U.S. Supreme Court 3d.
3d. That at the time of granting these letters patent and of the discovery of the continent of
Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 8 Wheat. 543 543 (1823)
Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. McIntosh
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543
ERROR TO THE DISTRICT
COURT OF ILLINOIS
Syllabus
A title to lands under grants to private individuals made by Indian tribes or nations northwest of
the River Ohio in 1773 and 1775 cannot be recognized in the courts of the United States.
Discovery the original foundation of titles to land on the American continent as between the
different European nations by whom conquests and settlements were made here.
Recognition of the same principle in the wars, negotiations, and treaties between the different
European powers.
Adoption of the same principle by the United States.
The exclusive right of the British government to the lands occupied by the Indians has passed to
that of the United States.
Foundation and limitation of the right of conquest.
Application of the principle of the right of conquest to the case of the Indian savages. Nature of
the Indian title, as subordinate to the absolute ultimate title of the government.
Effect of the proclamation of 1763.
Titles in New England under Indian grants.
This was an action of ejectment for lands in the State and District of Illinois, claimed by the
plaintiffs under a purchase and conveyance from the Piankeshaw Indians and by the defendant
under a grant from the United States. It came up on a case stated upon which there was a
judgment below for the defendant. The case stated set out the following facts:
1st. That on 23 May, 1609, James I, King of England, by his letters patent of that date, under
the great seal of England, did erect, form, and establish Robert, Earl of Salisbury, and others,
his associates, in the letters patent named and their successors into a body corporate and politic
by the name and style of "The Treasurer and Company of Adventurers and Planters of the City
of London for the first Colony in Virginia," with perpetual succession and power to make, have,
and use a common seal, and did give, grant, and confirm unto this company, and their
successors,
Page 21 U. S. 544
under certain reservations and limitations in the letters patent expressed,
"All the lands, countries, and territories situate, lying, and being in that part of North America
called Virginia, from the point of land called Cape or Point Comfort all along the seacoast to the
northward two hundred miles, and from the said Cape or Point Comfort all along the seacoast to
the southward two hundred miles, and all that space and circuit of land lying from the seacoast
of the precinct aforesaid up into the land throughout from the sea, west and northwest, and also
all the islands lying within one hundred miles along the coast of both seas of the precinct
aforesaid, with all the soil, grounds, rights, privileges, and appurtenances to these territories
belonging and in the letters patent particularly enumerated,"
and did grant to this corporation and their successors various powers of government in the
letters patent particularly expressed.
2d. That the place called in these letters patent Cape or Point Comfort is the place now called
and known by the name of Old Point Comfort, on the Chesapeake Bay and Hampton Roads, and
that immediately after the granting of the letters patent, the corporation proceeded under and
by virtue of them to take possession of parts of the territory which they describe and to form
settlements, plant a colony, and exercise the powers of government therein, which colony was
called and known by the name of the Colony of Virginia.
1
Page 21 U. S. 545
North America by the Europeans, and during the whole intermediate time, the whole of the
territory in the letters patent described, except a small district on James River, where a
settlement of Europeans had previously been made, was held, occupied, and possessed in full
sovereignty by various independent tribes or nations of Indians, who were the sovereigns of
their respective portions of the territory and the absolute owners and proprietors of the soil and
who neither acknowledged nor owed any allegiance or obedience to any European sovereign or
state whatever, and that in making settlements within this territory and in all the other parts of
North America where settlements were made under the authority of the English government or
by its subjects, the right of soil was previously obtained by purchase or conquest from the
particular Indian tribe or nation by which the soil was claimed and held, or the consent of such
tribe or nation was secured.
4th. That in the year 1624, this corporation was dissolved by due course of law and all its
powers, together with its rights of soil and jurisdiction under the letters patent in question were
revested in the Crown of England, whereupon the colony became a royal government with the
same territorial limits and extent which had been established by the letters patent, and so
continued until it became a free and independent state, except so far as its limits and extent
were altered and curtailed by the Treaty of February 10, 1763, between Great Britain and
France and by the letters patent granted by the King of England
Page 21 U. S. 546
for establishing the Colonies of Carolina, Maryland, and Pennsylvania.
5th. That sometime previous to the year 1756, the French government, laying a claim to the
country west of the Alleghany or Appalachian Mountains on the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers and
their branches, took possession of certain parts of it with the consent of the several tribes or
nations of Indians possessing and owning them, and with the like consent established several
military posts and settlements therein, particularly at Kaskaskias, on the River Kaskaskias, and
at Vincennes, on the River Wabash, within the limits of the Colony of Virginia, as described and
established in and by the letters patent of May 23, 1609, and that the government of Great
Britain, after complaining of these establishments as encroachments and remonstrating against
them, at length, in the year 1756, took up arms to resist and repel them, which produced a war
between those two nations wherein the Indian tribes inhabiting and holding the countries
northwest of the Ohio and on the Mississippi above the mouth of the Ohio were the allies of
France, and the Indians known by the name of the Six Nations or the Iroquois and their
tributaries and allies were the allies of Great Britain, and that on 10 February, 1763, this war
was terminated by a definitive treaty of peace between Great Britain and France and their allies
by which it was stipulated and agreed that the River Mississippi, from its source to the Iberville,
should forever after form the boundary between the dominions of
Page 21 U. S. 547
Great Britain and those of France in that part of North America and between their respective
allies there.
6th. That the government of Virginia, at and before the commencement of this war and at all
times after it became a royal government, claimed and exercised jurisdiction, with the
knowledge and assent of the government of Great Britain, in and over the country northwest of
the River Ohio and east of the Mississippi as being included within the bounds and limits
described and established for that colony, by the letters patent of May 23, 1609, and that in the
year 1749, a grant of six hundred thousand acres of land within the country northwest of the
Ohio and as part of Virginia was made by the government of Great Britain to some of its
subjects by the name and style of the Ohio Company.
7th. That at and before the commencement of the war in 1756 and during its whole continuance
and at the time of the Treaty of February 10, 1763, the Indian tribes or nations inhabiting the
country north and northwest of the Ohio and east of the Mississippi as far east as the river
falling into the Ohio called the Great Miami were called and known by the name of the Western
Confederacy of Indians, and were the allies of France in the war, but not her subjects, never
having been in any manner conquered by her, and held the country in absolute sovereignty as
independent nations, both as to the right of jurisdiction and sovereignty and the right of soil,
except a few military posts and a small territory around each,
Page 21 U. S. 548
which they had ceded to France, and she held under them, and among which were the aforesaid
posts of Kaskaskias and Vincennes, and that these Indians, after the treaty, became the allies of
Great Britain, living under her protection as they had before lived under that of France, but were
free and independent, owing no allegiance to any foreign power whatever and holding their
lands in absolute property, the territories of the respective tribes being separated from each
other and distinguished by certain natural marks and boundaries to the Indians well known, and
each tribe claiming and exercising separate and absolute ownership in and over its own
territory, both as to the right of sovereignty and jurisdiction and the right of soil.
8th. That among the tribes of Indians thus holding and inhabiting the territory north and
northwest of the Ohio, east of the Mississippi, and west of the Great Miami, within the limits of
Virginia, as described in the letters patent of May 23, 1609, were certain independent tribes or
nations called the Illinois or Kaskaskias and the Piankeshaw or Wabash Indians, the first of
which consisted of three several tribes united into one and called the Kaskasias, the Pewarias,
and the Cahoquias; that the Illinois owned, held, and inhabited, as their absolute and separate
property, a large tract of country within the last mentioned limits and situated on the
Mississippi, Illinois, and Kaskaskias Rivers and on the Ohio below the mouth of the Wabash, and
the Piankeshaws another large tract of country within the same
Page 21 U. S. 549
limits, and as their absolute and separate property, on the Wabash and Ohio Rivers, and that
these Indians remained in the sole and absolute ownership and possession of the country in
question until the sales made by them in the manner herein after set forth.
9th. That on the termination of the war between Great Britain and France, the Illinois Indians,
by the name of the Kaskaskias tribes of Indians, as fully representing all the Illinois tribes then
remaining, made a treaty of peace with Great Britain and a treaty of peace, limits, and amity,
under her mediation, with the Six Nations, or Iroquois, and their allies, then known and
distinguished by the name of the Northern Confederacy of Indians, the Illinois being a part of
the confederacy then known and distinguished by the name of the Southern Confederacy, and
sometimes by that of the Western Confederacy.
10th. That on 7 October, 1763, the King of Great Britain made and published a proclamation for
the better regulation of the countries ceded to Great Britain by that treaty, which proclamation
is referred to and made part of the case.
11th. That from time immemorial and always up to the present time, all the Indian tribes or
nations of North America, and especially the Illinois and Piankeshaws and other tribes holding,
possessing, and inhabiting the said countries north and northeast of the Ohio east of the
Mississippi and west of the Great Miami held their respective lands and territories each in
common, the individuals
2
Page 21 U. S. 550
of each tribe or nation holding the lands and territories of such tribe in common with each other,
and there being among them no separate property in the soil, and that their sole method of
selling, granting, and conveying their lands, whether to governments or individuals, always has
been from time immemorial and now is for certain chiefs of the tribe selling to represent the
whole tribe in every part of the transaction, to make the contract, and execute the deed, on
behalf of the whole tribe, to receive for it the consideration, whether in money or commodities,
or both, and finally to divide such consideration among the individuals of the tribe, and that the
authority of the chiefs so acting for the whole tribe is attested by the presence and assent of the
individuals composing the tribe, or some of them, and by the receipt by the individuals
composing the tribe of their respective shares of the price, and in no other manner.
12th. That on 5 July, 1773, certain chiefs of the Illinois Indians, then jointly representing, acting
for, and being duly authorized by that tribe in the manner explained above, did by their deed
poll, duly executed and delivered and bearing date on that day, at the post of Kaskaskias, then
being a British military post, and at a public council there held by them for and on behalf of the
said Illinois nation of Indians with William Murray, of the Illinois country, merchant, acting for
himself and for Moses Franks and Jacob Franks, of London, in Great Britain, David Franks, John
Inglis, Bernard Gratz, Michael
Page 21 U. S. 551
Gratz, Alexander Ross, David Sproat, and James Milligan, all of Philadelphia, in the p\Province of
Pennsylvania; Moses Franks, Andrew Hamilton, William Hamilton, and Edmund Milne of the
same place; Joseph Simons otherwise called Joseph Simon and Levi Andrew Levi of the Town of
Lancaster in Pennsylvania; Thomas Minshall of York County in the same province; Robert
Callender and William Thompson, of Cumberland County in the same province; John Campbell
of Pittsburgh in the same province; and George Castles and James Ramsay of the Illinois
country, and for a good and valuable consideration in the said deed stated grant, bargain, sell,
alien, lease, enfeoff, and confirm to the said William Murray, Moses Franks, Jacob Franks, David
Franks, John Inglis, Bernard Gratz, Michael Gratz, Alexander Ross, David Sproat, James
Milligan, Andrew Hamilton, William Hamilton, Edmund Milne Joseph Simons, otherwise called
Joseph Simon Levi Andrew Levi, Thomas Minshall, Robert Callender, William Thompson, John
Campbell, George Castles, and James Ramsay, their heirs and assigns forever, in severalty, or
to George the Third, then King of Great Britain and Ireland, his heirs and successors, for the
use, benefit, and behoof of the grantees, their heirs and assigns, in severalty, by whichever of
those tenures they might most legally hold, all those two several tracts or parcels of land
situated, lying, and being within the limits of Virginia on the east of the Mississippi, northwest of
the Ohio, and west of the Great Miami, and thus butted
Page 21 U. S. 552
and bounded:
Beginning for one of the said tracts on the east side of the Mississippi at the mouth of the Heron
Creek, called by the French the River of Mary, being about a league below the mouth of the
Kaskaskias River, and running thence a northward of east course in a direct line back to the
Hilly Plains, about eight leagues more or less; thence the same course in a direct line to the
Crab Tree Plains, about seventeen leagues more or less; thence the same course in a direct line
to a remarkable place known by the name of the Big Buffalo Hoofs, about seventeen leagues
more or less; thence the same course, in a direct line to the Salt Lick Creek, about seven
leagues more or less; then crossing the Salt Lick Creek, about one league below the ancient
Shawanese town in an easterly or a little to the north of east course in a direct line to the River
Ohio, about four leagues more or less; then down the Ohio by its several courses until it
empties into the Mississippi, about thirty-five leagues more or less; and then up the Mississippi,
by its several courses, to the place of beginning, about thirty-three leagues more or less; and
beginning for the other tract on the Mississippi at a point directly opposite to the mouth of the
Missouri and running up the Mississippi by its several courses to the mouth of the Illinois, about
six leagues more or less; and thence up the Illinois, by its several courses, to Chicagou or Garlic
Creek, about ninety leagues, more or less; thence nearly a northerly course, in a direct line, to
a certain remarkable place, being the ground on which a
Page 21 U. S. 553
battle was fought about forty or fifty years before that time between the Pewaria and Renard
Indians, about fifty leagues more or less; thence by the same course in a direct line to two
remarkable hills close together in the middle of a large prairie or plain, about fourteen leagues
more or less; thence a north of east course, in a direct line, to a remarkable spring known by
the Indians by the name of "Foggy Spring," about fourteen leagues more or less; thence the
same course in a direct line to a great mountain, to the northwest of the White Buffalo Plain,
about fifteen leagues more or less; and thence nearly a southwest course to the place of
beginning, about forty leagues more or less:
To have and to hold the said two tracts of land, with all and singular their appurtenances, to the
grantees, their heirs and assigns, forever in severalty or to the King, his heirs and successors,
to and for the use, benefit, or behoof of the grantees, their heirs and assigns, forever in
severalty, as will more fully appear by the said deed poll, duly executed under the hands and
seals of the grantors and duly recorded at Kaskaskias on 2 September, 1773, in the office of
Vicerault Lemerance, a notary public, duly appointed and authorized. This deed, with the several
certificates annexed to or endorsed on it, was set out at length in the case.
13th. That the consideration in this deed expressed, was of the value of $24,000 current money
of the United States and upwards, and was paid and delivered, at the time of the execution of
the deed, by William Murray, one
Page 21 U. S. 554
of the grantees, in behalf of himself and the other grantees, to the Illinois Indians, who freely
accepted it and divided it among themselves; that the conferences in which the sale of these
lands was agreed on and made and in which it was agreed that the deed should be executed
were publicly held for the space of a month at the post of Kaskaskias, and were attended by
many individuals of all the tribes of Illinois Indians, besides the chiefs, named as grantors in the
deed; that the whole transaction was open, public, and fair, and the deed fully explained to the
grantors and other Indians by the sworn interpreters of the government and fully understood by
the grantors and other Indians before it was executed; that the several witnesses to the deed
and the grantees named in it were such persons and of such quality and stations, respectively,
as they are described to be in the deed, the attestation, and the other endorsements on it; that
the grantees did duly authorize William Murray to act for and represent them in the purchase of
the lands and the acceptance of the deed, and that the two tracts or parcels of land which it
describes and purports to grant were then part of the lands held, possessed, and inhabited by
the Illinois Indians from time immemorial in the manner already stated.
14th. That all the persons named as grantees in this deed were, at the time of its execution and
long before, subjects of the Crown of Great Britain and residents of the several places named in
the deed as their places of residence, and that
Page 21 U. S. 555
they entered into the land under and by virtue of the deed and became seized as the law
requires.
3
15th. That on 18 October, 1775, Tabac and certain other Indians, all being chiefs of the
Piankeshaws and jointly representing, acting for, and duly authorized by that nation in the
manner stated above, did, by their deed poll, duly executed and bearing date on the day last
mentioned at the post of Vincennes, otherwise called post St. Vincent, then being a British
military post, and at a public council there held by them for and on behalf of the Piankeshaw
Indians, with Louis Viviat, of the Illinois country, acting for himself and for the Right Honorable
John, Earl of Dunmore, then Governor of Virginia, the Honorable John Murray, son of the said
Earl, Moses Franks and Jacob Franks, of London, in Great Britain, Thomas Johnson, Jr., and
John Davidson, both of Annapolis, in Maryland, William Russel, Matthew Ridley, Robert Christie,
Sr., and Robert Christie, Jr., of Baltimore Town, in the same province, Peter Compbell, of
Piscataway in the same province, William Geddes, of Newtown Chester in the same province,
collector of his Majesty's customs, David Franks and Moses Franks, both of Philadelphia in
Pennsylvania, William Murray and Daniel Murray, of the Illinois country, Nicholas St. Martin and
Joseph Page, of the same place, Francis Perthuis, late of Quebec, in Canada, but then of post
St. Vincent, and for good and valuable consideration, in the deed poll mentioned and
enumerated, grant, bargain, sell, alien, enfeoff, release, ratify, and
Page 21 U. S. 556
confirm to the said Louis Viviat and the other persons last mentioned, their heirs and assigns,
equally to be divided, or to George III, then King of Great Britain and Ireland, his heirs and
successors, for the use, benefit, and behoof of all the above mentioned grantees, their heirs and
assigns, in severalty, by whichever of those tenures they might most legally hold, all those two
several tracts of land in the deed particularly described situate, lying,
brk:
and being northwest of the Ohio, east of the Mississippi, and west of the Great Miami, within the
limits of Virginia and on both sides of the Ouabache, otherwise called the Wabash, which two
tracts of land are contained respectively within the following metes and bounds, courses and
distances, that is to say, beginning for one of the said tracts at the mouth of a rivulet called
Riviere du Chat, or Cat River, where it empties itself into the Ouabache or Wabash, by its
several courses, to a place called Point Coupee, about twelve leagues above post St. Vincent,
being forty leagues, or thereabouts, in length, on the said river Ouabache, from the place of
beginning, with forty leagues in width or breadth on the east side, and thirty leagues in breadth
or width on the west side of that river, to be continued along from the place of beginning to
Point Coupee. And beginning for the other tract at the mouth of White River where it empties
into the Ouabache, about twelve leagues below post St. Vincent, and running thence down the
Ouabache by its several courses until it empties into the Ohio, being from White River to the
Ohio, about fifty-three leagues in length, more or less, with forty
Page 21 U. S. 557
leagues in width or breadth on the east side and thirty in width or breadth on the west side of
the Ouabache, to be continued along from the White River to the Ohio, with all the rights,
liberties, privileges, hereditaments, and appurtenances to the said tract belonging, to have and
to hold to the grantees, their heirs and assigns, forever in severalty or to the King, his heirs and
successors, for the use, benefit, and behoof of the grantees, their heirs and assigns, as will
more fully appear by the deed itself, duly executed under the hands and seals of the grantors,
and duly recorded at Kaskaskias, on 5 December, 1775, in the office of Louis Bomer, a notary
public, duly appointed and authorized. This deed, with the several certificates annexed to or
endorsed on it, was set out at length.
16th. That the consideration in this deed expressed was of the value of $31,000 current money
of the United States and upwards, and was paid and delivered at the time of the execution of
the deed by the grantee, Lewis Viviat, in behalf of himself and the other grantees, to the
Piankeshaw Indians, who freely accepted it and divided it among themselves; that the
conferences in which the sale of these two tracts of land was agreed on and made, and in which
it was agreed that the deed should be executed were publicly held for the space of a month at
the post of Vincennes or post St. Vincent, and were attended by many individuals of the
Piankeshaw nation of Indians besides the chiefs named as grantors in the deed; that the whole
Page 21 U. S. 558
transaction was open, public, and fair, and the deed fully explained to the grantors and other
Indians by skillful interpreters, and fully understood by them before it was executed; that it was
executed in the presence of the several witnesses by whom it purports to have been attested,
and was attested by them; that the grantees were all subjects of the Crown of Great Britain,
and were of such quality, station, and residence, respectively, as they are described in the deed
to be; that the grantees did duly authorize Lewis Viviat to act for and represent them in the
purchase of these two tracts of land and in the acceptance of the deed; that these tracts of land
were then part of the lands held, possessed, and inhabited by the Piankeshaw Indians from time
immemorial, as is stated above; and that the several grantees under this deed entered into the
land which it purports to grant and became seized as the law requires.
17th. That on 6 May, 1776, the Colony of Virginia threw off its dependence on the Crown and
government of Great Britain and declared itself an independent state and government with the
limits prescribed and established by the letters patent of May 23, 1609, as curtailed and
restricted by the letters patent establishing the Colonies of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and
Carolina and by the Treaty of February 10, 1763, between Great Britain and France, which
limits, so curtailed and restricted, the State of Virginia, by its Constitution and form of
government, declared should be and remain the limits of the state and should bound its western
and northwestern extent.
Page 21 U. S. 559
18th. That on 5 October, 1778, the General Assembly of Virginia, having taken by arms the
posts of Kaskaskias and Vincennes, or St. Vincent, from the British forces, by whom they were
then held, and driven those forces from the country northwest of the Ohio, east of the
Mississippi, and west of the Great Miami, did, by an act of assembly of that date, entitled "An
act for establishing the County of Illinois and for the more effectual protection and defense
thereof," erect that country, with certain other portions of territory within the limits of the state
and northwest of the Ohio into a county, by the name of the County of Illinois.
19th. That on 29 December, 1783, the State of Virginia, by an act of assembly of that date,
authorized their delegates in the Congress of the United States, or such of them, to the number
of three at least, as should be assembled in Congress on behalf of the state and by proper
deeds or instruments in writing under their hands and seals, to convey, transfer, assign, and
make over to the United States, in Congress assembled, for the benefit of the said states, all
right, title, and claim, as well of soil as jurisdiction, which Virginia had to the territory or tract of
country within her limits, as defined and prescribed by the letters patent of May 23, 1609, and
lying to the northwest of the Ohio; subject to certain limitations and conditions in the act
prescribed and specified, and that on 1 March, 1784, Thomas Jefferson, Samuel Hardy, Arthur
Lee, and James Monroe, then being four of the delegates
Page 21 U. S. 560
of Virginia to the Congress of the United States, did, by their deed poll, under their hands and
seals, in pursuance and execution of the authority to them given by this act of assembly,
convey, transfer, assign, and make over to the United States, in Congress assembled, for the
benefit of the said states, all right, title, and claim, as well of soil as jurisdiction which that state
had to the territory northwest of the Ohio, with the reservations, limitations, and conditions in
the act of assembly prescribed, which cession the United States accepted.
4
20th. That on 20 July, 1818, the United States, by their officers duly authorized for that purpose
did sell, grant, and convey to the defendant in this action, William McIntosh, all those several
tracts or parcels of land, containing 11,560 acres, and butted, bounded, and described, as will
fully appear in and by the patent for the said lands, duly executed, which was set out at length.
21st. That the lands described and granted in and by this patent are situated within the State of
Illinois and are contained within the lines of the last or second of the two tracts described and
purporting to be granted and conveyed to Louis Viviat and others by the deed of October 18,
1775, and that William McIntosh, the defendant, entered upon these lands under and by virtue
of his patent and became possessed thereof before the institution of this suit.
22d. That Thomas Johnson, one of the grantees
Page 21 U. S. 561
in and under the deed of October 18, 1775, departed this life on or about 1 October, 1819,
seized of all his undivided part or share of and in the two several tracts of land described and
purporting to be granted and conveyed to him and others by that deed, having first duly made
and published his last will and testament in writing, attested by three credible witnesses, which
he left in full force and by which he devised all his undivided share and part of those two tracts
of land to his son, Joshua Johnson and his heirs, and his grandson, Thomas J. Graham, and his
heirs, the lessors of the plaintiff in this action, as tenants in common.
23d. That Joshua Johnson and Thomas J. Graham, the devisees, entered into the two tracts of
land last above mentioned under and by virtue of the will, and became thereof seized as the law
requires. That Thomas Johnson, the grantee and devisor, during his whole life and at the time of
his death, was an inhabitant and citizen of the State of Maryland; that Joshua Johnson and
Thomas J. Graham, the lessors of the plaintiff, now are and always have been citizens of the
same state; that the defendant, William McIntosh, now is and at and before the time of bringing
this action was a citizen of the State of Illinois, and that the matter in dispute in this action is of
the value of $2,000 current money of the United States and upwards.
24th. And that neither William Murray nor any other of the grantees under the deed of July 5,
1773, nor Louis Viviat nor any other of the
Page 21 U. S. 562
grantees under the deed of October 8, 1775, nor any person for them or any of them ever
obtained or had the actual possession under and by virtue of those deeds or either of them of
any part of the lands in them or either of them described and purporting to be granted, but
were prevented by the war of the American Revolution, which soon after commenced, and by
the disputes and troubles which preceded it, from obtaining such possession, and that since the
termination of the war and before it, they have repeatedly and at various times from the year
1781 till the year 1816 petitioned the Congress of the United States to acknowledge and confirm
their title to those lands under the purchases and deeds in question, but without success.
Judgment being given for the defendant on the case stated, the plaintiffs brought this writ of
error.
Page 21 U. S. 571
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The plaintiffs in this cause claim the land in their declaration mentioned under two grants
purporting to be made, the first in 1773 and the last in 1775, by the chiefs of certain
Page 21 U. S. 572
Indian tribes constituting the Illinois and the Piankeshaw nations, and the question is whether
this title can be recognized in the courts of the United States?
The facts, as stated in the case agreed, show the authority of the chiefs who executed this
conveyance so far as it could be given by their own people, and likewise show that the particular
tribes for whom these chiefs acted were in rightful possession of the land they sold. The inquiry,
therefore, is in a great measure confined to the power of Indians to give, and of private
individuals to receive, a title which can be sustained in the courts of this country.
As the right of society to prescribe those rules by which property may be acquired and
preserved is not and cannot be drawn into question, as the title to lands especially is and must
be admitted to depend entirely on the law of the nation in which they lie, it will be necessary in
pursuing this inquiry to examine not singly those principles of abstract justice which the Creator
of all things has impressed on the mind of his creature man and which are admitted to regulate
in a great degree the rights of civilized nations, whose perfect independence is acknowledged,
but those principles also which our own government has adopted in the particular case and
given us as the rule for our decision.
On the discovery of this immense continent, the great nations of Europe were eager to
appropriate to themselves so much of it as they could respectively acquire. Its vast extent
offered an
Page 21 U. S. 573
ample field to the ambition and enterprise of all, and the character and religion of its inhabitants
afforded an apology for considering them as a people over whom the superior genius of Europe
might claim an ascendency. The potentates of the old world found no difficulty in convincing
themselves that they made ample compensation to the inhabitants of the new by bestowing on
them civilization and Christianity in exchange for unlimited independence. But as they were all
in pursuit of nearly the same object, it was necessary, in order to avoid conflicting settlements
and consequent war with each other, to establish a principle which all should acknowledge as
the law by which the right of acquisition, which they all asserted should be regulated as
between themselves. This principle was that discovery gave title to the government by whose
subjects or by whose authority it was made against all other European governments, which title
might be consummated by possession.
The exclusion of all other Europeans necessarily gave to the nation making the discovery the
sole right of acquiring the soil from the natives and establishing settlements upon it. It was a
right with which no Europeans could interfere. It was a right which all asserted for themselves,
and to the assertion of which by others all assented.
Those relations which were to exist between the discoverer and the natives were to be regulated
by themselves. The rights thus acquired being exclusive, no other power could interpose
between them.
Page 21 U. S. 574
In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original inhabitants were in no instance
entirely disregarded, but were necessarily to a considerable extent impaired. They were
5
admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain
possession of it, and to use it according to their own discretion; but their rights to complete
sovereignty as independent nations were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of
the soil at their own will to whomsoever they pleased was denied by the original fundamental
principle that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.
While the different nations of Europe respected the right of the natives as occupants, they
asserted the ultimate dominion to be in themselves, and claimed and exercised, as a
consequence of this ultimate dominion, a power to grant the soil while yet in possession of the
natives. These grants have been understood by all to convey a title to the grantees, subject only
to the Indian right of occupancy.
The history of America from its discovery to the present day proves, we think, the universal
recognition of these principles.
Spain did not rest her title solely on the grant of the Pope. Her discussions respecting boundary,
with France, with Great Britain, and with the United States all show that she placed in on the
rights given by discovery. Portugal sustained her claim to the Brazils by the same title.
France also founded her title to the vast territories she claimed in America on discovery.
However
Page 21 U. S. 575
conciliatory her conduct to the natives may have been, she still asserted her right of dominion
over a great extent of country not actually settled by Frenchmen and her exclusive right to
acquire and dispose of the soil which remained in the occupation of Indians. Her monarch
claimed all Canada and Acadie as colonies of France at a time when the French population was
very inconsiderable and the Indians occupied almost the whole country. He also claimed
Louisiana, comprehending the immense territories watered by the Mississippi and the rivers
which empty into it, by the title of discovery. The letters patent granted to the Sieur Demonts in
1603, constitute him Lieutenant General, and the representative of the King in Acadie, which is
described as stretching from the 40th to the 46th degree of north latitude, with authority to
extend the power of the French over that country and its inhabitants, to give laws to the people,
to treat with the natives and enforce the observance of treaties, and to parcel out and give title
to lands according to his own judgment.
The states of Holland also made acquisitions in America and sustained their right on the
common principle adopted by all Europe. They allege, as we are told by Smith in his History of
New York, that Henry Hudson, who sailed, as they say, under the orders of their East India
Company, discovered the country from the Delaware to the Hudson, up which he sailed to the
43d degree of north latitude, and this country they claimed under the title acquired by this
voyage.
Page 21 U. S. 576
Their first object was commercial, as appears by a grant made to a company of merchants in
1614, but in 1621 the States General made, as we are told by Mr. Smith, a grant of the country
to the West India Company by the name of New Netherlands.
The claim of the Dutch was always contested by the English -- not because they questioned the
title given by discovery, but because they insisted on being themselves the rightful claimants
under that title. Their pretensions were finally decided by the sword.
No one of the powers of Europe gave its full assent to this principle more unequivocally than
England. The documents upon this subject are ample and complete. So early as the year 1496,
her monarch granted a commission to the Cabots to discover countries then unknown to
Christian people and to take possession of them in the name of the King of England. Two years
afterwards, Cabot proceeded on this voyage and discovered the continent of North America,
along which he sailed as far south as Virginia. To this discovery the English trace their title.
In this first effort made by the English government to acquire territory on this continent we
perceive a complete recognition of the principle which has been mentioned. The right of
discovery given by this commission is confined to countries "then unknown to all Christian
people," and of these countries Cabot was empowered to take possession in the name of the
King of England. Thus asserting a right to take possession
Page 21 U. S. 577
notwithstanding the occupancy of the natives, who were heathens, and at the same time
admitting the prior title of any Christian people who may have made a previous discovery.
The same principle continued to be recognized. The charter granted to Sir Humphrey Gilbert in
1578 authorizes him to discover and take possession of such remote, heathen, and barbarous
lands as were not actually possessed by any Christian prince or people. This charter was
afterwards renewed to Sir Walter Raleigh in nearly the same terms.
By the charter of 1606, under which the first permanent English settlement on this continent
was made, James I granted to Sir Thomas Gates and others those territories in America lying on
the seacoast between the 34th and 45th degrees of north latitude and which either belonged to
that monarch or were not then possessed by any other Christian prince or people. The grantees
were divided into two companies at their own request. The first or southern colony was directed
to settle between the 34th and 41st degrees of north latitude, and the second or northern
colony between the 38th and 45th degrees.
In 1609, after some expensive and not very successful attempts at settlement had been made,
