Verboven, Utility of affection – Working Paper -- 5171 words 1

Koenraad VERBOVEN

The utility of affection. Towards a new approach to

'friendship' in ancient Rome

“Actor, Agency, Network.” Personal relations as structuring elements in the formation of

broader networks (Medieval Friendship Network, Brussels, VUB, 24th March 2006)

Working paper

Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1
Social science ............................................................................................................ 2
Ancient philosophers and writers ............................................................................ 3
Greek philosophy .................................................................................................. 3
The Roman view : Cicero ...................................................................................... 4
Utility in friendship ............................................................................................... 5
Modern views on Roman amicitia (and patronage) ................................................ 6
Social history......................................................................................................... 6
Political history ..................................................................................................... 7
Economy ............................................................................................................... 8
Affection ............................................................................................................... 9
Towards an integrated approach ........................................................................... 10
Gift-exchange signifying affection ...................................................................... 10
Affection in response to favours received ......................................................... 10
Affection as ‘rule reminder’................................................................................ 12
Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 13
Bibliography ............................................................................................................ 13

Introduction

I would like to start with a quotation from Coleman’s Foundation of Social Theory1:

A final example of a simple authority structure that is not often recognized as

such, but that has much in common with charismatic authority, is love. A
person who has fallen in love with another has in effect, committed himself to
the other, has transferred control over many of his actions to the other. …

1
COLEMAN 1990, p. 164-165
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When the object of love also falls in love with the one who first loves, there is a
unique authority structure of two persons. Inwardly directed but with each
individual under the control of the other. A disconnected and symmetric
authority system of this sort seems to have special properties unlike that of any
other and often produces bizarre and exotic behavior. Unfortunately, although
this phenomenon has been richly described by novelist, it has been left largely
unexamined by social scientists.

Coleman’s approach is extremely functionalist, but his remarks are very much to the
point. Political leaders, swindlers, publicity experts and (instinctively) all of us have
always known that ‘love’ is a powerful instrument to persuade individuals and groups
to promote the interests of others.

Yet, oddly, affection in social and historical research has been largely ignored or
treated as irrelevant or unproblematic.

Since the 1980’s attempts have been made to create a theoretical and conceptual
framework and to develop a methodology for the study of emotions in history, but the
integration of these studies in social history at large is still very rudimentary.2

The case of ‘friendship’ (amicitia – philia) a good example, both in ancient history
research and in sociology.

Social science

The study of ‘friendship’ in social science is tributary to the great research tradition on
‘reciprocity’. Not coincidentally, the study of ‘friendship’ in social sciences has
flourished particularly in structural-functionalism and in exchange theory.

Social scientists have mostly defined instrumental friendship (as opposed to emotional
friendship) as a relation similar to patron-client relations. Both are ‘dyadic alliances’
linking two people in a particularistic relationship based on generalised or balanced
reciprocity. Underlying the relation is the sense of mutual obligations resulting from
and leading to the exchange of ‘gifts’ and ‘favours’. In ‘instrumental friendship’ the
exchange is more or less ‘balanced’ (the relation is ‘symmetrical’). In patron-client
relations the exchange is clearly unequal (the relation is ‘asymmetrical’). The purpose
of both is always instrumental. The implicit ‘function’ is to create exchange-relations
based on trust and solidarity.

Affection is mostly seen as a necessary but peripheral condition to sustain the trust
and solidarity expected from the partners.

2
Cf. for instance FRIJDA 1998 ; STEARNS & STEARNS 1985. For emotions as a research theme in ancient
history see for instance HARRIS 2001 ; BARTON 2001 ; BARTON 1993 ; KONSTAN 2001; KASTER 2005. More
essayistic MCMULLEN 2003.
 Verboven, Utility of affection – Working Paper -- 5171 words 3

Wolf distinguished emotional from instrumental friendship. The former aims at

emotional satisfaction, the latter at the creation of ‘generalized exchange’ situations.
Yet, even instrumental friendship retains an element of affection, without which the
relation would not be stable. This ‘emotional burden’ or ‘charge of affect’ supports the
open trust and ‘credit’ that are typical of generalised reciprocity.3

Pitt-Rivers goes further. The core of ‘friendship’ is ‘amity’, a concept denoting the ‘set
of normative premises’ focused upon the axiom of ‘prescriptive altruism’, the counter
principle of (prescriptive) reciprocity.

