‘THE ORIGIN OF THE WORK OF ART ‘nga Tye means that frm and by which something is what itirand oi What something ia tin we all ts emcee cx etre | The cgi of surthng is the oc of i ete. “The question concening the ign of the work of art ask bout the source of is nares Ox the eal view, the work ates out Of and by meats of the activity ofthe att. Bat by what and tcc the att what he i? Byte work; fort ay thatthe ‘otk does cet to the mister means that i isthe wok that fest las the artist emerge as + mater of his ar. The asi the origin ofthe wok. The work is the erga of the ais. Neier is without the othe. Neveteles, neither i the sole support ofthe other. In themselves and in thee inteelations asta and work are cach of them by vito of 2 hid thing ich is pir to Both, ae that which su ges att and ‘ork of at thi mera ‘As cecil 9 tho est the origin ofthe wok in 0 Alife way than the works the origin ofthe at, 30 it ually certain that, tll diferent way, ats the igi of eth ans and werk: But cia act be an gin at all Where snd how des at ect? Art—this nothing more than a word {0 which noting rel any longer correspond. It may pas for 4 coltv ides under which we fd apace for tht which hoe iste in ar: work and artis, Even ifthe word art wee taken {signify mae than a coltve nin, what is meaty the ot could exit nly on the bai of the actuality af works ” {18 POETRY, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT ad atts, Or i the conven the ese Bo works and ats stony because at exists a thee origin? ‘Whatever the decison may be, the question ofthe origin of the work of art bomes quetion about the eature of a Since the question whether and how art in general exists most sel remain open, we shall atempe to dacover the nature of atin the place where art undoubtedly prevail ia areal Way. ‘Ac is preset in the artwork, But what and how isa work of ‘What aris shoald be infeible from the wore. Wht the work of aris we can come to know only from the nate of 1 Anyone can easly ae that we are moving ina del. Ord tary understanding demands tht this cede Be avided bee Fevclates lg. What art incan be gathered frm 3 comparative cxuination of actual art works. But bow aze we tobe certain that we are indeed basing such an examination on artworks ‘if we do not ow beforchind what arts? And the nature of an can no more be artved at by a derivation from higher ‘concepts than by 4 collection of characteris of actual art work Foe such a derivation, too, already has in view the Caractere that must sutice to establish that what we ake in france to be an artwork is one in fact. But selecting works from among pten objets, and deriving concepts From pin pls, ate uly impossible her, and where these proceires fre paced the are self dexpion. “Thus we ate compelled to fallow the ede. This is neither 4 ake oe a defect. To eater upon ths path is the strength of ought, to cotoue on ts the fest of thought, esuming that thinking isa craft. Noe only the main step from work to aa cine like the step from art to work, but evry separate step that we tempt tls this ciel. Tn order to dicover the nature ofthe at that relly prevails in the work, et us goto the actual work and ask the work what and how its ‘Works of art are familie to eveyone. Architectual and ‘The Origin of the Work of Art 19 seulpeural works can be seen installed in public places, in churches, and in dwellings. Art works of the mos diverse petiods and peoples are housed in collections and exhibitions. If we consider the works in thie untouched actuality and do not deceive ourselves the results thatthe works areas naturally present as are things. The picture hangs on the wal ike afl ora ht. A painting, e.g, the one by Van Gogh that represents 2 pair of peasant shoes, travels from one exhibition to another, Works of art are shipped like cal from the Rube and logs ‘rom the Black Forest. During the Fest World War Halderln's Inymns were packed in the soldier knapsack together with cleaning gear. Beethoven's quartets lie inthe storeooms of the poblishing house like potatoes in a cli Al works have this thingly character. What would they be without i? But peshaps this rather crude and extemal view of ‘he work is objectionable to us. Shippers ot chirwomen in ‘museums may operate with such conceptions of the work of art We, however, have to take works as they ate encountered by ‘hose who experience and enjoy them. But even the much: ‘aunted aesthetic experience canct get around the tingly aspect, of the at work. Thete is something stony in a work of architec: ture, wooden in a carving, colored in a puating, spoken in a linguistic work, sonorous ia a musical composition. The tingly clement i 50 itremovably present in the art work that we are Compelled rather to say conversely thatthe architectural work isin ste, the caving isin wood, the painting in color, the linguistic work in speech, the musical composition in sound, ‘Obriousy," ie will be replied. No doube. But what is this self-evident chingly clement inthe work of art? Peesurably it Becomes superfuous and confusing to inquire into this feaure, since the art wotk is something ese over and abore the thingy element. This something else in the work ‘onsiutes its artistic nature, The att work i, to be sur, a thing ‘hat is made, but it says something other than the mere thing ‘vet i allo agorene\The work makes public something othet"| » POETRY, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT than ial it manifests something other; i 6am allegory. to the wore of art something othe i Brought together With the thing tat is made]|To bing together iin Grek, eben. “The wor» sym “Allegory and symbol provide the conceptual fame within whose chanel of vison the att woek has fr log tine been Garaceried. But thi one clement ia a wok that manifests Another, this one element dat joins with another, is the chingly featate inthe at wok. 1 seems almost as though the chingly element inthe artwork i ite the substructure into and upon hich the othe, authentic clement is bul And is tno this thingy festre da the work that te att cally makes By his handicraft (usm et arrive athe immediate and fll ely ofthe wok of at for nly i this