RULE 11.01 A Lawyer shall appear in court properly attired.

1. Duty to be Properly Attired in Court – Proper attire for male lawyers would be either the Barong Tagalog or the suit with tie.
For the lady lawyers, the appropriate business attire would be proper. In general, the proper attire would be the contemporary
business suit. A lawyer not wearing the proper attire in court may be held in contempt of court. He would usually be ordered to
leave the court and return when properly attired. In addition to the clothes, the lawyer must be clean, neat and well-groomed.

RULE 11.02 A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings.

1. Duty to be Punctual at Hearings. – A lawyer who is not punctual in court hearings does so at his own peril. Punctuality is
demanded by the respect which a lawyer owes to the court, to the opposing counsel and to all the parties to the case. It is not an
excuse that his tardiness was caused by matters which could reasonably be foreseen or anticipated, such as the traffic or the
breakdown of his vehicle. A lawyer must be diligent in ensuring his punctuality by being aware of his schedules for the day and
the reasonable travel time to and from his appointments.

RULE 11.05 A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper authorities only

Constitution, Art. VIII, sec. 6: The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.

- By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judge’s and court personnel’s compliance with all laws,
and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government
may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Canon 12 Assist in Speedy and Efficient Administration of Justice

Canon 12 – A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.

Rule 138 sec. 20 (g) Rules of Court:

(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding, or delay any man's cause, from any
corrupt motive or interest

Constitution, Art. III, sec. 16: All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies.

Notes: While lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their client’s right, they should
not forget that they are, first and foremost, officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. (Foronda v. Guerrero) Lawyers should not attempt to befuddle the issues of a case. Such a tactic will only betray
the inherent weakness of the cause of the party resorting to them. (Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete)

The speedy and efficient administration of justice is, however, the duty not only of the lawyer but also of the judge as well.

Rule 12.01 Adequate Preparation

RULE 12.01 A lawyer shall not appear for trial unless he has adequately prepared himself on the law and the facts of his case, the
evidence he will adduce and the order of its preference. He should also be ready with the original documents for comparison with the
copies.

1. Duty to be Prepared for Trial. – A lawyer’s toil and hard work begins with the preparation. The lawyer first studies the facts of
the case, as presented to him by the client and by his own independent assessment. He then studies the laws applicable. Having

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 studies the facts and the laws applicable, he then writes his notes from which he will then write his pleadings or memorandum.
The process is tedious and demanding in time. Each lawyer, however, may find his reward in different ways. For some, it may be
the work which he finds fulfilling. For another, it may be the financial compensation which he collects from his clients. For others,
it may be the simple joy in seeing that justice is done.

Rule 12.05- Rule 12.07- Proper Behavior - PD1829 Penalizing Obstruction of Justice

RULE 12.05 A lawyer shall refrain from talking to his witness during a break or recess in the trial, while the witness is still under
examination.

1. Duty Not to Coach a Witness Under Examination: Witness Preparation distinguished from Witness Coaching

Witness preparation is properly done when the attorney is helping the witness communicate the truth. Witness coaching, on the
other hand, is perceived as obfuscating the truth or instructing the witness to lie.

RULE 12.06 A lawyer shall now knowingly assist a witness to misrepresent himself or to impersonate another

1. Duty Not to Present a False Witness

RULE 12.07 A lawyer shall not abuse, browbeat or harass a witness nor needlessly inconvenience him.

1. Duty To Respect Witness

MALACAÑANG

Manila

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1829

PENALIZING OBSTRUCTION OF APPREHENSION AND PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS

WHEREAS, crime and violence continue to proliferate despite the sustained vigorous efforts of the government to effectively contain
them;

WHEREAS, to discourage public indifference or apathy towards the apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders, it is necessary to
penalize acts which obstruct or frustrate or tend to obstruct or frustrate the successful apprehension and prosecution of criminal
offenders;

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NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND, E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law do hereby decree
and order the following:

Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be
imposed upon any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the
investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:

(a) preventing witnesses from testifying in any criminal proceeding or from reporting the commission of any offense or the identity of any
offender/s by means of bribery, misrepresentation, deceit, intimidation, force or threats;

(b) altering, destroying, suppressing or concealing any paper, record, document, or object, with intent to impair its verity, authenticity,
legibility, availability, or admissibility as evidence in any investigation of or official proceedings in, criminal cases, or to be used in the
investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases;

(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has reasonable ground to believe or suspect, has
committed any offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest prosecution and conviction;

(d) publicly using a fictitious name for the purpose of concealing a crime, evading prosecution or the execution of a judgment, or
concealing his true name and other personal circumstances for the same purpose or purposes;

(e) delaying the prosecution of criminal cases by obstructing the service of process or court orders or disturbing proceedings in the fiscal's
offices, in Tanodbayan, or in the courts;

(f) making, presenting or using any record, document, paper or object with knowledge of its falsity and with intent to affect the course or
outcome of the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases;

(g) soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept any benefit in consideration of abstaining from, discounting, or impeding the prosecution of
a criminal offender;

(h) threatening directly or indirectly another with the infliction of any wrong upon his person, honor or property or that of any immediate
member or members of his family in order to prevent such person from appearing in the investigation of, or official proceedings in,
criminal cases, or imposing a condition, whether lawful or unlawful, in order to prevent a person from appearing in the investigation of or
in official proceedings in, criminal cases;

(i) giving of false or fabricated information to mislead or prevent the law enforcement agencies from apprehending the offender or from
protecting the life or property of the victim; or fabricating information from the data gathered in confidence by investigating authorities
for purposes of background information and not for publication and publishing or disseminating the same to mislead the investigator or to
the court.

If any of the acts mentioned herein is penalized by any other law with a higher penalty, the higher penalty shall be imposed.

Section 2. If any of the foregoing acts is committed by a public official or employee, he shall in addition to the penalties provided
thereunder, suffer perpetual disqualification from holding public office.

