Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC
for the following reasons:
FACTS:
Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban,
Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from
1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in St. Paul’s College now
Divine Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese
School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the
late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954,
she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos
Norte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in
1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965,
when Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter
in San Miguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of
Metro Manila during 1978.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent
Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position,
filed a “Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections
alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The
petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which
she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected
Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained
Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency
due to the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible
in running as representative of the First District of Leyte.
HELD:
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in
favor of a conclusion supporting petitoner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the
First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imelda’s domicile of
origin by operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a
bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and
acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these,
domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term
“residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda
married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely
gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to
choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the
country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile
of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in
Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brother’s house, an act, which supports the
domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing
residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence
qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of
Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May
25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the
Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected
Representative of the First District of Leyte.
MERCADO V. MANZANO CASE DIGEST [G.R. NO. 135083. MAY 26, 1999]
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for
Vice-Mayor of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.
Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of
votes. However, his proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition for
disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he was not a citizen of the
Philippines but of the United States.
From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US
citizen.
The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for
said elective position.
However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the
disqualification of the respondent was reversed. Respondent was held to have
renounced his US citizenship when he attained the age of majority and registered
himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August
31, 1998. Thus the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the
philippines.
RULING: The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and
R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is
different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the application of
the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a
national by the said states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a situation in
which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more
states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an individual's
volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to
strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual
citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they
elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of
different states.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear
allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate
their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state
and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship.
That is of no moment.
When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he
renounces his loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares that he
owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is
satisfied and complied with. The determination whether such renunciation is valid or
fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province
and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly
enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should
interfere with its operation and application.
The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed
to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might
have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino
citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he
will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and
allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent
has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American
citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines,
when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his
education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this
country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking
made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring
the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings.
In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court sustained the denial of entry into the country of
petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied
for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents
executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken
against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign
nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship.
The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

GAUDENCIO M. CORDORA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and GUSTAVO S.
TAMBUNTING,
The Facts:
Cordora asserted that Tambunting made false assertions in the following items:
That Annex A [Tambunting’s Certificate of Candidacy for the 2001 elections] and Annex
B [Tambunting’s Certificate of Candidacy for the 2004 elections] state, among others, as
follows, particularly Nos. 6, 9 and 12 thereof:
1. No. 6 – I am a Natural Born/Filipino Citizen
2. No. 9 – No. of years of Residence before May 14, 2001.
36 in the Philippines and 25 in the Constituency where I seek to be elected;
3. No. 12 – I am ELIGIBLE for the office I seek to be elected. 3 (Boldface and
capitalization in the original)
Cordora stated that Tambunting was not eligible to run for local public office because
Tambunting lacked the required citizenship and residency requirements.
To disprove Tambunting’s claim of being a natural-born Filipino citizen, Cordora
presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration which stated that, in two
instances, Tambunting claimed that he is an American: upon arrival in the Philippines
on 16 December 2000 and upon departure from the Philippines on 17 June 2001.
According to Cordora, these travel dates confirmed that Tambunting acquired American
citizenship through naturalization in Honolulu, Hawaii on 2 December 2000.
Tambunting, on the other hand, maintained that he did not make any misrepresentation
in his certificates of candidacy. To refute Cordora’s claim that Tambunting is not a
natural-born Filipino, Tambunting presented a copy of his birth certificate which
showed that he was born of a Filipino mother and an American father. Tambunting
further denied that he was naturalized as an American citizen. The certificate of
citizenship conferred by the US government after Tambunting’s father petitioned him
merely confirmed Tambunting’s citizenship which he acquired at birth. Tambunting’s
possession of an American passport did not mean that Tambunting is not a Filipino
citizen.
Tambunting further stated that he has resided in the Philippines since birth.
Tambunting has imbibed the Filipino culture, has spoken the Filipino language, and has
been educated in Filipino schools. Tambunting maintained that proof of his loyalty and
devotion to the Philippines was shown by his service as councilor of Parañaque.
To refute Cordora’s claim that the number of years of residency stated in Tambunting’s
certificates of candidacy is false because Tambunting lost his residency because of his
naturalization as an American citizen, Tambunting contended that the residency
requirement is not the same as citizenship.
The Ruling of the COMELEC Law Department
The COMELEC Law Department recommended the dismissal of Cordora’s complaint
against Tambunting because Cordora failed to substantiate his charges against
Tambunting. Cordora’s reliance on the certification of the Bureau of Immigration that
Tambunting traveled on an American passport is not sufficient to prove that
Tambunting is an American citizen.
The Ruling of the COMELEC En Banc
The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings and the resolution of the COMELEC Law
Department. The COMELEC En Banc was convinced that Cordora failed to support his
accusation against Tambunting by sufficient and convincing evidence.
Cordora filed a motion for reconsideration which raised the same grounds and the same
arguments in his complaint. In its Resolution promulgated on 20 February 2007, the
COMELEC En Banc dismissed Cordora’s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
The Issue
Whether there is Probable Cause to Hold Tambunting for Trial for Having Committed an
Election Offense
The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit. We affirm the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc.
Tambunting’s Dual Citizenship
We agree with Commissioner Sarmiento’s observation that Tambunting possesses dual
citizenship.
Because of the circumstances of his birth, it was no longer necessary for Tambunting to
undergo the naturalization process to acquire American citizenship. The process
involved in INS Form I-130 only served to confirm the American citizenship which
Tambunting acquired at birth. The certification from the Bureau of Immigration which
Cordora presented contained two trips where Tambunting claimed that he is an
American. However, the same certification showed nine other trips where Tambunting
claimed that he is Filipino. Clearly, Tambunting possessed dual citizenship prior to the
filing of his certificate of candidacy before the 2001 elections. The fact that Tambunting
had dual citizenship did not disqualify him from running for public office. 7
Requirements for dual citizens from birth who desire to run for public office
We deem it necessary to reiterate our previous ruling in Mercado v. Manzano, wherein
we ruled that dual citizenship is not a ground for disqualification from running for any
elective local position.
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when,
as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a
person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states.
Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the
following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which
follow the principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the
laws of their fathers’ country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are
considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have
renounced Philippine citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition.
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.
Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with
respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should
suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine
citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that
their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As
Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the Constitutional
Commission, pointed out: "Dual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we
have no control of the laws on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a
Filipino mother. But whether or not she is considered a citizen of another country is
something completely beyond our control."
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance
to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as
dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws,
such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship.