way sal we discover real ar alo Yithin Hence me rust fet big o view the thingy cleat the work To this ead i is necessary dat we should know with sfiient clarity what a thing is Only then an we say Ihthe the at work isa thing Buta thiag 0 which semebing dls adheres, only then can we decide whether the work iS at botiom something else and nothing a al. Thing and Work ‘What in truth i the thing, so far as itis a thing? When we ingure in this way, ove aim i to come to know the thing-being (thingness) of the thing. The point i to discover the thingly character of the thing. To this end we have to be acquainted ‘with the sphere to which all those entities belong which we Ihave lng called bythe name of thing. ‘The stone ia the road isa thing, a isthe cod in the fed. A jug i a thing, a i the well beside the road. But what about the mil iu the jug and the water ia the well? These too are things ifthe cloud in the sky and the thistle in the feld, the leaf in the autuma breeze and the hawk over the wood, are rightly called by the name of thing. All these must indeed be The Origin of the Werk of Art a called things ifthe ume is applied evento that which doesnot, like those just enumerated, show itself, ie, tht which does ot appear. According to Kant, the whole of the world, for example, and even God himself isa thing ofthis sor, a thing that does not itself appear, namely, 2 "thingin-self.” Inthe language of philosophy bach things-in-themselves and things that appear, all beings that in any way are, are called things. Airplanes and radio sets are nowadays among the things closet to us, but when we have ultimate things in mind we think of something altogether diferent. Desth and jugment-— these are ultimate things. On the wiole the word “thing” here designates whatever is not simply nothing. Ia this sense the work of art is also a thing so far as it isnot simply nothing, Yet this concept is of no use tous, atlas immediatly, in oat attempt to delimit entities that have the mode of being of a ‘hing, as against those having the mode of being of a work. And besides, we besitate to call God a thing. In the same way we hesitate to consider the peasant in the field, the stker at the bole, the teacher in the schol as things. A man isnot thing, Tis true that we speak of a young giel who is faced with a task too dificult for her as being a young thing, stl too yung fort, but only because we fel that being human isin certain way ‘missing here and think that instead we have to do herewith the factor that constitutes the thinly character of things, We hes- tate evento cal the deer in the Foret clesting, the beetle ia the as, the blade of gras a thiag. We would sooner think of a hhammer a5 a thing. oF a Shoe, or an ax, oF a clock, Bat even these are not mere things. Only a stone, acl of earth apiece of wood ate for us such mere things. Lifles beings of nature and objets of use. Natural things and utensils are the things ‘commonly socalled, We thus ce ourselves brought back from the widest domain, within which everthing is a thing. (thing = rer = ens= an ‘atity), incuding even the highest and last things tothe narrow Precinct of mere things. “Mere” ete means, fist, the pure2 POETRY, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT thing, whichis simply a thing and nothing more; but thea, at the Sime time, it means that which is ony thing, in an almost pejorative sense. It is mere things, excluding even use-object, that count as things in the seit sense. What does the thinly character of these things, then, consist in? It is in reference to these thatthe thingness of thiags must be determinable. This determination enables us to chércteriae what i is that i thinly 4s such. Thus prepared, we are able to characterize the almost palpable realty of works, in which something else inheres. [Now it passes fora knowa fact tat as far bac as antiquity, no seoner was the question raised as to whit etitie ate in genera, than things ia their thingness thrust themselves into Prominence again and again as the stindard ype of beings. Consequently we are bound to meet widh the defiition of the thingnessof things azeady in the raditoeal interpretations of beings. We thus need only to ascertain explicitly this tational ‘knowledge of the thing, tobe relieved of the tedious labor of making our own search for the thingy character of the thing, ‘The answers to the question “What is the thing?” ate s0 familiar that we ao longer sense anything questionable behind them. “The interpretations ofthe thingness of the thing which, pre dominant in the course of Western thought, have long become self-evident and ate now in everyday use, may be reduced to hace. ‘This block of granite, for example, i a mere thing. I is hard, heavy, extended, bulky, shapelss, rough, colored, partly dull, partly shiny. We can take note of all these features in the stone. Thus we acknowledge its characteristics. But sil, the traits signify something proper tothe stone itself. They are its properties, The thing has them. The thing? What ae we think ing of when we now have the thing in mind? Obviously thing is not merely an aggregate of tts, nor an accumulation of properties by which tht aggregate arises. A thing, as everyone thinks he knows, i that stound which the properties have ‘The Origin of the Work of Art 23 assembled. We speak in tis connection of the care of things. ‘The Greeks are supposed to have called it 10 bupokeimenon. For them, this core of the thing was something lying at the ‘ground of the thing, something always already there, The haracteristis, however, ae called 14 sumbebekota, that which Ins always turned up already along with the given core and ‘cccus along with it. ‘These designations are no arbitrary names, Something that lies beyond the purview of this essay speaks in them, the basic Greek experience of the Being of beings in the sense of pres cence, It is by these determinations, however, thatthe interpre tation of the thingness ofthe thing is established which hence- forth becomes standard, and the Wester interpetation of the Being of beings subilized. The proces begins with the appro- ration of Greek words by