
are other beings who have subjective experiences like your own?
How are you, or your mind, related to your body?

Other classical issues concern the existence and nature of time,

space, events, and God, but this short inventory is by no means
exhaustive.

The Ethics, Part I in a nutshell

Spinoza maintains that God is absolutely infinite being or substance,

that he necessarily exists, and that all other things are
modes of God. These modes or modifications of God, such as
people, trees, and rocks, are ontologically and conceptually dependent
on God. In addition, God or substance is the efficient cause
of all modes. God necessarily produces them, but he has no desires
or goals, and so does not produce them in order to achieve anything.
Unlike people, he does not act purposefully. Thus the world
has no purpose or direction. Although God has no free or
uncaused will, God is free in the sense that he is completely self-
determining.

Substance has infinitely many attributes, of which we know only

two: Thought and Extension. Conceived under the attribute of
Thought, substance produces an infinite mode (God�s intellect or
mind); conceived under Extension, it produces Motion and Rest and
an infinite body. Each finite body is surrounded by others (since

36
ETHICS I: GOD

there is no vacuum) and the �universe�, regarded as the totality of all

physical things, is an infinite body.

An introduction to Spinoza�s views about God: A contrast with

traditional views

Part I of Spinoza�s Ethics is concerned with the nature and properties

of God. Although he holds that God exists, Spinoza�s conception
of God is highly unorthodox. Indeed, it is one of the most
radical conceptions that can be found in the Western tradition. What
is most radical about it is that on Spinoza�s view God

1.
has no emotions, goals, or plans;
2.
does not have free will;
3.
is physical (as well as mental);
4.
is not separate from �the world�;
5.
has no inherent moral properties (such as justice or benevolence);
and
6.
is adequately known by us (in his essence).
Spinoza also holds, contrary to prominent theologians such as
Maimonides and Aquinas, that there was no first moment of creation.
Instead he accepts an infinite regress of finite causes for each
finite thing and holds, analogously, that each real thing is a cause of
something.

1. Spinoza rejects an anthropomorphic conception of God,

according to which God is like a human being. The word �anthropomorphic�
comes from two Greek words, transliterated as
�anthro�pos� (man) and �morphe�� (form, shape, or structure).
Although this could encompass any similarity whatever between
God and human beings, an anthropomorphic conception is primarily
one that takes God to be like people in having desires and emotions
such as love, anger, and jealousy, and in having virtues such as
benevolence and justice. Sometimes God is also regarded as having
hands, eyes, or a face.

In what important respects is God unlike a human being, according

to Spinoza? He certainly denies that God literally has hands,
eyes, or a face, although in Ep 64 he metaphorically characterizes the
infinite totality of all bodies as the �face of the whole universe� (facies
totius universi).

37
THE ETHICS

In addition, God has no desires and no emotions. He does not love

or hate anyone; he is never happy or sad, nor is he angry, vengeful,
or jealous. He is also unlike a king, a legislator, or a judge, for he does
not issue commands and then seek to reward or punish people for
obedience or disobedience.

Ordinary patterns by which we explain human action are thus

inapplicable to God�s actions. Commonsense explanations of
human action, or �folk psychology�, as it has been called, rely on a
variety of general theses.1 One of these is that people typically act in
ways that they believe will achieve their goals (or satisfy their
desires). Unlike us, however, God has no goals or desires, according
to Spinoza. Thus he does not survey alternative courses of action
and decide what to do.

Other �folk psychological� theses are concerned with emotions. A

person who hates you, for example, will want to harm you. He will
also be pleased when he learns, or even comes to believe, that something
bad has happened to you or to one you love. But God has no
emotions, according to Spinoza.

Spinoza�s general position is interestingly expressed in Ep 56,

where he writes, �I believe that a triangle, if indeed it had the ability
to speak, would say . . . that God is eminently triangular, and a circle
would say that the divine nature is eminently circular�.2 Wolf calls
attention to similar remarks by Xenophanes of Colophon (570�480
bc).3 In other letters, Spinoza denies that, philosophically speaking,
anything is pleasing to God or that he issues commands or acts like
a judge.4

It seems clearly to follow from this that on Spinoza�s view the

universe has no purpose. It is, as we might say, directionless or
pointless.

2. Closely related to 1 is Spinoza�s thesis that God does not have

free will (and we don�t either, on his view). Rather than deny that
God has a will, Spinoza identifies God�s will with his intellect, or
understanding. He maintains that for God to will that something be
so is the same as his understanding or knowledge that it is so. We
might thus call him a �reductivist� rather than an �eliminativist� in
this respect. For he �reduces� God�s will to his intellect, rather than
�eliminating� it outright.
In addition, Spinoza holds that God�s will, like everything else,
arises necessarily from God�s nature or essence and so it has a determining
cause. God necessarily acts as he does because of his nature

38
ETHICS I: GOD

or essence, not because of his free (that is, uncaused) will. Spinoza
also maintains, however, that God is free in the very different sense
that he is completely self-determining.

3. Spinoza thinks that God is physical as well as mental. By this

he does not mean that God is a body, even an infinite one. It is rather
that God has, or rather is, an �attribute�, the attribute of Extension.
The idea, following Descartes, is that to be extended (or have extension)
is to have length, width, and depth, that is, to be extended in
three dimensions. Extension itself is then three-dimensionality. God,
however, is also Thought, the other attribute that is known to us. Just
as God is not a body, but has one, so too he is not a mind, but he has
one.
4. Another important difference between Spinoza�s conception of
God and more traditional views is that God and �the world� (or �universe�)
are not two beings that are separate from each other. In his
language, they are not two �substances�, one of which (�the world�)
exists, after creation, apart from or �outside of� the other (God).
Instead, God is nature (natura naturans in his language), while �the
world� or �the universe�, understood as a totality of all finite bodies
(and minds), is a �modification� of God that is not separate from
him.
5. Spinoza denies that things are inherently good or bad. They are
good or bad, not in themselves, but only in relation to us (or to some
other being). Although Spinoza sometimes calls God �good�, he
regards this as true only because God is of benefit to us. Our existence
and preservation depend on God, as does our highest happiness.
Other moral properties, such as the virtues of justice and
benevolence, are simply inapplicable to God. After all, God has no
emotions and no desires.
6. We have adequate knowledge of the essence of God, according
to Spinoza. In this he departs from the �via negativa� or �negative
way�, according to which we can only know what God is
not. He also departs from those who hold that what we say of God
can only be understood by analogy with our talk about other
things.
Is Spinoza, then, an atheist? For if his conception of God is so
unorthodox, why regard it as a conception of God at all? Why not
maintain that �God� is a misnomer here, since Spinoza�s idea of God
diverges so much from the orthodox views of Muslims, Jews, and
Christians?