a new and more enlarged charter was given by the Crown to the first colony, in which the King
granted to the "Treasurer and Company of Adventurers of the City of London for the first colony
in Virginia," in absolute property, the lands extending along the seacoast four hundred miles,
and
Page 21 U. S. 578
into the land throughout from sea to sea. This charter, which is a part of the special verdict in
this cause, was annulled, so far as respected the rights of the company, by the judgment of the
Court of King's Bench on a writ of quo warranto, but the whole effect allowed to this judgment
was to revest in the Crown the powers of government and the title to the lands within its limits.
At the solicitation of those who held under the grant to the second or northern colony, a new
and more enlarged charter was granted to the Duke of Lenox and others in 1620, who were
denominated the Plymouth Company, conveying to them in absolute property all the lands
between the 40th and 48th degrees of north latitude.
Under this patent New England has been in a great measure settled. The company conveyed to
Henry Rosewell and others, in 1627, that territory which is now Massachusetts, and in 1628 a
charter of incorporation comprehending the powers of government was granted to the
purchasers.
6
Great part of New England was granted by this company, which at length divided their
remaining lands among themselves, and in 1635 surrendered their charter to the Crown. A
patent was granted to Gorges for Maine, which was allotted to him in the division of property.
All the grants made by the Plymouth Company, so far as we can learn, have been respected. In
pursuance of the same principle, the King, in 1664, granted to the Duke of York the country of
New England as far south as the Delaware
Page 21 U. S. 579
Bay. His Royal Highness transferred New Jersey to Lord Berkeley and Sir George Carteret.
In 1663, the Crown granted to Lord Clarendon and others the country lying between the 36th
degree of north latitude and the River St. Mathes, and in 1666 the proprietors obtained from the
Crown a new charter granting to them that province in the King's dominions in North America
which lies from 36 degrees 30 minutes north latitude to the 29th degree, and from the Atlantic
ocean to the South sea.
Thus has our whole country been granted by the Crown while in the occupation of the Indians.
These grants purport to convey the soil as well as the right of dominion to the grantees. In
those governments which were denominated royal, where the right to the soil was not vested in
individuals, but remained in the Crown or was vested in the colonial government, the King
claimed and exercised the right of granting lands and of dismembering the government at his
will. The grants made out of the two original colonies, after the resumption of their charters by
the Crown, are examples of this. The governments of New England, New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, and a part of Carolina were thus created. In all of them, the soil, at the
time the grants were made, was occupied by the Indians. Yet almost every title within those
governments is dependent on these grants. In some instances, the soil was conveyed by the
Crown unaccompanied by the powers of government, as in the case of the northern neck of
Virginia. It has never
Page 21 U. S. 580
been objected to this or to any other similar grant that the title as well as possession was in the
Indians when it was made and that it passed nothing on that account.
These various patents cannot be considered as nullities, nor can they be limited to a mere grant
of the powers of government. A charter intended to convey political power only would never
contain words expressly granting the land, the soil, and the waters. Some of them purport to
convey the soil alone, and in those cases in which the powers of government as well as the soil
are conveyed to individuals, the Crown has always acknowledged itself to be bound by the
grant. Though the power to dismember regal governments was asserted and exercised, the
power to dismember proprietary governments was not claimed, and in some instances, even
after the powers of government were revested in the Crown, the title of the proprietors to the
soil was respected.
Charles II was extremely anxious to acquire the property of Maine, but the grantees sold it to
Massachusetts, and he did not venture to contest the right of that colony to the soil. The
Carolinas were originally proprietary governments. In 1721, a revolution was effected by the
people, who shook off their obedience to the proprietors and declared their dependence
immediately on the Crown. The King, however, purchased the title of those who were disposed
to sell. One of them, Lord Carteret, surrendered his interest in the government but retained his
title to the soil. That
Page 21 U. S. 581
title was respected till the revolution, when it was forfeited by the laws of war.
Further proofs of the extent to which this principle has been recognized will be found in the
history of the wars, negotiations, and treaties which the different nations claiming territory in
America have carried on and held with each other.
The contests between the cabinets of Versailles and Madrid respecting the territory on the
northern coast of the Gulf of Mexico were fierce and bloody, and continued until the
establishment of a Bourbon on the throne of Spain produced such amicable dispositions in the
two Crowns as to suspend or terminate them.
Between France and Great Britain, whose discoveries as well as settlements were nearly
contemporaneous, contests for the country actually covered by the Indians began as soon as
their settlements approached each other, and were continued until finally settled in the year
1763 by the Treaty of Paris.
Each nation had granted and partially settled the country, denominated by the French Acadie,
and by the English Nova Scotia. By the 12th article of the Treaty of Utrecht, made in 1703, his
most Christian Majesty ceded to the Queen of Great Britain "all Nova Scotia or Acadie, with its
ancient boundaries." A great part of the ceded territory was in the possession of the Indians,
and the extent of the cession could not be adjusted by the commissioners to whom it was to be
referred.
The Treaty of Aix la Chapelle, which was made
Page 21 U. S. 582
on the principle of the status ante bellum, did not remove this subject of controversy.
Commissioners for its adjustment were appointed whose very able and elaborate, though
unsuccessful, arguments in favor of the title of their respective sovereigns show how entirely
each relied on the title given by discovery to lands remaining in the possession of Indians.
After the termination of this fruitless discussion, the subject was transferred to Europe and
taken up by the cabinets of Versailles and London. This controversy embraced not only the
boundaries of New England, Nova Scotia, and that part of Canada which adjoined those
colonies, but embraced our whole western country also. France contended not only that the St.
Lawrence was to be considered as the center of Canada, but that the Ohio was within that
colony. She founded this claim on discovery and on having used that river for the transportation
of troops in a war with some southern Indians.
This river was comprehended in the chartered limits of Virginia, but though the right of England
to a reasonable extent of country in virtue of her discovery of the seacoast and of the
settlements she made on it, was not to be questioned, her claim of all the lands to the Pacific
Ocean because she had discovered the country washed by the Atlantic, might, without
derogating from the principle recognized by all, be deemed extravagant. It interfered, too, with
the claims of France founded on the same principle. She therefore sought to strengthen her
original title to
Page 21 U. S. 583
the lands in controversy by insisting that it had been acknowledged by France in the 15th article
of the Treaty of Utrecht. The dispute respecting the construction of that article has no tendency
to impair the principle, that discovery gave a title to lands still remaining in the possession of
7
the Indians. Whichever title prevailed, it was still a title to lands occupied by the Indians, whose
right of occupancy neither controverted and neither had then extinguished.
These conflicting claims produced a long and bloody war which was terminated by the conquest
of the whole country east of the Mississippi. In the treaty of 1763, France ceded and guaranteed
to Great Britain all Nova Scotia, or Acadie, and Canada, with their dependencies, and it was
agreed that the boundaries between the territories of the two nations in America should be
irrevocably fixed by a line drawn from the source of the Mississippi, through the middle of that
river and the lakes Maurepas and Ponchartrain, to the sea. This treaty expressly cedes, and has
always been understood to cede, the whole country on the English side of the dividing line
between the two nations, although a great and valuable part of it was occupied by the Indians.
Great Britain, on her part, surrendered to France all her pretensions to the country west of the
Mississippi. It has never been supposed that she surrendered nothing, although she was not in
actual possession of a foot of land. She surrendered all right to acquired the country, and any
after attempt to purchase it from the Indians would have been considered
Page 21 U. S. 584
and treated as an invasion of the territories of France.
By the 20th article of the same treaty, Spain ceded Florida, with its dependencies and all the
country she claimed east or southeast of the Mississippi, to Great Britain. Great part of this
territory also was in possession of the Indians.
By a secret treaty which was executed about the same time, France ceded Louisiana to Spain,
and Spain has since retroceded the same country to France. At the time both of its cession and
retrocession, it was occupied chiefly by the Indians.
Thus all the nations of Europe who have acquired territory on this continent have asserted in
themselves and have recognized in others the exclusive right of the discoverer to appropriate
the lands occupied by the Indians. Have the American states rejected or adopted this principle?
By the treaty which concluded the war of our revolution, Great Britain relinquished all claim not
only to the government, but to the "propriety and territorial rights of the United States" whose
boundaries were fixed in the second article. By this treaty the powers of government and the
right to soil which had previously been in Great Britain passed definitively to these states. We
had before taken possession of them by declaring independence, but neither the declaration of
independence nor the treaty confirming it could give us more than that which we before
possessed or to which Great Britain was before entitled. It
Page 21 U. S. 585
has never been doubted that either the United States or the several states had a clear title to all
the lands within the boundary lines described in the treaty, subject only to the Indian right of
occupancy, and that the exclusive power to extinguish that right was vested in that government
which might constitutionally exercise it.
Virginia, particularly, within whose chartered limits the land in controversy lay, passed an act in
the year 1779 declaring her
"exclusive right of preemption from the Indians of all the lands within the limits of her own
chartered territory, and that no person or persons whatsoever have or ever had a right to
purchase any lands within the same from any Indian nation except only persons duly authorized
to make such purchase, formerly for the use and benefit of the colony and lately for the
Commonwealth."
The act then proceeds to annul all deeds made by Indians to individuals for the private use of
the purchasers.
Without ascribing to this act the power of annulling vested rights or admitting it to countervail
the testimony furnished by the marginal note opposite to the title of the law forbidding
purchases from the Indians in the revisals of the Virginia statutes stating that law to be
repealed, it may safely be considered as an unequivocal affirmance on the part of Virginia of the
broad principle which had always been maintained that the exclusive right to purchase from the
Indians resided in the government.
In pursuance of the same idea, Virginia proceeded at the same session to open her
Page 21 U. S. 586
land office for the sale of that country which now constitutes Kentucky, a country every acre of
which was then claimed and possessed by Indians, who maintained their title with as much
persevering courage as was ever manifested by any people.
The states, having within their chartered limits different portions of territory covered by Indians,
ceded that territory generally to the United States on conditions expressed in their deeds of
cession, which demonstrate the opinion that they ceded the soil as well as jurisdiction, and that
in doing so they granted a productive fund to the government of the Union. The lands in
controversy lay within the chartered limits of Virginia, and were ceded with the whole country
northwest of the River Ohio. This grant contained reservations and stipulations which could only
be made by the owners of the soil, and concluded with a stipulation that
"all the lands in the ceded territory not reserved should be considered as a common fund for the
use and benefit of such of the United States as have become or shall become members of the
confederation, . . . according to their usual respective proportions in the general charge and
expenditure, and shall be faithfully and bona fide disposed of for that purpose, and for no other
use or purpose whatsoever."
The ceded territory was occupied by numerous and warlike tribes of Indians, but the exclusive
right of the United States to extinguish their title and to grant the soil has never, we believe,
been doubted.
Page 21 U. S. 587
After these states became independent, a controversy subsisted between them and Spain
respecting boundary. By the treaty of 1795, this controversy was adjusted and Spain ceded to
the United States the territory in question. This territory, though claimed by both nations, was
chiefly in the actual occupation of Indians.
The magnificent purchase of Louisiana was the purchase from France of a country almost
entirely occupied by numerous tribes of Indians who are in fact independent. Yet any attempt of
others to intrude into that country would be considered as an aggression which would justify
war.
Our late acquisitions from Spain are of the same character, and the negotiations which preceded
those acquisitions recognize and elucidate the principle which has been received as the
foundation of all European title in America.
8
The United States, then, has unequivocally acceded to that great and broad rule by which its
civilized inhabitants now hold this country. They hold and assert in themselves the title by which
it was acquired. They maintain, as all others have maintained, that discovery gave an exclusive
right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy either by purchase or by conquest, and gave
also a right to such a degree of sovereignty as the circumstances of the people would allow
them to exercise.
The power now possessed by the government of the United States to grant lands, resided, while
we were colonies, in the Crown, or its grantees. The validity of the titles given by either has
never
Page 21 U. S. 588
been questioned in our courts. It has been exercised uniformly over territory in possession of
the Indians. The existence of this power must negative the existence of any right which may
conflict with and control it. An absolute title to lands cannot exist at the same time in different
persons or in different governments. An absolute must be an exclusive title, or at least a title
which excludes all others not compatible with it. All our institutions recognize the absolute title
of the Crown, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy, and recognize the absolute title of
the Crown to extinguish that right. This is incompatible with an absolute and complete title in
the Indians.
We will not enter into the controversy whether agriculturists, merchants, and manufacturers
have a right on abstract principles to expel hunters from the territory they possess or to
contract their limits. Conquest gives a title which the courts of the conqueror cannot deny,
whatever the private and speculative opinions of individuals may be, respecting the original
justice of the claim which has been successfully asserted. The British government, which was
then our government and whose rights have passed to the United States, asserted title to all the
lands occupied by Indians within the chartered limits of the British colonies. It asserted also a
limited sovereignty over them and the exclusive right of extinguishing the title which occupancy
gave to them. These claims have been maintained and established as far west as the River
Mississippi by the sword. The title
Page 21 U. S. 589
to a vast portion of the lands we now hold originates in them. It is not for the courts of this
country to question the validity of this title or to sustain one which is incompatible with it.
Although we do not mean to engage in the defense of those principles which Europeans have
applied to Indian title, they may, we think, find some excuse, if not justification, in the
character and habits of the people whose rights have been wrested from them.
The title by conquest is acquired and maintained by force. The conqueror prescribes its limits.
Humanity, however, acting on public opinion, has established, as a general rule, that the
conquered shall not be wantonly oppressed, and that their condition shall remain as eligible as
is compatible with the objects of the conquest. Most usually, they are incorporated with the
victorious nation, and become subjects or citizens of the government with which they are
connected. The new and old members of the society mingle with each other; the distinction
between them is gradually lost, and they make one people. Where this incorporation is
practicable, humanity demands and a wise policy requires that the rights of the conquered to
property should remain unimpaired; that the new subjects should be governed as equitably as
the old, and that confidence in their security should gradually banish the painful sense of being
separated from their ancient connections, and united by force to strangers.
When the conquest is complete and the conquered inhabitants can be blended with the
conquerors
Page 21 U. S. 590
or safely governed as a distinct people, public opinion, which not even the conqueror can
disregard, imposes these restraints upon him, and he cannot neglect them without injury to his
fame and hazard to his power.
But the tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce savages whose occupation was war
and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from the forest. To leave them in possession of their
country was to leave the country a wilderness; to govern them as a distinct people was
impossible because they were as brave and as high spirited as they were fierce, and were ready
to repel by arms every attempt on their independence.
What was the inevitable consequence of this state of things? The Europeans were under the
necessity either of abandoning the country and relinquishing their pompous claims to it or of
enforcing those claims by the sword, and by the adoption of principles adapted to the condition
of a people with whom it was impossible to mix and who could not be governed as a distinct
society, or of remaining in their neighborhood, and exposing themselves and their families to
the perpetual hazard of being massacred.
Frequent and bloody wars, in which the whites were not always the aggressors, unavoidably
ensued. European policy, numbers, and skill prevailed. As the white population advanced, that
of the Indians necessarily receded. The country in the immediate neighborhood of agriculturists
became unfit for them. The game fled
Page 21 U. S. 591
into thicker and more unbroken forests, and the Indians followed. The soil to which the Crown
originally claimed title, being no longer occupied by its ancient inhabitants, was parceled out
according to the will of the sovereign power and taken possession of by persons who claimed
immediately from the Crown or mediately through its grantees or deputies.
That law which regulates and ought to regulate in general the relations between the conqueror
and conquered was incapable of application to a people under such circumstances. The resort to
some new and different rule better adapted to the actual state of things was unavoidable. Every
rule which can be suggested will be found to be attended with great difficulty.
However extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery of an inhabited country into
conquest may appear; if the principle has been asserted in the first instance, and afterwards
sustained; if a country has been acquired and held under it; if the property of the great mass of
the community originates in it, it becomes the law of the land and cannot be questioned. So,
too, with respect to the concomitant principle that the Indian inhabitants are to be considered
merely as occupants, to be protected, indeed, while in peace, in the possession of their lands,
but to be deemed incapable of transferring the absolute title to others. However this restriction
may be opposed to natural right, and to the usages of civilized nations, yet if it be indispensable
to that system under which the country has been settled, and be
Page 21 U. S. 592
adapted to the actual condition of the two people, it may perhaps be supported by reason, and
certainly cannot be rejected by courts of justice.
This question is not entirely new in this Court. The case of Fletcher v. Peck grew out of a sale
made by the State of Georgia of a large tract of country within the limits of that state, the grant
of which was afterwards resumed. The action was brought by a subpurchaser on the contract of
9
sale, and one of the covenants in the deed was that the State of Georgia was, at the time of
sale, seized in fee of the premises. The real question presented by the issue was whether the
seizin in fee was in the State of Georgia or in the United States. After stating that this
controversy between the several states and the United States had been compromised, the court
thought in necessary to notice the Indian title, which, although entitled to the respect of all
courts until it should be legitimately extinguished, was declared not to be such as to be
absolutely repugnant to a seizin in fee on the part of the state.
This opinion conforms precisely to the principle which has been supposed to be recognized by all
European governments from the first settlement of America. The absolute ultimate title has
been considered as acquired by discovery, subject only to the Indian title of occupancy, which
title the discoverers possessed the exclusive right of acquiring. Such a right is no more
incompatible with a seizin in fee than a lease for years, and might as effectually bar an
ejectment.
Another view has been taken of this question
Page 21 U. S. 593
which deserves to be considered. The title of the Crown, whatever it might be, could be
acquired only by a conveyance from the Crown. If an individual might extinguish the Indian title
for his own benefit, or in other words might purchase it, still he could acquire only that title.
Admitting their power to change their laws or usages so far as to allow an individual to separate
a portion of their lands from the common stock and hold it in severalty, still it is a part of their
territory and is held under them by a title dependent on their laws. The grant derives its efficacy
from their will, and if they choose to resume it and make a different disposition of the land, the
courts of the United States cannot interpose for the protection of the title. The person who
purchases lands from the Indians within their territory incorporates himself with them so far as
respects the property purchased; holds their title under their protection and subject to their
laws. If they annul the grant, we know of no tribunal which can revise and set aside the
proceeding. We know of no principle which can distinguish this case from a grant made to a
native Indian, authorizing him to hold a particular tract of land in severalty.
As such a grant could not separate the Indian from his nation, nor give a title which our courts
could distinguish from the title of his tribe, as it might still be conquered from, or ceded by his
tribe, we can perceive no legal principle which will authorize a court to say that different
consequences are attached to this purchase because it was made by a stranger. By the treaties
concluded
Page 21 U. S. 594
between the United States and the Indian nations whose title the plaintiffs claim, the country
comprehending the lands in controversy has been ceded to the United States without any
reservation of their title. These nations had been at war with the United States, and had an
unquestionable right to annul any grant they had made to American citizens. Their cession of
the country without a reservation of this land affords a fair presumption that they considered it
as of no validity. They ceded to the United States this very property, after having used it in
common with other lands as their own, from the date of their deeds to the time of cession, and
the attempt now made, is to set up their title against that of the United States.
The proclamation issued by the King of Great Britain in 1763 has been considered, and we think
with reason, as constituting an additional objection to the title of the plaintiffs.
By that proclamation, the Crown reserved under its own dominion and protection, for the use of
the Indians, "all the land and territories lying to the westward of the sources of the rivers which
fall into the sea from the west and northwest," and strictly forbade all British subjects from
making any purchases or settlements whatever or taking possession of the reserved lands.
It has been contended that in this proclamation, the King transcended his constitutional powers,
and the case of Campbell v. Hall, reported by Cowper, is relied on to support this position.
Page 21 U. S. 595
It is supposed to be a principle of universal law that if an uninhabited country be discovered by
a number of individuals who acknowledge no connection with and owe no allegiance to any
government whatever, the country becomes the property of the discoverers, so far at least as
they can use it. They acquire a title in common. The title of the whole land is in the whole
society. It is to be divided and parceled out according to the will of the society, expressed by
the whole body or by that organ which is authorized by the whole to express it.
If the discovery be made and possession of the country be taken under the authority of an
existing government, which is acknowledged by the emigrants, it is supposed to be equally well
settled, that the discovery is made for the whole nation, that the country becomes a part of the
nation, and that the vacant soil is to be disposed of by that organ of the government which has
the constitutional power to dispose of the national domains, by that organ in which all vacant
territory is vested by law.
According to the theory of the British Constitution, all vacant lands are vested in the Crown, as
representing the nation, and the exclusive power to grant them is admitted to reside in the
Crown as a branch of the royal prerogative. It has been already shown that this principle was as
fully recognized in America as in the Island of Great Britain. All the lands we hold were originally
granted by the Crown, and the establishment of a regal government has never been considered
as
Page 21 U. S. 596
impairing its right to grant lands within the chartered limits of such colony. In addition to the
proof of this principle, furnished by the immense grants already mentioned of lands lying within
the chartered limits of Virginia, the continuing right of the Crown to grant lands lying within that
colony was always admitted. A title might be obtained either by making an entry with the
surveyor of a county in pursuance of law or by an order of the governor in council, who was the
deputy of the King, or by an immediate grant from the Crown. In Virginia, therefore, as well as
elsewhere in the British dominions, the complete title of the Crown to vacant lands was
acknowledged.
So far as respected the authority of the Crown, no distinction was taken between vacant lands
and lands occupied by the Indians. The title, subject only to the right of occupancy by the
Indians, was admitted to be in the King, as was his right to grant that title. The lands, then, to
which this proclamation referred were lands which the King had a right to grant, or to reserve
for the Indians.
According to the theory of the British Constitution, the royal prerogative is very extensive so far
as respects the political relations between Great Britain and foreign nations. The peculiar
situation of the Indians, necessarily considered in some respects as a dependent and in some
respects as a distinct people occupying a country claimed by Great Britain, and yet too powerful
and brave not to be dreaded as formidable enemies, required that means should be adopted for
Page 21 U. S. 597
10
the preservation of peace, and that their friendship should be secured by quieting their alarms
for their property. This was to be effected by restraining the encroachments of the whites, and
the power to do this was never, we believe, denied by the colonies to the Crown.
In the case of Campbell v. Hall, that part of the proclamation was determined to be illegal,
which imposed a tax on a conquered province, after a government had been bestowed upon it.
The correctness of this decision cannot be questioned, but its application to the case at bar
cannot be admitted. Since the expulsion of the Stuart family, the power of imposing taxes by
proclamation has never been claimed as a branch of regal prerogative, but the powers of
granting, or refusing to grant, vacant lands, and of restraining encroachments on the Indians
have always been asserted and admitted.
The authority of this proclamation, so far as it respected this continent, has never been denied,
and the titles it gave to lands have always been sustained in our courts.
In the argument of this cause, the counsel for the plaintiffs have relied very much on the
opinions expressed by men holding offices of trust, and on various proceedings in America to
sustain titles to land derived from the Indians.
The collection of claims to lands lying in the western country made in the 1st volume of the
Laws of the United States has been referred to, but we find nothing in that collection to support
the argument. Most of the titles were derived
Page 21 U. S. 598
from persons professing to act under the authority of the government existing at the time, and
the two grants under which the plaintiffs claim are supposed by the person under whose
inspection the collection was made to be void, because forbidden by the royal proclamation of
1763. It is not unworthy of remark that the usual mode adopted by the Indians for granting
lands to individuals has been to reserve them in a treaty or to grant them under the sanction of
the commissioners with whom the treaty was negotiated. The practice in such case to grant to
the Crown for the use of the individual is some evidence of a general understanding that the
validity even of such a grant depended on its receiving the royal sanction.
The controversy between the Colony of Connecticut and the Mohegan Indians depended on the
nature and extent of a grant made by those Indians to the colony; on the nature and extent of
the reservations made by the Indians, in their several deeds and treaties, which were alleged to
be recognized by the legitimate authority; and on the violation by the colony of rights thus
reserved and secured. We do not perceive in that case any assertion of the principle that
individuals might obtain a complete and valid title from the Indians.
It has been stated that in the memorial transmitted from the Cabinet of London to that of
Versailles, during the controversy between the two nations respecting boundary which took
place in 1755, the Indian right to the soil is recognized.
Page 21 U. S. 599
But this recognition was made with reference to their character as Indians and for the purpose
of showing that they were fixed to a particular territory. It was made for the purpose of
sustaining the claim of His Britannic Majesty to dominion over them.
The opinion of the Attorney and Solicitor General, Pratt and Yorke, have been adduced to prove
that in the opinion of those great law officers, the Indian grant could convey a title to the soil
without a patent emanating from the Crown. The opinion of those persons would certainly be of
great authority on such a question, and we were not a little surprised when it was read, at the
doctrine it seemed to advance. An opinion so contrary to the whole practice of the Crown and to
the uniform opinions given on all other occasions by its great law officers ought to be very
explicit and accompanied by the circumstances under which it was given, and to which it was
applied before we can be assured that it is properly understood. In a pamphlet written for the
purpose of asserting the Indian title, styled "Plain Facts," the same opinion is quoted, and is said
to relate to purchases made in the East Indies. It is, of course, entirely inapplicable to
purchases made in America. Chalmers, in whose collection this opinion is found, does not say to
whom it applies, but there is reason to believe that the author of Plain Facts is, in this respect,
correct. The opinion commences thus:
"In respect to such places as have been or shall be acquired by treaty or grant from any of the
Indian princes or governments,
Page 21 U. S. 600
your Majesty's letters patent are not necessary."
The words "princes or governments" are usually applied to the East Indians, but not to those of
North America. We speak of their sachems, their warriors, their chiefmen, their nations or
tribes, not of their "princes or governments." The question on which the opinion was given, too,
and to which it relates, was whether the King's subjects carry with them the common law
wherever they may form settlements. The opinion is given with a view to this point, and its
object must be kept in mind while construing its expressions.
Much reliance is also placed on the fact, that many tracts are now held in the United States
under the Indian title, the validity of which is not questioned.
Before the importance attached to this fact is conceded, the circumstances under which such
grants were obtained, and such titles are supported, ought to be considered. These lands lie
chiefly in the eastern states. It is known that the Plymouth Company made many extensive
grants which, from their ignorance of the country, interfered with each other. It is also known
that Mason to whom New Hampshire, and Gorges, to whom Maine was granted, found great
difficulty in managing such unwieldy property. The country was settled by emigrants, some from
Europe, but chiefly from Massachusetts, who took possession of lands they found unoccupied,
and secured themselves in that possession by the best means in their power. The disturbances
in
Page 21 U. S. 601
England, and the civil war and revolution which followed those disturbances, prevented any
interference on the part of the mother country, and the proprietors were unable to maintain
their title. In the meantime, Massachusetts claimed the country and governed it. As her claim
was adversary to that of the proprietors, she encouraged the settlement of persons made under
her authority, and encouraged likewise their securing themselves in possession, by purchasing
the acquiescence and forbearance of the Indians. After the restoration of Charles II, Gorges and
Mason, when they attempted to establish their title, found themselves opposed by men who
held under Massachusetts and under the Indians. The title of the proprietors was resisted, and
though in some cases compromises were made and in some, the opinion of a court was given
ultimately in their favor, the juries found uniformly against them. They became wearied with the
struggle, and sold their property. The titles held under the Indians were sanctioned by length of
possession, but there is no case, so far as we are informed, of a judicial decision in their favor.
Much reliance has also been placed on a recital contained in the charter of Rhode Island, and on
a letter addressed to the governors of the neighboring colonies, by the King's command, in
11
which some expressions are inserted, indicating the royal approbation of titles acquired from the
Indians.
The charter to Rhode Island recites
"That the said John Clark and others had transplanted
Page 21 U. S. 602
themselves into the midst of the Indian nations, and were seized and possessed, by purchase
and consent of the said natives, to their full content, of such lands,"
&c. And the letter recites, that
"Thomas Chifflinch and others, having, in the right of Major Asperton, a just propriety in the
Narraghanset Country, in New England, by grants from the native princes of that country, and
being desirous to improve it into an English colony, . . . are yet daily disturbed."
The impression this language might make, if viewed apart from the circumstances under which
it was employed, will be effaced, when considered in connection with those circumstances.
In the year 1635, the Plymouth Company surrendered their charter to the Crown. About the
same time, the religious dissentions of Massachusetts expelled from that colony several
societies of individuals, one of which settled in Rhode Island, on lands purchased from the
Indians. They were not within the chartered limits of Massachusetts, and the English
government was too much occupied at home to bestow its attention on this subject. There
existed no authority to arrest their settlement of the country. If they obtained the Indian title,
there were none to assert the title of the Crown. Under these circumstances, the settlement
became considerable. Individuals acquired separate property in lands which they cultivated and
improved; a government was established among themselves, and no power existed in America
which could rightfully interfere with it.
On the restoration of Charles II, this small society
Page 21 U. S. 603
hastened to acknowledge his authority, and to solicit his confirmation of their title to the soil,
and to jurisdiction over the country. Their solicitations were successful, and a charter was
granted to them, containing the recital which has been mentioned.
It is obvious that this transaction can amount to no acknowledgment that the Indian grant could
convey a title paramount to that of the Crown, or could in itself constitute a complete title. On
the contrary, the charter of the Crown was considered as indispensable to its completion.
It has never been contended that the Indian title amounted to nothing. Their right of possession
has never been questioned. The claim of government extends to the complete ultimate title,
charged with this right of possession and to the exclusive power of acquiring that right. The
object of the Crown was to settle the seacoast of America, and when a portion of it was settled,
without violating the rights of others, by persons professing their loyalty, and soliciting the royal
sanction of an act, the consequences of which were ascertained to be beneficial, it would have
been as unwise as ungracious to expel them from their habitations, because they had obtained
the Indian title otherwise than through the agency of government. The very grant of a charter is
an assertion of the title of the Crown, and its words convey the same idea. The country granted
is said to be "our island called Rhode Island," and the charter contains an actual grant of the soil
as well as of the powers of government.