Section 3. This Decree shall take effect immediately.

Done in the City of Manila, this 16th day of January, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-one.

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CASE: Montecillo v. Gica AUTHOR: Lew Earvin Manarin

GR NO: G.R. No. L-36800 DATE: October 21, 1974 # f Pages (Full Text): 8 pages

TOPIC: Canon 11.03 – Proper Language and Behavior NOTES:

PONENTE: Esguerra, J.

FACTS:

Jorge Montecillo was accused by Francisco Gica of slander. Atty. Quirico del Mar represented Montecillo and he successfully defended
Monteceillo in the lower court. Del Mar was even able to win their counterclaim thus the lower court ordered Gica to pay Montecillo the
adjudged moral damages.

Gica appealed the award of damages to the Court of Appeals where the latter court reversed the same. Atty. Del Mar then filed a motion
for reconsideration where he made a veiled threat against the Court of Appeals judges intimating that he thinks the CA justices “knowingly
rendered an unjust decision” and “judgment has been rendered through negligence” and that the CA allowed itself to be deceived.

The CA denied the MFR and it admonished Atty. Del Mar from using such tone with the court. Del Mar then filed a second MFR where he
again made threats. The CA then ordered del Mar to show cause as to why he should not be punished for contempt.

Thereafter, del Mar sent the three CA justices a copy of a letter which he sent to the President of the Philippines asking the said justices to
consider the CA judgment. But the CA did not reverse its judgment. Del Mar then filed a civil case against the three justices of the CA
before a Cebu lower court but the civil case was eventually dismissed by reason of a compromise agreement where del Mar agreed to pay
damages to the justices. Eventually, the CA suspended Atty. Del Mar from practice.

The issue reached the Supreme Court. Del Mar asked the SC to reverse his suspension as well as the CA decision as to the Montecillo case.
The SC denied both and this earned the ire of del Mar as he demanded from the Clerk of the Supreme Court as to who were the judges
who voted against him.

The Supreme Court then directed del Mar to submit an explanation as to why he should not be disciplined. Del Mar in his explanation
instead tried to justify his actions even stating that had he not been “convinced that human efforts in [pursuing the case] will be fruitless”
he would have continued with the civil case against the CA justices. In his explanation, del Mar also intimated that even the Supreme Court
is part among “the corrupt, the grafters and those allegedly committing injustice”.

Del Mar even filed a civil case against some Supreme Court justices but the judge who handled the case dismissed the same.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not Atty. Del Mar should be suspended for his actions towards the Courts?

HELD: Yes

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 46504-R, dated March 5, 1973, suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar from
the practice of law, as implemented by Our resolution of November 19, 1973, is hereby affirmed.

Respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar for his misconduct towards the Supreme Court, shall be, as he is hereby, suspended from the practice of

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law until further orders of this Court, such suspension to take effect immediately. (In re Almacen, No.L-27654, Feb. 18, 1970, 31 SCRA, p.
562.)

The Judicial Consultant of this Court is directed to circularize all courts and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines regarding the indefinite
suspension of Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law.

SO ORDERED.

RATIO:

Yes. Atty. Del Mar, by his contemptuous acts is in violation of his duties to the courts. As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral
duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily the high esteem and regard towards the court so essential to the proper administration of
justice.

It is manifest that del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Courts of the land when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a
case, he proceeded to challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short, his
allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case of his client.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE (Related to the Topic):

Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

CASE: SANGALANG v. IAC AUTHOR: FRANZ OFFEMARIA

GR NO: 71169 DATE: December 22, 1988 # f Pages (Full Text): 23

TOPIC: 11.03 – Proper language and behavior NOTES:

PONENTE: SARMIENTO

FACTS:

The incident before the Court refers to charges for contempt against Atty. J. Cezar Sangco, counsel for the petitioners Spouses Jose and
Lutgarda Sangalang.

On February 2, 1989, the Court issued a Resolution, requiring, among other things, Atty. Sangco to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt "for using intemperate and accusatory language." On March 2, 1989, Atty. Sangco filed an explanation.

The Court finds Atty. Sangco's remarks in his motion for reconsideration, particularly, “ The Court not only put to serious question its own
integrity and competence but also jeopardized its own campaign against graft and corruption undeniably pervading the judiciary”
disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled-for. His suggestions that the Court might have been guilty of graft and corruption in acting on
these cases are not only unbecoming, but comes, as well, as an open assault upon the Court's honor and integrity.

ISSUE(S): Whether or not the counsel’s act constitutes malpractice in violation of the Code’s (CPR) provision on the use of scandalous
offensive or menacing language or behavior before the courts.

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Held: Yes

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, these petitions are DENIED No pronouncement as to costs.

RATIO:

In rendering its judgment, the Court yielded to the records before it, and to the records alone, and not to outside influences, much less,
the influence of any of the parties. Atty. Sangco, as a former judge of an inferior court, should know better that in anylitigation, one party
prevails, but his success will not justifyindictments of bribery by the other party. He should be aware that because of his accusations, he
has done an enormous disservice to the integrity of the highest tribunal and to the stability of the administration of justice in general.

Atty. Sangco is entitled to his opinion, but not to a license to insult the Court with derogatory statements and recourses to argumenta ad
hominem. In that event, it is the Court's duty "to act to preserve the honor and dignity and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal
profession."

The Court in their "show-cause" Resolution, they sought to hold Atty. Sangco in contempt, specifically, for resort to insulting language
amounting to disrespect toward the Court within the meaning of Section 1, of Rule 71, of the Rules of Court. Clearly, however, his act also
constitutes malpractice as the term is defined by Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE (Related to the Topic)

Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

CASE: In Re Almacen AUTHOR: Claude P

GR NO: L-27654 DATE: February 18, 1970 NOTES:

TOPIC: Proper Language and Behavior

PONENTE: CASTRO, J.