‘The notion of friendship is founded on sentiment, but at the same time the
sentiments of the participants must be mutual … There must be reciprocity in
friendship, for failure to reciprocate in action is a denial of the reciprocity of
sentiment, yet this cannot be admitted for fear of the relationship becoming
jural. The only sanction in friendship is the withdrawal of sentiment, for to a
friend one can have only moral commitments. … The paradox of friendship lies
in this: though the favours of friends must be free, they must still be
reciprocated if the moral status quo is to be maintained. … By definition all
friendship must be both sentimental in inspiration and instrumental in effects,
since there is no other way to demonstrate one’s sentiments than through
those actions which speak plainer than words. The instrumental aspect
validates the affect. … The injured party can declare what is due to him and can
take steps towards its recovery, exercising the sanctions which relate to
reputation. But these cannot be used while the moral nature of the relation is
still accepted, for the disillusioned friend who complains that his favours have
not been reciprocated destroys his own reputation by implying that he
expected they should be, that he gave them only out of calculation in
expectation of a return.’4

Ancient philosophers and writers

Greek philosophy
Ancient philosophers as well struggled with the role of affection in friendship. The
deadlock in Plato’s Lysis arises from the conflicting images of philia as a relationship
based on utility and one based on affection.5

3
WOLF 1966, p. 10-13; ‘The charge of affect may thus be seen as a device form keeping the relation of
open trust or open credit (p. 13). See also MEDARD 1976, p. 106 on affection in patron-client relations :
‘Liant deux personnes d'une manière diffuse et particulariste, … (la relation) ne peut être affectivement
neutre. ... si le calcul est loin d'être absent, il baigne dans un environnement de sentiments de
reconnaissance, de fidélité, d'amitié ou d'affection.’ ; cf. LANDE 1977, p. xiii-xiv; FOSTER 1977.
4
PITT-RIVERS 1973, p. 96-97; the concept of ‘amity’ comes from Meyer Fortes.
5
cf. ANNAS 1977, p. 532-539.
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Aristotle distinguished three types ( δη) of friendship resulting from three different
grounds for affection : utility ( ), pleasure ( δ ) and virtue ( ). The
latter consisted of benevolence ( ) caused by love for the ‘absolute good’ (
γ θ ϛ) – that which is good in itself and not just good-for-something/someone-
else.

Only philia based on virtue was constant, while philiai based on utility or pleasure
lasted only as long as they were useful or pleasant. Yet, in Aristotle’s view affection
was genuine in all three cases. Significantly, he refused to restrict the concept of philia
to perfect philiai because this would be in conflict with phenomenal reality ( θ
6
). Even though he concedes that philia based on virtue is ‘primary’ ( ω
η) and provides the standards by which other philiai should be measured, he rejects
the idea that only philia based on virtue is ‘real’ friendship.

Aristotle was the last great philosopher who tried to integrate various types of
friendship. Epicurus believed that utility was the ground for all friendships, while the
stoic Zenon claimed the primacy of virtue. Neither ‘school’ denied that affection was
the essence of friendship, yet according to epicureans affection for others arose from
the need of and in response to the help and services received from others, while
according to stoics affection was a response to the perception of virtue in others.

The Roman view : Cicero

Philosophical views on amicitia in Rome, mostly adopted either the epicurist or the
stoic viewpoint. The most influential essay – whose popularity continued down to
modern times – was Cicero’s Laelius de amicitia.