Page 21 U. S. 604

The letter was written a few months before the charter was issued, apparently at the request of
the agents of the intended colony, for the sole purpose of preventing the trespasses of
neighbors, who were disposed to claim some authority over them. The King, being willing
himself to ratify and confirm their title was, of course, inclined to quiet them in their possession.

This charter and this letter certainly sanction a previous unauthorized purchase from Indians
under the circumstances attending that particular purchase, but are far from supporting the
general proposition, that a title acquired from the Indians would be valid against a title acquired
from the Crown, or without the confirmation of the Crown.

The acts of the several colonial assemblies prohibiting purchases from the Indians have also
been relied on as proving that, independent of such prohibitions, Indian deeds would be valid.
But we think this fact, at most, equivocal. While the existence of such purchases would justify
their prohibition, even by colonies which considered Indian deeds as previously invalid, the fact
that such acts have been generally passed, is strong evidence of the general opinion, that such
purchases are opposed by the soundest principles of wisdom and national policy.

After bestowing on this subject a degree of attention which was more required by the
magnitude of the interest in litigation, and the able and elaborate arguments of the bar, than by
its intrinsic difficulty, the court is decidedly of opinion, that the plaintiffs do not exhibit a title
which can

Page 21 U. S. 605
be sustained in the courts of the United States, and that there is no error in the judgment which
was rendered against them in the District Court of Illinois.
Judgment affirmed with costs.

12
 U.S. Supreme Court
Chavez v. United States, 175 U.S. 552 (1899)
Chavez v. United States
No. 14
Argued October 17-18, 1899
Decided December 22, 1899
175 U.S. 552
APPEAL FROM THE COURT
OF PRIVATE LAND CLAIMS
Syllabus
In Mexico, in 1831, a departmental assembly or territorial deputation had no power or authority
to make a grant of lands, and the fact that the governor presided at a meeting of the territorial
deputation at the time such a grant was made, makes no difference, as the power to make the
grant was exclusively in the governor, and the territorial deputation had no jurisdiction in the
matter.
The statement of the case will be found in the opinion of the Court.
MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Private Land Claims refusing to confirm the
title of the appellant to
Page 175 U. S. 553
some 5,000 acres of land in New Mexico, about one league from the Manzano grant. The title is
evidenced by a grant by the territorial deputation of New Mexico, made in 1831, and the first
question in the case relates to the authority of that body to make the grant.
It is also contended that if the territorial deputation did not have the power to make the grant,
and that power rested with the governor of the department, his presence in the territorial
deputation as its ex officio president when the grant was made, and, so far as the record shows,
his not protesting but acquiescing in its action, was equivalent to and the same as a grant made
by himself in his official character as governor.
It is further stated that, by reason of the action of the governor in writing the letter dated
December 22, 1831, and hereinafter set forth, that officer ratified and confirmed the grant, and
in effect made it his own.
It appears from the record that, on February 28, 1831, citizen Nerio Antonio Montoya petitioned
the honorable corporation of Tome, and asked it that it would append to his petition its own
report to the most excellent deputation, so that that body should grant him the land described
in the petition. The corporation of Tome, on the 19th of March, 1831, granted the prayer of the
petitioner, and adopted a resolution which provided that his petition should
"go before the most excellent territorial deputation, which, as the authority competent, may
accede to the donation of the land prayed for by the said petitioner without injuring the pastures
and watering places for the passers-by."
The resolution was accordingly forwarded to the territorial deputation, and that body on
November 12, 1831, took action as follows:
"(Extract from record of proceedings of the territorial deputation,"
13
"session of November 12, 1831)"
"The foregoing record having been read and approved, a petition of citizen Nerio Montoya, a
resident of Valencia, in which he asks for the donation, for agricultural purposes, of a tract of
vacant land in the Manzano within the limits of the Ojo de en Medio as far as the rancheria, was
taken up and the
Page 175 U. S. 554
report of the respectable corporation council of Tome, in which it is set forth that there is no
objection to the concession of the said land, having been heard it was ordered that it be
granted."
"* * * *"
"The session was adjourned."
"Santiago Abreu, President (Rubrick)"
"Juan Rafael Ortiz (Rubrick)"
"Anto. Jose Martinez (Rubrick)"
"Jose Manl. Salazar (Rubrick)"
"Teodosio Quintana (Rubrick)"
"Ramon Abreu, Secretary (Rubrick)"
In accordance with this action, the following direction by the deputation, signed by its secretary,
was given the alcalde of the proper jurisdiction:
"Santa Fe, November 12, 1831"
"The honorable the deputation of this territory, having received the report of the constitutional
council of Tome, appended to this petition, has resolved in this day's session to grant the land
prayed for by the petitioner, charging the alcalde of said jurisdiction to execute the document
that will secure the grantee in the grant hereby made to him."
"Abreu, Secretary"
The alcalde thereupon executed a document which, after reciting that,
"In obedience to the decree of the most excellent deputation of this territory made under date
of November 12 of the current year on the margin of the petition which, under date of February
28, the citizen Nerio Antonio Montoya, resident of this said jurisdiction, presented to this
honorable council, and on which petition is recorded the report made by this council, in
accordance with which report its excellency has deemed it proper to accede to the petition of
Montoya, granting him full and formal possession of the tract he prayed for,"
etc., declared that
"Montoya, whenever he may choose or think best to do, may notify me to proceed with him to
the locality to place him in possession of the property
Page 175 U. S. 555
granted him, with all the customary formality,"
etc. This was dated December 7, 1831, and signed by the alcalde.
On December 12 in the same year, the same alcalde,
"in compliance with the provision made by this most excellent deputation of this territory and
the notification given me by the citizen Nerio Antonio Montoya,"
proceeded with Montoya to the tract of land granted him and placed him in possession thereof,
the act being signed by the alcalde.
There was also put in evidence on the trial of the action in the court below, on the question of
ratification, the following:
"Office of the Political Chief of New Mexico"
"By your official communication of the 20th instant, I am advised of your having executed the
decree of the most excellent deputation granting to the citizen Nerio Antonio Montoya a tract of
land."
"But in regard to the inquiry you make of me, as to how much your fee should be, I inform you
that I am ignorant in the premises, and that you may, if you choose to do, put the question to
the assessor (asesor), who is the officer to whom it belongs, to advise the justices of first
instance in such cases."
"God and Liberty. Santa Fe, December 22, 1831."
"Jose Antonio Chavez"
"To Alderman Miguel Olona"
Various mesne conveyances were put in evidence on the trial, showing the transfer to the
appellant of whatever title Montoya had to the land described, and it was then admitted that the
appellant herein has succeeded to all the rights of the original grantee, if any, in this case.
Evidence of possession under this grant was also given.
The court below held that the departmental assembly or territorial deputation had no power or
authority to make a grant of lands at the time the grant in this case was attempted to be made,
and that the fact that the governor may have presided at the meeting at the time the action
was taken made no difference, as the power to make the
Page 175 U. S. 556
grant was exclusively in the governor, and the territorial deputation had no jurisdiction in the
matter. The claim was therefore rejected.
We think that in thus deciding, the court below was right.
We refer to some of the cases which show the territorial deputation did not have the power to
make a grant, but only the power to subsequently approve it.
In United States v. Vallejo, 1 Black 541, it was held that the Mexican law of 1824 and the
regulations of 1828 altered and repealed the Spanish system of disposing of public lands, and
that the law and the regulations from the time of their passage were the only laws of Mexico on
14
the subject of granting public lands in the territories. It was also held that the governor did not
possess any power to make grants public lands independently of that conferred by the act of
1824 and the regulations of 1828. Mr. Justice Nelson, who delivered the opinion of the Court in
that case, refers to the various sections of the law of 1824, and also to the regulations of
November, 1828, for the purpose of showing that the governors of the territories were
authorized to grant vacant lands within their respective territories with the object of cultivation
or settlement, and that the grants made by them to individuals or families were not to be
definitively valid without the previous consent of the departmental assembly, and when the
grant petitioned for had been definitively made a patent, signed by the governor, was to be
issued, which was to serve as a title to the party. This case did not decide that the territorial
deputation could not make a valid grant, because the grant was made by the governor, but the
various extracts from the law and regulations indicate very plainly that the authority to initiate a
grant of public lands existed in the governor alone, and not in the assembly.
In United States v. Vigil, 13 Wall. 449, it was held that departmental assemblies (territorial
deputations) had no power to make a grant.
In his argument at the bar, counsel for this appellant contended that the territorial deputation
had lawful power and
Page 175 U. S. 557
authority to make the grant to Montoya, and in order to maintain that proposition, stated that it
was necessary to discuss the effect of the decision of this Court in United States v. Vigil. He
claimed that what was said as to the lack of power in the territorial deputation to make a grant
was not necessary to the decision of the Court in that case, and that such expressions as were
therein used regarding the question would not therefore constitute a precedent now binding on
this Court.
In Vigil's case, there was a petition to the departmental assembly, through the Governor of New
Mexico, asking for a grant of land which in fact amounted to over two million, the grantees
binding themselves, if the grant were made, to construct two wells for the relief and aid of
travelers, and to establish two factories for the use of the state, and to protect them from
hostile invasion. The governor transmitted the petition to the assembly, but declined to
recommend that favorable action should be taken upon it. The assembly, notwithstanding this
refusal, granted the tract on January 10, 1846, for the purpose of constructing wells and
cultivating the land, etc., and the question was as to the validity of this grant.
The opinion was delivered by Mr. Justice Davis, who stated that it had been repeatedly decided
by this Court that the only laws in force in the territories of Mexico, for the disposition of public
lands, with the exception of those relating to missions and towns, were the act of the Mexican
Congress of 1824 and the regulations of 1828. In the course of his opinion, he said:
"These regulations conferred on the governors of the territories, 'the political chiefs,' as they are
called, the authority to grant vacant lands, and did not delegate it to the departmental
assembly. It is true the grant was not complete until the approval of the assembly, and in this
sense the assembly and governor acted concurrently, but the initiative must be taken by the
governor. He was required to act in the first instance -- to decide whether the petitioner was a
fit person to receive the grant, and whether the land itself could be granted without prejudice to
the public or individuals. In case the
Page 175 U. S. 558
information was satisfactory on these points, he was authorized to make the grant, and at the
proper time to lay it before the assembly, who were required to give or withhold their consent.
They were in this respect an advisory body to the governor, and sustained the same relation to
him that the Senate of the United States does to the President in the matter of appointments
and treaties."
A subsequent portion of the opinion dealt with the case upon the assumption that the grant had
been made by the governor, and even in that case it was said the grant would have been invalid
because it violated the fundamental rule on which the right of donation was placed by the law;
that the essential element of colonization was wanting, and that the number of acres granted
was enormously in excess of the maximum quantity grantable under the law. This in nowise
affected the prior ground upon which the opinion was based, that the departmental assembly
had no power to make the grant. That was the essential and material question directly involved
in the case, while the second ground mentioned was based upon an assumption that, even if the
governor had made the grant, it would still have been void for the reason stated. The court did
not base its decision that the departmental assembly had no power to make the grant because
of its enormous extent. It held that the assembly had no power to make any grant, no matter
what its size. It is, as we think, a decision covering this case.
In Hayes v. United States, 170 U. S. 637, the grant was by the territorial deputation of New
Mexico, and it was stated by MR. JUSTICE WHITE, speaking for the Court, that
"it cannot be in reason held that a title to land derived from a territory which the territorial
authorities did not own, over which they had no power of disposition, was regularly derived from
either Spain or Mexico or a State of the Mexican nation."
No presumption that the territorial deputations had authority to make grants can arise from the
fact that in some instances those bodies assumed to make them. The case in this respect bears
no resemblance to United States v. Percheman, 7 Pet. 51, 32 U. S. 96, or to United States v.
Clarke, 8 Pet. 436, 33 U. S. 447, 33 U. S. 453. In those cases, it was not denied that the
governor had authority in
Page 175 U. S. 559
some circumstances to make grants, and it was therefore held that a grant made by him
was prima facie evidence that he had not exceeded his power in making it, and that he who
denied it took upon himself the burden of showing that the officer by making the grant had
transcended the power reposed in him. There is in the case before us no evidence that the
territorial deputation had the power, in any event, to make grants other than the fact that in
some instances it assumed to make them.
The cases heretofore decided in this Court, and some of which have been above referred to,
show that such fact is inadequate to prove the existence of the authority.
It is, however, urged that the record of the action of the territorial deputation in regard to this
grant shows that the governor and ex officio president of the deputation was present when the
deputation decided to make the grant as petitioned for, and that his being so present and
attesting the action of the deputation was equivalent to the making of the grant himself as
governor. We do not think so. He did not assume to make any grant whatever, and certainly
none in his character as governor. It does not even appear beyond doubt that he was present
when the deputation made the grant. His signature is perfectly consistent with a mere
authentication of the previous action of that body.
The petition of Montoya was addressed primarily to the corporation of Tome, and he requested
that corporation to send his petition, approved by it, to the deputation to make him a grant of
the land described in his petition. Acting under that request, the corporation of Tome sent his
petition to the "most excellent territorial deputation," and asked that body to accede to the
donation of the land prayed for. In conformity to the petition, the territorial deputation itself
made the grant. The fact that the governor, being ex officio a member of the deputation, signed
15
as president of that body the record of the act of the deputation is not the equivalent of a grant
by him in his official character of governor, nor does such act bear any resemblance to a grant
by him. No one on reading the record would get the idea that the governor
Page 175 U. S. 560
was himself making the grant, or that he thereby intended so to do. It does not even show that
he was in favor of the grant as made by the deputation. His signing the record constituted
nothing more than an authentication of the act of the deputation. It purported to be nothing
else. He might have properly signed the record if in fact he had voted against the grant, and
had been opposed to the action of the assembly. He might have signed the record as an
authentication, and yet have been absent at the time of the action of the assembly. In any
event, it was his signature as an ex officio member or presiding officer of the deputation,
attesting or perhaps assenting to its action, and it was not his action as governor making a
grant in that capacity. The signature by the secretary alone, to the instrument (above set forth,
dated November 12, 1831) which recites the previous action of the deputation, and charges the
alcalde of the jurisdiction to execute the document which will secure the grantee in the grant, is
simply a direction to the alcalde, and has no materiality upon this branch of the case other than
as confirming the view that the grant was solely that of the deputation.
We cannot hold that, when the power was given under the laws of Mexico to the governor to
make grants of lands, he in any manner exercised that power, or performed an act equivalent to
its exercise, by presiding ex officio at a meeting of the territorial deputation which made a grant
of lands in conformity to a petition solely addressed to it and by authenticating as president the
action of the deputation in deciding that the grant should be made.
The two positions, president of the deputation and governor, are separate and distinct, and the
action of a governor merely as president of the deputation, and of the nature above described is
not in any sense and does not purport to be his separate and independent action as governor,
making a grant of lands pursuant to a petition addressed to him officially. As governor, he might
refuse the grant upon a petition addressed to himself, when as president of the deputation he
might sign the record authenticating its action in regard to a petition
Page 175 U. S. 561
addressed solely to that body. And it is obvious from the wording of the record that the
president of the deputation was not assuming to act as governor upon a petition addressed to
himself, but only as the president of the deputation. It might have been that he acquiesced in
the assumption by the deputation of the right to make the grant, but his act of signing the
record cannot be tortured into a grant or as the equivalent of a grant by himself.
It is further urged that there has been what amounts to a grant by the governor by reason of
his letter of December 22, 1831, signed by him and above set forth, thus, as is claimed,
ratifying the grant of the deputation and making it his own.
The only evidence that the person who signed the letter was the governor at that time is the
heading of the letter, "Office of the Political Chief of New Mexico." It will be also noted that the
person signing it is not the same one who signed the record of November 12, 1831, as president
of the deputation. But, assuming that Chavez was governor in December, 1831, when he signed
the letter, he therein simply acknowledged the receipt of the official communication of the
alcalde, in which that officer reports that he had executed the decree "of the most excellent
deputation, granting to the citizen Nerio Antonio Montoya a tract of land." In reply to the
question as to how much the alcalde's fee should be, he answered that he was ignorant of the
premises, and advised the alcalde to put the question to the assessor, the officer to whom it
belonged to advise the justices in the first instances in such cases.
Now what does the governor ratify by this letter? Nothing. We do not deny the right or the duty of a court to presume its existence in a proper case, in
order to quiet a title and to give to long continued possession the quality of a rightful possession
under a legal title. We recognize and enforce such rule in the case of United States v.
The contention in favor of the grant, based upon the letter, is that, assuming the governor had Chavez, decided at this term, in which the question is involved. We simply say in this case that
power to make the grant, it was his duty when he learned from the report of the alcalde that the possession was not of a duration long enough to justify any such inference.
one had been made by the deputation, and that possession had been delivered under it, to
protest against and to deny the power of the deputation to make such grant, and unless he did
so, his silence was evidence of the fact that he not only approved the act of the deputation in There is no proof of any valid grant, but, on the contrary, the evidence offered by the plaintiff
making the grant, but that he approved it as his own, and that such himself and upon which he bases the title that he asks the court to confirm, shows the existence
of a grant from a body which had no legal power to make it, and which therefore conveyed no
title whatever to its grantee, and the evidence is, as given by the plaintiff himself, that it was
Page 175 U. S. 562 under this grant alone that possession of the lands was taken. We cannot presume (within the
time involved in this case) that any other and valid grant was ever made. The possession of the
approval was the same as if the governor had himself made the grant, and in substance and plaintiff and of his grantors up to the time of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, in 1848, had not
effect it was his grant. been long enough to presume a grant. Crespin v. United States, 168 U. S. 208; Hayes v. United
States, 170 U. S. 637, 170 U. S. 649; Hays v. United States, ante, 175 U. S. 248. The
possession subsequently existing, we cannot notice. Same authorities.
This contention, we think, is not founded upon any legal principle, and is in itself unreasonable.
The writer of the letter is not the same person who signed the record of the proceedings of the
deputation. The report of the alcalde gave him the information which, it is true, he may have We think the judgment of the court below should be
had before, that the deputation had assumed the power to grant the land. His protest as to the
legality of such action would not have altered the fact that it had occurred, while, on the other Affirmed.
hand, his silence might simply be construed as evidence of his unreadiness at that time to
dispute, or possibly of his belief in the validity of the action of the deputation. Or his silence
might have been simply the result of his approval of the act of the alcalde in obeying the
commands of the deputation, while he thought it was not the proper occasion upon which to
contest or deny the validity of the grant which the deputation had actually made. Many reasons
for his silence might be suggested, but the claim that it equaled in law a positive grant by the
governor is, as we think, untenable.

