I.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
A. CONCEPT OF REMEDIAL OR PROCEDURAL
LAW
1) PRISCILLA ALMA JOSE V. RAMON C.
JAVELLANA, ET AL
G.R. No. 158239 January 25, 2012
Facts:
Margarita sold for consideration of P160,000.00
to Ramon Javellana by deed of conditional sale two
parcels of land in Guiguinto, Bulacan. They agreed that
Javellana would pay P80,000.00 upon the execution of
the deed and the balance of P80,000.00 upon the
registration of the parcels of land under the Torrens
System (the registration being undertaken by Margarita
within a reasonable period of time); and that should
Margarita become incapacitated, her son and attorney-in-
fact, Juvenal, and her daughter, petitioner Priscilla M.
Alma Jose, would receive the payment of the balance and
proceed with the application for registration.
After Margarita died and with Juvenal having
predeceased Margarita However, Priscilla did not comply
with the undertaking to cause the registration of the
properties under the Torrens System, and, instead, began
to improve the properties by dumping filling materials
therein with the intention of converting the parcels of land
into a residential or industrial subdivision.
Javellana commenced an action for specific
performance, injunction, and damages against her in the
RTC Malolos, Bulacan. Javellana averred that he had paid
the full consideration and that in 1996, Priscilla had called
to inquire about the mortgage constituted on the parcels
of land; and that he had told her then that the parcels of
land had not been mortgaged but had been sold to him.
Javellana prayed for the issuance of a TRO or writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain Priscilla from dumping
filling materials in the parcels of land; and that Priscilla
be ordered to institute registration proceedings and then
to execute a final deed of sale in his favor.
Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the
complaint was already barred by prescription; and that the
complaint did not state a cause of action. RTC initially
denied Priscilla’s motion to dismiss. However, upon her
motion for reconsideration, the RTC reversed itself and
granted the motion to dismiss, opining that Javellana had
no cause of action against her due to her not being bound
to comply with the terms of the deed of conditional sale
for not being a party thereto; that there was no evidence
showing the payment of the balance; that he had never
demanded the registration of the land from Margarita or
Juvenal, or brought a suit for specific performance against
Margarita or Juvenal; and that his claim of paying the
balance was not credible.
Javellana moved for reconsideration, contending
that the presentation of evidence of full payment was not
necessary at that stage of the proceedings; and that in
resolving a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to
state a cause of action, the facts alleged in the complaint
were hypothetically admitted and only the allegations in
the complaint should be considered in resolving the
motion. RTC denied the motion for reconsideration for
lack of any reason to disturb the order.
Javellana filed a notice of appeal which the RTC
gave due course to, and the records were elevated to the
Court of Appeals (CA).Priscilla countered that the order
was not appealable; that the appeal was not perfected on
time; and that Javellana was guilty of forum shopping.
It appears that pending the appeal, Javellana also
filed a petition for certiorari in the CA assail to orders
dismissing his complaint. However, the CA dismissed the
petition for certiorari, finding that the RTC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the orders,
and holding that it only committed, at most, an error of
judgment correctible by appeal in issuing the challenged
orders.
CA reversed and set aside the dismissal of Civil
Case remanding the records to the RTC "for further
proceedings in accordance with law." CA denied the MR,
hence this petition.
Issues:
WON Javellana committed forum shopping
Held:
No, Javellana did not commit forum shopping.
According to the SC, forum shopping is the act of
a party litigant against whom an adverse judgment has
been rendered in one forum seeking and possibly getting
a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal
or the special civil action of certiorari, or the institution
of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the
same cause or supposition that one or the other court
would make a favorable disposition. Forum shopping
happens when, in the two or more pending cases, there is
identity of parties, identity of rights or causes of action,
and identity of reliefs sought. Where the elements of litis
pendentia are present, and where a final judgment in one
case will amount to res judicata in the other, there is
forum shopping.
Here, pending the resolution of the appeal on the
RTC decision, Javellana filed a petition for certiorari in
CA assailing RTC upon granting of the motion to dismiss
filed by Alma Jose and the denial of the motion for the
consideration to disturb the latter. For forum shopping to
exist, both actions must involve the same transaction,
same essential facts and circumstances and must raise
identical causes of action, subject matter and issues.
Hence, forum shopping is not committed by Javellana as
he questioned different orders, two distinct causes of
action and issues were raised, and two objectives were
sought.
ANOTHER DIGEST:
1) Priscilla Alma Jose vs. Ramon Javellana et al G.R.
No. 158239, January 25, 2012 G.R. No. 158239,
January 25, 2012 BERSAMIN, BERSAMIN, J . J . : :
the denial of a motion for reconsideration of an order
granting the defending party’s motion to dismiss is not an
interlocutory but a final order because it puts an end to the
particular matter involved , or settles definitely the matter
there in disposed of , as to leave nothing for the trial court
to do other than to execute the order. Accordingly, the
claiming party has a fresh period of 15 days from notice
of the denial within which to appeal the denial .
FACTS: Margarita Marquez Alma Jose sold for
consideration of P160,000.00 to respondent Ramon
Javellana by deed of conditional sale two parcels of land
with areas of 3,675 and 20,936 square meters located in
Barangay Mallis, Guiguinto, Bulacan. They agreed that
Javellana would pay P80,000.00 upon the execution of the
deed and the balance of P80,000.00 upon the registration
of the parcels of land under the Torrens System (the
registration being undertaken by Margarita within a
reasonable period of time); and that should Margarita
become incapacitated, her son and attorney-in-fact,
Juvenal M. Alma Jose (Juvenal), and her daughter,
petitioner Priscilla M. Alma Jose, would receive the
payment of the balance and proceed with the application
for registration. After Margarita died and with Juvenal
having predeceased Margarita without issue, the vendors
undertaking fell on the shoulders of Priscilla, being
Margaritas sole surviving heir.
However, Priscilla did not comply with the undertaking
to cause the registration of the properties under the
Torrens System, and, instead, began to improve the
properties by dumping filling materials therein with the
intention of converting the parcels of land into a
residential or industrial subdivision. Faced with
Priscilla’s refusal to comply, Javellana commenced on
February 10, 1997 an action for specific performance,
injunction, and damages against her in the Regional Trial
Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in not outrightly
dismissing Javellanas appeal because (a) the June 21,
2000 RTC order was not appealable; (b) the notice of
appeal had been filed belatedly by three days
RULING: Denial of the motion for reconsideration of the
Denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order of
dismissal was a final order and appealable order of
dismissal was a final order and appealable First of all, the
denial of Javellanas motion for reconsideration left
nothing more to be done by the RTC because it confirmed
the dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97. It was clearly a
final order, not an interlocutory one.
And, secondly, whether an order is final or interlocutory
determines whether appeal is the correct remedy or not. A
final order is appealable, to accord with the f i n a l j u d
g m e n t r u l e enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of the R
u l e s o f C o u r t to the effect that appeal may be taken
from a judgment or final order that completely disposes
of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared
by these Rules to be appealable; but the remedy from an
interlocutory one is not an appeal but a special civil action
for c e r t i o r a r i .
Indeed, the Court has held that an appeal from an order
denying a motion for reconsideration of a final order or
judgment is effectively an appeal from the final order or
judgment itself; and has expressly clarified that the
prohibition agai nst appealing an order den ying a motion
for reconsideration referr ed only to a denial of a motion
for reconsideration of an interlocutory order.
Appeal was made on time pursuant to Appeal was made
on time pursuant to N e y p e s v . C A N e y p e s v . C A
Under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the R u l e s o f C o u r t ,
Javellana had only the balance of three days from July 13,
2000, or until July 16, 2000, within which to perfect an
appeal due to the timely filing of his motion for
reconsideration interrupting the running of the period of
appeal. As such, his filing of the notice of appeal only on
July 19, 2000 did not perfect his appeal on time, as
Priscilla insists.
The seemingly correct insistence of Priscilla cannot be
upheld, however, considering that the Court meanwhile
adopted the f r e s h p e r i o d r u l e in N e y p e s v . C o
u r t o f A p p e a l s , by which an aggrieved party desirous
of appealing an adverse judgment or final order is allowed
a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of
appeal in the RTC reckoned from receipt of the order
denying a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration. The f r e s h p e r i o d r u l e may be
applied to this case, for the Court has already retroactively
extended the f r e s h p e r i o d r u l e to actions pending
and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will
not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected, inasmuch as there are no vested rights
in rules of procedure.
B. NATURE OF REMEDIAL LAW
2) ATENEO VS DE LA ROSA
ALVERO V. DELA ROSA (GR NO. L-286, MARCH
29, 1946)
FACTS:
On June 25, 1945, respondent Jose R. Victoriano had filed
a complaint, in the Court of First Instance of the City of
Manila, against petitioner Fredesvindo S. Alvero and one
Margarita Villarica, alleging two causes of action: (1) to
declare in force the contract of sale, between said Jose R.
Victoriano and Margarita Villarica, of two parcels of land
in the Manotoc subdivision, Balintawak, in the barrio of
Calaanan, municipality of Caloocan, Province of Rizal,
which land was subsequently sold by said Villarica, in
favor of petitioner Fredesvindo S. Alvero, on December
31, 1944, for the sum of P100,000 in Japanese military
notes; and
(2) to declare said subsequent sale null and void. On July
7, 1945, Margarita Villarica filed an answer to said
complaint, expressly admitting having sold said land to
Fresdesvindo S. Alvero, for P100,000, in December,
1944, due to the necessity of raising funds with which to
provide for herself and family, and that she did not
remember the previous sale; at the same time, offering to
repurchase said land from Fredesvindo S. Alvero in the
sum of P5,000, but that the latter refused to accept the
offer. Jose R. Victoriano filed an answer to said
counterclaim, denying Fredesvindo S. Alvero's alleged
ownership over said land, and the other allegations
contained in Alvero's answer. On July 13, 1945,
Fredesvindo S. Alvero, in answering said complaint,
denied the allegations and claimed exclusive ownership
of the land in question.
Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of the City of Manila, one of the respondents in
this case, rendered his decision, in which it was declared
that the two parcels of land in question had been sold by
Margarita Villarica to Jose R. Victoriano and that
Victoriano continued making monthly payments until
December, 1941, but that owing to the war-time
conditions then existing, Margarita Villarica agreed
verbally to suspend such payments until the restoration of
peace and that Margarita Villarica, having forgotten the
sale of said land to Jose R. Victoriano, sold the same for
P100,000 in Japanese military notes, on December 31,
1944, to Fredesvindo S. Alvero, but afterwards offered to
repurchase said property from him, for the sum of P8,000
in genuine Philippine currency, after liberation. Jose R.
Victoriano had presented the deed of sale which was older
than that of Fredesvindo S. Alvero, the respondent judge
rendered his decision in favor of Jose R. Victoriano,
adjudging to him the title over the property in question,
including all the improvements existing thereon, and
dismissed the counterclaim.
On November 28, 1945, Fredesvindo S. Alvero was
notified of said decision; and on December 27, 1945, he
filed a petition for reconsideration and new trial, which
was denied on January 3, 1946. On January 8, 1946,
Fredesvindo S. Alvero filed his notice of appeal and
record on appeal simultaneously in the lower court,
without filing the P60-appeal bond. Jose R. Victoriano
filed a petition to dismiss the appeal, Fredesvindo S.
Alvero filed an opposition to said motion to dismiss,
alleging that on the very same day, January 15, 1946, said
appeal bond for P60 had been actually filed, and allege as
an excuse, for not filing the said appeal bond, in due time,
the illness of his lawyer's wife. The respondent judge,
Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, ordered the dismissal of the
appeal, declaring that, although the notice of appeal and
record on appeal had been filed in due time, the P60-
appeal bond was filed too late.
ISSUE: Is the petition defective in form as well as in
substance?
HELD: Yes, the period for perfecting herein petitioner's
appeal commenced from November 28, 1945, when he
was notified of the judgment rendered in the case, and
expired on December 28, 1945; and, therefore, his notice
of appeal and record on appeal filed on January 8, 1946,
were filed out of time, and much more so his appeal bond,
which was only filed on January 15, 1946. Counsel for the
petitioner Fredesvindo Alvero alleges as an excuse, for
his failure to perfect and file his appeal, in due time, the
illness of his wife. It is not difficult to understand the state
of mind of the attorney, and his intense devotion and
ardent affection towards his dying wife.
