Human Nature and Autonomy

Human Nature and Autonomy:
Jürgen Habermas’
Critique of Liberal Eugenics
Daniel C. Henrich
International Centre for Ethics in the
Sciences and Humanities
Tübingen University, Germany
ABSTRACT. This essay examines whether Habermas’ approach to bioethics implies
that the ethical challenges of eugenics cannot be answered within the scope of a
deontological account, but only with reference to a concept of the good life or a
normative anthropology. First, Habermas’ ‘argument against alien determination’ is
elaborated, based on an action-theoretical concept of ‘human nature’ which is ana-
lyzed in the part three. Habermas’ main objection against genetic engineering, namely
that it entails a reification of human nature by undermining the consciousness of
autonomy of the genetically manipulated person, is also discussed. Subsequently, his
concept of human nature as a condition of possibility of our ethical self-understand-
ing, which is expressed in the phrase ‘ethics of the species’, is introduced. It is argued
that this term clearly indicates Habermas’ departure from the path of deontological
ethics. Moreover, this essay asserts that two readings of the argument against alien
determination are possible (a weak and a quasi-transcendental one) and that the
expression ‘consciousness of autonomy’ therefore remains ambiguous. The fourth
part of the paper deals with the question whether or not the argument against alien
determination is conditional on the assumption of genetic determinism.
In part five, the author claims that in contrast to earlier conceptions, Habermas
now implicitly raises the question ‘Why be moral?’ and at the same time refuses
to address it. The essay concludes with two different anthropological accounts
that can be found in Habermas’ work and that might be helpful to correct the
anthropological deficiency of his bioethical account.
KEYWORDS. Anthropology, bioethics, PGD, genetic engineering, Jürgen Habermas,

discourse ethics
I. INTRODUCTION
G iven developments in biotechnology and medical engineering,

questions about related ethical limits are growing. One example
ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES 18, no. 2(2011): 249-268.

© 2011 by Centre for Ethics, K.U.Leuven. All rights reserved. doi: 10.2143/EP.18.2.2116812
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ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES – JUNE 2011
is preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), which allows genetic ana-

lysis of in-vitro fertilized embryos. In Germany, legal questions con-
cerning embryos are regulated by the Embryonenschutzgesetzt of 1990
(Embryo Protection Act, henceforth ESchG). As PGD was not yet
being practiced in Germany in 1990, no regulations on PGD can be
found in the ESchG.1 Hence, the courts have to decide whether and to
what extent PGD is consistent with the general rules of the ESchG. In
July 2010, the German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) decided
that PGD, in principle, does not contradict the ESchG, but may only
be used to detect severe genetic defects. No selection of embryos based
on specific characteristics such as gender, colour, etc. is permissible.
In contrast, there are no regulatory constraints at all in the United
States. Non-medical selection criteria such as gender are thus not prohib-
ited. In this context, the British reproductive biologist Alan Handyside
asserts that parents should decide themselves – especially since specific
characteristics, such as intelligence, are (and presumably will always be) too
complex to be controlled by direct genetic interventions (Handyside 2010).
One criticism of this liberal account2 suggests that these techniques
cross a border beyond which human nature is altered in an objectionable
way. The underlying question of such critique is whether the term ‘human
nature’ actually has the potential to provide ethical limits for biotechnology.
Moreover, the term poses a special challenge to ethical approaches that
argue for a clear distinction between nature and morality. In this respect it
is remarkable that the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas published an
essay entitled “The Future of Human Nature” in 2001 (the German edition
has an additional subtitle “On the Way to Liberal Eugenics?”).
II. GENETIC ENGINEERING AND ALIEN DETERMINATION
In his essay, Habermas addresses the question whether post-metaphys-

ical philosophy can contribute to the ethics of genetic intervention.
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Ethical Perspectives 18 (2011) 2

HENRICH – HUMAN NATURE AND AUTONOMY
He predicts that “as a first step, the population in general as well as

the political public sphere and parliament may come to feel that pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis as such may be morally permitted or
legally tolerated if limited to a small number of well-defined cases of
severe hereditary diseases” (2003, 18). This forecast is consistent with
the ruling of the German BGH of July 2010. Moreover, Habermas
assumes that in a next step genetic intervention will be legalized for
the purpose of genetic disease prevention, which would lead to a grey
area between negative and positive eugenics. Yet since we need clear
boundaries, especially in the field of eugenics, Habermas contends that
the challenges we face are paradoxical:
In the very dimension where boundaries are fluid, we are supposed to

draw and to enforce particularly clear cut lines (2003, 19).
Habermas’ essays can thus be understood as an attempt to develop a post-