FACTS: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen is before the court for proceedings on disciplinary action for abuse of language and questionable
behavior against the Courts. When he lost in a Civil Case for his Client Virginia Yaptinchay, he filed for a Motion for Reconsideration in
which he failed to indicate the time and place of the hearing; causing the motion to be denied. The Court of Appeals also denied the
same in concurrence with the Trial Court. Until the level of the Supreme Court, he was also outrightly denied in a minute resolution.

As a result, he filed a petition to surrender his lawyer’s certificate, while claiming that it is useless to practice the profession because
the Court, as he describes, are "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own
applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." He also described his client (Virginia
Yaptinchay) to be deeply aggrieved by the Court's "unjust judgment," from becoming "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of
hypocrisy " He also said that “justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf
and dumb."

While the Supreme Court waited for the actual surrender prior to taking action on the petition, Almacen never surrendered the
certificate as he “has chosen not to”. In an unapologetic manner, he also asked permission to be given a space to show cause why no

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disciplinary action should be taken against him.

ISSUE(S): Whether of Not Atty. Almacen should be disciplined for his language and behavior against the Court

HELD: Yes

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby, suspended
from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.

RATIO:

The misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity which cannot be overemphasized. His demonstrated
persistence in his misconduct by neither manifesting repentance nor offering apology therefor leave the Court no way of determining
how long the suspension should last.

As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew — or ought to have known — that for a
motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period of appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy of the motion upon
the adverse party, but also notify the adverse party of the time and place of hearing.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the
— assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers — even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.

Unjust criticism, insulting language, and offensive conduct toward the judges personally by attorneys, who are officers of the court,
which tend to bring the courts and the law into disrepute and to destroy public confidence in their integrity, cannot be permitted.

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

CASE: Soriano and Padilla v CA AUTHOR: puno

GR NO: G. R. No. 100633 DATE: # f Pages (Full Text): 18

TOPIC: 11.03 Proper Language and Behavior NOTES:

PONENTE:

FACTS:

Main issue not related to legprof but just in case: Deogracias and Rosalinan Reyes were employed by Soriano. The latter gave them a
one-apartment unit as payment for their services. She later reneged on this obligation. Later on, the couple became indebted to Soriano
so they mortgaged their properties to her. She allegedly give a deed of absolute sale instead of a real estate mortgage. During the
hearing, the Carmelite Sisters, benefactor of Soccoro, talked to respondent Judge Naval in his chambers and requested him to
immediately act on Socorros urgent ex-parte motion for a restraining order. Judge Naval told the Carmelite Sisters that he could not issue
the ex-parterestraining order because a Supreme Court administrative circular required a hearing with notice to the adverse party. To this
statement, Sister Margaret Mary retorted, Why would Atty. Padilla (Socorros counsel, Atty. Sabino Padilla, Jr.) ask for an ex-parte
restraining order when according to you that is prohibited by an order or circular of the Supreme Court? Do you mean Atty. Padilla does

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not even know that there is such an order or circular, when he has a brother in the Supreme Court (Associate Justice Teodoro Padilla).[30]
Facts related to the topic:

Socorro, through counsel, Atty. Padilla, filed a motion to inhibit Judge Naval praying that the ends of justice would best be served if
the case was re-raffled to another judge. Basically, the grounds cited were: First, while still a law practitioner and politician, Judge Naval
was a frequent customer of the restaurant owned by Deogracias and was a good friend of his. Second, Judge Naval was also a close friend
of Rosalina and Deogracias attorney, Atty. Dennis B. Recon. This was later dismissed.
In the case proper, Atty. Padilla kept asking for extension of the submission to file a responsive pleading and for the resetting of the
pre-trial. On December 15, 1989, only Deogracias, Rosalina and their counsel appeared during the pre-trial conference. The trial court
postponed the pre-trial since there was no showing that Socorro and Atty. Padilla were notified thereof. Subsequently, Atty. Padilla
admitted receipt of notice but reasoned that he received such only on the very same date of the pre-trial. On January 5, 1990, the same
incident occurred and pre-trial was re-set. Atty. Padilla claimed that they did not appear during the scheduled pre-trial since they received
notice thereof five (5) days after

On February 2, 1990, Socorro, through Atty. Padilla, mailed her ex-parte motion to reset the scheduled hearing.[54] The trial court
received the motion on February 7, 1990. On February 27, 1990, Atty. Padilla did not appear before the court. The court appointed a
counsel-de-oficio for Atty. Padilla, promulgated judgment against him, found him guilty of direct contempt and sentenced him to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine of one hundred pesos (P100.00)

Atty. Padilla then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and mandamus with temporary restraining order. Socorro
assailed the following orders of Judge Naval which included his citing of direct contempt but the CA dismissed the case. He then filed the
case with SC assailing the dismissal made by CA.

ISSUE(S): Whether the trial court gravely abused its discretion and acted in excess of jurisdiction in finding Atty. Sabino Padilla,
Jr. guilty of direct contempt.

HELD: Yes

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition in G. R. No. 100633 is PARTLY GRANTED. The petition in G. R. No. 101550 is
DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 20236, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the trial courts order
finding Atty. Sabino Padilla, Jr. guilty of direct contempt of court and imposing on him imprisonment for five (5) days, and ordering him
to pay a fine of one hundred pesos (P100.00) is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. With admonition to the trial court and counsel to observe
strictly the strictures of the ethics of the profession.

RATIO:

The Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the trial courts finding of direct contempt of court against Atty. Padilla.Rule 71, Section
1 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: Section 1. Direct contempt punished summarily - A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence
of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court.xxx
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts judgment on direct contempt on two grounds. [81] We quote[82]:

xxx 2. Pursuing relentlessly his design to embarrass this Presiding Judge by claiming in his Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration dated
August 26, 1989 that this Presiding Judge could not correctly understand the clearly worded Administrative Circular No. 1 of the Supreme
Court.