Unfortunately, counsel for petitioner has created a
difficult situation. In his motion for reconsideration and
new trial, dated December 27, 1945, he did not point out
specifically the findings or conclusions in the judgment,
are not supported by the evidence or which are contrary
to law, making express reference to the pertinent evidence
or legal provisions, as expressly required by Rule 37,
section 2, paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court. Motions of
that kind have been considered as motions pro forma
intended merely to delay the proceeding, and, as such,
they cannot and will not interrupt or suspend the period of
time for the perfection of the appeal.
He could have asked for an extension of time, within
which to file and perfect his appeal, in the court below;
but he had failed to do so, and he must bear the
consequences of his act. A strict observance of the rules
of court, which have been considered indispensable to the
prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and
speedy dispatch of judicial business, is an imperative
necessity. Human laws are inflexible and no personal
consideration should stand in the way of performing a
legal duty.
C. SUBSTANTIVE LAW VIS A VIS REMEDIAL
LAW
3) BUSTOS VS. LUCERO (March 8, 1946)
DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS vs. ANTONIOG.
LUCEROG.R. No. L-2068, October 20, 1948
FACTS:
The petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed
a motion with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
after he had been bound over to that court for trial, praying
that the record of the case be remanded to the justice of
the peace court of Masantol, the court of origin, in order
that the petitioner might cross examine the complainant
and her witnesses in connection with their testimony, on
the strength of which warrant was issued for the arrest of
the accused. The accused, assisted by counsel, appeared
at the preliminary investigation. In that investigation, the
justice of the peace informed him of the charges and asked
him if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon which he
entered the plea of not guilty. Then his counsel moved that
the complainant present her evidence so that she and her
witnesses could be examined and cross-examined in the
manner and form provided by law. The fiscal and the
private prosecutor objected, invoking section 11 of rule
108, and the objection was sustained. In view thereof, the
accused’s counsel announced his intention to renounce
his right to present evidence, and the justice of the peace
forwarded the case to the court of first instance.
ISSUE"
whether or not the justice of the Peace court of Masantol
committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to grant
the accused & motion to return the record.
HELD:
Evidence is the mode and manner of proving competent
facts and circumstances on which a party relies to
establish the fact in dispute in judicial proceedings. It is
fundamentally a procedural law. The Supreme Court that
section 11 of Rule 108 does not curtail the sound
discretion of the justice of the peace on the matter. Said
section defines the bounds of the defendant’s right in the
preliminary investigation, there is nothing in it or any
other law restricting the authority, inherent in a court of
justice, to pursue a course of action reasonably calculated
to bring out the truth. The foregoing decision was
rendered by a divided court. The minority went farther
than the majority and denied even any discretion on the
part of the justice of the peace or judge holding the
preliminary investigation to compel the complainant and
his witnesses to testify anew. Upon the foregoing
considerations, the present petition is dismissed with costs
against the petitioner.
ANOTHER:
BUSTOS vs. LUCERO
G.R. No. L-2068 October 20, 1948/ March 8, 1949
FACTS:
Accused in this case during the preliminary investigation
was informed of his charges and asked whether he pleads
guilty or not, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. His
counsel moved that the complainant present her evidence
so that she and her witnesses can be cross-examined.
Fiscal and private prosecutor objected invoking Sec 11 of
R 108 which was sustained by the court. In view thereof,
counsel of the accused renounce his right to present
evidence.
Trial ensued. Petitioner then filed a motion before CFI
Pampanga to remand the record of the case to the justice
of the peace of Masantol, court of origin on the ground
that the petitioner can cross-examine the complainant and
witnesses. SC dismissed his petition citing Dequito and
Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, G.R. No. L-1336: "The
constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the
witnesses against him does not apply to preliminary
hearings; nor will the absence of a preliminary
examination be an infringement of his right to confront
witness.
As a matter of fact, preliminary investigation may be done
away with entirely without infringing the constitutional
right of an accused under the due process clause to a fair
trial." We took this ruling to be ample enough to dispose
the constitutional question pleaded in the application for
certiorari. Heeding the wishes of the petitioner, we shall
enlarge upon the subject. Petitioner then filed his motion
for reconsideration.(NOTE: SEE SC’S RESOLUTION)
Petitioner’s contention:
i. Section 11 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
infringes section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution.
ii. That said deals with substantive matters and
impairs substantive rights.
ISSUE: WoN said rule impairs substantive rights
HELD: NO. Section 11 of Rule 108 is an adjective law
and not a substantive law or substantive right. Substantive
law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this
respect may be said to be synonymous. Substantive rights
is a term which includes those rights which one enjoys
under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal
relations. Substantive law is that part of the law which
creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates
the rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action;
that part of the law which courts are established to
administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law,
which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains
redress for their invasion.
SUNSTANTIVE LAW - which declares what acts are
crimes and prescribes the punishment for committing
them
PROCEDURAL LAW - law which provides or regulates
the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be
punished.
Preliminary investigation is eminently and essentially
remedial; it is the first step taken in a criminal
prosecution. As a rule of evidence, section 11 of Rule 108
is also procedural. Evidence — which is the "the mode
and manner of proving the competent facts and
circumstances on which a party relies to establish the fact
in dispute in judicial proceedings" — is identified with
and forms part of the method by which, in private law,
rights are enforced and redress obtained, and, in criminal
law, a law transgressor is punished. Criminal procedure
refers to pleading, evidence and practice the entire rules
of evidence have been incorporated into the Rules of
Court. We can not tear down section 11 of Rule 108 on
constitutional grounds without throwing out the whole
code of evidence embodied in these Rules.
Section 11 of Rule 108. Rights of defendant after arrest.
— After the arrest of the defendant and his delivery to the
court, he shall be informed of the complaint or
information filed against him. He shall also be informed
of the substance of the testimony and evidence presented
against him, and, if he desires to testify or to present
witnesses or evidence in his favor, he may be allowed to
do so. The testimony of the witnesses need not be reduced
to writing but that of the defendant shall be taken in
writing and subscribed by him.
Section 13, Article VIII. The Supreme Court shall have
the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to
the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase,
or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on
pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby repealed as
statutes, and are declared Rules of Courts, subject to the
power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same.
The National Assembly shall have the power to repeal,
alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice
of law in the Philippines.
D. PROCEDURAL LAWS APPLICABLE TO
ACTIONS PENDING AT THE TIME OF
PROMULGATION
4) PANAY RAILWAYS INC VS HEVA
MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION ET AL
DOCTRINE: Statutes and rules regulating the procedure
of courts are considered applicable to actions pending and
unresolved at the time of their passage. Procedural laws
and rules are retroactive in that sense and to that extent.
The effect of procedural statutes and rules on the rights of
a litigant may not preclude their retroactive application to
pending actions.
This retroactive application does not violate any right of
a person adversely affected. Neither is it constitutionally
objectionable. The reason is that, as a general rule, no
vested right may attach to or arise from procedural laws
and rules. It has been held that “a person has no vested
right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist
on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or
criminal, of any other than the existing rules of
procedure.”
More so when, as in this case, petitioner admits that it was
not able to pay the docket fees on time. Clearly, there were
no substantive rights to speak of when the RTC dismissed
the Notice of Appeal.
E. LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF PROCEDURAL
RULES
5) FELIX MARTOS ET AL VS NEW SAN JOSE
BUILDERS INC.
FACTS:
Felix Martos, et al. alleged that on various dates, New San
Jose Builders, Inc. hired them on different positions for
its San Jose Plains Project (SJPP), also known as the
"Erap City." Sometime in 2000, New San Jose Builders,
Inc. was constrained to slow down and suspend most of
the works on the SJPP project due to lack of funds of the
National Housing Authority.
Thus, the workers were informed that many of them
would be laid off and the rest would be reassigned to other
projects. Juan Villaber, Terso Garay, Rowell Batta, Pastor
Pantig, Rafael Villa, and Melvin Garay were laid off.
While on the other hand, Felix Martos, Ariel Dominguez,
Greg Bisonia, Allan Caballera, Orlando Limos, Mandy
Mamalateo, Eric Castrence, Anthony Molina, and Roy
Silva were among those who were retained and were
issued new appointment papers to their respective
assignments, indicating therein that they are project
employees.
However, they refused to sign the appointment papers as
project employees and subsequently refused to continue
to work.
On different dates, three (3) Complaints for Illegal
Dismissal and for money claims were filed before the
NLRC by the employees.
The Labor Arbiter ruled that Felix Martos (Martos) was
illegally dismissed; and dismissed the claims of other
complainants. Both parties appealed to the NLRC. The
NLRC dismissed San Jose Builders, Inc.s appeal and
partially granted the appeal made by the other
complainants.
On appeal to the CA, the CA reversed the NLRC and
reinstated the Labor Arbiters decision. The CA explained
that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in
reviving the complaints of petitioners despite their failure
to verify the same.
Out of the 102 complainants, only Martos verified the
position paper and his counsel never offered any
explanation for his failure to secure the verification of the
others. With respect to Martos, the CA ruled that he was
a regular employee and his termination was illegal.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the CA is correct in dismissing the
complaints filed by those petitioners who failed to verify
their position papers?
II. Whether or not Martos should be reinstated?
HELD: Petition is denied.
REMEDIAL LAW: verification; liberal construction
of the rules
FIRST ISSUE: The Court agrees with the CA.
The verification requirement is significant, as it is
intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the
pleading are true and correct and not the product of the
imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the
pleading is filed in good faith. Verification is deemed
substantially complied with when, as in this case, one who
has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the
allegations in the complaint or petition signs the
verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have
been made in good faith or are true and correct. The
absence of a proper verification is cause to treat the
pleading as unsigned and dismissible. The liberal
construction of the rules may be invoked in situations
where there may be some excusable formal deficiency or
error in a pleading, provided that the same does not
subvert the essence of the proceeding and it at least
connotes a reasonable attempt at compliance with the
rules.
LABOR LAW: doctrine of strained relations
SECOND ISSUE: Martos reinstatement is no longer
practicable.
As to Martos, the Court agrees that the reinstatement
being sought by him was no longer practicable because of
the strained relation between the parties. Thus, the Court
deems it fair to award separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement. In addition to his separation pay, Martos is
also entitled to payment of full backwages, 13th month
pay, service incentive leave pay and attorneys fees.
The accepted doctrine is that separation pay may avail in
lieu of reinstatement if reinstatement is no longer practical
or in the best interest of the parties. Separation pay in lieu
of reinstatement may likewise be awarded if the employee
decides not to be reinstated.
Under the doctrine of strained relations, the payment of
separation pay is considered an acceptable alternative to
reinstatement when the latter option is no longer desirable
or viable. On one hand, such payment liberates the
employee from what could be a highly oppressive work
environment. On the other hand, it releases the employer
from the grossly unpalatable obligation of maintaining in
its employ a worker it could no longer trust.
Petition is DENIED.
6) MARIA CONSOLACION RIVERA-PASCUAL
VS SPS. MARILYN LIM ET AL
Facts:
The present controversy involves a parcel of land located
in Valenzuela City registered under the name of the
Spouses Lim (or private respondents). On September
2004, the petitioner filed before the Office of the Regional
Agrarian Reform (RARAD) for Region IV-A a petition to
be recognized as a tenant of a property located in
Valenzuela City against one Deato. At that time, the
property was under Deato’s name. During the pendency
