G.R. No.

190521 January 12, 2011

LETICIA TAN, MYRNA MEDINA, MARILOU SPOONER, ROSALINDA TAN, and MARY
JANE TAN, MARY LYN TAN, CELEDONIO TAN, JR., MARY JOY TAN, and MARK ALLAN
TAN, represented herein by their mother, LETICIA TAN, Petitioners,
vs.
OMC CARRIERS, INC. and BONIFACIO ARAMBALA, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the motion for reconsideration1 – filed by Leticia Tan, Myrna Medina, Marilou Spooner,
Rosalinda Tan, Mary Jane Tan, Mary Lyn Tan, Celedonio Tan, Jr., Mary Joy Tan, and Mark Allan Tan
(petitioners), all heirs of the late Celedonio Tan – asking us to reverse and set aside our Resolution of
February 17, 2010.2 We denied in this Resolution their petition for review on certiorari for failing to
show any reversible error in the assailed Court of Appeals (CA) decision of June 22, 2009 3 sufficient to
warrant the exercise of our discretionary appellate jurisdiction.
The CA decision, in turn, affirmed with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Muntinlupa City in Civil Case No. 96-186, finding the respondents – OMC Carriers, Inc. (OMC) and
Bonifacio Arambala – guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to the petitioners.
THE FACTS
On September 27, 1996, the petitioners filed a complaint for damages with the RTC against OMC and
Bonifacio Arambala.4 The complaint states that on November 24, 1995, at around 6:15 a.m., Arambala
was driving a truck5 with a trailer6 owned by OMC, along Meralco Road, Sucat, Muntinlupa City.
When Arambala noticed that the truck had suddenly lost its brakes, he told his companion to jump out.
Soon thereafter, he also jumped out and abandoned the truck. Driverless, the truck rammed into the
house and tailoring shop owned by petitioner Leticia Tan and her husband Celedonio Tan, instantly
killing Celedonio who was standing at the doorway of the house at the time.7
The petitioners alleged that the collision occurred due to OMC’s gross negligence in not properly
maintaining the truck, and to Arambala’s recklessness when he abandoned the moving truck. Thus, they
claimed that the respondents should be held jointly and severally liable for the actual damages that they
suffered, which include the damage to their properties, the funeral expenses they incurred for
Celedonio Tan’s burial, as well as the loss of his earning capacity. The petitioners also asked for moral
and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.8
The respondents denied any liability for the collision, essentially claiming that the damage to the
petitioners was caused by a fortuitous event, since the truck skidded due to the slippery condition of the
road caused by spilled motor oil.9
THE RTC DECISION
After trial, the RTC found OMC and Arambala jointly and severally liable to the petitioners for
damages.10 Relying on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the RTC held that it was unusual for a truck to
suddenly lose its brakes; the fact that the truck rammed into the petitioners’ house raised the
presumption of negligence on the part of the respondents. These, the respondents failed to refute.11
The RTC did not agree with the respondents’ claim of a fortuitous event, pointing out that even with oil
on the road, Arambala did not slow down or take any precautionary measure to prevent the truck from
skidding off the road. The alleged oil on the road did not also explain why the truck lost its brakes. Had
OMC done a more rigid inspection of the truck before its use, the defective brake could have been
discovered. The RTC, thus, held OMC jointly and severally liable with Arambala for the damage
caused to the petitioners, based on the principle of vicarious liability embodied in Article 2180 12 of the
Civil Code.13
The dispositive portion of the decision stated:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendants ordering:
1. The defendants to pay the plaintiffs jointly and severally the amount of ₱50,000.00 for the
death of Celedonio Tan;
2. The defendants to pay the plaintiffs jointly and severally the amount of ₱500,000.00 for the
loss of earning capacity of Celedonio Tan, plus interest thereon from the date of death of
Celedonio Tan;
3. The defendants to pay the plaintiff Leticia Tan jointly and severally the amount of
₱355,895.00 as actual damages;
4. The defendants to pay the plaintiffs jointly and severally the amount of ₱500,000.00 as moral
damages;
5. The defendants to pay the plaintiffs jointly and severally the amount of ₱500,000.00 as
exemplary damages; and
6. The defendants to pay the plaintiffs jointly and solidarily the amount of ₱500,000.00 as
attorney’s fees.
Costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.14
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s findings on the issues of the respondents’ negligence and
liability for damages. However, the CA modified the damages awarded to the petitioners by reducing
the actual damages award from ₱355,895.00 to ₱72,295.00. The CA observed that only the latter
amount was duly supported by official receipts.15
The CA also deleted the RTC’s award for loss of earning capacity. The CA explained that the
petitioners failed to substantiate Celedonio Tan’s claimed earning capacity with reasonable certainty;
no documentary evidence was ever presented on this point. Instead, the RTC merely relied on Leticia
Tan’s testimony regarding Celedonio Tan’s income. The CA characterized this testimony as self-
serving.16
The CA further reduced the exemplary damages from ₱500,000.00 to ₱200,000.00, and deleted the
award of attorney’s fees because the RTC merely included the award in the dispositive portion of the
decision without discussing its legal basis.17
THE PETITION
In the petition for review on certiorari before us, 18 the petitioners assert that the CA erred when it
modified the RTC’s awarded damages. The petitioners submit the reasons outlined below.
First, the CA erred when it reduced the RTC’s award of actual damages from ₱355,895.00 to
₱72,295.00. The petitioners claim that they sought compensation for the damage done to petitioner
Leticia Tan’s house, tailoring shop, sewing machines, as well as other household appliances. Since the
damages primarily refer to the value of their destroyed property, and not the cost of repairing or
replacing them, the value cannot be evidenced by receipts. Accordingly, the RTC correctly relied on
petitioner Leticia Tan’s testimony and the documentary evidence presented, consisting of pictures of
the damaged property, to prove their right to recover actual damages for the destroyed property.
Second, the petitioners are entitled to actual damages for the loss of Celedonio Tan’s earning capacity.