3. Alleging in disrespectful and insulting manner in his Omnibus Motion for Recommendation dated August 26, 1989 the following:

After a perusal of the charges of direct contempt of court, we find that Atty. Padillas innuendoes are not necessarily disrespectful to

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the court as to be considered contumacious. A lawyers remarks explaining his position in a case under consideration do not necessarily
assume the level of contempt that justifies the court to exercise the power of contempt. [83]Courts must be slow to punish for direct
contempt. This drastic power must be used sparingly in cases of clearly contumacious behavior in facie curiae.[84] The salutary rule is that
the power to punish for contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle, [85] and on the corrective and not
retaliatory idea of punishment.[86] The courts must exercise the power to punish for contempt for purposes that are impersonal because
that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.[87]
Snide remarks or even sarcastic innuendoes do not necessarily assume that level of contumely actionable under Rule 71 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Judges generally and wisely pass unnoticed any mere hasty and unguarded expression of passion, or at least pass
it with simply a reproof. In the natural order of things, when a case is decided, one party wins and another loses, and oftentimes, both
sides are equally confident and sanguine. Thus, disappointment is great for the party whose action or view fails. It is human nature that
there be bitter feelings which often reach to the judge as the source of the supposed wrong. A judge, therefore, ought to be patient, and
tolerate everything which appears as but a momentary outbreak of disappointment. [88]
Lawyers may not be held to too strict an account for words said in the heat of the moment, because of chagrin at losing cases, and
that the big way is for the court to condone even contemptuous language. [89] While judges must exercise patience, lawyers must also
observe temperate language as well.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE (Related to the Topic):

Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct
by others.

A lawyer is an officer of the Court,[90] bound by the law. It is a lawyers sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy
unnecessarily the high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice. [91]
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the
judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance. [92] It is peculiarly incumbent for lawyers to support the courts against
unjust criticism and clamor.[93]
It may happen that counsel possesses a greater knowledge of the law than the judge who presides over the court. It may also
happen that since no court claims infallibility, judges may grossly err in their decision. Nevertheless, discipline and self-restraint on the
part of the bar even under adverse conditions are necessary for the orderly administration of justice. [94]Malicious attacks on courts have
in some cases been treated as libel, in other cases as contempt of court, and as a sufficient ground for disbarment. [95] However, mere
criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in
good faith may be tolerated.[96]
This is not to say that courts are above criticism. As a citizen and as an officer of the court, a lawyer may criticize the court. He must
do so in a bona fide manner, uberrima fides. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism on the one hand, and abuse and slander of the
courts and of the judges thereof on the other.[97] Unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteem in the courts, or creates or
promotes distrust in judicial administration is proscribed.[98]

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

NO DIGEST YET: LACUROM VS JACOBA : LECH QUIAMBAO

CASE: In re Aguas AUTHOR: PTQ

G.R. No. 12 DATE: August 8, 1901 NOTES:
FULL TEXT – read nalang 1 page lang to eh mahaba pa digest
TOPIC: hehehe
Rule 11.04. A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge
motives not supported by the record or have no http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1901/aug1901/gr_12_1901.

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 materiality to the case. html

PONENTE: SMITH, J. :

FACTS:
From the record during the progress of the trial before the Court of First instance in Pampanga, the court had occasion to caution
Angel Alberto, a witness in the case, not to look at the attorney for the defendant but to fix his attention on the !udge who was at
the time exaamining him. The witness did not give heed of the warning, there upon the judge arose from his seat and approach the
witness, seized him by the shoulders and using the expression “lingon ang mucha” - look at me - either shook him, as insisted by
the attorney of the defendant, or only turned him about, as claimed by the judge and others whether the witness was shaken or
not, at all elements seizing him & brought the action and protest against the action of the judge as coercive of the witness and
demanded that a record be made of the occurrence and that the further hearing of the case be postponed" Two days after the
clerk of court entered a record a recital of the incident and a statement that on other and prior occasion, the attorney, Marcelino
Aguas had been wanting in respect to the court by making use of improper phrases and by interrupting the opposing counsel in the
examination of the witness. The lower court adjudged the attorney to be in contempt of court and suspended him from practice of
his profession for a period of 20 days. The attorney appealed but his appeal has been denied by the lower court, he asked to be
heard in justification which was granted.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the attorney is disrespectful to the court?
Whether or not he had the right to protest and to demand that the incident be made a matter of record?

HELD:
No
Yes
The opinion of the court that the action of the judge in seizing Alberto Aguas by the shoulder and turning him about was
unwarranted and an interference with that freedom from unlawful personal violence to which every witness is entitled while giving
testimony in a court of justice. Against such conduct the appellant had the right to pretest and to demand that the incident be
made a matter of record, what he did so was not contempt, providing protest and demand were respectfully made and with due
regard for the dignity of the court.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

The judgment appealed from must therefore be reversed, and it is so ordered, with costs de oficio.

RATIO:
While lawyers are prohibited to attribute motives to a judge not supported by the record, lawyers must however be courageous
enough to expose arbitrariness and injustices of courts and judges

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE (Related to the Topic):

Rule 11.04. A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.

The rule allows such criticism so long as it is supported by the record or it is material to the case. A lawyer’s right to criticize the
acts of courts and judges in a proper and respectful way and through legitimate channels is well recognized. [Agpalo]

1. CONTEMPT OF COURT; TREATMENT OF WITNESS. — An attorney may rightfully protest against personal violence to a witness at
the hands of the court, and such protest, if respectful, is not contempt of court.

2. ID.; FINDINGS OF FACT. — A finding that an attorney’s attitude toward the court was "menacing" is a mere conclusion and will

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not support a judgment of contempt.

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

CASE: Judge Cervantes v. Atty. Sabio AUTHOR: Minerva J. Raneses

GR NO: A.C. No. 7828 DATE: August 11, 2008 # f Pages (Full Text): 5

TOPIC: 11.04 -- Not to Attribute to Judge Motives NOTES:

PONENTE: Carpio Morales

FACTS:

Before his optional retirement, Judge Cervantes had been handling the ejectment cases of Extra-Ordinary Development
Corporation (EDC) against clients of Atty. Sabio. It appears that respondent had filed motions for inhibition of complainant on the
basis of the fact that EDC gave him a house and lot putting into serious doubt his impartiality, independence and integrity. The
motions were denied.