of the petition, Deato sold the property to Spouses Lim.
The sale was registered on December 2004 leading to the
issuance of a TCT in favor of the private respondents.
Thus, the petitioner filed a motion on March 2005 to
implead the Spouses Lim.
On December 2005, the petition was granted by the
Regional Adjudicator (RA). The dispositive portion of the
decision includes, inter alia, that the petitioner is the
tenant of the subject land by succession from her deceased
father and that she should be subrogated to the rights of
the private respondents. The judgment of the RA became
final. Thus, Consolacion filed a motion for execution to
which a writ of execution was issued by the RA on
January 2008. Seven days after, the petitioner filed a
petition against the private respondents and the Registrar
of Deeds praying for the issuance of an order directing
Spouses Lim to accept the amount of P10million which
she undertook to tender, declare the property redeemed
and cancel the TCT.
RARAD: The petition was given due course by the RA,
the dispositive portion of the decision stating that the
property is lawfully redeemed, ordering the private
respondents to accept the amount consigned with the
DARAB, execute a deed of redemption in favor of the
petitioner and directing the RD to cancel the TCT
registered in the name of the private respondents and issue
a new one in favor of the petitioner.
DARAB: The decision of RARAD was reversed.
Consolacion moved for reconsideration which the
DARAB denied.
CA: Consolacion filed a petition for review under Rule 43
of the Rules of Court. The CA did not give due course to
the petition due to the following technical grounds: a)
failure of counsel to indicate in the petition his MCLE
Certificate of Compliance or Exemption Number and b)
the jurat of Consolacion’s verification and certification
against non-forum-shopping failed to indicate any
competent evidence of Consolacion’s identity apart from
her community tax certificate.
She moved for reconsideration but was denied.
Issue: WON the petition should be denied due to the
unexplained failure to comply with basic procedural
requirements of the Rules of Court.
Held: Yes, the petition should be denied.
Consolacion and her counsel claimed inadvertence and
negligence but they did not explain the circumstances
thereof. Absent valid and compelling reasons, the
requested leniency and liberality in the observance of
procedural rules appears to be an afterthought, hence,
cannot be granted. The CA saw no compelling need
meriting the relaxation of the rules. Neither did the Court
see any.
The Court is aware of the exceptional cases where
technicalities were liberally construed. However, in these
cases, outright dismissal is rendered unjust by the
presence of a satisfactory and persuasive explanation.
The parties therein who prayed for liberal interpretation
were able to hurdle that heavy burden of proving that they
deserve an exceptional treatment. It was never the
Court’s intent “to forge a bastion for erring litigants to
violate the rules with impunity.”
This Court will not condone a cavalier attitude towards
procedural rules. It is the duty of every member of the bar
to comply with these rules. They are not at liberty to seek
exceptions should they fail to observe these rules and
rationalize their omission by harking on liberal
construction.
While it IS the negligence of Consolacion's counsel that
led to this unfortunate result, she is bound by such.
 F. RULE MAKING POWER OF THE SUPREME
COURT
7) ESTIPONA V. HON. LOBRIGO
TOPIC: Section 23 of RA 9165, rule-making power of
Supreme Court, equal protection clause
PONENTE: Peralta
FACTS:
Petitioner Estipona, Jr. was charged with violation of
Section 11 of RA 9165.
On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the
Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining Agreement,
praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to
enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12 (NOTE:
should have been Section 15?) of the same law, with a
penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time
offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug
seized in his possession.
Petitioner argues that Section 23 of RA 9165 which
prohibits plea bargaining in all violations of said law
violates:
1. The intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2
thereof;
2. The rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under
Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and
3. The principle of separation of powers among the three
equal branches of the government.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional
as it encroached upon the power of the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules of procedure.
2. Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional
for being violative of the Constitutional right to equal
protection of the law.
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: YES
The Supreme Court held that the power to promulgate
rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now Their
exclusive domain and no longer shared with the Executive
and Legislative departments.
The Court further held that the separation of powers
among the three co-equal branchesof our government has
erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure
within the sole province of this Court. The
other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact
laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify
any of the procedural rules promulgated by the Court.
Viewed from this perspective, the Court had rejected
previous attempts on the part of the Congress, in the
exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of
Court (Rules), to wit:
1. Fabian v. Desierto -Appeal from the decision of the
Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative
disciplinary case should be taken to the Court of
Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules
instead of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 as provided
in Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770.
2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-
Purpose Cooperative, Inc. – The Cooperative Code
provisions on notices cannot replace the rules on
summons under Rule 14 of the Rules.
3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the
GSIS from Payment of Legal Fees; Baguio Market
Vendors MultiPurpose Cooperative
(BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes; In
Re: Exemption of the National Power Corporation
from Payment of Filing/Docket Fees; and Rep. of the
Phils. v. Hon. Mangotara, et al. – Despite statutory
provisions, the GSIS, BAMARVEMPCO, and NPC are
not exempt from the payment of legal fees imposed by
Rule 141 of the Rules.
4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division) –
The first paragraph of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770, which
prohibits courts except the Supreme Court from issuing
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin an investigation conducted by the
Ombudsman, is unconstitutional as it contravenes Rule 58
of the Rules.
Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified
the Rules, this Court asserted its discretion to amend,
repeal or even establish new rules of procedure, to the
exclusion of the legislative and executive branches of
government. To reiterate, the Court’s authority to
promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is
exclusive and one of the safeguards of Our institutional
independence.
SECOND ISSUE: UNRESOLVED
The Supreme Court did not resolve the issue of whether
Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is contrary to the
constitutional right to equal protection of the law in order
not to preempt any future discussion by the Court on the
policy considerations behind Section 23 of R.A. No.
9165.
Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the
statutory provision in toto or a qualified version thereof,
the Court deemed it proper to declare as invalid the
prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases until
and unless it is made part of the rules of procedure through
an administrative circular duly issued for the purpose.
ADDITIONAL DISCUSSIONS ABOUT PLEA
BARGAINING:
Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure
Fabian v. Hon. Desierto laid down the test for
determining whether a rule is substantive or procedural in
nature.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme
Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower courts,
abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the
test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is,
the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties
recognized by substantive law and for justly
administering remedy and redress for a disregard or
infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it
is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the
right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive
matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an
existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.
In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a
procedural rule violates substantive rights. By the same
token, it is towards the provision of a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases
in all courts that the rules on plea bargaining was
introduced. As a way of disposing criminal charges by
agreement of the parties, plea bargaining is considered to
be an “important,” “essential,” “highly desirable,” and
“legitimate” component of the administration of justice.
In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as “a
process whereby the accused and the prosecution work
out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject
to court approval.” There is give-and-take negotiation
common in plea bargaining. The essence of the
agreement is that both the prosecution and the defense
make concessionsto avoid potential losses. Properly
administered, plea bargaining is to be encouragedbecause
the chief virtues of the system – speed, economy, and
finality – can benefit the accused, the offended party, the
prosecution, and the court.
Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage,
the rules on plea bargaining neither create a right nor
take away a vested right. Instead, it operates as a means
to implement an existing right by regulating the judicial
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and
redress for a disregard or infraction of them.
No constitutional right to plea bargain
Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain.
No basic rights are infringed by trying him rather than
accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so
if he prefers to go to trial. Under the present Rules, the
acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable
right but depends on the consent of the offended party and
the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid
plea of guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily
included in the offense charged. The reason for this is that
the prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of
criminal actions; his duty is to always prosecute the
proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on
what the evidence on hand can sustain.
Plea bargaining, when allowed
Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the
pre-trial, or even up to the point when the prosecution
already rested its case.
As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage,
the trial court’s exercise of discretion should not amount
to a grave abuse thereof.
If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser
offense subsequent to a bail hearing or after the
prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a plea
only when the prosecution does not have sufficient
evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged. The
only basis on which the prosecutor and the court could
rightfully act in allowing change in the former plea of not
guilty could be nothing more and nothing less than the
evidence on record. The ruling on the motion must
disclose the strength or weakness of the prosecution’s
evidence. Absent any finding on the weight of the
evidence on hand, the judge’s acceptance of the
defendant’s change of plea is improper and irregular.
8) IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE
ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF AMPARO IN FAVOR
OF LILIBETH LADAGA VS. MAJOR GENERAL
REYNALDO MAPAGU ET AL
Facts:
Petitioners share the common circumstance of having
their names included in what is alleged to be a JCICC
“AGILA” 3rd Quarter 2007 Order of Battle Validation
Result of the Philippine Army's 10th Infantry Division
(10th ID). They perceive that by the inclusion of their
names in the said Order of Battle (OB List), they become
easy targets of unexplained disappearances or extralegal
killings – a real threat to their life, liberty and security.
ATTY. LILIBETH O. LADAGA (Atty. Ladaga), first
came to know of the existence of the OB List from an
undisclosed source on May 21, 2009. In the OB List, it
was reflected that the ULTIMATE GOAL is to TRY TO
OUST PGMA ON 30 NOV 2007.
On the other hand, Atty. Angela Librado-Trinidad (Atty.
Librado-Trinidad), delivered a privileged speech before
the members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to demand
the removal of her name from said OB List. The
Commission on Human Rights, for its part, announced the
conduct of its own investigation into the matter.
According to Atty. Librado-Trinidad, in the course of the
performance of her dutites and functions, she has not
committed any act against national security that would
justify the inclusion of her name in the said OB List. She
said that sometime in May 2008, two suspicious-looking
men tailed her vehicle. Also, on June 23, 2008 three men
tried to barge into their house
Meanwhile, Atty. Carlos Isagani T. Zarate was informed
that he was also included on the OB List. In his petition,
he alleged that the inclusion of his name in the said OB
List was due to his advocacies as a public interest or
human rights lawyer.
The Petitioners assert that the OB List is really a military
hit-list as allegedly shown by the fact that there have
already been three victims of extrajudicial killing whose
violent deaths can be linked directly to the OB List.
On June 16, 2009 filed before the RTC a Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Amparo. The RTC subsequently
issued separate Writs of Amparo, directing the
respondents to file a verified written return.
In the return of the respondents, they denied authorship of
the OB List, and alleged that petitioners failed to show
that they were responsible for the alleged threats.
After submission of the parties’ respective Position
Papers, the RTC issued Orders finding no substantial
evidence to show that the perceived threat to petitioners’