39
THE ETHICS

One answer is that despite these differences, there are important

similarities as well. Spinoza holds, in agreement with more traditional
conceptions, that God is omniscient, omnipotent, the creator of all
things, infinite, perfect, and unique (i.e. the sole God). In addition, his
essence involves existence. According to Spinoza, all of these are
properties of God, but not �attributes that express God�s essence�; that
is, they do not tell us what God is. In contrast are Thought and
Extension, the only attributes that, on his view, we know.

Another answer is certainly possible, however. It concedes that

�God�, as ordinarily used, is taken to refer to, and practically means,
a non-physical being with emotions and a goal or purpose in creating
the world. It then abandons the use of the term �God� and speaks
instead of infinite being or substance. On this view, Spinoza is an
atheist.

If he is an atheist, however, he is surely a very unusual specimen

of one. For he thinks that our highest happiness depends on, and
indeed our salvation or blessedness consists in, knowledge and love
of what he calls �God�.

Thus the issue seems to be at least largely terminological. As we

have seen, it was reported to the Spanish Inquisition that Spinoza
said, �God exists only philosophically speaking�.5 Although I have
spoken above of the �orthodox views� of some of the world�s major
religions, it should be noted that leading theologians within those
traditions often hold views that diverge from the beliefs of ordinary
followers. Maimonides, for example, maintains that we can only
describe God negatively. We know, for example, that God is not
unjust, rather than that he is (positively) just. Aquinas, in contrast,
holds that all of our descriptions of God must be understood by
analogy with our use of them in describing created things. The word
�just�, when applied to God, does not mean quite what it does when
applied to Solomon or any other person.

Ordinary believers, on the other hand, sometimes seem to suppose

that positive descriptions of God can be given and that they have the
same meaning when applied to God as when applied to anything
else. The claim that God is just or that God loves you is taken to
imply just what it would if you were speaking of another human
being.

The extent to which ordinary believers would recognize the God

of the philosophers, or of the theologians of their own faith, is not
easy to determine.

40
ETHICS I: GOD

A RECOMMENDED ORDER OF READINGS FOR PART I OF THE ETHICS

This section provides a recommended order of readings for Part I of

the Ethics. It is intended as a guide for an initial reading, to help you
to see for yourself the structure of the work and to understand some
of Spinoza�s main theses and arguments. Explanatory comments on
these readings and the issues that arise will be found in the next
section.

It is sometimes useful, when you read the propositions for the first
time, to read the demonstrations and scholia as well. Sometimes it is
not. Detailed consideration and assessment of the demonstrations
is not needed at first and it is certainly not expected on a first reading.

Note that Part I has two main sections or divisions. The first division,
from p 1 to p 14, attempts to establish the necessary existence
and uniqueness of God. The second, from p 15 to p 36, attempts to
show how everything else is related to God.

Abbreviated references are used below and are explained in the

separate list of abbreviations at the beginning of this book.

Reading Spinoza�s claim

App, 1st sentence Summary of Spinoza�s main theses
regarding God.
p 4d, 1st sentence Everything that really exists is a substance
or a mode.
p 11 God, or substance with infinite attributes,
necessarily exists.
p 14 God is the only substance that exists or is
conceivable.
p 15 Everything is in and conceived through God.
p 16 Infinite things in infinite ways � that is,
everything conceivable by an infinite
intellect � follows from the necessity of
God�s nature.
p 17c2 Only God is a free cause.
p 21�p 23, p 28 God immediately produces infinite modes,
these infinite modes produce others, and
each finite mode is produced by another
finite mode.
p 29 Nothing is contingent.

41
THE ETHICS

p 32 There is no free will.

p 33 Nothing could have been produced by God
in a different way.
Rest of App It is not the case that all things in nature act
purposively.

DISCUSSION OF THE RECOMMENDED READINGS FOR PART I OF

THE ETHICS

God�s properties

App, first sentence: Main theses regarding God.

The first sentence of the Appendix mentions some of the important

properties of Spinoza�s God. A list of these, along with the places in
the text where they are stated or discussed, is as follows:

God necessarily exists. p 11

God is unique. p 14 and its corollaries
God acts solely from the necessity of
his nature. p 16; see also p 17
God is the free cause of all things. p 17c2
All things are in God and depend on God. p 15
All things are predetermined, not by God�s p 16, p 29, p 32c1, p 33;
free will, but by God�s absolute nature. see also p 34

Spinoza�s substance�mode ontology

p 4d, first sentence: Everything that really exists is a substance or a

mode.

Spinoza defines God in terms of substance and he defines both substance

and mode in terms of two other notions that are undefined:
being in a thing and being conceived through a thing. His definitions
can be expressed as follows:

def6: God is substance consisting of infinite attributes.

def3: Substance is in itself and conceived through itself.

def5: A mode is in and conceived through something else.

Spinoza makes it clear as early as this in the Ethics (in p 4d) that his
official ontology admits exactly two kinds of �real things�, that is, things

42
ETHICS I: GOD

�in rerum natura�or �extra intellectum� (outside the intellect). Each real
thing is either a substance or a mode (an �affection� of substance).

His argument in p 4d cites def3 and def5 as well as ax1, which

reads:

ax1: Everything is either in itself or in another.

Thus Spinoza seems simply to assume that whatever is in a thing

is conceived through it. But what is it to be in and conceived through
a thing?

�Being in� a thing seems to express a notion of ontological dependence,

that is, a dependence with respect to the being or existence of
a thing. One thing is in another when it depends, perhaps in one
certain way, on that other for its existence; a thing is in itself when it
depends only on itself, and so not on another, for its existence.

�Being conceived through� something expresses a notion of conceptual

or epistemological dependence. Spinoza sometimes takes
being conceived through something to concern the formation of a
concept, as def3 indicates. Sometimes it concerns the acquisition of
knowledge and the explanation of one thing by recourse to another,
as ax4 and its uses indicate.

So substance is something that exists or would exist independently

of anything else and it can be conceived and known independently
of any other concept or knowledge. This substance�mode ontology
appears to be quite orthodox for that time.

What is unorthodox is Spinoza�s insistence that there could not be

more than one substance of the same kind (p 5), as well as his related
theses that no substance is finite (p 8) and no substance can produce
another (p 6).

This is unorthodox because �substance� was standardly used in the

seventeenth century to characterize particular finite bodies, such as
horses and chairs, as well as individual human minds. Spinoza
departs from this usage in refusing to call such things �substances�,
for they are not truly independent of other things. How could a
horse, for example, exist even for a moment, if it were not surrounded
by other bodies and not generated from other things?

The ontological argument for the existence of God

p 11 and its first demonstration: God, or substance with infinite

attributes, necessarily exists.

43
THE ETHICS

Spinoza�s first proof of God�s existence is quite short. The form of

the argument he gives is called a reductio ad absurdum (reduction to
absurdity), or more simply a �reductio�.

This form of argument begins by assuming the falsity of the thesis

to be proved. It then deduces from this assumption some �absurdity�,
that is, a claim that contradicts what is known to be true. Thus the
original assumption must be false and so the thesis is true. (If the
denial of a thesis deductively leads to something false, then the thesis
itself must be true.)