After the judge’s retirement, Atty. Sabio sought the investigation of the former for bribery. In support of the charge, respondent
submitted a Sinumpaang Salaysay of Edwin P. Cardeo, a utility worker in the MTC of Cabuyao, stating that,

1) orders and decisions of Judge Cervantes were not generated from the typewriter of the court but from a computer which
the court did not have;
2) that there had been many times that a certain Alex of EDC would go to the court bearing certain papers for the signature
of Judge Cervantes;
3) that he came to learn that a consideration of P500.00 would be given for every order or decision released by Judge
Cervantes in favor of EDC;
4) and that he also came to know that attempts at postponing the hearings of Judge Cervantes filed by EDC were thwarted by
the Judge himself as he wanted to expedite the disposition thereof.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, the complaint being
unsubstantiated and motivated by plain unfounded suspicion, and for having been filed after the effectivity of his optional
retirement.

Judge Cervantes, in retaliation, filed a complaint against Atty. Sabio for disbarment, which was referred to the IBP.

Finding respondent’s complaint unsubstantiated and motivated by plain, unfounded suspicion, the Investigating Commissioner
concluded that respondent knowingly instituted not only a groundless suit against herein complainant, but also a suit based simply
on his bare suspicion and speculation -- that he violated Canons 10, 11, & 12 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility under his oath of office. He accordingly recommended that respondent be fined in the amount of P5,000, with a
stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

ISSUE(S): Whether or not the Atty. Sabio is in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility by willingly and knowingly filing a
groundless suit.

HELD: Yes/No

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Jude Josue L. Sabio, is FINED in the amount of Five Thousand (P5,000)
Pesos, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar questioned act will be dealt with more severely.

RATIO: No doubt, it is this Courts duty to investigate the truth behind charges against judges and lawyers. But it is also its duty to

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shield them from unfounded suits which are intended to, among other things, harass them.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE (Related to the Topic):

Canon 11.04 - Rule 11.04 - A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to the
case.

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

CASE: Maceda v. Vasquez AUTHOR: Leigh Reyes

GR NO: 102781. April 22, 1993 # f Pages (Full Text): 3

TOPIC: GRIEVANCES AGAINST JUDGE NOTES: *Actually di talaga yung Rule 11.05 yung main topic
pero ito yung punto nung Rule  hahaha
PONENTE:

FACTS:

Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Antique, seeks the review of the
following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman:

(1) the Order dated September 18, 1991 denying the ex-parte motion to refer to the Supreme Court filed by petitioner

(2) the Order dated November 22, 1951 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his counter-
affidavit and other controverting evidences.

Atty Abiera in his affidavit-complaint dated April 18, 1991 filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, respondent Napoleon A.
Abiera of the Public Attorney’s Office alleged that petitioner had falsified his Certificate of Service 1 dated February 6, 1989, by
certifying “that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision or determination for a period of 90 days have been
determined and decided on or before January 31, 1998,” when in truth and in fact, petitioner knew that no decision had been
rendered in five (5) civil and ten (10) criminal cases that have been submitted for decision.

Respondent Abiera further alleged that petitioner similarly falsified his certificates of service for the months of February, April, May,
June, July and August, all in 1989; and the months beginning January up to September 1990, or for a total of seventeen (17) months.

On the other hand, petitioner contends that he had been granted by the Supreme Court an extension of ninety (90) days to decide
the aforementioned cases.

ISSUE(S): Whether or not Atty Abiera violated Rule 11.05 that says, “ A Lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper
authorities only.

HELD: Yes, All grievances against judges must be presented before the Supreme Court as a disciplining authority over all courts and
its personnel

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Ombudsman is hereby directed to dismiss the
complaint filed by public respondent Atty. Napoleon A. Abiera and to refer the same to this Court for appropriate action.

RATIO:

JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE OFFENSE RELATED TO OFFICIAL DUTIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION TAKEN AGAINST

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JUDGE BY SUPREME COURT; REASON. — However, We agree with petitioner that in the absence of any administrative action taken
against him by this Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches
into the Court's power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of
powers.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE (Related to the Topic):

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

CASE: CONCORDIA B. GARCIA, complainant, vs. ATTY. CRISANTO AUTHOR: SAMPATON

L. FRANCISCO, respondent.
# f Pages (Full Text): 3
GR NO: A.C. No. 3923 DATE: March 30, 1993
NOTES:

TOPIC: Rule 12.02 - A lawyer shall not file multiple actions

arising from the same cause
Please refer to the full text on cases filed vice versa

FACTS:

In a sworn complaint filed with the Court on October 6, 1992, Concordia B. Garcia seeks the disbarment of Atty. Crisanto L.
Francisco.

On March 9, 1964, Concordia B. Garcia and her husband Godofredo, the Dionisio spouses, and Felisa and Magdalena Baetiong
leashed a parcel of land to Sotero Baluyot Lee for a period of 25 years beginning May 1, 1964. Despite repeated verbal and written
demands, Lee refused to vacate after the expiration of the lease. Lee claimed that he had an option to extend the lease for another
5 years and the right of pre-emption over the property.

In this disbarment case, the complainant claims that Lee's counsel, respondent Francisco, commenced various suits before different
courts to thwart Garcia's right to regain her property and that all these proceedings were decided against Lee. The proceedings
stemmed from the said lease contract and involved the same issues and parties, thus violating the proscription against forum-
shopping.

Respondent, in his comment, says that he inserted in defense of his client's right only such remedies as were authorized by law.

ISSUE(S): Whether or not the Atty. Francisco violaed Canon rule 12.02 of CPR?