life, liberty and security was attributable to the unlawful
act or omission of the respondents. The privilege of the
Writ was therefore denied.
Issues:
WON the totality of evidence satisfies the degree of proof
required under the Writ of Amparo.
Held:
No, the evidence does not satisfy degree of proof for the
issuance of the Writ of Amparo. The Writ of Amparo was
promulgated by the Court pursuant to its rule-making
powers in response to the alarming rise in the number of
cases of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial
killings. It is an extraordinary remedy intended to address
violations of, or threats to, the rights to life, liberty or
security and that, being a remedy of extraordinary
character, is not one to issue on amorphous or uncertain
grounds but only upon reasonable certainty. Justifying
allegations must support the issuance of the writ, on the
following matters:
1. The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
2. The name and personal circumstances of the
respondent responsible for the threat, act or omission;
3. The right to life, liberty and security of the
aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by
an unlawful act or omission of the respondent and how
such threat or violation is committed with the attendant
circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
4. The investigation conducted specifying the
names, personal circumstances and addresses of the
investigating authority or individuals;
5. Actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to
determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party
and the identity of the person responsible for the threat,
act or omission;
6. The relief prayed for.
Under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the parties shall
establish their claims by substantial evidence, and if the
allegations in the petition are proven by substantial
evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and
such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate
Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. Petitioners sought to prove that the
inclusion of their names in the OB List presented a real
threat to their security by attributing the violent deaths of
the other known activists to the inclusion of their names
or the names of their militant organizations in the subject
OB List. However, the existence of the OB List could not
be directly associated with the menacing behaviour of
suspicious men or the violent deaths of certain
personalities.
The Petitioners cannot assert that the inclusion of their
names in the OB List is as real a threat as that which
brought ultimate harm to the other victims without
corroborative evidence from which it can be presumed
that the suspicious deaths of these three people were in
fact, on account of their militant affiliations.
The Petitioners therefore were not able to prove by
substantial evidence that there was an actual threat to their
rights to life, liberty and security. The mere inclusion of
their names in the OB List is not sufficient enough
evidence for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo.
G. NATURE OF PHILIPPINE COURTS
TOPIC: PRINCIPLE OF JUDICIAL HIERARCHY
9) UNITED CLAIMANTS ASSOCIATION OF NEA
VS. NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION
ADMINISTRATION (none)
10) EMMANUEL DE CASTRO VS EMERSON
CARLOS
G.R. No. 194944 / APR 16, 2013 / SERENO, C.J./CIV
PRO-HEIRARCHY OF COURTS/AJLCARDEÑO
NATURE Petition for the issuance of a writ of
quo warranto under Rule 66
PETITIONERS Emmanuel A. De Castro
RESPONDENTS Emerson S. Carlos
SUMMARY. De Castro (petitioner) was appointed as
Assistant General Manager I at the MMDA by Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. With the onset of the Aquino
administration, Carlos (respondent) was appointed as OIC
of the AGMO and De Castro’s name was removed from
the MMDA payroll. De Castro demanded for his
reinstatement thru a letter addressed to Aquino. However,
Aquino appointed Carlos as the new AGMO. De Castro
then petitioned to the SC. Carlos argues that De Castro
violated the doctrine of hierarchy of court when he
resorted directly to the Court.
DOCTRINE. “The Supreme Court is a court of last resort
and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the
functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and
immemorial tradition.” A disregard of the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts warrants, as a rule, the outright
dismissal of a petition. A direct invocation of the Supreme
Court’s jurisdiction is allowed only when there are special
and important reasons that are clearly and specifically set
forth in a petition. Although Sec. 5(1) of Art. VIII of the
1987 Constitution explicitly provides that the Supreme
Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and
habeas corpus, the jurisdiction of the SC is not exclusive
but is concurrent with that of the CA and RTC and does
not give petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court
forum.
FACTS.
 Emmanuel A. De Castro (petitioner) was appointed as
Assistant General Manager I (AGMO I) at the
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
(MMDA) on July 29, 2009 by then President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo.
 With the onset of the Aquino administration,
Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa issued Office of
the President (OP) Memorandum Circular No. 2
Series of 2010, amending OP MC No. 1, Series of
2010, which directed all non-Career Executive
Service Officials (non-CESO) to continue to
discharge their office until October 31, 2011 or until
their resignations have been accepted and/or their
respective replacements appointed or designated.
 On November 2, 2010, Emerson Carlos (respondent)
was appointed as OIC of the AGMO, citing OP
Memorandum Circular No. 2 Series of 2010.
 Since then, petitioner’s name was removed from the
MMDA payroll and he no longer received his salary
effective November 2010.
 Seeking reinstatement, and declining an offer to
become Director IV of the MMDA Public Health and
Safety Services, petitioner made a formal demand for
his reinstatement thru a letter addressed to the Office
of the President.
 However, the President appointed respondent as the
new AGMO of the MMDA effective January 4, 2011.
 Petitioner then filed this present petition for issuance
of writ of quo warranto to the SC, arguing that Sec.
2(3) of Art. IX(B) of the 1987 Constitution guarantees
the security of tenure of employees in the civil
service.
 Respondent argues otherwise, and maintains that
petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of court
when he resorted directly to the Court.
ISSUES & RATIO.
1. WON petitioner De Castro is entitled to the
position of AGMO. – NO
For the procedural issue, petitioner submits that a direct
recourse to the SC is warranted by the urgent demands of
public interest, particularly the veritable need for stability
in the civil service and the protection of the rights of civil
servants, and considering that no other than the President
of the Philippines is the appointing authority.
In this case, the petitioner’s excuses are not special and
important circumstances that would allow a direct
recourse to the SC.
A direct invocation of the SC’s jurisdiction is allowed
only when there are special and important reasons that are
clearly and specifically set forth in a petition. The
rationale behind this policy arises from the necessity of
preventing (1) inordinate demands upon the time and
attention of the SC, which is better devoted to those
matters within its exclusive jurisdiction; and (2) further
overcrowding of the SC’s docket.
Although Sec. 5(1) of Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution
explicitly provides that the SC has original jurisdiction
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus, the jurisdiction of the SC is
not exclusive but is concurrent with that of the CA and
RTC and does not give petitioner unrestricted freedom of
choice of court forum. The hierarchy of courts must be
strictly observed.
Settled is the rule that “the Supreme Court is a court of
last resort and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily
perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental
charter and immemorial tradition.” A disregard of the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts warrants, as a rule, the
outright dismissal of a petition.
DECISION.
Petition Denied.
NOTES [Substantive Aspect].
Even assuming that petitioner’s direct resort to the SC is
permissible, the Petition must still be dismissed for lack
of merit.
We consider the following factors on why AGMO is
covered by CES: First, an AGMO is a career position that
enjoys security of tenure by virtue of the MMDA Charter.
Second, the position of AGMO is above the division chief
level, which is equivalent to the rank of assistant secretary
with Salary Grade 29. Third, the MMDA Charter states
that the AGMO requires the performance of executive and
managerial functions.
In sum, the petitioner lacked of cause of action because
he lacked CES eligibility in a CES position.
TOPIC: TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE
11) UNITED CLAIMANTS ASSOCIATION OF NEA
VS. NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION
ADMINISTRATION (none)
TOPIC: DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERFERENCE
OR JUDICIAL STABILITY
12) SINTER CORPORATION AND PHIVIDEC
INDUSTRIAL AUTHORITY VS CAGAYAN
ELECTRIC POWER AND LIGHT CO., INC.
On January 21, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino and
her Cabinet approved a Cabinet Reform Policy for the
power sector and issued a Cabinet Memorandum, Item
No. 2 of which provides:
“Continue direct connection for industries
authorized under the BOI-NPC Memorandum of
Understanding of 12 January 1981, until such
time as the appropriate regulatory board
determines that direct connection of industry to
NPC is no longer necessary in the franchise area
of the specific utility or cooperative.
Determination shall be based in the utility or
cooperatives meeting the standards of financial
and technical capability with satisfactory
guarantees of non-prejudice to industry to be set
in consultation with NPC and relevant
government agencies and reviewed periodically
by the regulatory board.” (emphasis ours).
Pursuant to such Cabinet Memorandum, respondent
CEPALCO grantee of a legislative franchise to distribute
electric power to the municipalities of Villanueva, Jasaan
and Tagoloan, and the city of Cagayan de Oro, all of the
province of Misamis Oriental, filed with the Energy
Regulatory Board (ERB) a petition entitled “In Re:
Petition for Implementation of Cabinet Policy Reforms in
the Power Sector”
The petition sought the “discontinuation of all existing
direct supply of power by the National Power Corporation
(NPC, now NAPOCOR) within CEPALCO’s franchise
area.”
The ERB issued a notice of public hearing which was
published in the Newspapers and posted in the affected
areas. After hearing, the ERB rendered a decision
granting the petition.
NAPOCOR filed a motion for reconsideration, which the
ERB denied. Thereafter, NAPOCOR filed a petition for
review with the Court of Appeals. On October 9, 1992,
the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, holding that
the motion for reconsideration filed by NAPOCOR with
the ERB was out of time and therefore, the assailed
decision became final and executory and could no longer
be subject of a petition for review.
 1. WON RTC Cagayan de Oro has the power to
On a petition for review on certiorari, this Court affirmed
the Resolution of the Court of Appeals. Judgment was
entered on September 22, 1993, thus rendering final the
Decision of ERB.
To implement the decision in ERB Case No. 89-430,
CEPALCO wrote Philippine Sinter Corporation (PSC),
petitioner, and advised the latter of its desire “to have the
power supply of PSC, directly taken from NPC
(NAPOCOR), disconnected, cut and transferred” to
CEPALCO. PSC is an entity operating its business within
the PHIVIDEC Industrial Estate. The Estate is managed
and operated by the PHIVIDEC Industrial Authority
(PIA).
PSC refused CEPALCO’s request, citing its contract for
power supply with NAPOCOR effective until July 26,
1996.
To restrain the execution of the ERB Decision, PSC and
PIA filed a complaint for injunction against CEPALCO
with the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City,
Branch 17, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-186 They
alleged, inter alia, that there exists no legal basis to cut-
off PSC’s power supply with NAPOCOR and substitute
the latter with CEPALCO since: (a) there is a subsisting
contract between PSC and NAPOCOR; (b) the ERB
decision is not binding on PSC since it was not impleaded
as a party to the case; and (c) PSC is operating within the
PHIVIDEC Industrial Estate, a franchise area of PIA, not
CEPALCO, pursuant to Sec. 4 (1) of P.D. 538. Moreover,
the execution of the ERB decision would cause PSC a 2%
increase in its electrical bills.
On April 11, 1994, the trial court rendered judgment favor
of PSC and PIA. CEPALCO filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied by the trial Court in its
order dated December 13, 1994. Aggrieved, CEPALCO
appealed to the Court of Appeals. On July 23, 1996, the
Court of Appeals rendered its decision to sets aside the
decision of RTC and dissolved the writ of preliminary
injunction.
PSC and PIA filed a motion for reconsideration, which
was denied in a Resolution dated December 2, 1996.
Hence the instant petition.
ISSUE:
restrain the decision of ERB.
2. WON injunction lies against the final and
executory judgment of the ERB.
HELD:
1. RTC has no such power.
Corollarily, Section 10 of Executive Order No. 172 (the
law creating the ERB) provides that a review of its
decisions or orders is lodged in the Supreme Court.
Settled is the rule that where the law provides for an
appeal from the decisions of administrative bodies to the
Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, it means that such
bodies are co-equal with the Regional Trial Courts in
terms of rank and stature, and logically, beyond the
control of the latter. Hence, the trial court, being co-equal
with the ERB, cannot interfere with the decision of the
latter. It bears stressing that this doctrine of non-
interference of trial
2. We rule in the negative.
Clearly, an injunction to stay a final and executory
decision is unavailing except only after a showing that
facts and circumstances exist which would render
execution unjust or inequitable, or that a change in the
situation of the parties occurred. Here, no such exception
exists as shown by the facts earlier narrated. To disturb
the final and executory decision of the ERB in an
injunction suit is to brazenly disregard the rule on finality
of judgments.
5. Doctrine of primary jurisdiction

