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World War III in 1957

Part I
The year 1957 is not chosen at random. That is the year contemplated by "Dropshot," the U.S.
plan for a third world war, which governed strategic thinking for the 1950s. Originally created in
1949, the plan was eventually released under the Freedom of Information Act. It was published,
with commentary, in 1978 by Anthony Cave Brown in a book entitled "Dropshot." The war
described by that book is the starting point for this article, though my discussion departs from it
in many particulars. I would like to consider three topics:

(1) How could such a war could have started?

(2) What would the course of the war have been?

(3) What would postwar history have been like?

A preliminary matter that must be dealt with is the role of nuclear weapons. The writers of
Dropshot in 1949 did not think that nuclear weapons would be decisive. Their use would have
been optional except in retaliation. Though atomic bombs are devastating if you can transport
them someplace where they can do damage, the only means then available was the bomber.
This made delivery highly problematical, especially between continents. The writers did note
that their assessment would be obsolete if these weapons could be married to rockets capable
of flying between North America and Eurasia. As it happened, the era of the Intercontinental
Ballistic Missile (ICBM) did not really begin until the early 1960s. As late as the Cuban Missile
Crisis in 1962, the Soviets were estimated to have only about 50 ICBMs, none in hardened silos.
(The Pentagon expressed confidence to President Kennedy that the U.S. could destroy them
before they could be launched. Kennedy was not enthusiastic about putting this confidence to
the test).

Thus, while Dropshot did anticipate that the U.S. would be able to make successful nuclear
strikes at a few Soviet industrial facilities, it judged that these would not be enough to determine
the course of the war. Dropshot forecast that the Soviets would be able to drop no more than
two atomic bombs on the United States, and that only if they were lucky. It now appears that
those "duck and cover" instructional films that were shown in schools starting in the 1950s were
less irrational than later opinion has assumed. If you were affected by one of these strikes at all,
you were likely to be some distance from ground zero, where precautions against blast and
fallout would make perfect sense. We should also note that the relative immunity to atomic
attack enjoyed by the United States would not have applied to the European members of NATO.
Even in Europe, however, Dropshot did not believe that atomic weapons would be decisive, or
even necessarily used at all.

With these points settled, we may begin the discussion proper:

(1) How could such a war could have started? It could not have started by accident. The hair-
trigger nuclear response procedures which characterized the later stages of the Cold War simply
did not exist during the period in question. There was no need for them, since it would have
taken hours for a nuclear-armed bomber to reach its target. Indeed, the leaders of the U.S. and
the Soviet Union would have been less constrained than were the leaders of the major European
powers in August 1914. The intricate mass mobilization plans devised by France and Germany in
preparation for the First World War could not really be controlled once they were started. They
were intimately tied to strategic plans of offense and defense which required major battles to
occur within days of the start of mobilization. A war in 1957 between the United States and the
Soviet Union would have started very differently. The mobilization of whole continents is
necessarily a leisurely affair. The plans the newly mobilized armies would have been called on to
execute would have been calculated in terms of months or years. Therefore, though accidental
skirmishes between East and West might have occurred in Europe or the Mediterranean in the
1950s, an actual war would probably have to have been deliberate.

Since the Dropshot war is defensive, at least in its opening stages, we must imagine a situation in
which the Soviets launch a general offensive to occupy Western Europe (and various other
places, as we will see below.) This would have required a Soviet leadership that believed a
decisive victory for communism was achievable by military means, and a U.S. leadership that
was either threatening or indecisive or both. The first requirement would have been met by the
survival of Stalin into a vigorous old age. Though Stalin died in 1953, he would have only 78 years
old in 1957, hardly old enough to get a driver's license in Georgia. The Stalin whom Solzhenitsyn
described in his novel, "The First Circle," planned to fight and win a decisive third world war. Let
us then imagine the old tyrant succumbing to delusions of omnipotence because of his
overwhelming victory in the Second World War, yet frightened by events he sees happening on
the other side of the world.