The argument is as follows:

(1) Suppose that God does not necessarily exist or, equivalently,
God can be conceived not to exist.
(2) But according to ax7, if a thing can be conceived not to
exist, its essence does not involve existence.
(3) So God�s essence does not involve existence.
(4) But God is substance (def6) and so, by p 7,
(5) Existence belongs to the nature of God, that is, God�s
essence involves existence.
(6) however, (5) contradicts (3).
(7) Hence, God necessarily exists (or cannot be conceived not
to exist).

Reductio arguments can also be set out positively. A positive

formulation of p 11d might go as follows:

(1) God, by def3, is substance consisting of infinite attributes.

(2) Existence belongs to the nature of substance (p 7).
(3) Hence, existence belongs to the nature of God.
To say that existence belongs to the nature of God entails,
however, that God necessarily exists.

Is this just a verbal trick? God seems simply to be defined into

existence and if the argument works here, why couldn�t just anything
be similarly defined into existence?

A related objection might also be made. For Spinoza�s demonstration

of p 7 holds that since substance cannot be produced
by another, it is �cause of itself� (causa sui), and thus (by def1)
existence belongs to its nature. But doesn�t this just assume that
it has a cause? Round squares can�t be produced by another
either.

44
ETHICS I: GOD

Spinoza in effect replies to this in a proof he appends to the argument

in p 11d. (This is the first proof labelled �aliter�, or �another�,
by Spinoza. It is translated as �Second Proof� by Shirley.) Spinoza
there maintains that if a thing doesn�t exist there must be a cause or
reason why it doesn�t and this reason must be �contained in� the
nature of the thing or must be outside it. He argues that such a cause
cannot be outside God�s nature (for it would have to be in another
substance that has nothing in common with God). It also cannot be
in God�s nature, for there would then be a contradiction in the
concept of absolutely infinite being that is �in the highest degree
perfect�.

The argument in p 11d appears to be a variation on the �ontological

argument� given by St Anselm in Proslogion 1�4.6 In Anselm�s
formulation, God is �that than which nothing greater can be conceived�.
Since it is greater to exist in actuality than to exist only �in
the mind�, such a God must, allegedly, exist. In Descartes� formulation
in Meditations V, existence pertains to the essence of God and
hence God necessarily exists. Alternatively, God by definition has all
perfections. Since existence is a perfection, God exists.

Leibniz criticized Descartes for assuming, and not proving, that

all perfections are compatible, that is, that God is possible.

Later thinkers have objected that existence �adds nothing� to the

concept of a thing7 and that �exists� is not a predicate.8 Modern variations
of the argument appear to obviate these objections with the
help of modal logic.9

God�s uniqueness

p 14, p 14d, and p 14c1: God is the only substance that exists or is
conceivable.

Spinoza holds that there could be no substance other than God and
his argument for this is as follows. If there were a substance other
than God, it would have to have some attribute that God has.
Presumably, this is because God has infinite, and hence all, attributes.
But there cannot be two substances with the same attribute
(by p 5).

In the first corollary Spinoza states that God is single, or unique

(�Deum esse unicam�). This is interesting because in CM I.6 he says,
�God can only very misleadingly be called one or single (unam et
unicam).� He explains this in Ep 50, written to Jarig Jelles in 1674,

45
THE ETHICS

and says that it is not very important, since it affects only names, not
things.10

How all things depend on God

BEING IN GOD
p 15: Everything is in and conceived through God.

Spinoza maintains in p 15 that everything is in and conceived

through God. His argument for this states that God, the only substance,
is in and conceived through itself (by def3). Modes, on the
other hand, can neither be nor be conceived without substance (by
def5), and so are in and conceived through it. But only substance
and modes exist (by ax1).

An apparent difficulty with this is that def5 actually has two parts.
One part of it merely states that a mode is what is in and conceived
through another, rather than that a mode is in and conceived
through substance. The other part of def5 states that a mode is an
affection of substance.

In addition, it becomes clear from later parts of the Ethics that

there are modes of modes. These must be things that are in and conceived
through another which is itself in and conceived through a
third.

Spinoza�s concept of being in a thing seems to be derived from

Aristotle�s talk, in the Categories, of being in a subject. Aristotle
holds, for example, that when we say �Socrates is white�, we are
saying that the colour, whiteness, is in Socrates as its subject.
Spinoza�s view, unlike Aristotle�s, is that the ultimate subject of
everything we say is God.

p 15s is primarily a criticism of the view that God is not physical

or not a material substance. Spinoza�s opponents hold that material
substance is composed of parts and is divisible, hence it can be
destroyed. Spinoza�s reply is that matter, considered as substance,
has no parts and is not divisible.

He also says in this scholium, �we have concluded that extended

substance is one of God�s infinite attributes�. There is a glitch here,
since Spinoza has not yet even asserted this. This may be a reference
to p 14c2, but this corollary merely says that Thought and Extension
(�the extended thing and the thinking thing�) are either attributes or
affections of the attributes of God. It is not until II p 2d that Spinoza
tries to establish formally that Extension is an attribute of God.

46
ETHICS I: GOD

BEING CAUSED BY GOD

p 16: Infinite things in infinite ways � that is, everything conceivable
by an infinite intellect � follows from the necessity of God�s nature.

Spinoza�s demonstration maintains that many properties follow

from the essence of a thing and that the intellect can infer these properties
from its definition. In addition, it maintains that the more
reality the essence involves, the more properties follow from it. Since
God�s essence involves infinite attributes, and each of these is infinite
in its kind, �an infinity of things in infinite ways� must follow from
God�s essence.

This demonstration seems obscure and it invokes important principles

that are not found in the axioms. The primary model of a
property that follows from the essence of a thing seems to be a geometrical
one. Spinoza often illustrates this by saying that it follows
from the essence of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two
right angles. Triangles have this property because of what a triangle
is (its essence or definition), not because of some incidental feature
of it. In Ep 83, written in 1676 to Tschirnhaus, Spinoza replies to the
objection that only one property follows from the essence of a thing.

It is natural enough, I suppose, to think that there cannot be more

than an infinity of things in infinite ways and Spinoza seems to
accept this. In II p 17s he is explicit about it and uses the example of
a triangle:

However, I think I have shown quite clearly (Pr. 16) that from
God�s supreme power or infinite nature an infinity of things in
infinite ways � that is, everything � has necessarily flowed or is
always following from that same necessity, just as from the nature
of a triangle it follows from eternity that its three angles are equal
to two right angles.11

That God is the cause of all things (that are in him) is asserted
explicitly in I p 18d, as based on I p 16. I p 16 is the basis for all of
Spinoza�s claims about God�s causality.

The parenthetical remark in the proposition itself simply assumes

that God has an infinite intellect, but this is not established until
II p3.

It is natural for us to object that in fact we cannot infer from the

mere statement of what a triangle is that its three angles equal two

47
THE ETHICS

right angles. We must at least also have a definition of a right angle

and, presumably, other axioms of geometry.

