Judaism and the Secularization Debate

Author(s): Stephen Sharot

Source: Sociological Analysis, Vol. 52, No. 3, International Studies in the Sociology of Religion
(Autumn, 1991), pp. 255-275
Published by: Oxford University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3711361
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 Analysis1991, 52:3 255-275
Sociological

Judaism and the

Secularization Debate

Stephen Sharot
Ben-GurionUniversityof the Negev

The secularizationdebate is widened from the Christian context to include the case of
Judaism.Certain characteristicsof Judaism, the integralethnic-religionlink and the focus on
practice, are expected to mediate the effects of modernityon religionamong Jews. Data on
patternsof religiosityare presentedwithin a frameworkof a secularizationthesis,emphasizing
the ethnicand national basis of contemporarypatterns.Fourantisecularizationargumentsare
evaluated:a change in Jewish religiosityfrom practiceto beliefs and ethics; the development
of a Jewish civil religionwith its own sacredbeliefs and practices;the searchamongJews for
supernaturalcompensators outsideJudaism;and a revivalof traditionalJewishreligiouspractices
among the fourth generation. The evidence points to two divergentchanges, both of which
are related to modernity:a stabilizationof religiouspracticeamong the majorityand a more
stringentpattern of religiouspractice among a growing minority.

The debate on secularizationhas been confined mainly to the Christian context,

and there has been disagreement on whether the term "secularization"is useful as
a cross-culturalconcept (Dobbelaere, 1981). The debate will be extended in this paper
by showing how it can be conducted within the Jewishcontext, and it will be suggested
that differences among religions should be brought into the discussion of the effects
of modernity on religion.
Most sociologistsof religion are likely to acknowledgethat the relationshipbetween
religion and the processes of modernity is an interactional or, as many prefer to call
it, a dialecticalone. But although there is a vast debate on the effectsof Westernreligion,
especially Protestantism, on the modern world, there has been little consideration of
whether the effects of the processes of modernity (industrialization,urbanization, etc.)
on religion will depend on the characteristicsof the religions. Religions are understood
here to include all systems of beliefs and practices that are anchored in notions of
the supernatural, and in its barest formulation the secularization thesis states that
the processes of modernity are accompanied by, or result in a decline or contraction
of, such beliefs and practices.1
Both proponents and opponents of the secularizationthesis have supported their
arguments mainly with data from the Christian context, but they have also generally

1The multiplication of definitions, dimensions, and measurements of secularization (Shiner, 1967;

Dobbelaere, 1981; Lyon, 1985) has made it increasingly difficult to single out "the secularization thesis."
Some definitional issues in the secularization debate will be taken up in the body of the article, but
it will be recognized that I favor a substantive, exclusive definition of religion (Robertson, 1970) rather
than a functionalist (Yinger, 1970) or inclusive (Luckmann, 1967) one.

255
256 SOCIOLOGICALANALYSIS

assumedthat their argumentsareapplicableto other religiouscontexts.Berger(1967)

