ENCARNACION LOPEZ VDA. DE BALUYUTvs. HON.
JUDGE incompetent should be anchored on clear, positive and
LEONOR INES LUCIANO, G.R. No. L-42215. July 13, 1976
FACTS: In the Court of First Instance of Quezon City,
probate proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased Sotero Baluyut was instituted by his
alleged nephew, Alfredo Baluyut claiming mental
incapacity of the surviving widow, Encarnacion vda. de
Baluyut, to administer her affairs and that of the
decedent's estate. He prayed for appointment as
administrator. However, upon a counter petition, the
widow was appointed administratrix and qualified as
such. This appointment, was set aside by the Supreme
Court in Baluyut vs. Judge Paño, etc., G.R. L-42088, May
7, 1976, because the persons contesting her capacity to
act were not given an adequate opportunity to be heard
and to present evidence. Meantime, in the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City, two successive
petitions were filed to declare Mrs. Baluyut an
incompetent and to place her under guardianship. The
first petition, which was filed by Alfredo Baluyut, was
dismissed. The second, which was filed by her sisters,
were given due course. Acting on the latter petition, the
court summarily declared the widow as incompetent on
the basis of a report of a psychiatrist who was not cross-
examined, and without hearing the evidence of the
parties, particularly Mrs. Baluyut. The court denied a
motion for reconsideration of the order making such
declaration. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the resolution in the guardianship
proceeding of the question as to Mrs. Baluyut's alleged
incompetency should await the adjudication in the
administration proceeding (pending in the probate
court) of the issue as to her competency to act as
administratrix.
2. Whether Mrs. Baluyot was denied due process of law
when the guardianship court summarily announced its
verdict on her incompetency notwithstanding that her
lawyer had not cross-examined the psychiatrist.
Ruling: 1. Yes. In consonance with the last sentence of
section 29-A of the Charter of Quezon City which divests
the Juvenile and Domestic Relation Court of jurisdiction
or authority to resolve questions already in issue as an
incident in any case pending in the ordinary court, the
guardianship proceeding should be suspended and
should await the jurisdiction of the issue of petitioner's
competency to act as administratrix pending with the
probate court. 2. Yes. A finding that a person is
the present and past history of a prospective appointee,
definite evidence (Yangco vs. Court of First Instance of
Manila, 29 Phil. 183, 190). That kind of proof has not yet
been presented to the guardianship court to justify its
precipitate conclusion that Mrs. Baluyut is an
incompetent. In the nature of things, the guardianship
court should have first set for hearing the psychiatrist's
report and examined Mrs. Baluyut before prematurely
adjudging that she is an incompetent. Its hasty and
premature pronouncement, with its derogatory
implications, was not the offspring of fundamental
fairness which is the essence of due process. Moreover,
the lower court should have adhered strictly to the
procedure laid down in Rule 93 of the Rules of Court for
appointment of guardians. Rule 93 provides that after
the filing of the petition, the court should fix a time and
place for hearing and give the proper notices. At the
hearing, "the alleged incompetent must be present if
able to attend, and it must be shown that the required
notice has been given. Thereupon, the court shall hear
the evidence of the parties in support of their
respective allegations" (Sec. 5, Rule 93).
FELICIANO FRANCISCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No.
L-57438 January 31, 1984
FACTS: Feliciano Francisco (“Feliciano”) is the duly
appointed guardian of the incompetent Estefania San
Pedro (“Estefania”) in Special Proceedings No. 532 of
CFI Bulacan presided over by respondent Judge. On
August 30, 1974 Pelagio Francisco (“Pelagio”), claiming
to be a first cousin of Estefania, petitioned the court for
the removal of Feliciano and for the appointment in his
stead. Among other grounds, the petition was based on
the failure of the guardian to submit an inventory of the
estate of his ward and to render an accounting. The
respondent judge found the claim to be true, ordered
the retirement on the ground of old age. Petitioner filed
a motion for reconsideration, contending that he was
still fit to continue with the management of the estate
of his ward but the court denied the motion. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court is correct in
ordering the retirement of petitioner on the ground of
old age.