Dual citizenship is involuntary and arises when, as a result of the concurrent application
of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a
national by the said states. Thus, like any other natural-born Filipino, it is enough for a
person with dual citizenship who seeks public office to file his certificate of candidacy
and swear to the oath of allegiance contained therein. Dual allegiance, on the other
hand, is brought about by the individual’s active participation in the naturalization
process. AASJS states that, under R.A. No. 9225, a Filipino who becomes a naturalized
citizen of another country is allowed to retain his Filipino citizenship by swearing to the
supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines. The act of taking an oath of
allegiance is an implicit renunciation of a naturalized citizen’s foreign citizenship.
In Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual
citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their
allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. 12 Section 5(3) of
R.A. No. 9225 states that naturalized citizens who reacquire Filipino citizenship and
desire to run for elective public office in the Philippines shall "meet the qualifications
for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at
the time of filing the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath" aside from the oath of allegiance prescribed in Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225.
Tambunting’s residency
Residency, for the purpose of election laws, includes the twin elements of the fact of
residing in a fixed place and the intention to return there permanently, 16 and is not
dependent upon citizenship.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Resolutions of the Commission
on Elections En Banc dated 18 August 2006 and 20 February 2007 in EO Case No. 05-17.
SO ORDERED.
Maquiling v. COMELEC ( Sereno, April 16, 2013)
Facts:
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.
However, as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United
States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San
Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10
July 2008.
On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition
was issued in his favor.
On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed
an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship, which states:
On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua),
another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his
certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in
connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections.
Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of
Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-
American."
To further bolster his claim of Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua presented in his
Memorandum a computer-generated travel record dated 03 December 2009 indicating
that Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and departing
the Philippines.
On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order requiring the
respondent to personally file his answer and memorandum within three (3) days from
receipt thereof.
After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default and to
present evidence ex-parte.
Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where
Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the
winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer,
THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION:
Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of
candidacy based on misrepresentation, the COMELEC First Division considered it as one
for disqualification. The First Division disagreed with Arnado’s claim that he is a Filipino
citizen.
The Court ruled that Arnado’s act of consistently using his US passport after renouncing
his US citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of
Kauswagan, and who garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010
elections, intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for
Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnado’s Amended Motion for
Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First Division correctly disqualified
Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code is not
applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of Arnado’s
candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate
candidate who obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as
the winner.
RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC:
ruled in favor of arnado
Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado
qualified to run for public office despite his continued use of a US passport, There are
three questions posed by the parties before this Court which will be addressed seriatim
as the subsequent questions hinge on the result of the first. Issues: 1. whether or not
intervention is allowed in a disqualification case. 2. whether or not the use of a foreign
passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier
made. 3. whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government Code is
applicable to this case.
SC:
1. Intervention of a rival candidate in a disqualification case is proper when there has
not yet been any proclamation of the winner.
2. The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and
voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest
Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation
required to qualify one to run for an elective position.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November
2009, the date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run
counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign
passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American,
Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired
through a positive act of applying for naturalization. This is distinct from those
considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take the oath
of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy already carries with it
an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship.
Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only the
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce
foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for public office.
By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a
dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He
was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Code, he was not qualified to run for a local electiv . 3. The rule on
Succession under LGC is not applicable.
Maquiling is not a second-placer as he obtained the highest number of votes from
among the qualified candidates.
 Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v. Paredes which is the
jurisprudential spring of the principle that a second-placer cannot be proclaimed as the
winner in an election contest. This doctrine must be re-examined and its soundness
once again put to the test to address the ever-recurring issue that a second-placer who
loses to an ineligible candidate cannot be proclaimed as the winner in the elections.
The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the wreath of victory cannot be
transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question
is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."
This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum. The Court was
comparing "the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because
of fraud or irregularities in the elections x x x with that produced by declaring a person
ineligible to hold such an office."
A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that since the Court of
First Instance is without jurisdiction to try a disqualification case based on the
eligibility of the person who obtained the highest number of votes in the election, its
jurisdiction being confined "to determine which of the contestants has been duly
elected" the judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he "declared that no one had been
legally elected president of the municipality of Imus at the general election held in that
town on 4 June 1912" where "the only question raised was whether or not Topacio was
eligible to be elected and to hold the office of municipal president."
The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that Abad as the second placer
cannot be proclaimed in his stead. An ineligible candidate who receives the highest
number of votes is a wrongful winner. By express legal mandate, he could not even have
been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the lack of material time or any other
intervening circumstances, his ineligibility might not have been passed upon prior to
election date. Consequently, he may have had the opportunity to hold himself out to the
electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified candidate. However, notwithstanding the
outcome of the elections, his ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged. Ineligibility
does not only pertain to his qualifications as a candidate but necessarily affects his right
to hold public office. The number of ballots cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of
failure to qualify with the substantive legal requirements of eligibility to run for public
office.
The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was
qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of
citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his
total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any
other state.
It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the ballot by
ensuring that its exercise respects the rule of law. To allow the sovereign voice spoken
through the ballot to trump constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications
and disqualifications of candidates is not democracy or republicanism. It is electoral
anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and only the electorate’s voice spoken through
the ballot is made to matter in the end, it precisely serves as an open invitation for
electoral anarchy to set in.
With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he
obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates.
We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC and Jalosjos v. COMELEC that a
void COC cannot produce any legal effect.
Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in
determining the winner of an election.
Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the
electorate is still respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible
candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The
votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must
also be respected.
There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC that when the voters are
well aware within the realm of notoriety of a candidate’s disqualification and still cast
their votes in favor said candidate, then the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher
number of votes may be deemed elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that further
complicated the rules affecting qualified candidates who placed second to ineligible
ones.
 The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is not a prerequisite for
the disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying
circumstance makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a
candidate’s disqualification is not necessary before a qualified candidate who placed
second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in the
vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified candidates.
That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is
of no moment. The subsequent disqualification based on a substantive ground that
existed prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC but also
the proclamation.
The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s candidacy involves his
citizenship. It does not involve the commission of election offenses as provided for in
the first sentence of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to
disqualify the individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he has already been
elected, from holding the office.
The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. With Arnado being
barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered
void from the beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect except that
Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the elections
because he filed his answer to the petition when the elections were conducted already
and he was already proclaimed the winner.
Arnado's disqualification, although made long after the elections, reaches back to the
filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at all in the
May 201 0 elections.
Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted.
This leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of
votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local Government Code will not
apply.
LONZANIDA VS COMELEC, G.R. NO. 135150 CASE BRIEF SUMMARY
JULY 28, 1999
Facts:
Petitioner Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms as
municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 1995 elections. In the May
1995 elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was again
proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged the duties thereof. His
proclamation was contested and resulted to declaring his opponent winning the
election and ordered Lonzanida to vacate the office. In the May 11, 1998 elections
Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy. His opponent filed a petition for
disqualification on the grounds that it is a violation of the three-term rule. COMELEC
granted the petition. Petitioner filed a petition challenging the validity of the COMELEC
resolution.
