Criminal Law: Summary and Facts

Fall
08
27
August
Criminal Law
Summary and Facts
JD-1A
University of Cordillera
1. A
2. PEOPLE v SANCHEZ, 313, SCRA 254
(no full text available at the internet)
Facts:
State witness Vivencio Malabanan, team leader of the group of policemen went to Bishop Compound
in Calauan, Laguna, as part of security force of Mayor Antonio Sanchez. After a while, accused Ding
Repadillas arrived and asked for Mayor Sanchez. Peradillas informed Mayor Sanchez that there
would be a birthday party that night at Dr. VirvilioVelecina‘s house in Lanot, Calauan, Laguna near the
house of Peradillas. Peradillas assured the Mayor that Nelson Penalosa will be present. Penalosa is
a political leader of Dr. Velecina who is the political opponent of Mayor Sanchez for the mayoralty
seat of Calauan, Laguna. Mayor Sanchez then replied “Bahalana kayo mgaanak,
ayusinnaangninyoangtrabaho”,and then left the premises.Peradillas immediately called Corcolon and
Aveion and relayed the message – “―ayosnaangpag-uusap at humanapnalangngsasakyan”. All the
accused including Malabanan, understood is as an order to kill Nelson Penalosa. At around 7 in the
evening, Malabanan and the three accused boarded the car and went to MarporiPoulty farm in
BarngayLanoot near Dr. Velecina‘s house. Peradillas informed the occupants of the car that Nelson
Penalosa jeep was leaving the Velecina compound. Accused Averian immediately drove the car to the
front of Peradilla‘s house and the latter hooped in the car‘s back seat. As the car overtook the jeep,
Peradillas and Corcolon fired at Penalosa‘s jeep using M-16 and baby armalites, executed in
automatic firing mode. There were 3 burst of gunfire, based on the sketch prepared by Malabanan,
illustrating the relative position of the car and Nelson‘s jeep. RicksonPenalosa, son of Nelson
Penalosa, fell from the jeep; however, the jeep continued running in a zigzag position until it
overturned in front of Irais farm. After the shooting, the accused proceeded to the house of Mayor
Sanchez in Bai, Laguna and reported to him that Penalosa was already dead. Together with his
superior, SPO4 Lanorio and photographer Romeo Alcantara, policeman Daniel Escares went to the
crime scene, saw the body of Nelson Penalosa slumped at the driver seat of the owner type jeep.
Course Outline in Criminal 1 Page 57
Crime committed:
Complex crime of double murder
Contention of the State:
Malabanan positively identified the accused as perpetrators. He testified in categorical,

straightforward and spontaneous and frank manner. The apparent inconsistencies do not affect
witness Malabanan‘s credibility. Jurisprudence reaches that delay in revealing the identity of the
perpetrators of a crime does not necessarily impair the credibility of the witness, especially where
there is a sufficient explanation for it. It was natural for Malabanan to keep silent during the time
because he was a co-conspirator and Sanchez, being a mayor, is a powerful man. Alibi and denial
are worthless in the face of positive testimony of the witness showing the involvement of each
accused.
Contention of theAccused:
Sanchez and Averion appealed that the inconsistencies between Malabanan‘s testimony and the
autopsy results seriously affect his credibility as witness. Malabanan has sufficient motive to implicate
Sanchez and Corcolon in the killings due to the threats of Sanchez. Malabanan‘s delay in reporting
and involvement of the accused in the crime casts doubts on his credibility.
Ruling of the Supreme Court:
Decision modified. Sanchez and Averion found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of double murder and
sentenced to 2 penalties of reclusion perpetual and to indemnify the heirs of the victim. In conspiracy,
it is not necessary to show that all conspirators actually hit and killed the victim. What is important is
that the participants. Presence of a person at the scene of the crime does not make him co-
conspirators
Article 48, RPC
Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
3. People v. Hernandez
GR No. L-6025,
May 30, 1964
Facts:
The Accused had chosen the City of Manila as nerve center of their rebellious activities of all
their rebellious activities in the different parts of the Philippines. Herein accused has held Congress
Labor Organization which aligned their activities with the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan, a group
actively rising against the government. Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan, formerly known as
Hukbalahaps, supported, helped, promoted and maintained, directed or commanded the HMB to take
arms against the RP, or otherwise participate in the public uprising for the purpose of removing the
territory of the Philippines from the allegiance to the government and law thereof. They have risen
publicly and thereby making armed raids, sorties, and ambushes, attacks against the PNP,
constabulary, and army detachments as well as innocent civilians necessary for the furtherance
thereof have then and there committed acts of murder, pillage, looting, plunder, arson, and planned
destruction of private and public property to create and spread chaos, disorder, terror, and fear so as
to facilitate the accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose.
Contention of State:
The said accused and their other co-conspirators, as high-ranking officers and members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines, now in an armed rebellion against the Government of the
Philippines through an act therefore committed and planned to be further committed in Manila and
other places. The Solicitor General discloses that defendant-appellant Amado V. Hernandez, as a
Communist, was an active advocate of the principles of Communism, frequently exhorting his hearers
to follow the footsteps of Taruc and join the uprising of the laboring classes against capitalism and
more specifically against America and the Quirino administration. Thus, the accused is guilty of the
crime of rebellion with multiple arsons, murder, and robberies.
Contention of Accused:
That Hernandez refused to go underground is a fact which is further corroborated by the
following reasons (excuses) given by him for not going underground, namely (1) that his term of
councilor of the City of Manila was to extend to December, 1951; and (2) that he was elected
President of the CLO for a term which was to end the year 1951. He is merely the leader of CLO, and
an advocate of communism who posted propagandas in the local paper in support of the ideals of
CPP.
The advocacy of Communism or Communistic theory and principle is not to be considered as a
criminal act of conspiracy unless transformed or converted into an advocacy of action. In the very
nature of things, mere advocacy of a theory or principle is insufficient unless the communist
advocates action, immediate and positive, the actual agreement to start an uprising or rebellion or an
agreement forged to use force and violence in an uprising of the working class to overthrow
constituted authority and seize the reins of Government itself. A mere holding in the supremacy of the
proletariat does not advocate the seizing of reins of the government. As a theorist the Communist is
not yet actually considered as engaging in the criminal field subject to punishment. Only when the
Communist advocates action and actual uprising, war or otherwise, does he become guilty of
conspiracy to commit rebellion. What must be met, then, is the argument that membership, even
when accompanied by the elements of knowledge and specific intent, affords an insufficient quantum
of participation in the organization's alleged criminal activity, that is, an insufficiently significant form of
aid and encouragement to permit the imposition of criminal sanctions on that basis. It must indeed be
recognized that a person who merely becomes a member of an illegal organization, by that "act"
alone need be doing nothing more than signifying his assent to its purposes and activities on one
hand, and providing, on the other, only the sort of moral encouragement which comes from the
knowledge that others believe in what the organization is doing. The most important activity of
appellant Hernandez appears to be the propagation of improvement of conditions of labor through his
organization, the CLO.
While the CLO of which he is the founder and active president, has communistic tendencies,
its activity refers to the strengthening of the unity and cooperation between labor elements and
preparing them for struggle; they are not yet indoctrinated in the need of an actual war with or against
Capitalism. The appellant was a politician and a labor leader and it is not unreasonable to suspect
that his labor activities especially in connection with the CLO and other trade unions, were impelled
and fostered by the desire to secure the labor vote to support his political ambitions. It is doubtful
whether his desire to foster the labor union of which he was the head was impelled by an actual
desire to advance the cause of Communism, not merely to advance his political aspirations. The
mere fact that Hernandez delivered a speech of propaganda in favor of Communism and in favor of
rebellion does not make him guilty of conspiracy because there was no evidence that the hearers of
his speech then and there agreed to commit a felony.
4. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SANTOS DUCAY and EDGARDO
DUCAY, accused. SANTOS DUCAY, accused-appellant.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1993/aug1993/gr_86939_1993.html
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Facts:
Santos Ducay and Edgardo Ducay, father and son, were charged with the complex crime of double
murder and multiple frustrated murder in an Information 1 filed on 16 October 1986 with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, allegedly committed as follows:
that on or about the 12th day of October, 1986, in the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent
to kill Pacita Labos, Manuel Labos, Lina Labos-Mojica, Edwin Labos and Ma. Cristina Labos,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and treachery,
attack, assault and shoot with a .45 caliber [pistol] and shotgun they were then provided the said
Pacita Labos, Manuel Labos; Lina Labos-Mojica, Edwin Labos and Maria Cristina Labos, hitting them
on their body, thereby causing them serious physical injuries which directly caused the death of
Pacita Labos and Manuel Labos; thereby, also, with respect to Lina Labos-Mojica, Edwin Labos and
Maria Cristina Labos, performing all the acts of execution which ordinarily would have produced the
crime of murder but which nevertheless did not produce it by reason of a cause independent of their
will, that is, the timely and able medical attendance rendered to said Lina Labos-Mojica, Edwin Labos
and Maria Cristina Labos which prevented their death.
From the evidence thus adduced the Court is convinced beyond reasonable doubt that it was Santos
Ducay who was one of the persons who conspired with another in killing the victims, Manuel Labos,
Pacita Labos, and in trying to kill Lina Labos, Maria Cristina Labos and Edwin Labos, but was
frustrated, The evidence of evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and treachery, were
clearly shown by the prosecution when it proved convincingly to the Court that considering the time of
the attack, 5:00 at dawn, evident premeditation is clear especially if the testimony of Edwin Labos will
be considered that months previous to this attack, Santos Ducay had a quarrel with one of the victims
shot to death. There was abuse of superior strength and treachery because the victims were asleep
at the time of the attack and were therefore unprepared and unarmed for the attack. They had no
chance whatsoever to fight back, the six months baby Ma. Cristina Labos especially.
Contention of Accused:
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING AS "POSITIVE" PROSECUTION WITNESSES EDWIN