HELD: Yes

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED for ONE YEAR from the practice of law and from the enjoyment of all
the rights and privileges appurtenant to membership in the Philippine bar.
RULING:

The cause of the respondent's client in obviously without merit. The respondent was aware of this fact when he wilfully resorted to
the gambits summarized above, continuously seeking relief that was consistently denied, as he should have expected. He thereby
added to the already clogged dockets of the courts and wasted their valuable time. He also caused much inconvenience and

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expense to the complainant, who was obliged to defend herself against his every move.

By grossly abusing his right of recourse to the courts for the purpose of arguing a cause that had been repeatedly rebuffed, he was
disdaining the obligation of the lawyer to maintain only such actions or proceedings as appear to him to be just and such defense
only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law. By violating his oath not to delay any man for money or malice, he has
besmirched the name of an honorable profession and has proved himself unworthy of trust reposed in him by law as an officer of
the Court.

Atty. Crisanto l. Francisco took his oath as a lawyer on March 2, 1956. Considering his age and experience in the practice of the
laws, he should have known better than to trifle with it and to use it as an instrument for harassment of the complainant and the
misuse of judicial processes. For this serious transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he deserves to be sanctioned,
not only as punishment for his misconduct but also as a warning to other lawyers who may be influenced by his example.
RATIO:

A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client but not at the expense of truth and the administration of justice.

Forum shopping is an act of malpractice condemned as trifling with the courts and abusing their processes. (LEGAL ETHICS BY
FUNA)

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE (Related to the Topic):

Rule 12.02 - A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause

CASE: FRANCISCO A. ACHACOSO, in his own behalf and in behalf AUTHOR: Joma
of Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., petitioners, vs. THE HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, COTRAM, S.A., CAPITAL LIFE ASSURANCE # f Pages (Full Text):3
CORP ., and JOAQUIN G. GARRIDO, respondents
NOTES:
GR NO: G.R. No. L-35867 DATE: June 28, 1973

TOPIC:Not to delay man’s cause

PONENTE: TEEHANKEE, J p:

FACTS:

December 15, 1972 - Atty Rodrigo M. Nera, counsel of the petitioner filed petition for review of CA dismissing his petition for
mandamus.

February 8, 1973 – CA filed extensive eighteen page comment

February 12, 1973 – Nera filed a leave for reply which the court granted

March 14, 1973 (last day of filing) – requests for extension of 15 days “due to the pressure of his work” which the court again
granted.

March 29, 1973 (last day of filing) – he again requested for extension of 15 days “due to the urgency of his work and daily trial
engagement” which the court granted again but this would be his 3 rd and last extension.

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April 13, 1973 (deadline of filing) – Nera failed to file an answer.

May 24, 1973 – the Court denied the petition and further required Atty. Nera to show cause why disciplinary action should not be
taken against him for failure to file the reply after having obtained such leave and three extensions of time within which to do so.

June 7, 1973 – counsel filed his explanation that his engagement with the petitioner is piece-work basis and the petitioner failed to
remit the expenses for the preparation of the reply, that he received the notice to extend long after it had already expired, that it was
not intentional on his part.

ISSUE(S): Whether or not he has violated Canon 12.03 Not to delay man’s cause

HELD: Yes. The Court censures the practice of counsels who secure repeated extensions of time to file their pleadings and thereafter
simply let the period lapse without submitting the pleading or even an explanation or manifestation of their failure to do so.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: Considering, however, that counsel's record shows no previous infractions on his part since his admission to
the Philippine Bar in 1953, the Court is disposed to be lenient in this instance.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby administers a reprimand on Atty. Rodrigo M. Nera, with the warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this resolution be filed in his personal record.

RATIO:

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE (Related to the Topic):

Rule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without
submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

CASE: MALONSO V PRINCIPE AUTHOR: ABI SEBASTIAN

A.C. No. 6289 DATE: December 16, 2004 # f Pages (Full Text): 12

TOPIC: Canon 12.4 Court Process NOTES:

PONENTE: TINGA, J. Print the whole case kasi madaming unnecessary details sa
facts.Para lang may reference just in case Atty checks if we read
the whole case

FACTS: The case is disbarment complaint filed before the IBP by Julian Malonso against Atty. Pete Principe for:

- illegally representing him before the court in the expropriation proceedings initiated by NAPOCOR
- claiming forty (40%) of the selling price of his land to the NAPOCOR by way of attorney’s fees and
- claiming to be a co-owner of his (Malonso’s) property
However, this was opposed by Atty. Pete Principe in his answer. He replied that the services of his law office, Principe Villano
Villacorta and Clemente Law Offices, was engaged by Samahan ng mga Dadaanan at Maapektuhan ng NAPOCOR, Inc. (SANDAMA),
through its President, Danilo Elfa, as embodied in the Contract of Legal Services executed on 01 April 1997.

Atty. Principe claimed that Malonso is a member of SANDAMA and that said member executed a special power of attorney in favor of

NTAC:3NS-20
the president of SANDAMA, Danilo Elfa, which served as the latters authority to act in behalf of Malonso.

Malonso reiterated that he did not authorize Elfa to act in his behalf, considering that while the Contract of Legal
Services entered into by Atty. Principe and Elfa was dated 01 April 1997, the special power of attorney he executed bore a much later
date, 27 November 1997. Moreover, he could not have authorized Elfa to hire a lawyer in his behalf since he already had his own
lawyer in the person of Atty. Benjamin Mendoza. To counter this argument, Atty. Principe commented that the agreement entered
into by SANDAMA and his law firm is a continuing one and hence, Malonso was within the coverage of the contract even if he
executed the special power of attorney on a later date. Likewise, as a member of SANDAMA, Malonso is bound to honor the
organizations commitments.

After the chronological order of events as found by the IBP Investigating Commissioner, Julio C. Elamparo, Atty. Principe was
found to have violated Rule 3.01 of Canon 3, Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 and Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility by the IBP Board of Governers, and was recommended to be suspended from the practice of law for two years.
However, he was only declared to be suspended for one year.