In this short essay Cicero opposed the epicurean idea that amicitia was based on need
or utility. According to Cicero friendship was an ‘agreement on all things divine and
human, with goodwill (benevolentia) and affection (caritas)’. Amor from whence the
name amicitia was derived, was the source of benevolentia.7

The view of friendship being based on consensus was widespread. Sallustius has
Catilina say to his followers that ‘to want and not want the same thing, that is truly
firm friendship’.8

6
Aristoteles, Eth. Nic. 8,4,4 (1157a26-36); Eth. Eud. 7,1-2 (1234b1-1238b14); refusal to restrict the term:
Eth. Nic. 8, 4, 4-5 (1157a26-34); Eth. Eud. 7, 2, 22-23 (1236b21-27) (see here 1236b22 for the θ
fragment). cf.also Eth. Eud. 7, 2, 11-13 (1236a24-30); cf. SCHROEDER 1997; KONSTAN (1997), p. 67-78.
7
Cicero, Am. 20: Est enim amicitia nihil aliud nisi omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum cum
benevolentia et caritate consensio. Cicero, Am. 26: ut dandis recipiendisque meritis quod quisque minus
per se ipse posset, id acciperet ab alio vicissimque redderet, an esset hoc quidem proprium amicitiae, sed
antiquior et pulchrior et magis a natura ipsa profecta alia causa. Amor enim, ex quo amicitia nominata
est, princeps est ad benevolentiam coniungendam.
8
Sallustius, Cat. 20,4: idem velle atque idem nolle, ea demum firma amicitia est
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However, Cicero adds a distinctive moral – Greek – touch to this idea by claming that
real friendship can only exist between boni viri.9 Without virtue there can be no true
friendship.10

Yet Cicero equally rejects the stoic idea that because true friendship depended on
virtue, and only the ‘wise’ was truly virtuous, true friendship could only exist between
‘wise men’ (sapientes). This may have been true generally speaking, claims Cicero, but
the definition given to ‘wisdom’ (sapientia) by the stoics was such that no mortal man
had ever reached this ideal.11

The central ideas of the Laelius can be found in several other of Cicero’s philosophical
works, as the De finibus, the De officiis or the De natura deorum.12

Utility in friendship
But his views on friendship were not always so straightforward, nor were they shared
by all Roman intellectuals.

In his rhetorical study De Inuentione Cicero includes amicitia because it is highly useful
and may appear to be sought after for the material rewards it brings forth (fructus …
causa petenda videatur); some people believe that amicitia is desirable only for its
usefulness, others for itself only, again others for itself and its usefulness. Regardless
of who may right, in oratory friendship should be sought for both reasons.13

In his oration in defence of Roscius from Ameria Cicero claims that amicitiae are
fostered ut commune commodum mutuis officiis gubernetur.14

9
Cicero, Am. 18: nisi in bonis amicitiam esse non posse
10
Cicero, Am. 20 nec sine virtute amicitia esse ullo pacto potest
11
Cicero, Am. 18 : Sit ita sane; sed eam sapientiam interpretantur, quam adhuc mortalis nemo est
consecutus.
12
Cicero, Fin. 2,83: si fructibus et emolumentis et utilitatibus amicitias colemus, si nulla caritas erit, quae
faciat amicitiam ipsam sua sponte, vi sua, ex se et propter se expetendam, dubium est, quin fundos et
insulas amicis anteponamus? See also Cicero, N.D. I.122. FIORE 1997.
13
Cicero, Inv. 2,167: (167) hic, quia de civilibus causis loquimur, fructus ad amicitiam adiungimus, ut
eorum quoque causa petenda videatur, ne forte, qui nos de omni amicitia dicere existimant,
reprehendere incipiant. quamquam sunt qui propter utilitatem modo petendam putant amicitiam; sunt
qui propter se solum; sunt qui propter se et utilitatem. quorum quid verissime constituatur, alius locus
erit considerandi. nunc hoc sic ad usum oratorium relinquatur, utramque propter rem amicitiam esse
expetendam.
14
Cicero, Rosc. Am. 111 (xxxviii): In privatis rebus, si qui rem mandatam non modo malitiosus gessisset,
sui quaestus aut commodi causa, verum etiam neglegentius, eum maiorum summum admisisse dedecus
existimabant. Itaque mandati constitutum est iudicium non minus turpe quam furti, credo, propterea
quod quibus in rebus ipsi interesse non possumus, in iis operae nostrae vicaria fides amicorum
supponitur; quam qui laedit, oppugnat omnium commune praesidium et, quantum in ipso est, disturbat
vitae societatem. Non enim possumus omnia per nos agere; alius in alia est re magis utilis. Idcirco
amicitiae comparantur, ut commune commodum mutuis officiis gubernetur.
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Even in his Laelius the thought escapes him that he is speaking about ‘true and perfect’
friendship (de vera et perfecta), not about ‘vulgar or ordinary’.15