LABOS AND LINA LABOS' IDENTIFICATION OF ACCUSED; HENCE, IT ERRED WHEN IT
REJECTED ACCUSED'S DEFENSE OF ALIBI.
2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING ACCUSED'S PARTIAL MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION AND/OR NEW TRIAL FOR THE ADMISSION OF THE PARAFFIN
EXAMINATION ON ACCUSED A DAY AFTER THE INCIDENT FINDING HIM NEGATIVE OF POWER
(sic) BURNS.
3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED.
Held:
One of the grounds for a new trial mentioned in Section 2, Rules of Court is the discovery of new and
material evidence. The requisites therefor which must concur are: (1) that the evidence was
discovered after the trial; (2) that such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the
trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and (3) that such evidence is material, not merely
cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if admitted, it will probably
change the judgment. In the present case, the appellant was subjected to a paraffin test the day after
the crime was committed. Certainly, he knew that the findings of such test would be forthcoming. He
should have asked for the result of the test to find out if it is exculpatory, in which case he could have
presented it during the hearing of his application for bail or, at the latest, during the trial on the merits.
In any event, the chemistry report cannot be considered as newly discovered evidence since it was
already existing even before the trial commenced and could have been easily produced in court by
compulsory process. The appellant either did not exercise reasonable diligence for its production or
simply forgot about it. Forgotten evidence is, of course, not a ground for a new trial. Moreover, the
result of the paraffin test conducted on the appellant is not conclusive evidence that he did not fire a
gun. It is possible for a person to fire a gun and yet be negative for the presence of nitrates, as when
he wore gloves or washed his hands afterwards. The trial court, therefore, correctly denied the
motion for new trial.
ACCORDINGLY, the challenged judgment of Branch 172 of the Regional Trial court of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila in Criminal Case No. 7792-V-6 is AFFIRMED subject to the modifications herein
indicated. As modified, appellant Santos Ducay is convicted of (a) two crimes of murder for the death
of Pacita Labos and Manuel Labos and is accordingly sentenced to reclusion perpetua for each
death, with the indemnity in each crime increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 in conformance
with the current policy of this Court; and (b) three crimes of frustrated murder committed on Lina
Labos, Ma. Cristina Labos and Edwin Labos, and is hereby sentenced in each crime to an
indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium as minimum to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium as maximum.
5. Padilla v. Dizon
158 SCRA 127
Liablity Under Special Laws. Article 10 RPC. Offenses not subject to RPC
 Complainant Padilla addresses complaint against Respondent Dizon for gross negligence,
gross ignorance, and serious misconduct upon the latter's acquittal of Lo Chi Fai charged:
smuggling of foreign currency out of the country, he was found carrying with him foreign
currency and foreign exchange instruments (380 pieces) amounting to US$ 355,349.57
 Accused: A judge cannot be held to account or answer, criminally, civilly or administratively, for
an erroneous decision rendered by him in good faith.
 Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of gross incompetence or gross ignorance
of the law in rendering the decision in question
 The respondent-judge has shown gross incompetence or gross ignorance of the law in holding
that to convict the accused for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960, the prosecution must
establish that the accused had the criminal intent to violate the law. The respondent ought to
know that proof of malice or deliberate intent (mens rea) is not essential in offenses punished
by special laws, which are mala prohibita. In requiring proof of malice, the respondent has by
his gross ignorance allowed the accused to go scot free.
 Ruling: the Court finds the respondent Regional Trial Court Judge, Baltazar R. Dizon, guilty of
gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law and grave and serious misconduct affecting
his integrity and efficiency, and consistent with the responsibility of this Court for the just and
proper administration of justice and for the attainment of the objective of maintaining the
people's faith in the judiciary. It is hereby ordered that the Respondent Judge be DISMISSED
from the service. All leave and retirement benefits and privileges to which he may be entitled
are hereby forfeited with prejudice to his being reinstated in any branch of government service,
including government-owned and/or controlled agencies or corporations.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1988/feb1988/am_3086_1988.html
Additional Notes by Supreme Court in proving the decision in Judge Dizon’s case
 In the first place, in cases of special laws, such as that governing foreign currencies, intent is
not needed or even material to the determination of guilt in the case The mere act alone,
whether it was dolo or culpa, suffices for charge and consequently, conviction of the crime.
 Second, the denominations and the amount total that was caught upon the accused Lo Chi Fai
was inconsistent with the declaration which the accused testified to. Respondent-Judge failed
to acknowledge this fact, and closed his eyes to the fact that the very substantial amounts of
foreign exchange found in the possession of the accused at the time of his apprehension
consisted of personal checks of other people, as well as cash in various currency
denominations (12 kinds of currency in all), which clearly belied the claim of the accused that
they were part of the funds which he and his supposed associates had brought in and kept in
the Philippines for the purpose of investing in some business ventures.
The respondent ignored the fact that most of the CB Currency declarations presented by the
defense at the trial were declarations belonging to other people which could not be utilized by
the accused to justify his having the foreign exchange in his possession.
Respondent-judge chose to believe on the fantastical tale of the accused rather than consult
the evidence presented. These and other circumstances which make the story concocted by
the accused so palpably unbelievable as to render the findings of the respondent judge
obviously contrived to favor the acquittal of the accused, thereby clearly negating his claim that
he rendered the decision "in good faith." His actuations in this case amount to grave
misconduct prejudicial to the interest of sound and fair administration of justice.
 Third, Respondent-Judge not only acquitted the accused but also directed in his decision to
release to the accused at least $3,000.00 in spite of the forfeiture proceedings already
instituted by the Bureau of Customs. In invoking the provisions of CB Circular No. 960 to justify
the release of US$ 3,000.00 to the accused, the respondent judge again displayed gross
incompetence and gross ignorance of the law. There is nothing in the said CB Circular which
could be taken as authority for the trial court to release the said amount of U.S. Currency to the
accused.
6. PADILLA vs. CA
(269 SCRA 402)
FACTS: Robin Padilla was charged on December 3, 1992, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Angeles City with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions under P.D. 1866. Petitioner was
convicted of the crime charged and sentenced him to an "indeterminate penalty from 17 years, 4
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 21 years of reclusion perpetua, as
maximum.”
CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER:
Petitioner faults respondent court "in applying P.D. 1866 in a democratic ambience (sic) and a non-
subversive context" and adds that respondent court should have applied instead the previous laws on
illegal possession of firearms since the reason for the penalty imposed under P.D. 1866 no longer
exists. He stresses that the penalty of 17 years and 4 months to 21 years for simple illegal
possession of firearm is cruel and excessive in contravention of the Constitution. He then alleges that
the penalty was unconstitutional.
CONTENTION OF THE STATE:
With respect to the penalty imposed by the trial court as affirmed by respondent court (17 years 4
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 21 years of reclusion perpetua, as
maximum), we reduce the same in line with the fairly recent case of People v. Lian where the Court
en banc provided that the indeterminate penalty imposable for simple illegal possession of firearm,
without any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, should be within the range of ten (10) years and
one (1) day to twelve years (12) of prision mayor, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day to twenty (20) of reclusion temporal, as maximum. This is discernible from
the following explanation by the Court:
"In the case at bar, no mitigating or aggravating circumstances have been alleged or proved, In
accordance with the doctrine regarding special laws explained in People v. Simon, although
Presidential Decree No. 1866 is a special law, the penalties therein were taken from the Revised
Penal Code, hence the rules in said Code for graduating by degrees or determining the proper period
should be applied. Consequently, the penalty for the offense of simple illegal possession of firearm is
the medium period of the complex penalty in said Section 1, that is, 18 years, 8 months and 1 day to
20 years.
"This penalty, being that which is to be actually imposed in accordance with the rules therefor and not
merely imposable as a general prescription under the law, shall be the maximum of the range of the
indeterminate sentence. The minimum thereof shall be taken, as aforesaid, from any period of the
penalty next lower in degree, which is, prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in
its medium period.
HELD:
The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The trial court and the respondent court are
bound to apply the governing law at the time of appellant's commission of the offense for it is a rule
that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones. Indeed, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect
and apply the law as it stands. And until its repeal, respondent court cannot be faulted for applying
P.D. 1866 which abrogated the previous statutes adverted to by petitioner.
The penalty for simple possession of firearm, it should be stressed, ranges from reclusion temporal
maximum to reclusion perpetua contrary to appellant's erroneous averment. The severity of a penalty
does not ipso facto make the same cruel and excessive.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The burden of proving the invalidity of
the statute in question lies with the appellant which burden, we note, was not convincingly
discharged. To justify nullification of the law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication, as in this case. In fact, the constitutionality
of P.D. 1866 has been upheld twice by this Court. Appellant's grievance on the wisdom of the
prescribed penalty should not be addressed to us. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom,
efficacy or morality of laws. That question falls exclusively within the province of Congress which
enacts them and the Chief Executive who approves or vetoes them.
The decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining petitioner's conviction by the lower court of the crime
of simple illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions is AFFIRMED EXCEPT that petitioner's
indeterminate penalty is MODIFIED to ten (10) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to eighteen (18)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as maximum.
7. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARTIN SIMON y SUNGA
234 SCRA 555
July 29, 1994
Facts:
Martin Simon y Sunga was charged on November 10, 1988 with a violation of Section 4, Article II of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, under an
indictment alleging that on or about October 22, 1988, an information in the police unit at Camp
Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, of the illegal drug activities of a certain "Alyas Pusa" at Sto. Cristo,
Guagua, Pampanga. Capt. Francisco Bustamante, Commanding Officer of the 3rd Narcotics
Regional Unit in the camp, then formed a buy-bust team and the accused sold four tea bags of
marijuana to a Narcotics Command (NARCOM) poseur-buyer in consideration of the sum of P40.00,
which tea bags, when subjected to laboratory examination, were found positive for marijuana.
Eventually arraigned with the assistance of counsel, after his rearrest following his escape from Camp
Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga where he was temporarily detained, he pleaded not guilty. He
voluntarily waived his right to a pre-trial conference, after which trial on the merits ensued and was
duly concluded. Dr. Pedro S. Calara, a medical officer at Camp Olivas, examined appellant at 5:30
p.m. of the day after the latter's apprehension, and the results were practically normal except for his
relatively high blood pressure. The doctor also did not find any trace of physical injury on the person
of appellant.
The trial court rendered judgment convicting appellant for a violation of Section 4, Article II of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, to
pay a fine of twenty thousand pesos and to pay the costs. The four tea bags of marijuana dried
leaves were likewise ordered confiscated in favor of the Government.
Contention of the Petitioner:
The accused said that it was a frame up and evidence was inadmissible. Appellant tendered an
antipodal version of the attendant facts, claiming that on the day in question, at around 4:30 p.m., he
was watching television with the members of his family in their house when three persons, whom he
had never met before suddenly arrived. Relying on the assurance that they would just inquire about
something from him at their detachment, appellant boarded a jeep with them. He was told that they
were going to Camp Olivas, but he later noticed that they were taking a different route. While on
board, he was told that he was a pusher so he attempted to alight from the jeep but he was
handcuffed instead. When they finally reached the camp, he was ordered to sign some papers and,
when he refused, he was boxed in the stomach eight or nine times by Sgt. Pejoro. He was then
compelled to affix his signature and fingerprints on the documents presented to him. He denied
knowledge of the P20.00 or the dried marijuana leaves, and insisted that the twenty-peso bill came
from the pocket of Pejoro. Moreover, the reason why he vomited blood was because of the blows he
suffered at the hands of Pejoro. He admitted having escaped from the NARCOM office but claimed
that he did so since he could no longer endure the maltreatment to which he was being subjected.
Appellant now prays the Court to reverse the aforementioned judgment of the lower court, contending
in his assignment of errors that the latter erred in (1) not upholding his defense of "frame-up", (2) not
declaring Exhibit "G" (Receipt of Property Seized/Confiscated) inadmissible in evidence, and (3)
convicting him of a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Held:
After an assiduous review and calibration of the evidence adduced by both parties, we are morally
certain that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto engaging in the illegal sale of prohibited drugs.
The prosecution was able to prove beyond a scintilla of doubt that appellant, on October 22, 1988, did
sell two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez. The latter himself creditably testified as to
how the sale took place and his testimony was amply corroborated by his teammates. The
commission of the offense of illegal sale of prohibited drugs requires merely the consummation of the
selling transaction37 which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller. 38 In the
present case, and in light of the preceding discussion, this sale has been ascertained beyond any
peradventure of doubt.
There was an overlapping error in the provisions on the penalty of reclusion perpetua by reason of its
dual imposition, that is, as the maximum of the penalty where the marijuana is less than 750 grams,
and also as the minimum of the penalty where the marijuana involved is 750 grams or more. The
same error has been committed with respect to the other prohibited and regulated drugs provided in
said Section 20. To harmonize such conflicting provisions in order to give effect to the whole law, we
hereby hold that the penalty to be imposed where the quantity of the drugs involved is less than the
quantities stated in the first paragraph shall range from prision correccional to reclusion temporal, and
not reclusion perpetua. This is also concordant with the fundamental rule in criminal law that all
doubts should be construed in a manner favorable to the accused. Republic Act No. 6425, as now
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, has unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under the Revised Penal
Code in their technical terms, hence with their technical signification and effects. In fact, for purposes
of determining the maximum of said sentence, we have applied the provisions of the amended
Section 20 of said law to arrive at prision correccional and Article 64 of the Code to impose the same
in the medium period. Such offense, although provided for in a special law, is now in effect punished
by and under the Revised Penal Code. Correlatively, to determine the minimum, we must apply the
first part of the aforesaid Section 1 which directs that "in imposing a prison sentence for an offense
punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of said Code, and the minimum which shall
be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense.
Adjudication:
The judgment of conviction rendered by the court a quo against accused-appellant Martin Simon y
Sunga is AFFIRMED, but with the MODIFICATION that he should be, as he hereby is, sentenced to
serve an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to six (6) years
of prision correccional, as the maximum thereof.
8. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MAMERTO NARVAEZ, defendant-