wrote that the seeds of secularizationwere to be found in ancient Judaismand in
Protestantism,but thatthe modemindustrialeconomyis the majorsecularizing "carrier"
in the contemporaryWest, and that the spreadof Westerncivilizationinvolvesthe
spreadof secularization.Even though other religionsmay neverhave carriedwithin
themselvesthe seeds or the potentialof secularization,Bergerimpliesthat they will
be similarlyaffectedby the forcesof modernity.Wilsonwrotethatcertaincharacteristics
of Christianity,suchas its effectivecircumscription
of the sacred,havemadea difference
with respectto the secularization process,but he arguedthat the modelof seculariza-
tion is intendedto have generalvalidity,and he expectsthat similartechnological,
economic,and politicalchangeswill have similareffectson religionin societieswith
differentreligioustraditions(1982).
Sociologistswho have attemptedto refutethe secularizationthesis have made
occasionalreferencesto religiousresurgencein a numberof societies,but mostof their
evidencehas been drawn from a single religioustradition(Christianity)in a single
society(the United States).They are less likelythan "prosecularization" sociologists
to includeEuropeansocietiesin their analysis,and it has even been suggestedthat
Europeis a nonrepresentative case (Hadden,1987b).However,Martin'scomparative
analysisof patternsof secularization,encompassingboth Europeancountriesand the
United States, providesa point of departurefrom which comparativeanalysismay
be extendedto non-Christiancontexts (1978).
Problemsof comparingpossiblesecularization patternsamongsocietieswithdifferent
religious traditions are compoundedbecause, not only may the differentreligious
contextsmakea difference,but the many factors,such as industrialization, urbaniza-
tion, growthof scienceand technology,and politicaldevelopments,that manybelieve
to have producedsecularizationin the West, also vary enormouslyin their relative
importanceand patterns.The thesisof a uniformprocessof modernizationhas long
been questionedby sociologists,and if neitherthe "dependentvariable"(religion)nor
the "independentvariables"(the variousdimensionsof "modernization") are strictly
comparable,the problemsof extendingthe secularizationdebatebeyond its current
WesternChristianfocus do appearformidable.
The comparativeproblemsin this areado not appearto me to be insurmountable
or of suchmagnitudeasto makecomparative analysisworthless,but thereis the question
of wherewe shouldbeginthe comparison.Althougha casecouldbe madefor a number
of comparativestrategies,I believe one profitablestrategyis to begin with Judaism.
This may not take us very far outside the Westerncontext, but it takes us out of
the Christianone, and it has the advantageat this stageof wideningthe comparative
rangewhile retainingWesternpatternsof modernizationas parameters.The minori-
ty positionof Jewishcommunitieshas meantthat modernizationhas affectedJudaism
in specialways,but the comparativeanalysiscan includethe caseof Judaismin Israel,
whereJewsare in the majority.
Two characteristicsof Judaismthat differentiateit from Christianityare likely
to be relevantin consideringthe effectsof modernityon religionor on patternsof
secularization: the integraltie betweenthe religionand a particularpeople, and the
emphasis practice.Martin has shown, in his comparisonof Christiansocieties,
on
 JUDAISMAND THE SECULARIZATIONDEBATE 257

that wherereligionhas becomean importantcomponentof ethnicityor nationality,

as in Poland and Ireland,religiosityhas continued at relativelyhigh levels. The
importanceof religionin such cases has been contingenton factorsin the nations'
histories,but wherethereis an essentialidentityof religionandpeoplehood,as signified
by the covenantin Judaism,the implicationfor secularizationmay well be different.
The differentiationin the modernperiodof what are now termed"ethnic"or
"national"componentsof Jewishidentityfrom religiouselementsmay itselfbe con-
sideredone aspectof the secularizationof Jewishcommunities.In the traditionalsociety,
therehad been no consciousnessthat Jewishnesswas madeup of elementsthat could
be distinguishedin this way, and theirdifferentiationin the postemancipation period
made possiblea Jewishidentityin which there was a self-consciousfocus on either
the religiousor the ethnic component.The reformulationsof Jewishidentityin the
nineteenthand earlytwentiethcenturiesincludedthose with an exclusivelyreligious
or nationalistbasis,but theyarerarelyfoundtoday(Sharot,1976,1982).The exclusively
religiousidentificationthat was given ideologicaland ritualexpressionin "classical"
ReformJudaismlost its attractionin the face of vehementracialantisemitism,the
Holocaust,the achievementsof the Zionistmovement,and the establishmentof the
state of Israel.The destructionof Yiddishculturein EasternEuropeand the decline
of its remnantsin the West also undercutthe foundationsof a Jewishethnic identity
that could draw upon rich culturalresourceswith little regardto, or in opposition
to, the religiousheritage.Today,the ethnic or nationalcomponentin Jewishidentity
may be the focal one for the majorityof Jewsin both the diasporaand Israel,but
it is expressedthroughsymbolstaken fromthe religiousheritage.Ratherthan reject
religioussymbols, most contemporarysecularJews tend to reinterpretthem, and
this has meantthat a levelof religiousobservancehas continuedeven amongatheists
and agnostics.
The core of TalmudicJudaismis not theologybut halakha(religiouslaw)and its
practice,and it has been arguedthat the absenceof theologyhelps accountfor the
rapidsecularization of Jewsonce theyenteredopensocietiesandwereexposedto modern
scientificbeliefs. Nathan Glazer(1972)writes,concerningJewishimmigrantsfrom
EasternEuropein the United States,that "itmaybe saidJewslost theirfaithso easily
becausethey had no faithto lose;that is, they had no doctrine,no collectionof dogmas
to whichtheycouldclingandwithwhichtheycouldresistargument." Jewshadobserved
a complexsystemof practiceswithin the segregatedsociety, but once the first step
had been taken and certainpracticesthat werefelt to limit participationin an open
societywereabandoned,therewasno religiousprinciplethat couldstemthe abandon-
ment of furtherpractices.Religiouspracticefragmentedinto a greatvarietyof levels
and patternsof observance,but the majorityof Jewsarelikelyto retaina fewcommon
practicesthat appropriatelyexpresstheir Jewishidentity.
If the combinationof ethnic identityand the absenceof a theologyresultsin an
attenuatedreligiosityamongthe majoritywho accommodateto Westernnorms,for
the minorityof OrthodoxJewswho rejectsuch accommodationthe halakhicsystem
of religiouspractices(mitzvot)
providesa clearboundarybetweenthemselves,the pious
who observethe mitzvot,and those who do not. JewishOrthodoxyis bettertermed
an orthopraxy, and its boundaries,basedon the distinctionbetweenobservanceand
258 SOCIOLOGICALANALYSIS