metaphysical approach to bioethics that delineates the ethical limits of
genetic intervention. One of the main hypotheses of this article is that he
accomplishes this aim by departing from the path of deontological ethics.
First, it is important to understand that Habermas separates the eth-
ical question of genetic engineering (PGD) from the moral status of the
embryo. There are two main reasons for this. On the one hand, Haber-
mas holds an inter-subjective and language-oriented account of morality,
which suggests that human dignity cannot be understood as an inherent
trait of any particular entity. Furthermore, he believes – as already indi-
cated – that bioethical questions have to be open to answers that are
worldview-neutral and free of metaphysical assumptions. And since
Habermas considers that the debate on the moral status of the embryo
does not meet this neutrality, he chooses a different path.
His key hypothesis is that the selection of an embryo by means of
genetic assessment as well as the genetic alteration of an embryo implies
a new form of control over humans, which undermines their autonomy
— 251 —

and thus their ability to act as moral agents. Habermas calls this “the
argument against alien determination” (2003, 86).3
Consequently, for Habermas genetic modification on the whole entails
the risk of a transformation of the ethical self-understanding of the species
‘humankind’. He therefore proposes a “moralizing of human nature” (2003,
25), which can be understood as a commitment to the current ethical self-
understanding of humankind. Since Habermas contends that “an assess-
ment of morality as a whole is itself not a moral judgment” (2003, 73), he
deems it impossible to give any moral arguments for this commitment.
With this argumentation, Habermas himself raises the old and non-deonto-
logical question: ‘Why be moral?’ But – as I will argue – refuses to answer it.
III. GENETIC ENGINEERING AND THE REIFICATION OF HUMAN NATURE
Apart from an encyclopaedia article from 1958 (Habermas 1973), it is

difficult to find any explicit statements on ‘human nature’ or anthropol-
ogy in Habermas’ work.4 Even in his Philosophical Discourse of Modernity,
Habermas only mentions Arnold Gehlen and Helmut Plessner margin-
ally and does not explicitly refer to the term anthropology. Although he
seems impressed with Plessner’s work in a letter dating from 1972,
Habermas maintains that language is the most important criterion for any
differentiation between humans and (other) animals. Hence, Habermas
understands the concept of ‘excentric positionality’ (Plessner) as an
expression of linguistic structures – not vice versa. Habermas’ scepti-
cism towards anthropology refers to any ontological manner and any
kind of anthropological constants. Thirty years later, the question arises
whether Habermas has succumbed to his own criticism. Is his concept
of ‘human nature’ in The Future of Human Nature itself not ontological?
It is remarkable that Habermas avoids any explicit definition of the
term even in this essay. It simply refers prima facie to humans as they are
born, i.e. without any manipulation of their genes. ‘Nature’ or ‘natural’ in
— 252 —

this sense means the contingently ‘grown’, which Habermas distinguishes

from the intentionally ‘made’. In light of current biotechnological chal-
lenges, this natural and contingent aspect of human origin has an existen-
tial and normative significance for each individual – and its manipulation
therefore results in severe ethical consequences.
This rather ordinary contingency proves to be – in the very moment

we can master it – a necessary presupposition for being-able-to-be-
oneself and for the fundamentally egalitarian nature of our interper-
sonal relationships (2003, 13).
According to this argument, genetic intervention in an individual’s ‘natu-

ral’ properties changes the self-understanding of that particular individual
as well as his or her relation to the social environment. Both conse-
quences result from the fact that the ‘natural’ properties of the altered
individual are the expression of a foreign and subjective will. Habermas
refers to this as “a specific type of paternalism” (2003, 64) and thus
implicitly emphasizes that genetic engineering fundamentally differs from
any other form of determination by others, as it alters the individual’s
natural disposition. This is a crucial point, especially since Habermas’
approach is supposed to be non-metaphysical. In his book From Chance to
Choice, Allan Buchanan et al. argue that it is not possible to define genetic
interventions as a singular form of determination without using meta-
physical terms (Buchanan 2000).5
The idea seems to be that genetic interventions result in a different indi-

vidual, whereas environmental interventions merely modify the same
individual. These metaphysical metaphors are misleading. The relation
between genotype and phenotype cannot be reduced to any traditional
metaphysical relationship, such as that between matter and form, or
substance and attribute, or essence and accident (2000, 160).
However, Habermas explicitly denies that his account has an ontological or

metaphysical dimension. He argues that the distinction between genetic and
— 253 —

other forms of influence is rooted in a “logic of forms of action” (2003,

45), which has unquestioned validity in the lifeworld, and considers that
our intuitive capability to distinguish between inorganic and organic
nature depends on a close interlacing “with certain modes of dealing with
the world” (2003, 44). With reference to Aristotle, Habermas distinguishes
between an actor’s technical attitude “who is engaged in production” (ibid.)
and the practical attitude of individuals who “approach one another in a
context of interaction” (ibid.).
It is particularly worthy of note that Habermas compares all forms of
practical attitude in the following argument – “the performative attitude of
a subject who wants to reach an understanding with a second person […],
the practices of the peasant who tends his cattle and cultivates his soil […],
the doctor who diagnoses diseases in order to heal them” and “the breeder
who selects and improves hereditary traits” (2003, 45) – with regard to their
respect for nature. With this argument, Habermas emphasises a special
form of human praxis (Arendt 1998) and at the same time parallels human
interaction (“the performative attitude of a subject who wants to reach
an understanding with a second person”) with a special attitude towards
nature. It would otherwise not be possible to distinguish any intervention
in nature (e.g. for the purpose of healing) from a technical attitude.
All these classical practices of cultivating, healing, and breeding share

