G.R. No.

L-13484 May 20, 1960

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
DOMINADOR CAMERINO, MANUEL PAKINGAN, CRISANTO SARATAN, BIENVENIDO
OSTERIA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

Actg. Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Eriberto D. Ignacio for appellant.
Avelino A. Velasco for appellees.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

Dominador Camerino and eighty-six others were accused before the Court of First Instance
of Cavite of the crime of sedition under an information charging conspiracy among the said
accused in having allegedly perpetrated for political and social ends, insistent, repeated and
continuous acts of hate, terrorism and revenge against private persons, leaders, members
and sympathizers of the Nacionalista Party in the town of Bacoor, Cavite, and frustrating by
force, threats and violence, and intimidation the free expression of the popular will in the
election. The information described in detail the manner in which the alleged seditious acts
were performed, specifying the dates and the places where they were committed and the
persons who were victims thereof, under fourteen different overt acts of sedition. Before
arraignment, forty-eight of the eighty-seven accused, headed by Dominador Camerino, filed
a motion to quash the information on the ground of double jeopardy, claiming in support
thereof that they had been previously convicted or been in jeopardy of being convicted
and/or acquitted of the offense charged in other cases of the same nature before the court.

Issue: Whether or not the separate criminal charges constitute sedition.

In conclusion, we hold that the information filed in this case did not charged more than one
offense but only that of sedition; that in specifying the separate and different criminal acts
attributed to the defendants, it was not the purpose or intention of the Government to hold
them criminally liable in the present proceedings, but merely to complete the narration of
facts, though specifying different offenses which as a whole, supposedly constitute the
crime of sedition. Consequently, we believe that the information is valid.

We deem it unnecessary to discuss the other points raised in the appeal.

In view of the foregoing, the appealed orders are hereby set aside and the case is hereby
remanded to the trial court of further proceedings, without pronouncement as to costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, and
Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

FACTS:
On May 10, 1985, Attorney Laurente C. Ilagan was arrested in Davao City by elements
of the PC-INP and detained at Camp Catitipan on the basis of a Mission Order allegedly
issued by the Ministry of National Defense. On that same day, fifteen lawyers from the
IBP Davao Chapter visited Atty. Ilagan. Thereafter, two other petitioners were arrested
for the same cause.
This petition for habeas corpus was then filed by and on behalf of the three arrested
lawyers hereinafter referred to as the detained attorneys on the ground that their arrests
were illegal and violative of the Constitution, since arrests cannot be made on the basis
of Mission Orders. and that there appears to be a military campaign to harass lawyers
involved in national security cases.
On May 16, 1985, the Court issued the Writ, required a Return, and set the petition for
hearing on May 23, 1985. Respondents contend that the lawyers were arrested due to
basis of a PDA issued by the President on January 25, 1985 and that the lawyers
played active roles in organizing mass actions of the Communist Party of the Philippines
and the National Democratic Front.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners herein were denied of their constitutional right to due process
and the benefit of a preliminary investigation.

HELD:
If the detained attorneys question their detention because of improper arrest, or that no
preliminary investigation has been conducted, the remedy is not a petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus but a Motion before the trial court to quash the Warrant of Arrest, and
/or the Information on grounds provided by the Rules or to ask for an investigation /
reinvestigation of the case. Habeas corpus would not lie after the Warrant of
commitment was issued by the Court on the basis of the Information filed against the
accused. So is it explicitly provided for by Section. 14, Rule of 102 of the Rules of Court.
The right to a preliminary investigation, being waivable, does not argue against the
validity of the proceedings, the most that could have been done being to remand the
case in order that such investigation could be conducted.
... The proper forum before which absence of preliminary investigation should be
ventilated is the Court of First Instance, not this Court. Reason is not wanting for this
view. Absence of preliminary investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the court but
merely to the regularity of the proceedings. It could even be waived. Indeed, it is
frequently waived. These are matters to be inquired into by the trial court, not an
appellate Court.
Section 7, Rule 112, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure above referred to
provides:
SEC. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant.- When a person is lawfully
arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the
complaint or information may be filed by the offended party, peace officer or fiscal
without preliminary investigation having been first conducted on the basis of the affidavit
of the offended party or arrested officer or person.
However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested may
ask for a preliminary investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this Rule, but
 he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a
responsible person of his choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he may apply for bail as
provided in the corresponding rule and the investigation must be terminated within
fifteen (15) days from its inception.

.R. No. L-68955 September 4, 1986

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RUBEN BURGOS y TITO, defendant-appellant.
Facts: Defendant is charged with illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of
subversion (tasks such as recruiting members to the NPA and collection of
contributions from its members) and found guilty by the RTC of Digos, Davao del
Sur. From the information filed by the police authorities upon the information given
by Masamlok, allegedly a man defendant tried to recruit into the NPA, the police
authorities arrest defendant and had his house searched. Subsequently, certain
NPA-related documents and a firearm, allegedly issued and used by one Alias Cmdr.
Pol of the NPA, are confiscated. Defendant denies being involved in any subversive
activities and claims that he has been tortured in order to accept ownership of
subject firearm and that his alleged extrajudicial statements have been made only
under fear, threat and intimidation on his person and his family. He avers that his
arrest is unlawful as it is done without valid warrant, that the trial court erred in
holding the search warrant in his house for the firearm lawful, and that the trial
court erred in holding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of PD 9 in
relation to GOs 6and 7.
Issue: If defendant’s arrest, the search of his home, and the subsequent
confiscation of a firearm and several NPA-related documents are lawful.
Held: Records disclose that when the police went to defendant’s house to arrest him
upon the information given by Masamlok, they had neither search nor arrest
warrant with them—in wanton violation of ArtIV, Sec 3 (now Art III, sec 2). As the
Court held in Villanueva vs Querubin, the state, however powerful, doesn’t
have access to a man’s home, his haven of refuge where his individuality
can assert itself in his choice of welcome and in the kind of objects he
wants around him. In the traditional formulation, a man’s house, however
humble, is his castle, and thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by the
government.
The trial court justified the warrantless arrest under Rule 113 Sec 6 of the RoC:
a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about
to commit an offense in his presence;
b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to
believe that the person to be arrested has committed it;
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another