Cicero claimed that true amicitia was based on mutual affection and sought after for
its own sake, as beneficentia and liberalitas we desirable for their own sake and not for
the gratia they engendered. However, Aulus Gellius writes that Cicero was criticised
because the motives behind liberalitas and beneficentia were themselves dubious;
Gellius concluded that Cicero spoke in a philosophical sense only.16

The idea that amicitia arises from, or least consists in the exchange of gifts and favours
is ubiquitous in Roman literature.

Terence speaks of ‘procuring friends through a kindness’.17 A letter from Fronto to M.

Aurelius expressly distinguishes amor from amicitia by saying that the latter exists only
through the exchange of officia, whereas the former arises rather from impulse than
from calculation.18

Ancient literature, therefore, appears to betray an opposition between ideals and

philosophy on the one hand – emphasizing affection and virtue – and social practice
and common sense – emphasizing reciprocity obligations (gratia), loyalty (fides) and
honour – on the other.

Modern views on Roman amicitia (and patronage)

Social history
Contrary to ‘family’ or ‘patronage’, amicitia has rarely been studied as an independent
research object in Roman social history. Social historians usually mention ‘friendship’
as both affectionate and instrumental and stress its importance in politics or economic
activities, but rarely spend more than a few pages on it. When they do, it is treated
mostly as an instrumental relation, providing alternatives to economic institutions (for
instance to obtain loans and social support).
Although some affection was expected, it played only a secondary role. Philosophical
views like those of Cicero (or Seneca) were put aside as little more than idealisations.19

15
Cicero, Am. 22
16
cf. Cicero, Am. 30-31; Gellius 17,5,1-14 (esp. 10: 'beneficum et liberalem' Cicero appellat, ita ut
philosophi appellandum esse censent, non eum, qui, ut ipse ait, beneficia faeneratur, sed qui benigne
facit nulla tacita ratione ad utilitates suas redundante.
17
Terentius, Eun. 148: parere amicos beneficio.
18
Fronto, Ad. M. Caes. 1, 3, 5.
19
MICHEL 1962, p. 446-601; HANDS 1968, p. 33; MILLET 1991, p. 109-127; GALLANT 1991, p. 142-169;
ROULAND 1979, p. 13-15; SALLER 1982, p. 11-15; SALLER 1989; FIORE 1997, p. 66-67, 71-73. For the idea that
amicitia / cannot be adequately translated by ‘friendship’ cf. SALLER 1983, p. 256; MILLET 1991, p.
114.
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In the 1970’s and ‘80s sociological models and theories were adduced to support this
view.

Amicitia was defined as an instrumental particularistic relationship based on gift-

exchange and the obligation of reciprocity between more or less ‘equal’ partners,
while patronage was a ‘lop-sided friendship’, an asymmetric amicitia between parties
of unequal status exchanging gifts and services of unequal value. Affection is supposed
to be present and has to be feigned if necessary, but is neither the basis nor the object
of the relation, and is thus largely irrelevant for understanding friendship as a social
phenomenon.