RULING: YES. In determining the selection of a guardian,
the court may consider the financial situation, the
physical condition, the sound judgment, prudence and
trustworthiness, the morals, character and conduct, and
as well as the probability of his being able to exercise
the powers and duties of guardian for the full period
during which guardianship will be necessary. A guardian,
once appointed may be removed in case he becomes
insane or otherwise incapable of discharging his trust or
unsuitable therefor, or has wasted or mismanaged the
estate, or failed for thirty (30) days after it is due to
render an account or make a return. There is need for
petitioner Feliciano Francisco to be retired from the
guardianship over the person and property of
incompetent Estefania San Pedro. As correctly pointed
out by the appellate court, this finds direct support in
the delay of the accounting and inventory made by
petitioner. To sustain petitioner as guardian would,
therefore, be detrimental to the ward. While age alone
is not a controlling criterion in determining a person's
fitness or qualification to be appointed or be retained as
guardian, it may be a factor for consideration.
MARTIN NERY and LEONCIA L. DE LEON vs. ROSARIO,
ALFREDO, MARIANO, PACIFICO, ONOFRE, TEOFILO,
LOLOY and TRINIDAD, all surnamed LORENZO G.R. No. L-
23096. April 27, 1972
FACTS: Bienvenida de la Isla (“Bienvenida”), the
guardian of her minor children sold a parcel of land to
Spouses Martin Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon (hereafter,
the “Spouses”). The validity of the sale was however
challenged by her two elderly children on the ground
that they were not informed of such a move
notwithstanding the order issued by the court.
Moreover, they contended that the guardianship
proceeding was heard without them being notified
although. In the said case the heirs of Silvestra Ferrer,
who originally owned one-fourth of the property in
question filed an intervetion. The lower court ruled that
it acquired no jurisdiction over the guardianship
proceedings of the minors over 14 years of age who
were not notified of the proceedings and the court did
not acquire jurisdiction over the real property of the
minors and could not have validly authorized its sale.
Petitioner spouses elevated the case to the respondent
Court of Appeals which decided the case in its insofar as
the undivided 3/4 portion of the land in question is
concerned and declared the intervenors as owners in
common of the remaining undivided 1/4 portion of the
said land. Dissatisfied, both parties instituted the
petitions for review to this Court.
ISSUE: Whether the CA is correct in ignoring the
jurisdictional defects that tainted the guardianship
proceeding
RULING: NO. The CA is not correct in ignoring the
jurisdictional defects that tainted the guardianship
proceeding. Service of the notice upon the minor if
above 14 years of age or upon the incompetent, is
jurisdictional. Without such notice, the court acquires
no jurisdiction to appoint a guardian. The failure of
respondent Court of Appeals to give due weight to the
grave jurisdictional defect that tainted the guardianship
proceeding resulted in its judgment suffering the
corrosion of substantial legal error. The rights of the
children of Leoncio as upheld by the lower court must,
to repeat, be maintained. “When a petition for the
appointment of a general guardian is filed, the court
shall fix a time and place for hearing the same, and
shall cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the
persons mentioned in the petition residing in the
province, including the minor if above 14 years of age or
the incompetent himself, and may direct other general
or special notice thereof to be given."
LOLITA R. ALAMAYRI vs. ROMMEL, ELMER, ERWIN,
ROILER and AMANDA, all surnamed PABALE G.R. No.
151243 April 30, 2008
FACTS: A handwritten "Kasunduan Sa Pagbibilihan"
(Contract to Sell) was entered into by and between
Sesinando M Fernando (“Fernando”) and Nelly S. Nave
(“Nave”) involving a piece of land in Calamba, Laguna.
However, Nave reneged on their agreement when the
latter refused to accept the partial down payment
because she did not want to sell her property to him
anymore. Thereafter, Fernando filed a Complaint for
Specific Performance with Damages before RTC Laguna.
Nave filed a Motion to Dismiss averring that she could
not be ordered to execute the corresponding Deed of
Sale in favor of Fernando because she repudiated the
contract and besides she already sold the property in
good faith to the Pabale siblings before she received a
copy of the complaint. Subsequently, the Pabale siblings
filed a Motion to Intervene alleging that they are now
the land owners of the subject property. Unfortunately,
the trial court denied Nave’s Motion to Dismiss.