and the confiscation of the firearm under Rule 126, Sec 12:
A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.
However, the trial court has erred in its conclusion that said warrantless arrest
is under the ambit of aforementioned RoC. At the time of defendant’s arrest, he
wasn’t in actual possession of any firearm or subversive document, and was not
committing any “subversive” act—he was plowing his field. It is not enough that
there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has
committed a crime in a warrantless arrest. An essential precondition is
that a crime must have beenin fact or actually have been committed first;
it isn’t enough to suspect a crime may have been committed. The test of
reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator. The Court also
finds no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting officers sought to
arrest the accused. We fail to see why they failed to first go through the process of
obtaining a warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to believe that
the accused had truly committed a crime. There is no showing that there was a real
apprehension that the accused was on the verge of flight or escape. Likewise, there
is no showing that the whereabouts of the accused were unknown.

In proving the ownership of the questioned firearm and alleged subversive

documents, assuming they were really illegal, the defendant was never informed of
his constitutional rights at the time of his arrest; thus the admissions obtained are
in violation of the constitutional right against self-incrimination under Sec 20 Art IV
(now Sec 12, Art III) and thus inadmissible as evidence.
Furthermore, the defendant was not accorded his constitutional right to be assisted
by counsel during the custodial interrogation. His extra-judicial confession, the
firearm, and the alleged subversive documents are all inadmissible as evidence. In
light of the aforementioned, defendant is acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt
of the crime with which he has been charged. Subject firearm and alleged
subversive documents have been disposed of in accordance with law.
The Court also maintains that violations of human rights do not help in overcoming
a rebellion. Reiterating Morales vs Enrile, “while the government should
continue to repel the communists, the subversives, the rebels, and the
lawless with the means at its command, it should always be remembered
that whatever action is taken must always be within the framework of our
Constitution and our laws.”

SAYO VS. CHIEF OF POLICE OF MANILA80 PHIL 859 (1948)FACTS:Upon complaint of

one Bernardino Malinao, charging the petitioners with havingcommitted the
crime of robbery, Benjamin Dumlao, a policeman of the City of
Manila,arrested the petitioners on April 2, 1948, and presented a complaint against
them withthe fiscal's office of Manila. Until April 7, 1948, the petitioners were
still detained orunder aarest, and the city fiscal had not yet released or filed against
them an informationwith the proper court of justice

.ISSUE:Whether or not petitioners had been illegally restrained of their liberty?

RULING: Yes. Petitioners are being illegally restrained of their liberty, and their release
ish e r e b y o r d e r e d u n l e s s t h e y a r e n o w d e t a i n e d b y v i r t u e o f a
p r o c e s s i s s u e d b y a competent court of justice. Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code provides that “the penalties provided in the next preceding
article shall be imposed upon the public officeror employee who shall detain any person
for some legal ground and shall fail to deliversuch person to the proper judicial
authorities within the period of six hours.” PolicemanDumlao may have acted in good
faith in believing that he had complied with the mandateof article 125 by delivering the
petitioners within six hours to the office of the city fiscal,and the latter may have ignored
the fact that the petitioners were being actually detainedwhen said policeman filed a
complaint against them with the city fiscal.

Rule of Law: Under the constitution, no person may be deprived of his liberty except by
warrant of arrest or commitment issued upon probable cause by a judge after examination of the
complainant and his witness.

Facts: Upon complaint of Bernardino Malinao, charging Melencio Sayo (D) and Joaquin
Mostero (D) with having committed the crime of robbery, Benjamin Dumlao, a policeman of the
City of Manila, arrested the Sayo (D) and Mostero (D), and presented a complaint against them
with the fiscal's office of Manila. When the petition for habeas corpus was heard, the Sayo (D)
and Mostero (D) were still detained or under arrest, and the city fiscal had not yet released or
filed charges against them with the proper courts justice.

Issues: Is the warrantless arrest valid?

Ruling: No. Under the constitution, no person may be deprived of his liberty except by warrant
of arrest or commitment issued upon probable cause by a judge after examination of the
complainant and his witness.