According to Richard Saller, ‘the fundamentally instrumental nature of Roman

friendship was a corollary of the underdevelopment of rational, impersonal institutions
for the provision of services.’20 Friends gave loans, stood surety, helped to provide
dowries, left each other legacies, helped administer one’s patrimony, promoted one’s
interests, offered social support in times of crisis, protected one’s reputation,
negotiated positions, wrote recommendations, etc. ….

Political history
This dominantly ‘utilitarian’ view of amicitia is tributary to the prosopographic
approach of Roman political history developed by Sir Ronald Syme and Friedrich
Münzer. In this view family, amicitia and patronage formed the backbone of a parallel
power hierarchy which enabled the great families of the Republic to maintain a grip on
political institutions. It allowed the formation of more or less stable political factions,
based on personal fides and gratia. Amicitia formed the ‘the old Roman substitute for
party’.21

Under the empire, the system enabled the emperors to maintain the Republican
façade while controlling events behind the screen.22

Since the 1990’s, however, views on Roman politics have changed. Republican politics
are no longer seen as merely the extension on the public and institutional level of
private relations. The role of oratory, mob violence, corruption, but also of tradition,

20
SALLER 1982, p. 13-14; See also GARSNEY & SALLER 1987, p. 155-156: ‘Though the philosophers eschewed
material advantage as a motive for friendship, for other Romans (and indeed for the philosophers in
their more pragmatic moments) the exchange of services was a foundation for friendship. … The
benefits exchanged in friendship resemble those given between patrons and protégés, but the tone of
friendship on an equal footing is different.’ Amicitia was ‘characterized by courteous cooperation.
Behind the façade of cooperation lay competition: if a friend failed to make a return of the same order,
he risked slipping into the position of a ‘lesser friend’ and losing honour in the process’.
21
TAYLOR 1949, p. 7. The approach goes back to GELZER 1912. See also SYME 1939 ; MÜNZER 1920 ;
SCULLARD 1951 ; MEIER 1966 ; GRUEN 1968 ; GRUEN 1974 ; ROULAND 1979
22
for political amicitia and patronage under the empire see esp. SALLER 1982 ; but the basic idea goes
back to GELZER 1915. See particularly VON PREMERSTEIN 1937 ; SAINTE CROIX 1954.
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religion and law have been revalued. The field of politics was structured along lines
that were often incompatible with the demands of private amicitia.23

The social networks built on patronage and political friendship were no stable ‘party-
like’ groups, but highly unstable and often volatile alliances, made to further private
ambitions. Political amicitiae were important, because informal networks – inherited
or self-construed – were often the resource most easily available to play the game of
politics. It is also true that elite networks cut through institutions and procedures;
nevertheless the set of constraints and possibilities facing a politician was vastly more
complex than the social networks he could fall back upon.

The power balance shifted under the empire. Elite social networks converged to the
person of the emperor and more than before the emperor’s personal networks cut
through existing institutions and procedures. But custom, religion and institutional
procedures did not disappear. Significantly, Roman law knew its greatest development
over the first 250 years of the empire. The imperial army was more ‘professional’ and
institutionalised than ever under the Republic. The Roman empire never turned into a
feudal state.

Economy
A similar paradigmatic shift took place in ancient economic history.

Scholars of ancient economies have been divided between primitivists and modernists.
The latter believe neo-classical theories and concepts are useful to study ancient
economies, the former reject this idea, arguing that the market (as an economic
institution) did not exist until the Early Modern Period.
The most influential ‘primitivist’ was Moses Finley, whose great example was Karl
Polanyi. The latter distinguished three types of ‘economic’ transactions: 1°
redistribution, 2° reciprocity or gift-exchange, and 3° market transactions. Economies
before the capitalist era were typically ‘embedded’, meaning that transactions were
part of the interaction in social relations and were governed by norms and institutions
that were profoundly un-economic.24
According to ‘primitivists’ redistribution and gift-exchange were the prevalent modes
of economic transactions throughout antiquity and ‘friendship’ was the prevalent
social relation in which gift-exchange between non-family was embedded. In this view
‘friendship’ was primarily an instrumental relation built on gift-exchange, intended to
secure ‘economic’ needs. Affection was largely irrelevant.
Primitivist theories achieved virtual orthodoxy in the 1980’s and early 1990’s, but have
since the late 1990’s lost much ground. ‘Markets’ – although imperfect and
fragmented – are again seen as central institutions of ancient economies, with internal

