HazOP

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Table Of Contents:

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Hazards are everywhere. Unfortunately, a hazard is not always identified until
an accident occurs. It is essential to identify the hazards and reduce the risk
well in advance of an accident. For each process in a chemical plant the
following questions must be asked:
1. What are the hazards?
2. What can go wrong and how?
3. What are the chances?
4. What are the consequences?
The first question represents hazard identification. The last three questions are
associated with risk assessment, frequently called scenario identification. The
terminology used varies considerably. Hazard identification and risk
assessment are sometimes combined into a general category called hazard
evaluation.
The HAZOP study is a formal procedure to identify hazards in a chemical
process facility. The procedure is effective in identifying hazards and is well
accepted by the chemical industry. The basic idea is to let the mind go free in
a controlled fashion in order to consider all the possible ways that process and
operational failures can occur. Before the HAZOP study is started, detailed
information on the process must be available. This includes up-to-date process
flow diagrams (PFDs), process and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs),
detailed equipment specifications, materials of construction, and mass and
energy balances. The full HAZOP study requires a committee composed of a
cross-section of experienced plant, laboratory, technical, and safety
professionals. One individual must be a trained HAZOP leader and serves as
the committee chair. This person leads the discussion and must be experienced
with the HAZOP procedure and the chemical process under review. One
individual must also be assigned the task of recording the results, although a
number of vendors provide software to perform this function on a personal
computer. The committee meets on a regular basis for a few hours each time.
The meeting duration must be short enough to ensure continuing interest and

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input from all committee members. A large process might take several months
of biweekly meetings to complete the HAZOP study. Obviously, a complete
HAZOP study requires a large investment in time and effort, but the value of
the result is well worth the effort.

Objective of HAZOP:
 For identifying cause and the consequences of perceive mal operations
of equipment and associated operator interfaces in the context of the
complete system.
 It accommodates the status of recognized design Standards and codes
of practice but rightly questions the relevance of these in specific
circumstances where hazards may remain undetected

How and Why HAZOP is Used:

 HAZOP identifies potential hazards, failures and operability problems.

 Its use is recommended as a principal method by professional
institutions and legislators on the basis of proven capabilities for over
40 years.
 It is most effective as a team effort consists of plant and prices
designers, operating personnel, control and instrumentation engineer
etc.
 It encourages creativity in design concept evaluation.
 Its use results in fewer commissioning and operational problems and
better informed personnel, thus confirming overall cost effectiveness
improvement.
 Necessary changes to a system for eliminating or reducing the
probability of operating deviations are suggested by the analytical
procedure.
 HAZOP provides a necessary management tool and bonus in so far that
it demonstrates to insurers and inspectors evidence of comprehensive
thoroughness

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  HAZOP reports are an integral part of plant and safety records and are
also applicable to design changes and plant modifications, thereby
containing accountability for equipment and its associated human
interface throughout the operating lifetime.
 HAZOP technique is now used by most major companies handling and
processing hazardous material, especially those where engineering
practice involves elevated operating parameters:
- oil and gas production
- flammable and toxic chemicals
- pharmaceuticals etc.
 Progressive legislation in encouraging smaller and specialty
manufacturing sites to adopt the method also as standard practice.

Purpose of HAZOP:
 It emphasizes upon the operating integrity of a system, thereby
leading methodically to most potential and detectable deviations
which could conceivably arise in the course of normal operating
routine:
- including "start-up " and "shut-down" procedures
- as well as steady-state operations.
 It is important to remember at all times that HAZOP is an identifying
technique and not intended as a means of solving problems nor is the
method intended to be used solely as an undisciplined means of
searching for hazardous scenarios.

HAZOP Study Procedure:

 Procedure in HAZOP study consist of examining the process and

instrumentation (P&I) line diagram, process line by process line.
 A list of guide words is used to generate deviations from normal
operation corresponding to all conceivable possibilities.
 Guide words covering every parameter relevant to the system under
review: i.e. flow rate and quality, pressure, temperature, viscosity,
components etc.

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 Select Line

Select deviation
e. g more flow

Move on to next Is more flow possible

deviation

Is it hazardous or does it Consider

prevent efficient operation? other causes
of more flow

What change in plant Will the operator know that?

will tell him? there is more flow?