Issue:
Whether petitioner’s assumption of office from May 1995 to March 1, 1998 is
considered full term of office for the purpose of three-term rule
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that it cannot be considered a full term of office for
two reasons, he cannot be considered elected as the proclamation was void and he also
did not voluntary renounce office, but was involuntary severance from office.
The petition is granted and the resolution of the COMELEC declaring petitioner
Lonzanida disqualified to run for mayor in the 1998 mayoral elections are hereby set
aside.
VILLABER vs. COMELEC
369 SCRA 126
Facts:
Both petitioner Villaber and respondent Douglas R. Cagas were rival candidates
for a congressional seat in the First District of Davao del Sur during the May 14, 2001
elections.
Cagas filed with the COMELEC, a consolidated petition to disqualify Villaber and
to cancel the latter’s certificate of candidacy, alleging that Villaber was convicted for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. Cagas further alleged that this crime involves moral
turpitude; hence, under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, he is disqualified to
run for any public office.
COMELEC issued the resolution declaring Villaber disqualified as a candidate.
The latter filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude, which would
disqualify Villaber as a candidate for and from holding any public office.
Held:
COMELEC believed it is, applying Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code that
any person who has been sentenced by final judgment for any offense for which he has
been sentenced for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a
candidate and to hold any office.
Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties
which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and
customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
In the case at bar, petitioner does not assail the facts and circumstances
surrounding the commission of the crime. In effect, he admits all the elements of the
crime for which he was convicted. There was no grave abuse of discretion committed by
respondent COMELEC in issuing the assailed Resolutions.
RODOLFO FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
[G.R. No. 147387. December 10, 2003]
NATURE OF THE CASE:
Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to declare as
unconstitutional Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as
it expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code)
which provides:
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective official, whether national or
local, running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent
capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
FACTS:
The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of
Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is
unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution,
requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title.
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of
the Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider.
They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on
the one hand, and Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No.
9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election
propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices, while Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office
other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso
facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section
67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the
subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.
The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the
equal protection clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the
Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar
limitation to appointive officials, thus:
SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. – Any person holding a
public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of
his certificate of candidacy.
 They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against
appointive officials. By the repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office
other than the one which he is holding is no longer considered ipso facto resigned
therefrom upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials continue in public
office even as they campaign for reelection or election for another elective position. On
the other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials
remains - they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing
of their certificates of candidacy.
The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as
irregularities attended its enactment into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof,
should be declared null and void. Even Section 16 of the law which provides that “[t]his
Act shall take effect upon its approval” is a violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before it
becomes effective.
Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is
a good law; hence, should not have been repealed. The petitioners cited the ruling of the
Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,[13] that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is
based on the constitutional mandate on the “Accountability of Public Officers:”
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of
Representatives acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction for not considering those members of the House who ran for a seat in the
Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections as ipso facto resigned therefrom, upon the
filing of their respective certificates of candidacy.
ISSUES:
W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is a Rider.
W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Violative of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Constitution.
W/N Section 16 of the law which provides that “[t]his Act shall take effect upon
its approval” is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as
jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before it becomes effective.
HELD:
To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional
requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down
the rule that –
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes
should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation.
The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a
reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive
enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without
expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the
accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an
abstract or index of the Act.
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: “An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly,
Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices.”
The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are
comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code
within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be
expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content.
The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which
imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they
are holding, to the other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of
the ban on the use of media for election propaganda, does not violate the “one subject-
one title” rule. This Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated
in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be,
so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be
considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of
carrying out the general subject.
The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of
harassment or discrimination that had to be done away with and repealed. The
executive department found cause with Congress when the President of the Philippines
signed the measure into law. For sure, some sectors of society and in government may
believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as it would encourage political
adventurism. But policy matters are not the concern of the Court. Government policy is
within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government. It is not for
this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed,
whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory,
whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the
legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular
manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of
opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance. Congress
is not precluded from repealing Section 67 by the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v.
Mitra upholding the validity of the provision and by its pronouncement in the same case
that the provision has a laudable purpose. Over time, Congress may find it imperative to
repeal the law on its belief that the election process is thereby enhanced and the
paramount objective of election laws – the fair, honest and orderly election of truly
deserving members of Congress – is achieved.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive
officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They
are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon
stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of
their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold
their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others
serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Finally, the “Effectivity” clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides
that it “shall take effect immediately upon its approval,” is defective. However, the same
does not render the entire law invalid. In Tañada v. Tuvera, this Court laid down the
rule:
... the clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to
the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause
does not mean that the legislator may make the law effective immediately upon
approval, or on any other date without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its
discretion provide that the usual fifteen-period shall be shortened or extended….
Following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the doctrine enunciated in Tañada, Rep.
Act No. 9006, notwithstanding its express statement, took effect fifteen days after its
publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation.
In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in
constitutional law is that the courts do not involve themselves with nor delve into the
policy or wisdom of a statute. That is the exclusive concern of the legislative branch of
the government. When the validity of a statute is challenged on constitutional grounds,
the sole function of the court is to determine whether it transcends constitutional
limitations or the limits of legislative power. No such transgression has been shown in
this case.
BANTAY VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 177271
May 4, 2007
FACTS:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus to
nullify and set aside certain issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec)
respecting party-list groups which have manifested their intention to participate in the
party-list elections on May 14, 2007.
A number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations and
subsequently were accredited by the Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections.
Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR) filed
with the Comelec an Urgent Petition to Disqualify, seeking to disqualify the nominees of
certain party-list organizations. Docketed in the Comelec as SPA Case No 07-026, this
urgent petition has yet to be resolved.
Meanwhile petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed 2 letters to the Director of
the Comelec’s Law Department requesting a list of that groups’ nominees. Evidently
unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the issuance of Comelec en banc Resolution
07-0724 under date April 3, 2007 virtually declaring the nominees’ names confidential
and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales’ basic disclosure request. Comelec’s reason
for keeping the names of the party list nominees away from the public is deducible from
the excerpts of the news report appearing in the April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila
Bulletin, is that there is nothing in R.A. 7941 that requires the Comelec to disclose the
names of nominees, and that party list elections must not be personality oriented
according to Chairman Abalos.
In the first petition (G.R. No. 177271), BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR assail the Comelec
resolutions accrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the
forthcoming party-list elections without simultaneously determining whether or not
their respective nominees possess the requisite qualifications defined in R.A. No. 7941,
or the "Party-List System Act" and belong to the marginalized and underrepresented
sector each seeks to.
In the second petition (G.R. No. 177314), petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales,
Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution
dated April 3, 2007.