Freedom

p 17c2, its demonstration, and Spinoza�s definition of �free� (def7):

Only God is a (completely) free cause.

One conception of freedom is that of doing what you want, or

having the power to do what you want. Hume, for example, takes this
position. Spinoza does not accept this generally, primarily because
our wants and desires so often arise from causes that are external to
us. They are not fully �ours�.

Instead, he proposes a conception of freedom as self-determination.

His definition of this in def7 reads, �That thing is said to be free,
which exists solely from the necessity of its own nature, and is determined
to action by itself alone.�12 This is contrasted with a thing that
is �constrained�, that is (again by def7), a thing that is determined to
exist and act by another.

Thus God is completely free, since God exists by the necessity of

his nature (p 11) and God acts solely by the necessity of his nature
(p 16). Spinoza here takes acting to be the production or causation
of something. Furthermore, only God is completely free, for everything
else is produced by God.

Spinoza maintains later in the Ethics that human freedom is in a

similar sense possible to the extent that we are determined to an
action because of our nature (IV p 68, V p 36s). This will be considered
in more detail later.

In I p 17s Spinoza argues against a conception of divine freedom

as the ability to omit doing things that follow from his nature, that
is, things that are in his power. He also rejects the view that God
understands more than he can create.

The second part of this scholium maintains that if intellect and will
did pertain to God�s nature, then they would have to differ entirely
from our intellect and will (or would have only the name in common).
Note that on Spinoza�s view they do not pertain to the essence of
God, that is, they are not attributes. In saying that neither intellect nor
will �pertain to the essence� of God, Spinoza does not deny here that
God has an intellect or will; he means that they are not God�s essence.

It should be added that I p 33s 2 does not grant that intellect or

will �pertain to the essence of God�, except for the sake of argument.

48
ETHICS I: GOD

In this respect, the White�Stirling translation of an important part

of this scholium is at best misleading.13

A very different conception of freedom is espoused by others,

such as Descartes. On this conception, freedom consists in having a
�free will�, where this is taken to be a will that has no cause. It is in
this sense that Spinoza denies free will, for everything, on his view,
is caused.

God�s causality of finite and infinite modes

p 21�p 23, p 28: God immediately produces infinite modes, these infinite
modes produce others, and each finite mode is produced by
another finite mode.

In p 21, Spinoza speaks of what follows �from the absolute nature of

any attribute�. His claim is that what does follow from this must itself
be �eternal and infinite�.

Note that here and in p 22, p 23, and p 28, Spinoza speaks
indifferently of things as eternal, as necessarily existent, and as
always existent. Elsewhere, as in the explicatio of def8, he distinguishes
eternity from temporal existence.

In p 22 he speaks of what follows, not from the absolute nature of

an attribute, but from an attribute �modified by an infinite modification�.
These, too, must be infinite and necessarily existent.

In p 23 we find that any infinite and necessarily existent mode

follows from the absolute nature of an attribute (as in p 21) or from
the absolute nature of an attribute as modified by an infinite mode
(as in p 22).

Finally, in p 28, he maintains that a finite thing must be determined

to exist and act by another finite thing.

Ep 64 (in response to a request by Tschirnhaus, relayed through

Schuller) gives examples of immediate infinite modes of Thought
and of Extension as well as an example of a mediate infinite
mode of Extension. God�s intellect, or infinite understanding, is an
immediate infinite mode of Thought. Motion-and-Rest is an
immediate infinite mode, while an infinite body is a mediate infinite
mode, under the attribute of Extension. II lem7 offers further
explanation.

Spinoza�s denial of contingency

p 29 and p 29d: Nothing is contingent.

49
THE ETHICS

Spinoza�s argument in p 29d is complicated, partly because it takes

into account the idea that even if determined by God to act in a
certain way, a thing might determine itself to act differently. The
central idea of the argument is that everything has been determined
to exist and act by God�s nature; hence it exists and acts as
it does necessarily, not contingently, most basically because of
p 16.

The idea of contingency used here is that of something that is

not necessary and not impossible. A thing, for example, exists contingently
at a certain moment just if it is possible for it to exist at
that moment and also possible for it not to exist at that moment.
In p 33s 1, Spinoza reiterates his view that nothing is contingent
and explains that we say that things are contingent only because of
our ignorance of the essence of a thing or of the causal order of
nature.

The scholium to p 29 introduces the terms natura naturans and

natura naturata. The former is equivalent to �substance� and the
latter to �mode�. These expressions were also used by Aquinas and
by Giordano Bruno.

p 32, its demonstration and corollaries: There is no free will.

Spinoza�s argument is straightforward in outline. The will is a mode

and so it must be determined to exist and act by another. p 27 establishes
this for a finite will and p 23 for an infinite will.

If the will is not a mode, then it �pertains to God�s essence�, that

is, it is God or God�s essence. p 33s 2 argues against the view that
God acts by free will, that is, by an uncaused will, even if the will did
pertain to God�s essence.

p 33 and its demonstration: Nothing could have been produced by

God in a different way.

Spinoza�s argument for this claim is interesting. He maintains that

since things have necessarily been produced by God�s nature, if God
could have produced things differently then God�s nature could have
been different. But that nature would then also have to exist (by the
ontological argument in p 11d). So there would be two Gods, which
by p 14 is impossible.

It is tempting to formulate part of this argument as follows:

50
ETHICS I: GOD

(1) Every God that is possible is actual.

(2) A God that creates a different world is possible.
(3) Hence, a God that creates a different world is actual.
There would then have to be two Gods, on the assumption that a
God that creates a different world is different from the God that
creates this one.

In the very last part of p 33s 2, Spinoza contrasts two views that
are opposed to his own. On one, created things have arisen from
God�s arbitrary or indifferent will; on the other, they have arisen
from God�s will to do what is good. The latter, he says, subjects God
to fate, for it supposes that there is something, namely goodness, that
is independent of God, and is like a target at which he aims. The
former is thus closer to the truth than the latter, he says. In fact the
former is Descartes� position, while the latter is Leibniz�s.

The denial of purposiveness, except in people

Rest of App: It is not the case that all things in nature act purposively.

Spinoza states that his main aim in the Appendix is to expose the
prejudices that prevent acceptance of his views. He holds that these
depend primarily on one prejudice, namely, that all things, even
God, act as we do: to achieve a goal. His explicit aims, which provide
the structure of the Appendix, are to show (1) why people are so
prone to accept this; (2) that it is false; and (3) that it is the source of
misconceptions about �good and bad, right and wrong, praise and
blame�, and so on.