23
See esp. MILLAR 1984 ; MILLAR 1986 ; MILLAR 1989 MILLAR 1998 ; YAKOBSEN 1999 ; YAKOBSEN 1992 ; BRUNT
1988a (a selection of earlier essays on the topic)
24
FINLEY 1973 ; FINLEY 1977 ; POLANYI 1944 ; POLANYI e.a. 1957
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dynamics broadly comparable to those of early-modern markets. The great divide lay
not between ancient and medieval, but between industrial and pre-industrial.
Institutional constraints – legal, monetary, fiscal, and so forth – cannot be meaningfully
reduced to reciprocity relations, let alone to instrumental friendship. Yet at the same
time, social networks were vital to deploy any effective economic strategy. Friendship
secured credit and sureties and offered the necessary context of trust and solidarity
underlying business partnerships and agencies.25

As in politics, amicitia did not determine or affect the rules of the game, but it did
considerably enhance a person’s resources to play the game.

Affection
Curiously, although scholars of the ancient world usually agree that some affection
was expected in friendship, few have attempted to integrate it in their analysis. 26

A major exception was Peter Brunt, who as early as 1965 warned against
overemphasizing the utilitarian aspects of amicitia. He noted that even when ‘utility is
mentioned, what is stressed if often not so much the services actually rendered as the
constant and known will or readiness to render them’.27 Brunt was one of the most
influential ancient historians of this time. His 1965 paper was reprinted twice (in 1969
and 1988) and it is invariably cited in publications on Roman friendship.28 Yet, his
revaluation of affection in amicitia was largely ignored until the argument was picked
up by David Konstan in the early 1990’s.

Although Konstan acknowledges the importance of the principle of reciprocity, he

argues that ‘relations among friends … appear to be precisely the area that is exempt
from such expectations … (philia) constituted in principle, as modern friendship, a
space of personal intimacy and unselfish affection distinct from the norms regulating
public and commercial life’. Of course, the terms amicitia and philia could be used to
cover up relations of dependence or mutual advantage, but, this is hardly relevant for
the true nature of friendship in the Ancient World. After all, we too use the term
‘friendship’ for a wide variety of social relationships which we are well aware are by no
means true friendships.29

25
VERBOVEN 2002
26
SALLER 1982, p. 12; DUTHOY 1984, p. 12 ; MITCHELL 1997, p. 8-9 ; ADKINS 1963, p. 33: ‘undoubtedly
anyone who uses ς of a person or thing does so in virtue of an emotion which he feels for that
person or thing.’.
27
BRUNT 1988b, p. 356.
28
BRUNT 1965; BRUNT 1969; revised version BRUNT 1988
29
KONSTAN 1997, p. 82; see also KONSTAN 1995; KONSTAN 1996; contra see RACCANELLI 1998, p. 19-22.
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Instrumental friendship may be more common in history than ‘modern’ emotional

friendship,30 but in Konstan’s view the Ancient World and modern society ‘perhaps for
entirely different reasons – did produce a space for sympathy and altruism under the
name of friendship that stands as an alternative to structured forms of interaction
based on kinship, civic identity, or commercial activity.’31

Konstan’s view on ancient friendship is at variance with the divergent opinions on the
nature of friendship held by ancient writers. Consequently, although his work is usually
cited by other scholars on amicitia, his ideas are rarely picked up.

