LUZ M. ZALDIVIA, petitioner, vs. HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR., in his Sec. 2.
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of
capacity as Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth
Judicial Region, Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
 The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes
without a mayor's permit in violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of
1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, Rizal.
 The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990. The
referral-complaint of the police was received by the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990. The
corresponding information was filed with the MTC on October 2,
1990.
 The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground
that the crime had prescribed, but the motion was denied. On
appeal to the RTC of Rizal, the denial was sustained.
 In the present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner first
argues that the charge against her is governed by the following
provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure:
Sec. 1. Scope — This rule shall govern the procedure in first level courts
in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
xxx xxx xxx
She then invokes Act. No. 3326, as amended, reading as follows:
Sec. 1. Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after
two months.
the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from
the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted
against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings
are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Her conclusion is that as the information was filed way beyond the two-
month statutory period from the date of the alleged commission of the
offense, the charge against her should have been dismissed on the ground
of prescription.
For its part, the prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was
suspended upon the filing of the complaint against her with the OPP.
Agreeing with the respondent judge, the Solicitor General also invokes
Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure:
Sec. 1. How Instituted — For offenses not subject to the rule on
summary procedure in special cases, the institution of criminal action
interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged.
The respondent maintains that the filing of the complaint with the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor comes under the phrase "such institution" and
that the phrase "in all cases" applies to all cases, without distinction,
including those falling under the Rule on Summary Procedure.
Respondent invoked Francisco v. Court of Appeals.
It is important to note that this decision was promulgated on May 30,
1983, two months before the promulgation of the Rule on Summary
Procedure on August 1, 1983. On the other hand, Section 1 of Rule 110 is
new, having been incorporated therein with the revision of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure on January 1, 1985, except for the last paragraph,
which was added on October 1, 1988.
That section meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject
to the rule on summary procedure in special cases," which plainly signifies
that the section does not apply to offenses which are subject to summary
procedure. The phrase "in all cases" appearing in the last paragraph
obviously refers to the cases covered by the Section, that is, those offenses
not governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the
offenses it covers are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should
follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a
municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section
1 of Rule 110.
Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under
the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts," the obvious reference is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in
such courts:
These offenses are not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or
information shall be filed directly in court without need of a prior
preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." Both parties agree
that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a
preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be
deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the
prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means
that the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the
case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that.
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326
which says that the period of prescription shall be suspended "when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings
referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the
submission of the Solicitor General that they include administrative
proceedings. His contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does
not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.
At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on
Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a
conflict between Act. No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of
its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights". Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right.
Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the
petitioner commenced from its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and
ended two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section
1 of Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not a
judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have interrupted
the period was the filing of the information with the Municipal Trial Court
of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime
had already prescribed.
G.R. No. 196508, September 24, 2014
LEONARDO A. VILLALON AND ERLINDA TALDE-VILLALON, Petitioners, v.
AMELIA CHAN, Respondent.
BRION, J.:
Factual Antecedents
On May 6, 1954, the respondent Amelia Chan married Leon Basilio Chua in
a civil ceremony in the City Court of Caloocan.
The respondent claimed that her husband Leon Basilio Chua and the
present petitioner, Leonardo A. Villalon, are one and the same person.
During the subsistence of his marriage to Amelia, Leon Basilio Chua, this
time under the name of Leonardo A. Villalon, allegedly contracted a
second marriage with Erlinda Talde that took place on June 2, 1993. This
marriage was solemnized by Judge Ruth C. Santos of the Municipal Trial
Court of Antipolo, Rizal.
Amelia, who was then living in the United States and could not personally
file a case for bigamy in the Philippines, requested Benito Yao Chua and
Wilson Go to commence the criminal proceedings against the petitioners.
During the pre-trial, Atty. Apollo V. Atencia appeared in behalf of Amelia,
the private offended party. On February 20, 2006, Atty. Atencia formally
filed his entry of appearance as private prosecutor, with the conformity
and under the control and supervision of Assistant City Prosecutor Gerardo
P. Barot.
Leonardo filed an omnibus motion with the RTC seeking to disqualify Atty.
Atencia. He argued that Amelia could not be represented in the bigamy
case because she was not a party to the case, as she did not file the
complaint-affidavit. He also argued that Amelia had already waived her
right to file a civil and criminal case against him and his co-defendant
Erlinda. Amelia opposed the omnibus motion, while the public prosecutor
joined the petitioners in disqualifying Atty. Atencia from appearing in the
case. Such motion was granted. Trial of the case ensued thereafter.