What changes in plant or method Consider other

will prevent the deviation or make change(s) or
it less likely or protect against the agreed to accept
consequences? hazard

Is the cost of the change?

justified?

Agree change (s)

Agree who is responsible for
action

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Follow up to see action has been
taken
HAZOP Study Procedure:

GUIDE WORDS

POSSIBLE CAUSES DEVIATION (FROM DESIGN

AND/OR OPERATING INTENT)

CONSEQUENCES

ACTION(S) REQUIRED OR RECOMMENDEED

Guide Words:
NONE: No forward flow when there should be
MORE: More of any parameter than there should be, e.g. more flow, more
pressure, more temperature, etc.
LESS: As above, but "less of" in each instance
PART: System composition difference from what it should be
MORE THAN: More "components" present than there should be for
example, extra phase, impurities

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OTHER: What needs to happen other than normal operation, e.g. start up,
shutdown, maintenance
NONE: e.g., NO FLOW caused by blockage; pump failure; valve closed or
jammed: leak: valve open; suction vessel empty; delivery side over -
pressurized: vapor lock; control failure
REVERSE: e.g., REVERSE FLOW caused by pump failure: NRV failure or
wrongly inserted; wrong routing; delivery over pressured; back- siphoning;
pump reversed
MORE OF: e.g., MORE FLOW caused by reduced delivery head; surging;
suction pressurised; controller failure; valve stuck open leak; incorrect
instrument reading.
MORE OF: MORE TEMPERATURE, pressure caused by external fires;
blockage; shot spots; loss of control; foaming; gas release; reaction;
explosion; valve closed; loss of level in heater; sun.
LESS OF: e.g., LESS FLOW caused by pump failure; leak; scale in delivery;
partial blockage; sediments; poor suction head; process turndown.
LESS: e.g., low temperature, pressure caused by Heat loss; vaporisation;
ambient conditions; rain; imbalance of input and output; sealing; blocked
vent.
PART OF: Change in composition high or low concentration of mixture;
additional reactions in reactor or other location; feed change.
MORE THAN: Impurities or extra phase Ingress of contaminants such as air,
water, lube oils; corrosion products; presence of other process materials due
to internal leakage; failure of isolation; start-up features.
OTHER: Activities other than normal operation start-up and shutdown of
plant; testing and inspection; sampling; maintenance; activating catalyst;
removing blockage or scale; corrosion; process emergency; safety procedures
activated; failure of power, fuel, steam, air, water or inert gas; emissions and
lack of compatibility with other emission and effluents.

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HAZOP Study Form
Title:

Line 1:

DEVIATI CAUS CONSEQUEN EXISTIN ACTIONS,

ON ES CES G QUESTIONS OR
PROVISI RECOMMENDAT
ONS IONS

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PAGE 9
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 CASE STUDY: Shell And Tube Heat Exchanger

Guide Word Deviation Causes Consequences Action

NONE No cooling Failure of inlet Process fluid Install

water flow cooling water temperature is not Temperature
valve to open lowered accordingly indicator before
and after the
process fluid line
Install TAH
MORE More cooling Failure of inlet Output of Process Install
water flow cooling water fluid temperature Temperature
valve to close too low indicator before
and after
process fluid line
Install TAL

LESS Less cooling Pipe leakage Process fluid Installation of flow

water temperature too low meter

REVERSE Reverse process Failure of process Product off set Install check valve
fluid flow fluid inlet valve (whether it is
crucial have to
check?)

CONTAMINATION Process fluid Contamination in Outlet temperature Proper

contamination cooling water too low maintenance and
operator alert

Guide Word Deviation Causes Consequences Action

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Less Less flow of Pipe blockage Temperature of High
cooling water process fluid Temperature
remains constant Alarm

More More cooling Failure of Temperature of Low

flow cooling water process fluid Temperature
valve decrease Alarm

More of More pressure Failure of Bursting of tube Install high

on tube side process fluid pressure alarm
valve

Contamination Contamination Leakage of Contamination of Proper

of process fluid tube and process fluid maintainance
line cooling water and operator
goes in alert

Corrosion Corrosion of Hardness of Less cooling and Proper

tube cooling water crack of tube maintenance

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