nonobservance or partial observance, are clearer and easier to defend than Christian
orthodoxy, whose beliefs are subject to various interpretations.
Scientific and secular ideologies have posed threats to the traditional beliefs of
both Christians and Jews, but these ideologies are likely to pose a more direct threat
to a conservative religion whose core is theology than to one whose core is practice.
The defence of Christian evangelicalism or fundamentalism by theologians and other
members of its intellectual elite has involved clarifications and reinterpretations of
their doctrines, and an adoption of the scientific tools of their adversaries (Hunter,
1987).The Jewishultra-Orthodoxelite may feel much less need to defend their practices;
scientific and secular beliefs have little relevance for the core of their religion, and
they may be ignored or compartmentalized and relegated to a relatively unimportant
sphere of human knowledge.
Both Christian conservatives and Jewish traditionalists have emphasized moral
boundaries, but they may be subject to greater erosion when doctrine rather than
practice is the core of the religion. Among Christian evangelicals, the loosening of
the strict moral, ascetic regimen of the past has followed a decline in their consensus
over beliefs and an increasing vagueness about their basic doctrines (Hunter, 1987).
In Christianity the legitimation of moral codes by core beliefs implies some differen-
tiation of moralityfrom theology, but in Judaismreligiouspracticesare the moral codes.
For example, family purity is constituted by rules that regulate such matters as sexual
relations and attendance of the mikveh(ritualbath). A more stringentritual observance
means, therefore, a more stringent morality.
A comparison of the educational institutions of Christian orthodoxy and Jewish
orthopraxy reinforcesthe argumentthat, whereasmodernity may weaken traditionalist
doctrine, it can strengthen traditionalist practice. Hunter writes that, although the
universitiesof evangelicalProtestantismwere founded as a defensive response to secular
trends in higher education, the very nature of the education, in which students are
introducedto more ambiguousand complex ideas, has weakenedevangelicalorthodoxy.
A strict indoctrination into the truth of doctrines does not appear possible in the
context of modern higher education. In comparison, the Jewish yeshivot (advanced
religious educational institutions) can strengthen orthopraxy; they need be concerned
much less with the interpretation or defense of a few basic beliefs than with the
interpretation of the vast corpus of the Talmud or religious law. The emphasis on
interpretation and application in talmudic study enables yeshiva students to engage
in sharp and lively intellectual debates without challenging the validity of fundamental
beliefs (Helmreich, 1982; Danzger, 1989). Individual and original thinking can be
channeled into finding and justifying the most stringent interpretations of the law.
Thus, insofar as the effects of modernity are channeled or mediated by these
particular characteristics of Judaism (the ethnic factor and the focus on practice),
divergent patterns are possible: a highly stringent, encompassing pattern of Jewish
practice could emerge alongside a highly attenuated one. I will now turn to a review
of the evidence of Jewishreligiouspractice,setting it within the frameworkof the debate
on secularization.Sasaki and Suzuki (1987)have suggestedthat the most relevantmeans
to test the secularizationthesis in a number of societies is to use the most salient dimen-
sion of religious commitment in each society. In most Jewish communities the most
 JUDAISMAND THE SECULARIZATIONDEBATE 259

salientdimensionis the observanceof the mitzvot(cf. Himmelfarb,1975),and this

will be used in the followingsectionin orderto presentthe evidencefor seculariza-
tion. Objectionsto this approachwillbe consideredin the subsequentsectionin which
a numberof antisecularization argumentswill be reviewed.