On March 27, 2006, Amelia filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition,
with prayer for TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, with the CA. CA
issued a TRO enjoining further proceedings on the case.
Despite the TRO issued by the CA, trial of the bigamy case proceeded with
the presentation of the prosecution’s evidence, to which Leonardo filed a
demurrer to evidence. RTC dismissed the bigamy case for failure of the
prosecution to prove the petitioners’ guilt.
Petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA
In her petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA, Amelia alleged
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when it proceeded with
the bigamy case without permitting the participation of Atty. Atencia as
private prosecutor.
The CA granted Amelia’s petition and annulled the RTC’s resolution
disqualifying Atty. Atencia from participation in the case, and its order that
dismissed the bigamy case against the petitioners. The CA ruled that the
crime of bigamy, being public in nature, can be denounced by anyone, not
only by the offended party, before the prosecuting authorities without the
offended party losing her right to recover damages.
Also, the CA ruled that the offended party could be deprived of the right to
intervene in the criminal case only when he or she expressly waives the
civil action or reserves the right to institute one. The CA found no such
waiver from Amelia and held that Atty. Atencia’s appearance as private
prosecutor was proof enough of Amelia’s determination to enforce her
claim for damages in the bigamy case.
The case was therefore REMANDED to another branch of the RTC of
Antipolo, and the private prosecutor was allowed to intervene.
Villalon then filed a petition for certiorari to the SC, with the additional
imputation that Amelia’s petition is fatally defective since it failed to
implead the People of the Philippines as a party-respondent in that case,
hence, the same should have been dismissed outright.
HELD: IN FAVOR OF THE CA
First, the petitioners argue that the RTC’s September 5, 2006 order
dismissing the bigamy case against them had already become final because
it was not assailed by the respondent in her petition for certiorari before
the CA. The petitioners point out that the respondent only particularly
assailed the RTC’s March 3, 2006 resolution and failed to file a separate or
amended petition for certiorari to include the September 5, 2006 order as
one of the assailed orders of the RTC. Based on this assertion, the
petitioners contend that the CA, in ordering the remand and re-raffle of
the bigamy case to another RTC branch, violates their right against double
jeopardy.
The petitioners are mistaken. The review by the CA on whether the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion encompassed, not only the issuance
of the March 3, 2006 resolution, but all proceedings in the bigamy case
thereafter. This is apparent from the words used by the respondent in her
certiorari petition before the CA.
Thus, the RTC’s September 5, 2006 order, which is still the subject of
review by this Court, has not attained finality and the CA’s assailed order
would not violate the petitioners’ right against double jeopardy.
Also, we emphasize that the RTC issued its order in defiance of the TRO
issued by the CA. The records show that the CA had issued a TRO on April
19, 2006, which should have prohibited the RTC from further proceeding
on the case. But the RTC, instead, continued with the presentation of the
prosecution’s evidence and issued the assailed September 5, 2006 order.
Under this circumstance, the RTC’s September 5, 2006 order was actually
without force and effect and would not serve as basis for the petitioners to
claim that their right against double jeopardy had been violated. The RTC,
clearly, acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing its September 5,
2006 order in view of the earlier TRO issued by the CA.
Second, the petitioners argue that the CA gravely erred when it ruled that:
the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its March 3, 2006
resolution disqualifying Atty. Atencia as private prosecutor, and that Atty.
Atencia’s disqualification violated the respondent’s rights to intervene and
be heard in the bigamy case. They contend that, even with Atty. Atencia’s
disqualification, the respondent was never denied her right to participate
in the proceedings and was even called to stand as a witness but the
respondent never appeared before the court because she was out of the
country during the whole proceedings on the bigamy case.
Section 16 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly
allows an offended party to intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the
offense for the recovery of civil liability where the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is instituted with
the criminal action. The
In this case, the fact that the respondent, who was already based abroad,
had secured the services of an attorney in the Philippines reveals her
willingness and interest to participate in the prosecution of the bigamy
case and to recover civil liability from the petitioners. Thus, the RTC should
have allowed Atty. Atencia from intervening in the bigamy case as the
respondent, being the offended party, is afforded by law the right to
participate through counsel in the prosecution of the offense with respect
to the civil aspect of the case.
Lastly, the petitioners argue that the respondent’s certiorari petition
before the CA should have been dismissed outright because it failed to
implead the “People of the Philippines” as a party-respondent.
The respondent’s failure to implead the “People of the Philippines” as a
party-respondent is not a fatal defect warranting the outright dismissal of
her petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA because: (1) a
petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 is directed against any
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
alleged to have acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
(2) the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the respondent is a
special civil action separate and independent from the bigamy case filed
against the petitioners. For these reasons, the “People of the Philippines”
need not be impleaded as a party in a petition for certiorari and
prohibition.