There is a good argument to made that the United States took as little hurt from the Cold War as
it did because the president during the 1950s was that logistics expert, Dwight David
Eisenhower. Throughout his presidency, experts from the Pentagon would come to him with
estimates of the terrifying strength of the Soviet Union and proposals for huge increases in
conventional forces which would be necessary to counter it. Eisenhower, who had been a five
star general, knew just how seriously to take assessments of this type. Using his own good
judgment to gauge just what the Soviets could or would do, he starved the U.S. military during
the 1950s to let give the consumer economy room to breath. It was a risk, but history shows that
he was right to take it. (His successor, John Kennedy, lacking this self-assurance, tended to act on
the assumption that the most pessimistic assessment was the correct one, which was part of the
reason for the Vietnam War.) Eisenhower knew that the Soviets were a real threat, one that had
to be contained. In this he was right: the attempts by revisionist historians to ascribe the Cold
War to American paranoia are tendentious. He was also right in believing that containment, as
distinguished from rollback, could be achieved by feint and threat. He could make threats
effectively because he was a known quantity to the Soviet leadership. They knew he was a
cautious commander, that he would not start a fight if he did not have to, that he was not easily
deceived. Even when they lied to him, they lied within limits understood by both sides.

Let us picture an alternative president. Suppose that Eisenhower is out on the golf links in
September of 1956, taking a short break from his not-very-grueling campaign for almost certain
reelection, when he has a fatal heart attack. His running mate, Vice President Richard Nixon, was
even then a man of ambiguous reputation. Nixon assumes the top spot on the Republican ticket,
and he has few if any differences with his boss's sober military and foreign policies. However,
people quickly form the impression that he is too young and too opportunistic to be president
yet. They therefore turn, with a sigh of resignation, to the Democratic presidential contender,
Adlai Stevenson. Stevenson, of course, had many gifts. He was intelligent, well-informed, and
articulate to a degree rare among American politicians. Stevenson was a genuine intellectual.
Unfortunately, he was also a windbag in the great tradition of William Jennings Bryan and a
sentimental internationalist in the tradition of Woodrow Wilson. Sentiment and kindness are not
the same thing, so foreign affairs conducted by sentimental statesmen are often envenomed to
an unusual degree.

Stevenson's foreign policy is itself a good illustration. John Kenneth Galbraith, who helped write
Stevenson's speeches in the early 1950s, has remarked that part of his job consisted of toning
down the virtual declarations of war against the Soviet Union that Stevenson usually inserted in
his first drafts. Doubtless some of this rhetoric was intended merely to counter the impression
that the Democratic Party was soft on Communism. However, it cannot be denied that
Stevenson felt the policy of Cold War containment was immoral because it did not go far
enough. He did not favor an attack on the Soviet Union, but he did want it pressured from all
directions with physical and moral force. This was what Ronald Reagan actually did in the 1980s,
with considerable success. However, Reagan and his advisers knew that the Soviet Union had
exhausted the growth capacity of a command economy, that the system was strong but brittle.
In the 1950s, by contrast, the Soviet Union was growing and confident. Stevenson would not
have been deterred by this well-known fact; he had the sort of mind that regarded mere
practicality as rather tawdry. His idealism would have been costly. Even a symbolic threat to the
Soviet Empire, as it then was, would have brought results quite different from those of thirty
years later.

If the parties to the Cold War had wanted a military showdown, they would have had several
perfectly suitable occasions in 1956, notably the Suez Crisis and the Hungarian Uprising. Had
Stalin still been alive at that time, it is conceivable that he would have started to deal with the
peoples of Eastern Europe as he had begun to deal with the peoples of the Soviet Union in the
1930s. Certainly some Eastern Europeans believed that Stalin was planning massive movements
of populations and the vigorous purging of pre-World War II society. If this happened, an
outraged Stevenson Administration might then have announced its intention to send a standby
expeditionary force to Western Europe to support any future popular uprisings in Eastern
Europe. Less suspicious rulers than Stalin would have been moved to preemptive action in such
an event. He would not have been reassured by the interminable flow of moralistic rhetoric that
President Stevenson could have been relived upon to produce. There would have been too much
of it to read, much less analyze. Stalin could easily have decided that he could no longer wait for
his creatures in Western Europe to take power through force or fraud. Hoping for a decisive
victory before the U.S. expeditionary force could arrive, he sends his armies across the north
German plain to take the ports on the English Channel.