appellant
Crime: Murder
The defendant-appellant is guilty of murder for killing Davis Fleischer, who ordered the
chiseling of the former’s house, and Flaviano Rubia, who ran to Fleischer’s jeep knowing there is a
gun in it, when Fleischer fell down.
Contention of the Accused:
The lower court erred in convicting defendant-appellant despite the fact that he acted in
defense of his person and rights. He must therefore be exempt from criminal liability.
Under Art. 11, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, defense of one’s person or rights is treated as
a justifying circumstance when there is 1) unlawful aggression, 2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it and 3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.
It was held that there was aggression in the form of deceased Fleischer’s angry utterance in
ordering the continuation of the chiseling of the defendant-appellant’s house; that it would have
resulted in the further chiseling of the walls of the appellant’s house as well as the closure of
the access to and from his house and rice-mill which were not only imminent but were actually in
progress. This was indeed aggression, not on the person of the appellant, but on his property
rights. The deceased had no right to destroy or cause damage to appellant’s house, nor to close his
accessibility to the highway while he was pleading with them to stop and talk things over with him.
The assault on appellant’s property, therefore, amounts to unlawful aggression as
contemplated by law. Illegal aggression is equivalent to assault or at least threatened assault of
immediate and imminent kind. There was an actual physical invasion of appellant’s property which
he had the right to resist, pursuant to Art. 429 of the Civil Code of the Philippines: “…he may use such
force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical
invasion or usurpation of his property.” Furthermore, there was no provocation on the part of
appellant who was defending his property since he was asleep at first and was only awakened
by the noise produced by the victims and their laborers. However, appellant’s act in killing the
deceased was not justifiable, since not all the elements for justification are present. He is held
responsible for the death of his victims, but he could be credited with the special mitigating
circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to paragraph 6, Article 13 of the Revised Penal
Code. Furthermore, treachery and premeditation were ruled out as there was provocation on the side
of the deceased and no evidence of the planning or preparation to kill the victim. The defendant-
appellant was found guilty for two counts of homicide but with the mitigating circumstance of self-
defense and of voluntary surrender, with no aggravating circumstance, he was sentenced to just four
months of arresto mayor, to indemnify each group of heirs of Fleischer and Rubia in the sum of four
thousand pesos without subsidiary imprisonment considering the appellant has already been under
detention for almost fourteen years.
9. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SERGIO A. CARATAO, appellant.
[G.R. No. 126281. June 10, 2003]
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jun2003/126281.htm
FACTS:
 Sergio A. Caratao was accused of the crime of murder under Art. 248, Revised Penal Code.
Republic Act No. 7659 defining heinous crimes was not yet passed and effective at the time of
the commission of the crime. Accused Sergio A. Caratao is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties provided for in Art. 41, Revised Penal
Code. Further, the knife used in the commission of the crime is declared confiscated and
forfeited in favor of the government. Furthermore, he is ordered to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Edgardo Tado Bulawin.
 Upon his arraignment on August 11, 1992, appellant, assisted by his counsel, entered a plea of
not guilty. Trial thereafter ensued and the court a quo rendered the assailed decision.
CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED:
 Sergio Caratao admitted stabbing the victim, but interposed self-defense to exculpate himself.
For accordingly, the appellant was punched by the victim several times which started on an issue
where the victim refused to give appellant his rice. After the stabbing incident, appellant voluntarily
surrendered himself to the municipal hall.
The prosecution eyewitness who testified that the victim never boxed appellant, nor did he try to run
over the latter with his motorcycle prior to the stabbing, contrary to appellants claim.
RTC:
The trial court gave credence to the prosecutions version of the incident. It found that the victims
indifference to appellants repeated pleas for rice must have angered appellant to the point of
attacking the victim upon seeing the latter about to leave without heeding his request. It rejected the
plea of self-defense for appellants failure to prove unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. It
upheld the presence of treachery, but ruled out the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and cruelty, for lack of evidence.
THE APPELLANT APPEALED TO THIS COURT.
ISSUE:
WON the appellant acted in self-defense?
HELD:
To prove self-defense, the accused must show with clear and convincing evidence: (1) that the
victim committed unlawful aggression amounting to actual or imminent threat to the life and limb of
the person claiming self-defense; (2) that there was reasonable necessity in the means employed to
prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) that there was lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person claiming self-defense or, at least, that any provocation executed by the person
claiming self-defense was not the proximate and immediate cause of the victims aggression.
Appellant has not shown that the prosecution witnesses had any ill motive against him, which
would have moved them falsely to implicate him. On the contrary, he admitted on cross-examination
that prosecution witness Sugala is his friend. Prosecution witness Mangmang further testified that
appellant was his neighbor in their younger days, and that appellants brother is his friend. It is worth
reiterating that where there is no evidence that the principal witnesses of the prosecution were
actuated by ill motives, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit .
Finally, the question whether or not appellant acted in self-defense is essentially a question of
fact. The trial court found the testimonies of the prosecution worthy of belief. As to who between the
prosecution and the defense witnesses are to be believed, the trial courts assessment enjoys a great
amount of respect for the reason that the trial court has the advantage of observing the demeanor of
the witnesses as they testify, unless found to be clearly arbitrary or unfounded. [60] In the present case,
appellant failed to point out any arbitrariness on the part of the trial court.
Thus, we find that the court a quo was correct in upholding the testimonies of the prosecution.
The unlawful aggression was convincingly established to have emanated from appellant, and not
from the victim. Appellant having failed to discharge the burden of establishing his defense, his
conviction necessarily follows on the basis of his admission of the killing. [61]
In the absence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the crime committed is Homicide, not
Murder.[70] The penalty therefor, under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, is reclusion
temporal. Considering the attendant mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the penalty
should be imposed in its minimum period, pursuant to Article 64 (2) of the aforesaid Code. [71] Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellants sentence will consist of a minimum that is anywhere
within the full range of prision mayor, and a maximum which is anywhere within reclusion temporal in
its minimum period. We hereby fix it to be from eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum, to
thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
 the decision of the court a quo is MODIFIED. Appellant Sergio A. Caratao is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of an
indeterminate sentence of from eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum to thirteen (13)
years of reclusion temporal as maximum. Appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of the
victim the amounts of P50,000 as death indemnity, P30,000 as moral damages, P22,050 as
actual damages and P486,616 as indemnity for the victims loss of earning capacity. The
decision under review is AFFIRMED in all other respects. Cost de oficio.
10. A
11. PEOPLE vs. ESCARLOS
Facts:
Accused-Appellant: Timoteo Escarlos
Victim: Antonio Balisacan
On the night of July 1, 2000, accused Timoteo Escarlos was watching a benefit
dance. While there at,Kgd. Antonio Balisacan who was then drunk, passed in front of
accused and told him, 'You are here again to create trouble.' Escarlos was offended so
he answered back saying 'Why do you say that to me when I am not doing any trouble here.'
Antonio Balisacan told him, 'Okinnam ketdi' (vulva of your Mother) and without warning boxed him.
Timoteo was hit on the forehead. He intended to box back but he noticed that the victim was pulling
out a kitchen knife, so for fear of his life, he grabbed the weapon from Antonio Balisacan and used the
knife in stabbing the latter who was hit at the side below the left armpit. He stabbed him twice and
when the victim was about to fall down, he was able to hit him for the third time.
CRIME COMMITTED:
Murder
Appellant invokes self- defense. Escarlos asserts that it was the victim who initially approached and
assaulted him and he had no choice but to defend himself. He argues that in the heat of t h e
e n c o u n t e r, h e w a s n o t i n a p o s i t i o n t o c a l c u l a t e o r d e t e r m i n e t h e e ff e c t s o f h i s
b l o w s , a n d t h a t i t w a s nevertheless necessary for him to inflict them in order to save his own
life.
Appellant had deliberately adopted a treacherous mode of attack for the purpose of
depriving the victim of a chance to fight or retreat.
HELD:
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor without
the slightest provocation on the part of the victim, thus depriving the latter of any real chance to put
up a defense, and there by ensuring the commission of the attack without risk to the aggressor.
Treachery requires the concurrence of two conditions: (1) the employment of a means of execution
that gives the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and (2) the
deliberate and conscious adoption of the means of execution. There is no treachery when
the assault is preceded by a heated exchange of words between the accused and the
victim; or when the victim is aware of the hostility of the assailant towards the former. In the instant
case, the verbal and physical squabble prior to the attack proves that there was no treachery, and
that the victim was aware of the imminent danger to his life. Moreover, the prosecution failed to
establish that appellant had deliberately adopted a treacherous mode of attack for the
purpose of depriving the victim of a chance to fight or retreat. Certainly, the victim knew that his
scuffle with appellant could eventually turn into a violent physical clash. The existence of a struggle
before the fatal blows were inflicted on the victim clearly shows that he was forewarned of the
impending attack, and that he was afforded the opportunity to put up a defense. Indeed, a killing done
at the spur of the moment is not treacherous. Moreover, any doubt as to the existence of treachery
must be resolved in favor of the accused
12. Cano vs. People
The primordial issue to be resolved in this petition for certiorari is whether or not petitioner killed his
brother in self-defense.
The petitioner argued that he was compelled to defend himself to avoid the unlawful aggression of the
victim.
The Solicitor General argues that the petition raises merely factual issues, such as whether or not
petitioner is entitled to the justifying circumstance of self-defense and the mitigating circumstance of
provocation or threat and voluntary surrender.
Held:
For self-defense to prosper, petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence the following
elements: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself. Although all the three elements must concur, self-defense must rest firstly on proof
of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. If no unlawful aggression has been proved, no self-
defense may be successfully pleaded, whether complete or incomplete. In other words in self-
defense, unlawful aggression is a primordial element. It presupposes an actual, sudden and
unexpected attack or imminent danger on the life and limb of a person not a mere threatening or
intimidating attitude but most importantly, at the time the defensive action was taken against the
aggressor.
In the case at bar, there are several material circumstances which were ignored by both the court a
quo and the appellate tribunal.
1. Contrary to the findings of both the appellate and trial courts, there are facts extant on record
which clearly shows that it was an armed victim who initially attacked the petitioner with
a balisong.
2. The physical evidence is more in accord with petitioners version of what transpired,
specifically his assertion that it was the victim who was armed and persisted in his attack on
the petitioner even though the latter locked himself inside the dark room of his stall to protect
himself.
3. Circumstances prior to the fatal incident shows that it was the victim who purposely sought to
confront the petitioner because the latter had his business permit machine copied without his
permission.
4. The record reveals that while indeed numerous wounds were sustained by the victim, the
Medico-Legal Officer who conducted the autopsy admitted that of the thirty-five (35) wounds
supposedly inflicted, thirty-three (33) were scratches and contusionswhile only six (6) were
penetrating or stab wounds. As regards the finding that petitioner suffered only one hand
wound, it should be stressed that the superficiality of the nature of the wounds inflicted on
the accused does not, per se, negate self-defense. Indeed, to prove self-defense, the actual
wounding of the person defending himself is not necessary.It is sufficient that the aggression
be attempted so as to give rise to the right to prevent it.
The particular circumstances which confronted the petitioner at the time of the incident condoned the
means he employed to protect his life. It must be remembered that the measure of rational necessity
is to be found in the situation as it appeared to petitioner at the time when the blow was struck. The
law does not require that he should mete out his blows in such manner that upon a calm and
deliberate review of the incident it will not appear that he exceeded the precise limits of what was
absolutely necessary to put his antagonist hors de combat, or that he struck one blow more than was
absolutely necessary to save his own life; or that he failed to hold his hand so as to avoid inflicting a
fatal wound where a less severe stroke might have served the purpose. Under such conditions, an
accused cannot be expected to reflect coolly nor wait after each blow to determine the effects thereof.
5. There was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of petitioner.
6. Two other notable circumstances on record tend to show that petitioner was impelled by the
instinct of self-preservation rather than the murderous urge of one bent on killing. The first is
when petitioner was able to wrest the balisong from the victim, he never took advantage of
the opportunity to attack his already weaponless brother. Rather, he stood still and was
forced to act only when the victim picked up the scissors and lunged at him again. The
second instance is when the victim fell. Had petitioner been actuated by homicidal intentions,
he would have persisted in his attack on his prostrate brother. He did nothing of the sort. He,
in fact, intended to lift the victim up and bring him to the hospital but the sudden appearance
of the victims wife who hit him with a chair forced him to flee.Moreover, armed people were
attracted by the shouts of the victims wife and had gathered and started pursuing him.
7. In the case at bar, there are several material circumstances which were ignored by both the
court a quo and the appellate tribunal.
All told, evidence shows that petitioner acted in lawful self-defense. Hence, his act of killing the
victim was attended by a justifying circumstance, for which no criminal and civil liability can
attach. Article 11 (1) of the Revised Penal Code expressly provides that anyone who acts in lawful
self-defense does not incur any criminal liability. Likewise, petitioner is not civilly liable for his lawful
act.The only instance when a person who commits a crime with the attendance of a justifying
circumstance incurs civil liability is when he, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does an act which
causes damage to another, pursuant to subdivision 4 of Article 11 of the Revised Penal
Code. Otherwise stated, if a person charged with homicide successfully pleads self-defense, his
acquittal by reason thereof will extinguish his civil liability.
Petitioner Conrado Cano y Sampang is ACQUITTED of the crime charged against him and his
immediate release from custody is ordered unless there is another cause for his continued
detention.
13. Santos vs CA
Topic: Elements of self defense
Crime Committed:
Two counts of frustrated homicide
Characterized the petitioners claim of self-defense as unsubstantiated by evidence
Contention of the Accused :
(a) in not acquitting him of the crime charged on his plea of complete self-defense;
(b) in not appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstances of incomplete self-defense and
voluntary surrender
Ruling of the Supreme Court
Like alibi, self-defense is inherently a weak defense which, as experience has demonstrated, can
easily be fabricated.[18] To merit approbation, the accused is burdened to prove with clear and
convincing evidence the confluence of the following essential requisites for self-defense: (a) there
was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) that the means employed to prove or repel such
aggression was reasonable; and (c) there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.[19] Unlawful aggression contemplates an actual, sudden and unexpected attack
on the life and limb of a person or an imminent anger thereof; and not merely a threatening or
intimidating attitude.[20] There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, where there is no
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.[21]
The accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the
prosecution for even if the evidence of the prosecution were weak, the same can no longer be
disbelieved after the accused has admitted killing or injuring the victim.
Considering the location of the wound sustained by De Borja, his back was clearly against the
petitioner when the latter hacked him.
The petitioners insistence that he did not intend to kill any of the two victims because even after the
latter had been hacked and had fallen to the ground, the petitioner and his brother Pedro Santos, Jr.
left the scene, does not hold water. In People v. Delim,[30] this Court held that evidence of intent to
kill may consist inter alia in the use of weapons by the malefactors, the nature, location and number
of wounds sustained by the victim and the words uttered by the malefactors before, at the time of, or
immediately after the killing of the victim. In this case, the petitioner used a bolo and inflicted mortal
wounds on the victims, which could have caused their deaths were it not for timely medical
intervention. Hernandez sustained a complete open fracture on the right ulnar bone which, according
to the orthopedic surgeon who attended to him, would have been fatal were it not for the timely
medical treatment. The hack wound on Hernandez located on the temporo-parietal region of his head
could have caused his death were it not for timely medical treatment. The wound inflicted on De Borja
penetrated his right hemidiaphragm as well as the right lobe of his liver. The presence of these
wounds, their location and their seriousness would not only negate self-defense; they likewise
indicate a determined effort to kill.[31] The petitioner even told his brother Pedro, Jr. after hacking
Hernandez and De Borja: Utol, Jr. alis na tayo, patay na ang mga iyan.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/nov2003/126624.htm
14. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JESUS G. RETUBADO
[G.R. No. 124058. December 10, 2003]
Facts:
On November 5, 1993, around 9:30 in the evenings, at Barangay I Poblacion, Municipality of

