G.R. No.

95320 September 4, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BALTAZAR LACAO, SR., PATRIA LACAO and TRINIDAD LACAO MANSILLA, accused-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Geomer C. Delfin for accused-appellants.

REGALADO, J:p

In an information filed on February 3, 1986 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 1416 in the
Regional Trial Court of Capiz, Branch XXI, Baltazar Lacao, Sr., alias "Bantan", Patria Lacao, Trinidad
Mansilla, Baltazar Lacao II, alias "Boticol," and Baltazar Lacao III, alias "Toto," were charged with
the complex crime of murder with direct assault upon an agent of a person in authority allegedly
committed as follows:

That on or about the 28th day of September, 1985, at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening,
in Brgy. Manibad, Municipality of Mambusao, Province of Capiz, and within the
jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused armed with knives and wooden
stools, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation, treachery and taking
advantage of nighttime and superior strength to better facilitate the commission of the
offense, assault, attack and hit one POLICE CORPORAL JOSE G. INOCENCIO, JR., an agent
of person in authority while in the actual performance of his official duties, thereby
inflicting upon the latter several injuries on the different parts of his body which caused
his instantaneous death; that due to the death of said Police Corporal Jose G. Inocencio,
Jr. and the consequent loss of his earning capacity, his heirs have suffered and are entitled
to an indemnity in the sum of P30,000.00 plus moral and exemplary damages.

That accused Baltazar Lacao, Sr., alias "Bantan", has been previously convicted by final
judgment of the crime of homicide.

CONTRARY TO LAW.1

Upon arraignment, herein accused-appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr. admitted killing the victim but
interposed self-defense, hence a plea of not guilty was entered in his behalf, while Patria Lacao
and Trinidad Mansilla pleaded not guilty. The other two accused, Baltazar Lacao II and Baltazar
Lacao III, were not apprehended and have remained at large.
The facts found by the trial court, as established by unassailable evidence adduced at the trial,
are as follows: At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of September 28, 1985, prosecution witness
Mila Parto was at her house in Barangay Manibad attending to persons who came to the wake
of her aunt, Nemesia Lacao. Mila Parto is the sister-in-law of the deceased police Cpl. Jose G.
Inocencio, Jr. While she was so engaged, she heard and witnessed a commotion at the first floor
of the two-storey house and the events that took place thereafter. The commotion arose from a
card game where one Mansueto Rivera was losing and accused Baltazar Lacao II, who was playing
with him, was furiously arguing with the former. Baltazar Lacao II then unsheathed his knife and
threatened Mansueto Rivera by pointing the knife at the latter's neck. Wilma Rivera, the sister-
in-law of Mansueto, intervened and Baltazar Lacao II released the latter. Baltazar Lacao II then
went inside the house wielding his knife and causing the other guests to panic.

It was then that Cpl. Jose G. Inocencio, Jr. went down to inquire into the matter and to pacify
the people. When he saw Baltazar Lacao II with a knife, he held the latter's hand holding that
knife. Baltazar Lacao II then said: "Nyor, release me." As Cpl. Inocencio did not release him, the
latter's mother, Patria Lacao, then said: "Nyor, release my son." When Cpl. Inocencio released
Baltazar Lacao II, the latter suddenly stabbed Inocencio on his right side. Baltazar Lacao, Sr. and
his other son, Baltazar Lacao III, together with his wife, Patria Lacao, and his sister, Trinidad
Lacao Mansilla, rushed inside the house and surrounded the victim.

The men then stabbed Cpl. Inocencio several times while the women hit him with stools. As
the attack continued, the victim was pushed toward the door of the kitchen and he later
slumped on the floor facing downward. Baltazar Lacao, Sr. then sat astride him and continued
stabbing the latter as he was thus lying prostrate. Thereafter, this appellant asked: "Nyor, Nyor,
are you still alive?" Appellant Patria Lacao interjected: "What are you waiting for, it is already
finished, we have to go." Baltazar Lacao III then got the gun of Cpl. Inocencio and all the accused
went away.2

All the foregoing facts were clearly and categorically established by said prosecution witness,
unshaken and unaffected by the gruelling cross-examination to which she was subjected. In the
process she categorically identified the three appellants then present in the courtroom, as well
as the knives and the stools used against the victim in the commission of the crime. Ample and
credible corroboration was afforded by the straightforward testimonies of two other
eyewitnesses, Isabel Llorente3 and the victim's widow, Nelfa Inocencio,4 who were admittedly
present at the scene and the time of the bloody incident.

After an examination of the body of the deceased by Dr. Abel P. Martinez, a medico-legal officer
and rural health physician, the following autopsy report was submitted and thereafter admitted
in evidence:

PERTINENT POST-MORTEM FINDINGS ON THE BODY OF P/CPL. JOSE G. INOCENCIO, JR.

DONE AT MAMBUSAO, CAPIZ, ON SEPTEMBER 29, 1985 at 4:30 AM

1. Rigor mortis — present.

2. Livor mortis — present.

3. Lacerated wound about 1" dia located at the left frontopa reital region of the head,
superficial.

4. Stab wound, about 3/4" dia. located at the level of 31 CS MCL, left, going posters-
inferiorly reaching the anterior pericardium.

5. Stab wound, about 3/4" dia. located at the level of 31 CS 1" lateral to MCL right, going
posters-inferiorly reaching the right lung tissue.

6. Stab wound, about 2-1/2" horizontally located at the subcostal area, MCL right, going
posters-superiorly hitting the liver.

7. Stab wound 1" dia. located at the level of 51 CS AAL, right, going medio-superiorly
reaching the right lung.

8. Stab wound, about 2" dia. located at the level of the 10ICS AAL right, going media-
superiorly reaching the right lung.

9. Incised wound, about 1/2" dia. superficially located at the superior portion of the
posterior elbow.

10. Stab wound, about 1/2" dia. located at the base of the neck, left going medio-inferiorly
reaching the body of the cervical vertebra.

11. Stab wound, about 1" dia. diag. located at the supra-scapular region, left going antero-
inferiorly reaching the left lung.

12. Two stab wounds superimposed to one another located at the scapular region, left,
superficial, reaching the scapula.

13. Stab wound about 1-1/2" dia. perpendicularly located at the midscapular region,
superficial, reaching the body of the scapula.

14. Stab wound, about 1" dia. located at the left paravertebral line 10T, left hitting the
rib.

15. Stab wound, about 1" dia. located at the left paravert, line 1L, superficial, hitting the
underlying muscles.

16. Stab wound, 1" dia. located 2" lateral to Wd 15 going anteromedially hitting the
underlying muscles.
 CAUSE OF DEATH: CARDIAC TAMPONADE SEVERE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL
HEMORRHAGES SECONDARY TO THE HEREIN INFLICTED WOUNDS.5

After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment convicting the three appellants of the crime
charged, imposing on them the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering them to indemnify
the heirs of the victim in the sum of P30,000.00 for his death, P9,250.00 as actual damages, plus
P100,000.00 as moral damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
pay the costs.6

In their present recourse, appellants assign the following errors:

THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS BALTAZAR LACAO,
SR., PATRIA LACAO AND TRINIDAD LACAO MANSILLA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER WITH DIRECT ASSAULT UPON AN AGENT OF PERSON
IN AUTHORITY PURSUANT TO THE PROVISION OF ARTICLES 248 AND 148 IN RELATION TO
ARTICLE 48 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, As AMENDED, WHERE THE TRIAL COURT
SENTENCES EACH OF THEM TO SUFFER THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA AND TO
INDEMNIFY THE HEIRS OF THE VICTIM P/CPL JOSE INOCENCIO, JR. IN THE SUM OF THIRTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) FOR HIS DEATH; PLUS P9,250.00 AS ACTUAL DAMAGES;
PLUS P100,000.00 MORAL DAMAGES AND TO PAY THE COST OF THE SUIT.

II

THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
BALTAZAR LACAO, SR. ACTED IN COMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE WHEN HE STABBED THE
DECEASED JOSE INOCENCIO, JR.

III

THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT TREACHERY AS A QUALIFYING

CIRCUMSTANCE ATTENDED IN THE KILLING OF JOSE INOCENCIO BY ALL ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS.

IV

THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING APPELLANTS PATRIA LACAO AND TRINIDAD
MANSILLA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER WITH
DIRECT ASSAULT NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT PERFORMED
OVERT ACT SHOWING CONSPIRACY FOR MERE KNOWLEDGE, ACQUIESCENCE OR
APPROVAL OF THE ACT, WITHOUT COOPERATION IS NOT ENOUGH TO CONSTITUTE ONE
A PARTY TO A CONSPIRACY, AND THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
APPELLANTS TRINIDAD MANSILLA AND PATRIA LACAO NOT HAVING CONSPIRED WITH
 BALTAZAR LACAO, SR. IN KILLING THE VICTIM JOSE INOCENCIO, JR. TREACHERY CANNOT
BE CONSIDERED AGAINST THEM.

THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT BALTAZAR

LACAO, SR. ON SELF-DEFENSE AND IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
PATRIA LACAO AND TRINIDAD MANSILLA FOR FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
ESTABLISH THE GUILT OF SAID ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.7

The main thrust of the defense is that appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr. acted in self-defense since
Cpl. Jose Inocencio, Jr. attempted to shoot him but the gun did not fire. Said appellant allegedly
grabbed the gun and stabbed the deceased more than five (5) times. 8

The other appellants, Trinidad Mansilla and Patria Lacao, interposed the defense of alibi. Their
version is that at 7:30 in the evening of September 28, 1985, they and one Consolacion Lago went
to the wake at Barangay Manibad. They prayed and, at about 9:30 A.M., they went home but
Baltazar, Sr. was left behind.9 Baltazar Lacao II was alleged to be sleeping in their house and
Baltazar Lacao III was said to be then in Roxas City studying at the La Purisima College. 10

The Court finds the appeal to be devoid of merit.

Appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr., by pleading self-defense necessarily admits that he killed the
victim and he is thus duty bound to prove the essential requisites for this justifying
circumstance.11 This circumstance he has to prove by clear and convincing evidence, 12 the onus
probandi having shifted to him.

Now, this appellant admitted stabbing the victim more than five (5) times. As seen from the
medico-legal report, the victim actually suffered fifteen (15) stab wounds, that the cause of death
was hemorrhage and multiple stab wounds,13 and that most of the injuries inflicted were indeed
fatal. It cannot now be denied that, even indulging said appellant in his theory, he definitely
exceeded the limits of what is necessary to suppress an alleged unlawful aggression directed to
him by the victim. In fact, from the eyewitness accounts, he even continued stabbing the victim
who was already slumped prone and helpless.

Said appellant also sought to buttress his defense by claiming that Cpl. Inocencio, prior to the
stabbing, fired his gun at the former but the gun did not fire. This subterfuge is refuted by the
unequivocal statements of the prosecution witnesses that the victim never removed his gun from
his waistband,14 and that the revolver only fell when appellants pushed the
deceased.15 Significantly, this story of appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr. was never corroborated by
any evidence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. The first requisite of self-defense
is indispensable. There can be no self-defense unless it is proven that there has been unlawful
aggression on the part of the person injured or killed by the accused. If there is no unlawful
aggression, there is nothing to prevent or to repel. The second requisite of self-defense will have
no basis.16

We also take note of the finding of the court below that none of the six (6) bullets recovered from
the gun showed any sign or mark that the gun was ever fired. Had the gun been fired, the base
of at least one bullet would have been impressed in the center by the corresponding indentation
caused by the impact thereon by the firing pin of the revolver when the trigger is pulled. The
absence of such physical evidence further sustains the holding of the trial court that even the
first element of self-defense has not been proved despite said appellant's protestations.

Appellants Patria Lacao and Trinidad Mansilla were positively identified by all the prosecution
witnesses as the ones who hit the victim with stools several times while the other three (3) male
accused were stabbing the victim with their knives. In their defense, Patria and Trinidad sought
refuge in the impuissant sanctuary of alibi. Trite as it is, we have to impress on appellants once
again the doctrine that alibi is the weakest defense an accused can concoct. In order to prosper,
it must be so convincing as to preclude any doubt that the accused could not have been physically
present at the place of the crime or its vicinity at the time of the commission. In the face of
positive identification of the accused by eyewitnesses, an alibi crumbles like a sand fortress. 17

The trial court definitely held that appellants "Patria Lacao and Trinidad Mansilla were positively
identified by all the eyewitnesses for the prosecution who were without any motive to falsely
testify and implicate or point an unerring finger at the three accused inside the courtroom as the
perpetrators of the crime. Their disavowal of participation in the gory killing of Cpl. Inocencio are
self-serving and feeble attempts to disprove complicity and to which the court gives scant
consideration."18 Indeed, the participatory acts of said appellants having been testified to so
clearly in detail by three (3) eyewitnesses, to refute the same by the discreditable defense of alibi
would be an evidential travesty.

Identification of the culprits in this case was not difficult because the place where the crime
occurred was sufficiently lighted. Where considerations of visibility are favorable and the
witnesses do not appear to be biased against the accused, their assertions as to the identity of
the malefactor should be normally accepted. This is more so when the witness is the victim or his
near relative because these witnesses usually strive to remember the faces of the assailants.
Moreover, the trial court gave credence to the prosecution's identification of the appellants as
the culprits. Subject to exceptions which do not obtain in this case, the trial court is in a better
position to decide this question, having seen and heard the witnesses themselves and observed
their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.19

The Court, however, is not favorably impressed with the prosecution's theory that the assailants
acted pursuant to a conspiracy just because they apparently acted in unison in attacking the
victim. True, conspiracy is always predominantly mental in composition because it consists
primary of the meeting of minds and, generally, complicity may be inferred from circumstantial
evidence, i.e., the community of purpose and the unity of design in the contemporaneous or
simultaneous performance of the act of assaulting the deceased.20 However, conspiracy must be
proved with as much certainty as the crime itself.21 The same degree of proof required to
establish the crime is required to support a finding of conspiracy,22 that is, proof beyond
reasonable doubt.23

At the very least, conspiracy presupposes a prior agreement or contemporaneous understanding

on the part of the conspirators to commit a felony, in this case, to kill Cpl. Inocencio. A
dispassionate appraisal of the facts readily reveals, however, that the attack on the victim
originated spontaneously from and was initiated unexpectedly by Baltazar Lacao II. Appellant
Baltazar Lacao, Sr. and his other son, Baltazar Lacao III, immediately joined in the fray by attacking
the victim with their knives, whereupon the two female appellants, also assisted their menfolk
by hitting the victim with stools.

The rapidity in the succession of such consecutive acts of the assailants, with the last four
coming instinctively, as it were, to the aid of the original assailant, cannot but produce the
conclusion that their actuations were activated without prior or apparent deliberation. It does
not even appear that there was a call or a signal from one to the other to join the attack on Cpl.
Inocencio, much less is there even an intimation that they had such a murderous intent or cabal
at any time prior thereto. The spontaneity of their respective reactions, albeit resulting in an
attack where they all participated, rules out the existence of a conspiracy.

As a consequence, therefore, the respective liabilities of appellants shall be determined by the

nature of their individual participations in the felonious act.24 It is understood, however, that
whatever liabilities may attach to Baltazar Lacao II and Baltazar Lacao III are not concluded by the
dispositions herein nor shall they be bound by the discussions in this opinion on their putative
participations in the crime charged.

Anent the issue on whether or not treachery was properly appreciated as a qualifying
circumstance, we agree with the holding of the court below since this was sufficiently proven by
the evidence. It is elementary hornbook knowledge that there is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against persons employing means, methods, or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make.25

In the present case, the deceased was stabbed without warning the moment he unsuspectingly
released the hand of Baltazar Lacao II. So sudden and unanticipated was the attack that the victim
was given no chance to defend himself. Then herein appellants, although apparently acting
without prior agreement, also instantly and all together attacked him. Even if their aforesaid acts
were independently performed on their individual initiatives, such concerted action ensured the
commission of the crime without risk to them arising from any defense or retaliation that the
victim might have resorted to. Treachery was thus correctly appreciated against all appellants,
the use of superior strength being absorbed as an integral part of the treacherous mode of
commission.
Appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr. admitted during the trial that he was once convicted of the crime of
homicide but he was granted an absolute pardon therefor.26 The lower court properly considered
recidivism since a pardon for a preceding offense does not obliterate the fact that the accused is
a recidivist upon his conviction of a second offense embraced in the same title of the Code.27 This
aggravating circumstance of recidivism accordingly offsets the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender by Baltazar Lacao, Sr.

With respect to appellants Patria Lacao and Trinidad Lacao Mansilla, they did cooperate in the
execution of the offense by simultaneous acts which, although not indispensable to the
commission of the offense, bore a relation to the acts done by the principal and supplied material
or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way.28 Since they were aware of the
criminal intent of the principals and having participated in such murderous criminal design sans a
conspiracy, we hold them guilty of the milder form of responsibility as accomplices.29

The penalty for the complex crime at bar is that for the graver offense, the same to be applied in
its maximum period. No modifying circumstance can be considered for or against herein
appellants. With the proscription against the imposition of the death sentence, the trial court
correctly sentenced appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr. to suffer reclusion perpetua. Appellants Patria
Lacao and Trinidad Lacao Mansilla are hereby sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty of six
(6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The death indemnity is hereby increased to P50,000.00 in
accordance with the present policy on the matter, with appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr. primarily
liable for P40,000.00 and appellants Patria Lacao and Trinidad Lacao Mansilla for P10,000.00,
subject to the provisions of Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code.

WHEREFORE, with the foregoing modifications, the judgment of the trial court is hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-35156 November 20, 1981

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FLORO RODIL defendant-appellant.

MAKASIAR, J.:

Accused Floro Rodil was found guilty, beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of murder by the
Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, for the death of Lt. Guillermo Masana of the Philippine
Constabulary. Accordingly, he was sentenced to death, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in
the amount of P12,000.00, to pay the amount of P10,000.00 as moral damages and another
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and to pay the costs.

The information alleges:

That on or about April 24, 1971, in the Municipality of Indang, Province of Cavite,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with a double-bladed dagger, with evident premeditation and
treachery, and with intent to kill, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously, attack and stab PC Lt. Guillermo Masana while the latter was in the
performance of his official duties, inflicting upon him stab wounds on the
different parts of his body which directly caused his death.

Contrary to law

From the evidence adduced by the prosecution, We glean the following facts:

At about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 24, 1971, the deceased, PC Lt. Guillermo Masana
together with PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, Philippine Coast Guard serviceman Ricardo Ligsa and
Patrolman Felix Mojica of Indang, Cavite, was having lunch inside a restaurant in front of the
Indang market (pp. 2,3, t.s.n., Oct. 30, 1971; pp. 10, 19, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971; p. 21, t.s.n., Jan. 20,
1972). While they were eating, they saw, through the glass panel of the restaurant, appellant
outside the restaurant blowing his whistle. Their attention having been drawn to what appellant
was doing, Lt. Masana then in civilian clothing, accompanied by PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, went out
of the restaurant, approached appellant and asked the latter, after Identifying himself as a PC
officer, whether the gun that was tucked in his waist had a license. Instead of answering the
question of Lt. Masana appellant moved one step backward and attempted to draw his gun. PC
soldier Virgilio Fidel immediately grabbed appellant's gun from appellant's waist and gave it to
Lt. Masana After that, Lt. Masana told the appellant to go inside the restaurant. PC soldier Virgilio
Fidel followed. Lt. Masana and the appellant occupied a separate table about one and one-half
(1 1/2) meters from the table of Lt. Masana's three companions — Fidel, Ligsa and Mojica (p. 10,
t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971). After the two were already seated, Lt. Masana placed appellant's gun on
the table. After that Lt. Masana pulled out a piece of coupon bond paper from his pocket and
wrote thereon the receipt for the gun, and after signing it, he asked appellant to countersign the
same, but appellant refused to do so. Instead, he asked Lt. Masana to return the gun to him. Lt.
Masana rejected appellant's plea, telling, the latter that they would talk the matter over in the
municipal building of Indang, Cavite. When Lt. Masana was about to stand up, appellant suddenly
pulled out a double-bladed dagger and with it he stabbed Lt. Masana several times, on the chest
and stomach causing his death several hours thereafter (pp. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, t.s.n., Oct. 30, 1971; pp.
10, 11, 12, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971).

While the stabbing incident was taking place, the three companions of Lt. Masana — PC soldier
Virgilio Fidel, Coast Guard Ricardo Ligsa and policeman Felix Mojica — who were all seated at a
separate table about one and one-half (1 1/2) meters away from that occupied by the accused
and Lt. Masana stood up to assist Lt. Masana but Chief of Police Primo Panaligan of Indang,
Cavite, who happened to be taking his lunch in the same restaurant, was quicker than any of
them in going near the combatants and embraced and/or grabbed the accused from behind, and
thereafter wrested the dagger from the accused-appellant. Immediately thereafter, the Chief of
Police brought the accused to the municipal building of Indang, Cavite (p. 8, t.s.n., Oct. 30, 1971;
pp. 19-20, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971; pp. 26, 28, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972), while the companions of Lt.
Masana brought the latter to the V. Luna Hospital in Quezon City where he expired several hours
later as a result of the stab wounds inflicted by the accused (pp. 21, 22, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971). Dr.
Felicisimo del Rosario, Medico-Legal Officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, conducted
an autopsy of the cadaver of Lt. Masana and made the following findings, which are embodied in
his Report, Exhibits "D" and "D-1 " (pp. 88-89, rec.), and which reads as follows:

Postmortem findings.

General:

Fairly developed and nourished male subject in rigor mortis with postmortem
lividity over the dependent portions of the body. Pupils are dilated. Finger and toe
tips are pale. There is an exploratory laparotomy incision at the abdomen,
measuring 21 cm. long, 3 cm. left of the anterior midline, with eighteen (18)
stitches applied. There are surgical incisions at the left and right abdomen,
measuring 2 cm. long, 9 cm. from the anterior midline and 2 cm. long, 6.5 cm. from
the anterior midline with two (2) stitches applied and a rubber drain sticking out
of each, respectively.

TRUNK:

(1) Stab wound, left chest, measuring 0.9 by 0.4 cm., 5 cm. from the anterior
midline, 128 cm. above the heel, 1 cm. deep, directed posterior wards and slightly
upwards, passing superficially between muscles and tissues.

(2) Stab wound, left chest, measuring 1.2 by 0.4 cm., 9 cm. from the anterior
midline, 121 cm. above the heel, 5.5. cm. deep, directed posterior wards,
downwards and to the left, lacerating the muscles at the 4th intercostal space.

(3) Stab wound, abdomen, measuring 0.9 by 0.2 cm. just left of the anterior
midline, 96 cm. above the heel 11 cm. deep, directed posterior wards, upwards
and to the left, perforating the greater curvature of the stomach and the gastric
vessels, grazing the liver, perforating the diaphragm and infero-medial border of
the lower lobe of the right lung.

(4) Impact abrasion, right scapular region, measuring 2 by 0.2 cm., 12 cm. from
the posterior midline, 127 cm. above the heel.
 UPPER EXTREMITIES:

(5) Incised wound, anterior aspect of the distal third of the left arm, measuring 3
by 0.5 cm., just medial to its anterior midline.

(6) Incised wound, posterior aspect of the proximal phalange of the right index
finger, measuring 1 by 0.2 cm., just medial to its posterior midline.

Five hundred (500) cc. blood and blood clots accumulated in the thoracic cavity.

There are four (4) sutures applied at a lacerated wound at the greater curvature
of the stomach.

There is nothing remarkable in the unaffected organs internally.

REMARKS:

Cause of death is cardio-respiratory arrest due to severe shock and intrathoracic

hemorrhage as a result of multiple stab wounds of the body, perforating the
stomach, gastric vessels, liver, diaphragm and lower lobe of the right lung.