Unsatisfied, Nave and Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo (“Atty.
Gesmundo”) filed another motion, this time including
the fact of her incapacity to contract for being mentally
deficient based on the psychological evaluation report
conducted by Dra. Virginia P. Panlasigui, M. A., a
clinical psychologist. Finding the motion unmeritorious,
the same was denied by the court a quo. Temporarily,
the proceedings in this case was suspended in view of
the filing of a Petition for Guardianship of Nave with the
RTC, Branch 36 of Calamba, Laguna with Atty.
Gesmundo as the petitioner. Subsequently, a decision
was rendered in the said guardianship proceedings,
finding Nave an incompetent placing her and her estate
under guardianship. Accordingly, Atty. Leonardo C.
Paner (“Atty. Paner”) is appointed as her regular
guardian without need of bond, until further orders
from the Court. On December 9, 1992, Nave died. Upon
her death, Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo, Nave’s sole heir,
executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication pertaining to
his inherited properties from Nave. In this connection,
Atty. Gesmundo filed an issuance of a writ of execution
of the petition for guardianship. The Pabale siblings
filed their Opposition on the grounds that they were not
made a party to the guardianship proceedings and thus
cannot be bound by the Decision and that the validity of
the Deed of Absolute Sale was never raised in the
guardianship case. Surprisingly, out of nowhere, Lolita
R. Alamayri (“Alamayri”) filed a motion for substitution
alleging that the subject property was sold to her by
Atty. Gesmundo. In his answer, Atty. Gesmundo refuted
by stating that what he executed is a Deed of Donation
and not a Deed of Absolute Sale and the same was
already revoked. Subsequently, the trial court rendered
its Decision recognizing Alamayri as the owner of the
property. Fernando filed an appeal with the Court of
Appeals. CA, granted the appeals and uphold the
VALIDITY of the Deed of Absolute Sale. Alamayri and
Atty. Gesmundo sought reconsideration of the Decision
of the appellate court but were denied for lack of
merit. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Nave was an incompetent when
she executed a Deed of Sale of the subject property in
favor of the Pabale siblings rendering the said sale void.
RULING: NO, Nave was not incompetent when she
executed a Deed of Sale of the subject property in favor
of the Pabale siblings. A finding that she was
incompetent in 1986 does not automatically mean that
she was so in 1984. Hence, the significance of the two-
year gap herein cannot be gainsaid since Nave’s mental
condition in 1986 may vastly differ from that of 1984
given the intervening period. Capacity to act is
supposed to attach to a person who has not previously
been declared incapable, and such capacity is presumed
to continue so long as the contrary be not proved; that
is, that at the moment of his acting he was incapable,
crazy, insane, or out of his mind.23 The burden of
proving incapacity to enter into contractual relations
rests upon the person who alleges it; if no sufficient
proof to this effect is presented, capacity will be
presumed. Nave was examined and diagnosed by doctors
to be mentally incapacitated only in 1986 and she was
not judicially declared an incompetent until 22 June
1988 when a Decision in said case was rendered by the
RTC, resulting in the appointment of Atty. Leonardo C.
Paner as her guardian. Thus, prior to 1986, Nave is still
presumed to be capacitated and competent to enter
into contracts such as the Deed of Sale over the subject
property, which she executed in favor of the Pabale
siblings on 20 February 1984. The burden of proving
otherwise falls upon Alamayri, which she dismally failed
to do. Alamayri did not bother to establish with her own
evidence that Nave was mentally incapacitated when
she executed the Deed of Sale over the subject property
in favor of the Pabale siblings, so as to render the said
deed void.
BONIFACIA P. VANCIL vs. HELEN G. BELMES G.R. No.