a respect for the inherent dynamics of autoregulated nature. If they are
not to fail, the cultivating, therapeutic, or selecting interventions have
to abide by these dynamics (Habermas 2003, 45).
And since genetic engineering – as a special form of technical attitude –does

not abide by any natural dynamics, it approximates the grown and the made.
To the degree that the evolution of the species, proceeding by random

selection, comes within the reach of the interventions of genetic engi-
neering and, thus, of actions we have to answer for, the categories of
what is manufactured and what has come to be by nature, which in the life-
world still retain their demarcating power, dedifferentiate (2003, 46).
— 254 —

According to this point of view, genetic intervention dedifferentiates

between two types of action that are constitutive of the human self-under-
standing as species members: the technical and the practical attitude.
This action-theoretical argument can also be illustrated by Habermas’
disagreement with the equalization of socialization and genetic engineer-
ing. In his fourth chapter, he rejects the claim that socialization and
genetic intervention are comparable forms of influence exertion on oth-
ers. In his view, socialization can be characterized as a (partial) commu-
nicative situation in which “adolescents in principle still have the oppor-
tunity to respond to and to retroactively break away from it” (2003, 62).
In contrast, the genetic manipulation of a future individual implies “the
reifying perspective of a producer or a bricoleur” (2003, 51).
Habermas’ argumentation is reminiscent of the Dialectic of Enlighten-
ment in which Adorno and Horkheimer argue that the objectivation of
outer nature also has consequences for human nature (or the inner mind).6
In Habermas’ own work, the conceptual background can be found in the
action-theoretical terminology he establishes in his earlier writings, espe-
cially in his Theory of Communicative Action (2006, 84ff.). In short, Habermas
contrasts a genuine form of human practice (communicative action) with
secondary forms like instrumental action (technical attitude). His main
hypothesis is that communicative action is the primary mode of human
interaction and implies special normative elements. In contrast, instru-
mental action is a derivative mode that relates to an objective world in which
one realizes objective ends by choosing the appropriate means and, there-
fore, necessarily reduces normative aspects.
Habermas’ claim that the attitude of a producer or bricoleur is a case
of instrumental action is of particular significance. According to Haber-
mas, genetic engineering consequently represents a reification of human
beings that has severe ethical consequences.
Someone who performs treatment on an embryo approaches the quasi-
subjective nature of this embryo in the same perspective as he would
approach objective nature (Habermas 2003, 50).
— 255 —

To avoid undermining the possibility of any genetic intervention in gen-

eral (especially for the purpose of healing), Habermas proposes a virtual
discourse in which the physician figures him or herself as an opponent
of the future individual.
The presumption of informed consent transforms egocentric action into

communicative action. […] He [the geneticist] may, in the performative
attitude of a participant in interaction, anticipate the future person’s con-
sent to an essentially contestable goal of the treatment (2003, 52).
The action-theoretical understanding of the term ‘human nature’, therefore,

not only depends on the fact that no intervention takes place in principle.
Rather, the question is whether the geneticist (or doctor) engages in a vir-
tual discourse with the embryo and thus precludes any reifying attitude.
Habermas’ concept of ‘human nature’ in this action-theoretical version can
thus be defined as follows: the term ‘human nature’ relates to those features
of an individual that have developed entirely on their own and that have
only been intervened upon under the condition of anticipated consent.
But even if one agrees with Habermas’ account, a crucial question
remains: can a (reifying) intervention in the nature of a future individual actu-
ally have any consequences for the ethical self-understanding of that particu-
lar person? In other words, even if genetic engineering really implies some
form of reification, why should our morality depend on such an intervention?
IV. HUMAN NATURE AS THE CONDITION OF OUR ETHICAL SELF-