While they admit that they did not submit any documentary evidence to substantiate this claim, the
petitioners point out that Celedonio Tan was undisputably a self-employed tailor who owned a small
tailor shop; in his line of work, no documentary evidence is available.
Third, the petitioners maintain that they are entitled to exemplary damages in the amount of
₱500,000.00 because the RTC and the CA consistently found that the collision was caused by the
respondents’ gross negligence. Moreover, the respondents acted with bad faith when they fabricated the
"oil slick on the road" story to avoid paying damages to the petitioners. As observed by the CA, the
Traffic Accident Investigation Report did not mention any motor oil on the road at the time of the
accident. SPO4 Armando Alambro, the Investigation Officer, likewise testified that there was no oil on
the road at the time of the accident. For the public good and to serve as an example, the respondents
should be made to pay ₱500,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Lastly, the petitioners are entitled to attorney’s fees based on Article 2208 of the Civil Code which
provides, among others, that attorney’s fees can be recovered when exemplary damages are awarded,
and when the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff’s plainly
valid, just and demandable claim.
We initially denied the petition in our Resolution of February 17, 2010, for the petitioners’ failure to
show any reversible error in the CA decision sufficient to warrant the exercise of our discretionary
appellate jurisdiction. In our Resolution of August 11, 2010, we reinstated the petition on the basis of
the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
OUR RULING
Finding merit in the petitioners’ arguments, we partly grant the petition.
Procedural Issue
As both the RTC and the CA found that the respondents’ gross negligence led to the death of Celedonio
Tan, as well as to the destruction of the petitioners’ home and tailoring shop, we see no reason to
disturb this factual finding. We, thus, concentrate on the sole issue of what damages the petitioners are
entitled to.
We are generally precluded from resolving a Rule 45 petition that solely raises the issue of damages, an
essentially factual question, because Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, expressly states that –
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. – A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial
Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition
for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set
forth.
In light, however of the RTC’s and the CA’s conflicting findings on the kind and amount of damages
suffered which must be compensated, we are compelled to consider the case as one of the recognized
exceptions.19 We look into the parties’ presented evidence to resolve this appeal.
Temperate damages in lieu of actual damages
We begin by discussing the petitioners’ claim for actual damages arising from the damage inflicted on
petitioner Leticia Tan’s house and tailoring shop, taking into account the sewing machines and various
household appliances affected. Our basic law tells us that to recover damages there must be pleading
and proof of actual damages suffered.20 As we explained in Viron Transportation Co., Inc. v. Delos
Santos:21
Actual damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be proved with
a reasonable degree of certainty. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in
determining the fact and amount of damages. To justify an award of actual damages, there must be
competent proof of the actual amount of loss, credence can be given only to claims which are duly
supported by receipts.22
The petitioners do not deny that they did not submit any receipt to support their claim for actual
damages to prove the monetary value of the damage caused to the house and tailoring shop when the
truck rammed into them. Thus, no actual damages for the destruction to petitioner Leticia Tan’s house
and tailoring shop can be awarded.
Nonetheless, absent competent proof on the actual damages suffered, a party still has the option of
claiming temperate damages, which may be allowed in cases where, from the nature of the case,
definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be adduced although the court is convinced that the aggrieved
party suffered some pecuniary loss.23 As defined in Article 2224 of the Civil Code:
Article 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than
compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been
suffered but its amount can not, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.
In Canada v. All Commodities Marketing Corporation,24 we disallowed the award of actual damages
arising from breach of contract, where the respondent merely alleged that it was entitled to actual
damages and failed to adduce proof to support its plea. In its place, we awarded temperate damages, in
recognition of the pecuniary loss suffered.
The photographs the petitioners presented as evidence show the extent of the damage done to the
house, the tailoring shop and the petitioners’ appliances and equipment. 25 Irrefutably, this damage was
directly attributable to Arambala’s gross negligence in handling OMC’s truck. Unfortunately, these
photographs are not enough to establish the amount of the loss with certainty. From the attendant
circumstances and given the property destroyed,26 we find the amount of ₱200,000.00 as a fair and
sufficient award by way of temperate damages.
Temperate damages in lieu of loss of earning capacity
Similarly, the CA was correct in disallowing the award of actual damages for loss of earning capacity.
Damages for loss of earning capacity are awarded pursuant to Article 2206 of the Civil Code, which
states that:
Article 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three
thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity
shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by
the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant,
had no earning capacity at the time of his death[.]
As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for loss of earning
capacity.27 By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the
absence of documentary evidence when: (1) the deceased is self-employed and earning less than the
minimum wage under current labor laws, in which case, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in
the deceased's line of work, no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a
daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.28