Claiming self-defense, the accused, on the other hand, maintains and relies on the following facts:

At about 1: 00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 24, 1971, the accused and his wife were in a
restaurant near the market place of Indang, Cavite, in order to take their lunch. They had just
come from Mandaluyong, Rizal where they reside (pp. 21, 22, t.s.n., Dec. 10, 1971). Inside the
restaurant, the accused saw three persons to his right, eating, while to his left he saw a person
whom he later learned to be Lt. Guillermo Masana drinking beer alone. While the accused and
his wife were waiting for the food to be served, Lt. Masana approached him and asked him
whether he was Floro Rodil and whether he was a member of the Anti- Smuggling Unit. After
receiving an affirmative answer, Lt. Masana invited the accused to join him in his table. The
accused accepted the invitation so the two moved over to the officer's table where the deceased
offered beer to the accused who, however, refused saying he was still hungry. In the course of
their conversation, Lt. Masana told the accused not to report any matter about smuggling to the
PC. The accused informed the officer that he had not reported any smuggling activity to the
authorities. Lt. Masana then asked the accused for his identification card as a member of the
Anti-Smuggling Unit, which the latter did by showing his ID card, Exhibit " 1 ", bearing his picture
and indicating that he was an officer of the Anti-Communist League of the Philippines (pp. 62-68,
t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1971).

Thereupon, Lt. Masana told the accused that the latter's ID was fake, and after the accused
insisted that it was genuine, Lt. Masana tried to take it away from the accused when the latter
was about to put it back in his pocket. Because of his refusal to give his Id card to Lt. Masana the
latter got mad and, in an angry tone of voice, demanded: "Will you give it to me or not?" (P. 7
1, Ibid). Still the accused refused to surrender his ID to Lt. Masana Thereupon, the latter pulled a
gun from his waist and hit the accused on the head with its handle two (2) time Immediately,
blood gushed from his head and face. When Lt. Masana was about to hit the accused for the third
time, the latter parried the right hand of the officer, pulled his "pangsaksak" and stabbed the
officer two or three times and then pushed him away from him and ran out of the restaurant (pp.
74,75,79, Ibid).

The accused went in the direction of the municipal building of Indang, Cavite, where he intended
to surrender to the authorities. But on his way, he met Primo Panaligan, the Chief of Police of
Indang, Cavite. The Chief of Police asked him why his head and face were bloody and he answered
that he was hit by Lt. Masana on the head with a gun (pp. 86, 89, t.s.n., Ibid). If here upon, the
Chief of Police asked somebody to accompany the accused to the municipal building. Arriving
there, one Victor, a policeman of Indang, Cavite, accompanied him to Dr. Ruben Ochoa, whose
clinic was just across the street where the municipal building is located (p. 9, t.s.n., Ibid; p. 4,
t.s.n., Dec. 15, 1971). After he was given first aid treatment, he was brought back by the Indang
policeman to the municipal, building where he was detained for two days before he was picked
up by the Philippine Constabulary operatives and transferred to the 121th PC Headquarters in
Tagaytay City (pp. 90-91, t.s.n., Ibid; pp. 4, 39, 40, t.s.n., Dec. 10, 1971; p. 6, t.s.n., Dec. 15, 1971;
p. 5, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972).

After due trial, the court a quo rendered a decision sentencing the accused as heretofore stated.

Self-defense is an affirmative allegation that must be proven by clear, sufficient, satisfactory and
convincing evidence (People vs. Libed 14 SCRA 410, 413; People vs. Mendoza, 13 SCRA 11, 17;
People vs. Solaña, 6 SCRA 60, 65-66; People vs. Davis, 1 SCRA 473; 477; People vs. Paras, 80 Phil.
149; 152; People vs. Berio 59 Phil. 533; 536; People vs. Gimena, 59 Phil. 509, 514). Moreover, to
prove justification, the accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if it were weak, it could not be disbelieved after
the accused had admitted the killing (People vs. Llamera, 51 SCRA 48, 57; People vs. Talaboc, 30
SCRA 87; People vs. Navarro, 25 SCRA 491; 496; People vs. Solaña, 6 SCRA 60, 65-66; People vs.
Espenilla, 62 Phil. 264, 270; People vs. Apolinario, 58 Phil 586-588; People vs. Ansoyon, 65 Phil. 7
7 2). The rationale for this jurisprudence is that, having admitted the wounding or killing of the
victim, the accused must be held criminally liable for the crime unless he establishes to the
satisfaction of the court the fact of legitimate self-defense.

In the case at bar, the accused contends that it was the deceased, Lt. Guillermo Masana who
committed unlawful aggression when the latter hit him on his head with the handle of his gun
after he refused to surrender his (accused's) ID to him.

This claim does not merit belief.

The accused claims that after he refused to give his ID to the deceased because the same was his
and he also spent money for it, the latter hit him with the handle of his (deceased's) gun. WE
cannot perceive how this refusal of the accused could have provoked or enraged the deceased
to the extent of initiating the aggression by drawing his pistol and hitting the accused with its
butt, knowing that the accused was no longer armed after the latter's gun had earlier been taken
away from him. Besides, an agent of authority, like the deceased, ordinarily is not authorized to
use force, except in an extreme case when he is attacked, or subject to active resistance, and
finds no other way to comply with his duty or cause himself to be obeyed by the offender.
Furthermore, the records reveal an unrebutted fact to the effect that the deceased was unarmed
when the incident happened, he being then on leave. As a matter of fact, he was then in civilian
clothing (pp. 29-30, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972). WE are, therefore, inclined to believe that it was the
accused who had every reason to be resentful of the deceased and to be enraged after the
deceased refused to heed his plea that his gun be returned him; because he might be prosecuted
for illegal possession of firearms. Accordingly, We are constrained to draw the inescapable
conclusion that it was the accused, not the deceased, who initiated the aggression which ended
in the fatal wounding of the deceased resulting in his death.

The accused further claims that he was hit twice by the deceased before he parried the third
blow. This claim is belied by the record. During the trial, the court a quo asked the accused to
show the scar produced by the injuries inflicted by the deceased when he refused to give his ID
thus —

Court

Q Where is that scar?

(Witness showing his right side of the head to the Court)"

[pp. 86,88, t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1971].

Dr. Ruben Ochoa who treated the injuries of the accused corroborated the foregoing testimony
in his medical findings, Exhibit "3", which reads:

Injuries:

(1) lacerated wound 1/2 inch, parietal region.

(2) lacerated wound, 1 1/2 inches, rt ear lobe

(3) contusion, right mastoid area [Exh. "3"; p. 116, rec] .

The record reveals that the deceased was a right-handed person (pp. 76-77, t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1971).
It also shows that before the stabbing incident took place, the deceased and the accused were
facing each other. If that was the case, and considering that the deceased was, according to the
accused, holding the gun with his right hand, why was the accused hit on the right side of his
head and and on his right ear lobe WE find that this particular claim of the accused that it was
the deceased who first hit him twice with the handle of his gun before parrying the third blow
and then stabbing the latter is definitely belied not only by the location of the scar but also by
the medical finding of Dr. Ochoa aforequoted. Indeed, if the protagonists were facing each other,
and it appearing that they were both right- handed (p. 13, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971), the blow given
by one, if not parried by the other, would perforce land on the left, and not on the right, side of
the body of the recipient of the blow. WE, therefore, reject such claim for being improbable, the
same being contrary to the natural course of human behavior.

The fact of the matter, however, as testified to by state witness PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, is that
the victim parried with both hands the thrust of the appellant with such force that appellant
bumped his head on the edge of the table causing blood to ooze from the resulting injury on his
head.

When the accused allegedly met the Chief of Police of Indang, Cavite, on his way to the municipal
building from the scene of the stabbing incident purportedly to surrender to the authorities, he
claims that he told the Chief of Police that Lt. Masana hit him on his head with the handle of his
(Masana's) gun. On his return from the clinic of Dr. Ochoa where his injuries were treated, he
was detained in the municipal building of Indang, Cavite for two days before he was transferred
to the Tagaytay PC Headquarters. During all this time, he did not give any written statement,
much less inform any PC or other police agency that he stabbed Lt. Masana in self-defense. It was
only on July 8, 1971. after the lapse of more than two and one-half (2 1/2) months that he claimed
self-defense during the preliminary investigation of the case before the municipal judge of
Indang, Cavite (pp. 44, t.s.n., Dec. 10, 1971). If the accused had really acted in self-defense, he
would surely have so informed the Chief of Police at the first opportunity. He only allegedly told
the Chief of Police, who allegedly asked him why his head and face were bloody, that Lt. Masana
hit him with a gun. He did not tell the Police Chief that he was surrendering for stabbing the
deceased in self-defense. This claim of the accused made before the municipal judge of Indang,
Cavite, on July 8, 1971 aforesaid constitutes an exculpatory statement made so long after the
crime was committed on April 24, 1971. Such claim does not deserve credence since the same is
obviously an afterthought, which cannot overthrow the straightforward testimony of
prosecution witnesses PC soldier Virgilio Fidel and Coast Guard serviceman Ricardo Ligsa both
disinterested and unbiased witnesses, whose testimony as peace officers, in the absence of any
showing as to any motive that would impel them to distort the truth, must be afforded full faith
and credit as a whole.

The fact that the chief of police detained the accused that same day after he was treated by Dr.
Ochoa, confirms the testimony of the state witnesses that the police was present during the
incident between the appellant and the victim and that the police chief embraced appellant and
grabbed the knife from appellant, whom he thereafter brought to the municipal building.

II
Was the crime committed murder or homicide merely or murder or homicide complexed with
assault upon an agent of authority?

According to the Solicitor General, the crime committed was murder because "it was established
by the prosecution that during the stabbing incident, appellant suddenly and without giving the
victim a chance to defend himself, stabbed the latter several times with a dagger, inflicting upon
mortal wounds on the chest and stomach. ...Needless to say, such a sudden and unexpected
attack with a deadly weapon on an unarmed and unsuspecting victim, which made it impossible
for the latter to flee or defend himself before the fatal blow is delivered, is alevosia or treachery"
(p. 14, Appellee's brief).

In support of his contention, the Solicitor General cited the cases of U.S. vs. Cornejo (28 Phil.
475); People vs. Palomo (43 O.G. No. 10, 4190).

WE do not agree with the Solicitor General. Alevosia or treachery is belied by the following
testimony of Virgilio Fidel, star witness for the prosecution:

COURT

Q What is the truth?

A The truth is that when I saw that Floro Rodil stabbed Lt. Guillermo
Masana, Masana parried him and his head (Rodil's head) bumped
on the edge of a table; that is why he sustained an injury and blood
oozed from his head (pp. 8-9, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972; emphasis
supplied).

Then, on cross-examination, the same witness testified:

ATTY. MUÑOZ

Q You said that Floro Rodil's head was bumped on the edge of a
table and you saw blood oozing from his head, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q Who bumped the head of Rodil on the table?

A When Masana parried his stab with his hands he accidentally

bumped his head on the table.

Q Is it not a fact that Floro Rodil is much bigger than Lt. Masana

A Yes, sir.
 Q You mean, by simple parrying, Floro Rodil was pushed to the
extent that he bumped his head on the table?

A The force of Lt. Masana might have been strong in parrying.

xxx xxx xxx

Q When the head of Rodil bumped on the table, was Lt. Masana
already stabbed?

A It could be that he was already stabbed or he was not yet

stabbed.

pp 30-31, 33, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972; emphasis supplied].

After a thorough analysis of the aforequoted portions of the testimony of Virgilio Fidel, one of
the prosecution witnesses, WE can only conclude that the assailant and the victim were indeed
face to face when the stabbing took place. As such the attack was not treacherous because the
victim was able to ward off the same with his hand. As a matter of fact, the force he used in
warding off the attack was so strong that the accused bumped his head on a table nearby, causing
injuries to him which necessitated medical treatment. In short, the attack on the victim was made
on the spur of the moment. The suddenness of the attack does not by itself suffice to support a
finding of treachery (People vs. Torejas, et al., 43 SCRA 158, 167). Besides, the record failed to
show that the accused made any preparation to kill his victim so as to insure the commission of
the crime, making it at the same time possible or hard for the victim to defend himself or retaliate
(People vs. Saez, 1 11 Phil. 546, 553, citing the case of People vs. Tumaob, 83 Phil. 738). Neither
does it show that the accused employed means directly and specially tending to insure the killing
without risk to himself. On the contrary, it shows that the accused was easily within striking
distance of his three companions, two of whom were police officers. Furthermore, there was an
altercation between the accused and the victim about the confiscation by the latter of the gun
belonging to the former, and at the moment when the victim was about to stand up, the accused
drew a knife from his pocket and with it stabbed the victim in the chest. Clearly, therefore, the
impelling motive for the attack by appellant on his victim was the latter's performance of official
duty, which the former resented. This kind of evidence does not clearly show the presence of
treachery in the commission of the crime. Alevosia is not to be presumed, but must be proved as
conclusively as the act which it qualifies (People vs. Abril, 51 Phil. 670, 675). This is so because in
the explicit language of the Revised Penal Code, alevosia or treachery exists when the offender
commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make [Art. 14, par. 16, Revised Penal
Code].

While the evidence definitely demonstrated that appellant knew because the victim, who was in
civilian clothing, told him that he was an agent of a person in authority; he cannot be convicted
of the complex crime of homicide with assault upon an agent of a person in authority, for the
simple reason that the information does not allege the fact that the accused then knew that,
before or at the time of the assault, the victim was an agent of a person in authority. The
information simply alleges that appellant did attack and stab PC Lt. Guillermo Masana while the
latter was in the performance of his official duties, ..." Such an allegation cannot be an adequate
substitute for the essential averment to justify a conviction of the complex crime, which
necessarily requires the imposition of the maximum period of the penalty prescribed for the
graver offense. Like a qualifying circumstance, such knowledge must be expressly and specifically
averred in the information; otherwise, in the absence of such allegation, the required knowledge,
like a qualifying circumstance, although proven, would only be appreciated as a generic
aggravating circumstance. Applying this principle, the attack on the victim, who was known to
the appellant as a peace officer, could be considered only as aggravating, being "in contempt or
with insult to the public authorities" (Par. 1, Art. XIV of the Revised Penal Code), or as an "insult
or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank, ..." (par. 3, Art. XIV,
Revised Penal Code).

It is essential that the accused must have knowledge that the person attacked was a person in
authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties, because the accused must have the intention
to offend, injure, or assault the offended party as a person in authority or agent of a person in
authority (People vs. Villaseñor 35 SCRA 460 [19701, People vs. Rellin 72 Phil. 1038 [1947]; US
vs. Alvear et al., 35 Phil. 626 [1916]).

In the case of People vs. Balbar (21 SCRA 1119, Nov. 29, 1967), it was held that failure to expressly
alleged in the information that the accused had knowledge that the person attacked was a
person in authority does not render the information defective so long as there are facts alleged
therein from which it can be implied that the accused knew that the person attacked was a
person in authority. Thus, the information for Direct Assault upon a person in authority reads as
follows:

The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses Tiburcio Balbar of the crime of
Assault upon a Person in Authority, committed as follows:

That on or about the 29th day of August, 1960, in Barrio Cumba, Municipality of
Lian, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously assault Miss Ester Gonzales, a public school teacher in the school
bonding of Lian, duly qualified and appointed as such and while in the
performance of her official duties or on the occasion therefor, by then and there
pulling his dagger, embraced and kissed. and repeatedly trying to embrace and
kiss the said teacher, Miss Ester Gonzales. That the crime was committed with the
aggravating circumstances of having committed it inside the school building and
during school classes.

Contrary to law.
And the ruling of the Court was:

Direct assault is committed 'by any person or persons who, without a public
uprising, ... shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any
person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of
official duties, or on occasion of such performance' (See Art. 148, Revised Penal
Code).

By express provision of law (Com. Act No. 578, now part of Article 152 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 1978), "teachers, professors,
and persons charged with the supervision of public or duly recognized private
schools, colleges and universities shall be deemed persons in authority, in applying
the provisions of article 148." This special classification is obviously intended to
give teachers protection, dignity, and respect while in the performance of their
official duties. The lower court, however, dismissed the information on the ground
that there is no express allegation in the information that the accused had
knowledge that the person attacked was a person in authority. This is clearly
erroneous.

Complainant was a teacher. The information sufficiently alleges that the accused
knew that fact, since she was in her classroom and engaged in the performance of
her duties. He therefore knew that she was a person in authority, as she was so
by specific provision of law. It matters not that such knowledge on his part is not
expressly alleged, complainant's status as a person in authority being a matter of
law and not of fact, ignorance thereof could not excuse non- compliance on his
part (Article 3, Civil Code). This article applies to all kinds of domestic laws,
whether civil or penal (De Luna vs. Linatoc, 74 Phil 15) and whether substantive or
remedial (Zulueta vs. Zulueta, 1 Phil. 254) for reasons of expediency, policy and
necessity.

But, in the case of People vs. CFI of Quezon, Branch V (68 SCRA 305, Nov. 28, 1975), the
information for Direct Assault reads:

That on or about the 17th day of January, 1974, at Barrio Languyin, Municipality
of Potillo, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Ernesto Busto, Paulo Coralde, Dony
Grande and Jose Astjada each of whom was armed with a piece of wood, except
Paulo Coraide conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one
another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, box
and strike with said pieces of wood one Rufino Camonias a councilman of barrio
Languyin of said municipality, duly elected and qualified as such while said
councilman was engaged in the actual performance of his duties.

The trial court dismissed the same on the ground that:

 Of importance in this case is the lack of allegation in the complaint or in the
information that the offended party was an agent of a person in authority and that
such fact was known to the accused. The absence of such allegation is fatal in this
case."

The People appealed to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.

This Court held that the fiscal's proper course of action is not a petition for review on certiorari
but the refiling of a valid information against the accused, for the following considerations:

The Solicitor General in his comment of November 4, 1975 duly observed that '(I)t
is patent that the acquittal of the accused herein is not on the merits. There is
want of factual finding upon which their conviction or acquittal could have been
based.'

It need only be observed that contrary to the fiscal's contention, the information
was deficient in that it did not allege an essential element of the crime of direct
assault that the accused had knowledge of or knew the position of authority held
by the person attacked, viz. that of a barrio councilman (and hence the agent of a
person in authority under Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by
Republic Act No. 1978) [See U.S. vs. Alvear 35 Phil. 626; People vs. Rellin 77 Phil.
1038; Vol. 11, Padilla's Revised Penal Code, 10th Ed., p. 225].

What was held in People vs. Balbar 21 SCRA, 119,1123, cited by the fiscal is that it
is sufficient that the information alleged that the accused knew the position of
authority, held by the offended party, in that case a public school teacher, then
engaged in the performance of her official duties, and that it is not necessary to
allege further that the accused also knew that such position was that of a person
in authority, since 'this is a matter of law' thus:

Complainant was a teacher. The information sufficiently alleges

that the accused knew that fact, since she was in her classroom and
engaged in the performance of her duties. He therefore knew that
she was a person in authority, as she was so by specific provision
of law. It matters not that such knowledge on `his part is not
expressly alleged, complainant's status as a person in authority
being a matter of law and not of fact, ignorance whereof could not
excuse non-compliance on his part (Article 3, Civil Code). This
article applies to all kinds of domestic laws, whether civil or penal
(De Luna vs. Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15) and whether substantive or
remedial (Zulueta vs. Zulueta, 1 Phil, 254) for reasons of
expediency, policy and necessity.
 Since the 'decision' of acquittal was really a mere dismissal of the information for
failure to charge an offense and was not a decision on the merits with factual
findings as per the trial judge's own disavowal it is patent that the fiscal's proper
course is not the present petition but the refiling of a valid information against
respondents-accused, as herein indicated.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is dismissed without prejudice to the refiling of a valid

information against respondents-accused as hereinabove indicated (emphasis
supplied).

The ruling in the aforementioned case of People vs. CFI of Quezon, etc., supra, applies to the
instant case; because the information in the former is strikingly similar to the information in the
latter and does not allege facts from which inference can be deduced that the accused knew that
the person assaulted is a person, or an agent of a person, in authority.

The aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank should be appreciated because it is obvious

that the victim, PC. Lt. Masana Identified himself as a PC officer to the accused who is merely a
member of the Anti-Smuggling Unit and therefore inferior both in rank and social status to the
victim.

The term "rank" should be given its plain, ordinary meaning, and as such, refers to a high social
position or standing as a grade in the armed forces (Webster's Third New International Dictionary
of the English Language Unabridged, p. 1881); or to a graded official standing or social position
or station (75 CJS 458); or to the order or place in which said officers are placed in the army and
navy in relation to others (Encyclopedic Law Dictionary, Third Edition, Walter A. Shumaker and
George Foster Longsdorf, p. 90); or to the designation or title of distinction conferred upon an
officer in order to fix his relative position in reference to other officers in matters of privileges,
precedence, and sometimes of command or by which to determine his pay and emoluments as
in the case of army staff officers (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Third Edition, p. 2804); or to a grade
or official standing, relative position in civil or social life, or in any scale of comparison, status,
grade, including its grade, status or scale of comparison within a position (Vol. 36, Words and
Phrases, Permanent Edition, p. 100).

Thus, rank aggravated the killing of a staff sergeant by his corporal (People vs. Mil 92 SCRA 89,
105-106, July 30, 1979), the killing of the Assistant Chief of Personnel Transaction of the Civil
Service Commission by a clerk therein (People vs. Benito, 62 SCRA 351, 357-358, Feb. 13, 1975),
the murder by a pupil of his teacher (U.S. vs. Cabling, 7 Phil. 469. 474; People vs. Aragon & Lopez,
107 Phil. 706, 709), the murder of a municipal mayor (People vs. Lopez de Leon, et al., 69 Phil.
298), the murder -of a city chief of police by the chief of the secret service division (People vs.
Hollero 88 Phil. 167), assault upon a 66-year old District Judge of the Court of First Instance by a
justice of the peace (People vs. Torrecarreori CA 52 OG 7644), the killing of a Spanish consul by
his subordinate — a mere chancellor (People vs. Godinez, 106 Phil. 597, 606607), and the killing
of an army general (People vs. Torres, et al., L-4642, May 29, 1953).
As explained by Mr. Justice Mariano Albert, then of the Court of Appeals, those "generally
considered of high station in life, on account of their rank (as well as age or sex), deserve to be
respected. Therefore, whenever there is a difference in social condition between the offender
and the offended party, this aggravating circumstance sometimes is present" (Albert M.A. — The
Revised Penal Code Annotated, 1946 Ed., p. 109).

The difference in official or social status between a P.C. lieutenant and a mere member of an
anti-smuggling unit, is patent.

If the accused herein were charged with the complex crime of murder with assault against an
agent of a person in authority, and not merely murder, then the aggravating circumstance of
disregard of rank or contempt of or insult to public authority cannot be appreciated as
aggravating because either circumstance is inherent in the charge of assault against a person in
authority or an agent of a person in authority. But in the case at bar, the appellant is accused of
murder only. Consequently, either aggravating circumstance should be considered in the
imposition of the penalty.

Thus, in the following cases where the charge was merely murder or frustrated murder, the
aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank was appreciated:

(1) People vs. Benito, supra — the appellant, a clerk in the Civil Service Commission, was charged
with and convicted of the murder of the assistant chief of the personnel transaction of the said
Commission;

(2) People vs. Torres, et al., supra — the appellants were charged with and convicted of murder
for the death of Army Col. Valentin Salgado and attempted murder for the injuries inflicted on
Army Gen. Mariano Castaneda;

(3) People vs. Valeriano, et al. — appellants were accused and convicted of robbery with
homicide for the killing of District Judge Bautista of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga [90
Phil. 15, 34-35]; and

(4) People vs. Hollero supra — where the accused chief of the Secret Division of the Bacolod City
Police Department was convicted of murder for the killing of the chief of police.