(2) What would the course of the war have been? The Dropshot study is not a belligerent
document. It seems to be one of those common bureaucratic plans which deliberately present a
scenario so hair-raising that its intended readers will be dissuaded from ever trying it in real life.
It does, of course, wildly overestimate anything the Soviet could or would do. In addition to the
main thrust across northwestern Europe, it contemplates simultaneous Soviet offensives into the
Middle East and Japan. (For reasons wholly obscure, it directs that Hokkaido, the northernmost
and least populous of the main Japanese islands, be abandoned.) Its assessment of the early
course of the war in Europe, however, was certainly realistic in 1949, and might still have held
true in 1957. The gist of the forecast was two months of unrelieved disaster. While the planners
hoped to stop the offensive somewhere in Germany, their sober assessment was that it would
have been difficult even to hold Britain. Readers of Norman Schwartzkopf's memoir, "It Doesn't
Take A Hero," will recall his description of the state of the U.S. Army in the 1950s. At least that
part of it stationed in the United States was a hollow force of badly trained conscripts. Its
equipment was ill-maintained and its senior officer corps consisted disproportionately of World
War II veterans who would not otherwise have had jobs. This was the Army that was sent to fight
in Vietnam, with what results we know. While doubtless the emergency of a world war would
have quickly brought improvements, the opening phases of the war would have had to be fought
with what the U.S. had on hand. What it had was not all that good.

In some ways, an actual world war fought in 1957 would have been fought under even worse
conditions than those envisioned in 1949. When Dropshot was being developed, the fate of
China was still in doubt. The maps that come with the plan show China with a Communist north
and a Nationalist south. The study discusses the country mostly in terms of natural resources
and as a bridge to French Indochina. In reality, by 1957 China was a united ally of the Soviet
Union. It had a significant military, as proven by the Korean War. As we know now, Chairman
Mao tended to needle the Soviet leadership for being too accommodating to the West. By some
accounts, he even proposed an offensive war against the West to Nikita Khruschev, offering tens
of millions of soldiers and even the union of China with the USSR. Of course, China had (and has)
little striking power beyond its own borders, and the Soviet Union could not have come near to
supplying the Chinese Red Army with the equipment for offensive capabilities. Still, the Sino-
Soviet alliance in a World War would have been a formidable opponent. It is perfectly plausible
that some Chinese armies would have fought not just around China's perimeter, but in France
and Germany.

The worst case scenario for such a war is available, not in Dropshot, but in a 1955 novel by C.M.
Kornbluth, entitled "Not This August." We hear about the war mostly in retrospect, since in the
first few pages the president of the United States surrenders to the Communist alliance in a
radio address. The bulk of the book is a description of the Soviet occupation, as it affects a single
small town. The war lasted for three years, and it was not so different from the Dropshot war.
Nuclear weapons were not a decisive factor. The Soviets take all of Europe and, using its
resources and Chinese manpower, contrive to defeat the American fleet, make a landing in
Central America and work their way north. The U.S. surrenders when the American front in Texas
collapses.

It might seem a bit premature to surrender with the enemy only on the southern border, but the
author paints a good picture of a society that has already been bled white. All available
manpower and industrial capacity have been diverted to the war, and still it is not enough.
Dropshot contemplates a comparable degree of mobilization. Thirty million people of both sexes
would have been needed to win the war the plan laid out. It would not have been an
economically invigorating war, as the Second World War was for the United States. Wars are only
invigorating if the economy has a lot of unused potential which would go to waste if not used for
military production. This was the case with the American economy in 1940, but not in 1957.
Rather, it would have been like the Second World War was for Great Britain, with every warm
body either in the service or doing something to support the war effort, and with civilian
production at destitution levels. During and after the Second World War, a number of laws were
passed giving the president standby authority to nationalize or otherwise commandeer most of
the industrial plant of the U.S. in the event of a national emergency. Universal conscription was,
in principle, already in place. In the course of the war against the Communist alliance, the U.S.
would itself have become a command-economy state.