ISSUE(S): Whether or not Atty. Principe violated Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

HELD: No.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, this case is DISMISSED and considered CLOSED. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines is
enjoined to comply with the procedure outlined in Rule 139-B in all cases involving the disbarment and discipline of attorneys.

RATIO:

Normally, non-compliance with the procedural rules would result in the remand of the case. However, on many occasions, the
Court, in the public interest and the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead of remanding
them for further proceedings, such as where the ends of justice would not be subserved by the remand of the case, or when public
interest demands an early disposition of the case, or where the trial court had already received all the evidence of the parties. In view
of the delay in resolving the instant complaint against the respondent, and in the interest of justice and speedy disposition of cases,
the Court opts to resolve the same based on the records before it.

Before delving at length on the merits of the other aspect of the present proceedings, there is need to dwell first on a dimension
of expropriation proceedings which is uniquely its own.

There are two stages in every action for expropriation. The first is concerned with the determination by the courts of the
authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved
in the suit. The second phase is concerned with the determination by the court, with the assistance of commissioners, of the just
compensation for the property sought to be taken which relates to the valuation thereof. The order fixing the just compensation on
the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final and would dispose of the second stage of the suit,
leaving nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. During this stage, the main bone of contention is the valuation of
the property concerned.

The second stage which involves the issue of just compensation is as important, if not more, than the first stage which refers to
the issue of public purpose. But as it frequently happens, as in this case, the public purpose dimension is not as fiercely contested.
Moreover, in their quest to secure what they believe to be the fair compensation of their property, the owners seek inroads to the
leverages of executive power where compensation compromises are commenced and given imprimatur. In this dimension, the
services of lawyers different from the ordinary litigator may prove to be handy or even necessary. Negotiations are mostly out of
court and relies, for most part, on the sagacity, persuasion, patience, persistence and resourcefulness of the negotiator.

In the instant case, the trial court had already ruled on the valuation of the properties subject of the expropriation, the same

NTAC:3NS-20
order which is subject of the appeal filed by the NAPOCOR. Aware that it might take a long time before the said appeal is finally
resolved, and in view of the delay in the adjudication of the case, the landowners and NAPOCOR negotiated for a compromise
agreement. To assist them, the landowners, through SANDAMA and its president, Danilo Elfa, engaged the services of a lawyer in the
person of respondent. It is clear that respondent was hired precisely for the negotiation phase of the case.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE (Related to the Topic):

Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse Court processes

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

CASE: Saa v. IBP-CBD AUTHOR: Hannah Tangunan

GR NO: 132826 DATE: September 3, 2009 NOTES:

TOPIC: Rule 12.04 Court Process

PONENTE: Corona, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner Rolanda Saa filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Freddie A. Venida stating that the latter’s act of
filing two cases against him was oppressive and constituted unethical practice.

In a resolution dated February 17, 1992,3 Atty. Venida was required to comment on the complaint against him. He filed a partial
comment 11 months late, and he was only able to submit his complete comment 3 and ½ years after due date and gave a lame
excuse of typhoon and heavy work load for his delayed compliance. The said comment was a mere reiteration of his partial comment.
Atty. Venida also added that he was merely performing his duty as counsel of Saa’s adversaries.

The court forwarded the case to IBP for investigation. IBP recommended for the dismissal of the disbarment case for the lack of
merit. Saa subsequently filed for a certiorari for the grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case. The Court held that there was no
grave abuse of discretion and there is no enough evidence to warrant the disbarment. However, the Court strongly disapprove of
Atty. Venida’s blatant refusal to comply with various court directives.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not Atty. Venida violated Canon 12 Rule 12.04 (A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a
judgment or misuse Court processes)?

HELD: Yes

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The charge of oppressive or unethical behavior
against respondent is dismissed. However, for violation of Canons 1 and 12 and Rules 1.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as well as the lawyers oath, Atty. Freddie A. Venida is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year,
effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is further STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense
shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered into the
records of respondent Atty. Freddie A. Venida. The Office of the Court Administrator shall furnish copies to all the courts of the land

NTAC:3NS-20
for their information and guidance.

RATIO:

As a lawyer, he had the responsibility to follow legal orders and processes. Yet, he disregarded this very important canon of legal
ethics when he filed only a partial comment on January 26, 1993 or 11 months after being directed to do so in the February 17, 1992
resolution. Worse, he filed his complete comment only on June 14, 1995 or a little over three years after due date. In both instances,
he managed to delay the resolution of the case, a clear violation of Canon 12 and Rules 1.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

NO DIGEST YET: PLUS BUILDERS INC VS REVILLA, JR – KIM TENERIFE

CASE: PNB vs. UY TENG PIAO AUTHOR: Angel

GR NO: G.R. No. L-35252 DATE: October 21, 1932 # of Pages (Full Text): 3

TOPIC: Rule 12.08- Not to Testify on Behalf of Client NOTES:

PONENTE: VICKERS, J.:

FACTS: On September 9, 1924, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a judgment in favor of the Philippine National Bank and
against Uy Teng Piao in civil case No. 26328 for the sum of P17,232.42 with interest at 7 per cent per annum from June 1, 1924, plus
10 per cent of the sum amount for attorney's fees and costs. The court ordered the defendant to deposit said amount with the clerk
of the court within three months from the date of the judgment, and in case of his failure to do so that the mortgaged properties
described in transfer certificates of title Nos. 7264 and 8274 should be sold at public auction in accordance with the law and the
proceeds applied to the payment of the judgment.

Uy Teng Piao failed to comply with the order of the court, and the sheriff of the City of Manila sold the two parcels of land at public
auction to the Philippine National Bank on October 14, 1924 for P300 and P1,000 respectively.

The bank brought the present action to revive the judgment for the balance of P11,574.33, with interest at 7 per cent per annum
from August 1, 1930.