1. Spinoza maintains, very much in outline, that people recognize

that they act to achieve something and they then extend this model of
explanation to everything else. So they constantly seek the final
causes or goals of natural things. Since many of these are useful to
people, but not created by them, they suppose that there must be some
being like themselves who created them for a purpose. In short, the
model we use to explain human action (in terms of goals) is extended
or projected to other natural objects and even to the world itself.
2. Spinoza argues on several grounds that God does not act for the
sake of an end, that is, that God has no goal or purpose in acting. One
of the most powerful of these is that God�s acting for a purpose
requires that he lack something that he desires and hence is imperfect.
51
THE ETHICS

3. The supposition that things were created for the benefit of

people has led to �abstract notions�, by which ordinary people
attempt to explain things. These are �good, bad, order, confusion,
hot, cold, beauty, ugliness�. (Because they also mistakenly believe
they have free will, other notions have arisen, namely, the notions
of praise, blame, right, and wrong. These are discussed in IV
p 37s 2.) Spinoza�s view is that these terms are applied to things
because of they way they affect our imagination, as opposed to the
intellect. They do not indicate the nature of a thing as it is in itself;
rather, they indicate how it affects us. On his view, things are
not inherently good or bad, for example; they are so only in relation
to us.
COMPARISON OF SPINOZA WITH OTHERS: SPINOZA�S
PHILOSOPHICAL ALLIES AND OPPONENTS

We have already considered the major differences between Spinoza�s

conception of God and the conception promulgated by Islam,
Judaism, and Christianity. Spinoza�s conception in fact represents a
reversion, in important respects, to �pagan� conceptions advanced by
some of the ancient Greeks.

Aristotle, for example, characterized divinity as an �unmoved

mover�, that is, as a being that sets other things in motion because it
is an object of desire. Its sole activity is thinking and the sole object
of its thought is simply itself. God, so conceived, would evidently
not deign to concern itself with human beings or human interests.
So too, the ancient Stoics and Epicureans suppose that the gods take
no part in human affairs. We are just not important to them. Thus
we can put aside our fear of God, or the gods, as well as our hopes
for divine intervention on our behalf. This has important political
implications, as we will note later, for the power of the religious
authorities is in large part dependent on hope and fear, that is, on
the idea that God will reward or punish us.

Aristotle�s philosophy, however, is especially relevant for understanding

Spinoza, and indeed all other philosophers of the seventeenth
century, on a variety of important topics. In large part this is
because it was the dominant philosophy taught at the universities of
the time.

There are at least three major elements of Aristotle�s philosophy

that are relevant here: (1) Aristotle�s views on explanation, (2) his

52
ETHICS I: GOD

substance�mode ontology, that is, his metaphysics, and (3) his

theory of knowledge.

1. Of special importance is Aristotle�s doctrine of the four causes.

These causes are factors we cite to explain a thing and they correspond
to the answers to certain questions, as follows: (1) the formal
cause: �What is it?�; (2) the material cause: �Of what is it made or
composed?�; (3) the efficient cause: �Who or what produced it?�; and
(4) the final cause: �What is it for?� or �What is its goal or purpose?�
Thus it may be a statue, made of ivory and gold, by Phidias, to
honour Zeus.
Abandonment of the search for final causes is the battle cry of
seventeenth-century physics and cosmology and it appears to be the
hallmark of modern science. Descartes and others call for the abandonment
of the search for final causes, but Descartes, at least, does
so on the grounds that we cannot presume to discover, or know,
God�s purposes. Spinoza, in contrast, holds that God has no purposes.
Although Spinoza grants that people act purposively, or for
the sake of an end, he holds that the final causes of human action
are really their efficient causes, that is, human desires.

Whether Spinoza in fact fully succeeds in abandoning all use of

the concept of a goal or purpose can be disputed. What we have
seen, however, is that physics and cosmology have proceeded with
great success without the notion. Although biology has long been
thought to require the idea, even as late as Kant and into the nineteenth
century, Darwin took at least a major step in undermining it
even there. Psychology remains a major holdout.

2. Aristotle also provides an astonishingly influential theory of

categories, according to which the most basic beings are substances.
�Primary substances� are individual things such as a horse or a
house, but Aristotle also supposes that the species of these are �secondary
substances�. All other things are dependent on primary substances
and fall into one or another of the less basic categories, such
as quality, quantity, relation, place, and time.
This distinction is an important one in the metaphysics of all
philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Descartes,
for example, holds that while only God, strictly speaking, is a substance,
other things, such as human minds and bodies, can be called
substances as well. He holds, in fact, that the human mind and
human body are entirely distinct substances, whereas Spinoza, as we
have seen, denies they are substances at all. Hobbes, in contrast,

53
THE ETHICS

thinks that only bodies are substances, Leibniz and Berkeley that
only mental substances exist, and Hume that there are no substances.
All major philosophers of the period, except Hume, maintain
that the most basic beings in the world are substances and that
everything else is an �accident� or mode of a substance. Only Spinoza
is a radical �monist�, however, in holding that there is just one substance,
and all other things, including ourselves, are mere modifications
of it.

3. The final major element of Aristotle�s thought that is important

in understanding Spinoza is one that Spinoza endorsed without
modification. It is �foundationalism�, the doctrine that real knowledge
must, like a building, have secure foundations. It must have a
structure consisting of essentially two parts: the most basic truths,
which are known with certainty, and less basic truths, the knowledge
of which is derived ultimately from the basic truths. For if we know
anything by inference from other things, we must know some things
without inference (otherwise we would face an infinite regress or a
circle).
It seems, then, that all knowledge must be capable of being set out
�geometrically�, that is, in the manner of Euclid�s Elements.
Although this has been disputed (for example by Hegel in the nineteenth
century and by the pragmatists and Quine in the twentieth),
Euclid provided the ideal, for Spinoza and Descartes, of a fully
worked-out theory. Indeed, even Locke accepted this ideal, at least
for knowledge of the �relations of ideas�, and hence, in his view, for
our knowledge of ethics.

Spinoza�s relations to other philosophers and traditions are of

course complex, even within metaphysics, and this discussion, which
has focused primarily on Aristotle, is very far from complete.14

DISPUTED ISSUES OF INTERPRETATION

The problem of the attributes

One of the oldest and most celebrated difficulties in understanding

Spinoza�s metaphysics is �the problem of the attributes�. The
problem is essentially this.

Spinoza maintains in I p 4d that only substances and modes exist

and that, as I p 14 states, the only substance is God. He also holds,
however, that God has an infinity of attributes, that each attribute

54
ETHICS I: GOD

�constitutes the essence� of God, and that among these are Thought
and Extension.

If an attribute is something real, then by Spinoza�s �official ontology�

it must be a substance or a mode. It cannot be a substance,
because there is only one substance, but an infinity of attributes. It
also cannot be a mode, for a mode is conceived through another,
while an attribute is conceived through itself (alone).

Two attempts to solve this problem are well known. The �subjective
interpretation�, in what is perhaps its main version, holds that
the attributes are actually subjective ways in which we think of substance,
not objective properties of it. It notes that the definition of
an attribute (I def4) contains a reference to the mind and takes the
proper translation of this definition to be �what the mind perceives
as if (tanquam) constituting the essence of substance�. One trouble
with this is that Spinoza clearly does take an attribute to constitute
the essence of substance, as I p 20d makes clear.