G.R. No. 194445 March 12, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff, vs. ROGER POSADA y URBANO and
EMILY POSADA y SARMIENTO, Accused.
REYES, J.:
The Case
Accused-appellants Roger Posada (Roger) and Emily Posada (Emily) were
convicted by the RTC of Virac, Catanduanes, for selling 12 pieces of sachet
containing shabu.
Roger was also convicted for possession of one piece of torn plastic sachet,
containing residue of shabu, a piece of small aluminum foil, a pair of small
scissors, and fifteen 15 pieces of used lighter all of which are intended to
be used for smoking or introducing dangerous drugs into the body of a
person.
Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, the accused-appellants filed an appeal
before the Court of Appeals (CA) which, via a Decision[4] dated June 17,
2010, affirmed the RTC Decision as to the accused-appellants' conviction in
Criminal Case No. 3490 but acquitted Roger in Criminal Case No. 3489 on
the ground of reasonable doubt.
Now, the accused-appellants ask this Court for a complete exoneration
from the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 3490 on the ground that the
prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody and integrity of the
seized illegal items and to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Antecedent Facts
P/CI Tria ordered surveillance on the activities of the accused-appellants
and a certain Johnjohn Urbano. As a result of the said surveillance,PO1
Area was able to buy one sachet of shabu from Emily for P250.00 on
August 2, 2005. A buy-bust operation thereafter ensued.
The accused-appellants were subsequently charged in two separate
Informations, both dated August 4, 2005, with violation of Sections 5, 11
and 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. which were respectively docketed as
Criminal Case No. 3490 and Criminal Case No. 3489.
Meanwhile, Emily testified that on that fateful day of August 3, 2005, she
was washing clothes at her mother-in-law's house when a man, whom she
could not identify, approached her and asked her if she was Emily Posada.
She alleged that the man immediately held her hands, shouting Police!
Police! after which police officers Tria and Aldave arrived. Her picture was
taken. Subsequently, she was brought to the patrol car where her husband
Roger later joined her. Both Roger and Emily were then transported to the
police station. Roger was placed behind bars while Emily was placed at the
detention cell of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP).
The couple claimed that the police officers did not inform them why they
were brought to the police station and subsequently detained. Emily
denied that a buy-bust operation was conducted against her, but she was
aware of the search conducted in their house because her husband
informed her at the police station. Meanwhile, Roger also denied that the
police officers presented to him a search warrant. Likewise, both alleged
that the money taken from Emily's wallet were the proceeds of the sale of
their chickens, which Roger gave to Emily.
Our Ruling
The prosecution has established the chain of custody and integrity of the
seized illegal items.
The accused-appellants alleged that the prosecution failed to establish the
chain of custody and integrity of the seized illegal items because:
(1) The apprehending officers allegedly failed to submit the seized illegal
items to the PNP Crime Laboratory Service for a qualitative and
quantitative examination within the mandatory 24-hour period from
confiscation; and
(2) There is an alleged discrepancy as to the number of plastic sachets
recovered from the accused-appellants and those submitted to forensic
chemist PSI Clemen.
On the first factual issue, we find that the records of the case and the
testimonies of witnesses belie the accused-appellants' contention.
Based on the records, the buy-bust operation, the arrest of the accused-
appellants and the confiscation of the illegal items happened at around 12
noon of August 3, 2005. PO1 Area received from Emily one sachet of shabu
and after PO1 Area introduced himself and arrested Emily, 12 more
sachets of shabu were found in the possession of Emily. The said 12
sachets of shabu were inside a coin purse, with a bundle of money. PO1
Area prepared on the same day an RPS in the presence of Asuncion,
Kagawad Sarmiento and Vargas. On August 4, 2005, P/CI Tria requested for
a laboratory examination of a piece of the contrabands. The request of
P/CI Tria for laboratory examination dated August 4, 2005 was received by
PO2 Abanio and P/Insp. Sta. Cruz on the same date.
The accused-appellants wanted us to believe that a day had lapsed before
P/CI Tria submitted the illegal drugs to PNP Crime Laboratory Service,
contrary to the mandate of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. They even cited
the testimony of P/CI Tria where the latter allegedly admitted submitting
the subject seized items on August 4, 2005. However, a close look at the
testimony of P/CI Tria will reveal that nothing in it would show that he
submitted the alleged illegal drugs beyond the 24-hour reglementary
period. In fact, even the Laboratory Examination Request dated August 4,
2005 does not indicate violation of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.Clearly,
from the foregoing, the accused-appellants failed to adduce any evidence
to prove their contention.