SECULARIZATIONAMONG JEWS:
ETHNICITYAND PAI' ERNSOF RELIGIOSITY

In comparisonwiththe traditionalcommunity,in whichthe greatmajorityobserved

a comprehensivesystemof mitzvotthat guidedtheir everydaylife, Jewishreligious
observancetoday is highly selectiveand fragmented.Ritualsthat were observedby
the greatmajorityin the past, such as donningtephillin(phylacteries)
duringweekday
morningprayersor followingthe manydietarylaws,areobservedtodayby only small
minorities.Attendanceat synagoguehas also become a highly selectivepractice;in
most communitiesin the United Statesonly betweenten and twentypercentattend
synagogueon a regularweeklybasis,but only betweenfifteenand thirtypercentnever
attend.The majorityattendoccasionally,or once or twicea yearon YomKippur(Day
of Atonement) and RoshHashannah(New Year).
The historicalidentity of Judaismand the Jewish people has meant that a
predominantlyethnicJewishidentitycan be expressedonly throughreligioussymbols
and practices,but the symbolsand practicesthat are chosen by most contemporary
Jewsare those that relatethe individualand his or her familyto the themesof the
continuationof theJewishpeopleand its historicalemergenceandstrugglesforsurvival.2
The ritesof passage,circumcision,barmitzvah,religiousmarriageand burial,can be
interpretedin this way, and they are observedby the greatmajority,who also signal
theirJewishidentityby placingthe mezuzahon the door posts of their homes. The
mostpopularritualoccasionin all Westerncommunities(includingIsrael)is the Seder
meal at Passach(Passover).This is a familyoccasion, often of the extendedfamily,
which celebratesdeliverancefromEgypt.Surveysof AmericanJewishcommunities
in the 1980sfound that between80 percentand 90 percentparticipatein the Seder
(Tobinand Chenkin, 1985),and surveysin othercountriessuchas EnglandandIsrael
havefoundthe samehighlevel(Gould,1984;Ben-Meirand Kedem,1979).The second
most popularreligiousritual in the United States is the lightingof candlesduring
Hanukkah,which commemoratesthe successfulstruggleagainstSyrian-Greekrule
and the rededicationof the desecratedSecond Temple.The widespreadobservance
of this ritual in the United States, between 75 percentto 85 percentin most com-
munities,is also found in England(86%)and Israel(88%),but lowerpercentagesin
South Africa(40%),Italy(41%),and Denmark(49%)havebeen recorded(Tobinand
Chenkin, 1985;Gould, 1985;Ben-Meirand Kedem,1979;Dubb, 1977;DellaPergola,
1971;Blum, 1973).

2Jewishreligiosityhas often been analyzedas one aspect of Jewishidentification(Lazerwitz,1973;

Krausz,1977),and in this contextit hasbeen impliedthat secularization
is concomitantwith a diminishing
Jewishidentificationor a decline in Jewishsolidarity.However,it has been arguedthat, while there
is a continuingprocessof secularization,Jewishethnicityand solidarityare not diminishedand arenot
likely to diminishin the foreseeablefuture(Goldscheiderand Zuckerman,1984;Goldscheider,1986).
260 SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