The �objective interpretation�, in contrast, regards the attributes

as actually constituting the essence of substance and maintains or
suggests that substance simply is its attributes. There is one substance,
however, and an infinity of attributes. This seems to undermine
the alleged unitary nature of substance, for it is not easy to see
how one thing can also be an infinity of things.

An attempt to combine these interpretations may also be made.

This holds that the distinction between the attributes is subjective
although each attribute is actually the (single) essence of God. In
Spinoza�s language (following Descartes and Su�rez), there is only a
distinction of reason between them. This means that our concept of
Thought and our concept of Extension are distinct concepts,
although their objects, Thought and Extension themselves, are the
same.

There remains a problem, however, for there are attributes

(indeed, an infinity of them) of which we have no concept. In what
mind, then, is there a distinction of concepts between attributes X
and Y which are unknown to us? Spinoza seems to hold that it is
God�s mind. For in Ep 66 to Tschirnhaus, he states, �although each
thing is expressed in infinite modes in the infinite intellect of God,
the infinite ideas in which it is expressed cannot constitute one and
the same mind of a particular thing, but an infinity of minds�.15

In other words, God conceives of each mode in infinitely many

ways, and each distinct concept he has of a mode is a mind of that

55
THE ETHICS

thing. Thus, on the solution here proposed, God�s conceiving something

under the attribute of Extension and his conceiving it under
the attribute of X (unknown to us) are distinct, even though
Extension and X are one and the same.

This may seem the only possible view if we suppose that attributes
are real, that they are not themselves modes, and that everything is
a substance or a mode. There is an alternative, however, if we reject
�absolute identity� in favour of �relative identity�. We will then represent
Spinoza as holding (or as best holding) that Thought is the same
substance as Extension, but they are not the same attribute.

It might be noted that if this solution is correct (and I am uncertain

about this), then Spinoza�s notion of a distinction of reason
diverges in at least one important way from that of Su�rez. For
Su�rez maintains that God makes no distinctions of reason, on the
grounds that such a distinction requires inadequate concepts of the
object.16

Spinoza himself was asked about the problem, but his answer, in
Ep 9, does not seem to resolve it completely. There he takes �substance�
and �attribute� as two names for the same thing (except that
it is called �attribute� in relation to an intellect that attributes a specific
nature to it) and he gives another example of how one thing can
be called by different names.

What is God?17

We have seen above that God is substance, that is, something that is
in itself and conceived through itself. Commentators have disagreed,
however, about what more can be said. Some have held that for
Spinoza substance, conceived under Extension, is matter. Others
have held that it is space, the laws of nature, or even �all things�.

My own view is that Spinoza takes substance to be matter, when

conceived under or conceived as the attribute of Extension.

Spinoza indicates this in several passages. In I p 15s, for example,

he speaks of �matter, insofar as it is substance� and �water . . .
insofar as it is substance�. He also maintains, where he is talking of
quantity,

if . . . we conceive it, insofar as it is substance . . . it is found to be

infinite, single, and indivisible, which will be sufficiently evident
to those who know how to distinguish between the imagination

56
ETHICS I: GOD

and the intellect, especially if one attends to this as well: that

matter is everywhere the same, nor are parts distinguished in it,
except insofar as we conceive matter to be diversely affected,
whence its parts are only distinguished modally, not, however,
really.18

Further support is found in this qualification, in a passage from

TTP 6: �Note that by �Nature� here I do not understand matter
alone, and its affections, but besides matter, other infinite things.�19

�Nature�, as Spinoza often uses it, is either natura naturans (substance)

or natura naturata (the modes or affections of substance).
This distinction is set out in I p 29s. In TTP 6 he uses �nature� to refer
to matter � that is, to substance as extended, and its affections, as
well as to �other infinite things�.

But what are these other infinite things? Spinoza holds that there
is an infinity of attributes, although we know of only two: Thought
and Extension. Substance is matter, when conceived under
Extension. What is it when conceived under Thought? It must be
some analogue, in Thought, of matter. It must be, for lack of a better
expression, �mind-stuff�, which, like matter, can �take on� or give rise
to a variety of forms (its modes or affections).

The distinction between mass terms and count nouns is relevant

here. A count noun, like �book� or �lamp�, characteristically can be
preceded by the indefinite article (�a�, �an�), can take a plural form,
and can be used to ask, �How many ____ do you have?� None of this
is characteristically true of mass terms, like �milk� or �gold�. Thus we
say �a book�, �the books�, and �How many books do you have?� We
do not say, �a milk�, �the milks�, or �How many milks do you have?�
We use mass terms to ask how much, not how many.

In addition, some nouns can function in both ways. We can ask,

for example, how many chickens you have in your yard as well as
how much chicken you bought at the store. The latter would typically
be answered with the help of a count noun, such as �pounds� or
�kilograms�.

This is relevant to our understanding of Spinoza because some of

the important terms he uses can function in both ways. We can ask,
for example, how much thought you put into your remarks, but we
can also talk about a thought, the thought that 1#1#2, and how
many truly original thoughts you have had. �Thought�, �substance�,
and �being� can all function as mass terms. Instead of regarding God

57
THE ETHICS

as a substance and as an absolutely infinite being, perhaps God

should be regarded as substance and absolutely infinite being.

As noted above, others have held that according to Spinoza, God

or substance consists of the laws of nature,20 that it is space,21 or that
it is �all things�.

The first of these encounters a textual problem. For Spinoza

explicitly identifies the laws of nature with God�s will and intellect,
as TTP 6 indicates.22 But this is an infinite modification of substance,
not substance itself.

The thesis that substance is space takes physical objects to be constructions

from �strings of place-times�23 and supposes this to be
similar to the view that fields are most basic. On this interpretation
Spinoza has a �field metaphysic�. A popular expression of it states,
�Matter (particles) is simply the momentary manifestation of interacting
fields�.24

This view is not easy to assess, but two comments might be made.
First, Spinoza denies that matter has parts or consists of particles,
so it is not evident that the field metaphysic conflicts with the view
that Spinoza�s substance is matter. Secondly, Spinoza maintains in
V p 29s that we conceive things as actual in two ways: (1) insofar as
we conceive them in relation to a certain place and time and (2)
insofar as we conceive them to be contained in God. The field metaphysic,
because of the priority it accords place-time, seems to take

(1) as most basic and as a way of conceiving of things to be in God.