According to the petitioners, prior to his death, Celedonio was a self-employed tailor who earned
approximately ₱156,000.00 a year, or ₱13,000.00 a month. At the time of his death in 1995, the
prevailing daily minimum wage was ₱145.00,29 or ₱3,770.00 per month, provided the wage earner had
only one rest day per week. Even if we take judicial notice of the fact that a small tailoring shop
normally does not issue receipts to its customers, and would probably not have any documentary
evidence of the income it earns, Celedonio’s alleged monthly income of ₱13,000.00 greatly exceeded
the prevailing monthly minimum wage; thus, the exception set forth above does not apply.
In the past, we awarded temperate damages in lieu of actual damages for loss of earning capacity where
earning capacity is plainly established but no evidence was presented to support the allegation of the
injured party’s actual income.
In Pleno v. Court of Appeals,30 we sustained the award of temperate damages in the amount of
₱200,000.00 instead of actual damages for loss of earning capacity because the plaintiff’s income was
not sufficiently proven.
We did the same in People v. Singh,31 and People v. Almedilla,32 granting temperate damages in place
of actual damages for the failure of the prosecution to present sufficient evidence of the deceased’s
income.
Similarly, in Victory Liner, Inc. v. Gammad, 33 we deleted the award of damages for loss of earning
capacity for lack of evidentiary basis of the actual extent of the loss. Nevertheless, because the income-
earning capacity lost was clearly established, we awarded the heirs ₱500,000.00 as temperate damages.
In the present case, the income-earning capacity of the deceased was never disputed. Petitioners Mary
Jane Tan, Mary Lyn Tan, Celedonio Tan, Jr., Mary Joy Tan and Mark Allan Tan were all minors at the
time the petition was filed on February 4, 2010, 34 and they all relied mainly on the income earned by
their father from his tailoring activities for their sustenance and support. Under these facts and taking
into account the unrebutted annual earnings of the deceased, we hold that the petitioners are entitled to
temperate damages in the amount of ₱300,000.00 [or roughly, the gross income for two (2) years] to
compensate for damages for loss of the earning capacity of the deceased.
Reduction of exemplary damages proper
Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in
addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.35 In quasi-delicts, exemplary
damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.36
Celedonio Tan’s death and the destruction of the petitioners’ home and tailoring shop were
unquestionably caused by the respondents’ gross negligence. The law allows the grant of exemplary
damages in cases such as this to serve as a warning to the pubic and as a deterrent against the repetition
of this kind of deleterious actions.37 The grant, however, should be tempered, as it is not intended to
enrich one party or to impoverish another. From this perspective, we find the CA’s reduction of the
exemplary damages awarded to the petitioners from ₱500,000.00 to ₱200,000.00 to be proper.
Attorney’s fees in order
In view of the award of exemplary damages, we find it also proper to award the petitioners attorney's
fees, in consonance with Article 2208(1) of the Civil Code. 38 We find the award of attorney’s fees,
equivalent to 10% of the total amount adjudged the petitioners, to be just and reasonable under the
circumstances.
Interests due
Finally, we impose legal interest on the amounts awarded, in keeping with our ruling in Eastern
Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,39 which held that:
I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-
delicts is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages. The provisions under Title XVIII on
"Damages" of the Civil Code govern in determining the measure of recoverable damages.lavvphil
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages,
the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan
or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in
writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially
demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be
computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the
provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest
on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of
6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages
except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly,
where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from
the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such
certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall
begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the
quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base
for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the
rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be
12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be
by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
Accordingly, legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the amounts awarded starts to run from May
14, 2003, when the trial court rendered judgment. From the time this judgment becomes final and
executory, the interest rate shall be 12% per annum on the judgment amount and the interest earned up
to that date, until the judgment is wholly satisfied.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. The June 22, 2009
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 84733, which modified the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256, in Civil Case No. 96-186, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. As modified, respondents OMC Carriers, Inc. and Bonifacio Arambala are ordered
to jointly and severally pay the petitioners the following:
(1) ₱50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Celedonio Tan;
(2) ₱72,295.00 as actual damages for funeral expenses;
(3) ₱200,000.00 as temperate damages for the damage done to petitioner Leticia’s house,
 tailoring shop, household appliances and shop equipment;
(4) ₱300,000.00 as damages for the loss of Celedonio Tan’s earning capacity;
(5) ₱500,000.00 as moral damages;
(6) ₱200,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
(7) 10% of the total amount as attorney’s fees; and costs of suit.
In addition, the total amount adjudged shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from May 14,
2003, and at the rate of 12% per annum, from the finality of this Resolution on the balance and interest
due, until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 182835 April 20, 2010

RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD, Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case concerns a claim of commission of the crime of violence against women when a former
boyfriend sent to the girl the picture of a naked woman, not her, but with her face on it.
The Indictment
The public prosecutor charged petitioner-accused Rustan Ang (Rustan) before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Baler, Aurora, of violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act or
Republic Act (R.A.) 9262 in an information that reads:
That on or about June 5, 2005, in the Municipality of Maria Aurora, Province of Aurora, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, in a purposeful and reckless conduct, sent through the Short Messaging Service (SMS)
using his mobile phone, a pornographic picture to one Irish Sagud, who was his former girlfriend,
whereby the face of the latter was attached to a completely naked body of another woman making it to
appear that it was said Irish Sagud who is depicted in the said obscene and pornographic picture
thereby causing substantial emotional anguish, psychological distress and humiliation to the said Irish
Sagud.1
The Facts and the Case
The evidence for the prosecution shows that complainant Irish Sagud (Irish) and accused Rustan were
classmates at Wesleyan University in Aurora Province. Rustan courted Irish and they became "on-and-
off" sweethearts towards the end of 2004. When Irish learned afterwards that Rustan had taken a live-in
partner (now his wife), whom he had gotten pregnant, Irish broke up with him.
Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with Irish and tried to convince her to elope with
him, saying that he did not love the woman he was about to marry. Irish rejected the proposal and told
Rustan to take on his responsibility to the other woman and their child. Irish changed her cellphone
number but Rustan somehow managed to get hold of it and sent her text messages. Rustan used two
cellphone numbers for sending his messages, namely, 0920-4769301 and 0921-8084768. Irish replied
to his text messages but it was to ask him to leave her alone.
In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish received through multimedia message service (MMS) a
picture of a naked woman with spread legs and with Irish’s face superimposed on the figure (Exhibit
A).2 The sender’s cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-8084768, one of the numbers that
Rustan used. Irish surmised that he copied the picture of her face from a shot he took when they were
in Baguio in 2003 (Exhibit B).3
After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages from Rustan. He boasted that it would
be easy for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her. And he threatened to spread the picture
he sent through the internet. One of the messages he sent to Irish, written in text messaging shorthand,
read: "Madali lang ikalat yun, my chatrum ang tarlac rayt pwede ring send sa lahat ng chatter."4
Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora who referred her to the police. Under police
supervision, Irish contacted Rustan through the cellphone numbers he used in sending the picture and
his text messages. Irish asked Rustan to meet her at the Lorentess Resort in Brgy. Ramada, Maria
Aurora, and he did. He came in a motorcycle. After parking it, he walked towards Irish but the waiting
police officers intercepted and arrested him. They searched him and seized his Sony Ericsson P900
cellphone and several SIM cards. While Rustan was being questioned at the police station, he shouted
at Irish: "Malandi ka kasi!"
Joseph Gonzales, an instructor at the Aurora State College of Technology, testified as an expert in
information technology and computer graphics. He said that it was very much possible for one to lift
the face of a woman from a picture and superimpose it on the body of another woman in another
picture. Pictures can be manipulated and enhanced by computer to make it appear that the face and the
body belonged to just one person.
Gonzales testified that the picture in question (Exhibit A) had two distinct irregularities: the face was
not proportionate to the body and the face had a lighter color. In his opinion, the picture was fake and
the face on it had been copied from the picture of Irish in Exhibit B. Finally, Gonzales explained how
this could be done, transferring a picture from a computer to a cellphone like the Sony Ericsson P900
seized from Rustan.
For his part, Rustan admitted having courted Irish. He began visiting her in Tarlac in October 2003 and
their relation lasted until December of that year. He claimed that after their relation ended, Irish wanted
reconciliation. They met in December 2004 but, after he told her that his girlfriend at that time (later his
wife) was already pregnant, Irish walked out on him.
Sometime later, Rustan got a text message from Irish, asking him to meet her at Lorentess Resort as she
needed his help in selling her cellphone. When he arrived at the place, two police officers approached
him, seized his cellphone and the contents of his pockets, and brought him to the police station.
Rustan further claims that he also went to Lorentess because Irish asked him to help her identify a
prankster who was sending her malicious text messages. Rustan got the sender’s number and,
pretending to be Irish, contacted the person. Rustan claims that he got back obscene messages from the
prankster, which he forwarded to Irish from his cellphone. This explained, he said, why the obscene
messages appeared to have originated from his cellphone number. Rustan claims that it was Irish
herself who sent the obscene picture (Exhibit A) to him. He presented six pictures of a woman whom
he identified as Irish (Exhibits 2 to 7).5
Michelle Ang (Michelle), Rustan’s wife, testified that she was sure Irish sent the six pictures. Michelle
claims that she received the pictures and hid the memory card (Exhibit 8) that contained them because
she was jealous and angry. She did not want to see anything of Irish. But, while the woman in the
pictures posed in sexy clothing, in none did she appear naked as in Exhibit A. Further, the face of the
woman in Exhibits 2, 4, 5 and 6 could not be seen. Irish denied that she was the woman in those four
pictures. As for Exhibits 3 and 7, the woman in the picture was fully dressed.
After trial, the RTC found Irish’s testimony completely credible, given in an honest and spontaneous
manner. The RTC observed that she wept while recounting her experience, prompting the court to
comment: "Her tears were tangible expression of pain and anguish for the acts of violence she suffered
in the hands of her former sweetheart. The crying of the victim during her testimony is evidence of the
credibility of her charges with the verity borne out of human nature and experience." 6 Thus, in its
Decision dated August 1, 2001, the RTC found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A.
9262.
On Rustan’s appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), 7 the latter rendered a decision dated January 31,
2008,8 affirming the RTC decision. The CA denied Rustan’s motion for reconsideration in a resolution
dated April 25, 2008. Thus, Rustan filed the present for review on certiorari.
The Issues Presented
The principal issue in this case is whether or not accused Rustan sent Irish by cellphone message the
picture with her face pasted on the body of a nude woman, inflicting anguish, psychological distress,
and humiliation on her in violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.
The subordinate issues are:
1. Whether or not a "dating relationship" existed between Rustan and Irish as this term is
defined in R.A. 9262;
2. Whether or not a single act of harassment, like the sending of the nude picture in this case,
already constitutes a violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262;
3. Whether or not the evidence used to convict Rustan was obtained from him in violation of his
constitutional rights; and
4. Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture presented in the
case.
The Court’s Rulings
Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against women includes an act or acts of a person
against a woman with whom he has or had a sexual or dating relationship. Thus:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act,
(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed
by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom
the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or
against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which
result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic
abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty.
xxxx
Section 5 identifies the act or acts that constitute violence against women and these include any