But Konstan’s work is a salutary reminder of the central importance accorded to

affection in friendship by ancient writers and the neglect of it in modern scholarship.

In the following pages, I will suggest three approaches to affection in ancient Roman
friendship, that I believe may help us to achieve an better integrated view on the social
dynamics of amicitia.

Towards an integrated approach

Gift-exchange signifying affection

The first thing we may note is that – remarkably in line with Pitt-Rivers’ analysis –
friendship in Roman thought and praxis must always be substantiated through gifts
and ‘services’, that are voluntary (beneficia), but nevertheless morally due (officia) and
signify goodwill and affection.
Some of these gifts and services are mostly symbolic (writing letters, paying visits,
invitations to dinners etc.), but others can be very substantial (standing surety,
according loans, writing letters of recommendation, using one’s influence,
representation in course etc.).
Consequently, there is no such thing as a useless friend; nor is there anything shameful
in saying that one ‘uses’ a friend. The expression uti is very commonly used to describe
one’s intercourse with friends.
Significantly, Cicero’s essay on friendship doesn’t claim that true friendship is not
useful, rather that utility comes from affection, not vice versa. ‘To give and receive
favours’ (dandis recipiendisque meritis) is a distinctive feature of amicitia (proprium
amicitiae).32

Affection in response to favours received

This is nothing new, but what is much less realised, however, is that the reverse is also
true. Affection is not only part and parcel of friendship, but also of gratia and fides.

30 th th
See for instance KETTERING 1986; KETTERING 1992 (on 17 c. France); KOOIJMANS 1992 (18 c. Holland).
th
Cf. also CAMPBELL 1964, p. 224-238 (20 c. Greece).
31
KONSTAN 1997, p. 5-6.
32
Cicero, Am. 26 cf. Supra for the text
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Amor was ‘owed’ in response to beneficia. Gift-exchange is not only thought to signify
reciprocal sentiments, but also to create affection.

Even in Cicero’s Laelius we read that affection is enforced when a favour is received or
effort on one’s behalf is perceived.33

Seneca noted that love-in-response-to-favours was part of the natural order of things;
even wild beasts were brought to love those who cared for them. Affection had in turn
to be shown by beneficia that would kindle gratia in the receiver.34

In his Panegyric to Trajan, Pliny the Younger claimed that the emperor had so great a
capacity to put his friends under an obligation that only an ingrate could fail to love
him.35

Dionysius of Halicarnassus lets Coriolanus say: ‘neither the nature of one’s appearance
nor the imposition of a name defines what is friendly or inimical, but both are revealed
by services and deed, and … we all love what does us good and hate what does us
harm.’36

This norm of affection as an inherent part of gratia in friendship is very strong.

Affection may be feigned, but the norm is very real and subject to being interiorised
through socialisation and becoming part of the emotional habitus of the subjects.

Of course there was insincerity in ancient ‘friendship’ – as there is in today’s

‘friendships’. But insincerity requires a clear set of expectations regarding a persons’
behaviour. These expectations are considered both morally legitimate and efficient in
the sense that they are useful to predict that person’s behaviour.

Affection-in-response-to-favours is such an expectation. This affection doesn’t

necessarily run deep; there is a difference between ‘just friends’ and ‘bosom friends’–
but this doesn’t imply that sentiments between ‘just friends’ are ‘insincere’ and
ineffective in creating a real sense of obligation towards the other.

We tend to consider affection as a pristine virtue springing from within ourselves,

untainted by instrumental considerations or moral obligations, whereas in fact

33
Cicero, Am. 29: Quamquam confirmatur amor et beneficio accepto et studio perspecto et consuetudine
adiuncta, quibus rebus ad illum primum motum animi et amoris adhibitis admirabilis quaedam
exardescit benevolentiae magnitudo. Quam si qui putant ab inbecillitate proficisci. Cf. also Cicero, Fam.
13,60,1; RACCANELLI 1998, p. 20-21, 37-40.
34
Seneca, Ben. 1,2,5; cf. Fronto, Ad M. Caes. 1,3,4; Plautus, Trin. 438-439. Compare Valerius Maximus
5,4,7 on love towards parents as the prima naturae lex.
35
Plinius, Pan. 85, 8: tibi amicos tuos obligandi tanta facultas inest, ut nemo te possit nisi ingratus non
magis amare.
36
Dionysius, 8,34,1-3 ' ' ςθ ς, ς
ς ς δη ω , ς
 Verboven, Utility of affection – Working Paper -- 5171 words 12