The aggravating circumstance of contempt of, or insult to, public authority under paragraph 2 of
Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code can likewise be appreciated in the case at bar.

The evidence of the prosecution clearly established that Chief of Police Primo Panaligan of Indang
was present as he was taking his lunch in the same restaurant when the incident occurred.

As a matter of fact, the said chief of police was the one who embraced or grabbed the accused
from behind, wrested the dagger from him and thereafter brought him to the municipal building
of Indang. And appellant admittedly knew him even then as the town chief of police, although he
now claims that he went to the municipal building to surrender to the chief of police who was
not allegedly in the restaurant during the incident.

While it is true that in the cases of U.S. vs. Rodriguez, et al. (19 Phil. 150, 157-158), People vs.
Siojo (61 Phil. 307, 317), and People vs. Verzo (21 SCRA 1403), this Court ruled that the term
public authority refers to a person in authority and that a PC lieutenant or town chief of police is
not a public authority but merely an agent of a person in authority; there is need of re-examining
such a ruling since it is not justified by the employment of the term public authority in aforesaid
paragraph 2 of Article 14 instead of the term person in authority which is specifically used in
Articles 148 and 152 of the Revised Penal Code. There is no extended reasoning of the doctrine
enunciated in the aforesaid three (3) cases why the phrase public authority should comprehend
only persons in authority. The lawmaker could have easily utilized the term "persons in authority"
in the aforesaid paragraph 2 of Article 14 in much the same way that it employed the said phrase
in Articles 148 and 1452. The lawmaker must have intended a different meaning for the
term public authority, which may however include, but not limited to persons in authority.

Under the decided cases, a municipal mayor, barrio captain, barrio lieutenant or barangay
captain is a person in authority or a public authority. Even a public school teacher is now
considered a person in authority under CA 578 amending Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code
(Sarcepudes vs. People, 90 Phil 228). So is the town municipal health officer (People vs. Quebral
et al., 73 Phil 640), as well as a nurse, a municipal councilor or an agent of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (People vs. Yosoya, CA-GR No. 8522-R, May 26, 1955; People vs. Reyes, et al O.G.S. 11
p. 24).

The chief of police should therefore be considered a public authority or a person in authority; for
he is vested with jurisdiction or authority to maintain peace and order and is specifically duty
bound to prosecute and to apprehend violators of the laws and municipal ordinances, more than
the aforementioned officials who cannot prosecute and who are not even enjoined to arrest
malefactors although specifically mentioned as persons in authority by the decided cases and by
Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 1978 of June 22, 1957. The town chief
of police heads and supervises the entire police force in the municipality as well as exercises his
authority over the entire territory of the municipality, which is patently greater than and includes
the school premises or the town clinic or barrio, to which small area the authority or jurisdiction
of the teacher, nurse, or barrio lieutenant, respectively, is limited.

With two aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstance, the appellant should
therefore be condemned to suffer the maximum period of reclusion temporal the penalty
prescribed for homicide.

WHEREFORE, HAVING BEEN FOUND GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF HOMICIDE

AGGRAVATED BY CONTEMPT FOR OR INSULT TO A PUBLIC AUTHORITY OR DISREGARD OF THE
RESPECT DUE THE OFFENDED PARTY ON ACCOUNT OF HIS RANK, APPELLANT FLORO RODIL IS
HEREBY SENTENCED TO SUFFER AN INDETERMINATE TERM OF IMPRISONMENT RANGING
FROM 12 YEARS OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL AS MAXIMUM.
THUS MODIFIED, THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY AFFIRMED IN ALL OTHER RESPECTS

[G.R. No. 141718. January 21, 2005]

BENJAMIN PANGAN y RIVERA, petitioner, vs. HON. LOURDES F. GATBALITE, as the Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 56, and COL. JAMES D. LABORDO, as
the City Jail Warden of Angeles City, respondents.

DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, assailing the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 56, rendered
on January 31, 2000.[1]
The facts of this case are undisputed. The petitioner was indicted for simple seduction in
Criminal Case No. 85-816, at the Municipal Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 3.
During the trial of the case, Atty. Eduardo Pineda, counsel for petitioner, submitted the
case for decision without offering any evidence, due to the petitioners constant absence at
hearings.
On September 16, 1987, the petitioner was convicted of the offense charged and was
sentenced to serve a penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, on October 24, 1988, affirmed in toto the decision of the
Municipal Trial Court.
On August 9, 1991, the case was called for promulgation of the decision in the court of origin.
Despite due notice, counsel for the petitioner did not appear. Notice to petitioner was returned
unserved with the notation that he no longer resided at the given address. As a consequence, he
also failed to appear at the scheduled promulgation. The court of origin issued an order directing
the recording of the decision in the criminal docket of the court and an order of arrest against
the petitioner.[2]
Pursuant to the order of arrest, on January 20, 2000, the petitioner was apprehended and
detained at the Mabalacat Detention Cell. On January 24, 2000, petitioner filed a Petition for a
Writ of Habeas Corpus at the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City. He impleaded as respondent
the Acting Chief of Police of Mabalacat, Pampanga.[3] Petitioner contended that his arrest was
illegal and unjustified on the grounds that:

(a) the straight penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor prescribes in five years
under No. 3, Article 93 [of the] Revised Penal Code, and
 (b) having been able to continuously evade service of sentence for almost nine years, his
criminal liability has long been totally extinguished under No. 6, Article 89 [of the] Revised
Penal Code.[4]

After his transfer to the City Jail of Angeles City on January 25, 2000, petitioner filed an
Amended Petition with the Regional Trial Court, impleading herein respondent Col. James D.
Labordo, the Jail Warden of Angeles City, as respondent.[5]
In response, the Jail Warden alleged that petitioners detention was pursuant to the order of
commitment (mittimus), issued by Marlon P. Roque, Clerk of Court III of the Municipal Trial Court
of Angeles City, Branch 3, dated January 25, 2000.[6]
On January 31, 2000, respondent Judge rendered the decision, which is the subject of this
present appeal, which pronounced:

The Court cannot subscribe to the contention of the petitioner that the penalty imposed on him
in the decision adverted to above had already prescribed, hence, his detention is illegal for under
Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code:

The period of prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the date when the culprit
should evade the service of sentence, and it shall be interrupted if the defendant should give
himself up, be captured, should go to some foreign country with which this Government has
no extradition treaty, or should commit another crime before the expiration of the period of
prescription.

The elements of prescription are:

1. That the penalty is imposed by final judgment;

2. That convict evaded the service of the sentence by escaping during the term
of his sentence;

3. That the convict who had escaped from prison has not given himself up, or
been captured, or gone to a foreign country with which we have no extradition
treaty, or committed another crime;

4. The penalty has prescribed, because of the lapse of time from the date of the
evasion of the service of the sentence by the convict.

In this case, the essential element of prescription which is the evasion of the service of sentence
is absent. Admittedly, the petitioner herein has not served the penalty imposed on him in prison
and that during the service of the sentence, he escaped therefrom. Notably, at the trial of Crim.
Case No. 85-816 in the Municipal Trial Court, Branch III, Angeles City and on the date set for the
promulgation of the affirmed decision, the petitioner failed to appear and remained at large.
There was no evasion of the service of the sentence in this case, because such evasion
presupposes escaping during the service of the sentence consisting in deprivation of liberty.
(Infante vs. Warden, 48 O.G. No. 122) (92 Phil. 310).

Corollarily, the detention of the petitioner in Angeles City Jail in compliance with the Order of
Commitment (Exhibit E) is not illegal for

A commitment in due form, based on a final judgment, convicting and sentencing the defendant
in a criminal case, is conclusive evidence of the legality of his detention, unless it appears that
the court which pronounced the judgment was without jurisdiction or exceeded it. (U.S. vs. Jayne,
24 Phil 90, 24 J.F. 94, Phil. Digest, Vol. 2, 1398).

WHEREFORE, for not being meritorious and well-founded, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus
is hereby denied.

SO ORDERED.

Angeles City, January 31, 2000.[7]

From the above quoted decision, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on a question
purely of law and raised the following issue:

HOW SHOULD THE PHRASE SHALL COMMENCE TO RUN FROM THE DATE WHEN THE CULPRIT
SHOULD EVADE THE SERVICE OF SENTENCE IN ARTICLE 93 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE ON THE
COMPUTATION OF THE PRESCRIPTION OF PENALTIES BE CONSTRUED? PUT A LITTLE
DIFFERENTLY, WHEN DOES THE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD OF PENALTIES BEGIN TO RUN?[8]

Petitioner claims that:

xxx the period for the computation of penalties under Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code begins
to run from the moment the judgment of conviction becomes final and the convict successfully
evades, eludes, and dodges arrest for him to serve sentence.[9]

Petitioner supports his claim in the following manner:

The Decision subject of this appeal, which was based on the 1952 ruling rendered in Infante vs.
Warden, 48 O.G. No. 122, 92 Phil. 310, is, petitioner most respectfully submits, not good case
law. It imposes upon the convict a condition not stated in the law. It is contrary to the spirit,
nature or essence of prescription of penalties, creates an ambiguity in the law and opens the law
to abuse by government.

THE INFANTE RULING IMPOSES A

CONDITION NOT STATED IN THE LAW.
It appears that the Infante ruling imposes that, as an essential element, the convict must serve
at least a few seconds, minutes, days, weeks or years of his jail sentence and then escapes
before the computation of prescription of penalties begins to run. This, petitioner respectfully
submits is not a condition stated in Article 93, which states that, the prescription of penalties shall
commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of sentence.

There is no dispute that the duty of government to compel the service of sentence sets in when
the judgment of conviction becomes final.

The dispute, however, is in the construction of the phrase should evade the service of
sentence. When does the period of prescription of penalties begin to run? The Infante ruling
construes this to mean that the convict must escape from jail because such evasion presupposes
escaping during the service of the sentence consisting in deprivation of liberty.

Petitioner, with due respect, disagrees because if that were the intention of the law, then the
phrase should evade the service of sentence in Article 93 would have read: should escape during
the service of the sentence consisting in deprivation of liberty. The legislature could have very
easily written Article 93 to read this way

The period of prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the date when the
culprit should escape during the service of the sentence consisting in deprivation of liberty, and
it shall be interrupted if the defendant should give himself up, be captured, should go to some
foreign country with which this Government has no extradition treaty, or should commit another
crime before the expiration of the period of prescription.

But they did not.

The legislature wrote should evade the service of sentence to cover or include convicts like him
who, although convicted by final judgment, were never arrested or apprehended by government
for the service of their sentence. With all the powers of government at its disposal, petitioner
was able to successfully evade service of his 2 months and 1 day jail sentence for at least nine (9)
years, from August 9, 1991 to January 20, 2000. This is approximately 3 years and 5 months longer
than the 5-year prescriptive period of the penalty imposed on him.

That, as the respondent RTC Judge noted, petitioner did not attend the trial at the Municipal Trial
Court and the promulgation of his judgment of conviction in August 9, 1991 is of no moment. His
bond for provisional release was surely cancelled and an order of arrest was surely issued against
petitioner. The undisputed fact is that on August 9, 1991 the judgment of conviction was
promulgated in absentia and an order for petitioners arrest was issued by the Municipal Trial
Court of Angeles City, Branch III.

The duty of government, therefore, to arrest petitioner and compel him to serve his sentence
began on August 9, 1991. The 5-year prescriptive period of his arresto mayor penalty also began
to run on that day considering that no relief was taken therefrom. Since petitioner never gave
himself up [n]or was [he], until January 20, 2000, ever captured, for the service of his sentence
nor did he flee to some foreign country with which [our] government has no extradition treaty,
that 5-year prescriptive period of his penalty ran continuously from August 9, 1991 when his
judgment of conviction was promulgated in absentia and was never interrupted.

For reasons known only to it, however, government failed or neglected, for almost nine (9) years,
to arrest petitioner for the service of his arresto mayor sentence [which] should not be taken
against petitioner. He was able to successfully evade service of his sentence for a period longer
than the 5-year prescriptive period of his penalty and, as such, is entitled to total extinction of
his criminal liability.

To say, as was said in Infante, that the prescriptive period of the penalty never began to run in
favor of petitioner because he never escaped from jail during the service of his sentence imposes
a condition not written in the law. It also violates the basic principle that the criminal statutes are
construed liberally in favor of the accused and/or convict and is contrary to the spirit behind or
essence of statutes of limitations [and] prescription, in criminal cases.[10]

The Regional Trial Court based its decision on the case of Infante v. Warden[11]. In said case,
Infante, the petitioner, was convicted of murder and was sentenced to seventeen years, four
months and one day of reclusion temporal. After serving fifteen years, seven months and eleven
days, he was granted a conditional pardon. The condition was that he shall not again violate any
of the penal laws of the Philippines. Ten years after his release on conditional pardon, Infante
was found guilty by a Municipal Court for driving without a license. Infante was immediately
ordered rearrested for breach of the condition of his pardon. One of the issues raised by Infante
in his petition,

xxx was that the remitted penalty for which the petitioner had been recommitted to jail one year
and 11 days had prescribed. xxx [12]

The Court disagreed and reasoned out thus:

The contention is not well taken. According to article 93 of the Revised Penal Code the period
of prescription of penalties commences to run from the date when the culprit should evade the
service of his sentence. It is evident from this provision that evasion of the sentence is an
essential element of prescription. There has been no such evasion in this case. Even if there
had been one and prescription were to be applied, its basis would have to be the evasion of
the unserved sentence, and computation could not have started earlier than the date of the
order for the prisoner's rearrest.[13]

A perusal of the facts in Infante v. Warden reveals that it is not on all fours with the present
case. In Infante, the convict was on conditional pardon when he was re-arrested. Hence, he had
started serving sentence but the State released him. In the present case, the convict evaded
service of sentence from the start, and was arrested eight years later.
 The RTC decision, however, must stand, since it is in accord with applicable decisions of this
Court. The issue raised by petitioner is not novel. Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code[14] has been
interpreted several times by the Court.
The case of Tanega v. Masakayan[15] falls squarely within the issues of the present case. In
that case, petitioner Adelaida Tanega failed to appear on the day of the execution of her
sentence. On the same day, respondent judge issued a warrant for her arrest. She was never
arrested. More than a year later, petitioner through counsel moved to quash the warrant of
arrest, on the ground that the penalty had prescribed. Petitioner claimed that she was convicted
for a light offense and since light offenses prescribe in one year, her penalty had already
prescribed. The Court disagreed, thus:

xxx The period of prescription of penalties the succeeding Article 93 provides "shall commence
to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence". What then is
the concept of evasion of service of sentence? Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code furnishes
the ready answer. Says Article 157:

"ART. 157. Evasion of service of sentence. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods shall be imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his sentence
by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment. xxx"

Elements of evasion of service of sentence are: (1) the offender is a convict by final judgment;
(2) he "is serving his sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty"; and (3) he evades
service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence. This must be so. For, by the
express terms of the statute, a convict evades "service of his sentence" by "escaping during the
term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment." That escape should take place while
serving sentence, is emphasized by the provisions of the second sentence of Article 157 which
provides for a higher penalty if such "evasion or escape shall have taken place by means of
unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or by using picklocks,
false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance with other convicts
or employees of the penal institution, . . ." Indeed, evasion of sentence is but another
expression of the term "jail breaking."

xxx

We, therefore, rule that for prescription of penalty of imprisonment imposed by final sentence
to commence to run, the culprit should escape during the term of such imprisonment.

Adverting to the facts, we have here the case of a convict who sentenced to imprisonment by
final judgment was thereafter never placed in confinement. Prescription of penalty, then, does
not run in her favor.[16]

In Del Castillo v. Torrecampo[17], the Court cited and reiterated Tanega. Petitioner, Del
Castillo, was charged for violation of Section 178 (nn) of the 1978 Election Code. The trial court
found Del Castillo guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate
sentence of imprisonment of 1 year as minimum to 3 years as maximum. On appeal the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto. During the execution of judgment on
October 14, 1987, petitioner was not present. The presiding Judge issued an order of arrest and
the confiscation of his bond. Petitioner was never apprehended. Ten years later, petitioner filed
a motion to quash the warrant of arrest on the ground that the penalty imposed upon him had
already prescribed. The motion was denied by the trial court. Del Castillo, on a petition
for certiorari to the Court of Appeals, questioned the denial by the trial court. The Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Upon denial of his Motion for Reconsideration,
Del Castillo raised the matter to this Court. The Court decided against Del Castillo and after
quoting the ratio decidendi of the Court of Appeals in full, it ratiocinated, thus:

The foregoing conclusion of the Court of Appeals is consistent with the ruling of this Court
in Tanega vs. Masakayan, et al., where we declared that, for prescription of penalty imposed by
final sentence to commence to run, the culprit should escape during the term of such
imprisonment.

The Court is unable to find and, in fact, does not perceive any compelling reason to deviate from
our earlier pronouncement clearly exemplified in the Tanega case.

Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code provides when the prescription of penalties shall
commence to run. Under said provision, it shall commence to run from the date the felon
evades the service of his sentence. Pursuant to Article 157 of the same Code, evasion of service
of sentence can be committed only by those who have been convicted by final judgment by
escaping during the term of his sentence.

As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, "escape" in legal parlance and for purposes
of Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means unlawful departure of prisoner from the limits of his
custody. Clearly, one who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped
therefrom.

In the instant case, petitioner was never brought to prison. In fact, even before the execution
of the judgment for his conviction, he was already in hiding. Now petitioner begs for the
compassion of the Court because he has ceased to live a life of peace and tranquility after he
failed to appear in court for the execution of his sentence. But it was petitioner who chose to
become a fugitive. The Court accords compassion only to those who are deserving. Petitioner's
guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt but he refused to answer for the wrong he
committed. He is therefore not to be rewarded therefor.

The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is based on settled jurisprudence and applicable
laws. It did not engage in judicial legislation but correctly interpreted the pertinent laws. Because
petitioner was never placed in confinement, prescription never started to run in his favor. [18]

Consistent with the two cases cited above, this Court pronounces that the prescription of
penalties found in Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code, applies only to those who are convicted
by final judgment and are serving sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty. The period
for prescription of penalties begins only when the convict evades service of sentence by escaping
during the term of his sentence. Since petitioner never suffered deprivation of liberty before his
arrest on January 20, 2000 and as a consequence never evaded sentence by escaping during the
term of his service, the period for prescription never began.
Petitioner, however, has by this time fully served his sentence of two months and one day
of arresto mayor and should forthwith be released unless he is being detained for another
offense or charge.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 56 is AFFIRMED,
but petitioner is ordered released effective immediately for having fully served his sentence
unless he is detained for another offense or charge.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-25177 October 31, 1969

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
NICOLAS LAYSON, CEZAR RAGUB, CEZAR FUGOSO and JOVENTINO GARCES, defendants-
appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres
and Solicitor Lolita O. Gal-lang for plaintiff-appellee.
Potenciano Villegas, Jr. as counsel de officio for defendants-appellants.

PER CURIAM:

This is an automatic review of the decision dated September 25, 1965 of the Court of First
Instance of Davao in criminal case 8495 imposing the death penalty on Nicolas Layson, Cezar
Ragub, Cezar Fugoso and Joventino Garces.

On January 17, 1964 when these four accused stabbed Regino Gasang to death, they were
inmates of the Davao Penal Colony serving sentences of conviction for the following crimes:

Nicolas Layson — kidnapping with robbery, homicide, homicide and

theft;

Cezar Ragub — frustrated murder and homicide;

Cezar Fugoso — robbery in an inhabited house and theft;

 Joventino — robbery hold-up and robbery in an uninhabited
Garces house.

In the early morning of that hapless day, at about 4:45 o'clock, the four accused, armed with
bladed weapons, entered the cell where the unsuspecting victim, prisoner Regino Gasang, was.
Layson locked the door of the room. Without warning and acting in concert they then swiftly took
turns in stabbing Gasang. They thereafter barricaded themselves, refusing to surrender to the
trustees who had come to the scene of the crime, agreeing to surrender only to Vicente Afurong,
the supervising prison guard. Afurong arrived, identified himself, and assured them of their
safety, whereupon they handed their weapons through the hole of the barricaded door and
surrendered themselves.

Gasang died shortly after being brought to the prison hospital. Death was caused by severe
internal and external hemorrhage and shock, all secondary to multiple stab wounds.

Layson, Ragub and Fugoso admitted that they killed Gasang because the latter urinated on their
coffee cups a number of times. Garces stated that he killed Gasang because the latter spat on
him a week before. The four plotted to kill Gasang a few days prior to the actual slaying.

On March 25, 1964 all the accused were indicted for the crime of murder. The information
recites:

The undersigned accuses Nicolas Layson, Cezar Ragub, Cezar Fugoso and Joventino Garces
of the crime of Murder, under Art. 248, in relation to Art. 160, of the Revised Penal Code,
committed as follows:

That on or about January 17, 1964, in the Davao Penal Colony, Municipality of Panabo,
Province of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-
mentioned accused, while then being convicts serving in the said Davao Penal Colony their
corresponding sentences of conviction by reason of final judgment imposed upon them,
conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, armed with sharp-
pointed instruments, with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength, and with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and stab with said weapons Regino Gasang, their co-inmate in the said
Colony, thereby inflicting upon him serious injuries which caused his death; with the
aggravating circumstances of (1) recidivism with respect to the accused Nicolas Layson
and Cezar Ragub, and (2) all of them with two or more prior convictions.

Upon arraignment, all the four accused, assisted by counsel de officio, freely and
spontaneously pleaded guilty. Notwithstanding the plea of guilty, the court a quo proceeded to
receive testimony because of the gravity of the offense. On September 30, 1965 the court
rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
 WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of
the crime of murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
with the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty in favor of all of them and the
aggravating circumstances of recidivism and having been previously punished for two or
more crimes to which the law attaches a lighter penalty with respect to the accused
Nicolas Layson and Cezar Ragub, the aggravating circumstance of having been punished
with two or more offenses to which the law attaches a lighter penalty with respect to the
accused Cezar Fugoso and Joventino Garces and the aggravating circumstances consisting
of any two of the qualifying circumstances alleged in the information which are treachery,
evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength for one is sufficient to qualify the
crime to murder and the special aggravating circumstance of having committed the crime
charged while serving the penalty imposed upon them for previous offenses as regards
all the accused and conformably with Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby
sentences all of them to DEATH, to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the
deceased Regino Gasang in the amount of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency by reason of the penalty imposed and to
pay the costs proportionately.

For the purposes of this review, suffice it to consider, on the one hand, the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery and the special aggravating
circumstance of quasi-recidivism, and, on the other, the mitigating circumstance of plea of
guilty.

We reject the recommendation of the Solicitor General that the mitigating circumstance of
passion and obfuscation be considered in favor of all the accused. For this circumstance to exist,
it is necessary that the act which gave rise to the obfuscation be not removed from the
commission of the offense by a considerable length of time, during which period the
perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity.1

Three of the accused admitted that they harbored ill-feeling against Gasang because the latter
urinated on their coffee cups several times, all these taking place at least ten days before the
actual slaying. Gasang spat on Garces a week before the day of the killing. All of the accused
plotted to kill Gasang a few days before January 17, 1964. In the light of these circumstances, it
is evident that sufficient time had elapsed during which the accused regained their equanimity.
They moved their evil scheme forward to consummation after obtaining weapons from their
fellow inmates whose aid they had solicited. The aforenarrated circumstances negate the
presence of passion and obfuscation; upon the contrary, they prove the attendance of the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation.