form of harassment that causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to a woman.
Thus:
 SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. – The crime of violence against
women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
xxxx
h. Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that
alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This
shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:
xxxx
5. Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
The above provisions, taken together, indicate that the elements of the crime of violence against women
through harassment are:
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment
against the woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.
One. The parties to this case agree that the prosecution needed to prove that accused Rustan had a
"dating relationship" with Irish. Section 3(e) provides that a "dating relationship" includes a situation
where the parties are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of
the relationship. Thus:
(e) "Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the parties live as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course
of the relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two individuals in a
business or social context is not a dating relationship. (Underscoring supplied.)
Here, Rustan claims that, being "romantically involved," implies that the offender and the offended
woman have or had sexual relations. According to him, "romance" implies a sexual act. He cites
Webster’s Comprehensive Dictionary Encyclopedia Edition which provides a colloquial or informal
meaning to the word "romance" used as a verb, i.e., "to make love; to make love to" as in "He
romanced her."
But it seems clear that the law did not use in its provisions the colloquial verb "romance" that implies a
sexual act. It did not say that the offender must have "romanced" the offended woman. Rather, it used
the noun "romance" to describe a couple’s relationship, i.e., "a love affair."9
R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that "violence against women x x x refers to any act or a series of acts
committed by any person against a woman x x x with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship." Clearly, the law itself distinguishes a sexual relationship from a dating relationship.
Indeed, Section 3(e) above defines "dating relationship" while Section 3(f) defines "sexual relations."
The latter "refers to a single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing of a common child."
The dating relationship that the law contemplates can, therefore, exist even without a sexual intercourse
taking place between those involved.
Rustan also claims that since the relationship between Irish and him was of the "on-and-off" variety
(away-bati), their romance cannot be regarded as having developed "over time and on a continuing
basis." But the two of them were romantically involved, as Rustan himself admits, from October to
December of 2003. That would be time enough for nurturing a relationship of mutual trust and love.
An "away-bati" or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is a common occurrence. Their taking
place does not mean that the romantic relation between the two should be deemed broken up during
periods of misunderstanding. Explaining what "away-bati" meant, Irish explained that at times, when
she could not reply to Rustan’s messages, he would get angry at her. That was all. Indeed, she
characterized their three-month romantic relation as continuous.10
Two. Rustan argues that the one act of sending an offensive picture should not be considered a form of
harassment. He claims that such would unduly ruin him personally and set a very dangerous precedent.
But Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 punishes "any act or series of acts" that constitutes violence against
women. This means that a single act of harassment, which translates into violence, would be enough.
The object of the law is to protect women and children. Punishing only violence that is repeatedly
committed would license isolated ones.
Rustan alleges that today’s women, like Irish, are so used to obscene communications that her getting
one could not possibly have produced alarm in her or caused her substantial emotional or psychological
distress. He claims having previously exchanged obscene pictures with Irish such that she was already
desensitized by them.
But, firstly, the RTC which saw and heard Rustan and his wife give their testimonies was not impressed
with their claim that it was Irish who sent the obscene pictures of herself (Exhibits 2-7). It is doubtful if
the woman in the picture was Irish since her face did not clearly show on them.
Michelle, Rustan’s wife, claimed that she deleted several other pictures that Irish sent, except Exhibits
2 to 7. But her testimony did not make sense. She said that she did not know that Exhibits 2 to 7 had
remained saved after she deleted the pictures. Later, however, she said that she did not have time to
delete them.11 And, if she thought that she had deleted all the pictures from the memory card, then she
had no reason at all to keep and hide such memory card. There would have been nothing to hide.
Finally, if she knew that some pictures remained in the card, there was no reason for her to keep it for
several years, given that as she said she was too jealous to want to see anything connected to Irish.
Thus, the RTC was correct in not giving credence to her testimony.1avvphi1
Secondly, the Court cannot measure the trauma that Irish experienced based on Rustan’s low regard for
the alleged moral sensibilities of today’s youth. What is obscene and injurious to an offended woman
can of course only be determined based on the circumstances of each case. Here, the naked woman on
the picture, her legs spread open and bearing Irish’s head and face, was clearly an obscene picture and,
to Irish a revolting and offensive one. Surely, any woman like Irish, who is not in the pornography
trade, would be scandalized and pained if she sees herself in such a picture. What makes it further
terrifying is that, as Irish testified, Rustan sent the picture with a threat to post it in the internet for all to
see. That must have given her a nightmare.
Three. Rustan argues that, since he was arrested and certain items were seized from him without any
warrant, the evidence presented against him should be deemed inadmissible. But the fact is that the
prosecution did not present in evidence either the cellphone or the SIM cards that the police officers
seized from him at the time of his arrest. The prosecution did not need such items to prove its case.
Exhibit C for the prosecution was but a photograph depicting the Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone that
was used, which cellphone Rustan admitted owning during the pre-trial conference.
Actually, though, the bulk of the evidence against him consisted in Irish’s testimony that she received
the obscene picture and malicious text messages that the sender’s cellphone numbers belonged to
Rustan with whom she had been previously in communication. Indeed, to prove that the cellphone
numbers belonged to Rustan, Irish and the police used such numbers to summon him to come to
Lorentess Resort and he did.12 Consequently, the prosecution did not have to present the confiscated
cellphone and SIM cards to prove that Rustan sent those messages.
Moreover, Rustan admitted having sent the malicious text messages to Irish. 13 His defense was that he
himself received those messages from an unidentified person who was harassing Irish and he merely
forwarded the same to her, using his cellphone. But Rustan never presented the cellphone number of
the unidentified person who sent the messages to him to authenticate the same. The RTC did not give
credence to such version and neither will this Court. Besides, it was most unlikely for Irish to pin the
things on Rustan if he had merely tried to help her identify the sender.
Four. Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an
electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided
under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).
But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit A, for
the first time before this Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission
of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have
already waived such ground for objection.14
Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic
Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.15
In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the crime
charged beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR 30567 dated January 31, 2008 and its resolution dated April 25, 2008.
SO ORDERED.