While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or
publish the names of the nominees of the various party-list groups named in the
petitions, BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR have the additional prayers that the 33 private
respondents named therein be "declare[d] as unqualified to participate in the party-list
elections and that the Comelec be enjoined from allowing respondent groups from
participating in the elections.
ISSUE:
1. Can the Court cancel the accreditation accorded by the Comelec to the respondent
party-list groups named in their petition on the ground that these groups and their
respective nominees do not appear to be qualified.
2. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the
various party-list groups, has violated the right to information and free access to
documents as guaranteed by the Constitution; and
3. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to the
public the names of said nominees.
HELD:
The 1st petition is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to nullify the accreditation
of the respondents named therein. However, insofar as it seeks to compel the Comelec
to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of party-list groups, sectors or
organizations accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections, the 2 petitions are
GRANTED. Accordingly, the Comelec is hereby ORDERED to immediately disclose and
release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups,
1. The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and
UP-LR for cancellation of accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their petition.
The exercise would require the Court to make a factual determination, a matter which is
outside the office of judicial review by way of special civil action for certiorari. In
certiorari proceedings, the Court is not called upon to decide factual issues and the case
must be decided on the undisputed facts on record. The sole function of a writ of
certiorari is to address issues of want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and
does not include a review of the tribunal’s evaluation of the evidence. (note that
nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement that the qualification of a party-list
nominee be determined simultaneously with the accreditation of an organization. )
2. Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz:
Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well to government research data used as
basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law.
Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest.
COMELEC’s basis of its refusal to disclose the names of the nominees of subject
party-list groups, Section 7 of R.A. 7941,which last sentence reads: "[T]he names of the
party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list" is certainly not a justifying
card for the Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. There is absolutely nothing in
R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through
mediums other than the "Certified List" of the names.
It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to
elect their representatives on the basis of an informed judgment. While the vote cast in a
party-list elections is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its
nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of
Representatives. The Court frowns upon any interpretation of the law or rules that
would hinder in any way the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election
3. COMELEC has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the
nominees of the party-list groups named in the herein petitions. The right to
information is a public right where the real parties in interest are the public, or the
citizens to be precise, but like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to
information and its companion right of access to official records are not absolute. The
people’s right to know is limited to "matters of public concern" and is further subject to
such limitation as may be provided by law. But no national security or like concerns is
involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list groups in
question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the
legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups
subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies.
DE GUZMAN VS COMELEC
G.R. NO. 180048 JUNE 19, 2009
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining orderassails the June 15, 2007 Resolution of the First Division of
COMELEC, disqualifying ROSELLER DE GUZMAN fromrunning as vice-mayor in the May
14, 2007 elections.Petitioner was a naturalized American. However, on January 25,
2006, he applied for dual citizenship under RA9225. Upon approval of his application,
he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines onSeptember 6, 2006.
Having reacquired Philippine citizenship, he is entitled to exercise full civil and political
rights.As such, qualified to run as vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is disqualified from running for vice-mayor of
Guimba, Nueva Ecija inthe May 14, 2007 elections for having failed to renounce his
American Citizenship in accordance withRA 9225.
HELD:
We find that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office in view of
his failure to renounce hisAmerican citizenship. RA 9225 was enacted to allow
reacquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship for:1. Natural born citizens who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization ascitizens of a
foreign country;2. Natural born citizens of the Philippines who after the effectivity of the
law, becomes citizens of aforeign country.The law provides that they are not deemed to
have reacquired or retained their Philippinecitizenship upon taking the oath of
allegiance.Petitioner¶s oath of allegiance and certificate of candidacy did not comply
with section(5)2 of RA 9225 which furtherrequires those seeking elective public office
in the Philippines to make a personal and sworn renunciation of foreigncitizenship.
Petitioner failed to renounce his American citizenship; as such, he is disqualified from
running for vicemayor.
QUINTO V. COMELEC
FACTS
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws,
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of
Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in
Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of
Resolution No. 8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.—a) Any person holding a public
appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of
his certificate of candidacy.
b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned
upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or
position.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the
moment they file their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr.,
who hold appointive positions in the government and who intend to run in the coming
elections, filed the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration
of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void. Petitioners also
contend that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the assailed COMELEC resolution,
contains two conflicting provisions. These must be harmonized or reconciled to give
effect to both and to arrive at a declaration that they are not ipso facto resigned from
their positions upon the filing of their CoCs.
ISSUE:
Whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No.
9369 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal
protection clause
HELD:
Yes.In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned
from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other
civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the
first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold
appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such
differential treatment.
 In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act
may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4)
requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences
between the classes treated differently. As illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v.
Department of Public Works and Highways, a real and substantial distinction exists
between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles sufficient to justify its classification
among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Not all motorized vehicles are created
equal—a two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a four-
wheel vehicle.
Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with
the second requirement—if it is not germane to the purpose of the law.
The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only
for the present but as long as the problem sought to be corrected continues to exist.
And, under the last requirement, the classification would be regarded as invalid if all the
members of the class are not treated similarly, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed.
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the
differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding
elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a
governmental position to promote one’s candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or
coercive influence on the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the
efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that
the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than
the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the
entry of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could result in neglect
or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their
campaign rather than to their office work.
If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed
provision cannot be constitutionally rescued on the ground of valid classification.
Glaringly absent is the requisite that the classification must be germane to the purposes
of the law. Indeed, whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils
sought to be prevented by the measure remain. For example, the Executive Secretary, or
any Member of the Cabinet for that matter, could wield the same influence as the Vice-
President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the recent past,
elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to take charge of national housing, social
welfare development, interior and local government, and foreign affairs). With the fact
that they both head executive offices, there is no valid justification to treat them
differently when both file their CoCs for the elections. Under the present state of our
law, the Vice-President, in the example, running this time, let us say, for President,
retains his position during the entire election period and can still use the resources of
his office to support his campaign.
As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the
functions of his appointive office, the inverse could be just as true and compelling. The
public officer who files his certificate of candidacy would be driven by a greater impetus
for excellent performance to show his fitness for the position aspired for.
There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the
elective ones. The classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane
to the purposes of the law. The measure encapsulated in the second proviso of the third
paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal
protection clause.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second proviso in the
third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are declared as
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Facts: This is a motion for reconsideration filed by the Commission on Elections. The
latter moved to question an earlier decision of the Supreme Court declaring the second
proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the COMELEC
resolution, and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 unconstitutional. The
resolution provides that, “Any person holding a public appointive office or position
including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and
employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.” RA 9369
provides that
 “For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of
candidacy/petition of registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any
person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered
as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of
candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall
take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That
any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of
the armed forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must
vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy.
Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369
and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection
clause and therefore unconstitutional
Held: No. To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal
application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply
requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. The
test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness, which has
four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
Our assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned provisions
satisfy the first, third and fourth requisites of reasonableness. It, however, proffers the
dubious conclusion that the differential treatment of appointive officials vis-à-vis
elected officials is not germane to the purpose of the law, because "whether one holds
an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure
remain."
In the instant case, is there a rational justification for excluding elected officials from the
operation of the deemed resigned provisions? There is.
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the
sovereign power of the people. It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public
office by popular vote. Considering that elected officials are put in office by their
constituents for a definite term, it may justifiably be said that they were excluded from
the ambit of the deemed resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the
sovereign will. In other words, complete deference is accorded to the will of the
electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the term for which they
were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are
concerned.
The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to
the purposes of the law. For the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity,
efficiency, and discipline of the public service; the Legislature, whose wisdom is outside
the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with the competing,
yet equally compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign will.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondent’s and the
intervenors’ Motions for Reconsideration; REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Court’s
December 1, 2009 Decision; DISMISS the Petition; and ISSUE this Resolution declaring
as not UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, (2) the
second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, and (3)
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code.
==============
Note: Not applicable sa barangay office: Any elective or appointive municipal, city,
provincial or national official or employee, or those in the civil or military service,
including those in government-owned or-controlled corporations, shall be considered
automatically resigned upon the filing of certificate of candidacy for a barangay office.
Since barangay elections are governed by a separate deemed resignation rule, under the
present state of law, there would be no occasion to apply the restriction on candidacy
found in Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and later reiterated in the proviso of
Section 13 of RA 9369, to any election other than a partisan one. For this reason, the
overbreadth challenge raised against Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and the
pertinent proviso in Section 13 of RA 9369 must also fail.
SIMON B. ALDOVINO, JR vs COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND WILFREDO F. ASILO,
Respondents. G.R. No. 184836
FACTS :
The respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for
three consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms,
respectively. In September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office, the
Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case
he then faced. This Court, however, subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayans suspension
order; hence, he resumed performing the functions of his office and finished his term. In
the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The
petitioners Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the
petitioners) sought to deny due course to Asilos certificate of candidacy or to cancel it
on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three terms; his candidacy
for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X
of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160.
Is the preventive suspension of an elected public official an interruption of his
term of office for purposes of the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution and Section 43(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160, or the Local
Government Code)? > The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled that
preventive suspension is an effective interruption because it renders the suspended
public official unable to provide complete service for the full term; thus, such term
should not be counted for the purpose of the three-term limit rule. The COMELECs
Second Division ruled against the petitioners and in Asilos favour in its Resolution of
November 28, 2007. It reasoned out that the three-term limit rule did not apply, as Asilo
failed to render complete service for the 2004-2007 term because of the suspension the
Sandiganbayan had ordered.
The present petition seeks to annul and set aside this COMELEC ruling for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
ISSUES: The COMELEC en banc refused to reconsider the Second Divisions ruling in its
October 7, 2008 Resolution; hence, the PRESENT PETITION raising the following:
1. Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of the
three-term limit rule; and
2. Whether preventive suspension is considered involuntary renunciation as
contemplated in Section 43(b) of RA 7160
RULING: Thus presented, the case raises the direct issue of whether Asilos preventive
suspension constituted an interruption that allowed him to run for a 4th term.
THE COURTS RULING
We find the petition meritorious.
a. The Three-term Limit Rule:The Constitutional Provision Analyzed
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution states:
The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.
The word renunciation carries the dictionary meaning of abandonment. To
renounce is to give up, abandon, decline, or resign. The descriptive word voluntary
linked together with renunciation signifies an act of surrender based on the
surenderees own freely exercised will; in other words, a loss of title to office by
conscious choice. In the context of the three-term limit rule, such loss of title is not
considered an interruption because it is presumed to be purposely sought to avoid the
application of the term limitation.
The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to
circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same
time respect the people’s choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is
evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the
renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary
severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law
amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a
few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in
compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that
effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service
and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term. Our intended
meaning under this ruling is clear: it is severance from office, or to be exact, loss of title,
that renders the three-term limit rule inapplicable.
Conclusion Based on Law and Jurisprudence
From all the above, we conclude that the interruption of a term exempting an
elective official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the
involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official must have involuntarily left his
office for a length of time, however short, for an effective interruption to occur. This has
to be the case if the thrust of Section 8, Article X and its strict intent are to be faithfully
served, i.e., to limit an elective officials continuous stay in office to no more than three
consecutive terms, using voluntary renunciation as an example and standard of what
does not constitute an interruption.
Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by operation of law, being
involuntary, is an effective interruption of service within a term, as we held in
Montebon. On the other hand, temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the
functions of an elective post, even if involuntary, should not be considered an effective
interruption of a term because it does not involve the loss of title to office or at least an
effective break from holding office; the office holder, while retaining title, is simply
barred from exercising the functions of his office for a reason provided by law.
An interruption occurs when the term is broken because the office holder lost
the right to hold on to his office, and cannot be equated with the failure to render
service. The latter occurs during an office holders term when he retains title to the office
but cannot exercise his functions for reasons established by law. Of course, the term
failure to serve cannot be used once the right to office is lost; without the right to hold
office or to serve, then no service can be rendered so that none is really lost.
To recap, Asilos 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the Sandiganbayan-
imposed preventive suspension in 2005, as preventive suspension does not interrupt an
elective officials term. Thus, the COMELEC refused to apply the legal command of
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution when it granted due course to Asilos certificate of
candidacy for a prohibited fourth term. By so refusing, the COMELEC effectively
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; its
action was a refusal to perform a positive duty required by no less than the Constitution
and was one undertaken outside the contemplation of law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and accordingly
NULLIFY the assailed COMELEC rulings. The private respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo is
declared DISQUALIFIED to run, and perforce to serve, as Councilor of Lucena City for a
prohibited fourth term. Costs against private respondent Asilo. SO ORDERED.
ROQUE V.COMELEC (2010)
FACTS
On 10 July 2009, the COMELEC and the joint venture of Total Information
Management Corporation (TIM) and Smartmatic International Corporation
(Smartmatic) (Provider), signed the Contract for the automated tallying and recording
of votes cast nationwide in the 10 May 2010 elections. For P7,191,484,739.48, the
COMELEC leased for use in the 10 May 2010 elections 82,200 optical scanners (and
related equipment) and hired ancillary services of the Provider.
On 9 July 2009, petitioners, as taxpayers and citizens, filed this petition to enjoin
the signing of the Contract or its implementation and to compel disclosure of the terms
of the Contract and other agreements between the Provider and its subcontractors.