A peace officer has no power or authority to arrest a person without a warrant upon complaint of
the offended party or any other person, except in those cases expressly authorized by law. What
he or the complainant may do in such case is to file a complaint with the city fiscal or directly
with the justice of the peace courts in municipalities and other political subdivisions. A fortiori a
police officer has no authority to arrest and detain a person charged with an offense upon
complaint of the offended party or other persons even though, after investigation, he becomes
convinced that the accused is guilty of the offense charged.
Facts of the case
For his role in running an illegal lottery or "bolita," Efrain Santos was convicted on charges of illegal
gambling and money laundering. Santos had used income from the lottery to pay both the winners
and the couriers and collectors who worked for the gambling operation. The money laundering
charges were based on 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1), which criminalizes the use of the "proceeds" of an
illegal activity to promote or conceal that activity. However, federal courts disagreed on the meaning
of "proceeds." The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had ruled that the proceeds used in
money laundering can be any of the gross income obtained from the illegal activity, but the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which had jurisdiction over Santos's case, had recently
ruled that only net income (gross revenues minus expenses) used to promote or conceal illegal
activities can be the basis of a money laundering conviction. Because Santos had only used gross
revenues to promote his lottery, the District Court reversed the convictions.
The government argued on appeal that the Seventh Circuit's interpretation would put too great a
burden on prosecutions, because the bookkeeping of criminal operations is often purposefully
incomplete or misleading in order to obscure the distinction between gross and net income. The
narrow interpretation would also restrict money laundering prosecutions to criminal enterprises that
are actually profitable. Santos countered that the government's broad interpretation would result in
overlapping convictions for a wide variety of offenders charged with both money laundering and the
underlying crime. He argued that the government's interpretation strayed too far from the traditional
understanding of money laundering, which focuses on the subsequent disguising of profits obtained
from a criminal venture. The Seventh Circuit ruled for Santos and affirmed its original ruling.

Issue
In the federal money laundering statute 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1), which makes it a crime to use the
proceeds of an illegal activity to promote the activity or conceal the proceeds, does the word
"proceeds" refer to the gross income received from the illegal activity or to the net income (profits, or
gross income minus expenses)?
Conclusion

Splitting 5 to 4, the Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit, answering that "proceeds" refers to "net
income" or profits and not to "gross income." Because the statute nowhere defines the term
"proceeds", the plurality applied the so-called rule of lenity which requires such ambiguous statutes
to be interpreted in favor of defendants. Justice Antonin Scalia announced the judgment and wrote
a plurality opinion for himself and three other justices. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in the
judgment. Justice Samuel Alito wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts,
Jr., Justices Anthony Kennedy and Stephen G. Breyer.

G.R. No. L-7284 August 23, 1912

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOSE BATALLONES, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Luciano de la Rosa, for appellants.

Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.

CARSON, J.:

The defendants in this case were charged with the crime of detencion ilegal by the fiscal of
the Province of Laguna. The information charging the offense is as follows:

The undersigned charges Jose Batallones, Maximo Cuadro and Isaac Demo with
the crime of illegal detention, committed as follows:

On or about December 5, 1909, in the municipality of Cabuyao, Province of Laguna,

the accused Jose Battallones, justice of the peace and the accused Maximo Cuadro
and Isaac Demo, policemen of the said municipality, all of them acting in such
capacities, did willfully, maliciously and criminally arrest Apolonio Gumarang and
Inocencio Reyes and detain them that night to the morning of the 6th of the said
month and year, although they had not committed any crime or misdemeanor to
warrant such detention and although the accused were not authorized by any law or
ordinance to detain said persons — in violation of law.

Apolonio Gumarang and Inocencio Reyes, two secret service agents connected with the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, were in the municipality of Cabuyao on official business; that
while there they were arrested by the appellants Maximo Cuadro and Isaac Demo,
members of the local police, and were taken by them before the appellant Jose Batallones,
a justice of the peace, who directed that they be detained in the municipal jail until further
orders; and that in compliance with that order they were detained in the municipal jail until
the next morning, when they were released upon information as to their identity furnished by
the municipal treasurer.

So far as the conduct of the two policemen is concerned we are wholly unable to agree with
the trial judge that there was anything reprehensible in their action in making the arrest, and
certain it is that in view of the facts above set out a criminal charge of detencion arbitraria
cannot be maintained against them.

In a former case we held that official in these Islands who "by direct provisions of law or by
appointment of competent authority are charged with the maintenance of public order and
the protection and security of life and property," have authority to make arrest without
warrant substantially similar to the authority generally conferred upon "peace officers" in the
United States, and a more especially that class of "peace officers" known to American and
English law as constables; and that the "provisions of section 37 of Act No. 183" (the
Charter of Manila) "quite clearly set forth the powers usually conferred by American and
English law upon "peace officers including contables in making arrests without warrants,"
and provide that they "may pursue and arrest without warrant, any person found in
suspicious places or under suspicious circumstances reasonably tending to show that such
person has committed or is about to commit any crime or breach of the peace; may arrest,
or cause to be arrested without warrant, any offender, when the offense is committed in the
presence of a peace officer or within his view." (U. S. vs. Fortaleza, 12 Phil. Rep., 472,
479.)

In the light of after events it is of course very clear that the suspicion directed against the
secret service agents was not well founded; but viewing the facts as they must have
presented themselves to the woman who complained to, the policemen, and to the
policemen themselves, at the time of the arrest, we think that they must be held to have had
reasonable grounds upon which to base their suspicions as to the arrested men. One
readily sees that the conduct of these secret service agents, engaged, as presumably they
were, in attempt to surprise violators, of the Internal Revenue Law, might well give rise to
suspicions as to their real object and intentions in the mind of one who was not advised as
to the real object and intentions in the mind of one who was not advised as to the real object
which they had in view; and their inability satisfactorily to accounts for themselves and to
produce their cedulas undoubtedly tended to confirm the suspicions already aroused.