Furthermore, the CA is correct in giving credence to the testimonies of the
police officers as regards the timely submission of the subject illegal drugs
since they are presumed to have regularly performed their duties, unless
there is evidence suggesting ill-motive on the part of the police officers. In
this case, the accused-appellants failed to contradict the presumption.
What goes against the accused-appellants is the fact that they have not
offered any evidence of ill-motive against the police officers. Emily even
admitted that she did not know PO1 Area, the poseur-buyer. Considering
that there was no existing relationship between the police officers and the
accused-appellants, the former could not be accused of improper motive
to falsely testify against the accused-appellants.
On the second factual issue, we find the accused-appellants' claim not
supported by evidence.
The accused-appellants alleged that the integrity of the seized illegal items
was compromised and their evidentiary value diminished because of the
alleged discrepancy between the number of plastic sachets recovered from
the accused-appellants and those submitted to forensic chemist PSI
Clemen. They insisted that based on the Informations in Criminal Cases the
testimonies of witnesses Asuncion[37] and SPO1 Aldave, only fourteen (14)
plastic sachets were recovered from the accused-appellants, while PSI
Clemen allegedly testified that a total of 15 sachets were submitted for
examination.
However, a review of the defense-quoted testimony of PSI Clemen would
show that she received a total of 15 items.
Finally, we say that the prosecution has established the chain of custody
and integrity of the seized illegal items.
After PO1 Area arrested Emily and confiscated the 13 sachets of shabu,
P/CI Tria took pictures of the incident using his cellphone while the official
photographer was also taking pictures. Then PO1 Area prepared an RPS,
which Asuncion, Sarmiento and Vargas witnessed. Meanwhile, SPO1
Aldave, seizing officer went inside the house of the accused-appellants,
prepared and signed an RPS after the raiding team found the other
contrabands. Asuncion, Arcilla and Gonzales witnessed the preparation
and signing of the said RPS. Thereafter, on August 4, 2005, P/CI Tria
requested for a laboratory examination of the contraband. The request of
P/CI Tria for laboratory examination dated August 4, 2005 was received by
a certain PO2 Abanio and P/Insp. Sta. Cruz. Subsequently, witness PSI
Clemen, the forensic expert, received personally from PO2 Abanio the
above-mentioned marked pieces of evidence. She then immediately
conducted a laboratory examination, yielding a result that the contraband
were shabu. In open court, the above-mentioned pieces of evidence were
identified and marked.
From the foregoing, the prosecution, without an iota of doubt, has
established the chain of custody and integrity of the seized illegal items.
In the instant case, the prosecution was able to present, not only the
corpus delicti, but the testimonies of the people involved in each link in the
chain of custody.
The prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused-
appellants sold 12 sachets of shabu, but it has proven the accused-
appellants' guilt beyond reasonable doubt of possession of the same
number of shabu in violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
Before we proceed in discussing the guilt of the couple, we must first take
into account a discrepancy in the Information. In the said information, the
accused-appellants were charged for selling 12 pieces of transparent
sealed plastic sachet of shabu. However, based on the evidence which the
prosecution adduced, Emily sold to PO1 Area one sachet of shabu, which
was worth P250.00. Then, after she handed the one sachet of shabu to the
poseur-buyer, Emily received additional 12 sachets of shabu from her
husband Roger and when PO1 Area informed the couple of the buy-bust,
Emily had in her possession the 12 sachets of shabu.
The unfortunate fact of this case is that rather than separately charging
Emily for the sale of the one sachet of shabu and charging both Emily and
Roger for possession of the 12 sachets of shabu, the public prosecutor
lumped the charges together to sale of 12 sachets of shabu. This is wrong.
The Information is defective for charging the accused-appellants of selling
12 sachets of shabu when, in fact, they should have been charged of selling
one sachet of shabu and possessing 12 sachets of shabu. From the
evidence adduced, Emily and Roger never sold the 12 sachets of shabu.
They possessed them. Thus, they should have not been convicted for
selling the 12 sachets of shabu. However, this was exactly what was done
both by the trial court and the CA. Without basis in fact, they convicted the
couple for selling the 12 sachets of shabu.