RomaevLatin thought. Hupokeime- nom becomes snbectum; Dupoitass becomes eabitatia; cambe: bokos becomes avcidens. However, this translation of Greek ‘umes into Latin sin n0 way the innocent process is consid- cred to this day. Beneath the seemingly iterl and thus faithful translation there is concealed, rather, a raniation of Grete experience into a different way of thinking. Reman thought lubes over the Greek words without a corresponding, equally authentic experience of what they 14, witbont the Greek word. ‘The rootlessness of Western thought begins with thi tana: Accoeding to current opinion, this definition of the thingness ofthe thing asthe substance with its accidents scems to corte spond to our natural outlook oa things. No wonder thit the ‘current attitude toward things—out way of addressing ourelves ‘o things and speaking about them—has adapeed itself to this common view of the thigg. A simple propositional statement ‘consists of the subject, which is the Latin translation, hence already a reinterpretation, of bupoksimenon and the predicate, in which the thing's tras are stated of it. Who would have the ‘emerty to asl these simple fundamental relations between4 POFTRY, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT thing and statement, between sentence structure and thing: structure? Nevertheless we mus ask: Is the structure ofa simple propositional statement (the combination of subject and predi fate) the misror image of the structure ofthe thing (of the union of substance with accidents)? Or could it be that even the structure of the thing as thus envisaged is a projection of the Framework of the sentence? ‘What could be more obvioas than that man transposes his propositional way of understanding things inlo the structure Of the thing iself? Yet this view, seemingly cial yet actually rash and iltconsidered, would have to explain fst how such a transposition of propasitional stracture into the thing is sup posed to be pomible without the thing having already become visible, The question which comes first and functions as the standard, proposition structure of thing structure remains to this hou undecided. It even remains doubtful whether in tis form the question i at all decidable. ‘Actually, the sentence structure does not provide the standard forthe pattern of thing-strctue, nor is the later simply aie- rored ie the forme, Both sentence and thing structure derive, in their typial form and their posible matual relationship, from a common and more orginal source. Ta any case this fst interpretation of the thingness of the thing, the thing a8 hearer ofits characteristic tits, despite its curency, i not 38 natural 1s it appears to be, What seems natura tous i probably just tomething familie ia a long tradition that hss forgotten the ‘unfamiliar source from which it aro. And yet this unfamiliar Source once struck man as strange and caused him to think and to wonder. ‘Our fliance on the current interpretation ofthe thing is only seemingly well founded. But in addition this thing-concept (the thing as bearer of is characteristics) holds not enly of the mere ting in its strict sense, but also of any being whatsoever. Hence it cansot be used to set apart thingly beings from non thinly beings. Yet even befor all reflection, attentive dwelling The Origin of the Work of Art 2B within the sphere of things alicady tells us that this thing- concept does ee hit upon the thngly clement of the thing, its independent and self-contained characer. Occasionally we sil tnve the feeling that violence bas ong been doae to the thinly ‘clement of things and that thoughe has pliyed a part in this violence, for which reaon people disavow thought instead of taking pains to make it more thoughtful. But in defining the mature of the thing, what isthe use of a feeling, however cet- tain, if thought alone has the ight to speak here? Pethaps however what we call feeling or mood, here and in similar in- stances, is more rescoable—that i, more intelligently peccep- tivebeeause more open to Being thin all tht reason which, hnaving: meanwhile become ratio, was misinterpreted as being rational. The hankering after the ational, as abortive offspring of the unthought rational, therewith performed a curious st vice. To be sue, the current thing concept always fis each thing, [Nevertheless it doesnot lay hold ofthe thing asi sn ts own being, but makes an assalt upon it Gan such an asault peshaps be avoided—snd how? Only, certainly, by granting the thing, as it were, a fee fldto display its thingly character directly. Everything that might interpose lef between the thing and us in apprehending. and talking bout it mast fst beset aside. Only then do we yield ourselves to the undisguised presence of the thing. But we do not need first to call or arrange for this siaaion in which we lettings ‘encounter us without mediation. The situation alwaye prevails Tn what the senses of sight, beasing, and touch convey, in the sensations of color, sound, roughess, hardness, things more 1 boulily, in the literal meaning of the word. The thing i the sitbeon, that which is perceptible by sensations in the senses helonging to sensbily. Hence the concept later becomes & ‘ommonplace according to which a thing is nothing but the ‘nity of a manifold of what is given in the senses, Whether this unity is conceived as sum of as totality of a form alters nothing in the standard character of this thing-concept,6 POETRY, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT Now this interpretation of the things of the ting is as correct and demonstabe in every ase asthe previo one. This lead stces to cst doubt on i truth, If we consider more over what we ae sitching fe, the thingy charcer of the thing, then this thingconept agin leaves ws at lose. We never really fst perecive a throng of senstios, eg, 06 and noses, inthe appearance of things—as this thing concept Alleges; eather we her the storm whisting in the chimney, we fear the three motored plane, we heat the Mercedes ia imine diate distinction from the Volkswagen. Much close t us than All sensations ar the things themselves. We heat the doce shat inthe house