Spinoza, in contrast, seems to regard (2) as most basic and as
opposed to (1). Thus Spinoza seems to reject the view that in conceiving
of things with the help of place and time, we are thereby conceiving
of them as in God, or substance.
Other interpretations hold that God is either each thing or
the totality of all things.25 In KV I.2, for example, Spinoza regards
God as �all that is Anything�26 although even in that work he
more often writes as if there are many things other than God. He
speaks in KV I.1, for example, of God as �the subiectum of all
other things�.27

Many doctrines and passages in the Ethics also contradict this

reading. Modes, for example, are in and conceived through
another, while God is not; some modes are finite, but God is not;
and so on. Indeed, in Ep 73, written in 1675, Spinoza explicitly
rejects the view that God could be, or become, a human being. He
writes,

58
ETHICS I: GOD

For the rest, as to the doctrine which certain Churches add to

these, namely, that God assumed human nature, I expressly
warned them that I do not understand what they say. Indeed, to
confess the truth, they seem to speak no less absurdly than if
someone were to tell me that a circle assumed the nature of a
square.28

So the extreme pantheistic interpretation, according to which

each thing is God, seems impossible to sustain.

A view similar to this regards God as a whole, or as the totality of

�all being� (omne esse), as stated in TdIE: �This certainly is a single,
infinite being, that is, it is all being, besides which no being is given.�29
Here, one might suggest, we are to think of all bodies (or minds) as
summed up into one infinitely extended (or thinking) being.

This infinite being, however, is not natura naturans. It is instead

natura naturata, according to I p 29s. That is, the totality of finite
beings is an infinite being that is a mode, not a substance. Our intellects,
for example, are parts of God�s infinite intellect, according to
II p 11c and V p 40s. But by I p 31, God�s intellect is a mode, not a
substance.

II lem7s should also be considered here. For Spinoza there suggests

a way of regarding apparently separate things as one thing and
then adds: �And if we proceed in this way to infinity, we shall easily
conceive that the whole of nature (totam naturam) is one Individual
whose parts, that is, all bodies, vary in infinite ways, without any
change in the whole Individual.�30

This totam naturam is not, however, substance. For no substance

has parts and no substance is divisible (by I p 12 and p 13). It is
instead a mediate infinite mode, the face of the whole universe (facies
totius universi), as Spinoza�s reference to II lem7s in Ep 64 shows.

Additional disputes

Three other disputed issues might also be mentioned here, although

I will not discuss them at any length.31 The secondary sources cited
here will be difficult for new readers.

Being in a thing

Curley (1969) maintains that being in a thing, or at least being in

God, is nothing other than being caused by God and that modes,

59
THE ETHICS

according to Spinoza, are not in God in the way that a property is in

a subject.

One difficulty with this is that it makes I p 15 practically equivalent

to I p 16. Spinoza�s demonstrations of these propositions,
however, are quite different and so are his uses of them. Indeed, in
I p 18d, Spinoza cites I p 15 and I p 16 separately in arguing for the
thesis that �God is the cause of everything that is in him�. This,
however, is trivially true if being in something is the same as being
caused by it.

In addition, it is clear from Ep 83 that Spinoza is willing to regard

the things that follow from God, which includes all modes, as properties
of God.32

Necessity

The second dispute concerns Spinoza�s doctrine of necessity, for

some hold that Spinoza rejects the absolute necessity of all things,33
but others disagree.34

Teleology

Interpreters disagree as well about Spinoza�s views on teleology, final

causes, or purposiveness.

Spinoza explicitly maintains that God has no purposes, but that

people, at least, do act purposively or have desires. He also thinks,
however, that all such purposiveness is reducible to efficient causation.
In Aristotelian language, this is to say that final causes are
really efficient causes.

Bennett supposes that Spinoza intends to reject all purposiveness,

but does not succeed. On his view, Spinoza uses the concept of a
desire in an objectionably teleological way.35

60
CHAPTER 6

THE ETHICS, PART II: MIND AND KNOWLEDGE

BACKGROUND

Introduction to philosophy of mind

Philosophy of mind is currently one of the most prominent and

active areas of philosophy. The central issue is the mind�body
problem, that is, the problem of understanding what the mind is and
how it is related to the body. How is consciousness and how are you,
or your �self�, related to the physical world?

A popular religious answer is that you are essentially a mind or

soul, which is not physical, but which is temporarily connected or
�attached� to a particular body. When the body dies, you continue to
exist and will eventually be sent to heaven or hell, depending on how
you have lived.

Plato sets out a version of this in his myth of Er in the Republic.

St Thomas Aquinas, principal philosopher of the Roman Catholic
Church, also accepts a modified form of it. On his view, a person is
a combination of a soul and a body and when the body dies, the soul
continues to live. The body will be resurrected, however, and
reunited with the soul at the Last Judgement.

A less popular answer is that the soul consists in the functioning

of the body or of some part of it, such as the brain. Aristotle accepts
a view like this (except for his doctrine of the �active intellect�). It is
also the dominant conception accepted by materialists, from the
ancient atomists and Epicureans, through Hobbes and La Mettrie,
to twentieth and twenty-first century philosophers such as Smart
and Matson.

The issue has been at the forefront of modern metaphysics

since its inception, that is, since the time of Descartes. Although

61
THE ETHICS

Descartes� formulation and discussion of the problem have been

enormously influential, his solution was widely and almost immediately
rejected. He maintains that the human mind is a �thing� or substance
whose whole essence is to think. The body is also a substance,
but its essence is to be extended, that is, to be three-dimensional.
Bodies take up space, have a shape, and move; minds do not. Minds
think, affirm, doubt, and will; bodies do not. They are distinct things
whose essences are completely different. Hence, they are capable of
existing apart from and without each other, at least by the power of
God.

Descartes also holds that changes in the body cause events in the
mind, and vice versa. Dryness of the throat, for example, or damage
to the foot, produces a sequence of changes in the body, culminating
in a certain change in the brain. This change in the brain, which
perhaps occurs in the pineal gland, then immediately causes a
change in the mind: the sensation of thirst or the experience of a
pain in the foot. Similarly, a mental decision to look at something at
a great distance causes a change in the brain that leads to change in
the eyes, thus allowing us to focus on the object.

Cartesian dualism, that is, Descartes� dualism, thus maintains that

minds and bodies are distinct things, and distinct kinds of things,
but that they causally interact. Mental changes produce physical
ones, and vice versa. �Interactionist dualism� is another name for this
view.

In Meditations VI Descartes says in addition that the mind and

body are so intimately joined (not like a pilot in a ship) that they constitute
a single thing. How this is possible, given his view that they
are �really distinct�, remains unclear, however.1 Spinoza criticizes
Descartes� conception of this union in E V Pref, taking it to consist,
according to Descartes, in being causally connected.

Many reactions to Descartes are possible and most of them are

actual. How, for example, can completely different kinds of things
causally interact? This was immediately perceived as a problem and
a variety of solutions have been proposed.

Nicholas Malebranche (1638�1715) supposes that finite minds

and bodies cannot causally interact and, indeed, that no finite thing
can really be a cause of anything. He holds instead that only God is
a real cause, apparently taking the omnipotence of God to consist
in his having all power. How an infinite mind can cause physical
changes seems nonetheless problematic.

62
ETHICS II: MIND AND KNOWLEDGE

Arnold Geulincx (1624�1669) maintains, with Spinoza, that there

can be no causal traffic between the mental and the physical.
Instead, there are two separate series of events, which are arranged
so that, for example, pain (a mental event) immediately follows, but
is not caused by, your burning your hand (a physical event).