A. OMICTIN VS. CA

B. REPUBLIC VS. LACAP

6. Doctrine of adherence of jurisdiction/continuing

jurisdiction

ABAD, ET AL. VS. RTC OF MANILA

II. Jurisdiction

A. Over the parties

2. How jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired

A. OPTIMA REALTY CORPORATION VS. HERTZ

PHIL, EXCLUSIVE. INC.

B. AFDAL & AFDAL VS. CARLOS

Facts:

Respondent Romeo Carlos filed a complaint for unlawful

detainer and damages against petitioners Zenaida
Guijabar, et al.

Respondent alleged that petitioners were occupying, by

mere tolerance. Respondent claimed that petitioner
Abubakar Afdal sold the property to him but that he
allowed petitioners to stay in the property. Respondent
claimed that he demanded return of the property because
he needed its use but that they refused to heed the demand.

According to the records, there were three attempts to

serve the summons and complaint on petitioners which
were returned with the following annotations:

1.) Unsatisfied/given address cannot be located.

2.) Duly served as evidenced by his signature of
one Gary Acob (relative)
 3.) Duly served but refused to sign” without
specifying to whom it was served.
Petitioner failed to file an answer. The MTC ruled in favor
of respondent. Petitioner filed a motion for relief in the
MTC which they withdrew. They filed the same motion
in the RTC.
The RTC dismissed the petition holding that it didn’t have
jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the
petition for relief from judgement. No jurisdiction.
Ruling:
In the present case, petitioners cannot file the petition for
relief with the MTC because it is a prohibited pleading in
an unlawful detainer case. Petitioners cannot also file the
petition for relief with the RTC because the RTC has no
jurisdiction to entertain petitions for relief from
judgments of the MTC. Therefore, the RTC did not err in
dismissing the petition for relief from judgment of the
MTC.
The remedy is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the MTC over
the person of petitioners in view of the absence of
summons to petitioners. An action for unlawful detainer
or forcible entry is a real action and in personam. In an
action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and
decide the case. Any judgment of the court which has no
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and
void.
Service of summons upon the defendant shall be by
personal service first and only when the defendant cannot
be promptly served in person will substituted service be
availed of. In this case, the indorsements failed to state
that prompt and personal service on petitioners was
rendered impossible. These requirements are
indispensable because substituted service is in derogation
of the usual method of service.
Likewise, nowhere in the return of summons or in the
records of the case was it shown that Gary Acob, the
person on whom substituted service of summons was
effected, was a person of suitable age and discretion
residing in petitioners’ residence. the process server failed
to specify Gary Acob’s age, his relationship to petitioners
and to ascertain whether he comprehends the significance
of the receipt of the summons and his duty to deliver it to
petitioners or at least notify them of said receipt of
summons.
In sum, petitioners were not validly served with summons
by substituted service. Hence, the MTC failed to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioners and, thus,
the MTC’s decision is void
B. Over the subject matter
1. How jurisdiction is conferred and determined
A. FE V. RAPSING, ET AL VS. HON. JUDGE
MAXIMINO R. ABLES
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to
set aside the orders of the RTC of Masbate.
Respondents are members of the Alpha Company, 22nd
infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army in Masbate.
Petitioners are widows of Rapsing, Villanueva and
Aparejado, who were allegedly killed by the respondents.
Respondents alleged that on May 3, 2004, they received
information about the presence of NPA partisans in
Masbate. Acting on the information, they coordinated
with the PNP and proceeded to the place. There, they
encountered armed elements which resulted to an intense
fire fight. After which, seven persons were named dead
including the husbands of the petitioners.
Petitioners claimed that there was no encounter ensued.
Hence, they requested the NBI to conduct investigation.
NBI, relying on the statements of the witnesses who claim
that the military massacred helpless and unarmed
civilians recommended to the prosecutor of Masbate to
conduct a preliminary investigation against the
respondents for the crime of multiple murder.
Then, before the warrant of arrest of respondents was
issued by the RTC Masbate, Judge advocate general's
office of the AFP filed an Omnibus Motion seeking the
case against respondents be transferred to the jurisdiction
of the military tribunal, it was granted.
Petitioners then sought reconsideration of the order, but
was denied by the RTC. Hence, this present petition.
Issue:
Whether Judge Ables abused his discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction in granting the transfer.
Held:
Petition is meritorious. RTC abused its discretion in not
taking cognizance of the case, which actually falls within
its jurisdiction.
It is rule of the procedural law that jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case is conferred by law and is
determined by the allegations of the complaint. what
determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the
action pleaded as appearing in the complaint.
In this case, murder is a crime within the jurisdiction of
the RTC. The military tribunals cannot exercise
jurisdiction over this case because the offense charged is
not included in the enumeration of the "service-connected
offenses or crimes".
B. MENDOZA VS. GERMINO & GERMINO
(lawyerly meron)
C. REMEDIOS ANTONIO VS. THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF MAKATI CITY, ET AL.
FACTS:
Since March 21, 1978, petitioner Remedios Antonino had
been leasing a residential property located at Makati City
and owned by private respondent Tan Tian Su (Su). Under
the governing lease contract, Antonino was accorded with
the right of Frst refusal in the event Su would decide to
sell the subject property. On July 7, 2004, the parties
executed a document denominated as Undertaking
Agreement [4] where Su agreed to sell to Antonino the
subject property forP 39,500,000.00. However, in view of
a disagreement as to who between them would shoulder
the payment of the capital gains tax, the sale did not
proceed as intended. On July 9, 2004, Antonino Fled a
complaint against Su with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati City, for the reimbursement of the cost of
repairs on the subject property and payment of damages.
The complaint was ra±ed to Branch 149 and docketed as
Civil Case No. 04-802. Later that same day, Antonino
Fled an amended complaint to enforce the Undertaking
Agreement and compel Su to sell to her the subject
property. In an Order dated December 8, 2004, the RTC
dismissed Antonino’s complaint on the grounds of
improper venue and non-payment of the appropriate
docket fees. According to the RTC, Antonino’s complaint
is one for speciFc performance, damages and sum of
money, which are personal actions that should have been
Fled in the court of the place where any of the parties
resides. Antonino and Su reside in Muntinlupa and
Manila, respectively, thus Makati City is not the proper
venue.
ISSUE: WON the lack of jurisdiction over the case is a
ground for annulment?
HELD: YES. Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
a ground for annulment of judgment. As this Court
previously clarified in Republic of the Philippines v. "G"
Holdings, Inc., "lack of jurisdiction" as a ground for the
annulment of judgments pertains to lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the defending party or over the subject
matter of the claim. It does not contemplate "grave abuse
of discretion" considering that "jurisdiction" is different
from the exercise thereof.
Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction.
As distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction,
jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause, and not the
decision rendered therein. Where there is jurisdiction over
the person and the subject matter, the decision on all other
questions arising in the case is but an exercise of the
jurisdiction. And the errors, which the court may commit
in the exercise of jurisdiction, are merely errors of
judgment, which are the proper subject of an appeal.
2. Objections to jurisdiction over the subject matter
LASMIS VS. DONG-E
FACTS:
This case involves a conflict of ownership and possession
over an untitled parcel of land.
Petitioners are the actual occupants of the subject land and
respondent is claiming ownership thereof and is seeking
to recover its possession from petitioners.
According to respondent, her family’s ownership and
occupation of the land can be traced as far back as 1922
to her late grandfather, Ap-ap.
Upon Ap-ap’s death, the property was inherited by his
children, who obtained a survey plan and declared the
property for tax purposes in the name of “Teirs of Ap-ap.”
The heirs of Ap-ap then executed a deed of quitclaim in
favor of respondent’s father. That the heirs of Gilbert
Semon tolerated the acts of their first cousins, petitioner’s
in-laws, to stay on a Lot No. 1 together with their
respective families.
When Gilbert Semon died, his children extrajudicially
partitioned the property among themselves and
allotted Lot No. 1 in favor of Margarita.
When the petitioner began expanding their occupation on
the subject property and selling portions thereof,
Margarita filed a complaint for recovery of ownership,
possession, reconveyance, and damages.
RTC: preponderates in favor of respondents long-time
possession of and claim of ownership over the
subject property. The survey plan, tax declarations,
and the documentary evidence of the transfer of the land
from the heirs of ap-ap to respondent father were given
credence.
CA: Ruled that the respondent was able to discharge her
burden in proving
her title and interest to the subject property.
ISSUE:
(1) WON appellate court disregarded material facts and
circumstances in
affirming the trial courts decision
(2) WON petitioner have acquired the subject property by
prescription
(3) WON the ancestral land claim pending before the
National Commission
on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) should take
precedence over the reivindicatory action.
(4) WON the trial court has jurisdiction to decide the case
in light of the effectivity of RA 8371 or the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997 at the time that the
complaint was instituted.
HELD:
(1)Asda
(2)Asda
(3)No.
(4)Yes.
As a general rule, an objection over subject-matter may
be raised any time of the proceedings. This is because
jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties or vested by
the agreement of the parties. Jurisdiction is vested by law,
which prevailed at the time of the filing of the complaint.
However, an exception to this rule has been carved by
jurisprudence. In Tajim v. Sibonghanoy, the court ruled
that the existence of laches will prevent a party from
raising the courts lack of jurisdiction. Laches is defined as
the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within
a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined
it.
In the case at bar, the application of the Tijam doctrine is
called for because of the presence of laches cannot be
ignored.
At the time the complaint was file in 1998, the IPRA was
already in effect but the petitioners never raised the same
as a ground for dismissal; instead they filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the value of the property did
not meet the jurisdictional value for the RTC. They
obviously neglected to take the IPRA into consideration.
It is only before the SC, 8 years after the filing of the
complaint, after the trial court had already conducted a
full-blown trial and rendered a decision on the merits,
after the appellate court had made a thorough review of
the records, and after petitioner have twice encountered
adverse decision from the trial and the appellate courts
that petitioner now want to expunge all the efforts that
have gone into the litigation and resolution of their case
and start of over again.
3. Effect of estoppel on objections to jurisdiction
A. DE LEON VS. CA
Facts:
Balbuena, owner of a parcel of land, entered into a lease
agreement with Inayan in 1970, who bound himself to
deliver 252 cavans of palay each year as rental. The
ownership of the land was then transferred to Balbuena's
daughter, De Leon.
In 1983, Inayan stopped paying the agreed rental. In
1984, Balbuena filed a complaint for "Termination of
Civil Law Lease; Recovery of Posession; Recovery of
Unpaid Rentals and Damages" with the RTC against
Inayan.
The RTC ruled in favor of De Leon. On appeal to the CA,
Inayan questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC. The CA,
in Inayan's motion for reconsideration, dismissed the civil
case filed by De Leon for want of jurisdiction. It ruled
that De Leon's complaint was based on accion interdictal,
a summary action for recovery of possession that should
have been brought before the MTC. It found that the 1-
year period had not yet elapsed from the time when the
civil case for the recovery of possession was filed.
Issue:
Whether or not the complaint filed was for an unlawful
detainer making the RTC want jurisdiction over the case.
Held:
A detainer suit exclusively involves the issue of physical
possession. The case filed by De Leon was not an
unlawful detainer since it involved more than the issue of
possession. De Leon prayed that Inayan be ordered to
vacate the premises, pay back rentals, unpaid irrigation
fees, moral and exemplary damages and litigation fees.
Where the issues of the case extend beyond those
commonly involved in unlawful detainer suits, such as for
instance, the respective rights of parties under various
contractual arrangements and the validity thereof, the case
is converted from a mere detainer suit to one "incapable
of pecuniary estimation," thereby placing it under the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC.
B. TIJAM VS. SIBONGHANOY
FACTS:
The action at bar, which is a suit for collection of a sum
of money in the sum of exactly P 1,908.00, exclusive of
interest filed by Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog
against Spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia
Baguio, was originally instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948. A month prior to the
filing of the complaint, the Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A.
296) took effect depriving the Court of First Instance of
original jurisdiction over cases in which the demand,
exclusive of interest, is not more than P 2,000.00 (Secs.
44[c] and 86[b], R.A. 296.)
The case has already been pending now for almost 15
years, and throughout the entire proceeding the appellant
never raised the question of jurisdiction until the receipt
of the Court of Appeals' adverse decision.
Considering that the Supreme Court has the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over all cases in which jurisdiction