UNDERSTANDING?
If ‘human nature’ in its action-theoretical perspective can be understood as

the condition of our ethical self-understanding as humans, the normative
assessment of a genetic intervention in this ‘nature’ is only possible under
two (different) presuppositions: either one defines ‘human nature’ itself as
a normative nominal condition – which raises the problem of a naturalistic
— 256 —

fallacy – or one focuses on the (ethical) consequences of genetic interven-

tion.
In The Future of Human Nature, Habermas chooses the second option. His
central argument states that genetic engineering as an alien determination of
another person undermines a key condition of every moral agent, namely the
consciousness of autonomy. On account of genetic manipulation, the individual
thus lacks “a mental precondition for coping with the moral expectations to
take [...] the sole responsibility for her own life” (2003, 82). This argument
embodies the non-transcendental hypothesis that human nature can be under-
stood as a precondition of our ethical self-understanding, which seems to
contradict some of the basic assumptions of Habermas’ discourse ethics.
In discourse ethics, Habermas claims the universal validity of moral
rules, which he justifies with the so-called transcendental-pragmatic argu-
ment. This argument focuses on the term ‘discourse’ and its normative
implications. The main idea behind it is that every (linguistic) interaction
necessarily implies specific rules with specific normative content and must
be presupposed by every participant who wants to take part in a serious
discourse. Therefore, these rules can only be ignored at the cost of a
performative contradiction.7
Habermas explicitly speaks of ‘discourse’ – not of ‘conversation’ like
Gadamer – because discourse is supposed to be a rational, problem-
solving mode of communication that can be used to find non-violent
solutions across behavioural and cultural borders. The fact that this dis-
course enables participants to rationally transgress cultural borders and at
the same time implies specific normative presuppositions is the reason
for its central position in Habermas’ moral philosophy.
Die diskursethische Strategie, die Gehalte einer universalistischen Moral

aus den allgemeinen Argumentationsvoraussetzungen zu gewinnen, ist
gerade darum aussichtsreich, weil der Diskurs eine anspruchsvollere, über
konkrete Lebensformen hinausgreifende Kommunikationsform darstellt,
in der die Präsuppositionen verständigunsorientierten Handelns verallge-
meinert, abstrahiert und entschränkt […] werden (Habermas 1991, 18).
— 257 —

Without going into further details on this complex concept, it suffices to

say that the normative presuppositions of linguistic interaction are
extremely important for a discourse-ethical reconstruction of morality.
Only in communicative interaction is it actually possible to establish moral
claims and thus moral validity. At minimum, validity claims and conse-
quently symbolic interaction is required to be able to speak about morality.
Under such presuppositions, the question how any modification of
our genetic code could have severe ethical consequences transforms into
the question whether there are any connections between our ‘nature’ and
(the necessary presuppositions of) communication (cf. Henrich 2007).
And indeed, Habermas seems to indicate precisely this:
Our conceptions of – and attitude toward – prepersonal human life
embed the rational morality of subjects of human rights in the stabilizing
context of an ethics of the species. This context must endure if morality
itself is not to start slipping […]. And would not, then, the grammatical
form of our moral language game – the self-understanding of speakers
and actors as beings for whom normative reasons count – be changed
as a whole? (2003, 67)
But even if Habermas assumes that the grammatical form of our language
game could be altered by genetic interventions, it is striking that he does
not address this problem in detail.
The hypothesis of the author of the present essay is that the expres-
sion ‘consciousness of autonomy’ (and, accordingly, the argument against
alien determination itself) remains ambiguous. On the one hand, Haber-
mas suspects that “eugenic manipulation changes the rules of the lan-
guage game itself” (2003, 92) and therefore implies that the argument
against alien determination refers to a quasi-transcendental form of
autonomy, which is part of every (moral) language game (Habermas
2007). On the other, it seems that the term refers to moral agents’ psycho-
logical condition (one example will be discussed below).
Hence, a strong and a weak reading of the argument against alien determina-
tion is distinguished. The weak reading understands the term ‘consciousness
— 258 —

of autonomy’ as a mostly psychological condition for moral agency. In this

respect, Habermas’ account contains no argument against genetic engi-
neering in principle. Only some genetically manipulated individuals would feel
uncertain about their moral accountability, whereby the ethical assessment
of genetic engineering then depends on the psychological disposition of
each individual. To verify this account, empirical studies would be helpful
to examine the moral and ethical self-image of persons who have already
been genetically altered. The general, quasi-transcendental presupposition
of autonomy and thus morality is not affected by this interpretation.
According to the strong or quasi-transcendental reading, Habermas’ argu-
mentation suggests that genetic engineering endangers autonomy as a whole
and that human morality as a whole must therefore also be questioned.
Habermas’ argumentation leaves room for both notions. Since he
argues neither for a strict psychological reading nor for ethical naturalism,
important questions remain unanswered. Before these questions are
addressed, however, another intricacy of the argument against alien deter-
mination has to be mentioned.
V. ALIEN DETERMINATION, NATALITY, AND GENOCENTRIC FALLACY
The argument against alien determination depends prima facie on the

assumption that subjects’ concrete plans and intentions are ‘determinable’
by genetic manipulation (genetic determinism). Habermas, however, rig-
orously denies that his account implies any form of genetic determinism.
He argues that the question is not how genes determine the specific
characteristics of subjects, but rather how the intervention affects the
relationship of the subject to him or herself.
Irrespective of how far genetic programming could actually go in fixing

properties, dispositions, and skills, as well as in determining behavior
of the future person, post factum knowledge of this circumstance may
intervene in the self-relation of the person, the relation to her bodily
or mental existence (Habermas 2003, 53).
— 259 —