and never hear acoustical snstins or even mete sounds. In onde to hese a bare sound we have to lien ay from things, divert out ext from them, i listen abu. Tn the thing-concep jst mentioned there is wot s0 much an assault upon the ting as rater an inordinate attempt to bring it into the preset posible proximity to ws. Buta thing never reaches that positon a lng 28 we asin a thingy feature what perctved by the sens, Wheres the fs interpretation eps the thing a ems length fom us, av were, aad sets too fat of, the second makes it pres too hurd upon us a both Jntrpcatins the thing vanishes. Ie Herefre neesty to avid the exiggentions of both, The thing itslf must be Allowed to remain in ts sel cetainment. Ie mast be ace ints own constancy. This the thin interpretation scems to do, whichis just as old as the sexo ‘That which gives things thir constancy and pith but is sio atthe same time the source of thei particular mode of season prosure—oolored) rooant, hard, masse the mater im thingy In this analysis of the thing at mater (bul form (worphe) is aeeady coposited. What is constant in 4 thing, 10 coositeny, es ia the fat that mater stands logether with 4 form. The thing & formed matter, Ths iter preation appeals to the immediate view with which the ting ‘ols ws y i looks (cides) fn this sates of mater and The Origin of the Work of Art 2 form a thing-concepe Ins finally been found which applies ‘equally to things of nature and to use-objas. "This concept puts us in a position to answer the question concerning the thingly element in the work of art. The thingly clement i manifestly the mater of which it consists. Mater is the substrate and field for the ants’: formative action. But we could have advanced this obvious and wellknown definition of the thingly clement at the very outset. Why do we make a deour through other cutent thing-concepts? Because we alo mistrust this concept of the thing, which represent tas Formed ‘Buti not precisely this pur of concepts, matter form, usually ‘employed ia the damsin ia which we are supposed to be mov- ing? To be sute. The distinction of mater and form is che conceptual schema which is wsed, in the greatest variety of sways, quite generally for all art theory and aeubetce. This incontestable fac, however, proves nether that the distinction ‘of matter and form is adequately founded, nor that it belongs ‘originally tothe domain of art and the artwork. Moreover, the range of application of this pair of concepts has long extended far beyond the feld of aesthetis. Form and content are the ‘most hackneyed concepts under which anything and everything ray be subsumed. And if form is correlated with the rational and matter with the ination; if the rational is taken to be the logical and the itrational the alogical; if in addition the sub jec-object relation is coupled with the conceptual paic form ater; then representation has at its command a conceptual machinery tha nothing is capable of withstanding. If, however, i is thus with the distinction Between miter and form, how then shall we make use of i to lay hold of the Pcticular domain of mere things by contrast with all other ais? But perhaps this characterization in tems of matter and form would recover its defining power if oaly we reversed the proces of expanding and emptying these concep. Certainly, but this presupposes that we know in what sphere of beingsa POFTRY, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT they realize thee rue defining power. That tis isthe demain ‘of mere things isso far oaly an assumption. Reference t0 the copious use made of this conceptual framework in aesthetics right sooner lend tothe idea that matter and form ae specifica tions stemming from the nature of the art work and were in the fist place transfered from it ack tothe ting. Whee does the maiter-form structure have is origio—in the thinly chit- acter of the thing or in the workly character of the art work? ‘The self-contained block of granite is something material in 4 definite if unshapely form. Form means here the distribution and arrangement ofthe material pat in spatial locations, result ing in s particular shape, eamely that ofa block. Buta jug, an 1, «shoe ae also matter occurring i a form. Form as shape it not the consequence hereof a prior distribution of the mater. ‘The form, on the contrary, determines the arangement of the matter. Even more, it prescribes in each cae the kind and selection of the matter—impermeable for a jug, suiienly hard for an ax, fim yet flexible for shoes. The interfasion of form and matter peevaiing here i, moreover, controlled before- Ihand by the purposes served by jug, ax, shoes. Such usefulness is never assigned of added on afterward to being ofthe type ‘of a jg, ax, oF pur of shoes. But neither i something that floats somewhere abore it san end. ‘Usefulaess i the hase feature from which this entity regscde ‘uy, tha is, fathes at ut and ehereby i present and thus i this ‘entity. Both the formative act and the choice of material—a choice given with the act—and therewith the dominance of the conjunction of matter and form, are all grounded io such usefulness A being that falls under usefulness is always the product of a process of making. It is made as «piece of equip ‘ment for something, As determination of beings, accordingly, mater and form have theie proper place in the exetil nature ‘of equipment, This name designates what is produced expresly for employment and use. Matter and form ate in no case ‘original determinations of the thingness of the mere thing, The Origin of the Work of Art 2» A piece of equipment, pai of shoes for instance, when finished, is also selcontsined like the mere thing, but it does fot lave the chuacter of having taken shape by ite like the granite boulder. On the other hand, equipment splays an inity with the at work insofar as iis something produced by the human hand. However, by i self-suficien presence the work of artis similar eather to the mere thing which bs taken shape by itself and is selfcontained. Nevertheless we do not count such works among mere things. AS a rue it the use- objects around ws that are the nearest and