of any inferior court is in issue, the Court of Appeals
certified the case to the Supreme Court along with the
records of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant's motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance during the pendency of the appeal will prosper.
RULING:
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question
in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak
of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and
of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have
been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it
or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon
grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of
society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the
statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is
principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of
permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction
of a court to sure affirmative relief against his opponent
and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief,
repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs.
Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited,
by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the
question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the
subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not
important in such cases because the party is barred from
such conduct not because the judgment or order of the
court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for
the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated —
obviously for reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily
submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision
on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the
jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-
Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St.
Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And
in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it
is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the
jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an
affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same
jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
Upon this same principle is what We said in the three
cases mentioned in the resolution of the Court of Appeals
of May 20, 1963 (supra) — to the effect that we frown
upon the "undesirable practice" of a party submitting his
case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if
favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when
adverse — as well as in Pindañgan etc. vs. Dans, et al.,
G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano, et al.,
vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092;
Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of Industrial
Relation et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia
vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety
became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have
raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court
of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present
action by reason of the sum of money involved which,
according to the law then in force, was within the original
exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so.
Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a
quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the
jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and
submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It
was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the
Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the
question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such
conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as
useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it
was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the
judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The
inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but
revolting.
Coming now to the merits of the appeal: after going over
the entire record, We have become persuaded that We can
do nothing better than to quote in toto, with approval, the
decision rendered by the Court of Appeals x x x granting
plaintiffs' motion for execution against the surety x x x
UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the orders appealed
from are hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant
Manila Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc.
C. ATTY. CUDIAMAT, ET AL. VS. BATANGAS
SAVINGS & LOAN BANK
Atty. Restituto Cudamiat and his brother Perfecto were
the registered co-owners of a 320 square meter parcel of
land in Balayan, Batangas. Perfecto, without Restituto’s
knowledge and consent, obtained a loan from Batangas
Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (the bank) for which the
subject parcel of land was mortgaged. Eventually the
property was foreclosed and Cudiamat et al. filed before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Balayan a complaint
for quieting of title with damages against the bank,
assailing the mortgage as being null and void as they did
not authorize the encumbrance of the property. The bank,
in its answer, alleges, among others, that the Balayan RTC
had no jurisdiction over the case as the bank had been
placed under receivership and under liquidation by the
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC), thus,
jurisdiction to adjudicate disputed claims against it is
lodged with the liquidation court-RTC Nasugbu. The
Balayan RTC rendered judgment in favour of Cudiamat
et al. The bank appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA)
contending that the Balayan RTC had no jurisdiction over
Cudiamat et al.’s complaint for quieting of title.
ISSUE: May the bank be allowed to raise the question of
lack of jurisdiction after actively participating in the
proceedings in the Balayan RTC
HELD: Estoppel bars the bank from raising the issue of
lack of jurisdiction of the Balayan RTC. In Lozon v.
NLRC, the Court came up with a clear rule on when
jurisdiction by estoppel applies and when it does not:
“The operation of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction
seemingly depends on whether the lower court actually
had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the
case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had
jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from
assailing such jurisdiction, for the same “must exist as a
matter of law, and may not be conferred by the consent of
the parties or by estoppel.” However, if the lower court
had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon
a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no
jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory
will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent
position—that the lower court had jurisdiction…”
(underscoring supplied) The ruling was echoed in
Metromedia Times Corporation v. Pastorin. In the present
case, the Balayan RTC, sitting as a court of general
jurisdiction, had jurisdiction over the complaint for
quieting of title filed by petitioners on August 9, 1999.
The Nasugbu RTC, as a liquidation court, assumed
jurisdiction over the claims against the bank only on May
25, 2000, when PDIC’s petition for assistance in the
liquidation was raffled thereat and given due course.
While it is well- settled that lack of jurisdiction on the
subject matter can be raised at any time and is not lost by
estoppel by laches, the present case is an exception. To
compel petitioners to re- file and relitigate their claims
before the Nasugbu RTC when the parties had already
been given the opportunity to present their respective
evidence in a full- blown trial before the Balayan RTC
which had, in fact, decided petitioners’ complaint (about
two years before the appellate court rendered the assailed
decision) would be an exercise in futility and would
unjustly burden petitioners
4. Error of jurisdiction as distinguished from error of
judgement
FIRST CORPORATION VS. FORMER SIXTH
DIVISION OF CA
C. Over the issues
DE JOYA VS. MARQUEZ
 Manuel Dy filed a criminal case against Hao and
Tan for syndicated estafa.
 Dy complained that he was enticed to invest in a
large sum of money in State Resource
Development Management Corporation wherein
he issued several checks amounting to almost
P114M and in turn the corporation issued several
checks to Dy which were dishonored due to
insufficient funds.
 A resolution was issued by Prosecutor Nicdao
finding probable cause to indict petitioner and his
other co-accused for syndicated estafa and a copy
of the articles of incorporation of the
aforementioned corporation named petitioner as
incorporator and director to which they had
knowledge of its activities and transactions.
 The Court finds that these documents sufficiently
establish the existence of probable cause.
Probable cause - facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe
that an offense has been committed by the person sought
to be arrested
 Petitioner then filed for certiorari and prohibition
to nullify the warrant of arrest issued by Judge
Marquez for estafa. Petitioner asserts that
respondent judge erred in finding probable cause
justifying the issuance of the warrant against him
and his co-accused.
ISSUE: May De Joya seek relief from Court/trial even
though he continuously refuses to surrender and submit to
the Court’s jurisdiction? NO
HELD:
 A person is not entitled to seek relief from the
Supreme Court nor from the trial court where he
continuously refuses to surrender and submit to
the court’s jurisdiction.
 His continued refusal to submit to the court’s
jurisdiction should give this Court more reason to
uphold the action of the respondent judge.
 The purpose of a warrant of arrest is to place the
accused under the custody of the law to hold him
for trial of the charges against him.
  It should be remembered that he who invokes the
court’s jurisdiction must first submit to its
jurisdiction.
Note:
Requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction and how the
court acquires such jurisdiction:
a. Jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner:
 This is acquired by the filing of the complaint,
petition or initiatory pleading before the court by
the plaintiff or petitioner.
b. Jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent:
 This is acquired by the voluntary appearance
or submission by the defendant or respondent
to the court or by coercive process issued by
the court to him, generally by the service of
summons.
c. Jurisdiction over the subject matter:
 This is conferred by law and, unlike jurisdiction
over the parties, cannot be conferred on the court
by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties.
d. Jurisdiction over the issues of the case:
 This is determined and conferred by the pleadings
filed in the case by the parties, or by their
agreement in a pre-trial order or stipulation, or, at
times by their implied consent as by the failure of
a party to object to evidence on an issue not
covered by the pleadings, as provided in Sec. 5,
Rule 10.
e. Jurisdiction over the res (or the property or thing which
is the subject of the litigation)
 This is acquired by the actual or constructive
seizure by the court of the thing in question, thus
placing it in custodia legis, as in attachment or
garnishment; or by provision of law which
recognizes in the court the power to deal with the
property or subject matter within its territorial
jurisdiction, as in land registration proceedings or
suits involving civil status or real property in the
Philippines of a non-resident defendant
D. Over the Res or property in litigation
FERDINAND MARCOS JR., VS. REPUBLIC
FACTS:
in 1972, Ferdinand Marcos formed the Arelma S.A. entity
under the laws of Panama and, opened an account under
its name at the brokerage firm of Merrill, Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. in New York and deposited $2
million. A class action by the Marcos' human rights
victims resulted in a nearly $2 billion judgment for the
"Pimentel class," which claimed a right to enforce its
judgment by attaching the Arelma assets. The ownership
in Arelma was represented by two bearer share
certificates that are held in escrow by the Philippine
National Bank (PNB), after being transferred there in
1990 by an order of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court.
The Republic of thePhilippines claimed ownership of the
Arelma deposit of approximately $35 million based on its
custody of the Arelma shares, but citing claims to the
funds by the Marcos' human rights victims, Merrill Lynch
filed an interpleader motion to request the courts to settle
ownership of the funds. Litigation is ongoing in the
United States, as of early March 2011.
On 25 April 2012, this Court rendered a Decision
affirming the 2 April 2009 Decision of the Sandiganbayan
and declaring all the assets of Arelma, S.A., an entity
created by the late Ferdinand E. Marcos, forfeited in favor
of the Republic of the Philippines. The anti-graft court
found that the totality of assets and properties acquired by
the Marcos spouses was manifestly and grossly
disproportionate to their aggregate salaries as public
officials, and that petitioners were unable to overturn the
prima facie presumption of ill-gotten wealth, pursuant to
Section 2 of Republic Act No. (RA) 1379.
In June 2012, the New York Court of Appeals upheld
the New York State Appellate Court decision a year
earlier which held that the case of Swezey (representing
the class of human rights victims) v. Merrill Lynch, et al,
cannot proceed without the participation of the Republic
of Philippines, making reference to the Philippines'
Supreme Court ruling that the Arelma assets belonged to
the People of the Philippines and should be returned to
them.
ISSUE: WON the Sandiganbayan does not possess
territorial jurisdiction over the res or the Arelma proceeds
RULING:
We find that the Sandiganbayan did not err in granting the
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, despite the fact
that the Arelma account and proceeds are held abroad. To
rule otherwise contravenes the intent of the forfeiture law,
and indirectly privileges violators who are able to hide
public assets abroad: beyond the reach of the courts and
their recovery by the State. Forfeiture proceedings, as we
have already discussed exhaustively in our Decision, are
actions considered to be in the nature of proceedings in
rem or quasi in rem, such that:
Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the
seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is
brought into actual custody of the law; or (b) as a result of
the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of
the court is recognized and made effective. In the latter
condition, the property, though at all times within the
potential power of the court, may not be in the actual
custody of said court.
(The Republic's) national interests would be severely
prejudiced by a turnover proceeding because it has
asserted a claim of ownership regarding the Arelma assets
that rests on several bases: the Philippine forfeiture law
that predated the tenure of President Marcos; evidence
demonstrating that Marcos looted public coffers to amass