We must not be understood, however, as holding that under the law as it now exists the
mere fact that a citizen is unable to produce his cedula upon demand would in itself justify
his arrest and detention without a warrant. There is no authority in law for the making of
such arrests upon such grounds. But the conduct of these strangers in a provincial town in
these Islands having already a grave offense or were about to commit one, their failure or
inability to produce their cedulas, or to satisfactorily account for their failure so to do,
naturally impressed the local policemen as in some sort confirmatory of the suspicion
already aroused. The failure to produce their cedulas on demand was not in itself an
offense, but in the minds of the two policemen in the case at bar it was undoubtedly
calculated to confirm their suspicious already aroused.

Under all the circumstances we think that the action of the police officers in promptly
bringing the suspended persons before the local judicial officer clearly indicated that on their
part their acts were wholly inspired by a genuine desire to faithfully perform their duties as
guardians of the law and of the good order of the community. And we conclude, therefore,
that though the suspicions on which they based the arrest were not well founded, they are
in no wise criminally responsible for their action in making the arrest; the facts, as they
appeared to them at the time having been furnished reasonable grounds for their suspicions
under all the circumstances.

But the facts as developed by the evidence of record do not in our opinion sustain the
defense offered by Jose Batallones, the justice of the peace, and wholly fail to justify his
conduct in arbitrarily issuing the order for the confinement of the suspected secret service
agents. He himself denied that he had directed that they be detained, but we think that the
evidence of record shows conclusively that he did in fact issue a verbal order to that effect.
Indeed, the suspected persons having been brought before him by the police officers, it
would seem that it was his duty as a local judicial officer, either to order their discharge or to
direct that they be detained.

The suspected persons were brought before him about 6 or 7 o'clock in the evening at his
own house. There was plenty of opportunity for the verification of their claim that they were
not suspicious characters, and that such suspicion as might have arisen in the minds of the
policemen and of the woman who complained against them was founded upon acts the
meaning of which was satisfactorily explained by the fact that they were engaged in the
performance of their duties as secret service agents. The papers in their possession had
they been examined carefully by the justice of the peace, who is presumably a man of some
intelligence and education, were entirely sufficient to dispel any doubt as to the true
character if these men. The testimony of the justice of the peace himself would seem to
indicate that he was able to understand the contents of these documents; and even if the
fact that they were prepared in English rendered them unintelligence to him, he could easily
have verified the nature of their contents with the aid of one or other of the local officials or
of some other person in the municipality who could read English. As a matter of fact, the
municipal treasurer on the following morning secured the prompt discharge of the prisoners
by furnishing information as to their status and employment. The justice of the peace made
no effort whatever to verify the grounds upon which the police officers based their arrests,
but arbitrarily and without investigation, without taking any evidence or making any effort to
verify the claims of the arrested persons, issued his judicial order for their detention, and we
are satisfied that in doing so he acted without reasonable grounds upon which to based his
action. If the police officers were to make the arrests at all, it was necessary for them to act
promptly upon such information as they had at hand; but there was no such urgent
necessity upon the part of the justice of the peace to order the continued detention of the
arrested persons without making some investigation. Indeed, he seems to have acted
without the slightest regard to his obligations as a judicial officer or the rights of the arrested
persons to be set at liberty in the absence of reasonable grounds for their detention. No
reason suggests itself why, at the hour at which they were brought before him, he could not
have at least made some effort to verify the truth of their claims.
There is no ground for the belief that in acting as he did, the justice of the peace was
actuated by any special malice or illwill towards the prisoners, and the only explanation of
his conduct is that he was willfully negligent of their rights, and willing arbitrarily to detain
them rather than to take any trouble to verify their claims.

We think the judgment of conviction of the trial court should be affirmed, but we think that
the fine, imposed by the trial in its maximum degree, should be reduced from the sum of
3,250 pesetas to 325 pesetas.

The judgment of conviction, together with the sentences imposed by the trial court in the
cases of the appellants Maximo Cuadro and Isaac Demo, is hereby reversed, and these
appellants are hereby acquitted of the crime with which they are charged, and, if in
detention, will be set at liberty forthwith; if at liberty under bail, their bond is hereby
exonerated.

The judgment of the conviction of the appellant Jose Batallones is affirmed, but the
sentence imposed upon him should be, and is hereby modified by substituting for the fine
imposed by the trial court, a fine of 325 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in
accordance with law, in the event of insolvency and failure to pay the fine. One third of the
costs of these proceedings in the trial court will be taxed to this defendant. All other costs
are hereby declared de oficio. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Johnson and Trent, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-6909 February 20, 1912

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. HACHAW, Defendant-

Appellant.

Ellsworth E. Zook for appellant.

Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.

