Re: Request (ERAP CASE)

FACTS

A request for possible TV coverage of the Estrada plunder trial in the Sandiganbayan was filed, but it was
rejected by the same court

In Estes v Texas, US SC held that TV coverage of judicial proceeding involves an inherent denial of the due
process rights of a criminal defendant

Court identified several areas of potential prejudice which might arise from the impact of the cameras on the
jury, witness, trial judge and defendant:

1. Witness might be frightened, play to the camera or become nervous. They are subject to extraordinary
out-of-court influences that might affect their testimony
2. Telecast increases trial judge’s responsibility to avoid actual prejudice to the defendant and might affect his
performance
3. For the defendant telecasting is a form of mental harassment and subject him to excessive public exposure.
Also distracts him from presenting his defense

Press have no special standing to apply for writ of mandate to compel a court to permit them to attend a trial,
since in a courtroom, reporter’s consti rights are no greater than those of the public.

Because of the prejudice it poses to defendant’s right to due process, and the fair and orderly administration
of justice, live radio and tv coverage of court proceedings are not allowed. Video footages for news purposes
shall be restricted and limited to shots of the courtroom, judicial officers, parties and their counsel taken prior
to the start of the proceedings.

The press is a mighty catalyst in awakening public consciousness, and became an important instrument in
the quest for truth

ISSUE

Which right should prevail: freedom of the press and the right of public information, or the fundamental rights
of the accused?

HELD

The right of the accused must prevail, based on our jurisprudence

With the possibility of losing not only the precious liberty but also the life of an accused, it is imperative to
make sure that an accused receives a verdict solely on the basis of a just and dispassionate judgment: a
verdict after presentation of credible evidence testified by an unbiased witness, decreed by a judge with
unprejudiced mind

Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until proven guilty in a trial that is not lifted
above its individual settings nor made object of public’s attention, and where conclusions reached are
induced not by any outside force but only by evidence and argument given in open court

TV can work profound changes in the behavior of the people it focuses on.

To say that actual prejudice should first be present would leave to near nirvana the subtle threats to justice
that a disturbance of the mind so indispensable to the calm and deliberate dispensation of justice can create
(ANO DAW??)

The effect of tv may escape the ordinary means of proof, but not far-fetched for it to gradually erode our basal
conception of a trial.

Baguio Midland v CA

FACTS:
Oseo Hamada (petitioner) was the president and general manager of Baguio Printing and Publishing Co.,
which published Baguio Midland Courier. He was also the business manager of Baguio Midland. Cecilia
Afable (petitioner) was the editor in chief and a columnist who ran “In and Out of Baguio”

Ramon Labo (respondent) was one of the mayoralty candidate who already embarked on a political career by
running for a seat in the former Batasang Pambansa. Labo’s campaign ads appeared in Baguio Midland and
was printed by Baguio Publishing

* I no longer placed the facts that relate to Narukawa Labo because she no longer wanted to testify

Afable wrote in her column a series of articles dealing with the candidates of various elective positions.

Because of the articles, respondent filed a criminal and civil case against the petitioner for libel claiming that
the column were tainted with malice. DOJ dismissed the crim case due to lack of evidence

Respondent alleged that petitioner made it appear that he could not comply with his financial obligations and
that the article was for the purpose of destroying his integrity, reputation and personality

Petitioners denied articles are libelous. Respondent did own them a certain sum of money for political ads as
was stated in the article of Afable. Afable claims that her column were protected by freedom of speech and of
the press, and that they were privilege as they dealt with a public figure

TESTIMONIES:

For respondents, meaning of “dumpty in the egg”:

A. Respondent: someone who is a failure in his business undertakings

B. Dr. Pedro Rovillos: “a zero or a big lie”

Petitioners:

A. Sylvia Lambino, bookkeeper and accountant, who stated that several letters of demand was sent to
respondent for his unpaid obligations, and despite repeated demands, it remained unpaid.
B. Afable stated that the phrase referred to Horato Aquino.

Trial court dismissed to complaint for lack of complaint. They stated that the article was privileged and
constituted fair comment on matters of public interest because it dealt with the integrity of a candidate for
local office.

CA reversed the decision. It was stated that, at the time the article was published, the respondent was not yet
a public officer, article was malicious because it was published few days before election day.

ISSUE:

W/N the articles were libelous, false and malicious

HELD:

No, column was not libelous.

Principle that findings of fact of the appellate court are binding and conclusive upon us,] such adherence has
not prevented this Court from setting aside the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals when circumstances so
warrant.

The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals and Sun Brothers & Company: Court had the
occasion to enumerate the exceptions to the general rule as regards the conclusiveness of the findings of fact
of the appellate court, to wit:

(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;
(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) when the findings of facts are conflicting;
(6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court;
(8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed
by the respondent;
(10) when the findings of facts are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record; and
(11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties,
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.

(not sec 4 topic but you never know with Chan-G soooooo i just placed it as well)

All exceptions are present, except 1, 6, 9, and 10

As to contentions of Labo, a perusal reveal that it contained issued that involved other candidates as well,
respondent was unduly singled out, and it would reveal that the person alluded to by petitioner Afable in her
use of dumpty in the egg was not the respondent.

It is essential that the alleged victim be identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named. It is enough
if by intrinsic reference the allusion is apparent or if the publication contains matters of descriptions or
reference to facts and circumstances from which others reading the article may know the plaintiff was
intended, or if extraneous circumstances point to him such that persons knowing him could and did
understand that he was the person referred to.