Indeed, it must be pointed out that the prosecution filed a defective
Information. An Information is fatally defective when it is clear that it does
not really charge an offense or when an essential element of the crime has
not been sufficiently alleged. In the instant case, while the prosecution was
able to allege the identity of the buyer and the seller, it failed to
particularly allege or identify in the Information the subject matter of the
sale or the corpus delicti. We must remember that one of the essential
elements to convict a person of sale of prohibited drugs is to identify with
certainty the corpus delicti. Here, the prosecution took the liberty to lump
together two sets of corpora delicti when it should have separated the two
in two different informations. To allow the prosecution to do this is to
deprive the accused-appellants of their right to be informed, not only of
the nature of the offense being charged, but of the essential element of
the offense charged; and in this case, the very corpus delicti of the crime.
Furthermore, when ambiguity exists in the complaint or information, the
court has no other recourse but to resolve the ambiguity in favor of the
accused. Here, since there exists ambiguity as to the identity of corpus
delicti, an essential element of the offense charged, it follows that such
ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the accused-appellants. Thus, from
the foregoing discussion, we have no other choice but to acquit the
accused-appellants of sale of 12 sachets of shabu.
Truly, both the trial court and the CA were wrong in convicting the couple
for selling 12 sachets of shabu because the prosecution failed to show that
the husband and wife had indeed sold the 12 sachets of shabu.
Moreover, jurisprudence holds that the prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs can only be successful when the following elements are
established, namely:
(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and consideration of
the sale; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefore..
To our minds, while there was indeed a transaction between Emily and
PO1 Area, the prosecution failed to show that the subject matter of the
sale to PO1 Area was the 12 sachets of shabu. Based on the testimony of
PO1 Area, the 12 sachets of shabu were the sachets of shabu which Roger
handed to his wife Emily and were not sold, but which PO1 Area found in
her possession after the latter identified himself as a police officer.
InPeople v. Paloma, we acquitted the accused for the prosecution's failure
to prove the crime of illegal sale of drugs. Under the "objective" test set by
the Court in People v. Doria, the prosecution must clearly and adequately
show the details of the purported sale, namely, the initial contact between
the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or
payment of the consideration, and, finally, the accused's delivery of the
illegal drug to the buyer, whether the latter be the informant alone or the
police officer. This proof is essential to ensure that law-abiding citizens are
not unlawfully induced to commit the offense.
In the instant case, PO1 Area's testimony showed no evidence that the
transaction as to the sale of the 12 sachets of shabu ever happened.
Rather, PO1 Area adequately testified on the fact that accused-appellant
Roger handed the 12 sachets of shabu to Emily who kept them in a coin
purse. And after PO1 Area identified himself as a police operative, he
found the 12 sachets of shabu in Emily's possession. From the foregoing,
while the prosecution was able to prove the sale of one sachet of shabu, it
is patently clear that it never established with moral certainty all the
elements of illegal sale of the 12 sachets of shabu. And failure to show that
indeed there was sale means failure to prove the guilt of the accused for
illegal sale of drugs, because what matters in the prosecution for illegal
sale of dangerous drugs is to show proof that the sale actually happened,
coupled with the presentation in court of corpus delicti. Here, the
prosecution failed to prove the existence of the sale of the 12 sachets of
shabu and also to prove that the 12 sachets of shabu presented in court
were truly the subject matter of the sale between the accused-appellants
and PO1 Area.
Notwithstanding the above-discussion, we convict both Roger and Emily of
illegal possession of prohibited drugs despite the fact that they were
charged for the sale of illegal drugs, because possession is necessarily
included in sale of illegal drugs.
Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When
there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or
information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or
necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of
the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the
offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
Since sale of dangerous drugs necessarily includes possession of the same,
the accused-appellants should be convicted of possession. We have
consistently ruled that possession of prohibited or dangerous drugs is
absorbed in the sale thereof. Then Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban
logically and clearly explained the rationale behind this ruling, to wit:
The prevailing doctrine is that possession of marijuana is absorbed in the
sale thereof, except where the seller is further apprehended in possession
of another quantity of the prohibited drugs not covered by or included in
the sale and which are probably intended for some future dealings or use
by the seller.
Possession is a necessary element in a prosecution for illegal sale of
prohibited drugs. It is indispensable that the prohibited drug subject of the
sale be identified and presented in court. That the corpus delicti of illegal
sale could not be established without a showing that the accused
possessed, sold and delivered a prohibited drug clearly indicates that
possession is an element of the former. The same rule is applicable in cases
of delivery of prohibited drugs and giving them away to another.
For prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs to prosper, the
following essential elements must be proven, namely: (1) the accused is in
possession of an item or object that is identified to be a prohibited drug;
(2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and
consciously possess the said drug.