Part II of World War III in 1957


Click Here for Part I
In actuality, or course, even if the Soviets got to Antwerp, they would be most unlikely to have
arrived in Amarillo three years later. Rather than the immediate loss of Western Europe, we
must imagine Central Europe becoming a debatable region. After absorbing the initial offensive,
Dropshot calls for NATO to hold the line while the resources of the United States were mobilized.
Realistically, this could have taken at least a year. During that time, it would have been extremely
difficult to keep NATO together. One of the points which "Not This August" emphasizes as a
factor in the defeat of the United States is the role of the Communist underground. The state of
the evidence suggests that such a concern may be more than simple McCarthyite paranoia. The
part played by Communists and communist sympathizers in the politics and culture of the U.S. in
the 1930s and 1940s is still insufficiently appreciated. If I had to name a single book to support
this point, I would suggest the last of Upton Sinclair's "Lanny Budd" novels, entitled "A World to
Win." Published in 1946, it describes sympathetically the adventures of a wealthy American
Communist as he moves about the world during and just before the war, helping to organize the
fight against Fascism. The author, who made no secret of his own leftist sympathies, describes
the pro-Soviet cells which exist everywhere in the U.S., in Hollywood and Washington and the
arts. This, of course, was all edifying progressive fiction, but it seems to have been fictionalized
rather than fantastic.
The pro-Soviet streak in America politics did real harm during the Molotov-Ribbentrop pack,
when it actively impeded U.S. attempts to prepare for World War II. It continued to do harm
throughout the Cold War era, up to and including the "Nuclear Freeze" movement of the 1980s,
which nearly succeeded in depriving American negotiators of the bargaining power they needed
to get the Soviets to reduce the number of nuclear weapons. While this force in American
politics would have been as active as possible during a U.S.-Soviet war, they might not have
counted for that much, considering the high degree of national unity there would have been. In
any event, they would have worked through front groups as much as possible. This would not
have been the case in Europe. The powerful Communist Parties in France and Italy were openly
and proudly pro-Soviet, indeed pro-Stalin. They could and would have organized work stoppages
and mutinies. The peace movements they would have supported would have been particularly
persuasive with hostile and at least temporarily triumphant armies only a few hundred miles
away. Even if they could not have forced their countries to surrender, they could have made all
but the most perfunctory participation in the war impossible.

Still, these political difficulties would have been no more insurmountable than those that had to
be overcome to win the Second World War. Assuming, therefore, that NATO holds together while
it rearms and regroups, the second phase of the war could begin. Dropshot contemplated an
offense that would ultimately result in the occupation of the Soviet Union. Again, however, it did
nothing to suggest that anyone would enjoy trying this in real life. The plan considered the
various ways that the Soviet Union might have been invaded, and finds all but one of them
either impractical, like a drive north from the Middle East, or useless, like an invasion of the
Soviet Far East. The only way to do it is the hard way, back eastward across the north German
plain and into Poland. Securing the Balkans would be necessary simply to secure this endeavor.

Having defeated the Soviet armies in Eastern Europe, the rest of the war would have resembled
the German campaign of 1941, but without Hitler's mental problems. I can summarize the final
stage of the war no better than by quoting Dropshot itself:

"22. In the event of war with the USSR, we should endeavor by successful military and other
operations to create conditions which would permit satisfactory accomplishment of U.S.
objectives without a predetermined requirement for unconditional surrender. War aims
supplemental to our peacetime aims should include:

"a. Eliminating Soviet Russian domination in areas outside the borders of any Russian state
allowed to exist after the war.

"b. Destroying the structure of relationships by which the leaders of the All-Union Communist
Party have been able to exert moral and disciplinary authority over individual citizens, or groups
of citizens, in countries not under Communist control.