132223 June 19, 2001
FACTS: Reeder Vancil, the father of the minors Valerie
(6 yrs. Old) and Vincent (2 yrs old) died as a US navy
serviceman. Bonfacia Vancil, the mother of Reeder and
the grandmother of the minors, filed guardianship
proceedings over the persons and properties of the said
minors consisting of proceeds from their fathers pension
benefits with a probable value of P100,000.00 in the
RTC of Cebu City. Helen Belmes, the natural mother of
the minors, opposed to the guardianship proceedings
asserting that she is the natural mother in actual
custody of and exercising parental authority over the
subject minors in Zamboanga del Sur where they are
permanently residing. She further alleged that Bonifacia
Vancil is a naturalized American citizen and a resident
of Colorado, USA. The trial court rejected the
opposition and appointed the grandmother as the
guardian of the minors. On appeal, the CA reversed the
decision. Hence, this present petition alleging that
Helen is unfit to be a guardian of the minors considering
that Valerie was raped seven times by the mother’s live-
in partner while under her custody.
ISSUE: Who between the biological mother and the
grandmother should be appointed guardian of the
minors.
RULING: As to Valerie, the issue has become moot since
she has attained the age of majority. As to Vincent,
respondent being the natural mother of the minor, has
the preferential right over that of petitioner to be his
guardian. Art. 211 of the Family Code provide that the
father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental
authority over the persons of their common children.
Indeed, being the natural mother of the minor Vincent,
respondent has the corresponding natural and legal right
to his custody. Petitioner’s claim to be the guardian of
the same minor can only be realized by way of
substitute parental authority pursuant to Art. 214 of the
Family Code, which is only available in case of parent’s
death, absence or unsuitability. In the case at bar,
petitioner did not show proof that Helen is an unsuitable
guardian for the minor Vincent. Further,
notwithstanding the fact that there is nothing in the law
which requires the courts to appoint residents only as
administrators or guardians, this Court has held that
courts should not appoint persons as guardians those
who are not within the jurisdiction of the courts for
they will find it difficult to protect the wards.
SALVACION LOPEZ vs. JOSE TEODORO, SR EULALIO
LOPEZ, JR., and JESUS JALBUENA G.R. No. L-3071. May
29, 1950
FACTS: Eulalio Lopez Sr., an incapacitated under the
judicial guardianship of Eulalio Lopez Jr. was the
exclusive and absolute owner of a 100-hectare land in
Silay, Negros Occidental. Acting upon the motions filed
in the proceedings for guardianship, the court ordered
the guardian to pay the movants the loans properly
authorized by the court for the support and
maintenance of the incapacitated. In pursuance of this
authority, the guardian sold the only property of the
incapacitated to Jesus Jalbuena. However, in
authorizing the said sale, the court did not follow the
requirement of Sec. 2 of Rule 96 that the court shall
direct the next of kin of the ward, and all persons
interested in the estate, to appear at a reasonable time
and place to show cause why the prayer for the sale
should not be granted. Although Lopez Jr. was the
judicial guardian, the incapacitated was and is under
the actual care and custody of his sister, Salvacion
Lopez. Believing the sale is prejudicial to her brother’s
interest, Salvacion filed a petition for
certiorari/mandamus praying that the sale be revoked
after the motion for recon was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the sale of the property should be
declared null and void.
RULING: The guardianship court where the proceeding
was pending had the jurisdiction to order the questioned
sale. It was also undisputed that the outstanding
indebtedness of the guardianship was property and
legally incurred for the support and maintenance of the
incapacitated. Petitioner has no legal interest in the
complaint. The incapacitated has children, all of age,
one of whom is the judicial guardian, while the
petitioner is only the ward’s sister. Not being the ward’s
forced heir, she was not prejudiced by the sale she
seeks to impugn. Petitioner is wrong in asserting that
she is “next of kin”. “Next of Kin” within the meaning of
Rule 96 are relatives whose relationship is such that
they are entitled to share in the estate as distributes.