Tuburan, Province of Cebu, Philippines, assault and shot Emmanuel Caon with the use of unlicensed
revolver of unknown caliber, thereby hitting the latter on his forehead that resulted to the victim’s
instant death.
CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED :

Before November 5, 1993, someone played a joke on Edwin Retubado, the appellants younger
brother who was mentally ill. Someone inserted a lighted firecracker in a cigarette pack and gave it to
Edwin. He brought the cigarette home and placed it on the dining table. As he was having dinner with
his father, the firecracker exploded. he suspect was Emmanuel Caon, Jr. The matter was brought to
the attention of the barangay captain who conducted an investigation. It turned out that Emmanuel
Caon, Jr. was not the culprit. The barangay captain considered the matter closed. The appellant,
however, was bent on confronting Emmanuel Caon, Jr.
Around 9 pm of the same day, 50-year-old Emmanuel Caon, Sr., a pedicab driver called it a day
and decided to go home after a day work. He drove his pedicab and stopped at the junction of Rizal
and Gallardo Streets, at the Poblacion of Tuburan. The appellant, who was conversing with Marcial
Lucio saw him and asked why his son did it to his brother. The appellant ran after Emmanuel. He
overtook Emmanuel, grabbed and pushed the pedicab which nearly fell into a canal. Emmanuel again
ignored the appellant and pedaled on until he reached his house. His wife, Norberta Caon was in the
balcony of their house, above the porch waiting for him to arrive.Emmanuel, Jr., meanwhile, was
already asleep. Undeterred, the appellant continued following Emmanuel.
Shortly after Emmanuel had entered his house, the appellant arrived and tarried at the porch.
Emmanuel suddenly opened the door and demanded to know why he was being followed.The
appellant told Emmanuel that he just wanted to talk to Emmanuel, Jr., but Emmanuel told the
appellant that his son was already asleep. Norberta went down from the balcony and placed her hand
on her husbands’ shoulder to pacify him.
The appellant forthwith pulled out a handgun from under his T-shirt and shot Emmanuel on the
forehead. The latter fell to the floor as the appellant walked away from the scene.Norberta shouted for
help. The neighbors, her daughter, and her son-in-law arrived. They brought Emmanuel to
the Tuburan District Hospital, but the victim died shortly.

He was then convicted of murder, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and directing him to
indemnify the heirs of the victim Emmanuel Caon the sum of P50,000.00.
Held: the trial court convicted the appellant of murder sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. The
Court finds accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder under Art. 248 R.P.C.
and sentenced him to the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
the sum of P50, 000.00. However, accused is given full credit of his preventive imprisonment
15. REYNALDO CRISTE UNIDAD, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 129201. March 11, 2003
The accused is found guilty for the crime of homicide as charged in the Information defined and
penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner was, at the time material to this
case, the Chief Operations Officer of the Western Police District of the Philippine National Police.
The accused was with intent to kill willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use
personal violence upon the person of IRENEO DELA CRUZ Y VARGAS by then and there shooting
the latter hitting him on the left portion of his chest thereby inflicting upon him mortal gunshot wound
which was the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
The petitioner claimed that it was a self-defense. The defense presented their witnesses. One of the
witnesses, Eduardo Herrera, stated that he was then two arms-length away from Ireneo when he fired
his gun and that the victim and the accused were then facing each other. Another witness, Norma
Payawal, stated that Ireneo was drunk during the encounter and was creating trouble. Then, the
accused came and tried to talk with the victim. Ireneo poked his gun towards the accused then fired a
shot. The neighbor also testified that he saw the victim drinking with his friends at the store of Norma
Payawal. The Barangay Captain stated that he saw the victim before the encounter carrying a gun.
Unidad also serve as a witness to himself. He stated that after the second shot, which was directed at
him, thinking that he was hit and that his life was in actual danger, petitioner, who is left-handed, fired
his gun from the level of his waist by bending his body at the left side, making a hurried hip shot.
RESOLUTION OF THE SUPREME COURT:
The court modified the decision of the Court of Appeals, so as to reduce the penalty. The court cannot
sustain an incomplete self-defense in petitioners favor, there being no clear and convincing showing
that the victim was attacking him when he shot and killed him. However, petitioner voluntarily
surrendered. The trajectory and direction of the gun shots didn’t coincide with the accused’s
statement. Basing on the autopsy report, the inescapable conclusion is that the victim must have
been in a kneeling or sitting position in front of the accused with the accused standing over him when
the accused shot the victim, which contradicts to the statements of the defenses witnesses.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/mar2003/129201.htm
16. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. DANILO DELIMA (Acquitted) and OSCAR
AREO, accused.
FACTS:
This is an appeal from the Decisiondated October 13, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court of
Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 29, in Criminal Case No. 4426, finding herein appellant, Oscar Areo,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder for killing Roberto Pilapil.
The record shows that, on September 3, 1997, Provincial Prosecutor Juan C. Latorre, Jr. filed in
the Regional Trial Court of Samar an Informationcharging Oscar Areo and his co-accused, Danilo
Delima, with murder, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 8 th day of August, 1997, at nighttime which was purposely sought, at
Barangay Bachao, Municipality of Daram, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually
helping and aiding one another, with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation,
and with abuse of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, hold and hack one Roberto Pilapil with the use of a bolo (sundang) with which the said
accused had conveniently provided themselves for the purpose, thereby hitting and inflicting upon
said Roberto Pilapil multiple hacking wounds in the different parts of his body, which wounds directly
caused the death of Roberto Pilapil.
Crime committed:
MURDER

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME OF
MURDER BASED ON THE VERY INCREDIBLE TESTIMONIES OF THE ALLEGED
PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT BELIEVING THE TESTIMONY OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT AS CORROBORATED BY HIS WITNESSES.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT APPRECIATING THE EVIDENCES ADDUCED BY
THE ACCUSED DURING THE TRIAL IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLANT THAT THE
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE ATTENDED IN THE COMMISSION OF
THE ACT COMPLAINED OF.