While such silence is entirely consistent with other views that might have been held by the
governor, it certainly cannot properly be ascribed, as a legal inference from the facts stated, to
his desire to make the grant himself, nor could it be said that his desire (if he had it) was the
legal equivalent of an actual grant.

His knowledge that another body had assumed to make a grant is not equivalent to the making
of the grant himself, and he was the person who alone had power to make it. There is nothing in
the letter which aids the plaintiff herein.

Finally, it distinctly appears that the possession of the parties is insufficient in length of time to
prove a valid title. In United States v. Chaves, 159 U. S. 452, the possession was under the
claim of a grant made by the governor of New Mexico to the alleged grantees. The grant had
been lost, but it had been seen and read by witnesses, and its existence had been proved by
evidence sufficient, as was stated in the opinion

Page 175 U. S. 563

(page 159 U. S. 460), to warrant

"the finding of the court below that the complainants' title was derived from the Republic of
Mexico, and was complete and perfect at the date when the United States acquired sovereignty
in the Territory of New Mexico, within which the land was situated."

We do not question the correctness of the remarks made by MR. JUSTICE SHIRAS in regard to
evidence of possession and the presumptions which may under certain circumstances be drawn
as to the existence of a grant.

16
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 1413 March 30, 1904
ANDRES VALENTON, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MANUEL MURCIANO, defendant-appellee.
Montagne and Dominguez for appellants.
Del Pan, Ortigas and Fisher for appellee.
WILLARD, J.:
I. The findings of fact made by the court below in its decision are as follows:
First. That in the year 1860, the plaintiffs, and each one of them, entered into the
peaceful and quiet occupation and possession of the larger part of the lands described
in the complaint of the plaintiffs, to wit [description]:
Second. That on the date on which the plaintiffs entered into the occupation and
possession of the said lands, as above set forth, these lands and every part thereof
were public, untilled, and unoccupied, and belonged to the then existing Government
of the Philippine Islands. That immediately after the occupation and possession of the
said lands by the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs began to cultivate and improve them in a
quiet and peaceful manner.
Third. That from the said year 1860, the plaintiffs continued to occupy and possess
the said lands, quietly and peacefully, until the year 1892, by themselves, by their
agents and tenants, claiming that they were the exclusive owners of said lands.
Fourth. That on or about the 16th day of January, 1892, Manuel Murciano, defendant
in this proceeding, acting on behalf of and as attorney in fact of Candido Capulong, by
occupation a cook, denounced the said lands to the then existing Government of the
Philippine Islands, declaring that the said lands every part thereof were public,
untilled, and unoccupied lands belonging to the then existing Government of the
Philippine Islands, and petitioned for the sale of the same to him.
Fifth. That before the execution of the sale heretofore mentioned, various proceedings
were had for the survey and measurement of the lands in question at the instance of
the defendant, Murciano, the latter acting as agent and attorney in fact of said
Candido Capulong, a written protest, however, having been entered against these
proceedings by the plaintiff Andres Valenton.
Sixth. That on the 14th day of July, 1892, Don Enrique Castellvie Ibarrola, secretary
of the treasury of the Province of Tarlac, in his official capacity as such secretary,
executed a contract of purchase and sale, by which said lands were sold and
conveyed by him to the defendant, Manuel Murciano, as attorney for the said Candido
Capulong.
17
Seventh. That on the 19th day of July, 1892, said Candido Capulong executed a
contract of purchase and sale, by which he sold and conveyed the said lands to the
defendants, Manuel Murciano.
Eight. That from the said 14th day of July, 1892, Manuel Murciano has at no time
occupied or possessed all of the land mentioned, but has possessed only certain in
distinct and indefinite portions of the same. That during all this time the plaintiffs
have opposed the occupation of the defendant, and said plaintiffs during all the time
in question have been and are in the possession and occupation of part of the said
lands, tilling them and improving them by themselves and by their agents and
tenants.
Ninth. That never, prior to the said 14th day of July,, 1892, has the defendant,
Manuel Murciano, been in the peaceful and quiet possession and occupation of the
said lands, or in the peaceful and quiet occupation of any part thereof.
Upon these facts the Court of First Instance ordered judgment for the defendant on the ground
that the plaintiffs had lost all right to the land by not pursuing their objections to the sale
mentioned in the sixth finding. The plaintiffs excepted to the judgment and claim in this court
that upon the facts found by the court below judgment should have been entered in their favor.
Their contention is that in 1890 they had been in the adverse possession of the property for
thirty years; that, applying the extra ordinary period of prescription of thirty years, found as
well in the Partidas as in the Civil Code, they then became the absolute owners of the land as
against everyone, including the State, and that when the State in 1892 deeded the property to
the defendant, nothing passed by the deed because the State had nothing to convey.
The case presents, therefore, the important question whether or not during the years from 1860
to 1890 a private person, situated as the plaintiffs were, could have obtained as against the
State the ownership of the public lands of the State by means of occupation. The court finds
that at the time of the entry by the plaintiff in 1860 the lands were vacant and were public lands
belonging to the then existing Government. The plaintiffs do not claim to have ever obtained
from the Government any deed for the lands, nor any confirmation of their possession.
Whether in the absence of any special legislation on the subject a general statute of limitations
in which the State was not expressly excepted would run against the State as to its public lands
we do not find it necessary to decide. Reasons based upon public policy could be adduced why it
should not, at least as to such public lands as are involved in this case. (See Act No. 926, sec.
67.) We are, however, of the opinion that the case at bar must be decided, not by the general
statute of limitation contained in the Partidas, but by those special laws which from the earliest
times have regulated the disposition of the public lands in the colonies.
Did these special laws recognize any right of prescription against the State as to these lands;
and if so, to what extend was it recognizes? Laws of very early date provided for the assignment
of public lands to the subjects of the Crown. Law 1, title 12, book 4 of the Recopilacion de Leyes
de las Indias is an example of them, and is as follows:
In order that our subjects may be encouraged to undertake the discovery and
settlement of the Indies, and that they may live with the comfort and convenience
which we desire, it is our will that there shall be distributed to all those who shall go
out to people the new territories, houses, lots, lands, peonias, and caballerias in the
towns and places which may be assigned to them by the governor of the new
settlement, who in apportioning the lands, will distinguish between gentlemen and
peasants, and those of lower degree and merit, and who will add to the possessions
and better the condition of the grantees, according to the nature of the services
rendered by them, and with a view to the promotion of agriculture and stock raising.
To those who shall have labored and established a home on said lands and who shall
have resided in the said settlement for a period of four years we grant the right
 thereafter to sell and in every other manner to exercise their free will over said lands
as over their own property. And we further command that, in accordance with their
rank and degree, the governor, or whoever may be invested with our authority, shall
allot the Indians to them in any distribution made, so that they may profit by their
labor and fines in accordance with the tributes required and the law controlling such
matters.
And in order that, in allotting said lands, there may be no doubt as to the area of each
grant, we declare that apeonia shall consist of a tract fifty feet in breadth by one
hundred in length, with arable land capable of producing one hundred bushels of
wheat or barley, ten bushels of maize, as much land for an orchard as two yokes of
oxen may plough in a day, and for the planting of other trees of a hardy nature as
much as may be plowed with eight yokes in a day, and including pasture for twenty
cows, five mares, one hundred sheep, twenty goats, and ten breeding pigs.
A caballeria shall be a tract one hundred feet in breadth and two hundred in length,
and in other respects shall equal five peonias — that is, it will include arable land
capable of producing five hundred bushels of wheat or barley and fifty bushels of
maize, as much land for an orchard as may be ploughed with ten yokes of oxen in a
day, and for the planting of other hardy trees as much as forty yokes may plough in a
day, together with pasturage for one hundred cows, twenty mares, five hundred
sheep, one hundred goats, and fifty breeding pigs. And we order that the distribution
be made in such a manner that all may receive equal benefit therefrom, and if this be
impracticable, then that each shall be given his due.
But it was necessary, however, that action should in all cases be taken by the public officials
before any interest was acquired by the subject.
Law 8 of said title 12 is as follows:
We command that if a petition shall be presented asking the grant of a lot or tract of
land in a city or town in which one of our courts may be located, the presentation
shall be made to the municipal council. If the latter shall approve the petition, two
deputy magistrates will be appointed, who will acquaint the viceroy or municipal
president with the council's judgment in the matter. After consideration thereof by the
viceroy or president and the deputy magistrates, all will sign the grants, in the
presence of the clerk of the council, in order that the matter may be duly recorded in
the council book. If the petition shall be for the grant of waters and lands for
mercantile purpose, it shall be presented to the viceroy or municipal president, who
will transmit it to the council. If the latters shall vote to make the grant, one of the
magistrates will carry its decision to the viceroy or president, to the end that, upon
consideration of the matter by him, the proper action may be taken.
It happened, in the course of time, that tracts of the public land were found in the possession of
persons who either had no title papers therefor issued by the State, or whose title papers were
defective, either because the proper procedure had not been followed or because they had been
issued by persons who had no authority to do so. Law 14, title 12 book 4 of said compilation
(referred to in the regulations of June 25, 1880, for the Philippines) was the first of a long series
of legislative acts intended to compel those in possession of the public lands, without written
evidence of title, or with defective title papers, to present evidence as to their possession or
grants, and obtain the confirmation of their claim to ownership. That law is as follows:
We having acquitted full sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands territories, and
possession not heretofore ceded away by our royal predecessors, or by, or in our
name, still pertaining to the royal crown and patrimony, it is our will that all lands
which are held without proper and true deeds of grants be restored to us according as
they belong to us, in order that after reserving before all what to us or to our
viceroys, audiencias, and governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways,
pastures, and commons in those places which are peopled, taking into consideration
18
not only their present condition, but also the future and their probable increase, and
after distributing to the natives what may be necessary for tillage and pasturage,
confirming them in what they now have and giving them more if necessary, all the
rest of said lands may remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may
wish.
We therefore order and command that all viceroys and presidents of pretorial courts
designated, at such time as shall to them seem most expedient, a suitable period
within which all possessors of tracts, farms, plantations, and estates shall exhibit to
them, and to the court officers appointed by them for this purpose, their title deeds
thereto. And those who are in possession by virtue of proper deeds and receipts, or
by virtue of just prescriptive right shall be protected, and all the rest shall be restored
to us to be disposed of at our will.
While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to deed if he proves a
possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that
proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did
that the State remained the absolute owner.
In the preamble of this law there is, as is seen, a distinct statement that all those lands belong
to the Crown which have not been granted by Philip, or in his name, or by the kings who
proceeded him. This statement excludes the idea that there might be lands no so granted, that
did not being to the king. It excludes the idea that the king was not still the owner of all
ungranted lands, because some private person had been in the adverse occupation of them. By
the mandatory part of the law all the occupants of the public lands are required to produce
before the authorities named, and within a time to be fixed by them, their title papers. And
those who had good title or showed prescription were to be protected in their holdings. It is
apparent that it was not the intention of the law that mere possession for a length of time
should make the possessors the owners of the lands possessed by them without any action on
the part of the authorities. It is plain that they were required to present their claims to the
authorities and obtain a confirmation thereof. What the period of prescription mentioned in this
law was does not appear, but latter, in 1646, law 19 of the same title declared "that no one
shall be 'admitted to adjustment' unless he has possessed the lands for ten years."
In law 15, title 12, book 4 of the same compilation, there is a command that those lands as to
which there has been no adjustment with the Government be sold at auction to the highest
bidder. That law is as follows:
For the greater good of our subjects, we order and command that our viceroys and
governing presidents shall do nothing with respect to lands the claims to which have
been adjusted by their predecessors, tending to disturb the peaceful possession of the
owners thereof. As to those who shall have extended their possession beyond the
limits fixed in the original grants, they will be admitted to a moderate adjustment with
respect to the excess, and new title deeds will be issued therefor. And all those lands
as to which no adjustment has been made shall, without exception, be sold at public
auction to the highest bidder, the purchase price therefor to be payable either in cash
or in the form of quitrent, in accordance with the laws and royal ordinances of the
kingdoms of Castile. We leave to the viceroys and president the mode and from in
which what is here ordered shall be carried into effect in order that they may provide
for it at the least possible cost; and in order that all unnecessary expense with respect
to the collections for said lands may be avoided, we command that the same be made
by our royal officers in person, without the employment of special collectors, and to
that end availing themselves of the services of our royal courts, and, in places where
courts shall not have been established, of the town mayors.
And whereas, title deeds to lands have been granted by officers not authorized to
issue them, and such titles have been confirmed by us in council, we command that
those holding such a certificate of confirmation may continue to possess the lands to
 which it refers, and will, within the limits stated in the confirmation certificate, be
protected in their possession; and with respect to any encroachment beyond such
limits will be admitted to the benefits of this law.
Another legislative act of the same character was the royal cedula of October 15, 1754
(4 Legislacion Ultramarina, Rodriguez San Pedro, 673). Articles 3, 4, and 5 of this royal cedula
as follows:
3. Upon each principal subdelegate's appointment, which will be made in the manner
prescribed in article 1 of this cedula, and upon his receipts of these instructions, of
which every principal subdelegate already designated or who may hereafter be
appointed shall be furnished a copy, said subdelegate will in his turn issue a general
order to the courts in the provincial capitals and principal towns of his district,
directing the publication therein, in the manner followed in connection with the
promulgation or general orders of viceroys, presidents, and administrative courts in
matters connected with my service, of these instructions, to the end that any and all
persons who, since the year 1700, and up to the date of the promulgation and
publication of said order, shall have occupied royal lands, whether or not the same
shall be cultivated of tenanted, may, either in person or through their attorneys or
representatives, appear and exhibit to said subdelegates the titles and patents by
virtue of which said lands are occupied. Said subdelegates will designate as the period
within which such documents must be presented a term sufficient in length and
proportionate to the distance the interested party may have to travel for the purpose
of making the presentation. Said subdelegates will at the same time warn the parties
interested that in case of their failure to present their title deeds within the term
designated, without a just and valid reason therefor, they will be deprived of an
evicted from their lands, and they will be granted to others.
4. If it shall appear from the titles or instruments presented, or if it shall be shown in
any other legal manner that said persons are in possession of such royal lands by
virtue of a sale or adjustment consummated by duly authorized subdelegates prior to
the said year 1700, although such action may not have been confirmed by my royal
person, or by a viceroy or president, they shall in no wise be molested, but shall be
left in the full and quiet possession of the same; nor shall they be required to pay any
fee on account of these proceedings, in accordance with law 15, title 12, book 4 of
the Recopilacion de los Indias, above cited. A note shall be made upon said title deeds
to the effect that his obligation has been complied with, to the end that the owners of
such rival lands and their successors may hereafter be free from denunciation,
summons, or other disturbance in their possession.
Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds it shall be sufficient if
they shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription; provided,
however, that if the lands shall not be in state of cultivation or tillage, the term of
three months prescribed by law 11 of the title and book cited, or such other period as
may be deemed adequate, shall be designated as the period within which the lands
must be reduced to cultivation, with the warning that in case of their failure so to do
the lands will be granted, with the same obligation to cultivate them, to whomsoever
may denounce them.
5. Likewise neither shall possessors of lands sold or adjusted by the various
subdelegates from the year 1700 to the present time be molested, disturbed, or
denounced, now or at any other time, with respect to such possession, if such sales or
adjustments shall have been confirmed by me, or by the viceroy or the president of
the court of the district in which the lands are located while authorized to exercise this
power. In cases where the sales of adjustments shall not have been so confirmed, the
possessors will present to the courts of their respective district and to the other
officials hereby empowered to receive the same, a petition asking for the confirmation
of said sales and adjustments. After the proceedings outlined by the subdelegates in
19
their order with respect to the measurement and valuation of the said lands, and with
reference to the title issued therefor, shall have been duly completed, said courts and
officials will make an examination of the same for the purpose of ascertaining whether
the sale or adjustment has been made without fraud and collusion, and for an
adequate and equitable price, and a similar examination shall be made by the
prosecuting attorney of the district, to the end that, in view of all the proceedings and
the purchase or adjustment price of the land, and the media anata having been duly,
etc., paid into the royal treasury, as well as such additional sum as may be deemed
proper, there will be issued to the possessor, in my royal name, a confirmation of his
title, by virtue of which his possession and ownership of lands and waters which it
represents will be fully legalized, to the end that at no time will he or his heirs or
assigns be disturbed or molested therein.
The wording of this law is much stronger than that of law 14. As is seen by the terms of article
3, any person whatever who occupied any public land was required to present the instruments
by virtue of which he was in possession, within a time to be fixed by the authorities, and he was
warned that if he did not do so he would be evicted from his land and it would be granted to
others. By terms of article 4 those possessors to whom grants had been made prior to 1700,
were entitled to have such grants confirmed, and it was also provided that not being able to
prove any grants it should be sufficient to prove "that ancient possession," as a sufficient title
by prescription, and they should be confirmed in their holdings. "That ancient possession" would
be at least fifty-four years, for it would have to date from prior to 1700. Under article 5, where
the possession dated from 1700, no confirmation could be granted on proof of prescription
alone.
The length of possession required to be proved before the Government would issue a deed has
varied in different colonies and at different times. In the Philippines, as has been seen, it was at
one time ten years, at another time fifty-four years at least. In Cuba, by the royal cedula of
April 24, 1833, to obtain a deed one had to prove, as to uncultivated lands, a possession of one
hundred years, and as to cultivated lands a possession of fifty years. In the same islands, by the
royal order of July 16, 1819, a possession of forty years was sufficient.
In the Philippines at a later date royal of September 21, 1797 (4 Legislacion Ultramarina,
Rodriguez San Pedro, p. 688), directed the observation of the said royal cedula of 1754, but
apparently without being subject to the period of prescription therein assigned.
The royal order of July 5, 1862 (Gaceta de Manila, November 15, 1864), also ordered that until
regulations on the subject could be prepared the authorities of the Islands should follow strictly
the Laws of the Indies, the Ordenanza of the Intendentes of 1786, and the said royal cedula of
1754.
The royal order of November 14, 1876 (Guia del Comprador de Terrenos, p. 51), directed the
provincial governors to urge those in unlawful possession of public lands to seek an adjustment
with the State in accordance with the existing laws. The regulations as to the adjustment
(composicion) of the titles to public lands remained in this condition until the regulations of June
25, 1880. This is the most important of the modern legislative acts upon the matter of
"adjustment" as distinguished from that of the sale of the public lands.
The royal degree approving these regulations is dated June 25, 1880, and is as follows: 1
Upon the suggestion of the colonial minister, made in conformity with the decree of
the full meeting of the council of state, I hereby approve the attached regulations for
the adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the
Philippine Islands.
Articles 1, 4, 5, 8, and part of article 6 are as follows:
 ART. 1. For the purpose of these regulations and in conformity with law 14, title 12,
book 4 of the Recompilation of Laws of the Indies, the following will be regarded as
royal lands: All lands whose lawful ownership is not vested in some private, persons,
or, what is the same thing, which have never passed to private ownership by virtue of
cession by competent authorities, made either gratuitously or for a consideration.
ART. 4. For all legal effects, those will be considered proprietors of the royal lands
herein treated who may prove that they have possessed the lands without
interruption during the period of ten years, by virtue of a good title and in good faith.
ART. 5. In the same manner, those who without such title deeds may prove that they
have possessed their said lands without interruption for a period of twenty years if in
a state of cultivation, or for a period of thirty years if uncultivated, shall be regarded
as proprietors thereof. In order that a tract of land may be considered cultivated, it
will be necessary to show that it has been broken within the last three years.
ART. 6. Interested parties not included within the two preceding articles may legalize
their possession and thereby acquire the full ownership of the said lands, by means of
adjustment proceedings, to be conducted in the following manner: . . .
(5) Those who, entirely without title deeds, may be in possession of lands belonging
to the State and have reduced said lands to a state of cultivation, may acquire the
ownership thereof by paying into the public treasury the value of the lands at the time
such possessors or their representatives began their unauthorized enjoyment of the
same.
(6) In case said lands shall never have been ploughed, but are still in a wild state, or
covered with forest, the ownership of the same may be acquired by paying their value
at the time of the filing of the claim, as stated in the fourth paragraph."
ART. 8. If the interested parties shall not ask an adjustment of the lands whose
possession they are unlawfully enjoying within the time of one year, or, the
adjustment having been granted by the authorities, they shall fail to fulfill their
obligation in connection with the compromise, by paying the proper sum into the
treasury, the latter will, by virtue of the authority vested in it, reassert the ownership
of the State over the lands, and will, after fixing the value thereof, proceed to sell at
public auction that part of the same which either because it may have been reduced
to cultivation or is not located within the forest zone is not deemed advisable to
preserve as the State forest reservation.
The other articles of the regulations state the manner in which applications should be made for
adjustment, and the proceedings thereon.
Do these regulations declare that those who are included in article 4 and 5 are the absolute
owners of the land occupied by them without any action on their part, or that of the State, or do
they declare that such persons must seek an adjustment and obtain a deed from the State, and
if they do not do so within the time named in article 8 they lose all interest in the lands?
It must be admitted from the wording of the law that the question is not free from doubt. Upon
a consideration, however, of the whole matter, that doubt must, we think, be resolved in favor
of the State. The following are some of the reasons which lead us to that conclusion:
(1) It will be noticed that article 4 does not say that those persons shall be considered as
owners who have occupied the lands for ten years, which would have been the language
naturally used if an absolute grant had been intended. It says, instead, that those shall be
20
considered owners who may prove that they have been in possession ten years. Was this proof
to be made at any time in the future when the question might arise, or was it to be made in the
proceedings which these very regulations provided for that purpose? We think that the latter is
the proper construction.
(2) Article 1 declares in plain terms that all those lands as to which the State has never
executed any deeds are the property of the State — that is, that on June 25, 1880, no public
lands belonged to individuals unless they could exhibit a State deed therefor. This is entirely
inconsistent with the idea that the same law in its article 4 declares that the lands in question in
this case became the property of the plaintiffs in 1870, and were not in 1880 the property of the
State, though the State had never given any deed for them.
(3) The royal decree, by its terms, relates to lands wrongfully withheld by private persons. The
word detentados necessarily implies this. This is inconsistent with the idea that by article 4 of
the plaintiffs, in 1870, became the absolute owners of the lands in question, and were not
therefore, in 1880, withholding what did not belong to them.
(4) In the preface to this decree and regulations, the following language is used:
SIR: The uncertain, and it may be said the precarious, state of real property in
various parts of the Philippine Islands, as yet sparsely populated; the necessity for
encouraging the cultivation of these lands; the advantage of increasing the wealth
and products of the Archipelago; the immense and immediate profit which must result
to all classes of interests, public as well as private, from the substitution of full
ownership, with all the privileges which by law accompany this real right, for the mere
possession of the lands, have long counseled the adoption of the provisions contained
in the following regulations, which, after consulation with the Philippine council, and in
conformity with an order passed at a full meeting of the council of state, the
subscribing minister has the honor to submit for the royal approval. These regulations
refer not only to tenants of royal lands in good faith and by virtue of a valid title, but
also to those who, lacking these, may, either by themselves reducing such lands to
cultivation or by the application of intelligence and initiative, causing their cultivation
by others who lack these qualities, be augmenting the wealth of the Archipelago. 2
This preface is the most authoritative commentary on the law, and shows without doubt that
those who held with color of title and good faith were, notwithstanding, holding wrongfully, and
that true ownership should be substituted for their possession.
(5) This doubt suggested by the wording of the law was the subject of inquiries directed to the
officers in Manila charged with its execution. These inquiries were answered in the circular of
August 10, 1881, published in the Gaceta de Manila August 11, 1881, as follows:
Should possessors of royal lands under color of title and in good faith seek
adjustment?
It is evident that they must do so, for it is to them that article 4 of the regulations
refers, as also the following article covers other cases of possession under different
circumstances. It should be well understood by you, and you should in turn have it
understood by other, that the adjustment of lands whose ownership has not passed to
private individuals by virtue of cession by competent authorities, is optional only for
those within the limits of the common district (legua comunal) as provided by article
7. In all other cases where the interested parties shall fail to present themselves for
the adjustment of the lands occupied by them shall suffer the penalties set forth in
article 8 of said regulations.
In determining the meaning of a law where a doubt exists the construction placed upon it by the
officers whose duty it is to administer it is entitled to weight.
(6) There is, moreover, legislative construction of these regulations upon this point found in
subsequent laws. The royal decree of December 26, 1884, (Berriz Anuario, 1888, p. 117),
provides in articles 1 that —
All those public lands wrongfully withheld by private person in the Philippines which,
in accordance with the regulations of June 25, 1880, are subject to adjustment with
the treasury, shall be divided into three groups, of which the first shall include those
which, because they are included in articles 4 and 5, and the first paragraph of article
7, are entitled to free adjustment.
There were exceptions to this rule which are not here important. Article 10 provides that if the
adjustment is free for those mentioned in articles 4 and 5, who are included in the second
group, the deed shall be issued by the governor of the province. Article 11 says that if the
adjustment is not free, because the applicant has not proved his right by prescription, then no
deed can be issued until the proper payment has been made. The whole decree shows clearly
that the legislator intended that those mentioned in article 4 and 5 should apply for a
confirmation of their titles by prescription, as well as those mentioned in article 6. In fact, for
the adjustment of those of the first group, which necessarily included only those found within
articles 4 and 5, a board was organized (art. 15) in each pueblo whose sole duty it was to
dispatch applications made said two articles.
(7) The royal decree of August 31, 1888 (Berriz Anuario, 1888, p. 120), is another legislative
construction of this regulation. That decree repealed the decree of 1884, and divided all lands
subjects to adjustment under the regulations of June 25, 1880, into two groups. In the first
group were all those lands which bordered at any points on other State lands, and those which,
though not bordering on State lands, measured more than 30 hectares. In the second group
were those which were bounded entirely by lands of private persons and did not exceed 30
hectares. For the second group a provincial board was organized, and article 10 provides a
hearing before this board, and declares —
If no protest or claim shall be filed, and the adjustment must be free because the
occupant has proved title by prescription, as provided in articles 4 and 5 of the
regulations promulgated June 25, 1880, the proceedings shall be duty approved, and
the head officer of the province will, in his capacity of deputy director general of the
civil administration, issue the corresponding title deed.
The policy pursued by the Spanish Government from the earliest times, requiring settlers on the
public lands to obtain deeds therefor from the State, has been continued by the American
Government in Act No. 926, which takes effect when approved by Congress. Section 54, sixth
paragraph of that act, declares that the persons named in said paragraph 6 "shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant
and to have received the same." Yet such persons are required by section 56 to present a
petition to the Court of Land Registration for a confirmation of these titles.
We have considered the regulations relating to adjustment — that is, those laws under which
persons in possession might perfect their titles. But there were other laws relating to the sale of
public lands which contained provisions fatal to the plaintiff's claims. The royal decree of
January 26, 1889 (Gaceta de Manila, March 20, 1889), approved the regulations for the sale of
public lands in the Philippines, and it was in accordance with such regulations that the appellee
acquired his title. Article 4 of those regulations required the publication in the Gaceta de
Manila of the application to purchase, with a description of the lands, and gave sixty days within
which anyone could object to the sale. A similar notice in the dialect of the locality was required
to be posted on the municipal building of the town in which the land was situated, and to be
21
made public by the crier. Articles 5 and 6 declared to whom such objections shall be made and
the course which they should take. Article 8 is as follows:
ART. 8. In no case will the judicial authorities take cognizance of the suit against the
decrees of the civil administration concerning the sale of royal lands unless the
plaintiff shall attach to the complaint documents which show that he has exhausted
the administrative remedy. After the proceeding in the executive department shall
have been terminated and the matter finally passed upon, anyone considering his
interests prejudiced thereby may commence a suit in the court against the State; but
in no case shall an action be brought against the proprietor of the land.
Similar provisions are found in the regulations of 1883, approved the second time by royal order
of February 16 (Gaceta de Manila, June 28, 1883). Articles 18 and 23 of said regulations are as
follows:
ART. 18. Possessors of such lands as may fall within the class of alienable royal lands
shall be obliged to apply for the ownership of the same, or for the adjustment thereof
within the term of sixty days from the time of the publication in the bulletin of Sales
of the notice of sale thereof.
ART. 23. The judicial authorities shall take cognizance of no complaint against the
decrees of the treasury department concerning the sale of lands pertaining to the
state unless the complainant shall attached to the complaint documents which proved
that he has exhausted the administrative remedy.
This prohibition appears also in the royal order of October 26, 1881 (Gaceta de Manila,
December 18, 1881) which relates evidently both to sales of public lands and also to the
adjustments with the occupants.
Article 5 of this royal order is as follows:
During the pendency of proceedings in the executive department with respect to
grants of land, interested parties may present through executive channels such
protest as they may deemed advisable for the protection of their right and interests.
The proceeding having once been completed, and the grant made, those who consider
their interests prejudiced thereby may proceed in court against the State, but under
no circumstances against the grantees of the land.
The American legislation creating the Court of Land Registration is but an application of this
same principle. In both systems the title is guaranteed to the petitioner, after examination by a
tribunal. In Spanish system this tribunal was called an administrative one, in the American a
judicial one.
The court finds that the plaintiffs made a written protest against the sale to the defendants
while the proceedings for the measurements and survey of the land were being carried on, but
that they did not follow up their protest. This, as held by the court below, is a bar their recovery
in this action, under the articles above cited.
The plaintiff state in their brief that a great fraud was committed on them and the State by the
defendant in applying for the purchase of this lands as vacant and belonging to the public, when
they were in the actual adverse possession of the plaintiffs.
We have seen nothing in the regulations relating to the sale of the public lands which limited
their force to vacant lands. On the contrary there are provisions which indicate the contrary. In
the application for the purchase the petitioner is article 3 of the regulations of 1889 required to
state whether any portion of the land sought has been broken for cultivation, and to whom such
improvements belong. Article 9 provides that if one in possession applies to purchase the land,
he renounces his right to a composicion under the laws relating to that subject. By article 13 the
report of the officials making the survey must contain a statement as to whether any part of the
land is cultivated or not and if the applicant claims to be the owner of such cultivated part.
Moreover, under No. 2 it must be shown that the property is in danger of being lost. There was
no showing of that kind. The pleadings say nothing upon the subject. In the motion for the
appointment of the receiver it said that the plaintiffs are insolvent. There is no evidence, by
affidavit or otherwise, to support this statement. A bare, unsworn statement in a motion that
the adverse party is insolvent is not sufficient to warrant a court in appointing a receiver for
property in his possession.