Treachery attended the commission of the crime. The necropsy report (exh. I) and the diagram
(exh. J), plus the testimony of Dr. Guillermo de Guzman, conclusively prove that the victim was
killed in a manner insuring utter suddenness and complete surprise in the execution of the
offense, with resultant incapability of the victim to offer resistance. That there was abuse of
superior strength would suffice to qualify the crime to murder, but this circumstance must be
considered as absorbed in treachery.2

Treachery qualifies the killing to murder;3 evident premeditation becomes a mere generic
aggravating circumstance4 which is offset by the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty. A
qualifying circumstance not only gives the crime its proper and exclusive name but also places
the author thereof in such a situation as to deserve no other penalty than that specially
prescribed for said crime.5

The special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism (art. 160, Rev. Penal Code) was
correctly considered against all the accused, who, at the time of the commission of the offense,
were undoubtedly serving their respective sentences for previous convictions. Quasi-
recidivism has for its effect the punishment of the accused with the maximum period of the
penalty prescribed by law for the new felony, and cannot be offset by an ordinary mitigating
circumstance.6

When they pleaded guilty to the charge of murder, all the accused admitted all the material
facts and circumstances alleged in the information. The crime of murder is punished
with reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Because of the attendance of the
special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism, this Court is left with no alternative to
affirming the death penalty imposed by the court a quo.

It was error for the trial judge to consider against the accused the aggravating circumstance of
having been previously punished for two or more crimes to which the law attaches lighter
penalties because the said aggravating circumstance of "reiteracion" requires that the offender
against whom it is considered shall have served out his sentences for the prior offenses. Here all
the accused were yet serving their respective sentences at the time of the commission of the
murder.

Concurrence in the grim view that we take of this case is given by Attorney Potenciano Villegas,
Jr., counsel de officio for the four accused, who unqualifiedly recommends affirmance of the
judgment a quo.

It is indeed a lethal hand that pens affirmance of a death sentence, but ours is the inescapable
duty to enforce the inexorable mandate of the law.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo imposing the death penalty on Nicolas Layson, Cezar Ragub,
Cezar Fugoso and Joventino Garces, is affirmed. The indemnification to the heirs of the victim,
Regino Gasang, is hereby increased to P12,000,7 to be paid jointly and severally by the four
accused. Costs de officio.

MARK CLEMENTE y MARTINEZ @ EMMANUEL G.R. No. 194367

DINO,
 Petitioner, Present:

BRION, J.,
- versus - Acting Chairperson,
BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
MENDOZA,* and
SERENO, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondent.
June 15, 2011
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, seeking to reverse the March 29, 2010 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) which denied petitioner's appeal and affirmed the November 3, 2008 Judgment [2] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 7, convicting petitioner of illegal possession and use
of false bank notes under Article 168[3] of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended. Also
assailed is the CA Resolution dated October 14, 2010[4]denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.

Petitioner was charged before the RTC with violation of Article 168 of the RPC under an
Information[5] which reads:

That on or about August 5, 2007, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, with intent to use, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control twenty[-]four
(24) pcs. [of] P500.00 bill with Markings [] IIB-1 to IIB-24, respectively and
specifically enumerated, to wit:

SERIAL NO. PCS. AMOUNT SERIAL NO. PCS. AMOUNT

PX626388 1 P500.00 CC077337 1 P500.00
CC077337 1 500.00 CC077337 1 500.00
CC077337 1 500.00 CC077337 1 500.00
BR666774 1 500.00 CC077337 1 500.00
CC077337 1 500.00 BR666774 1 500.00
BB020523 1 500.00 BR666774 1 500.00
PX626388 1 500.00 CC077337 1 500.00
 BR666774 1 500.00 WW164152 1 500.00
PX626388 1 500.00 WW164152 1 500.00
BR666774 1 500.00 BR666774 1 500.00
UU710062 1 500.00 PX626388 1 500.00
CC077337 1 500.00 PX626388 1 500.00
Which are false and falsified.

Contrary to law.

Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. Trial thereafter ensued.

The version of the prosecution and the defense, as summarized by the CA, are as
follows:[6]

The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, namely: Jail Officer 1 (JO1)
Michael Michelle Passilan, the Investigator of the Manila City Jail; JO1 Domingo
David, Jr.; and Loida Marcega Cruz, the Assistant Manager of the Cash Department
of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.

[Their testimonies established the following:]

Appellant is a detainee at the Manila City Jail. On August 7, 2007, at

around 3:30 pm, an informant in the person of inmate Francis dela Cruz approached
JO1s Domingo David, Jr. and Michael Passilan. The informant narrated that he
received a counterfeit P500.00 bill from appellant with orders to buy a bottle of soft
drink from the Manila City Jail Bakery. The bakery employee, however, recognized
the bill as a fake and refused to accept the same. Consequently, JO1s David and
Passilan, along with the informant, proceeded to appellant's cell for a surprise
inspection. Pursuant to their agreement, the informant entered the cubicle first and
found appellant therein, lying in bed. The informant returned to appellant the latter's
P500.00 bill. The jail guards then entered the cell and announced a surprise
inspection. JO1 Passilan frisked appellant and recovered a black wallet from his back
pocket. Inside the wallet were twenty-three (23) pieces of P500.00, all of which were
suspected to be counterfeit. They confiscated the same and marked them
sequentially with IIB-2 to II-B24. They likewise marked the P500.00 bill that was
returned by informant to appellant with IIB-1. Appellant was consequently arrested
and brought out of his cell into the office of the Intelligence and Investigation Branch
(IIB) of the Manila City jail for interrogation.

Meanwhile, the twenty-four (24) P500.00 bills confiscated from appellant

were turned over to the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas for analysis. Pursuant to a
Certification dated August 7, 2007, Acting Assistant Manager Loida Marcega Cruz of
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas examined and found the following bills as counterfeit,
viz: one (1) P500.00 bill with Serial Number BB020523; six (6) P500.00 bills with Serial
 Number BR666774; nine (9) P500.00 bills with Serial Number CC077337; five (5)
P500.00 bills with Serial Number PX626388; one (1) P500.00 bill with Serial Number
UU710062; and two (2) P500.00 bills with Serial Number WW164152.

For the defense, appellant was the lone witness presented on the stand.

Appellant simply raised the defense of frame-up. He testified that in the

afternoon of August 5, 2007, he was inside his room located at Dorm 1 of the Manila
City Jail. At around 3:00 pm, JO1 Michael Passilan entered appellant's room while JO1
Domingo David, Jr. posted himself outside. Without any warning, JO1 Passilan frisked
appellant and confiscated his wallet containing one (1) P1,000.00 bill. JO1s David and
Passilan left immediately thereafter. Appellant was left with no other choice but to
follow them in order to get back his wallet. Appellant followed the jail officers to the
Intelligence Office of the Manila City Jail where he saw JO1 Passilan place the P500.00
bills inside the confiscated black wallet. Appellant was then told that the P500.00 bills
were counterfeit and that he was being charged with illegal possession and use
thereof. Appellant also added that JO1 Passilan bore a grudge against him. This was
because appellant refused to extend a loan [to] JO1 Passilan because the latter
cannot offer any collateral therefor. Since then, JO1 Passilan treated him severely,
threatening him and, at times, putting him in isolation.

After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
The RTC gave credence to the prosecution's witnesses in finding that the counterfeit money were
discovered in petitioner's possession during a surprise inspection, and that the possibility that
the counterfeit money were planted to incriminate petitioner was almost nil considering the
number of pieces involved.[7] The RTC also did not find that the jail officers were motivated by
improper motive in arresting petitioner,[8] and applied in their favor the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties considering the absence of contrary evidence. As
to petitioners defense of frame-up, the RTC held that the purported frame-up allegedly staged
by JO1 Passilan would not affect the prosecution's evidence since the testimony of JO1 David
could stand by itself. The RTC likewise found that it was strange that petitioner did not
remonstrate despite the fact that he was allegedly being framed.[9]

As to the elements of the crime, the RTC held that the fact that the P500.00 bills found in
petitioners possession were forgeries was confirmed by the certification issued by the Cash
Department of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, which was testified into by Acting Assistant
Manager Loida A. Cruz.[10] The RTC also ruled that petitioner knew the bills were counterfeit as
shown by his conduct during the surprise search and his possession of the bills. As to the element
of intention to use the false bank notes, the RTC ruled that the fact that petitioner intended to
use the bills was confirmed by the information received by the jail officers from another
inmate.[11]
 Aggrieved, petitioner sought reconsideration of the judgment. Petitioner argued that the
evidence used against him was obtained in violation of his constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Petitioner also argued that the prosecution failed to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt because of the non-presentation of the informant-inmate,
Francis dela Cruz, who could have corroborated the testimonies of the jail officers.

Unconvinced, the RTC denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. The RTC, however,
only ruled that there was no violation of petitioners constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures because the seizure was done pursuant to a valid arrest for violation of
Article 168 of the RPC. The trial court pointed out that prior to the search, a crime was committed
and the criminal responsibility pointed to petitioner.[12]

On appeal before the CA, petitioner argued that the RTC erred in finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for violating Article 168 of the RPC. Petitioner contended that one of
the elements of the crime which is intent to use the counterfeit bills was not established
because the informant Francis dela Cruz did not take the witness stand.[13]

The CA, however, found the appeal unmeritorious and denied petitioners appeal.[14] The
appellate court found that the fact the petitioner was caught in possession of twenty-four (24)
pieces of fake P500.00 bills already casts doubt on his allegation that he was merely framed by
the jail guards. The CA agreed with the RTC that even without the testimony of JO1 Passilan, the
testimony of JO1 David was already sufficient to establish petitioners guilt since petitioner did
not impute any ill motive on the latter except to point out that JO1 David was JO1 Passilans
friend.[15]

Regarding the element of intent to use, the CA found that there are several circumstances
which, if taken together, lead to the logical conclusion that petitioner intended to use the
counterfeit bills in his possession. The CA pointed out that jail officers were informed by inmate
Francis dela Cruz that he received a fake P500.00 bill from petitioner who told him to buy soft
drinks from the Manila City jail bakery. After Francis dela Cruz identified petitioner as the person
who gave him the fake money, the jail officers conducted a surprise inspection. Said inspection
yielded twenty-three (23) pieces of counterfeit P500.00 bills inside petitioner's black wallet,
which was taken from his back pocket. The CA further held that the non-presentation of Francis
dela Cruz would not affect the prosecution's case because even without his testimony,
petitioners intent to use the counterfeit bills was established. The CA added that the matter of
which witnesses to present is a matter best left to the discretion of the prosecution.[16]

Petitioner sought reconsideration of the above ruling, but the CA denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration in the assailed Resolution dated October 14, 2010.[17] Hence, the
present appeal.
 Petitioner raises the following assignment of errors, to wit:

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL

TRIAL COURT, CONVICTING PETITIONER OF THE CRIME CHARGED, DESPITE THE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT EXCLUDING THE COUNTERFEIT BILLS SINCE
THEY WERE DERIVED FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE.[18]

The petition is meritorious.

Generally, the trial courts findings are accorded finality, unless there appears in the record
some fact or circumstance of weight which the lower court has overlooked, misunderstood or
misappreciated, and which, if properly considered, would alter the result of the case. The
exception applies when it is established that the trial court has ignored, overlooked,
misconstrued or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances which, if considered, will change
the outcome of the case.[19]

Here, the Court finds that the RTC and the CA had overlooked certain substantial facts of
value to warrant a reversal of its factual assessments. While petitioner's denial is an intrinsically
weak defense which must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credence,
said defense must be given credence in this case as the prosecution failed to meet its burden of
proof.

Article 168 of the RPC, under which petitioner was charged, provides:

ART. 168. Illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank notes and other
instruments of credit. Unless the act be one of those coming under the
provisions of any of the preceding articles, any person who shall knowingly
use or have in his possession, with intent to use any of the false or falsified
instruments referred to in this section, shall suffer the penalty next lower in
degree than that prescribed in said articles. [Emphasis supplied.]

The elements of the crime charged for violation of said law are: (1) that any treasury or bank
note or certificate or other obligation and security payable to bearer, or any instrument
payable to order or other document of credit not payable to bearer is forged or falsified by
another person; (2) that the offender knows that any of the said instruments is forged or
falsified; and (3) that he either used or possessed with intent to use any of such forged or
falsified instruments.[20] As held in People v. Digoro, [21] possession of false treasury or bank
notes alone, without anything more, is not a criminal offense. For it to constitute an offense
under Article 168 of the RPC, the possession must be with intent to use said false treasury or bank
notes.[22]

In this case, the prosecution failed to show that petitioner used the counterfeit money or
that he intended to use the counterfeit bills. Francis dela Cruz, to whom petitioner supposedly
gave the fake P500.00 bill to buy soft drinks, was not presented in court. According to the jail
officers, they were only informed by Francis dela Cruz that petitioner asked the latter to buy soft
drinks at the Manila City jail bakery using a fake P500.00 bill. In short, the jail officers did not have
personal knowledge that petitioner asked Francis dela Cruz use the P500.00 bill.[23] Their account,
however, is hearsay and not based on the personal knowledge.[24]

This Court, of course, is not unaware of its rulings that the matter of presentation of
prosecution witnesses is not for the accused or, except in a limited sense, for the trial court to
dictate. Discretion belongs to the city or provincial prosecutor as to how the prosecution should
present its case.[25] However, in this case, the non-presentation of the informant as witness
weakens the prosecution's evidence since he was the only one who had knowledge of the act
which manifested petitioner's intent to use a counterfeit bill. The prosecution had every
opportunity to present Francis dela Cruz as its witness, if in fact such person existed, but it did
not present him. Hence, the trial court did not have before it evidence of an essential element of
the crime. The twenty-three (23) pieces of counterfeit bills allegedly seized on petitioner is not
sufficient to show intent, which is a state of mind, for there must be an overt act to manifest such
intent.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated March
29, 2010 and Resolution dated October 14, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32365
are REVERSED and SET-ASIDE. Petitioner Mark Clemente y Martinez alias Emmanuel Dino is
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of Illegal possession and use of false bank notes defined and
penalized under Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

With costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

LEONILA BATULANON, G.R. No. 139857

Petitioner,
Present:
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. Promulgated:
September 15, 2006
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition assails the October 30, 1998 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 15221, affirming with modification the April 15, 1993 Decision [2] of the Regional Trial Court
of General Santos City, Branch 22 in Criminal Case Nos. 3453, 3625, 3626 and 3627, convicting
Leonila Batulanon of estafa through falsification of commercial documents, and the July 29, 1999
Resolution[3] denying the motion for reconsideration.

Complainant Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated (PCCI) employed Batulanon as

its Cashier/Manager from May 1980 up to December 22, 1982. She was in charge of receiving
deposits from and releasing loans to the member of the cooperative.

During an audit conducted in December 1982, certain irregularities concerning the

release of loans were discovered.[4]

Thereafter, four informations for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents were
filed against Batulanon, to wit:

Criminal Case No. 3625

That on or about the 2nd day of June, 1982 at Poblacion Municipality of

Polomolok, Province of South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
the Honorable Court said accused being then the manager-cashier of Polomolok
Credit Cooperative, Inc., (PCCI), entrusted with the duty of managing the aff[a]irs
of the cooperative, receiving payments to, and collections of, the same, and
paying out loans to members, taking advantage of her position and with intent to
prejudice and defraud the cooperative, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify a commercial document, namely: Cash/Check Voucher No. 30-
A of PCCI in the name of Erlinda Omadlao by then and there making an entry
therein that the said Erlinda Omadlao was granted a loan of P4,160, Philippine
Currency, and by signing on the appropriate line thereon the signature of Erlinda
Omadlao showing that she received the loan, thus making it appear that the said
Erlinda Omadlao was granted a loan and received the amount of P4,160 when in
truth and in fact the said person was never granted a loan, never received the
same, and never signed the cash/check voucher issued in her name, and in
furtherance of her criminal intent and fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said
accused did then and there release to herself the same and received the loan of
P4,160 and thereafter misappropriate and convert to her own use and benefit the
said amount, and despite demands, refused and still refuses to restitute the same,
to the damage and prejudice of PCCI, in the aforementioned amount of P4,160,
Philippine Currency.[5]

Criminal Case No. 3626

That on or about the 24th day of September, 1982 at Poblacion,

Municipality of Polomolok, Province of South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, said accused being then the manager-cashier
of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc. (PCCI), entrusted with the duty of managing
the affairs of the cooperative, receiving payments to, and collections of, the same,
and paying out loans to members taking advantage of her position and with intent
to prejudice and defraud the cooperative, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously falsify a commercial document, namely: Cash/Check Voucher No.
237 A of PCCI in the name of Gonafreda Oracion by then and there making an
entry therein that the said Gonafreda Oracion was granted a loan of P4,000.00
and by signals on the appropriate line thereon the signature of Gonafreda Oracion
showing that she received the loan, thus making it appear that the said Gonafreda
Oracion was granted a loan, received the loan of P4,000.00 when in truth and in
fact said person was never granted a loan, never received the same, and never
signed the Cash/Check voucher issued in her name, and in furtherance of her
criminal intent and fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said accused did then and
there release to herself the same and received the amount of P4,000.00 and
thereafter misappropriate and convert to her own use and benefit the said
amount, and despite demands, refused and still refuses to restitute the same, to
the damage and prejudice of PCCI, in the aforementioned amount of P4,000,
Philippine Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
Criminal Case No. 3453

That on or about the 10th day of October 1982 at Poblacion, Municipality

of Polomolok, Province of South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of the Honorable Court, the said accused being then the manager-cashier of
Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc., (PCCI), entrusted with the duty of managing
the affairs of the cooperative, receiving payments to, and collection of the same
and paying out loans to members, taking advantage of her position and with intent
to prejudice and defraud the cooperative, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously falsify a commercial document, namely: an Individual Deposits and
Loan Ledger of one Ferlyn Arroyo with the PCCI by then and there entering on the
appropriate column of the ledger the entry that the said Ferlyn Arroyo had a fixed
deposit of P1,000.00 with the PCCI and was granted a loan in the amount of
P3,500.00, thus making it appear that the said person made a fixed deposit on the
aforesaid date with, and was granted a loan by the PCCI when in truth and in fact
Ferlyn Arroyo never made such a deposit and was never granted loan and after
the document was so falsified in the manner set forth, said accused did then and
there again falsify the Cash/Check Voucher of the PCCI in the name of Ferlyn
Arroyo by signing therein the signature of Ferlyn Arroyo, thus making it appear
that the said Ferlyn Arroyo received the loan of P3,500, Philippine Currency, when
in truth and in fact said Ferlyn Arroyo never received the loan, and in furtherance
of her criminal intent and fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said accused did then
and there release to herself the same, and received the amount of P3,500, and
thereafter, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate
and convert to her own personal use and benefit the said amount, and despite
demands, refused and still refuses to restitute the same, to the damage and
prejudice of the PCCI in the aforementioned amount of P3,500, Philippine
Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]

Criminal Case No. 3627

That on or about the 7th day of December, 1982 at Poblacion, Municipality

of Polomolok, Province of South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of the Honorable Court, the said accused being then the manager-cashier of
Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc., (PCCI) entrusted with the duty of managing
the affairs of the cooperative, receiving payments to, and collection of, the same
and paying out loans to members, taking advantage of her position and with intent
to prejudice and defraud the cooperative, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
 and feloniously falsify a commercial document, namely: an Individual Deposits and
Loan Ledger of one Dennis Batulanon with the PCCI by then and there entering on
the appropriate column of the ledger the entry that the said Dennis Batulanon had
a fixed deposit of P2,000.00 with the PCCI and was granted a loan in the amount
of P5,000.00 thus making it appear that the said person made fixed deposit on the
aforesaid date with, and was granted a loan by the PCCI when in truth and in fact
Dennis Batulanon never made such a deposit and was never granted loan and
offer the document was so falsified in the manner set forth, said accused did then
and there again falsify the Cash/Check Voucher No. 374 A of PCCI in the name of
Dennis Batulanon by signing therein the signature of Dennis Batulanon, thus
making it appear that the said Dennis Batulanon received the loan of P5,000.00
when in truth and in fact said Dennis Batulanon never received the loan and in
furtherance of her criminal intent and fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said
accused did then and there release to herself the same and receive the loan of
P5,000, and thereafter, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriate and convert to her own personal use and benefit the said amount,
and [despite] demands, refused and still refuses to restitute the same to the
damage and prejudice of the PCCI in the aforementioned amount of P5,000,
Philippine Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]

The cases were raffled to Branch 22 of the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City and
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 3453, 3625, 3626 and 3627.

Batulanon pleaded not guilty to the charges, afterwhich a joint trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented Maria Theresa Medallo, Benedicto Gopio, Jr., and Bonifacio
Jayoma as witnesses.

Medallo, the posting clerk whose job was to assist Batulanon in the preparation of cash
vouchers[9] testified that on certain dates in 1982, Batulanon released four Cash Vouchers
representing varying amounts to four different individuals as follows: On June 2, 1982, Cash
Voucher No. 30A[10] for P4,160.00 was released to Erlinda Omadlao; on September 24, 1982, Cash
Voucher No. 237A[11] for P4,000.00 was released to Gonafreda[12] Oracion; P3, 500.00 thru Cash
Voucher No. 276A[13] was released to Ferlyn Arroyo on October 16, 1982 and on December 7,
1982, P5,000.00 was released to Dennis Batulanon thru Cash Voucher No. 374A.[14]
 Medallo testified that Omadlao, Oracion, and Dennis Batulanon were not eligible to apply
for loan because they were not bona fide members of the cooperative.[15] Ferlyn Arroyo on the
other hand, was a member of the cooperative but there was no proof that she applied for a loan
with PCCI in 1982. She subsequently withdrew her membership in 1983.[16] Medallo stated that
pursuant to the cooperatives by-laws, only bona fide members who must have a fixed deposit
are eligible for loans.[17]

Medallo categorically stated that she saw Batulanon sign the names of Oracion and
Arroyo in their respective cash vouchers and made it appear in the records that they were payees
and recipients of the amount stated therein.[18] As to the signature of Omadlao in Cash Voucher
No. 30A, she declared that the same was actually the handwriting of appellant.[19]

Gopio, Jr. was a member of PCCI since 1975 and a member of its board of directors since
1979. He corroborated Medallos testimony that Omadlao, Arroyo, Oracion and Dennis Batulanon
are not members of PCCI. He stated that Oracion is Batulanons sister-in-law while Dennis
Batulanon is her son who was only 3 years old in 1982. He averred that membership in the
cooperative is not open to minors.[20]

Jayoma was the Vice-Chairman of the PCCI Board of Directors in 1980 before becoming
its Chairman in 1982 until 1983. He testified that the loans made to Oracion, Omadlao, Arroyo
and Dennis Batulanon did not pass through the cooperatives Credit Committee and PCCIs Board
of Directors for screening purposes. He claimed that Oracions signature on Cash Voucher No.
237A is Batulanons handwriting.[21] Jayoma also testified that among the four loans taken, only
that in Arroyos name was settled.[22]

The defense presented two witnesses, namely, Maria Theresa Medallo who was
presented as a hostile witness and Batulanon.

Medallo was subpoenaed by the trial court on behalf of the defense and was asked to
bring with her the PCCI General Journal for the year 1982. After certifying that the said document
reflected all the financial transactions of the cooperative for that year, she was asked to identify
the entries in the Journal with respect to the vouchers in question. Medallo was able to identify
only Cash Voucher No. 237A in the name of Gonafreda Oracion. She failed to identify the other
vouchers because the Journal had missing pages and she was not the one who prepared the
entries.[23]
 Batulanon denied all the charges against her. She claimed that she did not sign the
vouchers in the names of Omadlao, Oracion and Arroyo; that the same were signed by the loan
applicants in her presence at the PCCI office after she personally released the money to
them;[24] that the three were members of the cooperative as shown by their individual deposits
and the ledger; that the board of directors passed a resolution in August 1982 authorizing her to
certify to the correctness of the entries in the vouchers; that it has become an accepted practice
in the cooperative for her to release loans and dispense with the approval of Gopio Jr., in case of
his absence;[25] that she signed the loan application and voucher of her son Dennis Batulanon
because he was a minor but she clarified that she asked Gopio, Jr., to add his signature on the
documents to avoid suspicion of irregularity;[26] that contrary to the testimony of Gopio, Jr.,
minors are eligible for membership in the cooperative provided they are children of regular
members.