"c. Assuring that any regime or regimes which may exist on traditional Russian territory in the
aftermath of a war:

(1) Do not have sufficient military power to wage a war.

(2) Impose nothing resembling the present Iron Curtain over contacts with the outside world.

"d. In addition, if any Bolshevik Regime is left in any part of the Soviet Union, ensuring that it
does not control enough of the military-industrial potential of the Soviet Union to enable it to
wage war on comparable terms with any other regime or regimes which may exist on traditional
Russian territory.

"e. Seeking to create postwar conditions which will:

(1) Prevent the development of power relationships dangerous to the security of the United
States and international peace.

(2) Be conducive to the development of an effective world organization based on the purposes
and principles of the United Nations.

(3) Permit the earliest practicable discontinuance within the United States of wartime controls."

This passage is not without relevance to the state of the world in 1995. Let us imagine, however,
that all this has been achieved, but the year is only 1960.

(3) What would postwar history have been like?

The burden of Arnold Toynbee's great multivolumed work, "A Study of History," is that our
civilization has broken down and that it is now (during the 20th century) in a "time of troubles,"
like the Hellenistic period in the ancient West and the Era of Contending States in China. Such
periods are characterized by "world wars." In the course of them, one great power delivers a
"knockout blow" to its main rival, and sooner or later goes on to establish a universal state, like
the Roman Empire. The war Dropshot envisioned would have been such a blow. Actually,
Toynbee thought that a third world war would probably be started by the United States and won
by the Russians, "because they have a more serious attitude toward life." Be that as it may, since
we are working with the U.S. war plan, let us consider what the result of a Western victory
would have been.

The world of 1960 after Dropshot would have been poorer than the real world of that time.
Africa and the great arc of Eurasia around Russia would have collapsed into ethnic squabbling as
the reach and attention of the great powers were withdrawn. On the whole, the non-communist
countries of East Asia might have been invigorated, as they were by the Korean and Vietnam
Wars. However, there would have been no comparable world demand for consumer goods for
these countries to exploit. They could well have experienced a war boom, followed by prolonged
depressions, as their home markets slowly recovered.

China, we assume, would have been part of the losing alliance. Dropshot did not devote a great
deal of attention to it. If the plan had actually been implemented, it is unlikely that country
would have been the scene of major U.S. operations. However, with China's attention diverted
toward supporting the Soviet war effort, it is conceivable that the U.S. might have backed a
Nationalist reinvasion of southern China. It is debatable whether this would have found wide
support. The Communist regime did not begin to mismanage the country significantly until the
Great Leap Forward of the late 1950s, a program which presumably would have been postponed
in the event of a war. However, what with the stresses of a lost war and such resentment against
the regime as had already been generated, it is possible that China would have fallen apart,
much as it had during the warlord era of the 1920s, and as it may again in the later 1990s when
Deng Xiao Peng dies.

The biggest differences between a post-Dropshot world and the actual world of 1960 would have
been in Russia, Europe and the United States. Russia and Eastern Europe in the late 1950s were
still recovering from the effects of World War II, and the last thing they needed was another war.
In some ways, perhaps, the Dropshot war would been less damaging than the Second World
War, since it was supposed to be faster and would not have been directed against civilians. The
plan called for a war of tanks, fought for the most part on the plains of northern Europe. It would
still have been a catastrophe, but one that would not have returned the region to 1945 levels.

Russia in 1960 might have been better able to make the transition to a market economy than it
was in the 1990s, for the simple reason there was a substantial portion of the population who
were already adults during the last period when free enterprise had been allowed to operate,
during Lenin's "New Economic Policy" of the 1920s. It might, for instance, have been fairly simple
to recreate peasant agriculture. On the other hand, Russian industry in the 1950s was even more
strictly military than it was in the final stages of the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Since the military
occupation of Russia in 1960 would have been largely concerned with closing down the
country's military potential, this would have meant closing down all but a small fraction of the
country's industry. The country would have become, at least for a while, a country of peasants
and priests. This prospect might warm the heart of Alexander Solzhenitsyn, but the reality might
not have been sustainable.