In the regulations of January 19, 1883 (Gaceta de Manila, June 28, 1883) is the following The judgment of the court below is affirmed. Neither party can recover costs in this court.
article:

ART. 18. Possessors of such lands as may fall within the class of royal alienable lands
shall be obliged to apply for the ownership of the same, or for the adjustment thereof,
within the term of sixty days from the time of the publication in the Bulletin of Sales
of the notice of sale thereof.

In view of all these provisions it seems impossible to believe that the legislators even intended
to leave the validity of any sale made by the State to be determined at any time in the future by
the ordinary courts on parol testimony. Such would be the result if the contention of the
plaintiffs is to be sustained. According to their claim, this sale and every other sale made by the
State can be set aside if at any time in the future it can be proved that certain persons had been
in possession of the land for the term then required for prescription.

If this claim is allowed it would result that even though written title from the State would be
safe from such attack by parol evidence, by means of such evidence damages could have been
recovered against the State for lands sold by the State to which third persons might thereafter
prove ownership but prescription. The unreliability of parol testimony on the subject of
possession is well known. In this case in the report which the law required to be made before a
sale could be had it is stated by an Ayudante de Montes that the tract had an area of 429
hectares, 77 ares, and 96 centares uncultivated, and 50 hectares, 19 ares, and 73 centares
broken for cultivation. The official report also says (1890) that the breaking is recent.
Notwithstanding this official report, the plaintiffs introduced evidence from which the court
found that the greater part of the tract had been occupied and cultivated by the plaintiffs since
1860.

It is hardly conceivable that the State intended to put in force legislation under which its
property rights could be so prejudiced.

We hold that from 1860 to 1892 there was no law in force in these Islands by which the
plaintiffs could obtain the ownership of these lands by prescription, without any action by the
State, and that the judgment below declaring the defendant the owner of the lands must be
affirmed.

II. What has been said heretofore makes it unnecessary to consider the motion for a new trial,
made by the defendant on the ground that the findings of fact are not supported by the
evidence.

III. The exception of the defendant to the order vacating the appointment of the receiver can
not be sustained. The defendant at no time made any showing sufficient to authorize the
appointment of a receiver.

The case does not fall under No. 4 of section 174 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Neither party in
his pleadings asked any relief as to the crops. They were not, therefore, "the property which is
the subject of litigation."

Neither does the case fall under No. 2 of section 174, for the same reason.

22
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-2468 July 16, 1906

MAGDALENA CANSINO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
GERVASIO VALDEZ, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Wade H. Kitchens, for appellants.

Isabelo Artacho, for appellees.

WILLARD, J.:

The decision in this case was announced on the 30th of April, 1906. The grounds of that
decision are as follows: The case is almost identical with the case of Valenton vs. Murciano1 (2
Off Gaz., 434), decided on the 30th of March, 1904. The similarity extends even to the dates
and to the location of the land, for we judge from the description of the property involved in this
suit and the description of the property involved in the case of Valenton vs. Murciano that they
are two adjoining tracts of land, one situated in the Province of Pangasinan and the other in the
Province of Tarlac, the boundary line between the two tracts of land.

In the case of Valenton vs. Murciano, the defendant bought the land from the Spanish
Government by a deed dated the 14th of July, 1892. In this case the plaintiff, Magdalena
Cansino, bought the property in question, as public lands of the State from the Spanish
Government and received a deed therefor on the 27th of October, 1893. In the former case the
plaintiffs went into possession of the land in 1860 and claimed ownership thereof by the
extraordinary prescription of thirty years. In this case some of the defendants testified that they
went into possession in 1862 and they claimed the ownership of this land by the same
extraordinary prescription. In either one of the cases did the occupants have any written title to
the land.

In Valenton vs. Murciano we decided that title to lands such as were involved in that case could
not be acquired by prescription while they were the property of the State. The decision in that
case governs and controls this case and upon its authority judgment in this case was affirmed.

Arellano, C.J., Torres and Carson, JJ., concur.

23
U.S. Supreme Court
Carino v. Insular Government, 212 U.S. 449 (1909)
Carino v. Insular Government of the Philippine Islands
No. 72
Argued January 13, 1909
Decided February 23, 1909
212 U.S. 449
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
Syllabus
Writ of error is the general, and appeal the exceptional, method of bringing Cases to this Court.
The latter method is in the main confined to equity cases, and the former is proper to bring up a
judgment of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands affirming a judgment of the Court of
Land Registration dismissing an application for registration of land.
Although a province may be excepted from the operation of Act No. 926 of 1903 of the
Philippine Commission which provides for the registration and perfecting of new titles, one who
actually owns property in such province is entitled to registration under Act No. 496 of 1902,
which applies to the whole archipelago.
While, in legal theory and as against foreign nations, sovereignty is absolute, practically it is a
question of strength and of varying degree, and it is for a new sovereign to decide how far it will
insist upon theoretical relations of the subject to the former sovereign and how far it will
recognize actual facts.
Page 212 U. S. 450
The acquisition of the Philippines was not for the purpose of acquiring the lands occupied by the
inhabitants, and under the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, 32 Stat. 691, providing that
property rights are to be administered for the benefit of the inhabitants, one who actually
owned land for many years cannot be deprived of it for failure to comply with certain
ceremonies prescribed either by the acts of the Philippine Commission or by Spanish law.
The Organic Act of the Philippines made a bill of rights embodying safeguards of the
Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends those safeguards to all.
Every presumption of ownership is in favor of one actually occupying land for many years, and
against the government which seeks to deprive him of it, for failure to comply with provisions of
a subsequently enacted registration act.
Title by prescription against the crown existed under Spanish law in force in the Philippine
Islands prior to their acquisition by the United States, and one occupying land in the Province of
Benguet for more than fifty years before the Treaty of Paris is entitled to the continued
possession thereof.
7 Phil. 132 reversed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Page 212 U. S. 455
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
24
This was an application to the Philippine Court of Land Registration for the registration of certain
land. The application was granted by the court on March 4, 1904. An appeal was taken to the
Court of First Instance of the Province of Benguet on behalf of the government of the
Philippines, and also on behalf of the United States, those governments having taken possession
of the property for public and military purposes. The Court of First Instance found the facts and
dismissed the application upon grounds of law. This judgment was affirmed by the supreme
court, 7 Phil. 132, and the case then was brought here by writ of error.
The material facts found are very few. The applicant and plaintiff in error is an Igorot of the
Province of Benguet, where the land lies. For more than fifty years before the Treaty of
Page 212 U. S. 456
Paris, April 11, 1899, as far back as the findings go, the plaintiff and his ancestors had held the
land as owners. His grandfather had lived upon it, and had maintained fences sufficient for the
holding of cattle, according to the custom of the country, some of the fences, it seems, having
been of much earlier date. His father had cultivated parts and had used parts for pasturing
cattle, and he had used it for pasture in his turn. They all had been recognized as owners by the
Igorots, and he had inherited or received the land from his father in accordance with Igorot
custom. No document of title, however, had issued from the Spanish Crown, and although, in
1893-1894 and again in 1896-1897, he made application for one under the royal decrees then
in force, nothing seems to have come of it, unless, perhaps, information that lands in Benguet
could not be conceded until those to be occupied for a sanatorium, etc., had been designated --
a purpose that has been carried out by the Philippine government and the United States. In
1901, the plaintiff filed a petition, alleging ownership, under the mortgage law, and the lands
were registered to him, that process, however, establishing only a possessory title, it is said.
Before we deal with the merits, we must dispose of a technical point. The government has spent
some energy in maintaining that this case should have been brought up by appeal, and not by
writ of error. We are of opinion, however, that the mode adopted was right. The proceeding for
registration is likened to bills in equity to quiet title, but it is different in principle. It is a
proceeding in rem under a statute of the type of the Torrens Act, such as was discussed in Tyler
v. Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71. It is nearer to law than to equity, and is an assertion of
legal title; but we think it unnecessary to put it into either pigeon hole. A writ of error is the
general method of bringing cases to this Court, an appeal the exception, confined to equity in
the main. There is no reason for not applying the general rule to this case. Ormsby v.
Webb, 134 U. S. 47, 134 U. S. 65; Campbell v. Porter, 162 U. S. 478; Metropolitan R. Co. v.
District of Columbia, 195 U. S. 322.
Page 212 U. S. 457
Another preliminary matter may as well be disposed of here. It is suggested that, even if the
applicant have title, he cannot have it registered, because the Philippine Commission's Act No.
926, of 1903, excepts the Province of Benguet among others from its operation. But that act
deals with the acquisition of new titles by homestead entries, purchase, etc., and the perfecting
of titles begun under the Spanish law. The applicant's claim is that he now owns the land, and is
entitled to registration under the Philippine Commission's Act No. 496, of 1902, which
established a court for that purpose with jurisdiction "throughout the Philippine Archipelago," §
2, and authorized in general terms applications to be made by persons claiming to own the legal
estate in fee simple, as the applicant does. He is entitled to registration if his claim of ownership
can be maintained.
We come, then, to the question on which the case was decided below -- namely, whether the
plaintiff owns the land. The position of the government, shortly stated, is that Spain assumed,
asserted, and had title to all the land in the Philippines except so far as it saw fit to permit
private titles to be acquired; that there was no prescription against the Crown, and that, if there
was, a decree of June 25, 1880, required registration within a limited time to make the title
good; that the plaintiff's land was not registered, and therefore became, if it was not always,
public land; that the United States succeeded to the title of Spain, and so that the plaintiff has
no rights that the Philippine government is bound to respect.
If we suppose for the moment that the government's contention is so far correct that the Crown
of Spain in form asserted a title to this land at the date of the Treaty of Paris, to which the
United States succeeded, it is not to be assumed without argument that the plaintiff's case is at
an end. It is true that Spain, in its earlier decrees, embodied the universal feudal theory that all
lands were held from the Crown, and perhaps the general attitude of conquering nations toward
people not recognized as entitled to the treatment accorded to those
Page 212 U. S. 458
in the same zone of civilization with themselves. It is true also that, in legal theory, sovereignty
is absolute, and that, as against foreign nations, the United States may assert, as Spain
asserted, absolute power. But it does not follow that, as against the inhabitants of the
Philippines, the United States asserts that Spain had such power. When theory is left on one
side, sovereignty is a question of strength, and may vary in degree. How far a new sovereign
shall insist upon the theoretical relation of the subjects to the head in the past, and how far it
shall recognize actual facts, are matters for it to decide.
The Province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the Solicitor General, in his argument,
characterized as a savage tribe that never was brought under the civil or military government of
the Spanish Crown. It seems probable, if not certain, that the Spanish officials would not have
granted to anyone in that province the registration to which formerly the plaintiff was entitled
by the Spanish laws, and which would have made his title beyond question good. Whatever may
have been the technical position of Spain, it does not follow that, in the view of the United
States, he had lost all rights and was a mere trespasser when the present government seized
his land. The argument to that effect seems to amount to a denial of native titles throughout an
important part of the island of Luzon, at least, for the want of ceremonies which the Spaniards
would not have permitted and had not the power to enforce.
The acquisition of the Philippines was not like the settlement of the white race in the United
States. Whatever consideration may have been shown to the North American Indians, the
dominant purpose of the whites in America was to occupy the land. It is obvious that, however
stated, the reason for our taking over the Philippines was different. No one, we suppose, would
deny that, so far as consistent with paramount necessities, our first object in the internal
administration of the islands is to do justice to the natives, not to exploit their country for
private gain. By the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, § 12, 32 Stat. 691, all the property
and rights acquired there by the
Page 212 U. S. 459
United States are to be administered "for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof." It is reasonable
to suppose that the attitude thus assumed by the United States with regard to what was
unquestionably its own is also its attitude in deciding what it will claim for its own. The same
statute made a bill of rights, embodying the safeguards of the Constitution, and, like the
Constitution, extends those safeguards to all. It provides that
"no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the
laws."
§ 5. In the light of the declaration that we have quoted from § 12, it is hard to believe that the
United States was ready to declare in the next breath that "any person" did not embrace the
inhabitants of Benguet, or that it meant by "property" only that which had become such by
25
ceremonies of which presumably a large part of the inhabitants never had heard, and that it
proposed to treat as public land what they, by native custom and by long association -- one of
the profoundest factors in human thought -- regarded as their own.
It is true that, by § 14, the government of the Philippines is empowered to enact rules and
prescribe terms for perfecting titles to public lands where some, but not all, Spanish conditions
had been fulfilled, and to issue patents to natives for not more than sixteen hectares of public
lands actually occupied by the native or his ancestors before August 13, 1898. But this section
perhaps might be satisfied if confined to cases where the occupation was of land admitted to be
public land, and had not continued for such a length of time and under such circumstances as to
give rise to the understanding that the occupants were owners at that date. We hesitate to
suppose that it was intended to declare every native who had not a paper title a trespasser, and
to set the claims of all the wilder tribes afloat. It is true again that there is excepted from the
provision that we have quoted as to the administration of the property and rights acquired by
the United States such land and property as shall be designated by the President for military or
other reservations,
Page 212 U. S. 460
as this land since has been. But there still remains the question what property and rights the
United States asserted itself to have acquired.
Whatever the law upon these points may be, and we mean to go no further than the necessities
of decision demand, every presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like
the present. It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as
testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private
ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish
conquest, and never to have been public land. Certainly, in a case like this, if there is doubt or
ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt. Whether
justice to the natives and the import of the organic act ought not to carry us beyond a subtle
examination of ancient texts, or perhaps even beyond the attitude of Spanish law, humane
though it was, it is unnecessary to decide. If, in a tacit way, it was assumed that the wild tribes
of the Philippines were to be dealt with as the power and inclination of the conqueror might
dictate, Congress has not yet sanctioned the same course as the proper one "for the benefit of
the inhabitants thereof."
If the applicant's case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we do not discover such clear proof that
it was bad by that law as to satisfy us that he does not own the land. To begin with, the older
decrees and laws cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in error seem to indicate pretty clearly
that the natives were recognized as owning some lands, irrespective of any royal grant. In other
words, Spain did not assume to convert all the native inhabitants of the Philippines into
trespassers, or even into tenants at will. For instance, Book 4, Title 12, Law 14 of the
Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, cited for a contrary conclusion in Valenton v. Murciano, 3
Phil. 537, while it commands viceroys and others, when it seems proper, to call for the
exhibition of grants, directs them to confirm those who hold by good grants or justa
prescripcion. It is true that it
Page 212 U. S. 461
begins by the characteristic assertion of feudal overlordship and the origin of all titles in the
King or his predecessors. That was theory and discourse. The fact was that titles were admitted
to exist that owed nothing to the powers of Spain beyond this recognition in their books.
Prescription is mentioned again in the royal cedula of October 15, 1754, cited in 3 Phil. 546:
"Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they
shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription."
It may be that this means possession from before 1700; but, at all events, the principle is
admitted. As prescription, even against Crown lands, was recognized by the laws of Spain, we
see no sufficient reason for hesitating to admit that it was recognized in the Philippines in regard
to lands over which Spain had only a paper sovereignty.
The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as
already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. The royal decree of February 13, 1894,
declaring forfeited titles that were capable of adjustment under the decree of 1880, for which
adjustment had not been sought, should not be construed as a confiscation, but as the
withdrawal of a privilege. As a matter of fact, the applicant never was disturbed. This same
decree is quoted by the Court of Land Registration for another recognition of the common law
prescription of thirty years as still running against alienable Crown land.

It will be perceived that the rights of the applicant under the Spanish law present a problem not
The question comes, however, on the decree of June 25, 1880, for the adjustment of royal lands without difficulties for courts of a different legal tradition. We have deemed it proper on that
wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. This begins with the usual account to notice the possible effect of the change of sovereignty and the act of Congress
theoretic assertion that, for private ownership, there must have been a grant by competent establishing the fundamental principles now to be observed. Upon a consideration of the whole
authority; but instantly descends to fact by providing that, for all legal effects, those who have case, we are of opinion that law and justice require that the applicant should be granted what
been in possession for certain times shall be deemed owners. For cultivated land, twenty years, he seeks, and should not be deprived of what, by the practice and belief of those among whom
uninterrupted, is enough. For uncultivated, thirty. Art. 5. So that, when this decree went into he lived, was his property, through a refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain.
effect, the applicant's father was owner of the land by the very terms of the decree. But, it is
said, the object of this law was to require the adjustment or registration proceedings that it
described, and in that way to require everyone to get a document of title or lose his land. That Judgment reversed.
purpose may have been entertained, but it does not appear clearly to have been applicable to
all. The regulations purport to have been made "for the adjustment of royal lands wrongfully
occupied by private individuals." (We follow the translation in the government's brief.) It does
not appear that this land ever was royal land or wrongfully occupied. In Article 6, it is provided
that

"interested parties not included within the two preceding

Page 212 U. S. 462

articles [the articles recognizing prescription of twenty and thirty years] may legalize their
possession, and thereby acquire the full ownership of the said lands, by means of adjustment
proceedings, to be conducted in the following manner."