On Emily's Liability
To our minds, the testimony of PO1 Area is sufficient to establish
concurrence of all the elements necessary to convict Emily of violating
Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. PO1 Area vividly narrated the details
of the buy-bust operation. From the foregoing, it is patently clear that the
prosecution established with moral certainty all the elements of illegal
possession of shabu, that is: PO1 Area found in Emily's physical and actual
possession the 12 sachets of shabu; such possession of the 12 sachets of
shabu was not authorized; and since Emily put the 12 sachets of shabu in
the purse after receiving them from her husband, she possessed the same
freely and consciously.
Furthermore, PO1 Area's testimony was corroborated by the testimonies.
of the following: (a) Barangay Kagawad Sarmiento who witnessed how PO1
Area caught Emily doing the illegal act; (b) Barangay Captain Asuncion, Jr.
who testified that he was with the raiding team when the latter conducted
the buy-bust operation and that he witnessed how money changed hands;
(c) P/CI Tria who witnessed the buy-bust operation and was one of the
arresting officers; (d) SPO1 Aldave who executed the search warrant; and
(e) Barangay Kagawad Arcilla who also accompanied the raiding team in
the search of the accused-appellants' house. All these witnesses completed
all the angles of the buy-bust operation and the search on Emily's person
up to the finding that she possessed the 12 sachets of shabu. Indeed,
considering all of the above-findings of facts, we cannot have other
conclusion but to find Emily guilty beyond reasonable doubt for possession
of prohibited drugs.
Indeed, every accused deserves a second look before conviction. This is the
essence of the constitutional presumption of innocence. In the present
case, we did not only take a second look at the facts and laws of this case
because the accused-appellants are both parents. We take a third, a fourth
up to a seventh look to ensure that no child will be left unattended
because his parents were imprisoned based on false accusations. Thus,
after reviewing this case, the bare truth is Emily was found in possession of
12 sachets of shabu on August 3, 2005.
On Roger's Liability
As to Roger, can we also convict him of possession of the same 12 sachets
of shabu considering that same had been found in the possession of his
wife Emily?
We resolve in the affirmative.
In United States v. Juan,[68] we have clarified the meaning of the words
having possession of. We said that the said phrase included constructive
possession, that is, the relation between the owner of the drug and the
drug itself when the owner is not in actual physical possession, but when it
is still under his control and management and subject to his
disposition.[69] In other words, in that case, we recognized the fact that a
person remains to be in possession of the prohibited drugs although he
may not have or may have lost physical possession of the same.
Admittedly, the 12 sachets of shabu were found in the possession of Emily.
But PO1 Area saw Roger hand the same 12 sachets of shabu to Emily.
While Roger had lost physical possession of the said 12 sachets of shabu,
he had constructive possession of the same because they remain to be
under his control and management. While Roger had lost physical
possession of the 12 sachets of shabu to Emily, he maintained constructive
possession of the same.
G.R. No. 172372 December 4, 2009
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ROMAR
TEODORO y VALLEJO, Accused-Appellant.
BRION, J.:
FACTS
The prosecution charged the appellant before the RTC of the crime of rape
under three separate Informations ( June, 1995, July 1995, March 1996).
The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges laid.
 AAA was not yet 12
 Vallejo was an employee of her parents.
 AAA was raped on all 3 occasions at the bathroom of her parents’
sugarcane plantation.
 The appellant threatened to kill her if she reported the incident
to her parents.
 Vallejo had been staying in their house for three years. AAA
explained that their house had three bedrooms; and that the
appellant slept with her brothers. She maintained that one of her
brothers saw the March 30, 1996 rape and reported this incident
to their mother. AAA was confronted by her mother the next day.
 The appellant claimed that AAA had been his sweetheart since
June 22, 1996. He claimed that the sexual intercourse between
them on March 30, 1996 was consensual. He recalled that while
he was lying beside AAAs brother at the sala, AAA gave him a
signal to follow her to the bathroom. The appellant followed AAA
to the bathroom, where they had sex. He likewise denied having
raped AAA on June 18, 1995 and on the first week of July 1995.
The RTC convicted the appellant of two (2) counts (for the first two
occasions) of statutory rape. CA affirmed in toto.
The CA likewise believed AAAs testimony which it found credible. It held
that the court may convict the accused based solely on the victims
testimony provided it is credible, natural and convincing.
In his brief, the appellant argued that the lower courts erred in convicting
him of two (2) counts of statutory rape despite the prosecutions failure to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He claimed that the victims
testimony was full of inconsistencies. He likewise contended that the
Information in Criminal Case No. 8539 was defective for failure to state the
exact date of the commission of the crime.