Batulanon admitted that she took out a loan in her sons name because she is no longer
qualified for another loan as she still has to pay off an existing loan; that she had started paying
off her sons loan but the cooperative refused to accept her payments after the cases were filed
in court.[27] She also declared that one automatically becomes a member when he deposits
money with the cooperative.[28] When she was Cashier/Manager of PCCI from 1980 to 1982, the
cooperative did not have by-laws yet.[29]

On rebuttal, Jayoma belied that PCCI had no by-laws from 1980-1982, because the
cooperative had been registered since 1967.[30]

On April 15, 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting Batulanon as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the accused Leonila Batulanon

guilty beyond reasonable doubt in all the above-entitled case, she is sentenced in
each of the four cases to 4 months of ARRESTO MAYOR to 1 year and 2 months of
PRISION CORRECTIONAL, to indemnify the PCCI in the total sum of P16,660.00
with legal interest from the institution of the complaints until fully paid, plus costs.

SO ORDERED.[31]

The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court, thus:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Appellant LEONILA

BATULANON is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of Private
 Documents under Par. 2, Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code; and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto
mayor maximum, AS MINIMUM, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional medium, AS MAXIMUM; to pay a fine of five thousand (P5,000.00)
pesos; and to indemnify the Polomolok Cooperative Credit , Inc. the sum of
thirteen thousand one hundred sixty (P13,160.00), plus legal interests from the
filing of the complaints until fully paid, plus costs.

SO ORDERED.[32]

The motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.

Batulanon argues that in any falsification case, the best witness is the person whose signature
was allegedly forged, thus the prosecution should have presented Erlinda Omadlao, Gonafreda
Oracion and Ferlyn Arroyo instead of relying on the testimony of an unreliable and biased witness
such as Medallo.[33] She avers that the crime of falsification of private document requires as an
element prejudice to a third person. She insists that PCCI has not been prejudiced by these loan
transactions because these loans are accounts receivable by the cooperative.[34]

The petition lacks merit.

Although the offense charged in the information is estafa through falsification of

commercial document, appellant could be convicted of falsification of private document under
the well-settled rule that it is the allegations in the information that determines the nature of the
offense and not the technical name given in the preamble of the information. In Andaya v.
People,[35] we held:

From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to

the accused what is the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged.
It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. x x x That to which his attention
should be directed, and in which he, above all things else, should be most
interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit a crime
given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts
alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set forth. x x x The
real and important question to him is, Did you perform the acts alleged in the
manner alleged? not, Did you commit a crime named murder? If he performed the
acts alleged, in the manner stated, the law determines what the name of the crime
is and fixes the penalty therefor. x x x If the accused performed the acts alleged in
the manner alleged, then he ought to be punished and punished adequately,
whatever may be the name of the crime which those acts constitute.
 The elements of falsification of private document under Article 172, paragraph 2[36] of the
Revised Penal Code are: (1) that the offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except
those in paragraph 7, Article 171; (2) that the falsification was committed in any private
document; and (3) that the falsification caused damage to a third party or at least the falsification
was committed with intent to cause such damage.[37]

In Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626, and 3453, Batulanons act[38] of falsification falls under
paragraph 2 of Article 171, i.e., causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or
proceeding when they did not in fact so participate. This is because by signing the name of
Omadlao, Oracion, and Arroyo in Cash Voucher Nos. 30A, 237A, and 267A, respectively, as payee
of the amounts appearing in the corresponding cash vouchers, Batulanon made it appear that
they obtained a loan and received its proceeds when they did not in fact secure said loan nor
receive the amounts reflected in the cash vouchers.

The prosecution established that Batulanon caused the preparation of the Cash Vouchers
in the name of Omadlao and Oracion knowing that they are not PCCI members and not qualified
for a loan from the cooperative. In the case of Arroyo, Batulanon was aware that while the former
is a member, she did not apply for a loan with the cooperative.

Medallo categorically declared that she saw Batulanon forge the signatures of Oracion
and Arroyo in the vouchers and made it appear that the amounts stated therein were actually
received by these persons. As to the signature of Arroyo, Medallos credible testimony and her
familiarity with the handwriting of Batulanon proved that it was indeed the latter who signed the
name of Arroyo. Contrary to Batulanons contention, the prosecution is not duty-bound to
present the persons whose signatures were forged as Medallos eyewitness account of the
incident was sufficient. Moreover, under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the
handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of
such person because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon
which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the
handwriting of such person.

Her insistence that Medallo is a biased witness is without basis. There is no evidence
showing that Medallo was prompted by any ill motive.
 The claim that Batulanons letter to the cooperative asking for a compromise was not an
admission of guilt is untenable. Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that in criminal
cases, except those involving quasi-offenses or criminal negligence or those allowed by law to be
compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied
admission of guilt.

There is no merit in Batulanons assertion that PCCI has not been prejudiced because the
loan transactions are reflected in its books as accounts receivable. It has been established that
PCCI only grants loans to its bona fide members with no subsisting loan. These alleged borrowers
are not members of PCCI and neither are they eligible for a loan. Of the four accounts, only that
in Ferlyn Arroyos name was settled because her mother, Erlinda, agreed to settle the loan to
avoid legal prosecution with the understanding however, that she will be reimbursed once the
money is collected from Batulanon.[39]

The Court of Appeals[40] correctly ruled that the subject vouchers are private documents
and not commercial documents because they are not documents used by merchants or
businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions [41] nor are they defined and
regulated by the Code of Commerce or other commercial law.[42] Rather, they are private
documents, which have been defined as deeds or instruments executed by a private person
without the intervention of a public notary or of other person legally authorized, by which some
disposition or agreement is proved, evidenced or set forth. [43]

In all criminal prosecutions, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to establish the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It has the duty to prove each and every element
of the crime charged in the information to warrant a finding of guilt for the said crime or for any
other crime necessarily included therein.[44] The prosecution in this case was able to discharge its
burden completely.

As there is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of private document, [45] it is

important to ascertain whether the offender is to be charged with falsification of a private
document or with estafa. If the falsification of a private document is committed as a means to
commit estafa, the proper crime to be charged is falsification. If the estafa can be committed
without the necessity of falsifying a document, the proper crime to be charged is estafa. Thus,
in People v. Reyes,[46] the accused made it appear in the time book of the Calamba Sugar Estate
that a laborer, Ciriaco Sario, worked 21 days during the month of July, 1929, when in reality he
had worked only 11 days, and then charged the offended party, the Calamba Sugar Estate, the
wages of the laborer for 21 days. The accused misappropriated the wages during which the
laborer did not work for which he was convicted of falsification of private document.

In U.S. v. Infante,[47] the accused changed the description of the pawned article on the
face of the pawn ticket and made it appear that the article is of greatly superior value, and
thereafter pawned the falsified ticket in another pawnshop for an amount largely in excess of the
true value of the article pawned. He was found guilty of falsification of a private
document. In U.S. v. Chan Tiao,[48] the accused presented a document of guaranty purportedly
signed by Ortigas Hermanos for the payment of P2,055.00 as the value of 150 sacks of sugar, and
by means of said falsified documents, succeeded in obtaining the sacks of sugar, was held guilty
of falsification of a private document.

In view of the foregoing, we find that the Court of Appeals correctly held Batulanon guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of Private Documents in Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626
and 3453.

Article 172 punishes the crime of Falsification of a Private Document with the penalty
of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods with a duration of two (2) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. There being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period, which is three (3) years, six
(6) months and twenty-one (21) days to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days. Taking
into consideration the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Batulanon is entitled to an indeterminate
penalty the minimum of which must be within the range of arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its minimum period, or four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years
and four (4) months.[49] Thus, in Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453, the Court of Appeals
correctly imposed the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years
and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, which is within the range of the allowed
imposable penalty.

Since Batulanons conviction was for 3 counts of falsification of private documents, she
shall suffer the aforementioned penalties for each count of the offense charged. She is also
ordered to indemnify PCCI the amount of P11,660.00 representing the aggregate amount of the
3 loans without deducting the amount of P3,500.00 paid by Ferlyn Arroyos mother as the same
was settled with the understanding that PCCI will reimburse the former once the money is
recovered. The amount shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the filing of the
complaints on November 28, 1994 until the finality of this judgment. From the time the decision
becomes final and executory, the interest rate shall be 12% per annum until its satisfaction.

However, in Criminal Case No. 3627, the crime committed by Batulanon is estafa and not
falsification. Under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, the acts that may constitute
falsification are the following:

1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric;

2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or

proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;

3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding

statements other than those in fact made by them;

4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

5. Altering true dates;

6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which

changes its meaning;

7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of

an original document when no such original exists, or including in such copy a
statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original; or;

8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in

a protocol, registry, or official book.

In Criminal Case No. 3627, the trial court convicted petitioner Batulanon for falsifying Dennis
Batulanons signature in the cash voucher based on the Information charging her of signing the
name of her 3 year old son, Dennis. The records, however, reveal that in Cash Voucher No. 374A,
petitioner Batulanon did not falsify the signature of Dennis. What she did was to sign: by:
lbatulanon to indicate that she received the proceeds of the loan in behalf of Dennis. Said act
does not fall under any of the modes of falsification under Article 171 because there in nothing
untruthful about the fact that she used the name of Dennis and that as representative of the
latter, obtained the proceeds of the loan from PCCI. The essence of falsification is the act of
making untruthful or false statements, which is not attendant in this case. As to whether, such
representation involves fraud which caused damage to PCCI is a different matter which will make
her liable for estafa, but not for falsification. Hence, it was an error for the courts below to hold
that petitioner Batulanon is also guilty of falsification of private document with respect to
Criminal Case No. 3627 involving the cash voucher of Dennis.[50]

The elements of estafa through conversion or misappropriation under Art. 315 (1) (b) of
the Revised Penal Code are:

(1) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the

offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same;

(2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or

property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt;

(3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice

of another;

(4) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.
(Note: The 4th element is not necessary when there is evidence of
misappropriation of the goods by the defendant)[51]

Thus in the case of U.S. v. Sevilla,[52] the Court convicted the appellant of estafa by
misappropriation. The latter, a treasurer of the Manila Rail Road Company, took the sum of
P8,330.00 out of the funds of the company and used it for personal purposes. He replaced said
cash with his personal check of the same amount drawn on the Philippine National Bank (PNB),
with instruction to his cashier not to deposit the same in the current account of the Manila Rail
Road Company until the end of the month. When an audit was conducted, the check of appellant
was discovered to have been carried in the accounts as part of the cash on hand. An inquiry with
the PNB disclosed that he had only P125.66 in his account, although in the afternoon of the same
day, he deposited in his account with the PNB sufficient sum to cover the check. In handing down
a judgment of conviction, the Court explained that:

Fraudulent intent in committing the conversion or diversion is very

evidently not a necessary element of the form of estafa here discussed; the breach
of confidence involved in the conversion or diversion of trust funds takes the place
of fraudulent intent and is in itself sufficient. The reason for this is obvious: Grave
as the offense is, comparatively few men misappropriate trust funds with the
intention of defrauding the owner; in most cases the offender hopes to be able to
restore the funds before the defalcation is discovered. x x x
 Applying the legal principles here stated to the facts of the case, we find
all of the necessary elements of estafa x x x. That the money for which the
appellant's checks were substituted was received by him for safe-keeping or
administration, or both, can hardly be disputed. He was the responsible financial
officer of the corporation and as such had immediate control of the current funds
for the purposes of safe-keeping and was charged with the custody of the same.
That he, in the exercise of such control and custody, was aided by subordinates
cannot alter the case nor can the fact that one of the subordinates, the cashier,
was a bonded employee who, if he had acted on his own responsibility, might also
have misappropriated the same funds and thus have become guilty of estafa.

Neither can there be any doubt that, in taking money for his personal use,
from the funds entrusted to him for safekeeping and substituting his personal
checks therefor with instructions that the checks were to be retained by the
cashier for a certain period, the appellant misappropriated and diverted the funds
for that period. The checks did not constitute cash and as long as they were
retained by the appellant or remained under his personal control they were of no
value to the corporation; he might as well have kept them in his pocket as to
deliver them to his subordinate with instructions to retain them.

xxxx

But it is argued in the present case that it was not the intention of the
accused to permanently misappropriate the funds to himself. As we have already
stated, such intention rarely exists in cases of this nature and, as we have seen, it
is not a necessary element of the crime. Though authorities have been cited who,
at first sight, appear to hold that misappropriation of trust funds for short periods
does not always amount to estafa, we are not disposed to extend this
interpretation of the law to cases where officers of corporations convert
corporate funds to their own use, especially where, as in this case, the corporation
is of a quasi-public character. The statute is clear and makes no distinction
between permanent misappropriations and temporary ones. We can see no
reason in the present case why it should not be applied in its literal sense.

The third element of the crime with which the appellant is charged is injury
to another. The appellant's counsel argues that the only injury in this case is the
loss of interest suffered by the Railroad Company during the period the funds were
withheld by the appellant. It is, however, well settled by former adjudications of
this court that the disturbance in property rights caused by the misappropriation,
though only temporary, is in itself sufficient to constitute injury within the
meaning of paragraph 5, supra. (U.S. vs. Goyenechea, 8 Phil., 117 U.S. vs. Malong,
36 Phil., 821.)[53]
In the instant case, there is no doubt that as Cashier/Manager, Batulanon holds the money for
administration and in trust for PCCI. Knowing that she is no longer qualified to obtain a loan, she
fraudulently used the name of her son who is likewise disqualified to secure a loan from PCCI. Her
misappropriation of the amount she obtained from the loan is also not disputed as she even
admitted receiving the same for personal use. Although the amount received by Batulanon is
reflected in the records as part of the receivables of PCCI, damage was still caused to the latter
because the sum misappropriated by her could have been loaned by PCCI to qualified members,
or used in other productive undertakings. At any rate, the disturbance in property rights caused
by Batulaonos misappropriation is in itself sufficient to constitute injury within the meaning of
Article 315.

Considering that the amount misappropriated by Batulanon was P5,000.00, the applicable
provision is paragraph (3) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, which imposes the penalty
of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, where the
amount defrauded is over P200.00 but does not exceed P6,000.00. There being no modifying
circumstances, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period. With the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, Batulaon is entitled to an indeterminate penalty of three (3)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision
correccional, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the

following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) In Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453, Leonila Batulanon is found GUILTY of three
counts of falsification of private documents and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum, for each count, and to indemnify complainant Polomolok Credit
Cooperative Incorporated the amount of P11,660.00 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum
from November 28, 1994 until finality of this judgment. The interest rate of 12% per annum shall
be imposed from finality of this judgment until its satisfaction; and

(2) In Criminal Case No. 3627, Leonila Batulanon is found GUILTY of estafa and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of three (3) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1)
year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as maximum. She is likewise ordered to
indemnify Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated the sum of P5,000.00 with interest at the
rate of 6% per annum from November 28, 1994 until finality of this judgment. The interest rate
of 12% per annum shall be imposed from finality of this judgment until its satisfaction.

SO ORDERED.
PEDRO S. GIRON, JR., LETICIA GUJILDE- G.R. Nos. 145357-59
CRIZALDO, and FELIXBERTO B. ARREZA,
Petitioners, Present:

QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
SANDIGANBAYAN and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents. Promulgated:

August 23, 2006

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review[1] of the Decision[2] promulgated on 9 May 1997 and the
Resolution[3] promulgated on 4 October 2000 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.
17352, People of the Philippines v. Felixberto B. Arreza, and Criminal Case No. 19675, People of
the Philippines v. Pedro S. Giron, Jr., Leticia Gujilde-Crizaldo, Orlando B. Cedro, and Emiliano T.
Salang, Jr., both for falsification of public documents.

In Criminal Case No. 19675, the Sandiganbayan initially found petitioners Pedro S. Giron, Jr.
(Giron), Leticia Gujilde-Crizaldo (Crizaldo), and Orlando B. Cedro (Cedro) guilty of falsification of
public documents. The Sandiganbayan, however, acquitted Emiliano T. Salang (Salang) based on
reasonable doubt. The Sandiganbayan also found petitioner Felixberto B. Arreza (Arreza) guilty
of falsification of public documents in Criminal Case No. 17352. In Criminal Case No. 19676,
decided jointly with Criminal Case Nos. 17352 and 19675, People of the Philippines v. Pedro S.
Giron, Jr., Gertrude S. Sucias, Orlando B. Cedro, Robert G. Lala, and Felixberto B. Arreza, the
Sandiganbaya acquitted Giron, Gertrude S. Sucias (Sucias), Cedro, Robert G. Lala (Lala) and Arreza
based on reasonable doubt.

On reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan also acquitted Cedro in Criminal Case No. 19675.

The Facts

The present petition involves alleged irregularities in the construction of a two-kilometer road
connecting Barangays Kinayan and Kauswagan in Tandag, Surigao del Sur (Kinayan-Kauswagan
Road Project). Contrary to what was stated in the Monthly Status Report dated 25 January 1989
and the Physical Status Report dated 31 January 1989 (collectively, Reports), the Kinayan-
Kauswagan Road Project was not 100% complete as of 25 January 1989.
The Sandiganbayan established the following facts:

That in November 1988 the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) in
Tandag, Surigao del Sur embarked on an infrastructure undertaking known as
Kinayan-Kauswagan Road Project where a Barangay road in Barobo, Tandag,
Surigao del Sur will be constructed and/or rehabilitated connecting barangays
Kinayan and Kauswagan in the said town. The project was implemented by the
Office of the District Engineer of Tandag, Surigao del Sur and the following
participated in the same Engr. Pedro Giron[,] Jr. as District Engineer, Engr.
Felixberto Arreza as [P]roject [E]ngineer, Engr. Orlando Cedro as Chief of the
Construction section, Engr. Emiliano Salang as Assistant District Engineer, Engr.
Leticia Crizaldo as Construction Foreman and Engr. Gertrude Sucias as Civil
Engineering Aide (both were only in the Office and not at the site).

A Program of Work/Budget Cost was prepared duly approved by Engr. Emiliano

Salang[,] Jr.[,] then Asst. District Engineer and based at DPWH Sub-office in Bislig,
Surigao del Sur, and Pedro S. Giron[,] Jr.[,] the District Engineer, which placed the
No. of calendar days to complete as 60 CD with the following phases of work with
their respective Item nos. Excavation for Structure 106, Foundation Fill [-] 110,
Reprep. of Prevly Const Road 116, Soil Lime Base [-] 20, and RCCP 413[,] the total
cost of the project amounting to P207,000.00 (Exhibit I). Subsequently, a revised
Program of Work/Budget was submitted by Engr. Orlando Cedro with the
Assistant District Engineer Emiliano Salang[,] Jr. as the recommending authority,
and which was approved by Engineer Pedro Giron[,] Jr. as District Engineer. In this
document (Exhibit 2), the No. of calendar days to complete was changed to 70 CD
(Exhibit 2 -1) and with the following Item nos. as code or legend:clearing &
 grubbing 100, Earthmoving 105, Excavation for Structure 106, Foundation Fill 110,
Soil Lime Base Course (Surfacing) 210, and Inst[.] of Cross Drainage 413 while the
total cost of Project was increased to P227,225.70.

In a communication dated January 25, 1989, District [Engr.] Pedro S. Giron[,] Jr.
submitted to the Regional Director of DPWH Regional Office No[.] XI (Davao City)
(Exhibit B also Exhibit 4) the Monthly Status Report of CY 1988 Infrastructure
Program where it appeared under item [n]o. 15 that Kauswagan-Kinayan Road
was 100% complete as of January 25, 1989 (Exhibit B-15 and B-15-A).

Thereafter, in a letter dated January 31, 1989[,] Engr. Roberto G. Lala[,] for and in
the absence of the District Engineer[,] submitted the Physical Status Reports of
Project Costing P2.0 M and below under C.Y. 1988 Infra Program to the same
Regional Office of the DPWH (Exhibit G) wherein it appeared that the Kauswagan-
Kinayan Road, Barobo[,] Surigao del Sur is 100% complete. (Exhibit G-20 and G-20-
a).

Exhibit B the Monthly Status Report was prepared by Leticia Gujilde-Crizaldo,

checked by Orlando B. Cedro and submitted by Pedro S. Giron[,] Jr. (Exhibit B-40)
while Exhibit G the Physical Status Report of Project was prepared by Gertrude S.
Sucias, checked by Orlando B. Cedro and submitted by Robert G. Lala (exhibit G-
69).[4]

Contrary to the Reports, the road was not finished by 25 January 1989. On 30 June 1989, the
Barangay Council of Kinayan, Barobo, Surigao del Sur resolved to request the Ombudsman to
make an immediate investigation on the irregularities of the Kinayan-Kauswagan Road Project.[5]

The Ombudsman, through the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, ordered the Provincial Auditor
to conduct an investigation. On 19 June 1990, in a report addressed to the Deputy Ombudsman
for Mindanao, State Auditor III Eusebia Gamulo of the Office of the Provincial Auditor of Surigao
del Sur wrote that:

3. Actual implementation of the project was very much delayed. In an interview

made it was disclosed that while the road opening started in November 1988,
spreading of the delivered soil lime base course was done in October 1989 only[,]
which was contrary to the DPWH report that said project was 100% completed as
of January 25, 1989.[6]
Special Prosecution Officer Erdulfo Querubin (Prosecution Officer Querubin) was then authorized
by the Ombudsman to conduct a preliminary investigation on the involvement of Giron, District
Engineer of Surigao del Sur; Salang, OIC District Engineer, DPWH Sub-Office, Manggagiy, Bislig,
Surigao del Sur; Cedro, Chief, Construction Section; Crizaldo, General Construction Foreman;
Sucias, C.E. Aide II; Lala, Supervising Civil Engineer; and Arreza, Project Engineer of the Kinayan-
Kauswagan Road Project. Prosecution Officer Querubin recommended the filing of informations
against the accused.