To explain this argument, he refers to the concept of ‘natality’ by Hanna

Arendt and suggests that “birth as a natural fact, meets the conceptual
requirement of constituting a beginning we cannot control” (2003, 58).
In her book The Human Condition, Arendt stresses that the human
capability to perform actions has a very close “connection with the human
condition of natality” (1998, 9). Accordingly, only birth has the potential
for starting something entirely new. Acting is thus to be understood as
“the actualization of the human condition of natality” (1998, 178).
The miracle that saves the world, the realm of human affairs, from its
normal, ‘natural’ ruin is ultimately the fact of natality, in which the
faculty of action is ontologically rooted (1998, 247).
With reference to this position, Habermas understands birth as “a divide

between nature and culture” (2003, 59), which is supposed to represent
the condition in which one understands oneself as the initiator of one’s
own actions. In this sense, Habermas’ account does not actually embody
genetic determinism; instead, the major problem is the knowledge of being
genetically transformed.8
The change would take place in the mind. […] When the adolescent
learns about the design drawn up by another person for intervening in
her genetic features in order to modify certain traits, the perspective
of being a grown body may be superseded – in her objectivating self-
perception – by the perspective of being something made (2003, 53).
At the same time, this argument seems to indicate that only the weak
reading of the argument against alien determination (and thus of the term
autonomy) can be right: if the change did indeed only take place in the
mind, genetic engineering does not necessarily cause a loss of consciousness
for responsible agency, since the consequences of this knowledge might
differ from person to person.
In this respect, it is also important for the genetically altered indi-
vidual to know that genetic engineering is not (and will never be) able to
— 260 —

determine his or her actions and aspirations in general. Thus, John Dupré
calls the idea that human beings’ concrete intentions and life plans could
be programmed a ‘genocentric fallacy’, especially since the opinion that
genes are responsible for specific traits is scientifically incorrect.
It is still very common to hear references to ‘genes for’ this or that –
eye color, intelligence, height, homosexuality, and so on. But it is vital
to remember that though the production of particular proteins is nec-
essary for the appearance of many traits, it is almost never close to
sufficient (Dupré 2003, 84).
Alan Handyside emphasizes the limits of alien determination as follows:

It is important to acknowledge the limitations of PGD. Many people
are concerned about ‘designer babies’, but the scope for selecting
embryos with desirable traits beyond common characteristics such as
gender, hair or eye colour is constrained by several factors. The first is
that the genetic elements underlying a trait must be present in one or
both parents. The second is that since a typical in vitro fertilization
(IVF) cycle results in only a handful of fertilized embryos for biopsy
and testing, the chances of one embryo inheriting the right combina-
tion of genetic elements to give the desired characteristic may be too
low to make the procedure worth trying, particularly as only a fraction
of embryos implant successfully even in fertile couples. Finally,
although complex traits such as intelligence are known to have a strong
genetic component, many other variables would make it impossible to
identify individual embryos with desired traits (2010, 978).
With reference to Habermas’ account, these limitations could be used to

claim that as this knowledge raises the consciousness of an individuals’
scope of autonomy and of the opportunity to determine his or her own
life, it also affects the consciousness of autonomy.
VI. ‘WHY BE MORAL?’ THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL DEFICIENCY
Habermas’ essay on bioethics begins with an important choice: The deci-

sion to discuss the ethical challenges of genetic interventions separately
— 261 —

from the moral status of the embryo. Instead, he focuses on the conse-
quences of the intervention for our ethical self-understanding. His main
hypothesis is that genetic manipulation embodies a particular form of
determination that undermines constitutive conditions of human moral-
ity. The individual who has to accept his or her own ‘nature’ as the
expression of another’s will may lose a mental precondition for being a
morally responsible agent.
This argumentation embeds our moral ability in a natural context,
which functions as the condition of possibility of moral action. It is
expressed by the term ‘ethics of the species’: with respect to its natural
genesis, human morality as a whole can be understood as an ‘ethics of
the species’ and is therefore also subject to the general possibility of
transformation. The term thus implies a break with a central aspect of
deontological ethics in whose tradition Habermas’ discourse ethics can be
found: the apriority of moral philosophy. Although Kant did not disre-
gard the significance of ‘human nature’, he rigorously denied the possibil-
ity of any grounding of moral philosophy and ethical validity in anthro-
pological claims (Edwards 2000; Schmidt 2005; Sullivan 1995; Wilson
2007; Wood 1991).
In his earlier writings, Habermas shared this view. He maintained a
sharp distinction between the terms ‘ethical’ and ‘moral’. He understood
‘ethical’ in the sense of ‘ethos’, which approximates to ‘custom’ or ‘con-
vention’.9 For Habermas, ethical discourses are “embedded in the life-his-
torical context” (2001, 12) and are not supposed to be universal. They deal
with questions of lifestyle and identity and are relative to specific cultural
backgrounds. By contrast, “moral practical discourses […] require a break
with all of the unquestioned truth of an established, concrete ethical life,
in addition to distancing oneself from the contexts of life with which
one’s identity is inextricably interwoven” (2001, 13). Based on this point
of view, ethical and moral standards differ with regard to the scope of their
validity claims. Ethical norms offer cultural rules of behaviour that are
bound to a specific context, whereas moral rules claim to be independent
— 262 —