authentic things. Thus the piece of equipment is hal thing, because characterized by Uhingliness, and yeti is something more a che same time itis half art work and yet something less, because lacking the self suffiiency of the art work. Equipment has a pecalise poston imermediate between thing and work, assuming that such a Calealated ordering of them i permissible. ‘The maiterform structure, however, by which the being of 4 pice of equipment is frst determined, readily presents itelf as the immediately ineligible constitution of every entity, because here man himself as maker participates ia the way in which the piece of equipment comes into being. Because equip: ‘ment takes an termediate place between mere thing and work, the suggestion is that nonequipmental beings—things and works and ultimately everything that is—are to be comprehended with the help ofthe being of equipment (the matter form structure) ‘The indination to twcat the matter-form structure as the ‘cositution of every entity reeves a yet additional impulse from the fat that on the basis ofa religious faith, namely, the biblical faith, the totality of all beings is represented in advance 25 something ceated, which here means made. The philosophy ofthis faith can of course assure us that all of God's ctetive otk is to be thought of as diferent from the action ofa crt ‘man. Nevertheless, if atthe sime time or even before, in accordance with presumed predetermination of “Thomistic Philosophy for inerpeting the Bible, the ens credtnm is con30 PorTRy, LANGUAGE, THOWONT ceived as a unity of materia and forms, thn faith is expounded by way of 2 philosophy whose truth lies in an unconcealedness ‘of beings which difere in kind ftom the word believed in by faeh, The idea of creation, grounded in Faith, can love its guiding power of knowledge of beings as a whole. But the theological interpetation of all beings, the view of the world in ters of ‘matter and foem borrowed from an alien philosophy, having ‘once been instituted, can still remain a force. This happens 10 the transition from the Middle Ages to moder times. The metaphysicr of the modeen period rests on the formatter structure devised in the medieval period, wiich itself merely reals in is words the buted natures of tidor and bale. Thus the interpretation of “thing” by means of matter and form, ‘whether i remains medieval or becomes Kantian-transcendental, has become current and self-evidest. But for that resco, no lest than the other interpretations mentioned of the thingness of the thing iti» an encroichment upon the thing-bcing of the thing. “The situation stands reveled as soon as we speak of things in the strict sense as mere things. The "mere," afterall, means the removal of the character of usefulness and of being made, ‘The mere thing i 2 sor of equipment, albeit equipment de- nuded ofits equipmental being. Thing being consists in what is then left over, But this remnant isnot actually defined in its ontological character. Ie remains doubtful whether the thiagly character comes to view at all in the proces of stripping of everything equipmental. Thus the third mode of interpretation of the thing, that which follows the lead of the matter-form structute, also tums out to be an assault upea the thing. These three modes of defining thingness conceive of the thing as a bearce of traits, asthe unity of « manifold of scnst- tions, as formed matter, In the course of the history of truth about beings, the interpretations mentioned have also entered ito combinations, x matter we may now pass over. In such The Origin of the Work of Art a combination they have Further strengthened thei innate tendency to expand so as to apply in similar way to thing, to equipment, and to work. Thos they give rise toa mode of thought by which tre think not only about thing, equipement, and werk but about {il beings in general, This long fuilise mode of thought pre ‘conceives all immediate experience of beings. The preconception sluckles reflection on the being of any given entity. Thus it comes about that prevailing thingconcepts obstruct the way toward the thingly character of the thing as well as toward the cquipmental character of equipment, and all the more toward the workly characte of the work. This fac isthe reason why it is necessary to know about these thing-eoncepts, in order thereby to take heed of their derivation and their boundless presumption, but also of theit semblance of self-evidence. This knowledge becomes all the more necesary when we risk the attempe to bring t view and ‘express in words the thingly character ofthe thing, the equip meatal daactr of equipment, ad the wotkly character ofthe ‘work. To this end, however, only one clement is needful: (9 keep at distance all the precaceptions and assaults of the sbove modes of thought, to leave the thing to rest in is own self, for instance, in its thing-being. What seems easier than £9 let a being be jast the being that itis? Or does tis turn out ‘o be the most dificult of asks, particulaly if such an intention —to let a being be as it is—represents the opposite of the ia- Aifeence that simply turns its back upon the Being itself in favor of an unexamined concept of being? We ought to turn ‘oward the being, think about i in regard to its being, but by ‘ans of this thinking atthe same time let it rest upon itself inits very own being. This exertion of thought seems to mect with is greatest resistance in defining the thingnes of the thing; for where ele ould the cause ie ofthe failure of the efforts mentioned? The Lunpectentions thing evades thought most stubbornly. Or can it be thet this selfrefusl of the mere thing, this self-contained2 POETRY, LANGUAGE, THOUOHT independence, belongs precisely to the nature of the thiag? Mast ot this strange and uncommunicatve entre ofthe nature ofthe thing become intimately familiar to thought that tis to think the thing? If s, then we should not force our way 0 it thingly character ‘That the thingness of the thing is paricalaly dificult to express and only seldom expressible i inflibly docimented by the history ofits interpretation indicated above. This history ‘coincides with the destiny in accordance with which Western thought has hitherto thought the Being of beings. However, nt ‘only do we now esublish this point; a the sme time we dis: ‘over 2 clue in this history. Ist an acident tat inthe interpre tation of the thing the view that takes matter and form as ‘ide attains to special dominance? This definition ofthe thing derives fom an interpretation of the equipmental being of equipment. And equipment, having come into being through Ihumae making, is particulary familiar to human thinking. At the same time, this familiar being has a peculae intermediate poston between thing and work, We shal follow this clue and Search Bist forthe equipmenal character of equipment. Perhaps this will suggest something to us about the thingly character of the thing and the worky chitatr of the work. We must only avoid making thing and work prematurely into subspecies of equipment. We are disregarding the possibility, however, that differences relating to the history of Being may yet ako be present inthe way equipment. ‘But what path leads othe equipmental quality of equipment? How shal we discover what piece of equipment traly is? The procedure necesary at present mast plainly avoid any attempts that again immediately entail the encroachments of the usual interpretations. We are most easily insured agsinst thi if we simply describe some equipment without any. philosophical theory ‘We choose as example a commen sort of equipment—a pair of peasant shoes, We do not even need to exhibit actual pieces ‘The Origin ofthe Work of Art 3 of thi sort of useful article in order to describe them. Everyone is acqualated with them. But since ic i a matter hereof diect description, it may be well to facilitate the visual realization of them. For this purpose 2 pictorial representation suices. We shall choose a wellknown paioting by Van Gogh, who painted such shoes several times. But what is thereto sce here? Every- ‘one knows what shoes consist of. If they ae not wooden or bast shoes, there willbe leather soles and uppers, joined together by thread and nails. Such gear serves to clehe the feet. Depending ‘onthe use to which the shoes are to be put, whether foe work in the Geld or for dancing, matter and form will df, Such statements, no doubt correc, only expliate what we already know. The equipmental qualiy of equipment consist in its usefulness. But what about this wefuloss isl? Ta conceive ing it, do we already conceive along with it the equipmental character of equipment? In order to succeed in doing this, must ‘we not look out for useful equipment in its use? The peasant ‘woman wears her shoes in the field. Only here ae they what they are, They areal the more genuinely, the les the peasant woman thinks about the shoes while she i at work, ot Ioks at them a ll, i even aware of them, She stands and walks ia them. That i how shoes actully serve. It is inthis proces of the wse of equipment that we mast actually encounter the charae- ter of equipment AS long a5 we only imagine « put of shoes in general, ot simply lool at the empty, unased shoe as they merely stand there ia the picture, we shall never discover what the equip mental being of the equipment in truth is. From Van Gogh's painting we cannot even tell where these shoes stand. There is hothing surrounding this pair of peasant shoes in 6c towhich they might Belong—only an_undefined space. There ate not even clods of soil fom the field ot the fcd-path sicking to "em, which would at least hint at theie use. A pair of peasant shoes and nothing more, And yet— rom the dark openiag of the worn insides of the shoes theee poem, anes, moa Tee tileme endo the wots stars fot Tat sy rgged Nearness of the shoes thee the accumu tency of ak dow tage gh the fapending and ever worn fares PE ref the fild swept by a raw wind. On the leather le the damp- 5-9" nes and sich of the sl, Under the sles sides the lnc ee ‘es of the Bel-pth a evening falls. To the shes bates he Silat cal ofthe cats quit git ofthe ripening grain and is unexplained slfrfusl in the fallow desolation of the Winry fel. This equipment pernded by uocomplining any a5 to the cerainty of bread, the wordless joy of having nce more withstood want, the emBling before tn impending ehildbed snc kvering a the mrounding menace of deh The equipment belongs tothe er and its potted in the wold ofthe peasant noe. From out of this posed belonging the equipment elf ces to is resting within acl. Ut pethaps iis ony in the pte that we notice all his about the shoes The pestat sna, onthe tet han, siply ‘ear them. If only this simple wesing were so simple. Whee she aes off her oes ate tn the evening in deep bat hel fatigue, and riches out for them agin inthe sll dim dawn, x pss them by onthe dy of rex, she Knows all this without ating or tefiting. The equpmenal qaliy of the eq tent consists inde int fue. Bat tis wsefuloes lh tats inthe sundance ofan eset beng ofthe equipment. We al it ell. By virtue of this relablity the pease woman i made py tothe silent cll ofthe earth: by vie Of the elt’ of the equipment she is sue of her worl | ‘World and cath ext for er, ad for thse whe are vith he in her mode of being, only thus—in the equipment. We sy! “aly” and therewith fll nto err, forth relay of the equipment Gt gives tothe simple world is sexuiy. an) sou to the earth the freon of ts sendy thst eo “Te cqulpmentlbxng of equlpment, reliability, bees gt ce within elt all things aconting to thie manner and ect. The wefunes of equipment i nevertheless ely the The Origin ofthe Work of Art 3% coven connoqunce of rib. The fonmer vibe a the tite and would be nothing witout kA singe pee of equip ‘meni wom out and sel up bt atthe same time the se elf a fant ue, wats away and becomes wal Tus auipmently wastes avy, sinks info mere tu In such ws ing rally vanhen ‘This dwaling. howe im ach twechings owe ts burngy obtrusive tsualaess, 5 only oe ‘oe tstinony 10 the orginal nature of equpmetal being ‘The worment ula ofthe equipment then obtude a 2s the ole mode of being. apply perl t i excel. Only Hanke aeuinew pow remains vile, Te eval Be Impesion tat the rg of eqlpment sin ne fb ing thar