THE COURTS RULING: DENIED
  AAA’s testimonies were corroborated by medico-legal report and
testimony of Dr. Mendoza. We additionally do not see from the
records any indication that AAAs testimony should be seen in a
suspicious light. There is no plausible reason why AAA would
falsely testify against the appellant, imputing on him a crime as
grave as rape if the sexual incident did not happen. We have held
time and again that the testimonies of rape victims who are young
and immature, as in this case, deserve full credence considering
that no woman, especially one of tender age, would concoct a
story of defloration, allow the examination of her private parts,
and subject herself to a public trial if she had not been motivated
by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed against
her.
The Appellants Defenses
In his defense, the appellant invoked denial. He denied raping the victim
on June 18, 1995 and on the first week of July 1995, but admitted having a
consensual sexual intercourse with AAA on March 30, 1996.
It is settled that denial is an inherently weak defense. It cannot prevail over
positive identification, unless supported by strong evidence of lack of guilt.
In the context of this case, the appellants mere denial, unsupported by any
other evidence, cannot overcome the child-victims positive declaration on
the identity and involvement of the appellant in the crime attributed to
him.
The appellant further argues that the Information in Criminal Case No.
8539 is defective because it failed to state the exact date of the
commission of the crime.
The contention lacks merit.
An information, under Section 6, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, is deemed sufficient if the approximate date of the
commission of the offense. Section 11 of the same Rule also provides that
it is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date
the offense was committed, except when the date of commission is a
material element of the offense. The offense may thus be alleged to have
been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its
commission.
In the present case, the Information in Criminal Case No. 8539 states that
the offense was committed in the first week of July 1995; it likewise
alleged that the victim was below 12 years old at the time of the incident.
These allegations sufficiently informed the appellant that he was being
charged of rape of a child who was below 12 years of age. Afforded
adequate opportunity to prepare his defense, he cannot now complain
that he was deprived of his right to be informed of the nature of the
accusation against him.
In statutory rape, time is not an essential element except to prove that the
victim was a minor below twelve years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense. Given the victims established date of birth, she
was definitely short of 12 years under the allegations of the Information
and on the basis of the evidence adduced.
Moreover, objections relating to the form of the complaint or information
cannot be made for the first time on appeal. If the appellant had found the
Information insufficient, he should have moved before arraignment either
for a bill of particulars, for him to be properly informed of the exact date of
the alleged rape, or for the quashal of the Information, on the ground that
it did not conform with the prescribed form. Failing to pursue either
remedy, he is deemed to have waived objection to any formal defect in the
Information.
G.R. No. 135808 October 6, 2008
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. INTERPORT
RESOURCES CORPORATION, MANUEL S. RECTO, RENE S. VILLARICA,
PELAGIO RICALDE, ANTONIO REINA, FRANCISCO ANONUEVO, JOSEPH SY
and SANTIAGO TANCHAN, JR., respondents.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS:
SEC seeks a review of the CA order enjoining SEC from taking any action
against respondent IRC with respect to Sec 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised
Securities Act. SEC received reports that IRC directors were insider trading
and found that IRC failed to make timely disclosure of its acquisition of
100% of the capital stock of GHB in exchange of GHB acquiring 55% of the
capital stock of IRC. GHB was also going to arrange for a loan for the
acquisition of IRC of 67% of another company, the PRCI. IRC assailed the
SEC show cause order against them arguing that it was the Prosecution and
Enforcement Department (PED) of the SEC who had jurisdiction. SEC issued
an order creating a special investigating panel to hear and decide the case
against IRC and recalled their show cause orders. The IRC then filed a
petition before the CA which issued the injunction against SEC finding that
the SEC had no statutory authority and there were no implementing rules
and regulations regarding disclosure, insider trading, or any of the
provisions of the Revised Securities Acts which the respondents allegedly
violated. IRC also argues that the criminal complaint that
may be filed against them resulting from SEC‘s investigation had already
prescribed. They point
out that the prescription period applicable to offenses punished under
special laws, such as violations of the Revised Securities Act, is twelve years
under Section 1 of Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3585 and Act No.
3763. Since the offense was committed in 1994, they reasoned that
prescription set in as early as 2006 and rendered this case moot. ISSUE:
WON the offense has already prescribed HELD: NO. Lifted injunction 1. It is
an established doctrine that a preliminary investigation interrupts the
prescription period. While the SEC investigation serves the same purpose
and entails substantially similar duties as the preliminary investigation
conducted by the DOJ, this process cannot simply be disregarded. In
Bavierav. Paglinawan,[77] this Court enunciated that a criminal complaint
is first filed with the SEC, which determines the existence of probable
cause, before a preliminary investigation can be commenced by the DOJ. A
criminal charge for violation of the Securities Regulation Code is a
specialized dispute. Hence, it must first be referred to an administrative
agency of special competence, i.e., the SEC. Under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, courts will not determine a controversy involving a question
within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal, where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the
specialized knowledge and expertise of said administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact. The Securities Regulation
Code is a special law. Its enforcement is particularly vested in the SEC.