Petitioners sought the Contract's invalidation for non-compliance with the requirement
in Section 5 of RA 8436 or Election Modernization Act, as amended by RA 9369,
mandating the partial use of an automated election system before deploying it
nationwide. To further support their claim on the Contract's invalidity, petitioners
alleged that (1) there is a “high probability that there will be a failure of elections and
the COMELEC cannot provide 100% communication coverage; (2) the COMELEC
abdicated its constitutional functions in favour of the joint venture (TIM and
Smartmatic); (3) there is no legal framework to guide COMELEC incase PCOS machines
fail; (4) the optical scanners leased by the COMELEC do not satisfy the minimum
systems capabilities under RA 8436, as amended and (5) the Provider not only failed to
submit relevant documents during the bidding but also failed to show "community of
interest" among its constituent corporations (QUISDI).
ISSUE
Whether or not, the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion when it entered to
contract with the joint venture of TIM and Smartmatic and assailing to an automated
election.
RULING
Court finds the project award to have complied with legal prescriptions, and the
terms and conditions of the corresponding automation contract in question to be valid.
No grave abuse of discretion, therefore, can be laid on the doorsteps of respondent
COMELEC. And surely, the winning joint venture should not be faulted for having a
foreign company as partner.
Also, petitioners delves on possibilities, on matters may or may not occur.
Speculations are not equal to proof, it cannot be the basis of sound judgment.
Smartmatic is given a specific and limited technical task to assist the COMELEC in the
AES. The joint venture is merely a service provider to the COMELEC, which shall have
exclusive supervision and control of the electoral process.
The COMELEC is an independent constitutional body with a distinct and pivotal
role in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions as overseer of fair
elections, administrator and lead implementor of laws relative to the conduct of
elections, it should not be stymied with restrictions that would perhaps be justified in
the case of an organization of lesser responsibility. It should be afforded ample elbow
room and enough wherewithal in devising means and initiatives that would enable it to
accomplish the great objective for which it was created--to promote free, orderly,
honest and peaceful elections. This is as it should be for, too often, COMELEC has to
make decisions under difficult conditions to address unforeseen events to preserve the
integrity of the election and in the process the voice of the people. Thus, in the past, the
Court has steered away from interfering with the COMELEC’s exercise of its power
which, by law and by the nature of its office properly pertain to it. Absent, therefore, a
clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on comelec’s part, as here, the Court should
refrain from utilizing the corrective hand of certiorari to review, let alone nullify, the
acts of that body.
ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, and trans-genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list
organization to public respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the latter denied the
said petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic
passages in their decision. It also stated that since their ways are immoral and contrary
to public policy, they are considered nuissance. In fact, their acts are even punishable
under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition
on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the
exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the
establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions
contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and
equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines’
international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a
concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the
petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that
the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941,
and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its
national existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELEC’s field personnel.
ISSUE:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal
grounds.
HELD: MIRIAM DEFENSOR – SANTIAGO versus FIDEL RAMOS (253 SCRA 559)

Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for FACTS:
the proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to
The protestant, Miriam Defensor-Santiago ran for presidency and lost in the May
said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
1992 election. In her Motion on the 16th day of August in the year 1995, reiterated in
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals)
her comment of the 29th of August of the same year, protestant Defensor-Santiago
may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong
prayed that the revision in the remaining precincts of the pilot areas be dispensed with
Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, “the enumeration of marginalized
and the revision process in the pilot areas be deemed computed.
and under-represented sectors is not exclusive”. The crucial element is not whether a
sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with The Court deferred action on the motion and required, instead, the protestant
the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. and protestee to submit their respective memoranda. Hence, this petition.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At
bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in
religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious justification is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We thus find that it was grave violation of ISSUE:
the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to Whether or not the election protest filed by Defensor-Santiago is moot and
justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government action must have a academic by her election as a Senator in the May 1995 election and her assumption of
secular purpose. office as such on the 30th of June in the year 1995.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why
special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to HELD:
justify its position that petitioner’s admission into the party-list system would be so
harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society. YES. The Court held that the election protest filed by Santiago has been abandoned or
considered withdrawn as a consequence of her election and assumption of office as
We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal and Senator and her discharge of the duties and functions thereof.
civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a
nuisance as “any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else The protestant abandoned her “determination to protest and pursue the public interest
which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality,” the remedies for which are a involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate.
prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or
Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it would dissipate
abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal
the aura of uncertainty as to the results of the 1992 presidential elections, thereby
Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal
enhancing the all too crucial political stability of the nation during this period of
conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is
national recovery.
not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution
of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability. Also, the PET issued a resolution ordering the protestant to inform the PET within 10
days if after the completion of the revision of the ballots from her pilot areas, she still
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient wishes to present evidence. Since DS has not informed the Tribunal of any such
governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the intention, such is a manifest indication that she no longer intends to do so.
party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a
tool to further any substantial public interest.
EFREN ARATEA v. COMELEC AND ESTELA ANTIPOLO
FACTS:
Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) were
candidates for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 National and Local
Elections. Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo (Rodolfo) filed a petition under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due course or to cancel
Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that Lonzanida was elected, and had
served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for four (4) consecutive terms immediately
prior to the term for the May 2010 elections.
Rodolfo asserted that Lonzanida made a false material representation in his
certificate of candidacy when Lonzanida certified under oath that he was eligible for the
office he sought election. Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and Section 43(b)
of the Local Government Code both prohibit a local elective official from being elected
and serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same position.
The COMELEC Second Division rendered a Resolutionon 18 February 2010 cancelling
Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy.
Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc remained
pending during the May 2010 elections. Lonzanida and Efren Racel Aratea (Aratea)
garnered the highest number of votes and were respectively proclaimed Mayor and
Vice-Mayor.
Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor before Regional Trial Court (RTC)
Judge of Olongapo. On the same date, Aratea wrote the DILG and requested for an
opinion on whether, as Vice-Mayor, he was legally required to assume the Office of the
Mayor in view of Lonzanida’s disqualification.
DILG stated that Lonzanida was disqualified to hold office by reason of his
criminal conviction, and as a consequence, his office was deemed permanently vacant,
and thus, Aratea should assume the Office of the Mayor in an acting capacity without
prejudice to the COMELEC’s resolution of Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration.
In another letter dated 6 August 2010, Aratea requested the DILG to allow him to take
the oath of office as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. In his response, then Secretary
Jesse M. Robredo allowed Aratea to take an oath of office as "the permanent Municipal
Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales without prejudice however to the outcome of the cases
pending before the COMELEC.