VICENTE G. SINCO, PILAR G. SINCO vs. AGAPITO LONGA
and AGUEDA LONGA. G.R. No. 27962. February 14, 1928
FACTS: Hacienda Rosario was originally owned by Don
Rafael Sinco y Librado, the plaintiff’s great grandfather,
from whom it is passed to his son Escolastic Sinco who
died during the Spanish regime. The latter left a widow,
Saturnina Lopez and 3 children, Sergio, Maria Paz and
Coloma all surnamed Sinco. Of these, Sergio and Maria
Paz are still living, but Coloma died leaving 3 children
who are the plaintiffs in this case, namely Vicente, Pilar
and Desemparados. The estate of Escolastico appears to
have been encumbered with debts and in order to
liquidate this indebtedness, the widow and three
children leased the property. The lease was continually
extended until Saturnina died in 1904. After the death
of the mother, Sergio was hard pressed for money to
sustain numerous family and sold his undivided 1/3
share in the hacienda. The buyer, Longa insisted in
acquiring the whole property and subsequently the 1/3
share of Maria Paz was included in the sale. In order to
accomplish the said end, Emilio Tevez, the guardian of
the then minor plaintiffs petitioned for the approval of
the sale alleging that the estate was heavily
encumbered and that the minors had no cash assets to
meet their subsistence and education. Subsequently,
the court issued its order authorizing the guardian to
make the sale as requested. After the minors attained
majority age, they instituted this petition seeking to
annul the said sale pertaining to their 1/3 undivided
interest in the hacienda alleging that the subject sale
was attended with fraud. Emilio Tevez, the guardian,
was anxious for the sale to obtain money for his own
uses.
ISSUE: Whether or not the sale should be annulled.
RULING: In passing upon controversies involving charges
of fraud alleged to have been committed many years
before the litigation was begun, the proof of such fraud,
to be accepted by the court, should be full and
convincing. Experience teaches the danger of lightly
accepting charges of fraud made many years after the
transaction which is the subject of question was
accomplished, when death may have sealed the lips of
the principal actors and changes affected by time may
have given a totally different color to the questioned
transaction.In this case, the participants to the alleged
fraud such as the guardian Emilio Tevez, were already
dead. As to the irregularity in the guardianship
proceedings, the jurisdiction of the court to authorize
the sale of the property of minors rests upon the
averments of the petition and adequate publication or
appearance of the parties interested. The fact that the
statements of the petition may be untrue with respect
to the existence of encumbrances on the property and
necessity of the sale, does not affect the jurisdiction of
the court, which rests upon the averments and not upon
the truth of those averments.
MARCELO E. INTON, FE SEVERA E. INTON and her
husband FRANCISCO MABINI, ANTONIO E. INTON, and
OLIMPIA E. INTON vs. DANIEL QUINTANA G.R. No. L-1236
May 26, 1948
FACTS: Marcelo E. Inton, Fe Severa, E. Inton, Antonion
E. Inton and Olimpia E. Inton, brothers and sisters, were
the owners in equal and individed shares of a parcel of
land having an area of 15,167 square meters and
situated in Samal, Bataan. Macelo E. Inton, Fe Severa E.
Inton, both of age, and their mother Fileda Enrile, the
latter acting "in representation" of Antonio E. Inton and
Olimpia E. Inton, then under age, sold that land to
Alejandro Malibiran, husband and wife. By virtue of the
sale, the purchaser took possession of the property and
held it until they died, and the land, in the extrajudicial
partition among their heirs, passed into the hands of
Daniel Quintana, Alejandro Quintana's brother and the
principal or virtually the sole defendant in this case.
ISSUE: Whether the mother may sell the properties of
her minor children.
RULING: No. Although the mother was said to be the
minor children's guardian — an allegation on which there
is not the slightest evidence — it does not appear that
she was authorized to enter into this transaction or that
the sale was approved by the competent court. Without
the court's authority or approval, the sale was
ineffective as to the minor children even if she were the
minors' judicial guardian. A guardian has no authority to
sell real estate of his ward, merely by reason of his
general powers, and in the absence of any special
authority to sell conferred by will, statue, or order of
court. A sale of the wards realty of guardian without
authority of the court is void.
J. ANTONIO ARANETA vs. ANTONIO PEREZ G.R. No. L-
18872 July 15, 1966
FACTS: A trust was established pursuant to the will of
the late Angela S. Tuason. J. Antonio Araneta was
appointed trustee and he qualified when he took his
oath of office. The beneficiaries of the trust are
Benigno, Angela and Antonio, all surnamed Perez y
Tuason, the last two being represented by appellant
Antonio Perez, who is their father and judicial guardian.