a personal fortune worth billions of dollars; findings by
the Philippine Supreme Court and Swiss Federal Supreme
Court that Marcos stole related assets from the Republic;
and, perhaps most critically, the recent determination by
the Philippine Supreme Court that Marcos pilfered the
money that was deposited in the Arelma brokerage
account. Consequently, allowing the federal court
judgment against the estate of Marcos to be executed on
property that may rightfully belong to the citizens of the
Philippines could irreparably undermine the Republic's
claim to the Arelma assets.
Finally, we take note of the Decision rendered by the
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court on
26 June 2012. In Swezey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., the foreign court agreed with the dismissal
of the turnover proceeding against the Arelma assets
initiated by alleged victims of human rights abuses during
the Marcos regime. It reasoned that the Republic was a
necessary party, but could not be subject to joinder in light
of its assertion of sovereign immunity:
The Republic's declaration of sovereign immunity in this
case is entitled to recognition because it has a significant
interest in allowing its courts to adjudicate the dispute
over property that may have been stolen from its public
treasury and transferred to New York through no fault of
the Republic. The high courts of the United States, the
Philippines and Switzerland have clearly explained in
decisions related to this case that wresting control over
these matters from the Philippine judicial system would
disrupt international comity and reciprocal diplomatic
self-interests.
E. Jurisdiction of Courts
SUPAPO VS. SPS. DE JESUS
FACTS:
The Spouses Supapo filed a complaint for accion
publiciana against Roberto and Susan de Jesus with the
MeTC of Caloocan City. The complaint sought to compel
the respondents to vacate a piece of land located in
Novaliches, Quezon City, and registered under
petitioners’ name. The land has an assessed value of
Php39,980.00. Petitioners did not reside on the lot but
made sure to visit at least twice a year.
During one of their visits, they saw two houses built on
the lot without their knowledge and permission. They
learned that respondents occupied both houses. They
demanded the surrender of the lot by bringing the dispute
before the appropriate Lupong Tagapamayapa. The
Lupon issued a certificate to file action for failure of the
parties to settle amicably.
The Spouses Supapo filed a criminal case against the
respondents for violating PD No. 772 (Anti-Squatting
Law). The trial court convicted the respondents. On
appeal, the CA dismissed the case because Congress
enacted R.A. No. 8368 repealing the Anti-Squatting Law.
Notwithstanding the dismissal, the Spouses Supapo
moved for the execution of the respondents’ civil liability,
praying that the latter vacate the subject lot. The RTC
granted the motion and issued the writ of execution.
Respondents moved to quash it but the RTC denied their
motion. They filed with the CA a petition for certiorari.
The CA granted it and ruled that with the repeal of the
Anti-Squatting Law, the criminal and civil liabilities of
respondents were extinguished, but it also said that
recourse may be had in court by filing the proper action
for recovery of possession. Thus, the Spouses Supapo
filed the complaint for accion publiciana.
After filing their Answer, the respondents moved to set
their affirmative defenses for preliminary hearing and
argued that there is another action pending between the
same parties, the complaint is barred by statute of
limitations, and the petitioners’ cause of action is barred
by prior judgment.
The MeTC denied the motion to set the affirmative
defenses for preliminary hearing. The RTC granted the
petition for certiorari of respondents because the action
has prescribed and accion publiciana falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. It likewise denied the
motion for reconsideration of petitioners. On appeal, the
CA affirmed the RTC decision; hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the MeTC properly acquired
jurisdiction.
2. Whether or not the cause of action has prescribed.
3. Whether or not the complaint for accion publiciana is
barred by res judicata.
HELD:
1. YES. Under BP 129, the jurisdiction of the RTC over
actions involving title to or possession of real property is
plenary. However, R.A. No. 7691 granted the MeTC,
MTC, and MCTC the exclusive original jurisdiction to
hear actions where the assessed value of the property does
not exceed Php20,000 ot Php50,000 if the property is
located in Metro Manila. Jurisdiction over actions
involving title to or possession of real property is now
determined by its assessed value. It is its fair market value
multiplied by the assessment level.
In the present case, the Spouses Supapo alleged that the
assessed value of the subject lot located in Metro Manila
is Php39,980. Thus, the MeTC properly acquired
jurisdiction over the complaint for accion publiciana.
2. NO. Lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession. Even it be supposed
that the holders of the Torrens Title were aware of the
other persons’ occupation of the property, regardless of
the length of that possession, the lawful owners have a
right to demand the return of their property at any time as
long as the possession was unauthorized or merely
tolerated.
3. NO. Res judicata is not present in the case because:
a. First, there is no identity of parties. The criminal
complaint was prosecuted in the name of the People of the
Philippines. The accion publiciana was filed in the name
of the Spouses Supapo.
b. There is no identity of subject matter. The criminal case
involves the prosecution of a crime under the Anti-
Squatting Law while the accion publiciana is an action to
recover possession of the subject property.
c. There is no identity of causes of action. The People of
the Philippines filed the case to protect governmental
interests, while the spouses filed the accion publiciana to
protect their proprietary interests.
PETITION GRANTED.
F. Jurisdiction over small claims
A.L. ANG NETWORK, INC VS. EMMA
MONDEJAR, ET AL.
FACTS
On 23 March 2011, petitioner filed a complaint for
collection of sum of money under Rule of Procedure for
Small Claims Cases before the MTCC, seeking to collect
from respondent the amount of P23, 111.71 which
represented her unpaid water bills for the period of 1 June
2002 to 30 September 2005.
Petitioner claimed that it was duly authorized to
supply water to and collect payment therefor from the
homeowners of Regent Pearl Subdivision, one of whom
is the respondent.
Respondent assailed that she religiously paid the
monthly charges of P75.00. She claimed that the
increased rate of P113.00 for every 10 cubic meter of
water plus an additional P11.60 for every cubic meter
thereafter was not valid because the petitioner unilaterally
made the increase without informing the residents therein
which was stipulated in their agreement.
MTCC
The MTCC ruled in favour of the respondent. The
petitioner can only charge the respondent the agreed flat
rate for the period 1 June 2002 to 7 August 2003 since the
Certificate of Public Convenience was only issued on the
latter date. Respondent should be considered to have fully
paid.
The MTCC disregarded the petitioner’s reliance
on HLURB’s decision because it failed to prove that it
complied with the directive to inform the HLURB of the
result of its consultation with the concerned homeowners
as regards the rates to be charged and the HLURB’s
approval to such charges.
Petitioner also failed to submit evidence showing
the exact date when it actually began imposing the NWRB
approved rates and the formal agreement of the parties
containing the terms and conditions thereof, without
which it cannot establish with certainty respondent’s
obligation.
RTC
On a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court for grave abuse of discretion filed with the RTC,
the petitioner assailed that the MTCC disregarded
petitioner’s reliance on the source of its authority to
impose new water consumption rates.
The RTC issued a decision dismissing the
petition, finding that the petition was only filed to
circumvent the non-appealable nature of small claims
cases as provided in Section23 of the Rules of Procedure
on Small Claims Cases. To this end, the RTC ruled that it
cannot supplant the decision of the MTCC with another
decision directing respondent to pay petitioners a bigger
sum than that which has been awarded.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was
denied.
Hence, this instant petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing
petitioner’s recourse under Rule 65 of the RRC assailing
the propriety of the MTCC’s decision in the subject small
claims case.
RULING
Yes. The RTC erred in its decision.
The petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
RRC before the RTC was proper.
It is an essential requisite for the availability of
the extraordinary remedies under the Rules in the absence
of an appeal or any “plain, speedy and adequate remedy”
in the ordinary course of law.
In the case at bar, the first level courts are vested
exclusive jurisdiction over small claims cases, certiorari
petitions assailing its dispositions should be filed to their
corresponding RTCs.
The SC held that the RTC was wrong in
dismissing the said petition on the ground that it was an
improper remedy and, as such, the RTC case must be
reinstated and remanded thereto for its proper disposition.
Petition is granted. The RTC’s decision and
resolution are reversed and set aside. RTC case is
reinstated and the court a quo is ordered to resolve the
same with dispatch.
G. Rule on summary procedure
FLORELLO R. JOSE VS. ROBERTO ALFUERTO
H. Baranggay conciliation
1. GEGARE VS. CA
Facts: There was a lot with an area of approximately 270
sq. m. in General Santos City. Its title was named after
Paulino Elma. A reversion case was filed by the State
against Elma in the CFI of South Cotabato, wherein a
decision was rendered declaring Elma’s title null and void
and thus, was ordered cancelled. The lot was reverted to
the mass of public domain subject to disposition and
giving preferential right to its actual occupant, Napoleon
Gegare. (The writ of execution went to series of processes
including applying before the Board of Liquidators. They
are, however, not essential to our topic.)
The chief of LASEDECO, through the Board of
Liquidators’ directive, investigated the lot and
recommended the division of the same equally to both
parties. The Board issued the resolution ordering the said
division. The Office of the President affirmed the board’s
resolution.
 Private respondent, Armie Elma, paid for the Ratio: True it is that the Board is a government
value of the ½ of the lot. An original certificate was then instrumentality but the petitioner and private respondent
issued to him. Petitioner was also advised by the Board to who are also contending parties in the case are residents
do the same. of the same barangay so Section 6 of Presidential Decree
No. 1508 should apply to them as it provides---
Petitioner then filed an action for “Annulment
and Cancellation of Partition of Lot 5989, Ts-217, Section 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of
situated at Dadiangas, General Santos City and complaint. No complaint, petition, action or proceeding
Annulment of Resolutions No. 272 and and 185 and/or to involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon as
Declare them Null and Void” against private respondent provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in
and the Board. The suit was docketed Civil Case No. court or any other government office for adjudication
3270 in the RTC of General Santos City. unless there has been a confrontation of the parties before
the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or
Sequence of events after filing: settlement has been reached as certified by
the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary attested by
Priv. Resp: Motion to dismiss
(GRANTED) the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement
has been repudiated.
Pet: Motion for reconsideration
(GRANED) The purpose of this confrontation is to enable the parties
to settle their differences amicably. If the other only
PR: Asked for a preliminary hearing of the contending party is the government or its
grounds for the instrumentality or subdivision the case falls within the
exception but when it is only one of the contending
motion to dismiss in his affirmative defenses. parties, a confrontation should still be undertaken
(DENIED) among the other parties.
PR: Petition for certiorari and prohibition in the CA 2. SANCHEZ VS. TUPAZ
(GRANTED)
3. VDA. DE BORROMEO VS. POGOY
Pet: Urgent Motion for reconsideration (DENIED)
FACTS:
Pet: Appeal before the SC
(DISMISSED) Petitioner herein seeks to stop respondent Judge Julian B.
Pogoy of the Municipal Trial Court of Cebu City from
taking cognizance of an ejectment suit for failure of the
plaintiff to refer the dispute to the Barangay Lupon for
Respondent Elma’s Petitioner’s
conciliation.
Defense Response
Petitioner failed to Such law is not The intestate estate of the late Vito Borromeo is the owner
comply with the applicable since one of of a building bearing the deceased’s name which
provisions of PD No. the parties is the was leased and occupied by petitioner Petra Vda. de
1508 (Katarungang government or any Borromeo at a monthly rental of P500.00 payable in
Pambarangay Law) subdivision or advance within the first five days of the month.
before filing his instrumentality.
complaint in court. On August 28, 1982, Atty. Ricardo Reyes, administrator
of the estate, served upon petitioner a demand letter for
her to pay theoverdue rentals corresponding to the period
Issue: Whether or not Katarungang Pambarangay Law from March to September 1982, and thereafter to vacate
is applicable in this case. the premises. Petitioner failed to do so and Atty. Reyes
instituted an ejectment case against the former.
Held: Yes, Katarungang Pambarangay Law is
applicable in the case at bar.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the case pointing out that the
parties are residents of the same city and must refer the
dispute to the barangay court, as required by PD No.
1508, otherwise known
as Katarungang Pambarangay Law.
The motion was dismissed thus this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not going through Lupon was
necessary?
RULING: NO
The defense of Atty Reyes regarding the statute of
limitations is unacceptable because the case was filed on
September 16, 1982, less than a month before the letter of
demand was served. Forcible entry and detainer
prescribes in one year counted from demand to vacate the
premises and the law only required 60 days upon which
the parties should try to reconcile in Lupon; Respondent
had more than 9 months left even if reconciliation failed.
Under Section 4(a) of PD No. 1508, referral of a dispute
to the Barangay Lupon is required only where the parties
thereto are "individuals." An "individual" means "a single
human being as contrasted with a social group or
institution." 5 Obviously, the law applies only to cases
involving natural persons, and not where any of the
parties is a juridical person such as a corporation,