MORELAND, J. : chanro bles vi rt ual law li bra ry

The defendant in this case was convicted of the crime of having opium in his
possession without authority of law. His appeal is based solely upon the
proposition that the evidence is not sufficient to support the conviction. chan roblesv irtualawl ibra ry c hanro bles vi rtua l law li bra ry

The conviction is based upon the evidence of three witnesses of the

prosecution, namely, Jose Mendoza. Alejo Hilario, and Antonio Aquino. They
assert in substance that while they were on a certain street in the town of
Cavite they noticed the accused, a Chinaman, who was passing along the
street, acting very suspiciously. They called to him to stop, but, instead of
doing so, he started to run. They thereupon pursued and overtook him and
compelled him to go with them to the presidencia. Arriving there they
compelled him to take everything out of his pockets. Among the things
brought forth was, they claim, a small quantity of opium done up in paper.
chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry
c hanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra ry

The accused denies absolutely the story told by these witnesses. He asserts
that he never used opium in any way; that he did not deal in the drug; that
at the time of his arrest he had no opium in his possession; that the opium,
if any, found on him in the presidencia was placed in his pocket by the
witnesses above named and then therefrom on the search. In support of this
story he presented the testimony of three persons, members of the
Constabulary, one a sergeant, another a corporal, and the third a private.
They were at the time dressed in civilian clothes and were engaged under
the orders of their officers in making a quite search for criminals in that
locality. They assert that while standing upon the street on which the
accused was arrested Jose Mendoza came to them and asked them if they
did not want to make some money; that they asked him in what way he
proposed that the money should be made; that he replied that he had some
opium and that they should take it and put it in the pocket of some
Chinaman, whereupon he would arrest the Chinaman; that in all probability
the Chinaman would thereupon try to bribe them and then would come their
opportunity to make the money; that he showed them the opium and the
paper in which it was wrapped. These witnesses further assert that after
they had rejected the proposition Mendoza took the opium and put it in his
pocket. They stood there together for a short time afterwards, when they
saw a policeman, Alejo Hilario, coming down the street. Mendoza ordered
Hilario to arrest the accused, alleging as a reason therefor that he might
show some "forbidden thing" in his possession. When the accused came
along Mendoza ordered Hilario to stop him, which he did. Thereupon
Mendoza approached the accused, took from his pocket the opium he had
previously shown the witnesses and surreptitiously inserted it in the pocket
of the accused. These witnesses testified that they followed Mendoza and his
companions when they took the accused to the presidencia. They saw the
accused when he was searched and saw the opium when it was produced at
that time. They declared unhesitatingly that the opium was the same that he
had seen shown them by Mendoza and was wrapped in the identical paper in
which it was then inclosed. While the witnesses for the prosecution assert
that the Chinaman thereupon offered them three 20-peso bills if they would
let him go and say nothing about his possession of the opium, the
Constabulary soldiers testified that no such thing happened. chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry c han robles v irt ual law li bra ry
Mendoza does not deny that he was on the street at the place and time
alleged by the Constabulary soldiers and admits that they were also present
at the presidencia when the Chinaman was searched. He does not directly
deny the story told the Constabulary soldiers. The denial results by inference
from the contradictory stories told by the two sets of witnesses. chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry c hanro bles vi rt ual law li bra ry

The trial court based its rejection of the testimony of the Constabulary
soldiers upon the ground that it was unreasonable that Mendoza should have
tried to induce them to enter into a conspiracy to defraud the Chinaman,
asserting that if Mendoza had thought of doing any such thing he would
have kept it to himself instead of inviting others to participate with him. This
is correct without doubt to a certain extent, but we do not regard it as
controlling. If Mendoza had carried out the scheme according to the theory
of the trial court, while he would not have exposed himself to the mercy of
the Constabulary soldiers, he would, nevertheless, have been met with the
proposition on the trial that he had placed the opium in the pocket of the
accused, and he would have had his testimony alone against the testimony
of the Chinaman; whereas, if he had succeeded in inducing the Constabulary
soldiers to enter the conspiracy with him, his testimony against the
Chinaman would have been supported by that of three other persons. From
the record, we regard the story told by the Constabulary soldiers fully as
reasonable as that told by Mendoza. chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry c han robles v i rtual law lib rary

Mendoza presents as the only reason why he ordered the arrest of the
Chinaman that he was ating suspiciously. He did not say in what way he was
acting suspiciously. He did not say in what way he was acting suspiciously or
what was the particular act or circumstance which aroused his curiosity. He
said in that connection: chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

I told Alejo Hilario I had suspicions that he had some prohibited thing which
he carried on his person."

When asked to tell what prohibited thing he suspected, he said: chan roble s virtual law lib rary

There are many things which are prohibited which might be used to assault
a person with, or a pointed instrument which might be used to strike with or
with which a crime might be done against the government of robbery in his
some house, or opium on his person.

In another place he said:

I just said to Alejo Hilario that I had suspicions of this Chinaman, without
saying what my suspicions were.
Further on he said:

Yes, I followed along behind Hilario and the accused to the police station. I
wanted to see if he had committed a crime. . . .

This testimony of the witness does not present any clear reason why he
arrested the Chinaman. He arrested him because, as he said, "I wanted to
see if he had committed a crime." Among free men and under constitutional
and statutory guaranties of personal liberty, this furnishes no reason
whatever why a person should be arrested. cha nrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law lib rary

We believe that the testimony of these three witnesses for the defendant,
given as it is by person whose reputation is apparently good and whose
allegations have not been discredited in any way, is strong evidence in the
case and sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.
The trial court itself in no way impeached the credibility of those witnesses
except to say that their story was unreasonable. We do not believe it to be
so unreasonable that it ought to be rejected entirely. We regard it as
reasonable as the story told by Mendoza and as likely to have been the true
history of the occurrence as that given by the witnesses for the
prosecution. c hanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra ry cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

For the reasons the judgment of conviction is reversed and the defendant
acquitted.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Trent, JJ., concur.

ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL
v. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL
ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL v. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL

ENBANC

G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919

PONENTE: J. MALCOLM
 FACTS:

 Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police,
took custody of about 170 women at the night of October 25, 1918 beyond the women’s consent
and knowledge.
 Said women are inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of
Sampaloc, Manila.
 Thereafter the women were shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were signed
as laborers.
 The purpose of sending this women to davao is to exterminate vice, ordered the segregated
district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years.
 That when the women, its relative and lawyers filed for habeas corpus, the City of Manila Mayor
and police moved to dismiss the case saying that those women were already out of their
jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in the city of Davao instead.

ISSUE RELEVANT TO SECTION 1 ARTICLE II of the Constitution

1. WHETHER OR NOT MAYOR LUKBAN WHO IS AN OFFICER OF THE STATE, TO ERADICATE

VICES IN ITS CITY HAVE THE RIGHT TO DEPORT SAID WOMEN OF ILL-REPUTE?

OTHER ISSUE

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CITY OF MANILA DOES NOT HAVE A JURISDICTION TO ISSUE A WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS TO DAVAO CITY TO PRODUCE THE BODY OF THE WOMEN SINCE IT IS
OUT OF THEIR JURISDICTION AND THUS, DISOBEYING THE WRIT ISSUED BY THE COURT TO
PRODUCE THE BODY OF THE WOMEN?

HELD:

 The petition was granted. Respondent Lukban is found in contempt of court for not following the order of
the court to produce the body of the women and shall pay into the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court
within five days the sum of one hundred pesos (P100)

RATIO:
1. On the first issue, the court’s decision is based on the principle of Republicanism wherein “Ours is a
government of laws and not of men”

Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that”No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned,
or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise
destroyed; nor will we pass upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law
of the land. No official, no matter how high, is above the law. The courts are the forum which
functionate to safeguard individual liberty and to punish official transgressors

2. On the second issue, the court believed that the true principle should be that, if the respondent (Mayor
Lukban) is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and
thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. The writ of habeas
corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. Any further rights of the parties
are left untouched by decision on the writ, whose principal purpose is to set the individual at liberty.

3. In other words, If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport
these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same
means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may
not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile
and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of
liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 4367. September 3, 1908. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SALVADOR VALLEJO, ET AL., Defendants-

Appellants.

Chicote & Miranda and Manly & McMahon for Appellants.

Attorney-General Araneta for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. ARREST BY MUNICIPAL POLICE WITHOUT WARRANT. — Municipal policemen in the Philippine

Islands are peace officers and, as such are authorized to make arrests without warrant for breaches of
the peace committed in their presence, and may enter the house of an offender for such purpose,
 provided the unlawful conduct is such as to affect the public peace. (U. S. v. Alexander, 8 Phil. Rep.,
29; U. S. v. Burgueta, 10 Phil. Rep., 188.)

2. CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE; TWO OFFENSES. — A person may be tried and punished for
resisting an officer, although the act constituting this offense was apparently made a part of the
charge of disorderly conduct preferred against him before a justice of the peace, and for which he was
convicted. (U. S. v. Gavieres, 10 Phil. Rep., 694.)

3. PUBLIC FUNCTIONARY RESISTING AN OFFICER. — A public official found guilty of resisting an

officer comes within the second subdivision of article 250 of the Penal Code, entailing upon him an
increased punishment, but if he was intoxicated at the time, and such condition is not habitual, the
mitigating circumstance of intoxication should be considered.

DECISION

TRACEY, J. :

On the 17th of May, 1907, in consequence of a complaint of a public disturbance lodged by Januario
Duran with the police authorities of Polangui, in. the Province of Albay, the officer in charge at the city
hall sent two municipal policemen, named Tranquilino Saravillo and Dalmacio Sabio to the place of the
disturbance, which was the house of Salvador Vallejo, and the narrative of the policeman Sabio as to
that occurred there is as follows: jgc:chanro bles. com.ph

"The guard said to us, ’Go to San Diego and get the people who are making a scandal there.’ I
immediately went, following Tranquilino, to the house of Salvador Vallejo. While we were still on the
ground we heard the shouts of Vallejo. He was running from one side to the other of his house. When
I approached the house of Vallejo I heard the words, in a loud voice, Matza, turco, tesorero municipal
secretario de . . . (using obscenity which it is unnecessary to quote). We were about 5 rods distant.
When he spoke those words he was upstairs in his house at the window. Tranquilino and I and a great
many other people were near the house. We were in front of the house, looking and listening. There
are other houses there, but none immediately opposite. We immediately went up the steps to arrest
the accused Vallejo. On arriving at the top of the stairs I knocked on the door. We heard Vallejo ask,
’Who is it?,’ and I said, Municipal police.’ Thereupon Vallejo immediately came to the door to meet us,
and as he approached us he said ’. . . (another obscene expression), policias municipales.’ He stopped
inside the doorway and asked us, ’Have you any warrant to come in?’ I replied that we had none, and
then he immediately struck Tranquilino Saravillo with his fist, and immediately afterwards he struck
me also. When I felt him strike me here in the cheek, I dodged and struck him with my club. When he
attempted to strike me again with his fist, I caught his right hand. I said to Salvador Vallejo, ’You are
arrested.’ We arrested him because he did not come with us but resisted. Then Blas Ausina came out
and threw his arms around Vallejo’s body and dragged him away from us, and immediately drew him
inside and closed the door." cra law virt ua1aw li bra ry

Tranquilino Saravillo gives substantially the same account. Both policemen were at the time in
uniform.