On 11 August 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution disqualifying
Lonzanida from running for Mayor in the May 2010 elections. The COMELEC En Banc’s
resolution was based on two grounds: first, Lonzanida had been elected and had served
as Mayor for more than three consecutive terms without interruption; and second,
Lonzanida had been convicted by final judgment of 10 counts of falsification under the
Revised Penal Code. Lonzanida was sentenced for each count of falsification to
imprisonment of 4 years and 1 day of prisión correccional as minimum, to 8 years and 1
day of prisión mayor as maximum. The judgment of conviction became final on 23
October 2009 in the Decision of this Court in Lonzanida v. People, before Lonzanida filed
his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009.
The manner of filling up the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales is dependent upon the determination of Lonzanida’s removal.
Whether Lonzanida was disqualified under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, or
made a false material representation under Section 78 of the same Code that resulted
in his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio, is determinative of whether
Aratea or Antipolo is the rightful occupant to the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales.
HELD: Antipolo, the alleged "second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor because
Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a
candidate at all. All votes for Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo, the only
qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes for the position of
Mayor.
The grounds for disqualification for a petition under Section 68 1 of the Omnibus
Election Code are specifically enumerated.
A petition for disqualification under Section 68 clearly refers to "the commission of
prohibited acts and possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country." All
the offenses mentioned in Section 68 refer to election offenses under the Omnibus
Election Code, not to violations of other penal laws. There is absolutely nothing in
the language of Section 68 that would justify including violation of the three-term limit
1
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. ‒ Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is
declared by final decision by a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a)
given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public
officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his
candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code;
(d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104;
(e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6,
shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office.
Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to
run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent
resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in
the election laws.
rule, or conviction by final judgment of the crime of falsification under the Revised Penal
Code, as one of the grounds or offenses covered under Section 68.
On the other hand, Section 782 of the Omnibus Election Code states that a certificate of
candidacy may be denied or cancelled when there is false material representation of
the contents of the certificate of candidacy:
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code details the contents of the certificate of
candidacy:
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. ‒ The certificate of candidacy shall
state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated
therein and that he is eligible for said office x x x
The conviction of Lonzanida by final judgment, with the penalty of prisión
mayor, disqualifies him perpetually from holding any public office, or from being
elected to any public office. This perpetual disqualification took effect upon the
finality of the judgment of conviction, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of
candidacy.
The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law, the
accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special
disqualification. Under Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code, temporary absolute
disqualification produces the effect of "deprivation of the right to vote in any election
for any popular elective office or to be elected to such office.” The duration of temporary
absolute disqualification is the same as that of the principal penalty of prisión mayor.
On the other hand, under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code, perpetual special
disqualification means that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public
office during the period of his disqualification,” which is perpetually. Both
temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification constitute
ineligibilities to hold elective public office.
A person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public
office, and commits a false material representation if he states in his certificate of
candidacy that he is eligible to so run.
2
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. ‒ A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the
person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-
five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice
and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
Effect of a Void Certificate of Candidacy
A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy,
and much less to valid votes.
As the Comelec stated in their February 2011 Resolution: Since Lonzanida was never a
candidate for the position of Mayor [of] San Antonio, Zambales, the votes cast for him
should be considered stray votes. Consequently, Intervenor Antipolo, who remains as the
sole qualified candidate for the mayoralty post and obtained the highest number of votes,
should now be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible or not
qualified to run for Mayor.1âwphi1Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled
before or after the elections is immaterial because the cancellation on such ground
means he was never a candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy
being void ab initio. There was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 2010
elections - Antipolo, who therefore received the highest number of votes.
Petition dismissed.
DELA CRUZ vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Issue:
With the adoption of automated election system in our country, one of the emerging
concerns is the application of the law on nuisance candidates under a new voting
system wherein voters indicate their choice of candidates by shading the oval
corresponding to the name of their chosen candidate printed on the ballots, instead of
writing the candidate's name on the appropriate space provided in the ballots as in
previous manual elections. If the name of a nuisance candidate whose certificate of
candidacy had been cancelled by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) was
still included or printed in the official ballots on election day, should the votes
cast for such nuisance candidate be considered stray or counted in favor of the
bona fide candidate?
Facts:
In this petition for certiorari, Casimira S. Dela Cruz assails COMELEC Resolution
No. 8844 considering as stray the votes cast in favor of certain candidates who were
either disqualified or whose COCs had been cancelled/denied due course but whose
names still appeared in the official ballots or certified lists of candidates for the May 10, overspending and soliciting, receiving or making prohibited contributions) of the OEC
2010 elections. or Section 40 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).

During the canvassing of the votes by the Municipal Board of Canvassers In Fermin vs. COMELEC, this Court distinguished a petition for disqualification
(MBOC) of Bugasong on May 13, 2010, Casimira insisted that the votes cast in favor of under Section 68 and a petition to cancel or deny due course to a certificate of candidacy
Aurelio be counted in her favor. However, the MBOC refused, citing Resolution No. 8844. (COC) under Section 78. Said proceedings are governed by different rules and have
The Statement of Votes by Precinct for Vice-Mayor of Antique-Bugasong showed the distinct outcomes.
following results of the voting:
TOTAL RANK At this point, we must stress that a "Section 78" petition ought not to be
interchanged or confused with a "Section 68" petition. They are different remedies,
DELA CRUZ, AURELIO N. 532 3 based on different grounds, and resulting in different eventualities. x xx

DELA CRUZ, CASIMIRA S. 6389 2

To emphasize, a petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised
PACETE, JOHN LLOYD M. 6428 1 on Section 12 or 68 of the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a petition to
deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a material
representation in the said certificate that is false. The petitions also have different
Consequently, John Lloyd M. Pacete was proclaimed Vice-Mayor of Bugasong by
effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited
the MBOC of Bugasong.
to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due
course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed
Considering that Pacete won by a margin of only thirty-nine (39) votes, Casimira
a CoC. Thus, in Miranda vs. Abaya, this Court made the distinction that a candidate who
contends that she would have clearly won the elections for Vice-Mayor of Bugasong had
is disqualified under Section 68 can validly be substituted under Section 77 of the
the MBOC properly tallied or added the votes cast for Aurelio to her votes.