partnership, corporation sole, testate or intestate, estate,
etc.
In Civil Case No. R-23915, plaintiff Ricardo
Reyes is a mere nominal party who is suing in behalf of
the Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo. While it is true that
Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court allows the
administrator of an estate to sue or be sued without joining
the party for whose benefit the action is presented or
defended, it is indisputable that the real party in interest
in Civil Case No. R-23915 is the intestate estate under
administration. Since the said estate is a juridical person
6 plaintiff administrator may file the complaint directly in
court, without the same being coursed to the Barangay
Lupon for arbitration.
4. PEREGRINA VS. PANIS
Facts:
Spouses Sanchez filed a Civil Action for Damages against
Petitioners Peregrina for alleged disrespect for the
dignity, privacy and peace of mind of the Spouses under
Art.26 of the Civil Code, and for alleged defamation
under Art.33 of the same code.
The parties are neighbors in a barangay in Olongapo City.
However, no conciliation proceedings were filed before
the Lupon.
Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the Complaint.
Before filing an Opposition, Spouses applied for a Writ of
Preliminary Attachment. Thereafter, Spouses presented
their Opposition claiming that under Sec.6(3), PD 1508,
the parties may go directly to the Courts if the Action is
coupled with a provisional remedy such as a Preliminary
Attachment.
In resolving the Motion to Dismiss, respondent Judge
initially dismissed the Complaint for Spouse’s failure to
comply with the precondition for amicable settlement
under PD 1508. However, on Motion for Reconsideration,
respondent Judge denied the Petitioner’s Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that under Rule 57, Sec.1 of the
Rules of Court, the application for attachment can be
made at the commencement of the action or any time
thereafter.
Issue:
Whether respondent court’s assumption of jurisdiction,
without prior conciliation proceedings between the parties
in the Lupon Tagapamayapa, is valid.
Held:
Sec.3 of PD 1508 specifically provides that “disputes
between or among persons actually residing in the same
barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before
the Lupon of said barangay”.
Sec.6 of the same law also mandates that “no complaint,
petition, action or proceeding involving any matter within
the authority of the Lupon…shall be filed or instituted in
court or any government office for adjudication unless
there has been confrontation of the parties before the
Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or
settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon
Secretary or Pangkat Secretary, attested by the Lupon or
Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been
repudiated…”
PD 1508 makes the conciliation process at the Barangay
level a condition precedent for the filing of a complaint in
court. Non-compliance with that condition precedent
could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s cause of
action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on
the ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity. The
condition is analogous to exhaustion of administrative
remedies, or the lack of earnest efforts to compromise
suits between family members, lacking which, the case
can be dismissed.
The parties therein fall squarely within the ambit of PD
1508. They are actual residents in the same barangay and
their dispute does not fall under any of the excepted cases.
Respondent Judge erred in reconsidering his previous
Order of Dismissal on the ground that the provisional
remedy of attachment was seasonably filed. Not only was
the application for that remedy merely an afterthought to
circumvent the law, but also, a writ of attachment is not
available in a suit for damages where the amount,
including moral damages, is contingent or unliquidated.
Prior referral to the Lupon for conciliation proceedings,
therefore, was indubitably called for.
5. LIBRADA M. AQUINO VS. ERNEST AURE
FACTS
Aure Lending filed a Complaint for ejectment against
Aquino. In their Complaint, Aure and Aure Lending
alleged that they acquired the subject property from a
Deed of Sale.
Aquino countered that the Complaint lacks cause of
action for Aure and Aure Lending do not have any legal
right over the subject property.
MeTC rendered in favor of Aquino and dismissed the
Complaint for ejectment of Aure and Aure Lending for
non-compliance with the barangay conciliation process,
among other grounds. Te MeTC observed that Aure and
Aquino are residents of the same barangay but there is no
showing that any attempt has been made to settle the case
amicably at the barangay level.
RTC affirmed
CA reversed the MeTC and RTC Decisions and
remanding the case to the MeTC for further proceedings
and final determination of the substantive rights of the
parties.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT NON-COMPLIANCE
WITH THE BARANGAY CONCILIATION
PROCEEDINGS IS A JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT
THAT WARRANTS THE DISMISSAL OF THE
COMPLAINT.
HELD: NO
There is no dispute herein that the present case was never
referred to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation before
Aure and Aure Lending instituted Civil Case No. 17450.
In fact, no allegation of such barangay conciliation
proceedings was made in Aure and Aure Lending’s
Complaint before the MeTC.
It is true that the precise technical effect of failure to
comply with the requirement of Section 412 of the Local
Government Code on barangay conciliation (previously
contained in Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1508)
is much the same effect produced by non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies -- the complaint becomes
afflicted with the vice of pre-maturity; and the
controversy there alleged is not ripe for judicial
determination. The complaint becomes vulnerable to a
motion to dismiss.[22] Nevertheless, the conciliation
process is not a jurisdictional requirement, so that
non-compliance therewith cannot affect the
jurisdiction which the court has otherwise acquired
over the subject matter or over the person of the
defendant.[23]
As enunciated in the landmark case of Royales v.
Intermediate Appellate Court[24]:
Ordinarily, non-compliance with the condition precedent
prescribed by P.D. 1508 could affect the sufficiency of the
plaintiff's cause of action and make his complaint
vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack of cause of
action or prematurity; but the same would not prevent
a court of competent jurisdiction from exercising its
power of adjudication over the case before it, where
the defendants, as in this case, failed to object to such
exercise of jurisdiction in their answer and even
during the entire proceedings a quo.
While petitioners could have prevented the trial court
from exercising jurisdiction over the case by seasonably
taking exception thereto, they instead invoked the very
same jurisdiction by filing an answer and seeking
affirmative relief from it. What is more, they participated
in the trial of the case by cross-examining respondent
Planas. Upon this premise, petitioners cannot now be
allowed belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by
attacking the jurisdiction of the court to which they
had submitted themselves voluntarily. x x x (Emphasis
supplied.)
Jurisdiction in ejectment cases is determined by the
allegations pleaded in the complaint. As long as these
allegations demonstrate a cause of action either for
forcible entry or for unlawful detainer, the court acquires
jurisdiction over the subject matter. This principle holds,
even if the facts proved during the trial do not support the
cause of action thus alleged, in which instance the court -
- after acquiring jurisdiction -- may resolve to dismiss the
action for insufficiency of evidence.
x x x. The law, as revised, now provides instead that
when the question of possession cannot be resolved
without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of
ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue
of possession. On its face, the new Rule on Summary
Procedure was extended to include within the jurisdiction
of the inferior courts ejectment cases which likewise
involve the issue of ownership. This does not mean,
however, that blanket authority to adjudicate the issue of
ownership in ejectment suits has been thus conferred on
the inferior courts.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision
dated 17 October 2001 and its Resolution dated 8 May
2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 63733 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner.
6. CRISANTA ALCARAZ MIGUEL VS. JERRY D.
MONTANEZ
I. Totality rule
FLORES VS. MALLARE-PHILIPS
Summary:
 Flores has 2 causes of actions: 1st against
Binongcal for refusing to pay amount
representing cost of truck tires purchased on
credit from Flores from Aug-Oct 1981 and 2nd
against Calion for refusing to pay amount
representing cost of truck tires from 1981-
1982. RTC dismisses case for lack of
jurisdiction. The SC ruled that Flores is
partially correct, but still in favor of respondent
judge. The application of the totality rule under
Section 33(l) of BP 129 and Sec 11 of the
Interim Rules is subject to the requirements for
the permissive joinder of parties under Section
6 of Rule 3: the total of claims shall furnish the
jurisdictional test and that they arose out of the
same transaction or series of transactions and
there is a common question of law or fact.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC:
RTC Baguio City and Benguet Province dismissed
petition -> Petition for review SC Rule 45
FACTS:
 Flores appealed by certiorari from the order of
Judge Mallare-Phillipps of the RTC of Baguio
City and Benguet Province which dismissed his
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Flores did not
attach to his petition a copy of his complaint in
the erroneous belief that the entire original record
of the case shall be transmitted to this Court
pursuant to Sec 39 of BP129. This provision
applies only to ordinary appeals from the RTC to
the CA.
 However, the order appealed from states that the
1st cause of action alleged in the complaint was
against Ignacio Binongcal for refusing to pay the
amount of P11,643.00 representing cost of truck
tires which he purchased on credit from Flores on
various occasions from Aug to Oct 1981; and the
2nd cause of action was against respondent
Fernando Calion for allegedly refusing to pay the
amount of P10,212.00 representing cost of truck
tires which he purchased on credit from petitioner
on several occasions from Mar 1981-Jan 1982.
 Counsel for Binongcal filed a Motion to Dismiss.
At the MTD hearing, counsel for respondent
Calion joined in moving for the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Counsel for petitioner opposed the Motion to
Dismiss. RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT:
 Lower court has jurisdiction over the case
following the "novel" totality rule introduced in
 Sec 33(l) of BP129 and Sec 11 of the Interim
Rules.
 Flores compares the provisions with the pertinent
portion of the former rule under Sec 88 Judiciary
Act of 1948: ... Where there are several claims or
causes of action between the same parties
embodied in the same complaint, the amount of
the demand shall be the totality of the demand in
all the causes of action, irrespective of whether
the causes of action arose out of the same or
different transactions; but where the claims or
causes of action joined in a single complaint are
separately owned by or due to different parties,
each separate claim shall furnish the
jurisdictional test. ...
 With the deletion of the proviso in the former
rule, the totality rule was reduced to clarity and
brevity and the jurisdictional test is the totality of
the claims in all, not in each, of the causes of
action, irrespective of whether the causes of
action arose out of the same or different
transactions.
 Sec 11 Interim Rules: In actions where the
jurisdiction of the court is dependent on the
amount involved, the test of jurisdiction shall be
the aggregate sum of all the money demands,
exclusive only of interest and costs, irrespective
of whether or not the separate claims are owned
by or due to different parties. If any demand is for
damages in a civil action, the amount thereof
must be specifically alleged.
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT:
 12/15/83, counsel for respondent Binongcal filed
a MTD on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since
the amount of the demand against said respondent
was only P11,643.00, and under Section 19(8) of
BP129 RTC shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction if the amount of the demand is more
than twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). It was
further averred in said motion that although
another person, Fernando Calion, was allegedly
indebted to petitioner in the amount of
P10,212.00, his obligation was separate and
distinct from that of the other respondent.
ISSUES: WON the RTC correctly dismissed Flores’
petition for lack of jurisdiction - YES
HELD:
 Flores’ argument is partly correct. There is no
difference between the former and present rules
in cases where a plaintiff sues a defendant on two
or more separate causes of action. In such cases,
the amount of the demand shall be the totality of
the claims in all the causes of action irrespective
of whether the causes of action arose out of the
same or different transactions. If the total demand
exceeds twenty thousand pesos, then the regional
trial court has jurisdiction. Needless to state, if the
causes of action are separate and independent,
their joinder in one complaint is permissive and
not mandatory, and any cause of action where the
amount of the demand is twenty thousand pesos
or less may be the subject of a separate complaint
filed with a metropolitan or municipal trial court.
 However, there is a difference between the
former and present rules in cases where two or
more plaintiffs having separate causes of
action against a defendant join in a single
complaint.
 Vda. de Rosario vs. Justice of the Peace Under
the former rule, "where the claims or causes of
action joined in a single complaint are separately
owned by or due to different parties, each
separate claim shall furnish the jurisdictional
test". As worded, the former rule applied only to
cases of permissive joinder of parties plaintiff.
However, it was also applicable to cases of
permissive joinder of parties defendant.
 The application of the totality rule under Sec 33(l)
of BP 129 and Sec 11 Interim Rules is subject to
the requirements for the permissive joinder of
parties under Section 6 of Rule 3: the total of
claims shall furnish the jurisdictional test and that
they arose out of the same transaction or series of
transactions and there is a common question of
law or fact.
 After a careful scrutiny of the complaint, it
appears that there is a misjoinder of parties for the
reason that the claims against respondents
Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct
and neither of which falls within its jurisdiction
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed,
without pronouncement as to costs.