Borjal v CA: it is also not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person attacked or
defamed, but it must be shown that at least a third person could identify him as the object of the libelous
publication

Respondent failed to dispose of this responsibility. His lone witness, Dr. Rovillos, was able to give his own
understanding of the phrase but failed to sufficiently explain how he arrived at the conclusion.It was
insufficient to support finding of liability on the part of the petitioners as he was unable to offer an iota of
justification for his conclusion that it pertained to private respondent.

US v Sedano: Court had recognized the public’s right to be informed on the mental, moral, and physical
fitness of candidates for public office

NY Times v Sullivan: It is of the utmost consequence that the people should discuss the character and
qualifications of candidates for their suffrages... occasional injury to the reputations of individuals must yield
to the public welfare, although at times such injury may be great.

Rule only applies to fair comment on matters of public interest, fair comment being that which is true, or which
if false, expresses the real opinion of the author based upon reasonable degree of care and on reasonable
grounds. The principle does not grant an absolute license to authors or writers to destroy the persons of
candidates for public office by exposing the latter to public contempt or ridicule by providing the general public
with publications tainted with express or actual malice.The remedy is to show proof that an article was written
with the authors knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. While
the law creates the presumption that every defamatory imputation is malicious, the privileged character of a
communication destroys said presumption. The burden of proving actual malice shall then rest on the plaintiff.
Respondent was unable to prove that Afable’s column was tainted with actual malice. The records are replete
with evidence that he had an unpaid obligation.

Borjal: Assuming that the contents of the articles are false, mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity alone does
not prove actual malice. Errors or misstatements are inevitable in any scheme of truly free expression and
debate. Consistent with good faith and reasonable care, the press should not be held to account, to a point
of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfections in the choice of language.

We hold that petitioner Afable’s article constitutes a fair comment on a matter of public interest as it dealt with
the character of private respondent who was running for the top elective post in Baguio City at the
time. Considering respondent assured his would-be constituents that he would be donating millions of his
own money, Afable’s column with respect to respondent’s indebtedness provided the public with information
as regards his financial status which, in all probability, was still unknown to them at that time. The information
might have dissuaded some members of the electorate from voting in favor of private respondent but such is
the inevitable result of the application of the law.

RENO v American

FACTS

2 provision of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) seek to protect minors from harmful material on the
internet:

1. Sec 223(a)(1)(B)(ii): criminalizes the knowing transmission of obscene and indecent messages to any
recipient under 18 y/o
2. Sec 223 9(d): prohibits the knowing sending or displaying to a person under 18 of any message that, in
context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards,
sexual or excretory activities or organs

Defenses provided for those who take good faith effective actions to restrict access by minors to the
prohibited communications (sec 223(e)(5)(A)), and those who restrict such access by requiring designated
forms of age proof, like credit card or adult identification number (sec 223 (e)(5)(B)

Plaintiffs assail the constitutionality of the 2 provisions. District court entered a preliminary injunction against
enforcement of provisions. Court’s judgment enjoins gov’t from enforcing sec 223(a)(1)(B)’s prohibitions that
relate to indecent communications but preserves the right to investigate and prosecute the child pornography
activities prohibited. Injunction against sec 223(d) is unqualified because it contains no separate reference to
pornography pornography

ISSUE:

W/N the provisions are violative of the 1st amendment

HELD

YES. CDA is violates 1st amendment. CDA’s “indecent transmission” and “patently offensive display” abridge
freedom of speech

CDA differs from the various laws and orders upheld in other cases such as its not limited to commercial
transactions; doesn't allow parents to consent to their children’s use of restricted materials; fails to provide
any definition of "indecent" and omits any requirement that "patently offensive" material lack socially
redeeming value; neither limits its broad categorical prohibitions to particular times nor bases them on an
evaluation by an agency familiar with the medium's unique characteristics; is punitive; applies to a medium
that, unlike radio, receives full First Amendment protection; and cannot be properly analyzed as a form of time,
place, and manner regulation because it is a content based blanket restriction on speech.

The factors recognized in cases in justifying regulation of the broadcast media--the history of extensive
government regulation of broadcasting, the scarcity of available frequencies at its inception, and its "invasive"
nature are not present in cyberspace. Thus, these cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of First
Amendment scrutiny

The use of undefined terms “indecent” and “patently offensive” provoke uncertainty about how the terms
relate to each other and what they mean. The vagueness of such a content based regulation, coupled with its
increased deterrent effect as a criminal statute, raise special First Amendment concerns because of its
obvious chilling effect on free speech

CDA lacks precision that the 1st amendment requires when a statute regulates the content of speech. The
CDA pursues that interest by suppressing a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to
send and receive. Its breadth is wholly unprecedented. The CDA's burden on adult speech is unacceptable if
less restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective in achieving the Act's legitimate purposes. CDA’s
special problems are not narrowly tailored.

The contention that the Act is constitutional because it leaves open ample "alternative channels" of
communication is unpersuasive because the CDA regulates speech on the basis of its content, so that a "time,
place, and manner" analysis is inapplicable.

The assertion that the CDA's "knowledge" and "specific person" requirements significantly restrict its
permissible application to communications to persons the sender knows to be under 18 is untenable, given
that most Internet forums are open to all comers and that even the strongest reading of the "specific person"
requirement would confer broad powers of censorship, in the form of a "heckler's veto," upon any opponent of
indecent speech.

There is no textual support for the submission that material having scientific, educational, or other redeeming
social value will necessarily fall outside the CDA's prohibitions.

Sec 223(e)(5) defenses do not constitute the sort of "narrow tailoring" that would save the CDA. The
Government's argument that "good faith action" by "tagging" their indecent communications is illusory. The
proposed screening software does not exist yet, but, even if it did, there’s no way of knowing whether a
recipient would block the material. The Government also failed to prove that § 223(b)(5)'s verification defense
would significantly reduce the CDA's heavy burden on adult speech.