OEC because he/she remains a candidate until disqualified; but a person whose
CoC has been denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be
Ruling:
substituted because he/she is never considered a candidate. (Additional emphasis
The petition is meritorious.
supplied)
It bears to stress that Sections 211 (24) and 72 applies to all disqualification
cases and not to petitions to cancel or deny due course to a certificate of candidacy such
Strictly speaking, a cancelled certificate cannot give rise to a valid candidacy,
as Sections 69 (nuisance candidates) and 78 (material representation shown to be
and much less to valid votes. Said votes cannot be counted in favor of the candidate
false). Notably, such facts indicating that a certificate of candidacy has been filed "to put
whose COC was cancelled as he/she is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she
the election process in mockery or disrepute, or to cause confusion among the voters by
never filed a COC. But should these votes cast for the candidate whose COC was
the similarity of the names of the registered candidates, or other circumstances or acts
cancelled or denied due course be considered stray?
which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the
office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful
The foregoing rule regarding the votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as
determination of the true will of the electorate" are not among those grounds
such under a final judgment was applied by this Court in Bautista vs. COMELEC where
enumerated in Section 68 (giving money or material consideration to influence or
the name of the nuisance candidate Edwin Bautista (having the same surname with the
corrupt voters or public officials performing electoral functions, election campaign
bona fide candidate) still appeared on the ballots on election day because while the
COMELEC rendered its decision to cancel Edwin Bautista’s COC on April 30, 1998, it
denied his motion for reconsideration only on May 13, 1998 or three days after the
election. We said that the votes for candidates for mayor separately tallied on
orders of the COMELEC Chairman was for the purpose of later counting the votes
and hence are not really stray votes. These separate tallies actually made the will
of the electorate determinable despite the apparent confusion caused by a
potential nuisance candidate.
But since the COMELEC decision declaring Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate
was not yet final on electionday, this Court also considered those factual circumstances
showing that the votes mistakenly deemed as "stray votes" refer to only the legitimate
candidate (petitioner Efren Bautista) and could not have been intended for Edwin
Bautista. We further noted that the voters had constructive as well as actual knowledge
of the action of the COMELEC delisting Edwin Bautista as a candidate for mayor.
A stray vote is invalidated because there is no way of determining the real
intention of the voter. This is, however, not the situation in the case at bar.
Significantly, it has also been established that by virtue of newspaper releases and other
forms of notification, the voters were informed of the COMELEC’s decision to declare
Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate.
In the more recent case of Martinez III v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, this Court likewise applied the rule in COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 not to
consider the votes cast for a nuisance candidate stray but to count them in favor of the
bona fide candidate notwithstanding that the decision to declare him as such was issued
only after the elections.
As illustrated in Bautista, the pendency of proceedings against a nuisance
candidate on election day inevitably exposes the bona fide candidate to the confusion
over the similarity of names that affects the voter’s will and frustrates the same. It may
be that the factual scenario in Bautista is not exactly the same as in this case, mainly
because the Comelec resolution declaring Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate was
issued before and not after the elections, with the electorate having been informed
thereof through newspaper releases and other forms of notification on the day of
election. Undeniably, however, the adverse effect on the voter’s will was similarly
present in this case, if not worse, considering the substantial number of ballots with
only "MARTINEZ" or"C. MARTINEZ" written on the line for Representative - over five
thousand - which have been declared as stray votes, the invalidated ballots being more
than sufficient to overcome private respondent’s lead of only 453 votes after the
recount.
Here, Aurelio was declared a nuisance candidate long before the May 10, 2010
elections. On the basis of Resolution No. 4116, the votes cast for him should not have
been considered stray but counted in favor of petitioner. COMELEC’s changing of
the rule on votes cast for nuisance candidates resulted in the invalidation of significant
number of votes and the loss of petitioner to private respondent by a slim margin. We
observed in Martinez:
Bautista upheld the basic rule that the primordial objective of election laws is
to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voter. The inclusion of
nuisance candidates turns the electoral exercise into an uneven playing field
where the bona fide candidate is faced with the prospect of having a significant
number of votes cast for him invalidated as stray votes by the mere presence of
another candidate with a similar surname. Any delay on the part of the COMELEC
increases the probability of votes lost in this manner. While political campaigners try to
minimize stray votes by advising the electorate to write the full name of their candidate
on the ballot, still, election woes brought by nuisance candidates persist.
The Court will not speculate on whether the new automated voting system
to be implemented in the May 2010 elections will lessen the possibility of
confusion over the names of candidates. What needs to be stressed at this point is the
apparent failure of the HRET to give weight to relevant circumstances that make the will
of the electorate determinable, following the precedent in Bautista. x xx
COMELEC justified the issuance of Resolution No. 8844 to amend the former
rule in Resolution No. 4116 by enumerating those changes brought about by the new
automated election system to the form of official ballots, manner of voting and counting
of votes. It said that the substantial distinctions between manual and automated
elections validly altered the rules on considering the votes cast for the disqualified or
nuisance candidates. As to the rulings in Bautista and Martinez III, COMELEC opines that
these find no application in the case at bar because the rules on appreciation of
ballotsapply only to elections where the names of candidates are handwritten in the
ballots.

The Court is not persuaded.
In Martinez III, we took judicial notice of the reality that, especially in local
elections, political rivals or operators benefited from the usually belated decisions
by COMELEC on petitions to cancel or deny due course to COCs of potential
nuisance candidates. In such instances, political campaigners try to minimize
stray votes by advising the electorate to write the full name of their candidate on
the ballot, but still, election woes brought by nuisance candidates persist.
Finally, upholding the former rule in Resolution No. 4116 is more consistent
with the rule well-ensconced in our jurisprudence that laws and statutes governing
election contests especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the
end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by
technical infirmities. Indeed, as our electoral experience had demonstrated, such
infirmities and delays in the delisting of nuisance candidates from both the Certified List
of Candidates and Official Ballots only made possible the very evil sought to be
prevented by the exclusion of nuisance candidates during elections.

As far as COMELEC is concerned, the confusion caused by similarity of surnames

of candidates for the same position and putting the electoral process in mockery or
disrepute, had already been rectified by the new voting system where the voter simply
shades the oval corresponding to the name of their chosen candidate. However, as
shown in this case, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8844 on May 1, 2010, nine days
before the elections, with sufficient time to delete the names of disqualified candidates
not just from the Certified List of Candidates but also from the Official Ballot. Indeed,
what use will it serve if COMELEC orders the names of disqualified candidates to be
deleted from list of official candidates if the official ballots still carry their names?
We hold that the rule in Resolution No. 4116 considering the votes cast for
a nuisance candidate declared as such in a final judgment, particularly where
such nuisance candidate has the same surname as that of the legitimate
candidate, notstray but counted in favor of the latter, remains a good law.

Moreover, private respondent admits that the voters were properly informed of
the cancellation of COC of Aurelio because COMELEC published the same before election
day. As we pronounced in Bautista, the voters’ constructive knowledge of such
cancelled candidacy made their will more determinable, as it is then more logical
to conclude that the votes cast for Aurelio could have been intended only for the
legitimate candidate. The possibility of confusion in names of candidates if the names
of nuisance candidates remained on the ballots on election day, cannot be discounted or
eliminated, even under the automated voting system especially considering that voters
who mistakenly shaded the oval beside the name of the nuisance candidate instead of
the bona fide candidate they intended to vote for could no longer ask for replacement
ballots to correct the same.