Leibniz in contrast holds that monads, like mental atoms, are the
only simple substances, that they are not physical, and that they do
not causally interact. Although all perceptions and changes in a
monad arise internally, God has arranged the perceptions of each to
correspond with the perceptions of all of the others. It may seem
that you and I see the same tree and that our experiences are caused
by it. But in fact my experience arises from within me and yours
arises from within you. God has simply arranged things so that they
correspond. This is the �pre-established harmony�. Bodies are collections
of monads or �well-founded� phenomena (appearances).
Thus Leibniz rejects Cartesian dualism and denies causal interaction
between minds and bodies.

Hobbes, on the other hand, takes �immaterial substance� to be a

contradiction in terms and regards thought and perception simply
as the motion of matter.

Spinoza does not regard any mind or body as a substance. He

holds instead that a mind is a mode of Thought, while a body is a
mode of Extension. He often speaks of them as if they were distinct.
For example, he maintains that a finite mind is one of God�s ideas,
but he is not prepared to say that a body is an idea in God. So, too,
he holds that bodies, not minds, move, while minds, not bodies,
think. But in several passages, such as II p 21s and III p 2s, he maintains
that the mind and body are �one and the same thing, conceived
now under the attribute of Thought, now under the attribute of
Extension�.

The standard classification of types of theory of mind and body

is as follows.

1. Dualism. Minds and bodies are both real and they are different,
mutually exclusive types of thing. An alternative formulation speaks
of mental and physical events, rather than minds and bodies. Types
of dualism include the following.
A. Cartesian dualism (or �interactionist dualism�). Minds and
bodies causally interact, that is, mental events cause physical events,
and vice versa.
63
THE ETHICS

B. Epiphenomenalism. Physical events cause mental events, but

not vice versa. (T. H. Huxley).
C. Parallelism. There are no causal relations between mental and
physical events. Instead, there is a series of causally related physical
events, and a completely distinct series of causally related mental
events. When you step on a tack, a moment later you feel pain, but
this is not because the former (a physical event) causes the latter (a
mental event). It is rather that God has arranged the two series of
events to run �in parallel� (Geulincx).
Spinoza accepts this, but only in a modified form, since he is not
a dualist. There is actually just one series of events, on his view, but
it is �conceived in different ways�.

D. Occasionalism. The more radical theory proposed by

Malebranche that there are no causal relations between finite
things, and that only God is a real cause of anything. Note that
some authors, such as Matson,2 use �occasionalism� more broadly
and regard what I have called �parallelism� as a form of it.
2. Materialism. All events are physical.
A. Reductive materialism. There are mental events, and so they
are all physical (Hobbes, Smart, Armstrong, Matson, Davidson).
B. Eliminative materialism. There are no mental events
ETHICS II: MIND AND KNOWLEDGE

Introduction to epistemology (theory of knowledge)

Epistemology, or the theory of knowledge, is concerned with what

knowledge is and how, if at all, we can come to have any.

Other questions quickly follow. Are there fundamentally different

kinds of knowledge, for example in history, mathematics, science,
and ethics? How is knowledge that something is the case related to
knowledge of how to do something? Is there some knowledge that
is inexpressible in language? Are there inherent limits to what we can
know? To what extent is knowledge essentially a social phenomenon,
how can it be transmitted to others, and how is it related to power?

Scepticism is the doctrine that we do not, or at least may not, have

any real knowledge and the refutation of this is a major concern of
Descartes. His famous �method of doubt� begins by doubting everything
that can (for good reasons) be doubted. Anything that survives
the attempt will then be certain and so an item of knowledge.
Implicit is the thesis that knowledge involves certainty and, on the
face of it, that it consists in justified certainty.

Descartes� search for certain knowledge begins by casting doubt

on the existence of a physical world. If we cannot distinguish dreams
from waking experiences, how can we be sure right now that the
objects we seem to see are real? Indeed, how can we know, on the
basis of sense perception, that there are objects that continue to exist
when we do not perceive them?

His resolution of this and other doubts begins with his idea that
at least he himself must exist, insofar as he is thinking. This is the
�cogito, ergo sum�: �I think; therefore I am�. In addition, he finds a
guarantee of truth in everything that he clearly and distinctly perceives.
He can regard this as a mark of truth, at least, after establishing
the existence of a God who is not a deceiver.

Descartes thus leaves modern philosophers with �the problem of

the external world� and, by extension, �the problem of other minds�.
For we have no immediate access to the feelings and thoughts of
others. On what basis, then, can you suppose that there are other
beings whose subjective experiences are like yours?

He also leaves us with the idea that what we are immediately aware
of in perception are not qualities of bodies, but rather the contents
of our own minds. Thus Locke, who follows Descartes here, writes,
�Whatsoever the mind perceives in itself, or is the immediate object
of perception, thought, or understanding, that I call idea�.3 When

65
THE ETHICS

you look at a dog, what you see is not the dog, but your idea of the
dog. When you think of the moon, the �immediate object� of your
thought is not the moon, but your idea of the moon.

Spinoza is almost unique among seventeenth- and eighteenth-

century philosophers in rejecting this. He holds instead that the
immediate objects of perception and thought are the things of which
we have ideas. So it is not by perceiving an idea, but by having one,
that we are conscious of bodies. He holds, in addition, that the ideas
that represent external bodies to us are ideas of changes in our own
bodies and these changes are caused by the external bodies.

A traditional proposal about knowledge is that it consists in justified

true belief. But what is it for a belief to be justified? One answer,
which is called �foundationalism�, maintains that knowledge is like a
building. A building requires a strong foundation, on which the
walls and then the roof depend. In the same way, knowledge consists
of two types of belief: fundamental beliefs, which are self-evidently
true, and less basic beliefs, which are derived from and depend on the
fundamental beliefs.

Aristotle and Descartes are foundationalists, and, as noted earlier,

so is Spinoza. His ideal of knowledge is Euclidean geometry, which,
like the Ethics, is an axiomatized theory. Allegedly self-evident
axioms are set out, and all of the rest is derived from them with the
help of definitions and rules of inference.

A different analogy is used by a �coherence theory� of justification.

This holds that knowledge is more like a raft of logs or a cobweb. No
one part, or small number of parts, is most basic in the sense that all
others depend on them. It is rather that the parts are all interrelated
and mutually dependent on each other. The question whether a
belief is justified or is to be added to one�s existing beliefs is to be
answered by determining how it �fits in� or �coheres� with them. But
piecemeal adjustments can be made to the existing set, as a log on a
raft can be repaired or even replaced without modifying any other
and without dismantling the whole thing.

The Ethics, Part II in a nutshell

Philosophy of mind

Spinoza holds that the human mind is one of God�s ideas, that is, it
is an idea that is in God�s infinite intellect or mind. Its object is the
human body and represents the human body, as actually existing, to