This seems, by its very terms, not to apply to those declared already to be owners by lapse of
time. Article 8 provides for the case of parties not asking an adjustment of the lands of which
they are unlawfully enjoying the possession, within one year, and threatens that the treasury
"will reassert the ownership of the state over the lands," and will sell at auction such part as it
does not reserve. The applicant's possession was not unlawful, and no attempt at any such
proceedings against him or his father ever was made. Finally, it should be noted that the natural
construction of the decree is confirmed by the report of the council of state. That report puts
forward as a reason for the regulations that, in view of the condition of almost all property in
the Philippines, it is important to fix its status by general rules on the principle that the lapse of
a fixed period legalizes completely all possession, recommends in two articles twenty and thirty
years, as adopted in the decree, and then suggests that interested parties not included in those
articles may legalize their possession and acquire ownership by adjustment at a certain price.

It is true that the language of Articles 4 and 5 attributes title to those "who may prove"
possession for the necessary time, and we do not overlook the argument that this means may
prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer would have
recommended an application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated to
convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger,
if he had read every word of it. The words "may prove" (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of
the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There
are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for
want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost.

Page 212 U. S. 463

26
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 2506. April 16, 1906. ]
F. STEWART JONES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, Defendant-
Appellant.
Solicitor-General Araneta, for Appellant.
Pillsbury & Sutro, for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. ACTS OF THE COMMISSION; RESERVATION OF LANDS FOR PUBLIC USE. — Where lands
have been reserved by act of the Commission, a notice by the Governor-General to the Court of
Land Registration is sufficient to five that court jurisdiction of the cases mentioned in Act No.
648.
2. ID.; PRESCRIPTION AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. — The prescription of ten years mentioned
in Act No. 648 runs against the Government.
3. ID.; ADVERSE POSSESSION FOR TEN YEARS. — Held, That the evidence in the case proved
an adverse possession of the land in question for ten years.
4. ID.; NULLITY; ACTS OF CONGRESS. — Act No. 648 is not void because not previously
submitted to the President and Congress. It is not included in the provisions of section 13 of the
act of Congress of July 1, 1902.
5. ID.; PHILIPPINE COMMISSION; GRANTING OF LAND. — The provisions of section 14
authorizing the Commission to issue a patent for 16 hectares of land to a native of the Islands
who was in possession thereof on August 13, 1898, did not prohibit the Commission from
extending the provisions of Act No. 648 to foreigners.
DECISION
WILLARD, J. :
On the 16th day of January, 1904 F. Stewart Jones presented a petition to the Court of Land
Registration asking that he be inscribed as the owner of a certain tract of land situated in the
Province of Benguet, and within the reservation defined in Act No. 636. The Solicitor-General
appeared in the court below and opposed the inscription upon the ground that the property was
public land. At the trial he objected to any consideration of the case on the ground that the
court had no jurisdiction to register land situated in that reservation. The objections were
overruled and judgment entered in favor of the petitioner, from which judgment the
Government appealed to this court.
The act creating the Court of Land Registration (No. 496) gave it jurisdiction throughout the
Archipelago. By Act No. 1224, which was approved August 31, 1904, and which applied to
pending cases, the court was deprived of jurisdiction over lands situated in the Province of
Benguet. That act, however, contained a proviso by which the court was given jurisdiction over
applications for registration of title to land in all cases coming within the provisions of Act No.
648. Act No. 648 provides in its first section that —
"The Civil Governor is hereby authorized and empowered by executive order to reserve from
settlement or public sale and for specific public uses any of the public domain in the Philippine
Islands the use of which is not otherwise directed by law."cralaw virtua1aw library
Section 2 provides: "Whenever the Civil Governor, in writing, shall certify that all public lands
within limits by him described in the Philippine Islands are reserved for civil public uses, either
27
of the Insular Government, or of any provincial or municipal government, and shall give notice
thereof to the judge of the Court of Land Registration, it shall be the duty of the judge of said
court" to proceed in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 627. Act No. 627, which relates to
military reservations, provides that when notice is given to the Court of Land Registration of the
fact that any land has been so reserved, it shall be the duty of the court to issue notice that
claims for all private lands within the limits of the reservation must be presented for registration
under the Land Registration Act within six months from the date of issuing such notice, and that
all lands not so presented within said time would be conclusively adjudged to be public lands,
and all claims on the part of private individuals for such lands, not so presented, would be
forever barred.
On the 26th day of August, 1903, the following letter was directed by Governor Taft to the
judge of the Court of Land Registration:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SIR: You are hereby notified, in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 648, entitled "An act
authorizing the Civil Governor to reserve for civil public purposes, and from sale or settlement,
any part of the public domain not appropriated by law for special public purposes, until
otherwise directed by law, and extending the provisions of Act Numbered Six hundred and
twenty-seven so that public lands desired to be reserved by the Insular Government for public
uses, or private lands desired to be purchased by the Insular Government for such uses, may be
brought under the operation of the Land Registration Act;" that the Philippine Commission has
reserved for civil public uses of the Government of the Philippine Islands the lands described in
Act No. 636, entitled "An act creating a Government reservation at Baguio, in the Province of
Benguet," enacted February 11, 1903.
"It is therefore requested that the land mentioned be forthwith brought under the operation of
the Land Registration Act and become registered land in the meaning thereof, and that you
proceed in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 648.
"Very respectfully,
(Signed) "WM. H. TAFT,
"Civil Governor."cralaw virtua1aw library
The court of Land Registration, acting upon this notice from the Governor, issued the notice
required by Act No. 627, and in pursuance of that notice Jones, the appellee, within the six
months referred to in the notice, presented his petition asking that the land be registered in his
name.
The first claim of the Government is that the provisions of Act No. 648 were not complied with
in the respect that this letter of the Governor did not amount to a certificate that the lands had
been reserved. The Solicitor-General says in his brief:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"To bring these lands within the operation of section 2 of Act No. 648 it was necessary for the
Civil Governor first to certify that these lands were reserved for public uses, and second to give
notice thereof to the Court of Land Registration."cralaw virtua1aw library
We do not think that this contention can be sustained. Act No. 648 conferred power upon the
Governor to reserve lands for public purposes, but it did not make that power exclusive. The
Commission did not thereby deprive itself of the power to itself make reservations in the future,
if it saw fit; neither did it intend to annul any reservations which it had formerly made. The
contention of the Government is true when applied to a case where the land has not been
reserved by the Commission. In such a case it would be the duty of the Governor to first
reserve it by an executive order, and then to give notice to the Court of Land Registration, but
where the land had already been reserved by competent authority, it not only was not
necessary for the Governor to issue any executive order reserving the land but he had no power
to do so. In such cases the only duty imposed upon him was to give notice to the Court of Land
Registration that the land had been reserved. This notice was given in the letter above quoted.
The court had jurisdiction to try the case.
The petitioner Jones, on the 1st day of May, 1901, bought the land in question from Sioco
Cariño, an Igorot. He caused his deed to the land to be recorded in the office of the registrar of
property on the 8th day of May of the same year. Prior thereto, and while Sioco Cariño was in
possession of the land, he commenced proceedings in court for the purpose of obtaining a
possessory information in accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law. This possessory
information he caused to be recorded in the office of the registrar of property on the 12th day of
March, 1901.
The evidence shows that Sioco Cariño was born upon the premises in question; that his
grandfather, Ortega, during the life of the latter, made a gift of the property to Sioco. This gift
was made more than twelve years before the filing of the petition in this case — that is, before
the 16th day of January, 1904. Sioco’s grandfather, Ortega, was in possession of the land at the
time the gift was made, and has been in possession thereof for many years prior to said time.
Upon the gift being made Sioco took possession of the property, and continued in such
possession until his sale to Jones, the petitioner. Since such sale Jones has been in possession
of the land, and is now in such possession. For more than twelve years prior to the presentation
of the petition the land had been cultivated by the owners thereof, and the evidence is
sufficient, in our opinion, to bring the case within section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and
to show such an adverse possession thereof for ten years as is required by the section. The
evidence of Sioco Cariño shows that what he did in the way of presenting a petition to the
Spanish Government in regard to a deed of the land was done by order of the then comandante,
and was limited to securing a measurement thereof, as he then believed. These acts did not
interrupt the running of the statute of limitations.
Acts Nos. 627 and 648 provide that the provisions of section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure
shall be applicable to all proceedings taken under either one of these acts. These acts in effect
provide that in determining whether the applicant is the owner of the land or not, the general
statute of limitations shall be considered, and shall be applied against the Government. The
evidence showing, as we have said, such an adverse possession, the petitioner proved his
ownership of the land if the Commission had authority to make the statute of limitations
applicable to these proceedings.
The claim of the Government is that this provision is void; that the act thereby disposes of
public lands; that Congress is the only authority that can take such action, and that it has never
authorized or approved the action of the Commission in applying the statute of limitations to
proceedings under Acts Nos. 648 and 627. We do not think that this contention can be
sustained. Section 12 of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, provides as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 12. That all the property and rights which may have been acquired in the Philippine
Islands by the United States under the treaty of peace with Spain, signed December tenth,
eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, except such land or other property as shall be designated by
the President of the United States for military and other reservations of the Government of the
United States, are hereby placed under the control of the Government of said Islands, to be
administered for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof, except as provided in this act."cralaw
virtua1aw library
This gives the Government of the Philippine Islands power to dispose of these lands, and of all
public lands, and to pass the law in question, unless there is some provision in other parts of
the act of July 1, 1902, which takes away or limits that power. The government says that such
limitation is found in section 13 of the act. That section and sections 14 and 15 are as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 13. That the Government of the Philippine Islands, subject to the provisions of this Act
and except as herein provided, shall classify according to its agricultural character and
productiveness, and shall immediately make rules and regulations for the lease, sale, or other
disposition of the public lands other than timber or mineral lands, but such rules and regulations
shall not go into effect or have the force of law until they have received the approval of the
President, and when approved by the President they shall be submitted by him to Congress at
the beginning of the next ensuing session thereof and unless disapproved or amended by
Congress at said session they shall at the close of such period have the force and effect of law in
28
the Philippine Islands: Provided, That a single homestead entry shall not exceed sixteen
hectares in extent.
"SEC. 14. That the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and empowered to
enact rules and regulations and to prescribe terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect
their title to public lands in said Islands, who, prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to
the United States, had fulfilled all or some of the conditions required by the Spanish laws and
royal decrees of the Kingdom of Spain for the acquisition of legal title thereto, yet failed to
secure conveyance of title; and the Philippine Commission is authorized to issue patents,
without compensation, to any native of said Islands, conveying title to any tract of land not
more than sixteen hectares in extent, which were public lands and had been actually occupied
by such native or his ancestors prior to and on the thirteenth of August, eighteen hundred and
ninety-eight.
"SEC. 15. That the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and empowered,
on such terms as it may prescribe, by general legislation, to provide for the granting or sale and
conveyance to actual occupants and settlers and other citizens of said Islands such parts and
portions of the public domain, other than timber and mineral lands, of the United States in said
Islands as it may deem wise, not exceeding sixteen hectares to any one person, and for the sale
and conveyance of not more than one thousand and twenty-four hectares to any corporation or
association of persons: Provided, That the grant or sale of such lands, whether the purchase
price be paid at once or in partial payments, shall be conditioned upon actual and continued
occupancy, improvement, and cultivation of the premises sold for a period of not less than five
years, during which time the purchaser or grantee can not alienate or encumber said land or the
title thereto; but such restriction shall not apply to transfers of rights and title of inheritance
under the laws for the distribution of the estates of decedents."cralaw virtua1aw library
It is first to be noted that section 13 does not apply to all lands. Timber and mineral lands are
expressly excluded. If the Commission should pass laws relating to mineral lands without
submitting them to Congress, as it has done (Act No. 624), their validity would not be
determined by inquiring if they had been submitted to Congress under section 13, but rather by
inquiring if they were inconsistent with other provisions of the act relating to mineral lands. In
other words, the fact that such laws were not submitted to Congress would not necessarily
make them void.
The same is true of legislation relating to coal lands, as to which sections 53 and 57 contain
provisions. By section 57 this Government is authorized to issue all needful rules and
regulations for carrying into effect this and preceding sections relating to mineral lands. Such
regulations need not be submitted to Congress for its approval. Act No. 1128, relating to coal
lands, was not submitted.
The act of Congress also contains provisions regarding the purchase of lands belonging to
religious orders. Section 65 provides as to those lands as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 65. That all lands acquired by virtue of the preceding section shall constitute a part and
portion of the public property of the Government of the Philippine Islands, and may be held,
sold, and conveyed, or leased temporarily for a period not exceeding three years after their
acquisition by said Government, on such terms and conditions as it may prescribe, subject to
the limitations and conditions provided for in this Act. . . . Actual settlers and occupants at the
time said lands are acquired by the Government shall have the preference over all others to
lease, purchase, or acquire their holdings within such reasonable time as may be determined by
said Government."cralaw virtua1aw library
Does the clause "subject to the limitations and conditions of this act" require a submission to
Congress of legislation concerning such land? If it does, then Act No. 1120, which contains such
provisions, is void, because it was never so submitted.
Section 18 of the act of Congress provides as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That the forest laws and regulations now in force in the Philippine Islands, with such
modifications and amendments as may be made by the Government of said Islands, are hereby
continued in force."cralaw virtua1aw library
Must these modifications and amendments be submitted to Congress for its approval? If they
must be, then Act No. 1148, relating thereto, is void, because it was not so submitted.
It seems very clear that rules and regulations concerning mineral, timber, and coal lands, and
lands bought from religious orders need not be submitted to Congress. If they are not
inconsistent with the provisions of the act of Congress relating to the same subjects, they are
valid.
Congress, by section 12 of the act, gave to the Philippine Government general power all
property acquired from Spain. When it required the Commission to immediately classify the
agricultural lands and to make rules and regulations for their sale, we do not think that it
intended to virtually repeal section 12. Such, however, would be the effect of the rule contended
for by the Government. If, notwithstanding the provisions of section 12, any law which in any
way directly or indirectly affects injuriously the title of the Government to public lands must be
submitted to the President and Congress for approval, the general power given by section 12 is
taken away. An examination of some of the laws of the Commission will show that a holding
such as is contended for by the Government in this case would apparently require a holding that
such other laws were also void. Act No. 496, which established the Court of Land Registration,
the court that tried this case, provides in section 38 that the decrees of the court shall be
conclusive on and against all persons, including the Insular Government, and all the branches
thereof. Neither the President nor Congress ever gave their consent to this law. They never
consented that the title of the Government to public lands should be submitted to the judgment
of the courts of the Islands. That this law provides a means by which the Government may be
deprived of its property in such lands is apparent. In this very case, if the Government had not
appealed from the judgment, or if it should withdraw its appeal, the lands would be lost to it —
lands which the Attorney-General claims are public lands. The land could not be more effectually
lost by the law shortening the statute of limitations than by this law making the decrees of the
Court of Land Registration binding on the Government. In fact, the former law could not in any
way prejudice the Government if it were not for the latter law making the judgments of this
court binding upon it. Both of these laws in an indirect way affect the title to public lands, but
we do not think that for that reason they are included in the terms "rules and regulations" used
in section 13 of the act of Congress.
Act No. 1039 granted to the Province of Cavite and to the pueblo of Cavite certain public lands.
This act never was submitted either to the President or Congress. Acts Nos. 660 and 732
authorized the leasing of parts of the San Lazaro estate. The Government leased the sanitarium
at Benguet, and provided for its sale. None of these acts were ever submitted to the President
or Congress, which authorized such disposition. The Government owns many isolated tracts of
land, such as the Oriente Hotel, for example. It has reclaimed from the sea a large tract of land
in connection with the works of the port of Manila. If the Government should desire to sell this
reclaimed land or to lease a part of it for the site of an hotel, or should desire to sell the Oriente
Hotel building, we do not think legislation to accomplish such purposes would require the
previous approval of the President and of Congress. The general purpose of section 13 was to
require the Government to classify agricultural lands and to pass a homestead law — that is, a
law which would state the rules and regulations by virtue of which title to the public lands of
which it can be decided in every case whether an act of the Commission constitutes a rule or
regulation within the meaning of section 13. It is sufficient to say that the law in question (Act
No. 648), making a statute of limitations run against the Government when the title to few
scattered tracts of land throughout the Archipelago is under consideration, is not such a rule or
regulations as required previous submission to the President and Congress. It will be observed
that be section 86 of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, Congress reserves the right to annul
all legislation of the Commission.
There is nothing in section 14 which requires the rules and regulations therein mentioned to be
submitted to Congress. But it is said that although as to Act No. 648 submission to Congress
was not required, it is nevertheless void when applied to one not a native of the Islands,
because forbidden by this section; and that this section limits the power of the Commission to
declare possession alone sufficient evidence of title to cases in which the claimant is native and
in which the amount of land does not exceed 16 hectares.
29
Section 14 is not limited to agricultural lands, as are sections 13 and 15. It includes mineral and
timber lands. So far as it relates to proceedings theretofore taken under Spanish laws its
benefits are not limited to natives of the Islands nor to tracts not more than 16 hectares in
extent. Where the only claim is possession, no possession for any definite time prior to August
13, 1898, is required, nor is proof of any possession whatever after that date demanded.
According to the strict letter of the section a native would be entitled to a patent who proved
that he had been in possession for the months of July and August only of 1898. It is not stated
whether or not one who receives such a patent must occupy the land for five years thereafter,
as required by section 15. Neither is it stated whether or not a person who was in possession for
the month of August, 1898, would be entitled to a patent in preference to the actual settler
spoken of in section 6. When legislating upon the subject—matter of section 14, the
Commission, in Act No. 926, did not make such a limitation as has been suggested. Section 54,
paragraph 6, of that act is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural public land, as
defined by said act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, under a bona fide claim
of ownership except as against the Government, for a period of ten years next preceding the
taking effect of this act, except when prevented by war or force majeure, shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and to have
received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land under the provision
of this chapter."cralaw virtua1aw library
It is seen that this section does not exclude foreigners, nor is it limited to tracts not exceeding
16 hectares in extent. To adopt the view that the power of the Commission is so limited would
require a holding that this section is void as to foreigners and as to all tracts of land over 16
hectares in extent.
This paragraph of section 54 of Act No. 926 is in substance a continuation of Act No. 648 and an
extension of its provisions to all the lands of the Islands.
To adopt the construction contended for would lead to an unjust result. By the terms of the first
part of section 14 the Commission has the power to perfect the title to 100 hectares of land as
to which a Spaniards may have done nothing more than to file an application relating thereto,
and of which he never was in possession, while by the last party of the section the Commission
would be entirely without power to make any rules by which a native who by himself and his
ancestors had been in possession of 100 hectares. Such a discrimination in favor of foreigners
and against the natives could not have been intended. It could not have been the purpose of
Congress to give the Commission ample power to legislate for the benefit of foreigners and to
limit its power to legislate for the benefit of natives.
The meaning of these sections is not clear, and it is difficult to give to them a construction that
will be entirely free from objection. But we do not think that authority given by the Commission
to issue to a native a patent for 16 hectares of land of which he was in possession during the
month of August, 1898, was intended to limit the general power of control which by section 12
is given to the Commission.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this instance the Appellant. After
the expiration of twenty days let final judgment be entered in accordance herewith and ten days
thereafter let the cause be remanded to the lower court for proper procedure. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, and Tracey, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24066 December 9, 1925
VALENTIN SUSI, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANGELA RAZON and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, defendants. THE DIRECTOR OF
LANDS, appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Reyes for appellant.
Monico R. Mercado for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga by a complaint filed by
Valentin Susi against Angela Razon and the Director of Lands, praying for judgment: (a)
Declaring plaintiff the sole and absolute owner of the parcel of land described in the second
paragraph of the complaint; (b) annulling the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of
Angela Razon, on the ground that the land is a private property; (c) ordering the cancellation of
the certificate of title issued to said Angela Razon; and (d) sentencing the latter to pay plaintiff
the sum of P500 as damages, with the costs.
For his answer to the complaint, the Director of Lands denied each and every allegation
contained therein and, as special defense, alleged that the land in question was a property of
the Government of the United States under the administration and control of the Philippine
Islands before its sale to Angela Razon, which was made in accordance with law.
After trial, whereat evidence was introduced by both parties, the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga rendered judgment declaring the plaintiff entitled to the possession of the land,
annulling the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, and ordering the
cancellation of the certificate of title issued to her, with the costs against Angela Razon. From
this judgment the Director of Lands took this appeal, assigning thereto the following errors, to
wit: (1) The holding that the judgment rendered in a prior case between the plaintiff and
defendant Angela Razon on the parcel of land in question is controlling in this action; (2) the
holding that plaintiff is entitled to recover the possession of said parcel of land; the annulment
of the sale made by the Director of Lands to Angela Razon; and the ordering that the certificate
of title issued by the register of deeds of the Province of Pampanga to Angela Razon by virtue of
said sale be cancelled; and (3) the denial of the motion for new trial filed by the Director of
Lands.
The evidence shows that on December 18, 1880, Nemesio Pinlac sold the land in question, then
a fish pond, tho Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza for the sum of P12, reserving the right to
repurchase the same (Exhibit B). After having been in possession thereof for about eight years,
and the fish pond having been destroyed, Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, on September
5, 1899, sold it to Valentin Susi for the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase it (Exhibit
A). Before the execution of the deed of sale, Valentin Susi had already paid its price and sown
"bacawan" on said land, availing himself of the firewood gathered thereon, with the proceeds of
the sale of which he had paid the price of the property. The possession and occupation of the
land in question, first, by Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, and then by Valentin Susi has
been open, continuous, adverse and public, without any interruption, except during the
revolution, or disturbance, except when Angela Razon, on September 13, 1913, commenced an
action in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga to recover the possession of said land (Exhibit
30
C), wherein after considering the evidence introduced at the trial, the court rendered judgment
in favor of Valentin Susi and against Angela Razon, dismissing the complaint (Exhibit E). Having
failed in her attempt to obtain possession of the land in question through the court, Angela
Razon applied to the Director of Lands for the purchase thereof on August 15, 1914 (Exhibit C).
Having learned of said application, Valentin Susi filed and opposition thereto on December 6,
1915, asserting his possession of the land for twenty-five years (Exhibit P). After making the
proper administrative investigation, the Director of Lands overruled the opposition of Valentin
Susi and sold the land to Angela Razon. By virtue of said grant the register of deeds of
Pampanga, on August 31, 1921, issued the proper certificate of title to Angela Razon. Armed
with said document, Angela Razon required Valentin Susi to vacate the land in question, and as
he refused to do so, she brought and action for forcible entry and detainer in the justice of the
peace court of Guagua, Pampanga, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the case being
one of title to real property (Exhibit F and M). Valentin Susi then brought this action.
With these facts in view, we shall proceed to consider the questions raised by the appellant in
his assignments of error.lawphi1.net
It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in possession of the land in
question openly, continuously, adversely, and publicly, personally and through his predecessors,
since the year 1880, that is, for about forty-five years. While the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga against Angela Razon in the forcible entry case does not affect the
Director of Lands, yet it is controlling as to Angela Razon and rebuts her claim that she had
been in possession thereof. When on August 15, 1914, Angela Razon applied for the purchase of
said land, Valentin Susi had already been in possession thereof personally and through his
predecessors for thirty-four years. And if it is taken into account that Nemesio Pinlac had
already made said land a fish pond when he sold it on December 18, 1880, it can hardly be
estimated when he began to possess and occupy it, the period of time being so long that it is
beyond the reach of memory. These being the facts, the doctrine laid down by the Supreme
Court of the United States in the case of Cariño vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (212
U. S., 449 1), is applicable here. In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the
presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874,
amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were
complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his
predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and
publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions
of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor,
Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant
of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued in order that
said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient, under the
provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land
in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be the public domain and had
become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the
Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of
Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus
made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right.
The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of the public domain, the
plaintiff-appellee cannot maintain an action to recover possession thereof.lawphi1.net
If, as above stated, the land, the possession of which is in dispute, had already become, by
operation of law, private property of the plaintiff, there lacking only the judicial sanction of his
title, Valentin Susi has the right to bring an action to recover possession thereof and hold it.
For the foregoing, and no error having been found in the judgment appealed from, the same is
hereby affirmed in all its parts, without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Malcolm, Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., took no part.
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-3793. February 19, 1908. ]
CIRILO MAPA, Petitioner-Appellee, v. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, Respondent-
Appellant.
Attorney-General Araneta, for Appellant.
Basilio R. Mapa, for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. AGRICULTURAL PUBLIC LANDS DEFINED. — The phrase "agricultural public lands" defined by
the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, which phrase is also to be found in several sections of the
Public Land Act (No. 926), means those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither
mineral nor timber lands.
DECISION
WILLARD, J. :
This case comes from the Court of Land Registration. The petitioner sought to have registered a
tract of land of about 16 hectares in extent, situated in the barrio of San Antonio, in the district
of Mandurriao, in the municipality of Iloilo. Judgment was rendered in favor of the petitioner and
the Government has appealed. A motion for a new trial was made and denied in the court
below, but no exception was taken to the order denying it, and we therefore can not review the
evidence.
The decision of that court was based upon Act No. 926 section 54, paragraph 6 which
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the open,
continuous exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural public lands, as
defined by said act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, under a bona fide claim
of ownership except as against the Government, for a period of ten years next preceding the
taking effect of this act, except when prevented by war, or force majeure, shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and to have
received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land under the provisions
of this chapter."cralaw virtua1aw library
The only question submitted to the court below or to this court by the Attorney-General is the
question whether the land in controversy is agricultural land within the meaning of the section
above quoted. The findings of the court below upon that point are as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"From the evidence adduced it appears that the land in question is lowland, and has been
uninterruptedly, for more than twenty years, in the possession of the petitioner and his
ancestors as owners and the same has been used during the said period, and up to the present,
as fish ponds, nipa lands, and salt deposits. The witnesses declare that the land is far from the
sea, the town of Molo being between the sea and the said land."cralaw virtua1aw library
The question is an important one because the phrase "agricultural public lands" as defined by
said act of Congress of July 1, is found not only in section 54 above quoted but in other parts of
Act No. 926, and it seems that the same construction must be given to the phrase wherever it
occurs in any part of that law.
The claim of the Attorney-General seems to be that no lands can be called agricultural lands
31
unless they are such by their nature. If the contention of the Attorney-General is correct, and
this land because of its nature is not agricultural land, it is difficult to see how it could be
disposed of or what the Government could do with it if it should be decided that the Government
is the owner thereof. It could not allow the land to be entered as a homestead, for Chapter I of
Act No. 926 allows the entry of homesteads only upon "agricultural public lands" in the
Philippine Islands, as defined by the act of Congress of July 1, 1902. It could not sell it in
accordance with the provisions of Chapter II of Act No. 926 for section 10 only authorizes the
sale of "unreserved nonmineral agricultural public land in the Philippine Islands, as defined in
the act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two." It could not lease it in accordance
with the provisions of Chapter III of the said act, for section 22 relating to leases limits them to
"nonmineral public lands, as defined by section eighteen and twenty of the act of Congress
approved July first, nineteen hundred and two." It may be noted in passing that there is
perhaps some typographical or other error in this reference to sections 18 and 20, because
neither one of these sections mentions agricultural lands. The Government could not give a free
patent to this land to a native settler, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter IV, for that
relates only to "agricultural public land, as defined by act of Congress of July first, nineteen
hundred and two."cralaw virtua1aw library
In fact, by virtue of the provisions of Act No. 926, the Government could do nothing with this
land except to lay out a town site thereon in accordance with the provisions of Chapter V, for
section 36 relating to that matter, says nothing about agricultural land.
The question before us is not what is agricultural land, but what definition has been given to
that phrase by the act of Congress. An examination of that act will show that the only sections
thereof wherein can be found anything which could be called a definition of the phrase are
sections 13 and 15. Those sections are as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 13. That the Government of the Philippine Islands, subject to the provisions of this act
and except as herein provided, shall classify according to its agricultural character and
productiveness, and shall immediately make rules and regulations for the lease, sale, or other
disposition of the public lands other than timber or mineral lands, but such rules and regulations
shall not go into effect of have the force of law until they have received the approval of the
President, and when approved by the President they shall be submitted by him to Congress at
the beginning of the next ensuing session thereof and unless disapproved or amended by
Congress at said session they shall at the close of such period have the force and effect of law in
the Philippine Islands: Provided, That a single homestead entry shall not exceed sixteen
hectares in extent.
"SEC. 15. That the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and empowered
on such terms as it may prescribe, by general legislation, to provide for the granting or sale and
conveyance to actual occupants and settlers and other citizens of said Islands such parts and
portions of the public domain, other than timber and mineral lands, of the United States in said
Islands as it may deem wise, not exceeding sixteen hectares to any one person and for the sale
and conveyance of not more than one thousand and twenty-four hectares to any corporation or
association of persons: Provided, that the grant or sale of such lands, whether the purchase
price be paid at once or in partial payments shall be conditioned upon actual and continued
occupancy, improvement, and cultivation of the premises sold for a period of not less than five
years, during which time the purchaser or grantee can not alienate or encumber said land or the
title thereto; but such restriction shall not apply to transfers of rights and title of inheritance
under the laws for the distribution of the estates of decedents."cralaw virtua1aw library
It is seen that neither one of these sections gives any express definition of the phrase
"agricultural land." In fact, in section 15 the word "agricultural" does not occur.
There seem to be only three possible ways of deciding this question. The first is to say that no
definition of the phrase "agricultural land" can be found in the act of Congress; the second, that
there is a definition of that phrase in the act and that it means land which in its nature is
agricultural; and, third, that there is a definition in the act and that the phrase means all of the
public lands acquired from Spain except those which are mineral or timber lands. The court
below adopted this view, and held that the land, not being timber or mineral land, came within
the definition of agricultural land, and that therefore Section 54 paragraph 6, Act No. 926 was
applicable thereto.
1. There are serious objections to holding that there is no definition in the act of the phrase
"agricultural land." The Commission in enacting Act No. 926 expressly declared that such a
definition could be found therein. The President approved this act and it might be said that
Congress, by failing to reject or amend it, tacitly approved it. Moreover, if it should be said that
there is no definition in the act of Congress of the phrase "agricultural land," we do not see how
any effect could be given to the provisions of Act No. 916, to which we have referred. If the
phrase is not defined in the act of Congress, then the lands upon which homesteads can be
granted can not be determined. Nor can it be known what land the Government has the right to
sell in accordance with the provisions of Chapter II, nor what lands it can lease in accordance
with the provisions of Chapter III, nor the lands for which it can give free patents to native
settlers in accordance with the provisions of Chapter IV, and it would seem to follow,
necessarily, that none of those chapters could be put into force and that all that had up to this
time been done by virtue thereof would be void.
2. The second way of disposing of the question is by saying that Congress has defined
agricultural lands as those lands which are, as the Attorney-General says, by their nature
agricultural. As has been said before, the word "agricultural" does not occur in section 15.
Section 13 says that the Government "shall classify according to its agricultural character and
productiveness and shall immediately make rules and regulations for the lease, sale, or other
disposition of the public lands other than timber or mineral land." This is the same thing as
saying that the Government shall classify the public lands other than timber or mineral lands
according to its agricultural character and productiveness; in other words, that it shall classify
all the public lands acquired from Spain, and that this classification shall be made according to
the agricultural character of the land and according to its productiveness.
One objection to adopting this view is that it is so vague and indefinite that it would be very
difficult to apply it in practice. What lands are agricultural in nature? The Attorney-General
himself in his brief in this case says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The most arid mountain and the poorest soil are susceptible of cultivation by the hand of
man."cralaw virtua1aw library
The land in question in this case, which is used as a fishery, could be filled up and any kind of
crops raised thereon. Mineral and timber lands are expressly excluded, but it would be difficult
to say that any other particular tract of land was not agricultural in nature. Such lands may be
found within the limits of any city. There is within the city of Manila, and within a thickly
inhabited part thereof an experimental far. This land is in its nature agricultural. Adjoining the
Luneta, in the same city, is a large tract of land, Camp Wallace, devoted to sports. The land
surrounding the city walls of Manila, between them and the Malecon Drive on the west, the
Luneta on the south, and Bagumbayan Drive on the south and east, is of many hectares in
extent and is in nature agricultural. The Luneta itself could at any time be devoted to the
growing of crops.
salts. Section 34 relating to fee patents to native settlers makes no provision for any
determination by the Chief of Bureau of Public Lands in regard to the character of the land
applied for.
After homesteads have been entered, lands, sold, and leases made by the administrative
officers on the theory that the lands were agricultural lands by their nature, to leave the matter
of their true character open for subsequent action by the courts would be to produce an evil that
should if possible be avoided.
3. We hold that there is to be found in the act of Congress a definition of the phrase
"agricultural public lands," and after a careful consideration of the question we are satisfied that
the only definition which exists in said act is the definition adopted by the court below. Section
13 says that the Government shall "Make rules and regulations for the lease, sale, or other
disposition of the public lands other than timber or mineral lands." To our minds, that is the only
definition that can be said to be given to agricultural lands. In other words, that the phrase
"agricultural land" as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which
are not timber or mineral lands. As was said in the case of Jones v. The Insular Government (6
Phil Rep., 122, 133) where these same section of the act of Congress were under
discussion:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The meaning of these sections is not clear and it is difficult to give to them a construction that
would be entirely free from objection."cralaw virtua1aw library
But the construction we have adopted, to our minds, is less objectionable than any other one
that has been suggested.
There is nothing in this case of Jones v. The Insular Government which at all conflicts with the
result here arrived at. The question as to whether the lands there involved were or were not
agricultural lands within the meaning of the sections was neither discussed nor decided. In fact,
it appears from the decision that those lands, which were in the Province of Benguet, were
within the strictest definition of the phrase "agricultural lands." It appears that such lands had
been cultivated for more than twelve years. What that case decided was, not that the lands
therein involved and other lands referred to in the decision by way of illustration were not
agricultural lands but that the law there in question and the other laws mentioned therein were
not rules and regulations within the meaning of section 13.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against
the Appellant. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J. and Torres, J., concur.
Johnson, J., concurs in the result.