impreaes form upon sete tate, Neverthe in ' genwioely equipment bing. saipsnt stems fom a ote lau smc Mater and frm aod te ition have & ‘deeper origin, The repose & equipment rating within self consis in its realy: Only in hi clabilty do we discern what equpnent in th Bat we tll know nothing of whit we fst sought the thing's thinly character, And we now nehing a all of ‘what we really and solely sec: the worky chance of the ‘onk inthe cme of he wou ofa. (Or fave we sendy lared sorting uniting, in pss ings to peak both working of the wok The equpmental quality of equpnen was dicoverd, Bat how? Not by a desiption and explanation ofa pai of shee actually press not By vert aout the proc of making ‘ows: and ako ot by the eburatin ofthe cual we of shoes exci here and hte ut only by bringing ourselves before Van Gogh's painting. This puting spoke. othe ay of the wotk wel were suddenly somewhere ee than we usually tend tobe “Theat work err tnow-vhntstmermei-rath, It would be the worst slfeeption fo think tat out description as subjective action, had Bist depicted eveything thu and then36 POETRY, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT The Origin of the Work of Art 7 projeted it into the puicting. IF anything i questionble her, has long been taken to be the escnce of truth. But den, ii tis rather that we experienced to litle inthe neighborhood ‘our pinion that tis painting by Van Gogh depicts pai of ‘ofthe work and that we expremed the experience too crely ‘ctually exiting pest ies dis « work of wt been | aun too literally. But above al, dhe work dao, as i might dees 30 succesfully? Is our opinion thatthe panting deaws Wee seem at fin, serve merely fora better visualizing of what a «ike fom something atl anl transpossito a product ec of equipment i. Rather, the equipmentaly of equipment peppers ierters bern fg genie ais at pena toh be nt a ier le opodiar 0 uae pene nly in the wos Jar etity that happens toe pest at any given time; ion Wat es hae? Wh i wok in he wo? Man 1 ea ce gt ea eee Gogh's painting is the disclosure of what the equipment, th then where and how is tis general essence, so that art works a ‘pair of peasant shoes, is in truth. This entity emerges into the ble to aghed-witt BWV ET what mature of wat hic sale soconcalednes ofits being, The Gress led the wnconcea eck temple agree? Who could maintain the impose view (Sioa ibis alathats We my fees anette ithe cough thatthe Idea of Temple is represented in the building? And yet, in sing this woed. IF there occurs in the work a dsclorure of 4 particular being, disclosing what and how iti, then there is Ihere an occurting, a happening of tut at work Tn the work of art the «uth of an entiy has set ise to work. "To set" means here: to bring toa sand. Some patiulat cenity, a pu of peasant shoes, comes in the work to standin the light of is being. The being of the being comes into the steadiness of its shining. ‘The nature of art would then be this: the truth of beings setting itself to work But until now art presumably has had to do withthe beautiful and beauty, and not with truth, The ats truth is et to woek in sucha work, if its a work. Or et us thine of Halderlia’s ym, "The Rhine." What i prgiven to the poe, snd how ist given, so tat it can then be regiven inthe poem? | ‘And if inthe case ofthis hymn and similar poems te idea of 2 ‘copy teation between something already actual and the art wore clealy fils, the view thatthe wot ia copy i confirmed in the best posible way by a work of the kind presented in C. Fe Meg's pcm “Roman Fount,” Roman Fountain that produce such works ate called the beautiful of fine at, fr “The et ascends and falling lls contest with the applied or industrial arts that manfactore ‘The matbe basa circling round; ‘equipment. Io fine atthe art itself isnot beni, bt called This, veiling itself over, spills 0 because it produces the beatiful. Truth, in contrast, belongs Into 2 secoad basi's ground. to logic. Beauty, however, s reserved for aesthetics. ‘The second in such plenty ives, But pechaps the proposition that artis truth setting ite to Its bubbling lood a third invests, . ‘work intends to revive the fortunately obsolete view that art ‘And each at once receives and gives {san imitation and depiction of reality? The reproduction of ‘And streams and rts. what exists requires, to be sure, agreement with the actual being, adaptation to it; the Middle Ages called it adaeguatio This is neither a poetic psintng of «fountain actully present Asistotle already spoke of bomoio:. Agreement with whit ir ‘nor a repeodvcton ofthe general esence of a Roman fountain.38 POETRY, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT Yet truth is put ino the work (What truth is happening in the ‘work? Can truth happen at all ad thus be historical? Yet tuth, people say, is something timeless and supertempotl ‘We seck the reality f the art work in ordet to find there the art prevailing within it. The thingy substrucute is what proved tobe the mos immediate reality inthe work. But to comprehend this thinly fcarure the traditional thing concepts are not ade- quate; for they themselves fai to grasp the nature ofthe thing. The currently predominant thing-oncept, thing 2s formed matter, is not even derived from the nature of the thing but from the nature of equipment. It slko turned out that equip mental being generally bas log since occupied a peculiar pre eminence inthe interpretation of beings. This preeminence of ‘equipmentaliy, which however id not actually came to mind, suggested that we pore the question of equipment anew while avoiding the current interpretations, ‘We allowed 2 work to tell us what equipment i. By this means, almost Gandesinely, it came to light what is at work in the work: the disclosure of the particular being in its being, the happening of truth. If, however, the reality of the work cn be defined solely by means of what is at workin the work, then ‘what about cur intention to seck out the real art work ia its realy? As long as we supposed that the reality ofthe work lay primarily in its thingly substructure we were going astray. We ae ow confronted bya remarkable result of or