BERSAMIN, J.:
The constitutional guarantee to information does not open every door to any and all information, but is
rather confined to matters of public concern. It is subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The State's policy of full public disclosure is restricted to transactions involving public interest, and is
tempered by reasonable conditions prescribed by law.
The Case

The petitioner appeals the decision rendered on October 16, 2006 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 268, in Pasig City[1] dismissing the petition for mandamus he had filed in his capacity as a
citizen and as a stakeholder in the Philippine petrochemical industry to compel respondent Committee
on Tariff and Related Matters (CTRM) to provide him a copy of the minutes of its May 23, 2005
meeting; as well as to provide copies of all official records, documents, papers and government
research data used as basis for the issuance of Executive Order No. 486.[2]
Antecedents
On May 23, 2005, the CTRM, an office under the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA),
held a meeting in which it resolved to recommend to President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo the lifting of
the suspension of the tariff reduction schedule on petrochemicals and certain plastic products, thereby
reducing the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) rates on products covered by Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 161 from 7% or 10% to 5% starting July 2005.[3]

On June 9, 2005, Wilfredo A. Paras (Paras), then the Chairman of the Association of Petrochemical
Manufacturers of the Philippines (APMP), the main industry association in the petrochemical sector,
wrote to the CTRM Secretariat, through its Director Brenda Mendoza (Director Mendoza), to request a
copy of the minutes of the meeting held on May 23, 2005.

Director Mendoza denied the request through her letter of June 20, 2005,[4] to wit:
With reference to your request for a copy of the minutes and resolution of the Committee
on Tariff and Related Matters (CTRM) meeting held on 23 May 2005, our Legal Staff
advised that we cannot provide the minutes of the meeting detailing the position and views
of different CTRM member agencies. We may, however, provide you with the action taken
of the CTRM as follows:

"The CTRM agreed to reduce the CEPT rates on petrochemical resins and
plastic products covered under EO 161 from 7% / 10% to 5% starting July
2005, and to revert the CEPT rates on these products to EO 161 levels once the
proposed naphtha cracker plant is in commercial operation."

The CTRM has yet to confirm the minutes including the action taken during the said
meeting since it has not met after 23 May 2005.

The CTRM, again through Director Mendoza, sent a second letter dated August 31, 2005 as a response
to the series of letter-requests from the APMP, stating:
The CTRM during its meeting on 14 July 2005 noted that Section 3, Rule IV of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act 6713 or the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides that every department,
office or agency shall provide official information, records or documents to any requesting
public (sic). However, the section also provides exceptions to the rules, such as if '...(c)
such information, record or document south (sic) falls within the concepts of established
privileged or recognized exceptions as may be provided by law or settled policy or
jurisprudence...' The acknowledged limitations to information access under Section 3 (c)
include diplomatic correspondence, closed-door Cabinet meetings and executive sessions of
either House of Congress, as well as internal deliberations of the Supreme Court (Chavez
vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government, 299 SCRA 744)

The CTRM is of the view that the limitation pertaining to closed-door cabinet meetings
under Section 3 (c) of the IRR applies to the minutes of the meeting requested by APMP. In
view thereof, the CTRM is constrained [not] to provide the said minutes to the APMP.[5]

The APMP sent another letter-request dated October 27, 2005 to the CTRM through Director Mendoza
reminding about the legal implications of the refusal to furnish copies of the minutes as in violation of
the petitioner's Constitutional right of access to information on matters of public concern. However, the
CTRM continued to refuse access to the documents sought by the APMP.[6]

The attitude of the CTRM prompted the petitioner and the APMP to bring the petition for mandamus in
the RTC to compel the CTRM to provide the copy of the minutes and to grant access to the minutes.
The case was docketed as SCA No. 2903.

The APMP, through Paras and Concepcion I. Tanglao, respectively its Chairman and President at the
time, sent letters dated December 12, 2005[7] and January 10, 2006[8] to the Office of the President
(OP), stating the reasons why the recommendation of the CTRM should be rejected, but the OP did not
respond to the letters.

Thereafter, the petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction dated January 3, 2006, to which the respondent filed its Opposition dated January 26, 2006
and Motion to Dismiss dated February 16, 2006.[9]

Meanwhile, President Arroyo signed Executive Order No. 486,[10] dated January 12, 2006, to lift the
suspension of the tariff reduction on petrochemical resins and other plastic products under the ASEAN
Free Trade Area - Common Effective Preferential Tariff (AFTA-CEPT) Scheme. The relevant portions
of E.O. No. 486 read:
WHEREAS, Executive Order 234 dated 27 April 2000, which implemented the 2000-2003
Philippine schedule of tariff reduction of products transferred from the Temporary
Exclusion List and the Sensitive List to the Inclusion List of the accelerated CEPT Scheme
for the AFTA, provided that the CEPT rates on petrochemicals and certain plastic products
will be reduced to 5% on 01 January 2003;

WHEREAS, Executive Order 161 issued on 9 January 2003 provides for the suspension of
the application of the tariff reduction schedule on petrochemicals and certain products in
2003 and 2004 only;

WHEREAS, the government recognizes the need to provide an enabling environment for
the naphtha cracker plant to attain international competitiveness;

WHEREAS, the NEDA Board approved the lifting of the suspension of the aforesaid tariff
reduction schedule on petrochemicals and certain plastic products and the reversion of the
CEPT rates on these products to EO 161 (s.2003) levels once the naphtha cracker plant is in
commercial operation;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Republic

of the Philippines, pursuant to the powers vested in me under Section 402 of the Tariff and
Customs Code of 1978 (Presidential Decree No. 1464), as amended, do hereby order:

SECTION 1. The articles specifically listed in Annex "A" (Articles Granted Concession
under the CEPT Scheme for the AFT A) hereof, as classified under Section 104 of the Tariff
and Customs Code of 1978, as amended shall be subject to the ASEAN CEPT rates in
accordance with the schedule indicated in Column 4 of Annex "A". The ASEAN CEPT rates
so indicated shall be accorded to imports coming from ASEAN Member States applying
CEPT concession to the same product pursuant to Article 4 of the CEPT Agreement and its
Interpretative Notes.
In its order of May 9, 2006, the RTC denied the Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction but directed the parties to file their respective memorandums after
noting that the controversy involved a pure question of law.[11]