In Western Europe, the 1950s boom would gave been cancelled. Even assuming the Dropshot
war did less damage than the Second World War, still it would have been the third major war in
the region in fifty years. Maybe that would have been too much. People can only be expected to
rebuild so many times before they begin to despair about the future. It is hard to imagine the
normal market mechanisms of savings and investment operating at all in such environment.
What fool would invest money in a society that seemed to explode every 20 years? Who would
even want to keep money? People would try to turn their savings into tangible assets as quickly
as possible. The cloud of despondency would ultimately lift, of course, but would be greatly
impeded by the factor we will consider below.

Even in America, collectivism would have triumphed. As several historians have pointed out,
what we call socialism is simply the institutionalization in peacetime of the command economy
measures devised by Britain and Germany to fight the First World War. These institutions would
have been greatly strengthened throughout the West, but especially in the United States, by the
experience of two world wars so close in occurrence. We should remember that enlightened
opinion in the U.S. of the 1950s was that command economies really were superior in most was
to market economies. It was universally assumed that pro-market policies could never cure
underdevelopment in the Third World. Certainly the literature of the era is filled with ominous
observations that the Soviet Economy was growing much faster than the U.S. economy during
the same period. If the highly regimented American economy envisioned by Dropshot had
actually succeeded in winning the Third World War, this attitude might have become a fixed
assumption of American culture, as it did in so many other countries during the same period.
Private enterprise would doubtless have continued to constitute a major share of economic
activity, but it would have been so tightly regimented as to be virtually a creature of the state.
And there would have been no example, anywhere on Earth, of an important country that did
things differently.

The '60s, as we knew them, would also have been cancelled. Partly, of course, this would have
been because the country would have been broke. Everyone would have had a job with a fixed
salary, of course, but there would have been little money for cars or highways or private houses.
America would have remained a country of immense, densely populated cities, most of which
would have consisted of public housing. The biggest difference would have been the psychology
of the younger generation. The young adults of the 1950s, who had been children during the
Second World War, could not have conceived of allowing themselves the indiscipline and
disrespect shown by the young adults of the actual 1960s. The "Silent Generation" of the 1950s
knew from their earliest experiences that the world was a dangerous place and the only way to
get through it was by cooperation and conformity. If Dropshot had occurred, their children, the
babyboom children, would have been even more constrained in childhood and correspondingly
more well-behaved in young adulthood. Doubtless there would still have been something of an
increase in the percentage of the young in higher education in the 1960s, but the campuses
would have been a sea of crewcuts and neat bobs, white shirts and sensible shoes. The popular
music would not have been memorable.

The world after Dropshot would have had certain advantages, of course. Total world
expenditures on the military would probably have been much smaller than was actually the
case. The nuclear arms race would never have occurred. Indeed, the more alarming types of
nuclear missile, those with multiple warheads, would never have been invented. It would have
been a world much less cynical than the one which actually occurred. The three world wars
would have provided a sense of closure which modern history has not yet achieved. This time,
finally, all the great evils of the century would have been defeated. It would be unlikely to have
resulted in Toynbee's universal state, at least not during the 20th century. The American people
would probably have been as sick of the Adlai Stevenson Democrats after the Third World War
as they were of the Roosevelt Democrats after the Second World War. The country would have
kicked the victors out of office and sought to turn inward. America would not have been
enthusiastic about further adventures for a long time to come.

The exhausted world I have described would doubtless have revived in a few decades. Nations
would have broken out of the cultural constraints that the experience of universal conscription
tend to impose on a generation. People would slowly realize that their highly regulated
economies were not really keeping them safe but were really keeping them poor. There would
be an episode of restructuring as technologies developed for the military were finally converted
to consumer use, and old subsidized industries were allowed to die. All in all, the world of 1995
after Dropshot might have been similar to the one we see today. Still, it would have been
reached at immensely greater cost, both economic and spiritual. We are not living in the best of
all possible worlds, but it could easily have been worse.

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