In the order appealed from the lower court approved,
upon petition of the trustee, a deed of donation
executed by him in favor of the City of Manila covering a
lot pertaining to the trusteeship. Such approval was
given over the opposition of appellant Antonio Perez. On
the lot in question the trustee had been paying an
annual realty tax. Appellant does not deny the
beneficial aspects of the donation. But he maintains
that it is invalid on the ground that under Article 736 of
the Civil Code "guardians and trustees cannot donate the
properties entrusted to them".
ISSUE: Whether guardians and trustees cannot donate
the properties entrusted to them.
RULING: In this case, the guardian may donate the
properties entrusted to him. Although Article 736, New
Civil Code provides that, "guardians and trustees cannot
donate the properties entrusted to them", the same
cannot be applied considering that the aforecited
provision only took effect on August 30, 1950 (Rep. Act
No. 386) and does not apply retroactively to the
testamentary trust established upon the death of Angela
S. Tuason on March 20, 1948. There being nothing in the
old Civil Code which prohibits a trustee from donating
properties under trusteeship, and considering that the
powers given to herein appellee as trustee are of a
plenary character, subject only to the limitation that
they should be permissible under the law; considering
further that when the testatrix conferred such powers
she must have had in mind the law that was in force at
the time; and considering finally that after all a trust is
created for the benefit of the cestuis que trust and that
in this particular case the acts of the trustee are subject
to the supervision of the Court. 10. In re Guardianship of
the minor Maria Exaltacion Castillo.
COSME U. CASTILLO vs. POTENCIANO BUSTAMANTE G.R.
No. 44466. September 30, 1937
FACTS: Serapia de Gala instituted a civil action against
her husband Cosme U. Castillo, praying for the legal
separation of both, as spouses, and for the division of
the property acquired by them during their marriage. In
a compromise agreed by the court, the spouses agreed
to assign to their daughter Maria Exaltacion their
conjugal properties. A deed of donation was then
executed by the spouses in compliance with the
compromise in favor of their daughter Maria Exaltacio
which was accepted by the latters duly authorized
guardian, Potenciano Bustamante. Subsequently, the
guardian filed a petition in court praying that the
property belonging to the guardianship be delivered to
him by Cosme U. Castillo who retains it in his
possession. The court, acting favorably upon his
petition, ordered the turnover of said property to
Potenciano. In the same order, to cure any defect in the
acceptance of the donation by the guardian, the court
directed Potenciano to execute the necessary deed to
this effect and to notify the donors Cosme U. Castillo
and Serapia de Gala thereof. The appellant Cosme
alleges that the donation has been revoked prior to its
acceptance, hence the same is of no effect. Hence, this
case for the Court’s resolution.
ISSUES: 1. Whether guardian is under obligation to take
possession and recover donated property to the ward. 2.
Whether the donation is of no effect, having been
revoked before it was accepted.
RULING:
1. Yes. Inasmuch as the conjugal partnership property of
the appellant and his wife was donated to their only
daughter, and the donation was duly accepted by the
donee's guardian, said guardian is under obligation to
administer it, being entitled to take possession thereof
and to recover it from the appellant who retains it.
2. No. As the donation was made by virtue of a
compromise made by the spouses to terminate a suit
between them, it has, in itself, the authority of res
judicata and, furthermore, it is the decision rendered by
the court in said civil case pursuant to the terms of the
compromise (art. 1816 of the Civil Code). The appellant,
by himself alone, cannot revoke said donation having
such requisites.
CRISANTO RAFAELITO G. GUALBERTO vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and JOYCELYN D. PABLO-GUALBERTO G.R. No.
156254 June 28, 2005
FACTS: Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto filed a petition
for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Joycelyn D.
Pablo Gualberto, with an ancillary prayer for custody
pendente lite of their almost 4-year-old son, minor
Rafaello. The father argues that she is "unfit" to take
care of their son; hence, for "compelling reasons," he
must be awarded custody of the child. Crisanto cites
immorality due to alleged lesbian relations as the
compelling reason to deprive Joycelyn of custody. It has
indeed been held that under certain circumstances, the
mother’s immoral conduct may constitute a compelling
reason to deprive her of custody.
ISSUE : Whether or not Crisanto has the right for custody
of his minor child.