of any cultural context and, therefore, to be universal. Habermas called

this the primacy of the just over the good. With reference to Kant, he argued
that questions of the good life (ethics) have to be separated from ques-
tions of justice (morality). At no point did Habermas embed morality in
an ethical context. On the contrary, the break between ethical and moral
questions was necessary to designate discourse ethics as universalist.10
Otherwise, moral validity claims would only be the expression of a
particular (cultural) background and therefore be relativistic.
It must be underscored that Habermas abandons this clear cut hier-
archy in light of biotechnology challenges and thus questions basic aspects
of discourse ethics. But since he refuses at the same time to scrutinize the
relation between our ethical background and human morality in detail, he
does not provide any arguments why we should actually hold on to our
ethical self-understanding and moralize our nature. The present essay
argues, therefore, that Habermas’ approach suddenly becomes fairly deci-
sionistic: Why should we stick to our actual ethical self-understanding
and prevent its transformation through genetic engineering? The
author’s hypothesis is that these questions can only be answered within
the scope of the concept of a ‘good life’ or with reference to a normative
anthropology.
Hence, the results of Habermas’ approach become obvious. The fact
that he does not argue from a strictly deontological point of view gives
rise to the question why we should be moral at all. This kind of question
is typical for non-deontological approaches such as Aristotelian or anthro-
pological ethics. Therefore, the quest for an anthropological and not only
action-theoretical understanding of ‘human nature’ becomes important.
Yet, since Habermas still (as in his earlier writings) refuses to address this
issue, it is necessary to analyze whether there are any indications in his
own writings for such an account.
Two concepts are important: George Herbert Mead’s concept of a
linguistically mediated individuation through socialization and Arnold
Gehlen’s view of humans as deficient beings (Mängelwesen).11 Although both
— 263 —

anthropological accounts are present in Habermas’ work, he only refers

to Mead – and even in this case he does not explicitly speak about anthro-
pology. In fact, he uses Mead’s naturalistic and non-reductionist approach
to reconstruct the phylogenetic development of human beings in a prag-
matic perspective. The reference to Mead in this context is important for
two reasons. On the one hand, it indicates that Habermas evidently con-
siders Mead, to have some kind of anthropological meaning; on the other
hand, it emphasizes the meaning of language compared to other anthro-
pological approaches (cf. Habermas 1996). Mead can thus be described
as the philosopher who provides the anthropological basis for the lan-
guage-theoretical aspects of Habermas’ moral theory. At the same time,
he also contributes to the concept of a ‘weak naturalism’ which Habermas
developed in his recent work.
In addition to Mead, an even stronger anthropological account can be
found in Habermas’ work, although Habermas never fully developed it.
This approach understands the moral and linguistic skills of an individual as
a cultural response to his or her specific vulnerability. In this respect, moral-
ity functions as a compensatory action that helps humans resist their specific
vulnerability, which is understood as a result of a congenital incompleteness.
I conceive of moral behavior as a constructive response to the depen-

dencies rooted in the incompleteness of our organic makeup and in
the persistent frailty […] of our bodily existence (Habermas 2003, 33).
This account is reminiscent of Arnold Gehlen’s model of humans as a

Mängelwesen: Gehlen understands distinctive human traits as the result of
compensatory behaviour with regard to humans’ inner and outer frailty.
In contrast to Gehlen, Habermas does not consider humans as beings
that need to be disciplined to stabilize their cultural traits. On the con-
trary, in his Theory of Communicative Action, he demonstrates that language,
as the ‘space of reason’, is the essential medium of social and cultural
reproduction for humans, since it has a linguistic and normative core.
Therefore, language for Habermas also provides the conceptual basis to
— 264 —

reconstruct the deontological content of moral phenomena in a post-meta-

physical manner. One important aspect of this reconstruction are the so-
called ‘validity claims’, which Habermas uses to argue that even in moral
discourses rational and consensual results have to be possible (normative
cognitivism). In other words, morality emerges when ‘pure nature’ has been
overcome in favour of the ‘space of reason’. The problem, however, is that
Habermas does not explicitly address the relation of nature and reason –
either in a theoretical or in an anthropological manner. Even if such indica-
tions can be found in Habermas’ work, he refuses to use them for his moral
philosophy. The reason for this might be that he does not want to entirely
abandon his hypothesis of the primacy of the just over the good.
However, as long as Habermas suggests that biotechnology chal-
lenges might be able to undermine our morality, he departs from the path
of deontological ethics and implicitly raises the question “Why be moral?”
VII. CONCLUSION
Habermas’ essay can be summed up in three hypotheses: (i) ‘human nature’