cnsidertions iF ie sil deserves to be called a result at all. Two points become cles Flint: the dominant thing-concepts are inadequate as meus ‘of grasping the thinly aspect of the work, Second: what we ted to treat asthe most immediate reality of the work, its thinly substructre, does not belong to the work in that way a al, ‘As soon as we loo for such a thingly substructure in the work we have unwittingly tken the work as equipment, to which we then alo ascribe 2 superstructure supposed to con- tain its artistic quality. But the work is not a piece of equipment The Origin of the Work of Ant 2 that is fled out ia addition with an. scsthetic value that ad hneres to it. The work is n0 more anything ofthe kind than the bute thing isa piece of equipment that merely lacks the specific cquipmental characteristics of usefulness and being made. ‘Our formulation ofthe question ofthe work has been shaken because we asked, not about the work but half about «thing snd half about equipment. Stil, this formalation ofthe question was not fist developed by us. It isthe formulation native to austhetc. The way in which aesthetics views the art work from the outset is dominated by the traditional interpretation ofall beings. But the shaking of this accustomed formulation isnot the essential point. What matters i a fist opening of our ‘sion to the fact that what is workly in the work equipmental in equipment, and thinly in the thing comes close to us ony ‘wen We Unis the Being of beings. To this end itis necessary beforehand that the baiviess of our preconceptions fall away and thatthe current pseudo concepts be st aside. That is why we had to take this detour, Bat it brings us dreatly to a road that may lead to a determination of the thingly feature in the work. The thinly festte inthe work should nat be denied; but if it belongs admittedly to the work-being of the work, it must be conceived by way of the work's workly nature. I this is so, then the road toward the determination of the thingly rely of he work leds not fom thing Yo work bot from work tothing, ‘The art work opens up in its own way the Being of beings ‘This opening up, ic, thie deconceing, ie, the truth of be ings, happens ia the work. Inthe art work, the truth of what i thas set ielf to work. Aris truth setting itself to work, What fs truth iself, the it sometimes comes to pass as at? What is his setting tie to-work? The Work and Truth The origin of the art work is art. But what i at? Arti real in the at work. Hence we fst seck the reality of the work. In What does it consist? Art works universily display a thingy40 POETRY, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT character, albeit in » wholly distinct way. The atempt to inter: pret tis thing-character of the work with the aid ofthe usual thing concepts failed—not only because these concepts do at lay hold of the thingy featur, but because, in rising the ques- tion ofits thingly substructure, we force the work into a pre- conceived framework by which we obstruct our own acces £0 the work being of the work, Nothing an be discovered about the thingly aspect of the work so long as the pure self-subsis tence of the work has not distinctly dsplyed itl Yet is the work ever in itself accesible? To gain access to the work, it would be aecessiy to cemove it from all relations to Something other than self, in order t It it stand on its own for itself alone. But the atit's most peculiar intention alecady Ams inthis direction. The work isto be released by him tots ure self-subsistence, Ie is preciely in great art—and only such tut is under consideration here—that the artist remains inconse- ‘quential as compared with the work, almost like a passageway tha dstoys itself inthe ceatve proces forthe wor to emerge Wel, then, the works themselves stind and hang in collec tions and exhibitions. But are they here in themselves as the works they themselves are, orate they not eather here as objects of the art industry? Works are made avaiable for public and private art appreciation, Official agencies assume the care and maintenance of works. Ceanoisieur and critics busy themselves with them. Art dealers supply the market. Arthisorical study rakes the works the objects of science. Yet in allthis busy activity do we encounter the wotk itself? ‘The Aegina seulpeures in the Munich collection, Sopbaces Antigone in the bet tcl edition, ate, as the works they are, tom out of their own native sphere. However high their quality and power of impression, however good their state of preserva tion, however certain theit interpretation, placing them int collection has withdeawn them from thei own world. But even when we make an effort to cancel or void such displacement of wworks—when, for instance, we visit the temple in Pastum atts ‘The Origin of the Work of Art a wa ste or the Bamberg eathedal on its owa squate—the woeld ‘ofthe work that stands there has perished. ‘World-withdrawal and world-deay can never be undone ‘The works are no longer the same as they once were. Ii Uhey themselves, to be sure, that we encounter there, but they them selves are gone by. AS bygone works they stand over against us in the realm of tradition and conservation. Henceforth they remain merely such objects. Theit standing before us is sil indeed 2 consequence of, but no longer the same as, theit foxmer self subsistence. This elf-sabsitence has fed fom them. ‘The whole ar industry, even if caried to the extieme and exercised ia every way for the sake of works themsclves, ex: ‘ends only to the object being of the works, But this does nat constitute thei work-being. Bat does the work sill remain 2 work if it stands outside al relations? Is it not essential for the work to stand in relations? Yes, of course—except that it remains to ask in what relations it stands, ‘Where does a work belong? The work belongs, as work, uniquely. within the relm that is opened up by ise. For the work-being of the work i present io, and only in, such open- ing up. We suid that in the work there was 4 happening of truth at work, The reference to Van Gogh's pictre tied to point to this happening. With regard to i there arose the