In Criminal Case No. 19675, the Information against Giron, Crizaldo, Cedro and Salang read:

That on or about January 25, 1989, in the Municipality of Tandag, Surigao del Sur
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Pedro S. Giron, Jr.,
District Engineer; Leticia Gujilde-Crizaldo, Gen. Construction Foreman; Orlando B.
Cedro, Chief, Construction Section, and Emiliano T. Salang, Jr., Assistant District
Engineer, all of the District Engineer[]s Office of Surigao del Sur, conspiring and
confederating with one another and with Felixberto B. Arreza, also an engineer in
the same office who is accused in Criminal Case No. 17352 (SB) for the same
offense charged herein, taking advantage of their official positions and
committing the crime herein charged in relation to their office, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify Monthly Status Report of CY 1988
Infrastructure program for the month of January 1989, an official document
required for submission to the XIth DPWH Regional Office, by reflecting on page
16 hereof that the Kinayan-Kauswagan barangay road project at Barobo, Surigao
del Sur was fully completed as of January 25, 1989, a matter the truth of which
accused were under obligation to disclose, when in truth and in fact, as accused
fully well knew, the said road project as of said date was not yet finished, as the
road surfacing materials for use therein were not yet delivered then and were
delivered only on March 18-21, 1989, thereby making an untruthful statement in
a narration of facts.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Manila, Philippines, August 17, 1993.[7]

In Criminal Case No. 19676, the Information against Giron, Sucias, Cedro, Lala and Arreza alleged:

That on or about January 25, 1989, in the Municipality of Tandag, Surigao del Sur,
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Pedro S. Giron, Jr.,
Gertrude S. Sucias, Orlando B. Cedro, Robert G. Lala, all public officers being then
District Engineer, Civil Engineer Aide II, Chief, Construction Section, and
Supervising Civil Engineer I, respectively, of the Office of the District Engineer of
 Surigao del Sur, conspiring together and with accused Felixberto B. Arreza, of the
same office who was the project engineer of the road project treated herein,
taking advantage of their official positions and committing the crime herein
charged in relation to their office, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify Physical Status Report of Projects costing P2.0M and Below
under CY 1988 Infrastructure Program as of January 1989, an official document
required for submission to the XIth DPWH Regional Office, by stating on page 14
thereof that the Kinayan-Kauswagan barangay road project at Barobo, Surigao del
Sur, was fully completed as of January 25, 1989, a matter the truth of which
accused was under obligation to disclose, when in truth and in fact, as accused
fully well knew, the said road project as of said date was not yet finished as the
road surfacing materials for use therein were not yet delivered then and were only
delivered on March 18-21, 1989, thereby making an untruthful statement in a
narration of facts.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Manila, Philippines, August 16, 1993.[8]

Before the informations quoted above were filed, Arreza had been charged with malversation in
Criminal Case No. 17351 and with falsification of a public document in Criminal Case No.
17352. The charges in Criminal Case Nos. 17351 and 17352 were based on the same set of facts
as Criminal Case Nos. 19675 and 19676. The information for Criminal Case No. 17352 read:

That in January 1989 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Tandag, Surigao

del Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, a public officer being then the duly appointed [P]roject Engineer
of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), taking advantage of his
official position did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify his
report on the Status of Project Implementation on the repair of the Kinayan-
Kauswagan Road at Barobo, Surigao del Sur, by causing it to appear that the same
was 100% complete as of January 25, 1989, when in fact and in truth, as the
accused knows fully well, it is not yet complete on the said date, the same having
been completed in October 1989.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Manila, November 27, 1991.[9]

The proceedings in Criminal Case No. 17352 were suspended pending the conduct of a
preliminary investigation. The preliminary investigation resulted in the filing of Criminal Case
Nos. 19675 and 19676. In the meantime, Arrezas trial in Criminal Case No. 17351 for malversation
continued, with the Sandiganbayans First Division acquitting him of the charge.The
Sandiganbayans Second Division resolved to consolidate Criminal Case Nos. 17352, 19675 and
19676 on 20 October 1993. All the accused interposed separate pleas of not guilty, and joint trial
ensued shortly thereafter.

The Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

In its decision promulgated on 9 May 1997, the Sandiganbayans First Division found Giron,
Crizaldo, Cedro and Arreza guilty and sentenced them accordingly. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 19676, accused Pedro S. Giron[,] Jr., Gertrude S.

Sucias, Orlando B. Cedro, Robert G. Lala, and Felixberto B. Arreza are
all ACQUITTED on the basis of reasonable doubt.

2. In Criminal Case No. 19675, the guilt of accused Pedro S. Giron[,] Jr.,
Leticia Gujilde-Crizaldo and Orlando B. Cedro having been proven beyond
reasonable doubt, they are hereby found guilty as principals, and
accordingly this Court sentences each one of them in default of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances to an indeterminate prison term
of SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE DAY of Prision Correccional as minimum to
SIX (6) YEARS[,] EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor
as maximum and to pay a fine of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) each without
any subsidiary liability in case of insolvency.

Accused Emiliano T. Salang is hereby ACQUITTED on the basis of reasonable

doubt[.] [H]is participation [is] seemingly limited to the acts before the actual
construction of the project[.]

3. In Criminal Case No. 17352[,] the prosecution having established the

guilt of accused Felixberto B. Arreza beyond reasonable doubt for having
conspired with accused Pedro Giron[,] Jr.[,] Leticia Gujilde-Crizaldo and
Orlando B. Cedro[,] [this Court] hereby finds him guilty as principal for
violation of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, and accordingly
sentences him, in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, to an indeterminate prison term of FOUR (4) MONTHS and
 ONE (1) DAY of ARRESTO MAYOR as minimum to FOUR (4) YEARS[,] NINE
(9) MONTHS and TEN (10) DAYS of Prision Correccional as maximum and
to pay a fine of FIVE THOUSAND pesos (P5,000.00) with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.

All those found guilty shall pay the costs proportionately.

The facts from which civil liability could have arisen not having been adequately
established[,] there is no pronouncement as to the same.
SO ORDERED.[10] (Emphasis in the original)

Giron, Crizaldo, Cedro, and Arreza filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 23 May 1997 and a
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration on 13 June 1997 with regard to the Sandiganbayans
decision in Criminal Case Nos. 19675 and 17352. In a resolution promulgated on 4 October 2000,
the appellate court reconsidered its previous decision and ruled thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated March 10, 1997, only
insofar as the criminal aspects of Criminal Cases No[s]. 19675 and 17352 are
concerned, is hereby reconsidered and set aside, and a new one entered as
follows:

1. In Criminal Case No, 19675, accused ORLANDO B. CEDRO is hereby

ACQUITTED by reason of reasonable doubt. As for accused PEDRO S.
GIRON, JR. and LETICIA GUJILDE-CRIZALDO, their guilt having been
established beyond reasonable doubt, taking into account the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, they are hereby sentenced to: (a)
suffer an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of six (6) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum; (b) suffer all the appropriate accessory
penalties consequent thereto, including perpetual special disqualification;
and (c) pay a fine of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) each.

2. In Criminal Case No. 17352, accused FELIXBERTO B. ARREZA, his guilt

having been established beyond reasonable doubt, taking into account the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, is hereby sentenced to: (a)
suffer an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of four (4) months and
one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional, as maximum; (b) suffer all the
appropriate accessory penalties consequent thereto, including perpetual
special disqualification; and (c) pay a fine of Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00).
 All those adjudged guilty are likewise hereby ordered to proportionately pay the
costs.

SO ORDERED.[11]

The Issues

Petitioners Giron, Crizaldo and Arreza come before this Court to question the Sandiganbayans
rulings. They raise the following issues:

First Ground

It is settled jurisprudence that an intention to injure a third person is an essential

element of the offense of falsification of a public document by making an
untruthful statement of facts. In these cases, the prosecution failed to prove that
petitioners had intended to injure the government or a third person through the
Monthly Status Report. Likewise, the Joint Decision and Resolution pointed to no
evidence of an actual injury to the government or a third person.

The Honorable Sandiganbayan departed from the established jurisprudence by

convicting petitioners on the basis of its erroneous ruling that the existence of a
wrongful intent to injure a third person is not necessary when the falsified
document is a public document, and that criminal intent is presumed to exist from
the knowledge of the falsity of the entry in [the] Monthly Status Report on the
status of the road project and did not need to be established by the prosecution.

Second Ground

Jurisprudence is settled that in offenses of falsification of a public document by

making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, the accused is not liable if
the acts imputed to him are consistent with good faith. The prosecution did not
prove that petitioners had acted in bad faith. Likewise, the Joint Decision and
Resolution failed to cite any evidence of bad faith on the part of petitioners.

The Honorable Sandiganbayan departed from the established jurisprudence and

grievously erred by not holding that petitioners had acted in good faith that
negates the existence of a criminal intent to commit falsification.

Third Ground
It is a settled doctrine that the offense of falsification is not deemed to have been
committed if the statements are not altogether false or if these statements have
colorable truth. The defense proved that the road project was almost eighty
percent (80%) complete, less the delivery of the limestone as of the submission
date of the Monthly Status Report on 25 January 1989. The delivery of the
limestone was suspended due to heavy rains, as the delivery trucks would only
destroy the road that was already prepared for the limestone surfacing. The
limestone was delivered to and spread at the project site in March 1989.

The Honorable Sandiganbayan departed from the established jurisprudence and

grievously erred by not ruling that the statement in the Monthly Status Report
regarding the 100% completion of the road project was not absolutely false.

Fourth Ground

Petitioner Arreza did not prepare, and was not a signatory to, the Monthly Status
Report. In fact, the Sandiganbayan found that this petitioner had no participation
in the preparation and execution of the report. Conspiracy in the preparation of
the report was ruled out. The Honorable Sandiganbayan grievously erred and
departed from the established jurisprudence [in] not acquitting petitioner Arreza.

Fifth Ground

Petitioner Giron, the District Engineer, did not prepare the Monthly Status Report,
which was submitted [by] Asst. Dist. Engr. Emiliano T. Salang in lieu of petitioner
Giron whose facsimile signatures were merely stamped in the covering latter and
the last page of the report. The respondent court ruled out the existence of
conspiracy in the preparation of the report.

The Honorable Sandiganbayan departed from the established jurisprudence and

grievously erred [in] not acquitting petitioner Giron.

Sixth Ground

Petitioner Crizaldo was the construction foreman merely assigned to type the
report at the Office of the District Engineer. She never went to the project site and
was not shown to have had personal knowledge about the Kinayan-Kauswagan
road project, which was only one of the more than 100 projects mentioned in the
report.

The Honorable Sandiganbayan departed from the established jurisprudence and

grievously erred [in] not acquitting petitioner Crizaldo.
 Seventh Ground

The Honorable Sandiganbayan departed from established jurisprudence and

grievously erred by convicting petitioners notwithstanding the prosecutions
failure to prove beyond reasonable doubt that these petitioners had committed
the crime of falsification of the Monthly Status Report.[12]

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has merit.

The main issue in this appeal is whether Giron, Crizaldo and Arreza are indeed guilty of
falsification of documents under Article 171(4) of the Revised Penal Code.

The Crime of Falsification of Documents

under Article 171(4) of the Revised Penal Code

Article 171(4) of the Revised Penal Code reads:

Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic

minister. The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall
be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage
of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following
acts:

xxxx

4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

x x x x.

There are three elements in the crime of falsification of documents under Article 171(4). First,
the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public. Second, the offender takes advantage
of his official position. Third, the offender falsifies a document by making untruthful statements
in a narration of facts.
Let us examine whether the charges against Giron, Crizaldo and Arreza satisfy these three
essential elements. There is no doubt that all three are public officials, as they were employees
of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) at the time of the questioned act.

There is serious doubt, however, as to whether anyone among Giron, Crizaldo and Arreza actually
took advantage of his official position. The offender takes advantage of his official position when
he has the duty to make or to prepare or otherwise to intervene in the preparation of the
document, or he has the official custody of the document which he falsifies.[13]According to the
Sandiganbayan, Giron testified that:

In preparing these reports, the project engineer reports to the Construction

Section the degree of work they had accomplished with respect to the project
assigned to them. The reports of the project engineers were to be consolidated
into one hence arriving at a Monthly Status Report. These reports were being
submitted every 25th of the month and it takes the Office of the District Engineer
three (3) to five (5) days to prepare the said report.[14]

The Monthly Status Report was typed by Crizaldo, checked by Cedro, and submitted by Salang in
lieu of Giron. Engr. Cedro, who supervised the preparation of the Monthly Status Report and
checked the same, was acquitted by the Sandiganbayan because he never signed the subject
reports.[15] Salang was also acquitted by the Sandiganbayan because his participation [was]
seemingly limited to the acts before the actual construction of the project.[16]

Crizaldos item was that of a General Construction Foreman but she was not assigned to the
project site.[17] Crizaldo was assigned in the office and was tasked to type the Monthly Status
Report. The prosecution never proved that Crizaldo had knowledge of the actual status of the
Kinayan-Kauswagan Road Project at the time she prepared the Monthly Status Report. Crizaldo
could have merely relied on field reports submitted to her, precluding her from making, on her
own, untruthful statements at the time she prepared the Monthly Status Report. Crizaldo could
not have conspired with any other party because the Sandiganbayan found that there is
reasonable doubt as to the existence of conspiracy on the part of the accused herein to falsify
the subject reports.[18] The Sandiganbayan ruled that any criminal liability should be based on
their individual participation in the questioned act.[19]

Girons testimony as to the usual procedure cannot be used against him because he did not sign
the Monthly Status Report. Girons facsimile signature was merely stamped on the Monthly Status
Report. The stamped facsimile signatures of Giron do not establish his personal participation in
the preparation of the Monthly Status Report. To use this portion of Girons testimony to establish
his personal participation is to extrapolate and speculate. This will not suffice in a criminal action,
which requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction.[20]

Arreza was the Project Engineer of the Kinayan-Kauswagan Road Project. However, like Giron
and Crizaldo, the prosecution was unable to prove his actual participation in the questioned
reports. The Sandiganbayan found that Arreza had no participation in the preparation and
execution of the said document[s].[21] The Sandiganbayan also found that Arreza did not take
advantage of his public position,[22] and thus Arreza is liable under Artcle 172 of the Revised Penal
code for falsification of a private document. In the dispositive portion of its Decision of 9 May
1997, however, the Sandiganbayan adjudged Arreza guilty as charged in Criminal Case No. 17352,
which was for falsification of a public document.

In sum, we acquit Giron, Crizaldo and Arreza for failure of the prosecution to satisfy the requisites
for the conviction of the crime of falsification of public documents. All are public officers,
however, the prosecution has failed to prove their criminal culpability beyond reasonable
doubt. There is no moral certainty that Giron, Crizaldo, and Arreza took advantage of their
positions to make a false statement in a narration of facts in a public document.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision promulgated on 9 May 1997 and the
Resolution promulgated on 4 October 2000 of the Sandiganbayan are SET ASIDE.Pedro S. Giron,
Jr., Leticia Gujilde-Crizaldo, and Felixberto B. Arreza are ACQUITTED based on reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.
 NORMA DELOS REYES VDA. G.R. No. 186030
DEL PRADO, EULOGIA R.
DEL PRADO, NORMITA R. Present:
DEL PRADO and RODELIA
R. DEL PRADO, CARPIO, J.,
Petitioners, Chairperson,
BRION,
PEREZ,
-versus- SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. March 21, 2012

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which seeks
to assail and set aside the following issuances of the Court of Appeals (CA) in the case docketed
as CA-G.R. CR No. 31225 and entitled Norma Delos Reyes Vda. Del Prado, Eulogia R. Del Prado,
Normita R. Del Prado and Rodelia R. Del Prado v. People of the Philippines":

1) the Decision[1] dated September 15, 2008 affirming with modification the decision
and order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 38, Lingayen, Pangasinan in
Criminal Case No. L-8015; and

2) the Resolution[2] dated January 6, 2009 denying the motion for reconsideration of the
Decision of September 15, 2008.

The Factual Antecedents

This petition stems from an Information for falsification under Article 172, in relation to Article
171(4), of the Revised Penal Code filed against herein petitioners Norma Delos Reyes Vda. Del
Prado (Norma), Normita Del Prado (Normita), Eulogia Del Prado (Eulogia) and Rodelia[3] Del Prado
(Rodelia) with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Lingayen, Pangasinan, allegedly committed as
follows:
 That on or about the 19th day of July, 1991, in the [M]unicipality of Lingayen,
[P]rovince of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously falsified,
execute[d] and cause[d] the preparation of the DEED OF SUCCESSION, by stating
and making it appear in said document that they were the only heirs of the late
Rafael del Prado, when in truth and in fact, all the accused well knew, that Ma.
Corazon Del Prado-Lim is also an heir who is entitled to inherit from the late Rafael
Del Prado, and all the accused deliberately used the DEED OF SUCCESSION to claim
ownership and possession of the land mentioned in the DEED OF SUCCESSION to
the exclusion of the complainant Ma. Corazon Del Prado-Lim to her damage and
prejudice.

Contrary to Art. 172 in relation to Art. 171, par. 4 of the Revised Penal
Code.[4]

Upon arraignment, the accused therein entered their plea of not guilty. After pre-trial
conference, trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution claimed that Ma. Corazon Del Prado-Lim (Corazon), private complainant in the
criminal case, was the daughter of the late Rafael Del Prado (Rafael) by his marriage to Daisy
Cragin (Daisy). After Daisy died in 1956, the late Rafael married Norma with whom he had five
children, namely: Rafael, Jr., Antonio, Eulogia, Normita and Rodelia.

The late Rafael died on July 12, 1978. On October 29, 1979, Corazon, as a daughter of the late
Rafael, and Norma, as the late Rafaels surviving spouse and representative of their five minor
children, executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition of the Estate of Rafael Del Prado to cover the
distribution of several properties owned by the late Rafael, including the parcel of land covered
by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-22848, measuring 17,624 square meters, more or less,
and situated at Libsong, Lingayen, Pangasinan.

Per agreement of the heirs, Corazon was to get a 3,000-square meter portion of the land covered
by OCT No. P-22848. This right of Corazon was also affirmed in the Deed of Exchange dated
October 15, 1982 and Confirmation of Subdivision which she executed with Norma.

Corazon, however, later discovered that her right over the subject parcel of land was never
registered by Norma, contrary to the latters undertaking. The petitioners instead executed on
July 19, 1991 a Deed of Succession wherein they, together with Rafael, Jr. and Antonio,
partitioned and adjudicated unto themselves the property covered by OCT No. P-22848, to the
exclusion of Corazon. The deed was notarized by Loreto L. Fernando (Loreto), and provides in
part:

WHEREAS, on the 12[th] day of July 1978, RAFAEL DEL PRADO[,] SR., died intestate
in the City of Dagupan, leaving certain parcel of land, and more particularly
described and bounded to wit:

ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. P-22848

A certain parcel of land (Lot No. 5518, Cad-373-D) Lingayen

Cadastre, situated in Poblacion, Lingayen,
Pangasinan, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE., by Lots Nos.
5522, 5515; and 6287; on the SE., by Lots Nos. 5516, 5517, 55 and
Road; on the SW., by Road, and Lots Nos. 5521, 5510, and 5520;
and on the NW., by Road; x x x containing an area of SEVENTEEN
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED TWENTY-FOUR (17,624) Square Meters,
more or less. Covered by Psd-307996 (LRC), consisting of two
lots. Lot No. 5510-A and Lot 5518-B.

WHEREAS, the parties hereto are the only heirs of the decedent, the first name,
is the surviving spouse and the rest are the children of the decedent;

xxx

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the premises and invoking the
provisions of Rule 74, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court, the parties hereto do by these
presents, agree to divide and partition the entire estate above[-]described and
accordingly adjudicate, as they do hereby adjudicate the same among themselves,
herein below specified to wit:

x x x[5]

By virtue of the said Deed of Succession, OCT No. P-22848 was cancelled and several new titles
were issued under the names of Corazons co-heirs. When Corazon discovered this, she filed a
criminal complaint against now petitioners Norma, Eulogia, Normita and Rodelia. Antonio and
Rafael, Jr. had both died before the filing of said complaint.

Among the witnesses presented during the trial was Loreto, who confirmed that upon the
request of Norma and Antonio, he prepared and notarized the deed of succession. He claimed
that the petitioners appeared and signed the document before him.
For their defense, the petitioners denied having signed the Deed of Succession, or having
appeared before notary public Loreto. They also claimed that Corazon was not a daughter, but a
niece, of the late Rafael. Norma claimed that she only later knew that a deed of succession was
prepared by her son Antonio, although she admitted having executed a deed of real estate
mortgage in favor of mortgagee Prudential Bank over portions of the subject parcel of land
already covered by the new titles.

The Ruling of the MTC

The MTC rejected for being unsubstantiated the petitioners denial of any participation in the
execution of the deed of succession, further noting that they benefited from the property after
its transfer in their names. Thus, on August 9, 2006, the court rendered its decision[6] finding
petitioners Norma, Eulogia, Normita and Rodelia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged, sentencing them to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four months and one day
of arresto mayor as minimum to two years and four months and one day of prision
correccional as maximum. They were also ordered to pay a fine of P5,000.00 each, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment of fine.

Considering the minority of Rodelia at the time of the commission of the crime, she was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of four months of arresto mayor, plus payment of fine
of P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment.

All the petitioners were ordered to indemnify Corazon in the amount of P10,000.00 as attorneys
fees, and to pay the costs of suit.

Unsatisfied with the MTCs ruling, the petitioners filed a motion for new trial on the grounds of
alleged gross error of law, irregularities during the trial, and new and material evidence. To prove
that they did not intend to exclude Corazon from the estate of the late Rafael, the petitioners
cited their recognition of Corazons right to the estate in the deed of extra-judicial partition,
confirmation of subdivision, deed of exchange, joint affidavit and petition for guardianship of
minors Rafael, Jr., Eulogia, Antonio and Normita, which they had earlier executed. [7] Again, the
petitioners denied having signed the deed of succession, and instead insisted that their
signatures in the deed were forged.

The motion was denied by the MTC via a resolution[8] dated December 21, 2006,
prompting the filing of an appeal with the RTC.

The Ruling of the RTC

On August 10, 2007, the RTC rendered its decision[9] affirming the MTCs decision, with
modification in that the case against Rodelia was dismissed in view of her minority at the time of
the commission of the crime. The decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the Municipal Trial

Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan dated August 9, 2006 is hereby AFFIRMED, but
modified as to accused Rodelia R. Del Prado as the case against her is hereby
DISMISSED on account of her minority at the time of the commission of the
offense.

SO ORDERED.[10]

A motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit by the RTC via its resolution[11] dated
October 31, 2007. Hence, Norma, Eulogia and Normita filed a petition for review with the CA.

The Ruling of the CA

On September 15, 2008, the CA rendered its decision[12] dismissing the petition and affirming the
RTCs ruling, with modification as to the imposable penalty under the Indeterminate Sentence
Law. The decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The appealed

Decision dated August 10, 2007 and Order dated October 31, 2007 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 38, Pangasinan, in Crim. Case No. L-8015
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that appellants Norma delos Reyes Vda. Del
Prado, Eulogia R. Del Prado and Normita R. Del Prado are hereby sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of one (1) year and one (1) day of arresto mayor,
as minimum, to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.[13]

The motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied by the CA in its
resolution[14] dated January 6, 2009. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners appealed from the
decision and resolution of the CA to this Court, through a petition for review
on certiorari[15] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The Present Petition

 The petitioners present the following assignment of errors to support their petition:

A. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT CLEARLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
COMPLAINANT MA. CORAZON DEL PRADO-LIM WAS EXCLUDED AS AN HEIR
OF THE LATE RAFAEL DEL PRADO.

B. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT CLEARLY ERRED IN NOT

APPRECIATING THE FACT THAT IN SEVERAL DOCUMENTS/INSTRUMENTS
EXECUTED BY THE PETITIONERS WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF COMPLAINANT
MS. CORAZON DEL PRADO-LIM, SHE WAS SPECIFICALLY NAMED AS AN HEIR
WITH CORRESPONDING SHARES/INHERITANCE IN THE ESTATE OF THE LATE
RAFAEL DEL PRADO.

C. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT CLEARLY ERRED IN FAILING TO

APPRECIATE THE GOOD FAITH OF THE PETITIONERS WHICH NEGATES THE
COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE OF FALSIFICATION ON THEIR PART.

D. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT CLEARLY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
PETITIONERS WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE PRESUMPTION
OF INNOCENCE OF THE PETITIONERS NOT HAVING BEEN OVERCOME BY THE
PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE.

E. WITH DUE RESPECT [THE LOWER COURT ERRED] IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
CASE IS PURELY CIVIL ONE[,] NOT CRIMINAL.[16]

To support their assigned errors, the petitioners invoke the existence and contents of the
several documents which they had presented before the MTC, including the deed of extrajudicial
partition of the estate of Rafael Del Prado dated October 29, 1979, confirmation of subdivision,
deed of exchange and petition in the guardianship proceedings for the minor Del Prado children
filed by Norma, in which documents they claim to have indicated and confirmed that Corazon is
also an heir of the late Rafael. Given these documents, the petitioners insist that they cannot be
charged with falsification for having excluded Corazon as an heir of their decedent.

In sum, the issue for this Courts resolution is whether or not the CA erred in affirming the
petitioners conviction for falsification, notwithstanding the said petitioners defense that they
never intended to exclude private complainant Corazon from the estate of the late Rafael.