affection is very much subject to social and cultural prescriptions. Socialisation teaches
us how and whom to love and hate, how to express feelings (including towards
ourselves) and when to hide them

This doesn’t imply that emotions are merely social constructs picked up by basic
instincts (the drive to survive, to reproduce, to feed etc.). Although it is not usually
classified as a ‘basic’ emotion, a genetic ‘need’ and impulse to develop affection
towards others is certainly innate to human beings. But, man is essentially a social and
cultural being.

Affection is a typical ‘cognitive emotion’, neurologically situated in the neocortex of

the brain; the part most susceptible to socialisation and its cultural contingencies.

Instinct and genetic individuality are important, but the emotional habitus we develop,
arises out of the constant interaction between ourselves as individuals and the social
environment we grow up and live in.

An extreme example is provided by attachment disorders, often resulting from neglect

and abuse of young children. The victim becomes incapable of developing affectionate
relationships, is extremely self-centred, manipulative and violent. Attachment disorder
is an extreme pathological case, but it illustrates well how education affects a person’s
emotional status; and education is, of course, to a large extent culturally and socially
determined.

Affection as ‘rule reminder’

Affection has to be shown through gifts and services, which in turn create affection
which includes the sense of obligation to render favours.

Pitt-Rivers rightly noted that appeals to the obligation to reciprocate are not
permitted, because they violate the ‘amity’ underlying friendship. However, the
Roman material shows that appeals to affection are allowed.

Appeals to affection are stock and barrel of Cicero’s letters of recommendation, which
play upon the idea that mutual affection has to be shown in mutual services and
conversely that services received will both confirm and kindle affection.

The most common appeal is to benevolentia, i.e. ‘goodwill’. As in English this concept is
rather superficial and can be used to cover a very wide range of relations. Requests are
made ‘on the grounds of the strongest bond and the equal and mutual goodwill
between us …’ ; ‘on the grounds of your greatest goodwill and enduring observance for
 Verboven, Utility of affection – Working Paper -- 5171 words 13

me …’ ; ‘on the grounds of our very close connection and your enduring and greatest
goodwill for me …’37

The recommendation itself is often presented as due by Cicero to the commendatus on

account of the affection between them. Here diligere is the most commonly used
term, which is much more affectionate that simple goodwill. ‘I love Precilius dearly for
his modesty, humanity, character and exceptional love for me’ ; ‘I have loved young P.
Crassus among the nobility most’ ; ‘Curius, who does business in Patrae, is loved by me
for many and important reasons’.38

No doubt in many of these letters the ‘goodwill’ and ‘affection’ is superficial or even
feigned, but not necessarily always. Appeals to affection occur only in approximately
1/3 of Cicero’s letters of recommendation.

The letters illustrate not only that the norm of affection was real, but also that it was
instrumental. Whereas a return for favours received could not properly be asked,
favours as tokens of affection could be legitimately requested.

Conclusion
The distinction between ‘emotional’ and ‘instrumental’ friendship is analytically blurry.
Affection is a pervasive element in any Roman friendship, even though affection didn’t
always run deep and could occasionally be feigned. Conversely gift-exchange was a
structural feature of the cultural and social architecture that framed and formed
amicitiae. In order to better understand Roman amicitia and its social importance, we
need to reconsider the role of affection in it.

Koenraad Verboven
Post-doctoral research fellow
Research Foundation – Flanders
Ghent (Belgium)

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