These facts are not seriously contested, and upon the the judge of First Instance found both
defendants guilty of an attempt against an agent of authority, and giving Vallejo the benefit of
drunkenness as an extenuating circumstance, sentenced him to Bilibid for three years and six months,
with P100 fine, and sentenced Blas Ausina to four years two months and one day, together with a like
fine. The prosecution was under the Penal Code.

The defense rests upon points of law: First. That within his own house a man’s person in sacred and
he may conduct himself as he pleases. The inviolability of a dwelling has been well explained in United
States v. Arceo (3 Phil. Rep., 381), but while it may he true in general that "a man’s house is his
castle," it is equally true that he may not use that castle as a citadel for aggression against his
neighbors, nor can he within its walls create such disorder as to affect their peace. It is clear from the
testimony that in this case the behavior of the defendant amounted to more than private misconduct
and constituted a public annoyance and a breach of the peace of the neighborhood.

Second. It is further urged that even for a breach of the peace the policemen had no right to arrest
without a warrant and that in doing so they acted without authority, so that resistance to them was
lawful. Municipal police in the Philippines hold office under the statutes of the Commission, by which
their powers are supposed to be defined, and which may be construed in the light of American law. It
is axiomatic in the law of England and America that a peace officer may arrest without warrant for a
breach of the peace committed in his presence, but it is contended that municipal policemen outside of
Manila have not conferred upon them by statute any such powers. The extent to which police officers
may go in the city of Manila is considered in the case of the United States v. Alexander (8 Phil. Rep.,
29), in which the policeman was held empowered to arrest without warrant for breach of municipal
ordinances committed in his presence. And their powers in other municipalities may be implied from
our decision in United States v. Burgueta (10 Phil. Rep., 188.)

The law for municipalities in general gives the municipal council power to established, regulate, and
maintain a police department to promote the prosperity, improve the orals, peace, good order,
comfort, and convenience of the township and inhabitants thereof, and to enforce obedience thereto
with such lawful fines and penalties as the council may prescribe. (Act No. 82, sec. 39, subdivision t,
dd, and jj.)

There is nowhere any express definition of the word "policeman," not any specification of his powers,
which therefor, are left to be inferred from the common law or to be taken from the express provisions
of local; ordinances. In the municipality of Polangui, ordinances had been passed;prohibiting
disturbances of public order, drunkenness, and indecent behavior "in a public place or in a place which
is in view if the public," but the papers before us disclose no ordinance or regulation directing the
police when to act, or empowering a policeman in any instance to arrest without a warrant. Thus, in
the absence of any legislation by the commission or by the municipal council, we are thrown back on
the common law powers of the officer.

Among the public officers who may arrest for a felony or a breach of the peace in their presence are
the sheriff, the coroner and the constable(2 Blackstone’s Com. 292), who are included in the technical
term "peace officers," and the general trend of American decisions appears to be that local officers
such as policemen who are neither sheriffs, coroners, nor constables shall not be presumed to have
such power without a statutory grant of it. There are, on the other hand, decisions indicating that
what the law looks to is the character of the duty to be discharged by the officers, rather than the
name under which he acts, and that all officers that all officers having the general attributes of
constables may be inferred to be clothed with their ordinary powers of arrest. Whatever may be the
historically theory on any on the of the several States of the Union, we think that, under the
circumstances existing in these Islands, in the absence of an express legislative definition of the
faculties of police officers, they must be assumed top possess those powers necessary to the
convenient exercise of the duties for which their offices were created. The creation of the office of
policeman implies the ability of the incumbent to perform the functions usually inherent in it, and
wherever in any American jurisdiction we find such powers in terms conferred by a legislative grant,
they appear uniformly to include those proper to peace officers, and among these none is more
important that the power to make arrests. See for example the Constabulary Act, No. 175. We
therefore hold that, in the absence of any other disposition in the statutes or in the local ordinances, a
duly appointed police officer in these Islands has those powers which, under the common law of
England and America, belong to a peace officer, and among them the power to arrest without warrant
for offenses of this nature committed in his presence.

Third. The accused, Vallejo, set up as a further defense double jeopardy, alleging a former conviction
under the municipal ordinance as a bar to his prosecution under the Penal Code. The merits of that
contention are covered by our discussion in the case of the united States v. Gavieres (10 Phil. Rep.,
694), on which the majority of the court held that the double prosecution under a municipal ordinance
and a general law would lie, and although that decision is now on appeal to the supreme Court of the
United States, we regard it as binding upon us in the present case, so that the defense must be
overruled.
It has been suggested that is unnecessary to rely upon the Gavieres case, inasmuch as it will bear a
distinction from the one before us, on the ground that, while the conviction of Gavieres was for one
act viewed in two different aspects, in the present case the act of resistance to the policemen, which
characterizes the offense under the Penal Code, did not necessarily enter into the disorderly conduct
of the defendants, which indeed preceded the appearance of the policemen, and was not therefore to
be considered as part of the same act. But a reference to the complaint before the justice of the peace
in the first prosecution shows that this resistance was there specified as a constituent part of the
disorder, and for this reason the suggested distinction between the two cases can not be accepted as
wholly satisfactory.