RULING: No. As a general rule, a mother is to be
preferred in awarding custody of children under the age
of seven. The so-called "tender-age presumption" under
Article 213 of the Family Code may be overcome only by
compelling evidence of the mother’s unfitness. The
mother has been declared unsuitable to have custody of
her children in one or more of the following instances:
neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality,
habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of
the child, insanity or affliction with a communicable
disease. But sexual preference or moral laxity alone
does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. In
this case, not even the fact that a mother is a prostitute
or has been unfaithful to her husband would render her
unfit to have custody of her minor child. To deprive the
wife of custody, the husband must clearly establish that
her moral lapses have had an adverse effect on the
welfare of the child or have distracted the offending
spouse from exercising proper parental care. It is
therefore not enough for Crisanto to show merely that
Joycelyn was a lesbian. He must also demonstrate that
she carried on her purported relationship with a person
of the same sex in the presence of their son or under
circumstances not conducive to the child’s proper moral
development. Such a fact has not been shown here.
There is no evidence that the son was exposed to the
mother’s alleged sexual proclivities or that his proper
moral and psychological development suffered as a
result.
EMILIA O'LACO and HUCO LUNA vs. VALENTIN CO CHO
CHIT, O LAY KIA and COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 58010
March 31, 1993
FACTS: Philippine Sugar Estate Development Company,
Ltd., sold a parcel of land with the Deed of Absolute
Sale naming Emilia O'Laco as vendee. Private
respondent-spouses Valentin Co Cho Chit and O Lay Wa
learned from the newspapers that Emilia O'Laco sold the
same property to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila with assumption of the real estate mortgage
constituted thereon. Respondent-spouses asserting that
petitioner Emilia O'Laco knew that they were the real
vendees of the Oroquieta property sold by Philippine
Sugar Estate Development Company, Ltd., and that the
legal title thereto was merely placed in her name. They
contend that Emilia O'Laco breached the trust when she
sold the land to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila. Emilia O’Laco and Huco Luna deny the existence
of any form of trust relation. They averred that the
property was actually bought using Emilia’s own money.
Finding no trust relation between the parties, the trial
court dismissed the complaint together with the
counterclaim. Petitioners and respondents appealed to
the Court of Appeals which set aside the lower court’s
decision. When the motion for reconsideration was
denied, petitioners filed this instant petition to the
Supreme Court for relief.
ISSUE: Whether a trust relation existed between the half
sisters.
RULING: Yes. By definition, trust relations between
parties may either be express or implied. Express trusts
are those which are created by the direct and positive
acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or
by words evincing an intention to create a trust. Implied
trusts are those which, without being express, are
deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters
of intent, or which are super induced on the transaction
by operation of law as matters of equity, independently
of the particular intention of the parties. Implied trusts
may either be resulting or constructive trusts, both
coming into being by operation of law. Resulting trusts
are based on the equitable doctrine that valuable
consideration and not legal title determines the
equitable title or interest and are presumed always to
have been contemplated by the parties. They arise from
the nature or circumstances of the consideration
involved in a transaction whereby one person thereby
becomes invested with legal title but is obligated in
equity to hold his legal title for the benefit of another.
On the other hand, constructive trusts are created by
the construction of equity in order to satisfy the
demands of justice and prevent unjust enrichment.
Unlike express trusts concerning immovables or any
interest therein which cannot be proved by parol
evidence, implied trusts may be established by oral
evidence. However, in order to establish an implied
trust in real property by parol evidence, the proof
should be as fully convincing as if the acts giving rise to
the trust obligation were proven by an authentic
document. It cannot be established upon vague and
inconclusive proof. In this case, a resulting trust was
intended by the parties under Art. 1448 which provides
that “There is an implied trust when property is sold,
and the legal estate is granted to one party but the
price is paid by another for the purpose of having the
beneficial interest of the property. The former is the
trustee, while the latter is the beneficiary”. As
stipulated by the parties, the document of sale, the
owner's duplicate copy of the certificate of title,
insurance policies, receipt of initial premium of
insurance coverage and real estate tax receipts ware all
in the possession of respondent spouses which they
offered in evidence. As emphatically asserted by
respondent O Lay Kia, the reason why these documents
of ownership remained with her is that the land in
question belonged to her.