To escape criminal liability, appellant invokes the justifying circumstance of self-defense. He
admits hacking Roberto but vigorously insists that he did so to defend himself and his family.
Appellant further contends that it was Roberto who started the aggression by acting in a manner
that was threatening and dangerous to him and his family. When appellant saw that Roberto was
already opening the door of their kitchen and sensing that Roberto had a bolo, Oscar took the
bamboo pole from the window and struck Robertos hand holding the bolo. When the bolo fell, Oscar
picked it up and, afraid that Roberto was still going to attack him, he hacked Roberto several times.
Oscars declaration was corroborated by his wife who was present at the scene of the crime.
Despite this corroboration, however, we are not convinced by appellants theory of self-defense.
Jurisprudence holds that, when the accused admits committing the crime but invokes self-
defense to escape criminal liability, the burden of proof shifts to him. It necessarily follows that he
must now rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the
prosecution, for even if the latters evidence is weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the accused has
admitted the killing. He must then prove the following elements of self-defense: unlawful aggression
on the part of the victim; reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it and lack
of sufficient provocation on the part of the one resorting to self-defense. Of these requisites, the most
indispensable is unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. If there is no unlawful aggression, there
is nothing to prevent or repel. And for unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must be a strong
and positive act of real aggression, not merely a threat or an intimidating stance. Thus, the accused
who claims self-defense must positively establish that there was an actual, sudden and unexpected
attack, or imminent danger thereof, by the victim
Upon review of the evidence on record, we find that the appellant has failed to discharge this
burden. There was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim to speak of. Contrary to the claim
of the defense, the prosecution established through its eyewitness that the victim was lured to the
appellants house and there hacked by the appellant. Appellants effort to buttress his theory of self-
defense can only be described as desperate
To successfully invoke self-defense, appellant must prove, by satisfactory evidence, the
concurrence of all the elements of self-defense, the most important of which is unlawful aggression by
the victim. Without unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, and
conviction of appellant must follow
Another factor that militates against the appellants claim of self-defense is the physical evidence
on record, that is, the number of wounds inflicted on the victim. As testified to by Dr. Lucia Astorga,
the attending physician, the victim suffered eight wounds, most of them fatal. It is an oft-repeated rule
that the presence of many wounds on the victim negates self-defense; it in fact indicates a
determined effort to kill him. Even assuming for the sake of argument that it was the deceased who
initiated the attack and the accused merely defended himself, clearly there was no need for him to
stab the victim several times if the purpose was simply to disable the victim or make him desist from
his unlawful assault
One thing more is the matter of flight. Appellant admitted that, immediately after the incident, he
fled from the crime scene. Flight, in jurisprudence, is a strong indication of guilt, although the opposite
does not necessarily imply innocence either . Appellants alleged fear of retaliation from the victims
relatives was a figment of his imagination. He failed to report the incident immediately to the barangay
chairman and police authorities, negating his claim of self-defense. In sum, appellant failed to present
clear and convincing evidence to prove self-defense.
Furthermore, what appellant tries to depict is that it was the accused who was the unlawful
aggressor. We do not think so. It would have been totally against human nature for the victim to look
for trouble at a time when he was with his family, awaiting the birth of his new baby. Under the
circumstances, we cannot believe appellant that it was the victim who went to his house to commit
violence there.
For all the foregoing reasons, we accept the testimony of Robertos mother that her son was lured
to the appellants house and hog-tied before he was hacked to death. This constituted treachery which
is committed when two conditions concur, namely, that the means, method and form of execution
employed give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and that such
means, method and form of execution are deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused
without danger to his person.1<!--[if ! These two conditions were evidently present in the instant case.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision dated October 13, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of
Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 29 in Criminal Case No. 4426 finding Oscar Areo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of
Roberto Pilapil the amount of P50,000 as moral damages, in addition to the civil indemnity of
P50,000. Costs against appellant.
17. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.GABRIEL ANNIBONG y INGGAO, appellant.
G.R. No. 139879 May 8, 2003
QUISUMBING, J.:
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2003/may2003/gr_139879_2003.html
FACTS
Appellant, a kitchen aide serving at the camp, testified that on February 13, 1998, while he and
Tallong narrated that on February 13, 1998, around 2:00 P.M., Cpl. Obngayan arrived at the
Philippine Army detachment in Brgy. Doña Loreta, Pudtol, Apayao where he was then the
commanding officer.5 Still perspiring and thirsty from an operation in Centro, Pudtol, Apayao, Cpl.
Obngayan hurriedly proceeded to the camp's kitchen for a drink. Incensed that all of the water
containers were empty, Obngayan confronted appellant whose duty it was to maintain the camp's
kitchen. He gave appellant a jab in the abdomen, then slowly walked away towards his bunker.
1
Infuriated, appellant without warning, picked up his M-14 armalite rifle and strafed the former on the
back. Obngayan sprawled bloodied on the ground. Shortly after, appellant took the garand rifle of
Artemio Tallong, and unleashed another barrage of gunshots. Obngayan died instantaneously with
his brain splattered and an eye fallen on the ground.
CONTENTION OF THE STATE

As held in People v. More,19 "In legitimate self-defense the aggression must still be existing or
continuing when the person making the defense attacks or injures the aggressor. Thus when the
unlawful aggression ceases to exist, the one making the defense has no more right to kill the former
aggressor."
CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. Although he admitted killing the victim,
appellant invoked self-defense. Thus, the order of the trial was reversed, with the defense presenting
its evidence first.
RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Apayao, Branch 26, in Criminal Case No. 9-
98, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Gabriel Annibong y Inggao is declared guilty of
murder, but his sentence is hereby reduced to reclusion perpetua. Further, he is ordered to pay the
heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P1,620,000.00 for lost earnings,
P10,000.00 as nominal damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P20,000 as exemplary
damages. Costs de oficio.
18. People vs. Gonza
APPELLEE: The People of the Philippines
APPELLANT: Percival Gonza
SUBJECT: Burden of proof
CRIME: Homicide (Modified)
CONTENTION OF THE STATE: Gonza, armed with a fan-knife, with intent to kill and treachery,
willfully and unlawfully feloniously attacked, assaulted and stabbed Virgilio Mortega, who died shortly
after.
CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED: Gonza only acted in self-defense, due to the fact that when
Percival stepped out of the house of one Catalino Mortega, Virgilio suddenly, without provocation,
punched him on the left eye, which blurred his vision. Although Gonza retreated, Virgilio still followed
him which led to Gonza picking up an open fan knife and using it to defend himself from his attacker.
RULING: The contention of the appellant was without merit. The requisites of self-defense (unlawful
aggression on part of the victim, reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it,
and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself) were not proven. And in
cases where self-defense is employed, the burden of proof is transferred to the one claiming to
defend himself during the commission of the felony.
19. PEOPLE v. RICOHERMOSO

G.R. No. L-30527-28, 56 SCRA 431
March 29, 1974
Aquino, J.:
Facts:
Geminiano de Leon owned a parcel of land in Barrio Tagbacan, Silangan, Catanuan Quezon which
the defendant Ricohermoso cultivated as kaingin. About 9:00 AM of January 1965, Geminiano
encountered Ricohermoso and the former asked for his share of the palay harvested. Ricohermoso
told him to go to his house anytime and he would give the palay. At 2:00 in the afternoon, Geminiano
and his family (his son had a rifle slung on his shoulder) went to the house of Ricohermoso and when
he ask for the palay, the latter refused to get the palay. Ricohermoso got his bolo and stabbed
Geminiano on the neck. When Geminiano fell face down in the ground, Severo Padernal
(Ricohermoso’s father-in-law), hacked him on the back with an axe. On the other hand, Juan
Padernal embraced Marianito de Leon (son of Geminiano) from behind with his right arm locked
around Marianito’s neck and his left pressing Marianito’s left forearm. They rolled downhill and
Marianito passed out. When he regained his consciousness, he saw his father wounded and dead.
Contention of the accused:

Juan Padernal invoked the justifying circumstances of avoidance of greater evil or injury (par. 4, Art.
11, RPC) in preventing Marianito de Leon from shooting Ricohermoso and Severo Padernal. He
asserts he only assaulted Marianito because Marianito had a rifle and was ready to shoot.
Contention of the state:

Juan Padernal conspired with Ricohermoso and his father, Severo Padernal, in killing Geminiano de
Leon. The trial court rationalized its conclusion that there was conspiracy by stating that their conduct
revealed unity of purpose and a concerted effort to encompass Geminiano's death.
Ruling:
The judgement of the lower court as to the appellant Juan Padernal is affirmed with cost against him.
The act of Juan padernal in preventing Marianito from shooting Ricohermoso and Severo was
designed to ensure the killing of Geminiano. He was not avoiding any evil. His role was to weaken the
defense thus, his reliance on the justifying circumstances in erroneous.
Juan Padernal was not avoiding any evil when he sought to disable Marianito. Padernal's malicious
intention was to forestall any interference in the felonious assault made by his father and brother in-
law on Geminiano.
AFFIRMED IN FAVOR OF THE STATE.
Source: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1974/mar1974/gr_l_30527_28_1974.html
Handout Address:
2. State of necessity (Avoidance of greater evil)
page 8 of 26
20. PEOPLE v DELIMA, 46 PHIL 738
FACTS:
Lorenzo Napilon escaped from the jail. Some days afterwards, policeman Felipe Delima found him in
the house of Jorge Alegria, armed with a pointed piece of bamboo in the shape of a lance, and
demanded his surrender. Napilon answered with a stroke of his lance. Delima dodged, it, and
to impose his authority fired his revolver, but the bullet did not hit him. Napilon ran away, without
parting with his weapon. Delima went after him and fired again his revolver, this time hitting and
killing him. Delima was tried and convicted for homicide and sentenced to reclusion temporal and the
accessory penalties.
RULING:
The SC ruled that Delima must be acquitted. The court held that the killing was done in performance
of a duty. Napoleon was under the obligation to surrender and had no right, after evading service of
his sentence, to commit assault and disobedience with a weapon in the hand which compelled the
policeman to resort to such an extreme means, which, although it proved to be fatal, was justified by
the circumstances.
Article 8, No. 11, of the Penal Code being considered, Felipe Delima committed no crime.
21. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO Z. OANIS and
ALBERTO GALANTA, defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-47722
July 27, 1943
FACTS:
Chief of Police Oanis and his co-accused Corporal Gellanta were under instructions to arrest
one Balagtas, a notorious criminal and escaped convict, and if overpowered, to get him dead or alive.
Proceeding to the suspected house, they went into a room and on seeing a man sleeping with his
back towards the door, simultaneously fired with their revolvers without first making any reasonable
inquiry as to his identity. The victim turned out to be an innocent man, Tecson and not the wanted
criminal.
Even if the victim was the notorious criminal, the accused will not be justified in killing him
while the latter is sleeping. The law does not permit the captor to kill him. It is only when the fugitive
from justice is determined to fight the officers of the law who are trying to capture him that the killing
would be justified.
They only acted in the performance of their duty and that their acts should be justified.
HELD:
As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder with the qualifying
circumstance of alevosia. There is, however, a mitigating circumstance of weight consisting in the
incomplete justifying circumstance defined in article 11, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code. According
to such legal provision, a person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or
in the lawful exercise of a right or office. Their duty was to arrest Balagtas or to get him dead or alive
if resistance is offered by him and they are overpowered. But through impatience or over-anxiety or in
their desire to take no chances, they have exceeded in the fulfillment of such duty by killing the
person whom they believed to be Balagtas without any resistance from him and without making any
previous inquiry as to his identity.
The appellant were declared guilty of murder with mitigating circumstances according to the
Revised Penal Code, Article 69.
22. People vs. Lagata
Plaintiff-Appellee: People of the Philippines
Defendant-Appellant: Ignacio Lagata
FACTS:
The accused, Ignacio Lagata, a provincial guard of Catbalogan, Samar, was in charge of 6
prisoners (Jesus, Tipace, Eusebio, Mariano, Labong & Abria) assigned to work in the capitol
plaza of Samar.
Lagata ordered the prisoners to go to the nursery to pick up gabi. Not long afterwards, they
were called to assemble. Epifanio Labong was missing so Lagata ordered the 5 remaining
prisoners to go look for him.
Eusebio Abria said that while they were gathering gabi, he heard 3 shots. He was wounded by
the 2nd one. They were already assembled by the 1st shot and that he did not see Tipace
being shot. He said he ran away because he was afraid that he might be shot again and
that his companions were also probably scared and that is why they ran.
Another prisoner, Mariano Ibañez stated that Epifanio Labong did not answer their call so
Ignacio Lagata ordered to go look for him in the mountain. He said that Abria went to the
camote plantation and found footprints and called on Lagata to inform him about the
footprints. When Abria told Lagata of the flattened grass and that he was unable to look for
Labong, Ignacio Lagata fired at him and he was hit on his left arm. Abria told Lagata he was
wounded and in turn, Lagata told them to assemble. Once they were assembled, Lagata
cocked his gun and shot Ceferino Tipace. Mariano said that when he saw Tipace was shot,
he ran away because he also could have been shot.
Eustaquio Galet, another detainee, received good treatment from Lagata though his testimony
corroborated those of the other prisoners.
Pedro Mayuga, chief of Samar Provincial Hospital & Gilberto Rosales, Sanitary Division
president, verified the gunshot wound and that the death of Tipace resulted therein.
Ignacio Lagata, however, said that he fired his gun because the prisoners were running far
from him when he already ordered them to stop. He said that he would be the one in jail if a
prisoner escaped under his custody. Furthermore, he would be discharged from duty like
the others. He was hopeless already. Moreover, the picking up of gabi was not part of the
prisoner’s work.
HELD:
Court ruled that Lagata should be sentenced for homicide and serious physical injuries.
Appellant was entitled to the benefit of mitigating circumstance of incomplete justifying
circumstance. (Art.11 par.5, RPC)
RATIO:
It was clear that Lagata had absolutely no reason to fire at Tipace. The record does not show
that Tipace was bent on committing any act of aggression or that he attempted to escape.
According to Lagata himself, Tipace was running towards and around him. How could anyone
intending to escape run towards and around the very guard one was supposed to escape
from?
Even if Lagata sincerely believed that he acted in the performance of his duties, the
circumstances show that there was no necessity for him to fire directly against the prisoners
as to wound them seriously and even kill one of them.
While custodians should take care for prisoners not to escape, only ABSOLUTE NECESSITY
would authorize them to fire against them.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1949/mar1949/gr_l-1940-42_1949.html
23. Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan 268 SCRA 332
Through his petitions for review, Luis Tabuena (General Manager of Manager of Manila International
Airport Authority (MIAA)) appealed a Sandiganbayan decision and a Resolution denying
reconsideration, convicting him of malversation under Article 217 of RPC (alongside Adolfo Peralta -
Acting Finance, MIAA). He and Peralta have malversed P55 million of MIAA funds.
President Marcos instructed Tabuena over the phone to pay directly to the president’s office and in
cash what the MIAA owes the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC). A week later, he
received a Presidential Memorandum dated January 8, 1986 from Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez, Marcos’
private secretary stating Marcos’ previous instruction. Tabuena withdrew the sum on 3 separate
occasions - P25M by Gerardo Dabao (10/01), P25M by Gerardo Dabao (16/01), P5M by Peralta
(29/01). He delivered the P55M to Mrs. Gimenez and was issued a receipt.