This Courts Ruling

The petition is bound to fail.

Only questions of law may be raised in petitions for

review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.

First, the questions being raised by the petitioners refer to factual matters that are not
proper subjects of a petition for review under Rule 45. Settled is the rule that in a petition for
review under Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised. It is not this Courts function to analyze
or weigh all over again evidence already considered in the proceedings below, our jurisdiction
being limited to reviewing only errors of law that may have been committed by the lower
court. The resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts, whose findings on these
matters are received with respect. A question of law which we may pass upon must not involve
an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants. [17] This is clear
under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, which provides:

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to appeal

by certiorari from a judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals,
the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other
courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified
petition for review on certiorari. The petition may include an application for a writ
of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only
questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the
same provisional remedies by verified motion filed in the same action or
proceeding at any time during its pendency. (Emphasis supplied)

The distinction between a question of law and a question of fact is settled. There is a
question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of
facts. Such a question does not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants or any of them. On the other hand, there is a question of fact when the
doubt arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts or when the query necessarily invites
calibration of the whole evidence, considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and
relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to one another and to the whole,
and the probabilities of the situation.[18]

Contrary to these rules, the petitioners ask us to review the lower courts factual finding on
Carmens exclusion in the subject deed of succession, to reconsider its contents and those of the
other documentary evidence which they have submitted with the court a quo, all of which
involve questions of fact rather than questions of law. In their assignment of errors, petitioners
even fully question the factual basis for the courts finding of their guilt. However, as we have
explained in Medina v. Asistio, Jr.:[19]

Petitioners allegation that the Court of Appeals grossly disregarded their

Exhibits A, B, C, D and E, in effect, asks us to re-examine all the [evidence] already
presented and evaluated as well as the findings of fact made by the Court of
Appeals. Thus, in Sotto v. Teves (86 SCRA 154 [1978]), [w]e held that the
appreciation of evidence is within the domain of the Court of Appeals because its
findings of fact are not reviewable by this Court (Manlapaz v. CA, 147 SCRA 236
[1987]; Knecht v. CA, 158 SCRA 80 [1988] and a long line of cases).

It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh such evidence all
over again. Our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law that may have
been committed by the lower court. (Nicolas[,] et al., v. CA, 154 SCRA 635
[1987]; Tiongco v. de la Merced, 58 SCRA 89 [1974]).

There are recognized exceptions to this rule on questions of law as subjects of petitions for
review, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures, (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible, (3) when
there is grave abuse of discretion, (4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts,
(5) when the findings of fact are conflicting, (6) when in making its findings, the CA went beyond
the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the
appellee, (7) when the CAs findings are contrary to those by the trial court, (8) when the findings
are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based, (9) when the acts
set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent, (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and contradicted by the evidence on record, or (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.[20] After a consideration of the petitioners arguments, this Court holds that the
present appeal does not fall under any of these exceptions.

There can be no good faith on the part of the

petitioners since they knew of the untruthful
character of statements contained in their deed of
succession.

Even granting that the present petition may be admitted, we find no cogent reason to
reverse the CA decision appealed from, considering that the elements of the crime of falsification
under Art. 171, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Art. 172 thereof, were duly proved
during the proceedings below. Said elements are as follows:

(a) The offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of

facts;
(b) The offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by
him; and
(c) The facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false.[21]

These elements are based on the provisions of Art. 172, in relation to Art. 171, par. 4, of
the Revised Penal Code, which reads:

Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastical

minister. The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000 pesos shall
be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage
of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following
acts:

xxx

4. Making untruthful statements in narration of facts;

xxx

Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents.

The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine
of not more than P5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:

1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications

enumerated in the next preceding article in any public or official
document or letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial
document; and
2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to
cause such damage, shall in any private document commit any of the
acts of falsification enumerated in the next preceding article.

xxx

The material document claimed to be falsified in this case is the Deed of Succession dated
July 19, 1991, the presentation of which before the Register of Deeds and other government
agencies allowed the cancellation of OCT No. P-22848, and the issuance of several new titles in
its stead. The first and third elements were committed by the inclusion in the subject deed of the
clause that states, (w)hereas, the parties hereto are the only heirs of the decedent, the first
name, is the surviving spouse and the rest are the children of the decedent.[22] The untruthfulness
of said statement is clear from the several other documents upon which, ironically, the
petitioners anchor their defense, such as the deed of extrajudicial partition dated October 29,
1979, the parties confirmation of subdivision, deed of exchange and Normas petition for
guardianship of her then minor children. Specifically mentioned in these documents is the fact
that Corazon is also a daughter, thus an heir, of the late Rafael.

The obligation of the petitioners to speak only the truth in their deed of succession is
clear, taking into account the very nature of the document falsified. The deed, which was
transformed into a public document upon acknowledgement before a notary public, required
only truthful statements from the petitioners. It was a legal requirement to effect the
cancellation of the original certificate of title and the issuance of new titles by the Register of
Deeds. The false statement made in the deed greatly affected the indefeasibility normally
accorded to titles over properties brought under the coverage of land registration, to the injury
of Corazon who was deprived of her right as a landowner, and the clear prejudice of third persons
who would rely on the land titles issued on the basis of the deed.

We cannot subscribe to the petitioners claim of good faith because several documents
prove that they knew of the untruthful character of their statement in the deed of
succession. The petitioners alleged good faith is disputed by their prior confirmation and
recognition of Corazons right as an heir, because despite knowledge of said fact, they included in
the deed a statement to the contrary. The wrongful intent to injure Corazon is clear from their
execution of the deed, showing a desire to appropriate only unto themselves the subject parcel
of land. Corazon was unduly deprived of what was due her not only under the provisions of the
law on succession, but also under contracts that she had previously executed with the
petitioners.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is

hereby DENIED. The Decision dated September 15, 2008 and Resolution dated January 6, 2009
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31225 are hereby AFFIRMED.

ERNESTO M. FULLERO, G.R. NO. 170583

Petitioner,
Present:
 YNARES-SANTIAGO,
-versus Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. NACHURA, JJ.

Promulgated:

September 12, 2007

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DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court,[1] petitioner Ernesto M. Fullero seeks to set aside the Decision[2] dated 19 October 2005 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 28072, affirming in toto the Decision[3] dated 9 October
2003 of the Legazpi City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, in Criminal Case No. 7712, finding
petitioner guilty of falsification of public document as defined and penalized in paragraph 4,
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.

In an Amended Information[4] dated 14 October 1997, petitioner was charged with

falsification of public document under paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code,
allegedly committed as follows:
 That sometime in 1988, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to
prejudice and defraud, being then the Acting Chief Operator of Iriga City
Telecommunications Office, while acting in said capacity and taking advantage of
his official function, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify
and/or caused to be falsified a genuine public document, that is when he prepared
his CSC 212 (Personal Data Sheet) for submission to Bureau of Telecommunication
Regional Office No. 5, Legazpi City, he made it appear that he passed the Civil
Engineering Board Examinations given by Professional Regulation Commission on
May 30 and 31, 1985 with a rating of 75.8%; however, upon verification issued by
PRC, said accused took the examination in May 1984 and another one [in] May,
1985 with general ratings of 56.75% and 56.10% respectively.

When arraigned on 5 January 1998, petitioner, with the assistance of counsel de parte,
pleaded Not Guilty to the charge.[5] Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

Culled from the records are the following facts:

In 1977, petitioner was employed as a telegraph operator at the Bureau of

Telecommunications Office in Iriga City (BTO, Iriga City). In 1982, he became the Acting Chief
Operator of the same office until 1994.[6]

A Personal Data Sheet (PDS) [Civil Service Form 212] dated 8 January 1988, purportedly
accomplished and signed by petitioner, states that he passed the Civil Engineering Board
Examination given on 30-31 May 1985 in Manila with a rating of 75.8%.[7] It appears that he
submitted the PDS to the Bureau of Telecommunications Regional
Office, Legazpi City (BTO, Legazpi City).[8]
 A letter dated 7 March 1988 and signed by petitioner shows that he applied for the
position of either a Junior Telecommunications Engineer or Telecommunications Traffic
Supervisor with the Regional Director of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), Region
5, Legazpi City.[9]

Upon inquiry made by Florenda B. Magistrado (Magistrado), a subordinate of petitioner

in the BTO, Iriga City, with the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC), it was verified that
petitioner never passed the board examination for civil engineering and that petitioners name
does not appear in the book of registration for civil engineers.[10]

Petitioner denied executing and submitting the subject PDS containing the statement that
he passed the 30-31 May 1985 board examination for civil engineering. He likewise disowned the
signature and thumbmark appearing therein. He claimed that the stroke of the signature
appearing in the PDS differs from the stroke of his genuine signature.[11] He added that the letters
contained in the PDS he accomplished and submitted were typewritten in capital letters since his
typewriter does not have small letters. As such, the subject PDS could not be his because it had
both small and capital typewritten letters.

Moreover, petitioner claimed that Magistrado had an ill motive in filing the instant case
against him because he issued a memorandum against her for misbehavior in the
BTO, Iriga City.[12] He further argued that the RTC had no jurisdiction to try him there being no
evidence that the alleged falsification took place in Legazpi City.[13]

After trial, the Legazpi City RTC rendered a Decision dated 9 October 2003 finding
petitioner guilty of the crime of falsification. Thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused Ernesto M. Fullero is

hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Falsification defined and penalized under Art. 171 (4) of the Revised Penal
 Code, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6)
years of prision correccional maximum to ten (10) years of prision mayor medium
as the maximum and to pay a fine of three thousand P3,000.00 Pesos. Costs
against the accused.[14]

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 19 October 2005, the appellate court
promulgated its Decision affirming in toto the assailed Legazpi City RTC Decision. The appellate
court decreed:

In sum, the Court finds that the prosecution has successfully established
all the elements of the offense of falsification of a public document and that the
trial court correctly rendered a judgment of conviction against appellant.

WHEREFORE, the appeal at bench is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the
appealed 09 October 2003 decision is AFFIRMED.[15]

On 21 November 2005, petitioner lodged the instant petition before us citing as errors
the following:

I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
SUSTAINING THE JUDGMENT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DESPITE THE FACT
THAT SAID LOWER COURT CONVICTED THE ACCUSED IN THE ABSENCE OF
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE I.E., PROOF TO SHOW THAT THE ACCUSED ACTUALLY
PERFORMED THE ACT OF FALSIFICATION HE IS ACCUSED OF;

II.
 WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
SUSTAINING THE JUDGMENT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DESPITE THE FACT
THAT, EVEN ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ACCUSED FILLED UP THE PERSONAL DATA
SHEET (PDS) INCLUDING THE STATEMENT THAT HE IS A LICENSED ENGINEER,
ACCUSED WAS UNDER NO OBLIGATION TO STATE SAID DATA AND NO CRIMINAL
INTENT WAS SHOWN.

III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
SUSTAINING THE JUDGMENT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DESPITE THE FACT
THAT SAID RTC ADMITTED EVIDENCES NOT PROPERLY IDENTIFIED AND
THEREAFTER CONSIDERED THE SAME IN DETERMINING THE ALLEGED GUILT OF
THE ACCUSED;

IV.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

SUSTAINING THE JUDGMENT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DESPITE THE FACT
THAT THE LOWER COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION BECAUSE THE VENUE SHOULD
HAVE BEEN IN THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF IRIGA CITY, WHERE THE ALLEGED
PERSONAL DATA SHEET WAS ACCOMPLISHED NOT IN THE RTC OF LEGAZPI CITY.

Apropos the first issue, petitioner maintained that none of the prosecution witnesses
actually saw him accomplish and sign the PDS; that the prosecution failed to establish that he
took advantage of his position in falsifying the PDS; that a person need not be an Acting Chief
Operator to be able to falsify a PDS; that he never became the custodian of the PDS nor did he
have any special access to it by reason of his office; and that the identity of the person who
falsified the PDS has not been established by the prosecution.[16]
 In establishing its charge of falsification against petitioner, the prosecution presented the
following witnesses, namely: Magistrado, Joaquin C. Atayza (Atayza), Romeo Brizo(Brizo), Emma
Francisco (Francisco) and Edith C. Avenir (Avenir).

Magistrado, a subordinate of petitioner at the BTO, Iriga City, testified that prior to the
filing of the instant case against petitioner, she sued the petitioner for unjust vexation as the
latter kissed her on one occasion. While the case for unjust vexation was pending, her lawyer,
Atty. Mariano Baranda, Jr. (Atty. Baranda), asked her if petitioner was indeed a licensed civil
engineer since some persons simply referred to petitioner as Mr. Fullero whereas in the
BTO, Iriga City, petitioner was known as Engineer Fullero. Suspicious of the true status of
petitioner, she went to the Records Office of the BTO, Legazpi City, and requested therein if she
can see petitioners PDS. Upon being shown petitioners PDS, she observed that, under Item No.
18 thereof, petitioner appears to be a licensed civil engineer having passed the board
examination for civil engineering given on 30-31 May 1985. Unconvinced of the veracity of
petitioners statement in the PDS that he is a licensed civil engineer, she sought the advice of
Atty. Baranda. Atty. Baranda then proceeded to the main office of the PRC in Manila to check the
records of petitioner. Subsequently, Atty. Baranda obtained a certification from the PRC
attesting that petitioner never passed the board examination for civil
engineering. Atty. Baranda showed the said certification to her. Thereafter, she instituted the
instant case against petitioner.[17]

Atayza, Regional Director of the PRC in Legazpi City, testified that petitioner is not
registered as a board passer for the civil engineering examination given on 30-31 May 1985.[18]

Brizo, Human Resource Management Officer and Acting Records Officer of the
BTO, Legazpi City, testified that his duty as acting records officer was to safeguard the records
and files of the BTO, Iriga City, and BTO, Legazpi City. He said he personally knows the petitioner
and is familiar with the latters signature because he regularly received petitioners daily time
records and other documents bearing petitioners signature. He confirmed that the signature
appearing in petitioners PDS was the signature of petitioner.[19]
 Francisco was the Officer-In-Charge of the Records Section of the PRC, Manila. She
declared that petitioners name was included in the master list of examinees in the May 1984 civil
engineering licensure examination where petitioner obtained a failing grade of 56.75%. She
affirmed that petitioners name also appears in the list of examinees for the 30-31 May 1985 and
May 1990 civil engineering licensure examinations where he got failing marks.[20]

Avenir was the Special Investigator III in the Legal Affairs Division of the CSC, Regional
Office No. 5, Legazpi City. As the duly authorized representative of the Regional Director of the
said office, Avenir brought to the court the letter of petitioner applying for the position of either
Junior Telecommunications Engineer or Telecommunications Traffic Supervisor, and a
certification submitted by the petitioner stating that the latter is a licensed civil
engineer. Avenir stated that the letter and the certification were taken from the records of their
office and that these documents were being kept as part of the records of an administrative case
of petitioner with the said office.[21]

The prosecution also presented documentary evidence to bolster the foregoing

testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, to wit: (1) a certification issued by Jose A. Arriola,
Director II, PRC, Manila, attesting that petitioners name is not registered in the book of registry
for licensed civil engineers; (2) certifications issued by Francisco affirming that petitioner failed
in the 30-31 May 1985 board examination for civil engineering;[22] (3) the PDS where petitioner
stated that he passed the 30-31 May 1985 board examination for civil engineering with a rating
of 75.8% and which was signed by him;[23] (4) certifications issued by Francisco attesting that
petitioner failed the May 1990 board examination for civil engineering;[24] (5) transcript of
stenographic notes in the perjury case filed by petitioner against Magistrado which states that,
during the trial thereof, petitioner affirmed before the court hearing the case that he is a licensed
civil engineer;[25] (6) a letter signed and submitted by petitioner to the Regional Director of the
CSC, Regional Office No. 5, LegazpiCity, claiming to be a licensed civil engineer and applying for
the position of either a Junior Telecommunications Engineer or Telecommunications Traffic
Supervisor;[26] (7) an Order dated 20 December 2001 of the CSC, Regional Office No. 5, finding
petitioner administratively liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and
imposing upon him a penalty of six months suspension for falsifying his PDS which is also the
subject matter of the instant case;[27] (8) a certification submitted by the petitioner to the CSC,
Regional Office No. 5, Legazpi City, showing that he is a licensed civil engineer;[28] (9) the daily
time records of Magistrado signed by petitioner as the formers superior;[29] and (10) other
documents bearing the signature of petitioner in blue ballpen.[30]

On the other hand, the defense presented petitioner as its sole witness. No documentary
evidence was proffered.

Petitioner interposed denials and alibi to support his contentions. Petitioner denied that
he executed and submitted the subject PDS containing the statement that he passed the board
examinations for civil engineering. He likewise disowned the signature
and thumbmark appearing therein. He averred that the PDS he accomplished and submitted was
typewritten in capital letters since his typewriter does not have small letters; thus, the subject
PDS could not be his since the letters were typewritten in small and capital letters; that the stroke
of the signature appearing in the PDS differs from the stroke of his genuine signature;
that Magistrado had an ill motive in filing the instant case against him since he issued a
memorandum against her for the latters misbehavior in the BTO, Iriga City; that he is not a
licensed civil engineer; and that he accomplished a different PDS in the BTO, Iriga City.

Petitioner testified that he cannot recall the exact date when he issued the alleged
memorandum against Magistrado[31] and when during the trial of his perjury case
against Magistrado, he claimed that he is a licensed civil engineer.[32] He cannot also remember
if he submitted a letter to the CSC, Regional Office No. 5, Legazpi City, applying for the position
of either a Junior Telecommunications Engineer or Telecommunications Traffic Supervisor[33] and
the fact that he submitted therein a certification that he is a licensed civil engineer. [34]

The initial query to be resolved is whose evidence between the prosecution and defense
is credible.
 Case law dictates that an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available as
long as sufficient circumstantial evidence had been presented by the
prosecution.[35]Circumstantial evidence is sufficient if:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce

a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[36]

Although none of the prosecution witnesses actually saw the petitioner falsifying the PDS,
they, nonetheless, testified that that they are very familiar with the petitioners handwriting and
signature. Magistrado testified that, being a subordinate of petitioner, she is very familiar with
petitioners signature and actually witnessed petitioner affixing his signature on her daily time
records for September 1987 to May 1988.[37] Brizo testified that he is also familiar with
petitioners signature because he personally knows petitioner and that he regularly received
petitioners daily time records and other documents bearing petitioners
signature.[38] Both Magistrado and Brizo opined that the signature in the PDS belongs to
petitioner.

The foregoing testimonies are consistent with the documentary evidence submitted by
the prosecution. The RTC and the Court of Appeals found the testimonies
of Magistradoand Brizo as trustworthy and believable.

More significant are the documentary evidence consisting of petitioners signature in

certain authentic instruments which are apparently similar to the signature in the PDS. The RTC
and the Court of Appeals have compared petitioners signatures in Magistrados daily time records
and petitioners signature in his application letter to the CSC, Regional Office No. 5, Legazpi City,
with that of petitioners alleged signature in the PDS. They observed that the slant position of the
writing, as well as the stroke and the last rounding loop of the signature in the PDS, does not
differ from petitioners signatures in Magistrados daily time records and in petitioners application
letter.[39] They noted that petitioners signatures in the said documents are strikingly similar, such
that through the naked eye alone, it is patent that the signatures therein were written by one
and the same person. The observation of the Court of Appeals is worth noting, viz:

Appellants allegation that he did not execute the subject PDS is

unavailing. First, the informations entered in the PDS, such as his accurate
personal data and precise employment history, are matters which only the
accused could have known. Second, a visual analysis of appellants signatures in
the Certificate of Arraignment and Notice of Hearing, vis-a-vis his signature in the
PDS would show no significant disparity, leading to the conclusion that appellant
himself prepared the PDS and affixed his signature therein. Third, the signature of
appellant in the PDS and in the Daily Time Records (Exhibits J to Q) of prosecution
witness Florenda Magistrado, were glaringly identical. x x x.[40]

The rule is that the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of
the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions
anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect.[41] This is more
true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court. When the trial courts findings have
been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon this Court.[42]

In absolute disparity, the evidence for the defense is comprised of denials. Petitioner
denied having accomplished and signed the PDS. He tried to impart that someone else had filled
it up. However, aside from this self-serving and negative claim, he did not adduce any convincing
proof to effectively refute the evidence for the prosecution.
 It is a hornbook doctrine that as between bare denials and positive testimony on
affirmative matters, the latter is accorded greater evidentiary weight.[43]

The subsequent matter to be determined is whether the elements of falsification for

which petitioner is charged were proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Article 171, paragraph (4) of the Revised Penal Code, provides:

ART. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or

notary or ecclesiastic minister. The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to
exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary
who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by
committing any of the following acts:

xxxx

4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts.

The elements of falsification in the above provision are as follows:

a) the offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a

narration of facts;

b) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by

him; and

c) the facts narrated by him are absolutely false.[44]

 In addition to the aforecited elements, it must also be proven that the public officer or
employee had taken advantage of his official position in making the falsification. In falsification
of public document, the offender is considered to have taken advantage of his official position
when (1) he has the duty to make or prepare or otherwise to intervene in the preparation of a
document; or (2) he has the official custody of the document which he falsifies.[45]

All of the foregoing elements of falsification of public documents under paragraph 4,

Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, have been sufficiently established.

First, petitioner was a public officer, being then the Acting Chief Operator of the
BTO, Iriga City, when he accomplished and submitted his PDS on 4 January 1988 at the
BTO, Legazpi City. It is settled that a PDS is a public document.[46] He stated under Item No. 18 of
his PDS that he passed the civil engineering board examination given on 30-31 May 1985
in Manila with a rating of 75.8%. Thereafter, petitioner submitted his PDS to the
BTO, Legazpi City.

Second, in Inting v. Tanodbayan,[47] we ruled that the accomplishment of the PDS being a
requirement under the Civil Service Rules and Regulations in connection with employment in the
government, the making of an untruthful statement therein was, therefore, intimately connected
with such employment. Hence, the filing of a PDS is required in connection with promotion to a
higher position and contenders for promotion have the legal obligation to disclose the truth.
Otherwise, enhancing their qualifications by means of false statements will prejudice other
qualified aspirants to the same position.[48]

Petitioner was legally obliged to disclose in the PDS that he is not a licensed civil engineer
since, as evidenced by his application letter, he was applying for positions to be occupied only by
licensed civil engineers. Further, petitioner was also legally obliged to make truthful statements
in his PDS since he affirmed therein under the penalty of perjury that his answers to the queries
are true and correct to the best of [his] knowledge and belief.[49]
 Third, petitioners statement in the PDS that he passed the civil engineering board
examination given on 30-31 May 1985 in Manila with a rating of 75.8% is absolutely false.As
Officer-in-Charge of the Records Section of the PRC, Manila, Francisco declared that petitioner
was included in the master list of examinees in the May 1984 civil engineering licensure
examination wherein petitioner obtained a failing grade. She affirmed that petitioners name also
appears in the list of examinees for the May 1985 and May 1990 civil engineering licensure
examinations where petitioner also got failing marks. She also submitted certifications and
authentic documents in support of her statements. Further, petitioner admitted that he never
passed the board examination for civil engineering.[50]

Finally, as a public officer, petitioner is duty-bound to prepare, accomplish and submit his
PDS pursuant to the Civil Service Rules and Regulations.[51] Were it not for his position and
employment in the government, he could not have accomplished the PDS. In People
v. Uy,[52] Santiago Uy, a field agent of the National Bureau of Investigation, was charged with
falsification of public document under paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, for
making false statements in his Personal Information Sheet. We ruled therein: [T]hat the
defendant (Santiago Uy) took advantage of his position may be gathered from the fact that he
himself filled the information sheet which obviously was to be submitted by each and every
officer or employee of the NBI. In the same vein, petitioner also had the responsibility to
prepare, accomplish and submit his PDS at the time he made a false statement therein that he is
a licensed civil engineer. Hence, it is clear that petitioner took advantage of his position as Acting
Chief Operator of BTO, Iriga City when he falsified his PDS.