INES FELICIANO vs.ELISA CAMAHORT G.R. No. L-6962
March 14, 1912
FACTS: This petition arose from the removal of
appellant Ines Feliciano as guardian of a certain minor
and replaced by one Manual Navarro.
ISSUE: Whether the judge committed grave abuse of
discretion in removing the appellant as guardian for
being unfit.
Ruling: No, the facts of the case are bereft of any
showing that the judge committed grave error or fraud.
Matters of this nature is within the judge’s discretion. It
is the judge who deals directly with the parties, and for
this reason, is in the best position to form a correct
opinion as to the special needs of the minors, the
character and qualifications of persons whose names are
proposed for appointment as guardian, and the wise and
prudent course to be adopted under all the varying
circumstances of each particular case. In the case at
bar, it appears that the judge has exercised care and
diligence in selecting the guardian. In the absence of a
grave error or of any allegation and proof of fraud, the
exercise of such discretion will not be disturbed on
appeal.
RESTITUTO CENIZA and JESUS CENIZA vs. THE HON.
COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 46345. January 30, 1990
FACTS: Jose Ceniza and Vicente Dabon jointly purchased
Lot 627 on installment basis and they agreed, for
convenience, to have the land registered in the name of
Dabon. Since then, Jose Ceniza, Vicente Dabon, and
their heirs have possessed their respective portions of
the land, declared the same for taxation, paid real
estate taxes on their respective shares, and made their
respective installment payments to the Seminario de
San Carlos de Cebu. Thereafter, Jacinta Dabon and
Restituto Ceniza, one of the children of the co-owners
Jose and Vicente, subdivided the property in question
into Lot 627 A, B & C. However, private respondents
Magno, Vicenta, Teresita, Eugenia and Tomas all
surnamed Dabon, children of co-owner Vicente refused
to convey Lots Nos. 627-B and 627-C to the petitioners,
children of co-owner Jose Ceniza. They claimed that
their predecessor-in-interest, Vicente Dabon, was the
sole and exclusive owner of Lot 627, by purchase from
the Seminario de San Carlos de Cebu and that
petitioners' right of action had already prescribed.
Therefore, case was then filed at the Court of First
Instance (now, RTC) where the trial court rendered
judgment for the petitioners on the ground of the
existence of co-ownership among the parties. However,
said decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether there exists an implied trust between
Vicente Dabon and Jose Ceniza.
2. Whether the registration of the title of the land in
the name of one of the coowners constituted a
repudiation of the co-ownership for purposes of
acquisitive prescription.
RULING:
1. Yes. The registration of Lot No. 627 in the name of
Vicente Dabon created a trust in favor of his co-owner
Jose Ceniza, and the latter's heirs. Article 1452 of the
Civil Code states: "If two or more persons agree to
purchase property and by common consent the legal
title is taken in the name of one of them for the benefit
of all, a trust is created by force of law in favor of the
others in proportion to the interest of each."

2. No. In Custodio v. Casiano, 9 SCRA 841, it has been

ruled that:"Where title to land was issued in the name
of a co-heir merely with the understanding that he
would act as a trustee of his sisters, and there is no
evidence that this trust relation had ever been
repudiated by said trustee, it is held that a relation of
co-ownership existed between such trustee and his
sisters and the right of the successors-in-interest of said
sisters to bring the present action for recovery of their
shares therein against the successors-in-interest of said
trustee cannot be barred by prescription, despite the
lapse of 25 years from the date of registration of the
land in the trustee's name." Further, the Court has ruled
in numerous cases involving fiduciary relations that, as a
general rule, the trustee's possession is not adverse and
therefore cannot ripen into a title by prescription.
Adverse possession requires the concurrence of the
following circumstances: a) that the trustee has
performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to
the ouster of the cestui que trust; b) that such positive
acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui
que trust; and c) that the evidence thereon should be
clear and conclusive. Apparently, the foregoing is not
present in this case. Hence, respondents cannot claim
title to such property on account of acquisitive
prescription.