There was no outstanding obligations in favour of PNCC at the time of the disbursement of the P55
million.
Good faith. Tabuena claimed that he was merely complying with the Marcos Memorandum and that
he was of the belief that MIAA indeed had liabilities to PNCC.
RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:
We are swayed to give credit to his claim of having caused the disbursement of the P55 Million solely
by reason of such memorandum. Tabuena had no other choice but to make the withdrawals, for that
was what the MARCOS Memorandum required him to do. He could not be faulted if he had to obey
and strictly comply with the presidential directive, and to argue otherwise is something easier said
than done. Marcos was undeniably Tabuena’s superior — the former being then the President of the
Republic who unquestionably exercised control over government agencies such as the MIAA and
PNCC. In other words, Marcos had a say in matters involving inter-government agency affairs and
transactions, such as for instance, directing payment of liability of one entity to another and the
manner in which it should be carried out. And as a recipient of such kind of a directive coming from
the highest official of the land no less, good faith should be read on Tabuena’s compliance, without
hesitation nor any question, with the MARCOS Memorandum. Tabuena therefore is entitled to the
justifying circumstance of "Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for
some lawful purpose." The subordinate-superior relationship between Tabuena and Marcos is clear.
Thus, even if the order is illegal if it is patently legal and the subordinate is not aware of its illegality,
the subordinate is not liable, for then there would only be a mistake of fact committed in good faith.
He was acquitted.
24. PEOPLE vs. TULIN
Cheong contended that he must not be acquitted for his participation on the said crime. The crime
was committed outside of the Philippine territory and notwithin the Philippine Waters under PD 532.
He contended further that he only participated in the sale of kerosene and oil in Singapore and not in
the seizure of the vessel within Philippine Waters.
Defendant Cheong argued that he should be acquitted for his participation of the crime
wascommitted outside Philippine Territory and not within Philippine Waters under PD 532-Argued that
he only participated in the sale of kerosene and oil in Singapore and not in theseizure of the vessel
within Philippine Waters- Appeal to SC the judgment of conviction of the lower court
Contention of the Appellee: The Appellee filed a criminal case against the defendants for Piracy in
Philippine Waters under PD 532 for seizing M/T Tabango from the Philippines to Singapore.
Moreover, Cheong must be convicted as he was an accomplice.
Ruling: Cheong is liable and the appeal is dismissed.
FULL CASE: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/aug2001/111709.htm
25. People v Genosa

GR 135981
FACTS:
This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his wife Marivic Genosa, appellant herein.
During their first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily but apparently thereafter, Ben
changed and the couple would always quarrel and sometimes their quarrels became violent.
Appellant testified that every time her husband came home drunk, he would provoke her and
sometimes beat her. Whenever beaten by her husband, she consulted medical doctors who testified
during the trial. On the night of the killing, appellant and the victim were quarrelling and the victim
beat the appellant. However, appellant was able to run to another room. Appellant admitted having
killed the victim with the use of a gun. The information for parricide against appellant, however,
alleged that the cause of death of the victim was by beating through the use of a lead pipe. Appellant
invoked self defense and defense of her unborn child. After trial, the Regional Trial Court found
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide with an aggravating circumstance
of treachery and imposed the penalty of death.
Contention of the Accused: On automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed an
URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the Honorable Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben
Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his death; (2) the examination of Marivic Genosa by
qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she killed her
husband; and finally, (3) the inclusion of the said experts’ reports in the records of the case for
purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial re-opening of the case a quo to take
the testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists. The Supreme Court partly granted the
URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION of the appellant. It remanded the case to the trial court for reception of
expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the “battered woman syndrome” plea. Testimonies
of two expert witnesses on the “battered woman syndrome”, Dra. Dayan and Dr. Pajarillo, were
presented and admitted by the trial court and subsequently submitted to the Supreme Court as part of
the records.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not appellant herein can validly invoke the “battered woman syndrome” as constituting
self defense.
2. Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.
Ruling: 1. The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to prove that she is afflicted with the
“battered woman syndrome”.
A battered woman has been defined as a woman “who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful
physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to
do without concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate
relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go
through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with
a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered
woman.”
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called “cycle of violence,”
which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the
tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.
The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered woman
syndrome. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at
least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute
battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered person’s
mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to
use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed
probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the history
of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could
satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not all of
these elements were duly established.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the “cycle of violence” supposedly characterizing
the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents but
appellant failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a
similar pattern. Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the
cycle.
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal right
of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-
defense. Settled in our jurisprudence, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must face a
real threat on one’s life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely
imaginary. Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides that the following requisites of self-defense must
concur: (1) Unlawful aggression; (2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel
it; and (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden and
unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person. In the present
case, however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval
between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to
withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their children’s bedroom. During that time, he
apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he
posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life
or safety.
The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and passion and obfuscation were, however, taken in
favor of appellant. It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as
well as passion and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts.
The first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery inflicted by the
batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her
psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power
without depriving her of consciousness of her acts.
As to the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally
produced passion and obfuscation, it has been held that this state of mind is present when a crime is
committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts
or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. To appreciate this circumstance, the
following requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a
condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from the commission of the crime by a
considerable length of time, during which the accused might recover her normal equanimity.
2. NO. Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be proved as conclusively as
the killing itself. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument
or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased
may be said to have been forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant.
Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the aggressor must have
been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the unlawful act
without risk from any defense that might be put up by the party attacked.
The appellant acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion or
obfuscation. The acute battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in
spite of the fact that she was eight (8) months pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put her
in the aforesaid emotional and mental state, which overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate
her life and that of her unborn child.
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant for parricide. However, considering the
presence of two (2) mitigating circumstances and without any aggravating circumstance, the penalty
is reduced to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years 8 months and 1
day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the
minimum penalty hereby imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may
immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due determination that she is eligible for parole, unless
she is being held for some other lawful cause.
NOTE: After this case was decided by the Supreme Court, R.A. 9262, otherwise known as Anti-
Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004 was enacted. Sec. 26 of said law provides
that "xxx. Victim-survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering from battered women
syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil liability nothwithstanding the absence of any of the
elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code.xxx"
26. People vs. Guillermo Florendo alias “IMONG”

Link to full case: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/136845.htm
TOPIC: Exempting Circumstances (RPC, Art. 12)

1. Insanity and Imbecility
CONTENTION OF THE STATE
The trial court found the appellant guilty of parricide with the aggravating circumstance of cruelty and
was sentenced to death. Florendo hacked his wife, Erlinda, with a bolo in the head and other parts of
her body resulting in 16 wounds on various parts of her body, 4 of which were considered fatal and
resulted in her instant death. The trial court held that the aggravating circumstance of cruelty was
present because the victim suffered 16 wounds.
CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED
The appellant admitted killing his wife in the pre-trial conference, but put up the defense of insanity to
claim exemption from criminal liability. In his appeal to the Supreme Court, he contends that the trial
court erred in not acquitting him on the ground of insanity and for appreciating cruelty instead as an
aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime.
RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, with the modification that he should suffer
reclusion perpetua instead of death. The Court rejected the appellant’s plea of insanity because
pursuant to Art. 12, par. 1 of the RPC, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act. The burden of proof rests upon him who invokes insanity as an
exempting circumstance since the favor is on sanity. The Supreme Court held that the alleged
insanity of the appellant was not substantiated by sufficient evidence, since it is inconclusive as to
whether he was insane at the time immediately preceding or at the very moment of the killing.
27. People vs Estrada

333 SCRA 699
2000
Facts:
The sacrament of confirmation was being performed at St. John's Cathedral, Dagupan City by the
Roman Catholic Bishop when Roberto Estrada went up and walked towards the center of the
altar and sat on the Bishop's chair. Crisanto Santillan, who was assisting the Bishop at the rites,
approached Estrada and requested him to vacate the Bishop's chair. Gripping the chair's armrest,
accused-appellant replied in Pangasinese: "No matter what will happen, I will not move out!" Hearing
this, Santillan moved away. Rogelio Mararac, the security guard at the cathedral went near Estrada
and told him to vacate the Bishop's chair. Estrada stared intensely at the guard. Mararac then held his
nightstick and tapped twice Estrada's hand on the armrest. When Mararac was about to tap again,
Estrada suddenly drew a knife from his back, lunged at Mararac and stabbed him twice, causing the
death of the latter.Then Estrada got up, went to the microphone and shouted: "Anggapuy nayan dia!"
(No one can beatme here!). He returned to the Bishop's chair and sat on it again. The police came
and when they frisked appellant, they found a leather scabbard tucked around his waist. He was
brought to the police station and placed in jail. Then Jail Warden Wilfredo Valdez requested the court
to allow Estrada, to be treated at the Baguio General Hospital to determine whether he should remain
in jail or be transferred to some other institution as other prisoners were allegedly not comfortable
with appellant because he had been exhibiting unusual behavior; he would shout at the top of his
voice and cause panic among the jail inmates and personnel; he had not been eating and sleeping;
and his co-inmates had been complaining of not getting enough sleep for fear of being attacked by
him while asleep; that once, while they were sleeping, he took out all his personal effects and waste
matter and burned them inside the cell which again caused panic among the inmates.
Dr. Gawidan, testified that the illness of accused-appellant, i.e., schizophrenia, paranoid type, is a
"lifetime illness" and that this requires maintenance medication to avoid relapses. After accused-
appellant was discharged on February 22, 1993, he never returned to the hospital, not even for a
check-up.
He claimed that the prosecution failed to prove the crime of murder because there was no evidence
of the qualifying circumstance of treachery; that there was unlawful aggression by the victim when he
tapped accused-appellant's hand with his nightstick; and that accused-appellant did not have
sufficient ability to calculate his defensive acts because he was of unsound mind.