Anent the second issue, petitioner posited that being a licensed civil engineer is not a
qualification for him to hold office and such is not a requirement for his promotion; that the false
statement caused no prejudice to any private person as he did not have any competitor in his
position nor was the government damaged by such false statement; that the false statement
would not in any way redound to his benefit and, as such, no criminal intent could have impelled
him to make such false claim; and that no evidence was produced showing that he had intent to
cause injury.
 The law is clear that wrongful intent on the part of the accused to injure a third person is
not an essential element of the crime of falsification of public document.[53] It is jurisprudentially
settled that in the falsification of public or official documents, whether by public officers or
private persons, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a
third person for the reason that, in contradistinction to private documents, the principal thing
punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of truth as therein solemnly
proclaimed.[54] In falsification of public documents, therefore, the controlling consideration is the
public character of a document; and the existence of any prejudice caused to third persons or, at
least, the intent to cause such damage becomes immaterial.[55]

The fact that the petitioners false statement in the PDS did not redound to his benefit,
and that the government or any private individual was not thereby prejudiced, is
inconsequential. What is clear and decisive in this case is that petitioner made an entry in his PDS
that he passed the 30-31 May 1985 board examination for civil engineering despite his full
awareness that such is not true.

Regarding the third issue, petitioner contended that the prosecutions documentary
evidence, consisting of Exhibits A, C, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q and R and their sub-markings,
are inadmissible in evidence based on the following reasons:

(1) Exhibit A, which is the Certification of the PRC dated 17 January 1998, confirming that
petitioners name does not appear in the registry books of licensed civil engineers, was not
properly identified during the trial. The proper person to identify the certification should have
been the signatory therein which was PRC Director II Jose A. Arriola, or in his absence, a person
who actually witnessed the execution of the certification. Prosecution witness Atayza, who was
not present when the certification was executed, had identified the certification during the
trial. Thus, the contents of the certification are mere hearsay; (2) Exhibit C, which is, according
to petitioner, a machine copy of the PDS, does not show that it was the petitioner who prepared
and submitted the PDS to BTO, Legazpi City. There was nothing in the PDS which requires a
periodic submission of an updated PDS. Prosecution witness Brizo does not know whether
petitioners PDS was personally delivered or mailed. Hence, the identification and subsequent
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on the PDS are mere hearsay; (3) Exhibit F, which is the
Transcript of Stenographic Notes dated 17 March 1998 of the perjury case filed by petitioner
against Magistrado where petitioner allegedly admitted that he is a civil engineer, lacks proper
identification as the stenographer or records officer was not presented in court; (4) Exhibit G,
which is the alleged letter of petitioner to the Regional Director of the CSC, Region 5, Legazpi City,
applying for the position of either a Junior Telecommunications Engineer or Telecommunications
Traffic Supervisor; and Exhibit I, which is a machine copy of a certification allegedly issued by the
PRC attesting that petitioner is a licensed civil engineer and which was allegedly submitted by
petitioner to the Regional Director of the CSC, Region 5, Legazpi City, as his credential in applying
for the aforesaid positions, are merely machine copies and the loss and unavailability of their
original were not proven; and (5) Exhibits J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q and R, which are the daily time
records of Magistrado signed by petitioner and which were offered to compare petitioners
alleged signature in the PDS with the said exhibits, are devoid of factual basis. Petitioners
signatures in the said exhibits are, with the use of naked eye, not the same as his signature in the
PDS. The Legazpi City RTC should have submitted these documents to a handwriting expert for
examination instead of relying on the testimony of Magistrado.[56]

Section 36, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, states that a witness can testify
only to those facts which he knows of or comes from his personal knowledge, that is, which are
derived from his perception. A witness, therefore, may not testify as to what he merely learned
from others either because he was told, or he read or heard the same. Such testimony is
considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned.[57] This
is known as the hearsay rule.

The law, however, provides for specific exceptions to the hearsay rule. One of the
exceptions is the entries in official records made in the performance of duty by a public
officer.[58] In other words, official entries are admissible in evidence regardless of whether the
officer or person who made them was presented and testified in court, since these entries are
considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. Other recognized reasons for this
exception are necessity and trustworthiness. The necessity consists in the inconvenience and
difficulty of requiring the officials attendance as a witness to testify to innumerable transactions
in the course of his duty. This will also unduly hamper public business. The trustworthiness
consists in the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty by a public officer. [59]

Exhibit A, or the Certification of the PRC dated 17 January 1998, was signed by Arriola,
Director II of the PRC, Manila.[60] Although Arriola was not presented in court or did not testify
during the trial to verify the said certification, such certification is considered as prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein and is therefore presumed to be truthful, because
petitioner did not present any plausible proof to rebut its truthfulness. Exhibit A is therefore
admissible in evidence.

Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, provides that an evidence is
admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or rules. Exhibit C, which
according to petitioner is the machine copy of the PDS, is very relevant to the charge of
falsification and is not excluded by the law or rules. It was offered precisely to prove that
petitioner committed the crime of falsification by making false statements in the PDS. Further,
the information specifically accuses petitioner of falsifying such PDS. A scrutiny of Exhibit C would
show that it is the very PDS which petitioner falsified and not a mere machine copy as alleged by
petitioner. Being the original falsified document, it is the best evidence of its contents and is
therefore not excluded by the law or rules.[61]

Section 2, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, explicitly provides that a transcript
of the record of the proceedings made by the official stenographer, stenotypist or recorder and
certified as correct by him shall be deemed prima facie a correct statement of such proceedings.

Petitioner failed to introduce proof that Exhibit F, or the Transcript of Stenographic Notes
dated 17 March 1998 of the perjury case filed by petitioner against Magistrado in which
petitioner allegedly admitted that he is a civil engineer, is not what it purports to be. Thus, it
is prima facie correct. Moreover, as earlier elucidated, one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule
is the entries in official records made in the performance of duty by a public officer. Exhibit F,
being an official entry in the courts records, is admissible in evidence and there is no necessity to
produce the concerned stenographer as a witness.[62]

Section 7, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, provides that when the original of
a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may
be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. Exhibit G, which is
the alleged letter of petitioner to the Regional Director of the CSC, Region 5, Legazpi City,
applying for the position of either a Junior Telecommunications Engineer or Telecommunications
Traffic Supervisor; and Exhibit I, which is the machine copy of a certification allegedly issued by
the PRC attesting that petitioner is a licensed civil engineer and which was allegedly submitted
by petitioner to the Regional Director of the CSC, Region 5, Legazpi City, as his credential in
applying for the aforesaid positions, are certified true copies of their original documents recorded
or kept in the CSC, Regional Office No. 5, Legazpi City[63] and, thus, admissible to prove the
contents of their originals.

Exhibits J to R, which are the daily time records of Magistrado signed by petitioner and
which were offered to compare petitioners alleged signature in the PDS with the said exhibits,
are admissible in evidence since they are relevant and material to the charge of falsification
against petitioner. The signatures of petitioner in the said exhibits, the authenticity of which were
not denied by petitioner, were presented to prove that these signatures were similar to
petitioners signature in the PDS where he made the alleged falsification.

Well-entrenched is the rule that resort to handwriting experts is not

mandatory. Handwriting experts, while probably useful, are not indispensable in examining or
comparing handwritings or signatures.[64] This is so since under Section 22, Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence, the handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who
believes it to be the handwriting of such person, because he has seen the person write; or has
seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or has been charged, and has
thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Moreover, the opinion of a non-
expert witness, for which proper basis is given, may be received in evidence regarding the
handwriting or signature of a person with which he has sufficient familiarity.[65]

The Legazpi City RTC was, therefore, not obliged to put a handwriting expert on the
witness stand and direct the latter to examine petitioners signatures in the foregoing exhibits
before ruling on their admissibility. It can, as it did, rely on the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses who are familiar with petitioners handwriting/signature in determining the
admissibility of the aforesaid exhibits. It can, by itself, also compare petitioners signature in the
PDS with the petitioners signatures in the subject exhibits with or without the aid of an expert
witness and thereafter rule on the admissibility of such exhibits based on its own observation. In
short, it can exercise independent judgment as regards the admissibility of said exhibits.

As to the fourth issue, petitioner argued that since none of the prosecution witnesses
testified that they actually saw him fill up the PDS, then there is no evidence showing that the
alleged falsification took place in Legazpi City; that when the PDS was allegedly falsified, he was
stationed at BTO, Iriga City, and was a resident of Iriga City; that, even assuming without
admitting that he filled up the PDS, the same was, in all probability, filled up in Iriga City and, as
such, the crime of falsification was consummated therein; that, consequently, the instant case
should have been tried in the Iriga City RTC and not in the Legazpi City RTC.[66]

There are three important requisites which must be present before a court can acquire
jurisdiction over criminal cases. First, the court must have jurisdiction over the offense or the
subject matter. Second, the court must have jurisdiction over the territory where the offense was
committed. And third, the court must have jurisdiction over the person of the accused.[67] There
is no dispute that the Legazpi City RTC has jurisdiction over the offense and over the person of
petitioner. It is the territorial jurisdiction of the Legazpi City RTC which the petitioner impugns.
 The territorial jurisdiction of a court is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint
or information as regards the place where the offense charged was committed.[68] It should also
be emphasized that where some acts material and essential to the crime and requisite to its
consummation occur in one province or city and some in another, the court of either province or
city has jurisdiction to try the case, it being understood that the court first taking cognizance of
the case will exclude the others.[69]

In the case at bar, the information specifically and positively alleges that the falsification
was committed in Legazpi City. Moreover, as heretofore discussed, the testimonies and
documentary evidence for the prosecution have sufficiently established that petitioner
accomplished and thereafter submitted the PDS to the BTO, Legazpi City. The foregoing
circumstances clearly placed the locus criminis in Legazpi City and not in Iriga City.

We find no reason to disturb the prison term and fine imposed on petitioner by
the Legazpi City RTC and the Court of Appeals, as they are in accord with law and jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated 19 October 2005, in CA-G.R. CR. No. 28072, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 43659 : December 21, 1990.]

192 SCRA 521
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. HON. FELICIDAD CARANDANG VILLALON and
FEDERICO DE GUZMAN, Respondents.

DECISION
REGALADO, J.:

Assailed in this special civil action for Certiorari is the order rendered by Judge Manuel Castañeda
on January 28, 1976 dismissing Criminal Case No. D-868 of the former Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, and the order rendered in the same case on March 22, 1976 by his successor, the
herein public respondent, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order
of dismissal.
Culled from the records, 1 it appears that complainant Mariano Carrera and his brother, Severo
Carrera, are co-owners of a parcel of land located at Barrio Buenlag, Binmaley, Pangasinan,
registered in their names under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47682.
On February 5, 1964, complainant allegedly executed a special power of attorney before Notary
Public Jaime B. Arzadon, Jr., naming private respondent Federico de Guzman as his lawful
attorney-in-fact. On February 13, 1964, private respondent mortgaged the parcel of land with
the People's Bank and Trust Company in Dagupan City using the said special power of attorney,
and was able to obtain the amount of P8,500.00 as a loan from the mortgagee bank. Both the
special power of attorney and the mortgage contract were duly registered in the Registry of
Deeds of Pangasinan on February 13, 1964.:- nad
After the expiration of the term of the mortgage, and the mortgage account not having been
paid, the mortgagee bank foreclosed said mortgage and the land was sold to one Ramon Serafica
and Vileta Quinto who were issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 85181 for said property. In
January, 1972, complainant allegedly discovered that their property was already registered in the
name of said Ramon Serafica when the latter filed on said date an action for the ejectment of the
former from the premises.
On March 29, 1974, Criminal Case No. D-868 for estafa thru falsification of a public document
was filed against private respondent in the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, the
information reading as follows:
"That on or about the 15th day of February, 1964, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Court, the abovenamed accused FEDERICO DE GUZMAN, being then a
private individual, after having in his possession Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47682, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally falsify and forge the signature of one MARIANO F.
CARRERA, in a Power of Attorney, causing and making it appear that the said MARIANO F.
CARRERA, signed and affixed his signature in the said Power of Attorney, which is a public
document, when as a matter of fact and in truth, said MARIANO F. CARRERA, did not in anyway
(sic) participate in any acts thereof, nor gave his permission, and in order to make good the acts
of falsification, with intent of gain and by means of fraud and other deceits, the said accused
FEDERICO DE GUZMAN, thru the said falsified public document (Power of Attorney) did succeed
in securing the loan from the People's Bank and Trust Company in the amount of EIGHT
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P8,500.00) Philippine currency, without the knowledge and
consent of said MARIANO F. CARRERA, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the amount
of P4,250.00, and other consequential damages." 2
After arraignment where private respondent pleaded not guilty, the case proceeded to trial and
the prosecution presented complainant Mariano F. Carrera and one Melanio Esguig from the
Office of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan. Another witness, Col. Jose G.
Fernandez, a handwriting expert, gave his partial testimony but the same was not continued as
counsel for private respondent moved for and was granted leave to file a motion to dismiss.
On December 16, 1975, the motion to dismiss 3 was filed, wherein it was alleged that the crime
charged would not lie due to the partial testimony of complainant allegedly to the effect that he
authorized private respondent to mortgage the said one-half portion of the land owned by him
and his brother. Said partial testimony of complainant was quoted, with the emphasized
portions, as follows:
"Q Mr. Carrera, do you know what happened to the title of your property at present?
A Yes, sir, I know.
Q Could you tell us what happened to your title?
A It was foreclosed by the Bank, sir.
Q Now, you said that it was foreclosed by the Bank. Do you know the reason why it was foreclosed
by the Bank?
A Yes, sir.
Q Could you tell this Honorable Court how it was foreclosed by the Bank?
A Yes, sir. On February 10, 1964, my brother Severo Carrera went to Manila and he asked me to
sign a document as a witness and I asked him he interpreted that this is an authorization to
Federico de Guzman to get a loan from the Bank on the half portion of the land which belongs to
me, my brother said.
Q So sometime in 1964, your older brother Severo Carrera went to you in Manila and asked you
to sign a power of attorney authorizing de Guzman to mortgage the one-half portion of that land
owned by you and your brother. Do you have any document to show that?
xxx
ATTY. DIAZ:
Q Can you recognize that document which you signed in 1964 if shown to you?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now I am asking . . . I am showing here a document which is, your Honor, for the purpose of
identification, and may we request that it be marked as Exhibit B for the prosecution. This
document consist (sic) of two pages, your Honor, and the first page be marked as Exhibit B and
the second page be marked as Exhibit B-1, page two. Will you tell this Honorable Court what is
this?
A This is the document brought by my brother to Manila for me to sign, sir.
xxx
(Hearing of June 18, 1974, pp. 8-10; Emphasis supplied)" 4
Based on the aforequoted testimony, private respondent contends that there is no sufficient
basis for the charge and this fact warrants the dismissal of the case.
Private respondent also claims that the crime has prescribed since more than ten (10) years had
elapsed from the time the crime was committed. Since the information charges the complex
crime of estafa thru falsification of a public document, then the penalty shall be that for the more
serious crime which shall be applied in its maximum period, as provided for by Article 48 of the
Penal Code. The more serious crime in the present case is the falsification of the public document
which is punishable with prision correccional in its medium and maximum period and a fine not
exceeding P5,000.00. Prision correccional being a correctional penalty, the same prescribes in
ten (10) years.
It was noted in said motion to dismiss that the information filed in the case merely alleged the
date of the commission of the crime which was February 5, 1964 and the information was filed
only on March 29, 1974. This being the case, private respondent claims that more than ten (10)
years has passed from the commission of the crime to the filing of the information. No other
allegation having been made as to the discovery of the alleged crime, private respondent claimed
that the period of prescription commenced on the day on which the crime was committed. He
asserts that, from the date appearing in the transfer certificate of title covering the land
mortgaged with the bank, the mortgage documents were duly registered with the Registry of
Deeds of Dagupan City on February 13, 1984, hence the alleged crime became public knowledge
on the same date. To support his theory, private respondent made the following citation:
"The period of prescription commences to run from the date of the commission of the crime if it
is known at the time of its commission.:-cralaw
"Thus, if there is nothing that was concealed or needed to be discovered, because the entire
series of transactions was by public instruments, duly recorded, the crime of estafa committed
in connection with said transaction was known to the offended party when it was committed and
the period of prescription commenced to run from the date of its commission. People v. Dinsay,
C.A. 40 O.G. 12th Supp. 50 (The Revised Penal Code by Justice Luis B. Reyes, Revised Edition 1967,
Vol. I, pp. 711-712)." 5
The prosecution countered that the testimony of Mariano Carrera shows that what was intended
was an authority to mortgage only the one-half portion pertaining to his brother and he was only
quoting what his brother told him when he said that ". . . this is an authority to Federico de
Guzman to get a loan from the bank on the half portion of the land which belongs to me, my
brother said." 6
It further submitted that the information was not filed out of time since the date to be considered
should not be the date of registration of the alleged power of attorney on February 13, 1964. It
argued that the crime was actually discovered only in January, 1972 when Ramon S. Serafica filed
an action to eject complainant from the premises, which fact was not alleged in the information
because it was considered by the prosecution as a mere evidentiary matter which would not be
in accord with the legal truism that an "information must allege only ultimate facts and not
evidentiary matters." 7
With regard to the case of People vs. Dinsay cited by private respondent, petitioner submits that
"(t)he same has only a persuasive effect and not to be considered as an interpretation of Article
91 of the Revised Penal Code as the same is the sole prerogative of the Supreme Court." 8
As earlier noted, then Presiding Judge Manuel Castañeda of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, Branch III, dismissed the case on January 28, 1976 on the ground that the crime had
prescribed. The People's motion for reconsideration was denied by the succeeding Presiding
Judge Felicidad Carandang Villalon.
On March 25, 1976, the prosecution filed a notice of appeal from both orders of the trial court.
In a resolution dated May 13, 1976, this Court required the prosecution to file a petition for
review on Certiorari in accordance with Republic Act No. 5440. 9 Thereafter, said petition for
review and the corresponding comment and reply of the parties having been filed, on February
21, 1977 the Court resolved to treat said petition as a special civil action and required petitioner
and private respondent to submit their respective memoranda. 10
From the memoranda submitted, the Court is tasked with the resolution of the following issues:
1. Whether the People could appeal from the order of dismissal because the private respondent
would thereby be placed in double jeopardy;
2. Whether the charge of estafa thru falsification of a public document filed against the private
respondent has sufficient ground to exist in law and in fact; and,
3. Whether the offense charged in the aforementioned criminal case is already extinguished by
prescription. 11
The bar of double jeopardy is not involved in the present recourse. As enunciated in People vs.
City Court of Manila, etc., et al.:
"As a general rule, the dismissal or termination of the case after arraignment and plea of the
defendant to a valid information shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged,
or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the complaint or information (Section 9, Rule 113). However,
an appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal (of the criminal case) by the trial court
shall not constitute double jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made upon motion, or with the express
consent, of the defendant, and (2) the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon consideration
of the evidence or of the merits of the case; and (3) the question to be passed upon by the
appellate court is purely legal so that should the dismissal be found incorrect, the case would
have to be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, to determine the guilt or
innocence of the defendant." 12
On the issue of whether the charge of estafa thru falsification of a public document has sufficient
basis to exist in fact and in law, we hold in the affirmative. The falsification of a public document
may be a means of committing estafa because before the falsified document is actually utilized
to defraud another, the crime of falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent
to cause damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of public, official or
commercial documents. The damage to another is caused by the commission of estafa, not by
the falsification of the document, hence, the falsification of the public, official or commercial
document is only a necessary means to commit the estafa. 13
Petitioner posits that the offense charged is supported by the fact that what was intended to be
mortgaged was the one-half portion pertaining to Severo Carrera, not the portion pertaining to
complainant, otherwise complainant would not have quoted his brother's words. The theory of
petitioner and the findings of public respondent are substantially the same. We agree that the
offense charged does exist in fact and in law, as explained in the findings of the court below:
"In the light of the circumstances revealed by the partial testimony of complainant Mariano
Carrera and of the record, as regards the first ground, the court finds that the contention of the
defense that the authorization given to him to mortgage the whole property is not sustained by
the evidence because a cursory study of the answer made by the witness complainant clearly
shows that what was intended to be mortgaged was the one-half (1/2) portion pertaining only
to Severo Carrera, excluding that portion pertaining to said complainant. (T.S.N.. pp. 8-10,
hearing on June 18, 1974). In other words, the alleged authorization given to Federico de Guzman
to get a loan from the Bank on the half portion of the land referred to the share of Severo Carrera
only. This finding is based on the following quoted answer:
'A . . . and when I asked him he interpreted that this is an authorization to Federico de Guzman
to get a loan from the bank on the half portion of the land which belongs to me, my brother said.'
Mariano Carrera on June 18, 1974, gave the above-quoted testimony. He merely quoted his
brother Severo Carrera to whom the half portion of the land belongs. Severo Carrera, as quoted
by Mariano Carrera, did not use the phrase `which belongs to you.'" 14
Notwithstanding the foregoing disquisition on the sufficiency of the charge of estafa thru
falsification of a public document, the resolution of the issue on prescription is, however,
determinative of the validity of the impugned orders of public respondent.: nad
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for a complex crime is that for the
most serious component offense, the same to be applied in its maximum period. In the crime of
estafa thru falsification of a public document, the more serious crime is the falsification which
carries with it the correctional penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods and a fine not more than P5,000.00 imposed by Article 172 of the Code. Crimes
punishable by correctional penalties prescribe in ten (10) years pursuant to Article 90 of the Code,
and Article 91 thereof states that the prescriptive period commences to run "from the day on
which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents . . ."
The document which was allegedly falsified was a notarized special power of attorney registered
in the Registry of Deeds of Dagupan City on February 13, 1964 authorizing private respondent to
mortgage a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47682 in order to secure a
loan of P8,500.00 from the People's Bank and Trust Company. The information for estafa thru
falsification of a public document was filed only on March 29, 1974. We reject petitioner's claim
that the ten-year period commenced when complainant supposedly discovered the crime in
January, 1972 by reason of the ejectment suit against him.
People vs. Reyes 15 cites authorities on the well established rule that registration in a public
registry is a notice to the whole world. The record is constructive notice of its contents as well as
all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. All persons are charged with knowledge of
what it contains. On these considerations, it holds that the prior ruling in Cabral vs. Puno, etc., et
al., 16 to the effect that in the crime of falsification of a public document the prescriptive period
commences from the time the offended party had constructive notice of the alleged forgery after
the document was registered with the Register of Deeds is not without legal basis.
It was also noted that in Armentia vs. Patriarca, et al., 17 in interpreting the phrase "from the
discovery" found in Article 1391 of the Civil Code which authorizes annulment, in case of mistake
or fraud, within four years from the time of the discovery of the same, the Court also held that
the discovery must be reckoned to have taken place from the time the document was registered
in the Register of Deeds, for the familiar rule is that registration is a notice to the whole world
and this should apply to both criminal and civil cases.: nad
We are further in accord with the conclusion in Reyes that the application of said rule on
constructive notice in the interpretation of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code would most
certainly be favorable to private respondent herein, since the prescriptive period of the crime
shall have to be reckoned with earlier, that is, from the time the questioned documents were
recorded in the Registry of Deeds.
In the instant case, the special power of attorney involved was registered on February 13, 1964.
The criminal information against private respondent having been filed only on March 29, 1974,
or more than ten (10) years thereafter, the crime with which private respondent was charged has
indubitably prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the challenged orders of
public respondent are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.