One of the attorneys for the plaintiff testified that the defendant renounced his right to redeem the parcel of land in Calle
Ronquillo, Exhibit 1, because a friend of the defendant was interested in buying it.

With respect to the testimony of the bank's attorney, we should like to observe that although the law does not forbid an attorney
to be a witness and at the same time an attorney in a cause, the courts prefer that counsel should not testify as a witness unless it
is necessary, and that they should withdraw from the active management of the case. (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, p. 148.) Canon 19 of

NTAC:3NS-20
the Code of Legal Ethics reads as follows:

When a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to merely formal matters, such as the attestation
or custody of an instrument and the like, he should leave the trial of the case to other counsel. Except
when essential to the ends of justice, a lawyer should avoid testifying in court in behalf of his client.
ISSUE(S): WON lawyers are allowed to testify on behalf of the client.

HELD: No unless it is necessary.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the defendant is condemned to pay
the plaintiff the sum of P11,574.38 with interest thereon at the rate of 7 per cent per annum from August 1, 1930, and the costs of
both instances.

(NO RULING AS TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE LAWYER)

RATIO: Although the law does not forbid an attorney to be a witness and at the same time an attorney in a cause, the courts prefer
that counsel should not testify as a witness unless it is necessary, and that they should withdraw from the active management of
the case. (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, p. 148.) Canon 19 of the Code of Legal Ethics reads as follows:

When a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to merely formal matters, such as the attestation
or custody of an instrument and the like, he should leave the trial of the case to other counsel. Except
when essential to the ends of justice, a lawyer should avoid testifying in court in behalf of his client.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE (Related to the Topic):

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

CASE: Santiago v. Rafanan AUTHOR: Rod Zuleta

AC NO: 6252 DATE: Oct 5, 2004 # f Pages (Full Text):

TOPIC: Rule 12.08 Not to Testify on Behalf of Client NOTES:

PONENTE: Panganiban, J.

NTAC:3NS-20
FACTS:

Complainant Jonar Santiago, an employee of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, lodged a disbarment complaint against
respondent Atty. Edison Rafanan before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines alleging, inter alia, that Atty. Rafanan violated Rule
12.07 and Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when the latter executed an affidavit in favour of his
client and offered the same as evidence in a case where he is actively representing his client. The complaint also alleged that after the
hearing of the case, respondent accompanied by several persons waited for Complainant and after confronting the latter disarmed
him of his sidearm and thereafter uttered insulting words and veiled threats. In his answer, respondent denied having disarmed the
complainant and uttered insulting words nor veiled threats against the latter. He however admitted that he executed an affidavit in
favour of his client and offered the same as evidence in a case where he is actively representing his client but interposed the defense
that lawyers could testify on behalf of their clients "on substantial matters, in cases where [their] testimony is essential to the ends of
justice." Complainant charged respondent’s clients with attempted murder. Respondent averred that since they were in his house
when the alleged crime occurred, "his testimony is very essential to the ends of justice.” The IBP, while finding that administrative
offense was committed by respondent for violating the notarial law, recommended the dismissal of the complaint for alleged
violation of Rule 12.07 and Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for insufficiency of evidence. Hence, the
present action was commenced.

ISSUE(S): Whether or not a can lawyer testify on substantial matters which he is actively representing in a case without violating the
Code of Professional Responsibility?

HELD: YES

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: Atty. Edison V. Rafanan is found guilty of violating the Notarial Law and Canon 5 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is hereby FINED P3,000 with a warning that similar infractions in the future will be dealt with more severely.

RATIO:

Parenthetically, under the law, a lawyer is not disqualified from being a witness, except only in certain cases pertaining to privileged
communication arising from an attorney-client relationship. The reason behind such rule is the difficulty posed upon lawyers by the
task of dissociating their relation to their clients as witnesses from that as advocates. Witnesses are expected to tell the facts as they
recall them. In contradistinction, advocates are partisans -- those who actively plead and defend the cause of others. It is difficult to
distinguish the fairness and impartiality of a disinterested witness from the zeal of an advocate. The question is one of propriety
rather than of competency of the lawyers who testify for their clients.

Thus, although the law does not forbid lawyers from being witnesses and at the same time counsels for a cause, the preference is for
them to refrain from testifying as witnesses, unless they absolutely have to; and should they do so, to withdraw from active
management of the case.

Notwithstanding this guideline and the existence of the Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan in favor of his clients, we cannot hastily
make him administratively liable for the following reasons:
First, we consider it the duty of a lawyer to assert every remedy and defense that is authorized by law for the benefit of the client,
especially in a criminal action in which the latter’s life and liberty are at stake. Having undertaken the defense of the accused,
respondent, as defense counsel, was thus expected to spare no effort to save his clients from a wrong conviction. The Affidavit
executed by Atty. Rafanan was clearly necessary for the defense of his clients, since it pointed out the fact that on the alleged date
and time of the incident, his clients were at his residence and could not have possibly committed the crime charged against them.
Notably, in his Affidavit, complainant does not dispute the statements of respondent or suggest the falsity of its contents.
Second, paragraph (b) of Rule 12.08 contemplates a situation in which lawyers give their testimonies during the trial. In this instance,
the Affidavit was submitted during the preliminary investigation which, as such, was merely inquisitorial. Not being a trial of the case

NTAC:3NS-20
on the merits, a preliminary investigation has the oft-repeated purposes of securing innocent persons against hasty, malicious and
oppressive prosecutions; protecting them from open and public accusations of crime and from the trouble as well as expense and
anxiety of a public trial; and protecting the State from useless and expensive prosecutions. The investigation is advisedly called
preliminary, as it is yet to be followed by the trial proper. Nonetheless, we deem it important to stress and remind respondent to
refrain from accepting employment in any matter in which he knows or has reason to believe that he may be an essential witness for
the prospective client. Furthermore, in future cases in which his testimony may become essential to serve the "ends of justice," the
canons of the profession require him to withdraw from the active prosecution of these cases.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE (Related to the Topic):

Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the CPR

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

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