Subsequently, the RTC rendered its assailed decision on October 16, 2006[12] dismissing the petition
for mandamus for lack of merit. It relied on the relevant portions of Section 3 of Rule IV of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees), to wit:
Sec 3. Every department, office or agency shall provide official information, records and
documents to any requesting public except if:

x x x x

(c) the information, record or document sought falls within the concepts of established
privilege or recognized exceptions as may be provided by law or settled policy or
jurisprudence;

(d) such information, record or document comprises drafts or decisions, orders, rulings,
policies, memoranda, etc.

and relevant portions of Section 7 (c) of the same law, viz.:

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public
officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following
shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are
hereby declared unlawful:

x x x x

(c) Disclosure and/or misuse of confidential information - Public officials and employees
shall not use or divulge confidential or classified information officially known to them by
reason of their office and not made available to the public either:

x x x x

(2) To the prejudice of public interest.[13]

The RTC declared that the "CTRM is an advisory body composed of various department heads or
secretaries and is classified as cabinet meetings and inter-agency communications;"[14] and that the
record of the communications of such body "falls under the category of privileged information because
of the sensitive subject matter which could seriously affect public interest."[15]

Hence, this appeal directly to the Court on questions of law.[16]

Issues

The petitioner submits the following issues for resolution, namely:

I. Are meetings of the CTRM and the minutes thereof exempt from the Constitutional
right of access to information?
 II. Assuming arguendo that the minutes of CTRM meetings are privileged or
confidential, is such privilege or confidentiality absolute?

III.Can privilege or confidentiality be invoked to evade public accountability, or worse,

to cover up incompetence and malice?[17]

In short, the issue is whether or not the CTRM may be compelled by mandamus to furnish the
petitioner with a copy of the minutes of the May 23, 2005 meeting based on the constitutional right to
information on matters of public concern and the State's policy of full public disclosure. The request for
information was motivated by his desire to understand the basis for the CTRM's recommendation that
allegedly caused tremendous losses to the petrochemical industry through the issuance of E.O. No. 486.

In seeking the nullification of the assailed decision of the RTC, and the consequent release of the
minutes and the disclosure of all official records, documents, papers and government research data used
as the basis for the issuance of E.O. No. 486, the petitioner invokes the following provisions of the
1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6713, thusly:

Section 28 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution:

Section 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

Section 7 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution:

Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official
acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.

Section 1 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution:

Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

Section 5 of R.A. No. 6713:

Section 5. Duties of Public Officials and Employees. - In the performance of their duties,
all public officials and employees are under obligation to:

x x x x

(e) Make documents accessible to the public. - All public documents must be
made accessible to, and readily available for inspection by, the public within
reasonable working hours.

Ruling of the Court

The dismissal of the petition for mandamus by the RTC is affirmed.

The constitutional guarantee of the right to information on matters of public concern enunciated in
Section 7 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution complements the State's policy of full public disclosure
in all transactions involving public interest expressed in Section 28 of Article II of the 1987
Constitution. These provisions are aimed at ensuring transparency in policy-making as well as in the
operations of the Government, and at safeguarding the exercise by the people of the freedom of
expression. In a democratic society like ours, the free exchange of information is necessary, and can be
possible only if the people are provided the proper information on matters that affect them. But the
people's right to information is not absolute. According to Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,[18] the
constitutional guarantee to information "does not open every door to any and all information."[19] It is
limited to matters of public concern, and is subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.[20]
Likewise, the State's policy of full public disclosure is restricted to transactions involving public
interest, and is further subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law.[21]

Two requisites must concur before the right to information may be compelled by writ of mandamus.
Firstly, the information sought must be in relation to matters of public concern or public interest. And,
secondly, it must not be exempt by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.

As to the first requisite, there is no rigid test in determining whether or not a particular information is of
public concern or public interest.[22] Both terms cover a wide-range of issues that the public may want
to be familiar with either because the issues have a direct effect on them or because the issues
"naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen."[23] As such, whether or not the information
sought is of public interest or public concern is left to the proper determination of the courts on a case
to case basis.

In his capacity as a citizen and as the Executive Director of the APMP, the petitioner has sought to
obtain official information dealing with the policy recommendation of the CTRM with respect to the
reduction of tariffs on petrochemical resins and plastic products. He has asserted that the
recommendation, which would be effected through E.O. No. 486, not only brought significant losses to
the petrochemical industry that undermined the industry's long-term viability and survival, but also
conflicted with official government pronouncements, policy directives, and enactments designed to
support and develop an integrated petrochemical industry. He has claimed that the implementation of
E.O. No. 486 effectively deprived the industry of tariff support and market share, thereby jeopardizing
large investments without due process of law.[24]

The Philippine petrochemical industry centers on the manufacture of plastic and other related materials,
and provides essential input requirements for the agricultural and industrial sectors of the country.
Thus, the position of the petrochemical industry as an essential contributor to the overall growth of our
country's economy easily makes the information sought a matter of public concern or interest.