The objection to adopting this construction on account of its uncertainty is emphasized when we
consider that whether certain land was or was not agricultural land, as defined by the act of
Congress, and therefore subject to homestead entry, to sale, or to lease in accordance with the
provisions of Act No. 926, would be a question that would finally have to be determined by the
courts, unless there is some express provision of the law authorizing the administrative officers
to determine this question for themselves. Section 2 of Act No. 926 relating to homesteads
provides that the Chief of The Bureau of Public Lands shall summarily determine whether the
land described is prima facie under the law subject to homestead settlement. Section 13,
relating to the sale of public lands, provides simply that the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands
shall determine from the certificate of the Chief of the Bureau of Forestry whether the land
applied for is more valuable for agricultural than for timber purposes, but it says nothing about
his decisions as to whether it is or is not agricultural land in its nature. Section 26 relating to the
lease of public lands provides that the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall determine from
the certificate of the Chief of the Bureau of Forestry whether the land applied for is more
valuable for agricultural than for timber purposes and further summarily determine from
available records whether the land is or is not mineral and does not contain deposits of coal or

32
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 13298. November 19, 1918. ]
CORNELIO RAMOS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, objector-
appellee.
Basilio Aromin, for Appellant.
Solicitor-General Paredes, for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. PROPERTY; LAND; POSSESSION. — Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of
acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own
property.
2. ID.; ID.; CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION. — The possession and cultivation of a portion of a
tract of land, under claim of ownership of all, is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder
is not in the adverse possession of another.
3. ID.; ID.; ID. — One who has color of title, has acted in good faith, and has had open,
peaceable, and notorious possession of a portion of the property sufficient to apprise the
community an the world that the land was for his enjoyment, Held; To be entitled to a title to
the entire tract of land for which he asks registration.
4. ID.; CLASSES. — The Philippine Bill in Sections 13 to 18 recognizes three classes of land. The
first is" Public Land," the second is "Mineral Land" and the third is "Timber Land."cralaw
virtua1aw library
5. ID.; "AGRICULTURAL PUBLIC LAND;" DEFINED. — The phrase "agricultural public lands
acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands." (Mapa v. Insular Government
[1908], Phil., 175.) The idea would appear to be to determine, by exclusion, if the land is
forestal or mineral in nature, and if not so found to consider it to be agricultural land.
6. ID.; "FOREST," DEFINED BY LEXICOGRAPHIES. — Lexicographers define "forest" as "a large
tract of land covered with a natural a growth of trees and underbrush; a large wood.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; BY LEGAL AUTHORITIES. — The authorities say that the word "forest" has a
significant, not an insignificant meaning and that it does not embrace land only partly woodland.
It is a tract of land covered with trees, usually of considerable extent.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; BY FORESTERS. — The foresters say that no legal definition of "forest" is
practicable or useful.
9. ID.; ID.; POLICY OF BUREAU OF FORESTRY. — The policy of the Bureau of Forestry of the
Philippine Islands is set out in the opinion.
10 ID.; CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES. — There should be conservation of the
natural resources of the Philippines. The idea should be "the control of nature’s powers by man
for his own good."cralaw virtua1aw library
11. ID.; PUBLIC POLICY. — On the other hand, the presumption should be, in lieu of contrary
proof, that land is agricultural in nature. One very apparent reason is that it is for the good of
the Philippine Islands to have the large public domain come under private ownership.
12. ID.; REMEDIES OF GOVERNMENT AS AGAINST PRIVATE CLAIMANTS. — When the claim of
the citizen and the claim of the Government as to a particular piece of property collide, if the
Government desires to demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest, the Director of Forestry
should submit to the court convincing proof that the land is not more valuable for agricultural
than for forest purposes. Great consideration, it may be stated, should and undoubtedly will be,
33
paid by the courts to the opinion of the technical expert who speaks with authority on forestry
matters.
DECISION
MALCOLM, J. :
This is an appeal by the applicant and appellant from a Judgment of the Court of First Instance
of Nueva Ecija, denying the registration of the larger portion of parcel No. 1 (Exhibit A of the
petitioner), marked by the letters A, B, and C on the plan, Exhibit 1, of the Government.
One Restituto Romero y Ponce apparently gained possession of a considerable tract of land
located in the municipality of San Jose, Province of Nueva Ecija, in the year 1882. He took
advantage of the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, to obtain a possessory information title to
the land, registered as such on February 8, 1896. Parcel No. 1, included within the limits of the
possessory information title of Restituto Romero, was sold in February, 1907, to Cornelio
Ramos, the instant petitioner, and his wife Ambrosia Salamanca.
Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title registered. Opposition was entered by
the Director of Lands on the ground that Ramos had not acquired a good title from the Spanish
government and by the Director of Forestry on the ground that the first parcel was forest land.
The trial court agreed with the objectors and excluded parcel No. 1 from registration. So much
for the facts.
As to the law, the principal argument of the Solicitor-General is based on the provisions of the
Spanish Mortgage Law and of the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, commonly known as the
Maura Law. The Solicitor-General would emphasize that for land to come under the protective
aegis of the Maura Law, it must have been shown that the land was cultivated for six years
previously, and that it was not land which pertained to the "zonas forestales." As proof that the
land was, even as long ago as the years 1894 to 1896, forestal and not agricultural in nature is
the fact that there are yet found thereon trees from 50 to 80 years of age.
We do not stop to decide this contention, although it might be possible, following the doctrine
laid down by the United States Supreme Court with reference to Mexican and Spanish grants
within the United States, where some recital is claimed to be false, to say that the possessory
information, apparently having taken cognizance of the requisites for title, should not now be
disturbed. (Hancock v. McKinney [1851], 7 Tex., 192; Hornsby and Roland v. United States
[1869], 10 Wall., 224.) It is sufficient, as will later appear, merely to notice that the
predecessor in interest to the petitioner at least held this tract of land under color of title.
Subsection 6 of Section 54, of Act No. 926, entitled The Public Land Law, as amended by Act
No. 1908, reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural public lands, as
defined by said Act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, under a bona fide claim
of ownership except as against the Government, for a period of ten years next preceding the
twenty-sixth day of July, nineteen hundred and four, except when prevented by war or force
majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
government grant and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to
such land under the provisions of this chapter."cralaw virtua1aw library
There are two parts to the above quoted subsection which must be discussed. The first relates
to the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of what, for
present purposes, can be conceded to be agricultural public land, under a bona fide claim of
ownership.
Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a
nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property. Relative to actuality of
possession, it is admitted that the petitioner has cultivated only about one fourth of the entire
tract. This is graphically portrayed by Exhibit 1 of the Government, following:
Sketch of Private land claimed by Cornelio Ramos showing the general characteristics of the
ground cover. Scale, 1-5,000 Inspected March 21 & 22. 1917 he question at once arises: Is the
actual occupancy of a part of the land described in the instrument giving color of title sufficient
to give title to the entire tract of land?
The doctrine of constructive possession indicates the answer. The general rule is that the
possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract under claim of ownership of all is a constructive
possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of another. (Barr v. Gratz’s
Heirs [1819], 4 Wheat., 213; Ellicott v. Pearl [1836], 10 Pet., 412; Smith v. Gale [1892], 144
U.S., 509.) Of course, there are a number of qualifications to the rule, one particularly relating
to the size of the tract in controversy with reference to the portion actually in possession of the
claimant. It is here only necessary to apply the general rule.
The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith; and he has had open, peaceable, and
notorious possession of a portion of the property, sufficient to apprise the community and the
world that the land was for his enjoyment. (See Arts. 446, 448, Civil Code.) Possession in the
eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground
before it can be said that he is in possession. Ramos and his predecessor in interest fulfilled the
requirements of the law on the supposition that the premises consisted of agricultural public
land.
The second division of the law requires consideration of the term "agricultural public land." The
law affirms that the phrase is defined by the Act of Congress of July 1st, 1902, known as the
Philippine Bill. Turning to the Philippine Bill, we find in Sections 13 to 18 thereof that three
classes of land are mentioned. The first is variously denominated "public land" or "public
domain," the second "mineral land," and the third "timber land." Section 18 of the Act of
Congress comes nearest to a precise definition, when it makes the determination of whether the
land is more valuable for agricultural or for forest uses the test of its character.
Although these sections of the Philippine Bill have come before the courts on numerous
occasions, what was said In the case of Jones v. Insular Government ([1906], 6 Phil., 122), is
still true, namely: "The meaning of these sections is not clear and it is difficult to give to them a
construction that will be entirely free from objection. In the case which gave most serious
consideration to the subject (Mapa v. Insular Government [1908], 10 Phil., 1753, it was found
that there does exist in the Act of Congress a definition of the phrase "agricultural public lands."
It was said that the phrase "agricultural public lands" as used in Act No. 926 means "those
public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands."cralaw virtua1aw library
The idea would appear to be to determine, by exclusion, if the land is forestal or mineral in
nature and, if not so found, to consider it to be agricultural land. Here, again, Philippine law is
not very helpful. For instance Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917 provides: "For
the purposes of this chapter, ’public forest’ includes, except as otherwise specially indicated, all
unreserved public land, including nipa and mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves of
whatever character." This definition of "Public forest," it will be noted, is merely "for the
purposes of this chapter." A little further on, Section 1827 provides: "Lands in public forests, not
including forest reserves, upon the certification of the Director of Forestry that said lands are
better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by
the public interests to be kept under forest, shall be declared by the Department Head to be
agricultural lands." With reference to the last section, there is no certification of the Director of
Forestry in the record, as to whether this land is better adapted and more valuable for
agricultural than for forest purposes.
The lexicographers define "forest" as "a large tract of land covered with a natural growth of
trees and underbrush; a large wood." The authorities say that the word "forest" has a
significant, not an insignificant meaning, and that it does not embrace land only partly
woodland. It is a tract of land covered with trees, usually of consider able extent. (Higgins v.
Long Island R. Co. [1908], 114 N.Y. Supp., 262; People v. Long Island R. Co. [1908], 110
34
Supp., 512.)
The foresters say that no legal definition of "forest" is practicable or useful. B.H. Baden-Powell,
in his work on Forest Law of India, states as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Every definition of a forest that can be framed for legal purposes will be found either to exclude
some cases to which the law ought to apply, or on the other hand, to include some with which
the law ought not to interfere. It may be necessary, for example, to take under the law a tract
of perfectly barren land which at present has neither trees brushwood, nor grass on it, but
which in the course of time it is hoped will be ’reboise;’ but any definition wide enough to take
in all such lands, would also take in much that was not wanted. On the other hand, the
definition, if framed with reference to tree-growth, might (and indeed would be almost sure to)
include a garden, shrubbery orchard, or vineyard, which it was not designed to deal with."cralaw
virtua1aw library
B. E. Fernow, in his work on the Economics of Forestry states as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A forest in the sense in which we use the term, as an economic factor, is by no means a mere
collection of trees but an organic whole in which all parts, although apparently heterogeneous,
jumbled together by accident as it were and apparently unrelated, bear a close relation to each
other and are as interdependent as any other beings and conditions in nature."cralaw virtua1aw
library
The Director of Forestry of the Philippine Islands has said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"During the time of the passage of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, this question of forest
and agricultural lands was beginning to receive some attention and it is clearly shown in Section
18 of the above mentioned Act it leaves to the Bureau of Forestry the certification as to what
lands are for agricultural or forest uses. Although the Act states timber lands, the Bureau has in
its administration since the passage of this act construed this term to mean forest lands in the
sense of what was necessary to protect, for the public good; waste lands without a tree have
been declared more suitable for forestry in many instances in the past. The term ’timber’ as
used in England and in the United States in the past has been applied to wood suitable for
construction purposes but with the increase in civilization and the application of new methods
every plant producing wood has some useful purpose and the term timber lands is generally
thought of as synonymous with forest lands or lands producing wood, or able to produce wood,
if agricultural crops on the same land will not bring the financial return that timber will or if the
same land is needed for protection purposes.
x x x
"The laws in the United States recognize the necessity of technical advice of duly appointed
boards and leave it in the hands of these boards to decide what lands are more valuable for
forestry purposes or for agricultural purposes.
"In the Philippine Islands this policy is followed to as great an extent as allowable under the law.
In many cases, in the opinion of the Bureau of Forestry, lands without a single tree on them are
considered as true forest land. For instance, mountain sides which are too steep for cultivation
under ordinary practice and which, if cultivated, under ordinary practice would destroy the big
natural resource of the soil, by washing, is considered by this Bureau as forest land and in time
would be reforested. Of course, examples exist in the Mountain Province where steep hillsides
have been terraced and intensive cultivation practiced but even then the mountain people are
very careful not to destroy forests or other vegetative cover which they from experience have
found protect their water supply. Certain chiefs have lodged protests with the Government
against other tribes on the opposite side of the mountain cultivated by them, in order to prevent
other tribes from cutting timber or destroy cover guarding their source of water for irrigation.
"Dr. M.S. Shaler, formerly Dean of the Lawrence Scientific School, remarked that if mankind
could not devise and enforce ways dealing with the earth, which will preserve this source of life
’we must look forward to the time remote it may be, yet equally discernible, when our kin
having wasted its great inheritance will fade from the earth because of the ruin it has
accomplished.’
"The method employed by the Bureau of Forestry in making inspection of lands, in order to
determine whether they are more adapted for agricultural or forest purposes by a technical and
duly trained personnel on the different phases of the conservation of natural resources, is based
upon a previously prepared set of questions in which the different characters of the land under
inspection are discussed, namely:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Slope of land: Level; moderate; steep; very steep.
"Exposure: North; South; East; West.
"Soil: Clay; sandy loam; sand; rocky; very rocky.
"Character of soil cover: Cultivated, grass land, brush land, brush land and timber mixed, dense
forest.
"If cultivated, state crops being grown and approximate number of hectares under cultivation.
(Indicate on sketch.)
"For growth of what agricultural products is this land suitable?
Either way we look at this question we encounter difficulty. Indubitably, there should be
conservation of the natural resources of the Philippines. The prodigality of the spendthrift who
squanders his substance for the pleasure of the fleeting moment must be restrained for the less
spectacular but surer policy which protects Nature’s wealth for future generations. Such is the
wise stand of our Government as represented by the Director of Forestry who, with the Forester
for the Government of the United States, believes in "the control of nature’s powers by man for
his own good." On the other hand, the presumption should be, in lieu of contrary proof, that
land is agricultural in nature. One very apparent reason is that it is for the good of the Philippine
Islands to have the large public domain come under private ownership. Such is the natural
attitude of the sagacious citizen.
If in this instance, we give judicial sanction to a private claim, let it be noted that the
Government, in the long run of cases, has its remedy. Forest reserves of public land can be
established as provided by law. When the claim of the citizen and the claim of the Government
as to a particular piece of property collide, if the Government desires to demonstrate that the
land is in reality a forest, the Director of Forestry should submit to the court convincing proof
that the land is not more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes. Great consideration,
it may be stated, should, and undoubtedly will be, paid by the courts to the opinion of the
technical expert who speaks with authority on forestry matters. But a mere formal opposition on
the part of the Attorney-General for the Director of Forestry, unsupported by satisfactory
evidence will not stop the courts from giving title to the claimant.

"State what portion of the tract is wooded, name of important timber species and estimate of
stand in cubic meters per hectare, diameter and percentage of each species.
"If the land is covered with timber, state whether there is public land suitable for agriculture in
vicinity, which is not covered with timber.
"Is this land more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes? (State reasons in full.)
"Is this land included or adjoining any proposed or established forest reserve or communal
forest? Description and ownership of improvements.
We hold that the petitioner and appellant has proved a title to the entire tract of land for which
he asked registration, under the provisions of subsection 6, of Section 54, of Act No. 926, as
amended by Act No. 1908, with reference to the Philippine Bill and the Royal Decree of February
13, 1894, and his possessory information.
Judgment is reversed and the lower court shall register in the name of the applicant the entire
tract in parcel No. 1, as described in plan Exhibit A, without special finding as to costs. So
ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Street and Fisher, JJ., concur.

"If the land is claimed under private ownership, give the name of the claimant, his place of
residence, and state briefly (if necessary on a separate sheet) the grounds upon which he bases
his claim.

"When the inspection is made on a parcel of public land which has been applied for, the
corresponding certificate is forwarded to the Director of Lands; if it is made on a privately
claimed parcel for which the issuance of a title is requested from the Court of Land Registration,
and the inspection shows the land to be more adapted for forest purposes, then the Director of
Forestry requests the Attorney-General to file an opposition, sending him all data collected
during the inspection and offering him the forest officer as a witness.

"It should be kept in mind that the lack of personnel of this Bureau, the limited time intervening
between the notice for the trial of an expediente of land and the day of the trial, and the
difficulties in communications as well as the distance of the land in question greatly hinder the
handling of this work.