The accused "pretended to be weak, tame and of unsound mind;" that after he made the first stab, he
"furiously continued stabbing and slashing the victim to finish him off undeterred by the fact that he
was in a holy place where a religious ceremony was being conducted".
Ruling:
Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act. Mere
abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. The accused must be "so insane as to
be incapable of entertaining a criminal intent." He must be deprived of reason and act without the
least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern or a total deprivation
of freedom of the will.
Section 12, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure speaks of a mental examination. The
human mind is an entity, and understanding it is not purely an intellectual process but depends to a
large degree upon emotional and psychological appreciation. Thus, an intelligent determination of an
accuseds capacity for rational understanding ought to rest on a deeper and more comprehensive
diagnosis of his mental condition than laymen can make through observation of his overt behavior.
Once a medical or psychiatric diagnosis is made, then can the trial court determine the legal question
of incompetency. By this time, the accused’s abilities may be measured against the specific demands
a trial will make upon him.
If the mental examination on accused-appellant had been promptly and properly made, it may have
served a dual purpose by determining both his competency to stand trial and his sanity at the time of
the offense. In some Philippine cases, the medical and clinical findings of insanity made immediately
after the commission of the crime served as one of the bases for the acquittal of the accused. The
crime in the instant case was committed way back in December 1994, almost six (6) years ago. At
this late hour, a medical finding alone may make it impossible for us to evaluate appellants mental
condition at the time of the crimes commission for him to avail of the exempting circumstance of
insanity. Nonetheless, under the present circumstances, accused-appellants competence to stand
trial must be properly ascertained to enable him to participate in his trial meaningfully.
By depriving appellant of a mental examination, the trial court effectively deprived appellant of a fair
trial. The trial courts negligence was a violation of the basic requirements of due process; and for this
reason, the proceedings before the said court must be nullified. In People v. Serafica, we ordered that
the joint decision of the trial court be vacated and the cases remanded to the court a quo for proper
proceeding. The accused, who was charged with two (2) counts of murder and one (1) count of
frustrated murder, entered a plea of guilty to all three charges and was sentenced to death. We found
that the accused’s plea was not an unconditional admission of guilt because he was not in full
possession of his mental faculties when he killed the victim; and thereby ordered that he be subjected
to the necessary medical examination to determine his degree of insanity at the time of commission
of the crime.
The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Dagupan City in Criminal Case No. 94-00860-D
convicting accused-appellant Roberto Estrada and sentencing him to death is vacated and the case
is remanded to the court a quo for the conduct of a proper mental examination on accused-appellant,
a determination of his competency to stand trial, and for further proceedings.
28. People vs Villa Jr.

331 SCRA 1422000
Facts:
Dionito Fernandez was cutting grass when his neighbor Rodolfo Villa, Jr., a member of the CAFGU
came out with his M-1 Garand rifle and shot Dionito killing him instantly (discovered later that Dionito
accused him of stealing chickens). Ronald and Sheila, children of Dionito, rushed out and were also
shot. Sheila was only shot in the thigh and tummy. Samuel Eclevia, attempted to wrestle the rifle but
was also gunned down. Villa Jr. surrendered and was charged with multiple murder.
Contention of the state:
Insanity exists when there is complete deprivation of intelligence while committing the act, i.e., the
accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is complete
absence of power to discern, or that there is total deprivation of freedom of the will.
Contention of the accused:
He pleaded not guilty and invoked self defense (says that Dionito was charging at him with a bolo).
His new lawyer (he changed lawyers in the middle) moved for a psychiatric examination and it was
granted. He was confined in the Mental Hospital for evaluation (for insanity) for a month which
resulted in the finding of Insanity or Psychosis classified as Schizophrenia. After which he pleaded
insanity as a defense but was disregarded by the courts.
Issue:
The only issue to be resolved is whether accused-appellant was insane during the commission of the
crimes as would exempt him from criminal liability.
Held:
Court was not convinced that he was insane during the commission of the crime since theevaluation
did not say so in unequivocal terms. Dr. Zalsos was unsure when she testified.
In order thatinsanity can be considered as an exempting circumstance, it must be shown to

exist just before orduring the commission of the offense. It must be shown beyond doubt that
there was completedeprivation of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of
the commission of thecrime, which the accused failed to prove.
Insanity is evidenced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties which
ismanifested in language and conduct. An insane person has no full and clear understanding of the
natureand consequences of his acts. We are convinced that accused-appellant was sane at the
time heperpetrated the killings. The following circumstances clearly point to saneness. (a)
Immediatelysurrendering to the Police; (b) He showed remorse during his confinement; (c) Gave a
sworn statement
before the Prosecutor’s Office after the crimes narrating the incident (admit that he was of sound
mind).These are hardly the acts of a person with a sick mind.The law presumes every man to be of
sound mind. Thus, a person accused of a crime whopleads the exempting circumstance of insanity
has the burden of proving it
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/apr2000/129899_apr2000.html
29. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FERNANDO MADARANG y MAGNO

G.R. No. 132319.
May 12, 2000
PUNO, J.: HTML
Facts: The accused, his wife Lilia and their children were forced to stay in the house of Avelina
Mirador as the accused could no longer support his family. On September 3, 1993, the accused and
Lilia had a squabble. The accused was jealous of another man and was accusing Lilia of infidelity. In
the heat of the fight and in the presence of their children, the accused, with evident premeditation and
treachery, armed with a bladed weapon, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack
and stab LILIA M. MADARANG, his legitimate wife, inflicting upon her stab wounds caused her
instantaneous death.
At the arraignment, the accused refused to enter a plea.The accused's counsel manifested that his
client had been observed behaving in an abnormal manner inside the provincial jail. Thus, the Court
called the accused to the stand but he refused to answer any of the questions propounded by the
court. Hence the Court issued an Order directing the transfer of the accused to the National Center
for Mental Health (NCMH) for psychiatric evaluation to determine his fitness to stand trial. CODES
The initial examination of the accused at the NCMH revealed that he was suffering from a form of
psychosis known as schizophrenia. The accused was detained at the hospital and was administered
medication for his illness. After more than two (2) years of confinement, the accused was discharged
from the NCMH and recommitted to the provincial jail as he was already found fit to face the charges
against him. At the resumption of the hearing, a reverse trial was conducted. The accused proceeded
to adduce evidence on his claim of insanity at the time he committed the offense. The accused
declared that he has absolutely no recollection of the stabbing incident. The NCMH conducted three
(3) medical and psychiatric evaluations of the accused during his confinement therein. The accused
was recommended to be discharged from the NCMH and recommitted to jail to stand trial.
The trial court convicted the accused as his evidence failed to refute the presumption of sanity at the
time he committed the offense. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
Contention of the Accused: The appellant insists that at the time he stabbed his wife, he was
completely deprived of intelligence, making his criminal act involuntary. His unstable state of mind
could allegedly be deduced from the following:
First. He had no recollection of the stabbing incident. Hence, he was completely unaware of his acts
that fateful day and must have committed the crime without the least discernment.
Second. His behavior at the time of the stabbing proved he was then afflicted with schizophrenia.
He cited the testimony of Dr. Tibayan that a schizophrenic may go into extremes -- he may be violent
and destructive, or very silent and self-focused. He avers that this is peculiar only to persons who are
mentally deranged for a sane person who just committed a crime would have appeared
remorseful and repentant after realizing that what he did was wrong.
Third. The appellant also relies on Dr. Tibayan's opinion that there was a high possibility that he
was already suffering from insanity prior to his commission of the crime. The defense posits
that his mental illness may have been caused by his loss of fortune. The appellant further
contends that the fact that he and his wife never engaged in a fight prior to that fateful day should be
considered. The marked change in his behavior when he uncharacteristically quarreled with his wife
on that day and suddenly turned violent on her confirms that he was mentally disturbed when he
committed the crime.
Lastly, the appellant urges that he had no motive to kill Lilia who was scheduled to give birth to their
eighth child. Jealousy, the appellant posits, is not a sufficient reason to kill a pregnant spouse.
Held: The accused failed to establish by convincing evidence his alleged insanity at the time he killed
his wife, we are constrained to affirm his conviction. In the Philippines, the courts have established
a more stringent criterion for insanity to be exempting as it is required that there must be
a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the accused is deprived of
reason; he acted without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the
power to discern, or that there is a total deprivation of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental
faculties will not exclude imputability.
In the case at bar, the appellant was diagnosed to be suffering from schizophrenia when he was
committed to the NCMH months after he killed his wife. Symptomatically, schizophrenic reactions
are recognizable through odd and bizarre behavior apparent in aloofness or periods of impulsive
destructiveness and immature and exaggerated emotionality, often ambivalently directed. The
interpersonal perceptions are distorted in the more serious states by delusions and hallucinations.
None of the witnesses presented by the appellant declared that he exhibited any of the myriad
symptoms associated with schizophrenia immediately before or simultaneous with the
stabbing incident. To be sure, the record is bereft of even a single account of abnormal or bizarre
behavior on the part of the appellant prior to that fateful day. Although Dr. Tibayan opined that there
is a high possibility that the appellant was already suffering from schizophrenia at the time of the
stabbing, he also declared that schizophrenics have lucid intervals during which they are
capable of distinguishing right from wrong. Hence the importance of adducing proof to show that
the appellant was not in his lucid interval at the time he committed the offense. Although the appellant
was diagnosed with schizophrenia a few months after the stabbing incident, the evidence of insanity
after the fact of commission of the offense may be accorded weight only if there is also proof of
abnormal behavior immediately before or simultaneous to the commission of the crime.
The Court found the evidence adduced by the defense insufficient to establish his claim of insanity at
the time he killed his wife. There is a dearth of evidence on record to show that the appellant was
completely of unsound mind prior to or coetaneous with the commission of the crime. The
appellant attributes his loss of sanity to the fact that he lost his business and became totally
dependent on his mother-in-law for support but the court said that this is purely
speculative and unsupported by record. To be sure, there was no showing of any odd or bizarre
behavior on the part of the appellant after he lost his fortune and prior to his commission of the
crime that may be symptomatic of his mental illness
He admits committing the crime but claims that he is not guilty because he was insane at the time of
its commission. Hence, the accused is tried on the issue of sanity alone and if found to be sane,
a judgment of conviction is rendered without any trial on the issue of guilt as he had already
admitted committing the crime.
Adjudication: The decision of the trial court convicting the appellant of the crime of parricide is
AFFIRMED in toto.
30. People vs. Diaz
320 SCRA 168
1999
Topic: Insanity and Imbecility (Exempting Circumstance)
Facts:
FRANCIS BART FULACHE, eleven (11) years old, was found dead at Bulacao Bridge, Cebu City,
on 4 December 1996. Subsequently, for his death, Ralph Velez Diaz alias "Jimboy" was charged
before the Regional Trial Court[1] of Cebu City with murder in relation to RA 7610.
The defense, invoking the doctrine of parens patriae, also appeals to this Court for the psychiatric
examination and evaluation of accused-appellant if indeed he is found to have committed the crime
charged. The defense emphasizes the fact that accused-appellant was institutionalized twice within a
considerable period in the National Center for Mental Health; consequently, there is no certainty that
he was sane when he committed the crime imputed to him.
We cannot grant the request. When accused-appellant was committed to the National Center for
Mental Health, he was not diagnosed as insane but was suffering from pedophilia. Thus, there is no
doubt in our mind that he was sane during his two-year confinement in the center, pedophilia being
dissimilar to insanity.
A defendant in a criminal case who interposes the defense of mental incapacity has the burden of
establishing that fact, i.e., he was insane at the very moment when the crime was committed. [21] He
must prove it by clear and positive evidence. [22] In the instant case, the defense of insanity as an
exempting circumstance was not established and did not overcome the legal presumption that a
person's acts are of his own free will and intelligence. The settled rule is that the onus probandi rests
upon him who invokes insanity as a defense, and the defense failed to discharge this burden. Thus,
the conviction of accused-appellant no doubt is in order.
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the 11 April 1997 Decision of the RTC-Br. 15, Cebu City, is MODIFIED. Accused-
appellant Ralph Velez Diaz is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and sentenced
to reclusion perpetua instead of death. He is also ordered to pay the legal heirs of Francis Bart
Fulache the amount of P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00
as exemplary damages and P40,000.00 as reimbursement for funeral expenses. Costs de oficio.
Source: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/dec99/130210.htm
31. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CRESENCIO TABUGOCA
Facts:
Cresencio Tabugoca guilty of two counts of rape committed against his very own daughters and
imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua in the first case and the death penalty in the
second.
28th day of March, 1992 JACQUELINE A. TABUGOCA, only 12 years and 3 months old, was asked
by her father to scratch his back then after awhile he removed her shorts and underwear and made
her to lie down beside him and inserted his penis into her vagina.
9th day of December, 1994 JINKY A. TABUGOCA, a girl of 12 years and 9 months old, while cleaning
some articles in their house, her father approached her and took off her clothes. He inserted his penis
but she complained of pain and her father was not able to penetrate into her vagina and said that they
will do it again next time.
December 10, 1994 Jacqueline and Jinky were watching television at their grandmother's house
nearby, Jinky confided to her grandmother about the sexual abuses of her father against her.
Upon hearing the revelations of her sister, Jacqueline also disclosed to her grandmother her own
experience with her father two years before.
The victims' grandmother, Perlita Alejandro, forthwith brought her granddaughters to the police
authorities and then to the Municipal Health Officer of Naguilian for physical examination. The two
were examined on December 12, 1994 by Dr. Maryann M. Fontanares.
Insanity may be taken as exempting circumstances, there must be complete depreciation of