provides a species-specific context of human morality which Habermas calls
the ‘ethics of the species’; (ii) genetic manipulation of this nature embodies
a specific form of reification and has to therefore be avoided “if morality
itself is not to start slipping” (2003, 67); (iii) the demand for ‘moralizing
human nature’ is justified by the second hypothesis.
In discourse ethics, Habermas held a quasi-transcendental status of
autonomy and (in contrast to Apel) denied the necessity for any ‘meta-
commitment for morality’ (2001, 76ff.). Since humans have found them-
selves in a social and thus normative context ever since, he has not taken
a situation into account in which we have to assess our morality as a whole.
Yet, in light of biotechnology challenges, this has changed: Habermas
now assumes that deontological accounts are inadequate to answer these
kinds of ethical questions.
— 265 —

Even if one agrees that some bioethical questions cannot be answered

within a deontological account, however, two problems remain: the ambi-
guity of the term autonomy and the question why we should hold on to
our ethical self-understanding at all.
The weak reading of Habermas’ account might be beyond dispute.
Some individuals will develop identity problems if they discover that
they have been genetically manipulated and others will not. Conse-
quently, it seems that this interpretation does not provide any arguments
against genetic engineering in general and passes the problem on to psy-
chological research and treatment. Although this might not be an unac-
ceptable outcome, other parts of Habermas’ essay are not consistent with
this notion, particularly when he indicates that genetic engineering endan-
gers our morality as a whole in a quasi-transcendental way. Moreover, his
suggestion that we moralize human nature remains unclear, primarily
because he does not explain why we should hold on to our moral self-
understanding and why we are not supposed to change it. To answer this
question, reference to our ‘consciousness of autonomy’ is not sufficient;
if this expression is to be understood in a strong sense, Habermas needs
to develop a concept of the good life or a normative anthropology that
addresses the non-deontological question ‘Why be moral?’
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Arendt, Hannah. 1998. The Human Condition. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Buchanan, Allen. 2000. From Chance to Choice. Genetics and Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Dupré, John. 2003. Darwin’s Legacy. What Evolution Means Today. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Edwards, Jeffrey. 2000. “Self-Love, Anthropology and Universal Benevolence in Kant’s
Metaphysics of Morals.” The Review of Metaphysics 53:887-914.
Habermas, Jürgen. 1973. “Philosophische Anthropologie (ein Lexikonartikel).” In Kultur
und Kritik. Verstreute Aufsätze, 89-111. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Habermas, Jürgen. 1991.“Treffen Hegels Einwände auch auf die Diskursethik zu?”
In Erläuterungen zur Diskursethik, 9-30. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
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Habermas, Jürgen. 1995. “Morality and Ethical Life: Does Hegel’s Critique of Kant
Apply to Discourse Ethics?” In Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 195-
215. Cambridge, Polity.
Habermas, Jürgen. 1996. “Individuation through Socialization: On George Herbert
Mead’s Theory of Subjectivity.” In Postmetaphysical Thinking, 149-204. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Habermas, Jürgen. 2001. Justification and Application. Remarks on Discourse Ethics. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Habermas, Jürgen. 2003. The Future of Human Nature. Oxford: Blackwell.
Habermas, Jürgen. 2006. The Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Polity.
Habermas, Jürgen. 2007. “The Language Game of Responsible Agency and the Problem
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Honneth, Axel. 1991.“Habermas’ Anthropology of Knowledge: The Theory of Knowl-
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Fragments. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Prusak, Bernard G. 2005. “Rethinking ‘Liberal Eugenics’.” Hastings Center Report 6:31-42.
Schmidt, Claudia M. 2005. “The Anthropological Dimension of Kant’s Metaphysik of
Morals.” Kant-Studien 1:65-84.
Sullivan, Roger J. 1995. “The Influence of Kant’s Anthropology on His Moral Theory.”
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NOTES
1. Alan Handyside reported on the first successful applications of PGD in 1990 (Handyside
1990).
2. Buchanan et al. refer to this kind of account as “The personal service model” (Buchanan
et al. 2000, 12ff.).
3. Habermas also uses the phrase “alien co-authorship” (2003, 85).
— 267 —