"In the case of lands claimed as private property, the Director of Forestry, by means of his
delegate the examining officer, submits before the court all evidence referring to the present
forest condition of the land, so that the court may compare them with the alleged right by the
claimant. Undoubtedly, when the claimant presents a title issued by the proper authority or
evidence of his right to the land showing that he complied with the requirements of the law, the
forest certificate does not affect him in the least as such land should not be considered as a part
of the public domain; but when the alleged right is merely that of possession, then the public or
private character of the parcel is open to discussion and this character should be established not
simply on the alleged right of the claimant but on the sylvical condition and soil characteristics
of the land, and by comparison between this area, or different previously occupied areas, and
those areas which still preserve their primitive character."cralaw virtua1aw library

35
 EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25010 October 27, 1926
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. PAULINO
ABELLA, ET AL., claimants;
MARIA DEL ROSARIO, petitioner-appellant.
Francisco, Lualhati and Lopez for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
This is a petition for the registration of a certain parcel or tract of land located in the
municipality of San Jose, Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippine Islands. It appears from the record
that on the 21st day of September, 1915, the appellant Maria del Rosario presented a petition in
the Court of First Instance for the registration under the Torrens system, of the very land now in
question by virtue of her appeal. In that case, after issue joined and after hearing the evidence,
the Honorable Vicente Nepomuceno, judge, denied the registration of all of the northern portion
of the land included in her petition represented by Exhibit 1, which was the plan presented in
that action, upon the ground that said portion was more valuable for timber purposes than for
agricultural purposes. From that judgment Maria del Rosario
appealed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In this court she presented a motion for rehearing and in support thereof presents some proof
to show that the northern portion of the land in question is not forestry land but that much of it
is agricultural land. With reference to said motion for rehearing, it may be said that all of the
proof which is presented in support thereof existed at the time of the trial and might, with
reasonable diligence, have been presented. It cannot, therefore, be considered now. It is not
newly discovered evidence. And moreover if it should be accepted it would not be sufficient to
justify the granting of a new trial.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
After a careful examination of the entire record and the evidence adduced during the trial of this
cause as well as that adduced during the trial of the first cause, we are fully persuaded that no
error has been committed. Whether particular land is more valuable for forestry purposes than
for agricultural purposes, or vice-versa, is a question of fact and must be established during the
trial of the cause. Whether the particular land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral is a question to
be settled in each particular case, unless the Bureau of Forestry has, under the authority
conferred upon it, prior to the intervention of private interest, set aside for forestry or mineral
purposes the particular land in question. (Ankronvs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 40
Phil., 10.) During the trial of the present cause the appellant made no effort to show that the
land which she claimed, outside of that which had been decreed in her favor, was more valuable
for agricultural than forestry purposes. For all of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is
hereby affirmed, with costs. So ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Avanceña, C. J., Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

The Supreme Court after a consideration of the evidence affirmed the decision of the lower
court. In the course of that decision the Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Moir,
said: "We have examined the plans and all the evidence presented in this case and are of the
opinion that the trial court was correct in its declaration that this send a did not mean the old
road to Boñgabon. The fact that nearly all the northern property is forestry land is a further
indication that the applicant's possessory information title did not include the land running up to
the road to Bongabon, because all the papers which the applicant has regarding this property
call the land palayero." 1 chanrobles virtual law library

Judge Nepomuceno in his decision directed that the appellant herein present an amended plan
in that case, showing the particular part or parcel of the land in question which she was entitled
to have registered. We have no evidence before us showing that order of Judge Nepomuceno
was ever complied with.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Nothing further seems to have occurred with reference to the registration of the land included in
the former case until the 26th day of April, 1921, when the Acting Director of Lands presented
the petition in the present case for the registration, under the cadastral survey, of a portion of
land located in the municipality of San Jose, which included the very land claimed by Maria del
Rosario in the former action. She presented her opposition in the present action, claiming the
very land which she claimed in the former action. The only proof which she presented in support
of her claim in the present action was the proof which she had presented in the former action.
No proof was adduced in addition thereto, which in the slightest degree showed that she was
entitled to the registration of any other parcel of land than those which had been conceded to
her in the first action.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Upon the issue and the proof adduced in the present case the Honorable C. Carballo, Auxiliary
Judge of the Sixth Judicial District, ordered registered in the name of Maria del Rosario, under
the cadastral survey, lots 3238, 3240, 3242 and 3243, which are the very lots which had been
ordered registered in her name in the former action. From that judgment she appealed to this
court upon the ground that the lower court committed an error in not registering all of the land
included in her opposition in her name.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

36
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-13756 January 30, 1919
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, ET AL., petitioners.
VICENTE JOCSON, ET AL., appellants,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, objector-appellee.
Mariano Locsin Rama and J. E. Blanco for appellants.
Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.
MOIR, J.:
In the cadastral land registration for the town of Hinigaran, Occidental Negros, the appellants
sought to register the three lots or parcels of land involved in this appeal, which registration was
opposed by the Director of Forestry.
The trial court found that lot 1104 was almost entirely "forestry" land, that a small portion of lot
1154 and all of lots 1158 were "forestry" lands, to which appellants had no title, and declared
the lots public lands, and refused registration of the parts of these lots to which opposition had
been filed by the Forestry Bureau. The claimants excepted and perfected their bill of exceptions
and brought the case to this court for review, setting up the following assignments of error:
1. The court erred in not holding to have been proven the facts that the lots 1104,
1154, and 1158 of the cadastral survey of Hinigaran were possessed by Bibiano
Jocson as owner during his lifetime and from a time prior to the year 1880, and, after
his death, by his heirs, on which lots nipa plants were planted and now exists and that
these latter are not spontaneous plants utilized by said heirs.
2. The court erred in not holding to have been proven the a part of lot No. 1158 is rice
and pasture land that was possessed as owner by Bibiano Jocson during his lifetime
and peaceably long before 1880, a possession continued by his heirs who still enjoy
the use of the land up to the present time.
3. The court erred in not holding to have been proven that on that same lot 1158,
there has existed since the year 1890, and still exists, a fish hatchery which has been
possessed and enjoyed by the heirs of Bibiano Jocson, as owners, for more than 27
years, not counting the prior possession of their predecessor in interest.
4. The court erred in holding that lot No. 1158 and part of lots 1104 and 1154 are
forest land, finding this fact as sufficiently proven by the sole and absurd testimony of
the ranger to the effect that nipa is a plant of spontaneous growth and in not planted;
and , as the photographs only refer to small portions of the area of the lot, the court
also erred in holding that the whole lot was covered with firewood trees, while in fact
but a very small portion of it is covered with trees which protect the nipa plants and
the fish hatchery, it having been proven that a large part of the lot was sown with rice
and used as pasture land.
37
5. The court erred in not holding that the parts of lots 1104, 1154 and 1158, covered
by mangrove swamps, are agricultural land, and in not holding to have been proven
that these swamp are not available, inasmuch as they are drained at low tide; errors
committed with manifest violation of law and disregard of the jurisprudence
established by the Honorable Supreme Court of the Philippine.
6. The court erred in not holding that the claimants and appellants, by their
peaceable, public, and continuous possession for more than forty years, as owners,
including that held by their predecessors in interests, had acquired by prescription lots
1104, 1154, and 1158, in conformity with act No. 190, section 41, which, without
exception, is applicable to the State as well as to private parties, and by extraordinary
prescription of thirty years.
7. The court erred in not adjudicating said lots to the claimants and appellants, in
consideration of the possession they have had for more than forty years, form the
time of their predecessor in interest to the present time, thus violating the legal
provision whereby the holders of land who have been in its possession for ten years
prior to the enactment of the land law, Act No. 926, by the United States Philippine
Commission, are to be deemed the absolute owners of such land, and to be presumed
to have applied for the same and to have complied with the Spanish laws and all the
proceedings required by the Royal Decrees on the composition of titles; and,
therefore, pursuant to said Act now in force, the land in question should be
adjudicated to the possessors thereof.
8. The court erred in not granting the new trial requested by the appellants, the
motion therefor being based on the ground that his findings of facts, if there are any,
are openly and manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence.
It is not necessary to consider all these assignments of error, for the main question involved is
whether manglares[mangroves] are agricultural lands or timber lands. If they are timber lands
the claimants cannot acquire them by mere occupation for ten years prior to July 26, 1904; if
not, they can so acquire them under the Public Land Act, and no grant or title is necessary.
This being a cadastral case there are no findings of fact, but the trial court states that lot 1104
was in possession of claimants and their ancestors for more than thirty years and lot 1154 for
more than twenty-five years. Lot 1158 is declared to be wholly "forestal." The are of the lots
does not appear.
The evidence fully sustains the contention of the claimants that they have been in possession of
all of those lots quietly, adversely and continuously under a claim of ownership for more than
thirty years prior to the hearing in the trial court. There is not a word of proof in the whole
record to the contrary. They set up no documentary title. They do claim the parts of the lands
denied registration are "mangles" with nipa and various other kinds of aquatic bushes or trees
growing on them, and that in 1890 on lot 1158 they constructed a fishpond (vivero de peces)
which was later abandoned as unprofitable, and that part of this lot is pasture land, part palay
and part "mangles."
The attorney-General contends in his brief that the parts of the lands denied registration are
public forest and cannot be acquired by occupation, and that all "manglares are public forests."
In the Act of Congress of July 1st, 1902, there is a classification of all public lands of the
Philippine Islands, and in mentioning forestry land the Act of Congress used the words "timber
land." These words are always translated in the Spanish translation of that Act as "terrenos
forestales." We think there is an error in this translation and that a better translation would be
"terrenos madereros." Timber land in English means land with trees growing on it.
The manglar plant would never be called a tree in English but a bush, and land which has only The definition of forestry as including manglares found in the Administrative Code of 1917
bushes, shrubs or aquatic plants growing on it can not be called "timber land." cannot affect rights which vested prior to its enactment.

The photographs filed by the Government as exhibits in this case show that at two places there
were trees growing on this land, but the forester who testified for the Government always calls
these lots "mangles," and he says the trees which are growing on the lands are of no value
except for firewood. The fact that there are a few trees growing in a manglar or nipa swamp
does not change the general character of the land from manglar to timber land.
These lands being neither timber nor mineral lands the trial court should have considered them
agricultural lands. If they are agricultural lands then the rights of appellants are fully established
by Act No. 926.
Paragraph 6 of section 54 of that Act provides as follows:

That manglares are not forestry lands within the meaning of the words "Timber lands" in the Act
of Congress has been definitely decided by this Court in the case of Montano vs. Insular
Government (12 Phil. Rep., 572). In that case the court said:
Although argued at different times, five of these cases have been presented
substantially together, all being covered by one brief of the late Attorney-General in
behalf of the Government in which, with many interesting historical and graphic
citations he described that part of the marginal seashore of the Philippine Islands
known as manglares, with their characteristic vegetation. In brief, it may be said that
they are mud flats, alternately washed and exposed by the tide, in which grow various
kindered plants which will not live except when watered by the sea, extending their
roots deep into the mud and casting their seeds, which also germinate there. These
constitute the mangrove flats of the tropics, which exists naturally, but which are
also, to some extent, cultivated by man for the sake of the combustible wood of the
mangrove, like trees, as well as for the useful nipa palm propagated thereon.
Although these flats are literally tidal lands, yet we are of the opinion that they can
not be so regarded in the sense in which the term is used in the cases cited or in
general American jurisprudence. The waters flowing over them are not available for
purpose of navigation, and they "may be disposed of without impairment of the public
interest in what remains."
The court on page 573 further said:
All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
public lands, as defined by said Act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and
two, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as against the Government, for a
period of ten years next preceding the taking effect of this Act, except when
prevented by war of force majuere, shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a government grant and to have received the same, and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land under the provisions of this
chapter.
xxx xxx xxx
This Act went into effect July 26th, 1904. Therefore, all persons who were in possession of
agricultural public lands under the conditions mentioned in the above section of Act No. 926 on
the 26th of July, 1894, are conclusively presumed to have a grant to such lands and are entitled
to have a certificate of title issued to them. (Pamintuan vs.Insular Government, 8 Phil., Rep.,
485.)
While we hold that manglares as well as nipa lands are subject to private acquisition and
ownership when it is fully proved that the possession has been actual, complete and adverse,
we deem it proper to declare that each case must stand on its own merits.

It is a kindred case to Cirilo Mapa vs. The Insular Government . . . (10 Phil. Rep., One cannot acquire ownership of a mangrove swamp by merely cutting a few loads of firewood
175). from the lands occasionally. The possession must be more complete than would be required for
other agricultural lands.
As some discussion has arisen as to the scope of that decision, it appears opportune
to reaffirm the principle there laid down. The issue was, whether lands used as a The appellants were in actual possession of the lots in question from 18821, and their ancestors
fishery, for the growth of nipa, and as salt deposits, inland some desistance from the before that date, and they should have been declared the owners and title should have been
sea, and asserted, thought not clearly proved, to be overflowed at high tide, could be issued to them.
registered as private property on the strength of ten years' occupation, under
paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926 of the Philippine Commission. The point
decided was that such land within the meaning of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, There is no need to consider the other points raised on appeal.
was agricultural, the reasoning leading up to that conclusion being that Congress
having divided all the public lands of the Islands into three classes it must be included
The judgment of the lower court is reversed and the case is returned to the lower court, with
in tone of the three, and being clearly neither forest nor mineral, it must of necessity
instruction to enter a decree in conformity with this decision. So ordered.
fall into the division of agricultural land.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Street, Araullo and Avanceña, JJ., concur.
In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil. Rep., 175), this court said that the phrase
"agricultural lands" as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which
are not timber or mineral lands.

Whatever may have been the meaning of the term "forestry" under the Spanish law, the Act of
Congress of July 1st, 1902, classified the public lands in the Philippine Islands as timber,
mineral or agricultural lands, and all public lands that are not timber or mineral lands are
necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglares,
fisheries or ordinary farm lands.

38
 Republic of the Philippines As the applicant failed to show the title to the lot, and has invoked the provisions of the Public
SUPREME COURT Land Act, it seems unnecessary to make pronouncement in this case on the nature or
Manila classifications of the sought to be registered.

EN BANC It may be argued that under the provisions of the Public Land Act the applicant immediate
predecessor in interest would have been entitled to a decree of registration of the lot had they
applied for its registration; and that he having purchased or acquired it, the right of his
G.R. No. L-48321 August 31, 1946 immediate predecessor in interest to a decree of registration must be deemed also to have been
acquired by him. The benefits provided in the Public Land Act for applicant's immediate
OH CHO, applicant-appellee, predecessors in interest should comply with the condition precedent for the grant of such
vs. benefits. The condition precedent is to apply for the registration of the land of which they had
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, oppositor-appellant. been in possession at least since July 26, 1894. This the applicant's immediate predecessors in
interest failed to do. They did not have any vested right in the lot amounting to the title which
was transmissible to the applicant. The only right, if it may thus be called, is their possession of
Office of the Solicitor General Roman Ozaeta and Assistant Solicitor General Rafael Amparo for the lot which, tacked to that of their predecessors in interest, may be availed of by a qualified
appellant. person to apply for its registration but not by a person as the applicant who is disqualified.
Vicente Constantino for appellee.
Ferrier, Gomez and Sotelo and J. T. Chuidian as amici curiae.
It is urged that the sale of the lot to the applicant should have been declared null and void. In a
suit between vendor and vendee for the annulment of the sale, such pronouncement would be
PADILLA, J.: necessary, if the court were of the opinion that it is void. It is not necessary in this case where
the vendors do not even object to the application filed by the vendee.
This is an appeal from a judgment decreeing the registration of a residential lot located in the
municipality of Guinayangan, Province of Tayabas in the name of the applicant. Accordingly, judgment is reversed and the application for registration dismissed, without costs.

The opposition of the Director of Lands is based on the applicant's lack of title to the lot, and on
his disqualification, as alien, from acquiring lands of the public domain.

The applicant, who is an alien, and his predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the lot from 1880 to filing of the application for
registration on January 17, 1940.

The Solicitor General reiterates the second objection of the opponent and adds that the lower
court, committed an error in not declaring null and void the sale of the lot to the applicant.

The applicant invokes the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496), or should it not be applicable to
the case, then he would apply for the benefits of the Public Land Act (C.A. No. 141).

The applicant failed to show that he has title to the lot that may be confirmed under the Land
Registration Act. He failed to show that he or any of his predecessors in interest had acquired
the lot from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, under the laws, orders and
decrease promulgated by the Spanish Government in the Philippines, or by possessory
information under the Mortgaged Law (section 19, Act 496). All lands that were not acquired
from the Government, either by purchase or by grant below to the public domain. An exception
to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his
predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the
presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a
private property even before the Spanish conquest. (Cariño vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S.,
449; 53 Law. Ed., 594.) The applicant does not come under the exception, for the earliest
possession of the lot by his first predecessors in interest begun in 1880.

As the applicant failed to show title to the lot, the next question is whether he is entitled to
decree or registration of the lot, because he is alien disqualified from acquiring lands of the
public domain (sections 48, 49, C.A. No. 141).

39
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-59447 December 27, 1982
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Director of Lands and the Director of Forest
Development, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IGLESIA NI CRISTO, represented by its Executive Minister
ERANO G. MANALO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-60188 December 27, 1982
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Director of Lands, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE DOMINADOR S. CENDAÑA of CFI-La Union, Branch II and IGLESIA NI
CRISTO, respondents.
Solicitor General for petitioner.
Eliseo M. Cruz for respondents.
PLANA, J.:
These are two land registration cases instituted by the Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC), a corporation
sole, under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act which reads:
Sec 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines occupying lands
of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit . . .
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
...
In both cases, the applications for land registration were granted by the lower courts, impelling
the Republic to elevate the cases to this forum on this basic legal issue: whether the lands
applied for may be registered in the name of INC. in the light of the Constitutional provision that
"no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by
lease." (Article XIV, Section 11). An ancillary question refers to the nature of the lands subject
to registration proceedings — whether they are private or public.
The issues are not new. In at least two decisions, (Meralco vs. Judge Castro Bartolome et al 114
SCRA 799; Republic vs. Judge Candido P. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875), this court has ruled on
the questions. Specifically, in Republic vs. Judge Villanueva, this court, speaking thru Justice
Ramon C. Aquino, said:
As correctly contended by the Solicitor General, the Iglesia Ni Cristo, as a
corporation sole or a juridical person, is disqualified to acquire or hold
alienable lands of the public domain, like the two lots in question, because
40
of the constitutional prohibition already mentioned and because the said
church is not entitled to avail itself of the benefits of section 48 (b) which
applies only to Filipino citizens or natural persons. A corporation sole (an
"unhappy freak of English law") has no nationality (Roman Catholic
Apostolic Adm. of Davao, Inc. vs. Land Registration Commission, 102 Phil.
596. See Register of Deeds vs. Ung Siu Si Temple 97 Phil. 58 and sec. 49 of
the Public Land Law).
The contention in the comments of the Iglesia Ni Cristo (its lawyer did not
file any brief) that the two lots are private lands, following the rule laid
down in Susi vs. Razon and Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 424, is not correct.
What was considered private land in the Susi case was a parcel of land
possessed by a Filipino citizen since time immemorial, as in Carifio vs.
Insular Government, 212 U.S. 449, 531 L. ed. 594, 41 Phil. 935 and 7 Phil.
132. The lots sought to be registered in this case do not fall within that
category. They are still public lands. A land registration proceeding under
section 48 (b) "presupposes that the land is public" (Mindanao vs. Director
of Lands, L-19535, July 10, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).
As held in Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, "all lands that were
not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong
to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that
should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-
in-interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the
presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that
it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest. "
In Uy Un vs. Perez, 71 Phil. 508, it was noted that the right of an occupant
of public agricultural land to obtain a confirmation of his title under section
48 (b) of the Public Land Law is a "derecho dominical incoativo" and that
before the issuance of the certificate of title the occupant is not in the
juridical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State.
(114 SCRA 881-882)
Following the above cases, this court sustains the stand of the Republic, without need to inquire
into the veracity of the allegation in G.R. L-59447 that the evidence presented therein do not
prove INC. continuity of possession of the land for the period prescribed by law. The appealed
decisions of the lower courts are hereby set aside and the INC. applications for registration are
hereby dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19535 July 10, 1967
HEIRS OF PELAGIO ZARA; PIO, CLEMENTE, SERAFIA, PORFIRIO and ESTEBAN, all
surnamed MINDANAO; MARIA and GLICERIA, both surnamed SEDARIA; DULCE
CORDERO, VICTORIA DE LOS REYES and JOSE GARCIA, applicants-appellants,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, Government oppositor-appellees.
VICENTE V. DE VILLA, JR., and VICENTE S. DE VILLA, SR., private oppositors-appellees.
Jose L. Matias and H. A. Jambora for applicants-appellants.
Francisco Villanueva, Jr. and Gregorio L. Oquitania for private oppositors-appellees.
Manuel Reyes Castro for oppositor-appellee Director of Forestry.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Batangas (Lipa City) dismissing
appellants' "application for registration of the parcel of land consisting of 107 hectares, more or
less, situated in the barrio of Sampiro, Municipality of San Juan, Province of Batangas, and
designated in amended plan PSU-103696 as Lot A."
The proceedings in the court a quo are not disputed.
On August 4, 1960 appellants filed an application for registration of the land above described
pursuant to the provisions of Act 496. They alleged that the land had been inherited by them
from their grandfather, Pelagio Zara, who in turn acquired the same under a Spanish grant
known as "Composicion de Terrenos Realengos" issued in 1888. Alternatively, should the
provisions of the Land Registration Act be not applicable, applicants invoke the benefits of the
provisions of Chapter VIII, Section 48, subsection (b) of C.A. 141 as amended, on the ground
that they and their predecessor-in-interest had been in continuous and adverse possession of
the land in concept of owner for more than 30 years immediately preceding the application.
Oppositions were filed by the Director of Lands, the Director of Forestry and by Vicente V. de
Villa, Jr. The latter's opposition recites:
x x x that the parcel of land sought to be registered by the applicants consisting of
107 hectares, more or less, was included in the area of the parcel of land applied for
registration by Vicente S. de Villa, Sr. in Civil Case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 in this
Court, which was decided by this same Court through the then incumbent Judge, the
Honorable Juan P. Enriquez, on September 30, 1949; that the parcel sought to be
registered by the applicants was declared public land in said decision; that they (the
oppositors Vicente V. de Villa, Jr. and Vicente S. de Villa, Sr.) have an interest over
the land in question because for a period more than sixty (60) years, the de Villas
have been in possession, and which possession, according to them, was open
continuous, notorious and under the claim of ownership; that the proceeding being in
rem, the failure of the applicants to appear at the case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 to
prove their imperfect and incomplete title over the property, barred them from raising
the same issue in another case; and that as far as the decision in Civil Case No. 26,
L.R. Case No. 601 which was affirmed in the appellate court in CA-G.R. No. 5847-R is
concerned, there is already "res-adjudicata" — in other words, the cause of action of
the applicant is now barred by prior judgment; and that this Court has no more
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the decision of the Court in said case having
transferred to the Director of Lands.
On November 15, 1960 the De Villas (De Villa, Sr. was subsequently included as oppositor) filed
a motion to dismiss, invoking the same grounds alleged in its opposition, but principally the fact
that the land applied for had already been declared public land by the judgment in the former
registration case.
41
The trial court, over the objection of the applicants, granted the motion to dismiss by order
dated January 27, 1961, holding, inter alia, that "once a parcel of land is declared or adjudged
public land by the court having jurisdiction x x x it cannot be the subject anymore of another
land registration proceeding x x x (that) it is only the Director of Lands who can dispose of the
same by sale, by lease, by free patent or by homestead."
In the present appeal from the order of dismissal neither the Director of Lands nor the Director
of Forestry filed a brief as appellee. The decisive issue posed by applicants-appellants is whether
the 1949 judgment in the previous case, denying the application of Vicente S. de Villa, Sr., and
declaring the 107 hectares in question to be public land, precludes a subsequent application by
an alleged possessor for judicial confirmation of title on the basis of continuous possession for at
least thirty years, pursuant to Section 48, subsection (b) of the Public Land Law, C.A. 141, as
amended. This provision reads as follows:
The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of
a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation
of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
Chapter.1äwphï1.ñët
The right to file an application under the foregoing provision has been extended by Republic Act
No. 2061 to December 31, 1968.
It should be noted that appellants' application is in the alternative: for registration of their title
of ownership under Act 496 or for judicial confirmation of their "imperfect" title or claim based
on adverse and continuous possession for at least thirty years. It may be that although they
were not actual parties in that previous case the judgment therein is a bar to their claim as
owners under the first alternative, since the proceeding was in rem, of which they and their
predecessor had constructive notice by publication. Even so this is a defense that properly
pertains to the Government, in view of the fact that the judgment declared the land in question
to be public land. In any case, appellants' imperfect possessory title was not disturbed or
foreclosed by such declaration, for precisely the proceeding contemplated in the aforecited
provision of Commonwealth Act 141 presupposes that the land is public. The basis of the decree
of judicial confirmation authorized therein is not that the land is already privately owned and
hence no longer part of the public domain, but rather that by reason of the claimant's
possession for thirty years he is conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant.
On the question of whether or not the private oppositors-appellees have the necessary
personality to file an opposition, we find in their favor, considering that they also claim to be in
possession of the land, and have furthermore applied for its purchase from the Bureau of
Lands.1äwphï1.ñët
Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside and the case is remanded to the Court a quo for
trial and judgment on the merits, with costs against the private oppositors-appellees.
Reyes, J.B.L., Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., took no part.