intelligence in the commission of the act of that the accused acted without the least discernment.
They did not present any expert witness, any psychiatric evaluation report or any psychological
findings or evidence regarding his mental condition at the time of the commission of the offenses.
Chastisement is not strong enough to make daughters of Filipino family invent a charge that would
only bring shame and humiliation upon them and their family.
The accused raised the defense that he is completely unaware of what transpired on those 2
occasions as he was very drunk. He learned to drink liquor after his wife died on August 28, 1991,
that he claims exemption from criminal liability on the ground of insanity.
Held:
Tabugoca’s guilt has been proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. Tabugoca
neither denied the charges against him nor raised any absolutory cause in his defense. The
categorical and untraversed testimonies of Jacqueline and Jinky as to how Tabugoca committed the
bestial outrage, and their identification of the accused as their defiler remain uncontroverted and fully
establish the charges. Jacqueline’s failure to immediately report the crime does not necessarily cast
doubt on the credibility of her charge. We cannot expect young Jacqueline to disregard the threat on
her life and immediately cry rape in the face of her father’s threats and his constant presence in her
home. It is highly inconceivable that Jacqueline would invent a charge that would only bring shame
and humiliation upon them and their family and be the object of gossip among their classmates and
friends in order to get even with their father or to empathize with her sister, especially given our
culture. It is axiomatic in criminal law that in order to sustain a conviction for rape, full penetration is
not required.
32. People vs. Genosa
341 SCRA 493

Source: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/sept2000/135981.htm
Facts:
That on or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang, Municipality of Isabel,
Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound one BEN GENOSA, her legitimate husband,
with the use of a hard deadly weapon, which the accused had provided herself for the purpose,
causing the following wounds, to wit:
'Cadaveric spasm.
'Body on the 2nd stage of decomposition.
'Face, black, blown[ ]up & swollen w/ evident post- mortem lividity. Eyes protruding from its
sockets and tongue slightly protrudes out of the mouth.
'Fracture, open, depressed, circular located at the occipital bone of the head, resulting [in]
laceration of the brain, spontaneous rupture of the blood vessels on the posterior surface of the brain,
laceration of the dura and meningeal vessels producing severe intracranial hemorrhage.
'Blisters at both extrem[i]ties, anterior chest, posterior chest, trunk w/ shedding of the
epidermis.
'Abdomen distended w/ gas. Trunk bloated.'which caused his death."

Appellant alleges that the trial court grievously erred in concluding that she had lied about the
means she employed in killing her husband. On the contrary, she had consistently claimed that she
had shot her husband. Yet the trial judge simply ruled that the cause of his death was
"cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to severe intracranial hemorrhage due to a depressed fracture of
the occipital bone," which resulted from her admitted act of "smashing" him with a pipe. Such
conclusion was allegedly unsupported by the evidence on record, which bore no forensic autopsy
report on the body of the victim.
Appellant further alleges that despite the evidence on record of repeated and severe beatings
she had suffered at the hands of her husband, the trial court failed to appreciate her self-defense
theory. She claims that under the surrounding circumstances, her act of killing her husband was
equivalent to self-defense. Furthermore, she argues that if she "did not lie about how she killed her
husband, then she did not lie about the abuse she suffered at his hands."
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is hereby AFFIRMED.
However, there being two (2) mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance attending
her commission of the offense, her penalty is REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum; to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby imposed upon her,
the director of the Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due
determination that she is eligible for parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause.
Costs de oficio.
33. People vs. Estepano
307 SCRA 707
May 28, 1999
FACTS:
Enrique Balinas was stabbed and hacked to death for which Dominador, Rodrigo, Ruben, Rodney,
Dante and Rene, all surnamed Estepano, were charged with murder. Rodrigo died during the trial and
before judgment could be rendered. Dante was never apprehended hence, as against him, the case
was archived. After trial, Dominador was acquitted on reasonable doubt. Only Ruben, Rodney and
Rene were found guilty. Accordingly, the three (3) were sentenced to reclusion perpetua and ordered
to indemnify the heirs of Enrique Balinas in the amount of P100,000.00 for moral damages and
P9,500.00 for actual damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
According to witness Florencio Tayco, on 16 April 1991, at around ten o’clock in the evening, he was
on his way home in Barangay IV, Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, with Lopito Gaudia and Enrique
Balinas. Enroute, they met Dominador Estepano at the BM Trucking compound. At this juncture,
according to Florencio, Lopito started to talk to Dominador while he and Enrique stood nearby.
Suddenly, Rodrigo appeared and without any provocation stabbed Enrique in the stomach with a
guinunting. Ruben who was armed with a cane cutter and Rodney, Dante and Rene, each armed with
a bolo, followed suit in hacking Enrique. While this was happening, Dominador told his companions,
You better kill him!
Accused Ruben, Rene and Rodney invoked alibi. Ruben claimed that on 16 April 1991, at around ten
oclock in the evening, he was at the provincial hospital in Bacolod City attending to his wife who
earlier underwent a caesarian operation. Rene and Rodney, sons of Rodrigo, claimed that they were
at home sleeping when the killing occurred. Rene, who was only thirteen (13) years of age then,
testified that he came to know about the incident that same night when his mother awakened him to
inform him about it. Rodney, on the other hand, was awakened by shouts that his father killed Enrique
Balinas. The crux of this appeal of Ruben, Rodney and Rene is that the trial court erred in finding
them guilty of murder.

The trial court was correct in finding accused-appellants Ruben Estepano and Rodney Estepano
guilty of murder as the killing was attended by treachery. The evidence shows that they suddenly and
unexpectedly attacked the victim while the latter was waiting for Lopito Gaudia who was talking to
Dominador Estepano. The penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed on them in the
absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances.
With respect to accused-appellant Rene Estepano, the records show that he was only thirteen
(13) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense. Under Art. 12, par. (3), of The
Revised Penal Code, a person over nine (9) years of age and under fifteen (15) is exempt from
criminal liability unless it is shown that he acted with discernment. The minor referred to here is
presumed to have acted without discernment. Thus, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove
that such minor acted otherwise.
A scrutiny of the records shows that the prosecution failed to prove that accused-appellant
Rene Estepano acted with discernment. The testimony of prosecution witness Florencio Tayco only
attempted to establish, as it did, Renes presence at the crime scene and his supposed participation in
the killing of Enrique Balinas.
The prosecution did not endeavor to establish Renes mental capacity to fully appreciate the
consequences of his unlawful act. Accordingly, even if he was indeed a co-conspirator, he would still
be exempt from criminal liability as the prosecution failed to rebut the presumption of non-
discernment on his part by virtue of his age. The cross-examination of Rene could have provided the
prosecution a good occasion to extract from him positive indicators of his capacity to discern. But, in
this regard, the government miserably squandered the opportunity to incriminate him.
HELD:
Decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Accused-appellants RUBEN ESTEPANO and RODNEY

ESTEPANO are found GUILTY. Accused-appellant RENE ESTEPANO is ACQUITTED in the absence
of proof that he acted with discernment; consequently, his immediate RELEASE from confinement is
ORDERED unless he is detained for some other lawful cause.
34. People vs. Doquena

68 Phil. 580 (1939)
FACTS:
Between 1-2 pm of Nov. 19, 1938, Juan Ragojos and Epifanio Rarang were playing
volleyball in the yard of their school in Sual, Pangasinan. Valentin Doquena, the accused,
intercepted the ball, and threw it a Ragojos, who was hit in the stomach. Miffed, Ragojos
chased Doquena, and upon catching him, slapped Doquena on the nape, and punched him
in the face. After doing this, Ragojos went back to Rarang to resume playing volleyball.
Insulted, Doquena looked for something to throw at Ragojos, finding none, he got his
cousin's (Romualdo Cocal) knife, and confronted Ragojos. Ragojo's denied Doquena's
request for a fight and resumed playing. Doquena stabbed the unaware Ragojos in the
chest, thereby killing the latter.

The accused contented that he acted with discernment and was conscious of the nature
and consequences of his acts, therefore his defense that he was a minor was untenable
(given that the Doquena was a 7th grade pupil, one of the brightest in his class, and was
an officer in the CAT program), and thus convicted him of the crime of homicide.

The court, after trying the case, held that the accused acted with discernment in
committing the act imputed to him and, proceeding in accordance with the provisions of
article 80 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 99, ordered
him to be sent to the Training School for Boys to remain therein until he reaches the age
of majority.
The following must be taken into consideration:
a) The facts and circumstances which gave rise to the act committed.
b) The state of mind at the time the crime was committed
c) The time he had at his disposal
d) The degree of reasoning of the minor
RULING:
Decision affirmed. Yes, the accused acted with discernment. Accused mistakes the
discernment for premeditation, or at least for lack of intention, as a mitigating
circumstance. However, the DISCERNMENT that constitutes an exception to the
exemption from criminal liability of a minor under 15 years but over nine, who commits an
act prohibited by law, is his MENTAL CAPACITY to understand the difference between
right and wrong, and such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking
into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case,
the very appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment and behavior of said minor,
not only before and during the commission of the act, but also after and even during the
trial.

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Fall

Complex crime of double murder

Contention of the State:

Malabanan positively identified the accused as perpetrators. He testified in categorical,

1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING AS "POSITIVE" PROSECUTION WITNESSES EDWIN

2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING ACCUSED'S PARTIAL MOTION FOR

3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED.

7. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARTIN SIMON y SUNGA

234 SCRA 555

July 29, 1994

Contention of the Petitioner:

8. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MAMERTO NARVAEZ, defendant-

On November 5, 1993, around 9:30 in the evenings, at Barangay I Poblacion, Municipality of

CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED :

CONTENTION OF THE STATE:

CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED:

CONTENTION OF THE STATE:

CONTENTION OF THE STATE

APPELLEE: The People of the Philippines

APPELLANT: Percival Gonza

SUBJECT: Burden of proof

CRIME: Homicide (Modified)

19. PEOPLE v. RICOHERMOSO

Contention of the accused:

Contention of the state:

AFFIRMED IN FAVOR OF THE STATE.

20. PEOPLE v DELIMA, 46 PHIL 738

G.R. No. L-47722

July 27, 1943

CONTENTION OF THE STATE:

CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED:

23. Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan 268 SCRA 332

CONTENTION OF THE STATE:

Contention of the Accused:

Ruling: Cheong is liable and the appeal is dismissed.

FULL CASE: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/aug2001/111709.htm

25. People v Genosa

26. People vs. Guillermo Florendo alias “IMONG”

TOPIC: Exempting Circumstances (RPC, Art. 12)

CONTENTION OF THE STATE

CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT

27. People vs Estrada

Contention of the Accused:

Contention of the State:

28. People vs Villa Jr.

Contention of the state:

Contention of the accused:

In order thatinsanity can be considered as an exempting circumstance, it must be shown to

29. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FERNANDO MADARANG y MAGNO

PUNO, J.: HTML

30. People vs. Diaz

320 SCRA 168

Topic: Insanity and Imbecility (Exempting Circumstance)

Contention of the State:

Insanity may be taken as exempting circumstances, there must be complete depreciation of

Contention of the Accused:

32. People vs. Genosa

341 SCRA 493

Contention of the Accused:

33. People vs. Estepano

307 SCRA 707

May 28, 1999