The offense of Vallejo falls under the second paragraph of article "249 of the Penal Code, as it
amounted to a resistance to public officers while executing their duty. As he has been proved to be a
public official, that is, a sanitary officer duly commissioned, he comes within subdivision second of
article 250, entailing upon him an increased punishment, while on the other hand, having been
intoxicated, without being an habitual drunkard, he is entitled to that as one extenuating
circumstance. He is sentenced to prision mayor for two years, four months and one day, with a fine of
P100. In the case of Blas Ausina, no one of the circumstances specified in the four numbered
paragraphs of article 250 exists, and therefore he is sentenced to prision correccional for one year
eight months and twenty-one days, and a fine of P100; each of the defendants to pay one-half of the
costs. The sentence of the court below is revoked in so far as it may be in conflict with the foregoing,
and in all other respects, as modified thereby, is affirmed. So ordered.

64 Phil. 33 (1937)

ARRESTS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES > Examination of witnesses

Facts: The Anti-Usury Board of the Department of Justice presented to Judge David a sworn
affidavit that a certain Narciso Alvarez is in possession of books, receipts, chits, lists used by
him as money lender/usurer charging usurious rates in violation of law. Affiant Almeda, chief of
the task force, didn’t say that the information was based on his personal knowledge but was only
received by him from a reliable source. Subsequently, the judge issued the warrant ordering the
search of Alvarez’ house. On June 4, 1936, the agents raided the subject place and seized
different documents namely, banknotes, bankbooks, stubs, cashbooks, bills of lading, credit
receipts, etc. Thereafter, the articles seized was not brought immediately to the custody of the
judge who issued the SW. Alvarez moved that the agents of the Board be declared guilty of
contempt and prays that all articles in question be returned to him because the SW issued was
illegal. On the other hand, the Anti-Usury Board pleaded that they be allowed to retain custody
of the articles seized for further investigation. When the judge sustained the latter’s motion.
Alvarez elevated the matter to the SC and prayed that the search warrant as well as the order of
the judge authorizing the Anti-Usury Board to retain custody be declared null and void.

Issue: Whether the SW issued by the judge is illegal for having solely as basis the affidavit of
Agent Almeda in whose oath the latter declared that he had no personal knowledge of the facts
which were to serve as basis for the issuance of the warrant but he had knowledge thereof only
through information secured from a person whom he considered reliable.
Ruling: For the foregoing considerations, the search warrant and the seizure of June 3, 1936, and the
orders of the respondent court authorizing the relation of the books and documents, are declared illegal
and are set aside, and it is ordered that the judge presiding over the Court of First Instance of Tayabas
direct the immediate return to the petitioner of the nineteen (19) documents designated on pages 1 to
4 of the inventory by Nos. 5, 10, 16, 23, 25,26, 27, 30, 31, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43 and 45,
without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

Ruling: Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and Section 97 of General
Orders 58 require that there be not only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant
but that the search warrant must be based upon an application supported by oath of the applicant
and the witnesses he may produce. In its broadest sense, an oath includes any form of attestation
by which a party signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully and
truthfully; and it is sometimes defined as an outward pledge given by the person taking it that his
attestation or promise is made under an immediate sense of his responsibility to God. The oath
required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner
or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not
the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence
of probable cause. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a
search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be
charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused. The affidavit, which served
as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the
manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, the search warrant and the subsequent seizure
of the books, documents and other papers are illegal. Further, it is the practice in this jurisdiction
to attach the affidavit of at least the applicant or complainant to the application. It is admitted
that the judge who issued the search warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon the affidavit
made by agent Almeda and that he did not require nor take the deposition of any other witness.
The Constitution does not provide that it is of an imperative necessity to take the depositions of
the witnesses to be presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit of the
latter. The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to
satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of
the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other witnesses.
Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent was insufficient because his knowledge of the facts was
not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more
witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance
of the search warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains sufficient facts
within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists
probable cause; when the applicant’s knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one
or more witnesses having a personal knowledge of the facts is necessary. Thus the warrant issued
is likewise illegal because it was based only on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal
knowledge of the facts

Stonehill v. Diokno Digest

Stonehill v. Diokno
20 SCRA 283 (1967)

Concepcion, CJ

Facts:

1. Respondent (porsecution) made possible the issuance of 42 search warrants

against the petitioner and the corporation to search persons and premises of
several personal properties due to an alleged violation of Central Bank Laws,
Tariff and Custom Laws, Internal Revenue Code and the Revised Penal Code of the
Philippines. As a results, search and seizures were conducted in the both the
residence of the petitioner and in the corporation's premises.

2.The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as their
issuance violated the Constitution and the Rules of Court for being general
warrants. Thus,he filed a petition with the Supreme Court for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus and injunction to prevent the seized effects from being
introduced as evidence in the deportation cases against the petitioner. The court
issued the writ only for those effects found in the petitioner's residence.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can validly assail the legality of the search
and seizure in both premises
The SC ruled in favor of Stonehill et. al., reversing the
M o n c a d o doctrine.

RULING: No, he can only assail the search conducted in the residences but not
those done in the corporation's premises. The petitioner has no cause of action in
the second situation since a corporation has a personality separate and distinct
from the personality of its officers or herein petitioner regardless of the amount
of shares of stock or interest of each in the said corporation, and whatever office
they hold therein. Only the party whose rights has been impaired can validly
object the legality of a seizure--a purely personal right which cannot be exercised
by a third party. The right to object belongs to the corporation ( for the 1st group
of documents, papers, and things seized from the offices and the premises).