The second requisite is that the information requested must not be excluded by law from the
constitutional guarantee. In that regard, the Court has already declared that the constitutional guarantee
of the people's right to information does not cover national security matters and intelligence
information, trade secrets and banking transactions and criminal matters.[25] Equally excluded from
coverage of the constitutional guarantee are diplomatic correspondence, closed-door Cabinet meeting
and executive sessions of either house of Congress, as well as the internal deliberations of the Supreme
Court.[26] In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,[27] the Court has ruled that the right to information
does not extend to matters acknowledged as "privileged information under the separation of powers,"
which include "Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet
meetings."[28] Likewise exempted from the right to information are "information on military and
diplomatic secrets, information affecting national security, and information on investigations of crimes
by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused."[29]

The respondents claim exemption on the ground that the May 23, 2005 meeting was classified as a
closed-door Cabinet meeting by virtue of the committee's composition and the nature of its mandate
dealing with matters of foreign affairs, trade and policy-making. They assert that the information
withheld was within the scope of the exemption from disclosure because the CTRM meetings were
directly related to the exercise of the sovereign prerogative of the President as the Head of State in the
conduct of foreign affairs and the regulation of trade, as provided in Section 3 (a) of Rule IV of the
Rules Implementing R.A. No. 6713.[30]

The authority of the CTRM as the advisory body of the President and the NEDA is set forth in E.O. No.
230, series of 1987 (Reorganization Act of the National Economic and Development Authority), to wit:
SECTION 6. National Economic and Development Authority Inter-agency Committees. -
To assist the NEDA Board in the performance ol its functions, there are hereby created the
following committees which shall nereafter be under the direct control of the NEDA Board
and shall submit all their recommendations to the President for approval on matters
involving their respective concerns. The Chairman of these committees shall be designated
by the President. The NEDA Board shall likewise determine where the technical staff of the
said committees shall be based.

xxxx

(e) Committee on Tariff and Related Matters (TRM) - The TRM to be composed of the
Director-General of the National Economic and Development Authority Secretariat, the
Executive Secretary, the Secretaries of Trade and Industry, Foreign Affairs, Agriculture,
Environment and Natural Resources and of Budget and Management, the Governor of the
Central Bank and the Chairman of the Tariff Commission shall have the following
functions:

(i) Advise the President and the NEDA Board on tariff and related matters, and
on the effects on the country of various international developments;

(ii) Coordinate agency positions and recommend national positions for

international economic negotiations;

(iii) Recommend to the President a continuous rationalization program for the

country's tariff structure. (underlining supplied)

The respondents are correct. It is always necessary, given the highly important and complex powers to
fix tariff rates vested in the President,[31] that the recommendations submitted for the President's
consideration be well-thought out and well-deliberated. The Court has expressly recognized in Chavez
v. Public Estates Authority[32] that "a frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from
the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of
decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power." In Almonte v.
Vasquez[33] the Court has stressed the need for confidentiality and privacy, stating thusly: "A President
and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and
making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately."[34]
Without doubt, therefore, ensuring and promoting the free exchange of ideas among the members of the
committee tasked to give tariff recommendations to the President were truly imperative.

Every claim of exemption, being a limitation on a right constitutionally granted to the people, is
liberally construed in favor of disclosure and strictly against the claim of confidentiality. However, the
claim of privilege as a cause for exemption from the obligation to disclose information must be clearly
asserted by specifying the grounds for the exemption.[35] In case of denial of access to the information,
it is the government agency concerned that has the burden of showing that the information sought to be
obtained is not a matter of public concern, or that the same is exempted from the coverage of the
constitutional guarantee.[36] We reiterate, therefore, that the burden has been well discharged herein.

The respondents further assert that the information sought fell within the concept of established
privilege provided by jurisprudence under Section 3 (c) of Rule IV of the Rules Implementing R.A. No.
6713, the May 23, 2005 meeting being regarded as a closed-door Cabinet meeting.[37] The petitioner,
disagreeing, posits that R.A. No. 6713, by itself, neither provides exceptions to the constitutional right
to information nor specifies limitations on the State policy of full public disclosure; that the
Implementing Rules and Regulations went beyond the scope of R.A. No. 6713 in providing exceptions
not covered by the law; that the alleged closed-door Cabinet meeting exception, so as to fall within the
ambit of Section 3(c) of the Rules Implementing R.A. No. 6713, was not established under settled
policy or jurisprudence; that the reliance on the rulings in Chavez v. PCGG and Chavez v. PEA-Amari
that declared the closed-door Cabinet meeting as an exception to the right to information was
misplaced considering that the exception was not squarely in issue in those cases; that the
pronouncement could only be regarded as obiter dicta; that the closed-door Cabinet meeting exception,
assuming though not admitting the same to have been established by law or settled jurisprudence, could
not be automatically applied to all the CTRM meetings because the CTRM was different from the
Cabinet inasmuch as two of its members, namely, the Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and
the Chairman of the Tariff Commission, were not members of the President's Cabinet; and that the
deliberations of the CTRM as a body merely akin to the Cabinet could not be given the privilege and
confidentiality not expressly provided for by law or jurisprudence, most especially considering that
only by legislative enactment could the constitutional guarantee to the right to information be
restricted.

We cannot side with the petitioner.

In Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita,[38] we have said that executive privilege is properly invoked in
relation to specific categories of information, not to categories of persons. As such, the fact that some
members of the committee were not part of the President's Cabinet was of no moment. What should
determine whether or not information was within the ambit of the exception from the people's right to
access to information was not the composition of the body, but the nature of the information sought to
be accessed. A different holding would only result to the unwanted situation wherein any concerned
citizen, like the petitioner, invoking the right to information on a matter of public concern and the
State's policy of full public disclosure, could demand information from any government agency under
all conditions whenever he felt aggrieved by the decision or recommendation of the latter.

In case of conflict, there is a need to strike a balance between the right of the people and the interest of
the Government to be protected. Here, the need to ensure the protection of the privilege of non-
disclosure is necessary to allow the free exchange of ideas among Government officials as well as to
guarantee the well-considered recommendation free from interference of the inquisitive public.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; and AFFIRMS the decision
of the Regional Trial Court in Special Civil Action No. 2903, without pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.