Hence, all complaints for any violation of the Code and its implementing
rules and regulations should be filed with the SEC. Where the complaint is
criminal in nature, the SEC shall indorse the complaint to the DOJ for
preliminary investigaton and prosecution as provided in Section 53.1
earlier quoted. It should be noted that the SEC started investigative
proceedings against the respondents as early as 1994. This investigation
effectively interrupted the prescription period. However, said proceedings
were disrupted by a preliminary injunction issued by the Court of Appeals
on 5 May 1995, which effectively enjoined the SEC from filing any criminal,
civil, or administrative case against the respondents herein. Thereafter, on
20 August 1998, the appellate court issued the assailed Decision ordering
that the writ of injunction be made permanent and prohibiting the SEC
from taking cognizance of the case. The SEC was bound to comply with the
aforementioned order. An investigation of the case by any other
administrative or judicial body would likewise be impossible pending the
injunctive writs issued by the Court of Appeals. Given the ruling of this
Court in Baviera v. Paglinawan,[80] the DOJ itself could not have taken
cognizance of the case and conducted its preliminary investigation without
a prior determination of probable cause by the SEC. Thus, even presuming
that the DOJ was not enjoined by the Court of Appeals from conducting a
preliminary investigation, any preliminary investigation conducted by the
DOJ would have been a futile effort since the SEC had only started with its
investigation when respondents themselves applied for and were granted
an injunction by the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, it is only after this
Court corrects the erroneous ruling of the Court of Appeals in its Decision
dated 20 August 1998 that either the SEC or DOJ may properly conduct any
kind of investigation against the respondents for August 5, 2008 violations
of Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act. Until then, the
prescription period is deemed interrupted. To reiterate, the SEC must first
conduct its investigations and make a finding of probable cause in
accordance with the doctrine pronounced in Baviera v. Paglinawan.[81] In
this case, the DOJ was precluded from initiating a preliminary investigation
since the SEC was halted by the Court of Appeals from continuing with its
investigation. Such a situation leaves the prosecution of the case at a
standstill, and neither the SEC nor the DOJ can conduct any investigation
against the respondents, who,in the first place, sought the injunction to
prevent their prosecution. All that the SEC could do in order to break the
impasse was to have the Decision of the Court of Appeals overturned, as it
had done at the earliest opportunity in this case. Therefore, the period
during which the SEC was prevented from continuing with its investigation
should not be counted against it. The law on the prescription period was
never intended to put the prosecuting bodies in an impossible bind in
which the prosecution of a case would be placed way beyond their control;
for even if they avail themselves of the proper remedy, they would still be
barred from investigating and prosecuting the case.
2. Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act do not require the
enactment of implementing rules to make them binding and effective. In
the absence of any constitutional or statutory infirmity, which may concern
Sections 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act, this Court upholds these
provisions as legal and binding. It is well settled that every law has in its
favor the presumption of validity. Unless and until a specific provision of
the law is declared invalid and unconstitutional, the same is valid and
binding for all intents and purposes.[27] The mere absence of
implementing rules cannoteffectively invalidate provisions of law, where a
reasonable construction that will support the law may be given. The
necessity for vesting administrative authorities with power to make rules
and regulations is
based on the impracticability of lawmakers‘ providing general regulations
for various and varying
details of management.[30] To rule that the absence of implementing rules
can render ineffective an act of Congress, such as the Revised Securities
Act, would empower the administrative bodies to defeat the legislative will
by delaying the implementing rules. To assert that a law is less than a law,
because it is made to depend on a future event or act, is to rob the
Legislature of the power to act wisely for the public welfare whenever a
law is passed relating to a state of affairs not yet developed, or to things
future and impossible to fully know.[31] It is well established that
administrative authorities have the power to promulgate rules and
regulations to implement a given statute and to effectuate its policies,
provided such rules and regulations conform to the terms and standards
prescribed by the statute as well as purport to carry into effect its general
policies. Nevertheless, it is undisputable that the rules and regulations
cannot assert for themselves a more extensive prerogative or deviate from
the mandate of the statute.[32] Moreover, where the statute contains
sufficient standards and an unmistakable intent, as in the case of Sections
30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act, there should be no impediment to
its implementation.