4. For the meaning of anthropology in Habermas’ early work, cf. Honneth 1991.
5. Cf. Prusak 2005, 32ff.
6. Horkheimer, Adorno 2002.
7. For Habermas, these presuppositions have an exclusive epistemic status. In contrast, Karl-
Otto Apel claims that they also have an existential content, which obliges each participant to adhere
to them.
8. The correctness of Habermas’ interpretation of Arendt’s account of natality will not be
discussed here.
9. The term ‘moral’ usually refers to the level of concrete normative orders of human action,
whereas ‘ethical’ refers to a theoretical level, the analysis of this concrete (moral) normativity.
Ethics thus usually refers to a ‘theory of morals’. According to this conventional understanding,
the terms ‘ethics’ and ‘moral philosophy’ can be used synonymously.
10. Cf. Habermas 1995, 197.
11. For further analysis of the relationship between anthropology and pragmatism in Haber-
mas’ early writings, cf. Honneth 1991.
— 268 —

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Human Nature and Autonomy:

KEYWORDS. Anthropology, bioethics, PGD, genetic engineering, Jürgen Habermas,

G iven developments in biotechnology and medical engineering,

ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES 18, no. 2(2011): 249-268.

94545_Ethical_Persp_2011/2_05.indd 249 7/06/11 13:12

is preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), which allows genetic ana-

II. GENETIC ENGINEERING AND ALIEN DETERMINATION

In his essay, Habermas addresses the question whether post-metaphys-

94545_Ethical_Persp_2011/2_05.indd 250 7/06/11 13:12

He predicts that “as a first step, the population in general as well as

In the very dimension where boundaries are fluid, we are supposed to

Habermas’ essays can thus be understood as an attempt to develop a post-

94545_Ethical_Persp_2011/2_05.indd 251 7/06/11 13:12

III. GENETIC ENGINEERING AND THE REIFICATION OF HUMAN NATURE

Apart from an encyclopaedia article from 1958 (Habermas 1973), it is

94545_Ethical_Persp_2011/2_05.indd 252 7/06/11 13:12

this sense means the contingently ‘grown’, which Habermas distinguishes

This rather ordinary contingency proves to be – in the very moment

According to this argument, genetic intervention in an individual’s ‘natu-

The idea seems to be that genetic interventions result in a different indi-

However, Habermas explicitly denies that his account has an ontological or

94545_Ethical_Persp_2011/2_05.indd 253 7/06/11 13:12

other forms of influence is rooted in a “logic of forms of action” (2003,

All these classical practices of cultivating, healing, and breeding share

And since genetic engineering – as a special form of technical attitude –does

To the degree that the evolution of the species, proceeding by random

94545_Ethical_Persp_2011/2_05.indd 254 7/06/11 13:12

According to this point of view, genetic intervention dedifferentiates

94545_Ethical_Persp_2011/2_05.indd 255 7/06/11 13:12

To avoid undermining the possibility of any genetic intervention in gen-

The presumption of informed consent transforms egocentric action into

The action-theoretical understanding of the term ‘human nature’, therefore,

IV. HUMAN NATURE AS THE CONDITION OF OUR ETHICAL SELF-

If ‘human nature’ in its action-theoretical perspective can be understood as

94545_Ethical_Persp_2011/2_05.indd 256 7/06/11 13:12

fallacy – or one focuses on the (ethical) consequences of genetic interven-

Die diskursethische Strategie, die Gehalte einer universalistischen Moral

94545_Ethical_Persp_2011/2_05.indd 257 7/06/11 13:12

Without going into further details on this complex concept, it suffices to

94545_Ethical_Persp_2011/2_05.indd 258 7/06/11 13:12

of autonomy’ as a mostly psychological condition for moral agency. In this

V. ALIEN DETERMINATION, NATALITY, AND GENOCENTRIC FALLACY

The argument against alien determination depends prima facie on the

Irrespective of how far genetic programming could actually go in fixing

94545_Ethical_Persp_2011/2_05.indd 259 7/06/11 13:12

To explain this argument, he refers to the concept of ‘natality’ by Hanna

With reference to this position, Habermas understands birth as “a divide

94545_Ethical_Persp_2011/2_05.indd 260 7/06/11 13:12

Alan Handyside emphasizes the limits of alien determination as follows:

With reference to Habermas’ account, these limitations could be used to

VI. ‘WHY BE MORAL?’ THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL DEFICIENCY

Habermas’ essay on bioethics begins with an important choice: The deci-

94545_Ethical_Persp_2011/2_05.indd 261 7/06/11 13:12

94545_Ethical_Persp_2011/2_05.indd 262 7/06/11 13:12

of any cultural context and, therefore, to be universal. Habermas called

94545_Ethical_Persp_2011/2_05.indd 263 7/06/11 13:12

anthropological accounts are present in Habermas’ work, he only refers

I conceive of moral behavior as a constructive response to the depen-

This account is reminiscent of Arnold Gehlen’s model of humans as a

94545_Ethical_Persp_2011/2_05.indd 264 7/06/11 13:12

reconstruct the deontological content of moral phenomena in a post-meta-

Habermas’ essay can be summed up in three hypotheses: (i) ‘human nature’

94545_Ethical_Persp_2011/2_05.indd 265 7/06/11 13:12

Even if one agrees that some bioethical questions cannot be answered