The PassoverSederand the lightingof Hanukkahcandlesmeetthe criterialisted

by Sklare (1971)in accountingfor the continuedobservanceof certainritualsamong
AmericanJews:(1)theycan be effectivelyredefinedin modern,nonsupernatural terms;
(2)they do not demandsocialisolationor the adoptionof a uniquelife-style;(3) they
accordwith the widerreligiouscultureand providea "Jewish"alternativewhen such
is felt to be needed;(4) they are centeredon the child; and (5) they are performed
annuallyor infrequently.Withrespectto the firstfactor,it shouldbe emphasizedthat
the ritualsare redefinednot so much in the sense of givingthem new meanings,but
ratherby diminishingor removingthe traditionalfocus on God and his law, and
givingprecedenceto the traditionalthemesof kinshipandpeoplehood(Frankel,1980).
The fourthcriterion,child-centeredness, reflectsnot only a generalcharacteristicof
modernWesternculturebut alsoconnectsthe familyto the perpetuationof the Jewish
people.The ethnicthemebecomescentral,but as the secondand fifthcriteriaindicate,
this can be done with littleif any limitationon involvementin modernsociety.With
respectto the third factor,it is perhapsrelevantthat Passoverfalls close to Easter,
but it is the closenessof Hanukkahto Christmasthat has often been emphasizedin
accountingfor the centralityof this holidayin the ritualcalendarof AmericanJews.
It has becomeincorporatedby schoolsand otherpublicinstitutionsinto the festivities
of the Christmasseason, and practicessuch as Hanukkahcardsand presentshave
enabledJewsto participatein the season'sfestivitiesin a Jewishfashion. This con-
siderationis not relevantfor the popularityof the holidayin Israel,but it shouldbe
noted that, whereasin the United StatesHanukkahhas becomethe majorchildren's
festival,in Israelthere are other ritualoccasions,Purimand Lag B'Omer,in which,
for the majority,the majorcelebrationshavecometo focusaroundthe children(fancy
dress and bonfiresrespectively).
No other religiouspracticescome near to the almostuniversalobservanceof the
PassoverSederand Hanukkahcandles,but anotheryearlyritual,fastingon YomKippur,
is observedby abouthalfof the AmericanJewishpopulationand by highproportions
in otherWesterncommunities.3 Highoverallpercentages havebeen recordedin France
(65%) and Israel
(74%),but it would be somewhat misleadingto comparethesepopula-
tions with AmericanJewrybecausethey includelargeproportionsof firstgeneration
immigrants fromthe moretraditionalcommunitiesof NorthAfricaand Asia (Bensimon
and DellaPergola,1984;Ben-Meirand Kedem,1979).A moreappropriate comparison
is withFrenchJewsborn in France(37%fast)and IsraeliAshkenazim(56%fast).These
are still high proportions,and it could be arguedthat Yom Kippurcannot be fitted
into the interpretationthat emphasizesthat only ritualswhosecentralthemeis Jewish
peoplehoodareobservedby the majority.The majorthemesof Yom Kippurarecon-
fession,repentance,and judgmentof the individualfor his or her actsover the year.
A surveyof IsraeliJewsin the early1970sfoundthat Yom Kippurhad little meaning
for 16 percentof the samplebecause,unlikeother religiousholidays,it could not be

3A surveyin 1981-1982of AmericanJewsfound that 55%of those between ages 18 and 39 fasted
on Yom Kippur,59%in the 40 to 59 age range,and 47%of those over 60 years(Cohen, 1983b).The
1981surveyof New YorkJewsfound that 67%fasted(Ritterbandand Cohen, 1984).In 1975in Boston,
55%fasted(Cohen, 1983a),and in Los Angeles73%of the affiliatedand 37%of the nonaffiliatedfasted
(Sandberg,1986).
 JUDAISM AND THE SECULARIZATIONDEBATE 261

reinterpretedin strictlynationalterms(Katz,1973).The meaningof fastingon Yom

Kippuramongcontemporary Jewshas yet to be investigated,but in Israel,whereeven
the most secularof Jewsrefrainfrom travelon Yom Kippur,the majormeaningof
fastingamong many does appearto be an expressionof solidaritywith the Jewish
people.It is possiblethat the "YomKippurWar"reinforcedthis tendency.Manyfast
without any ritualparticipation,such as attendanceat synagogue,and it shouldbe
noted in this context that the proportionwho fast in Israel(74%)is greaterthan the
proportionwho say that they believe in God (64%).
Only a smallminorityobservethe Sabbathin a traditionally fullmanner(a survey
in 1981-1982of AmericanJewsfound that 5%refrainfromworkingor shoppingon
the Sabbath),but like anothertraditionallyimportantritualarea,dietaryregulations,
certainselectedpracticescontinue to be observedby largerminorities.The survey
foundthat 22 percentregularlylit Sabbathcandles,and 15percenthad separatedishes
formeatand milk(Cohen,1983b).Higherpercentages havebeenfoundto retaindietary
regulations in a selective
manner. Forexample, some buy koshermeatbut areprepared
to eat nonkosheroutside the home. Many eat predominantlynonkosherbut draw
the line at pork or bacon. In contrastwith the PassoverSeder and the Hanukkah
candles,the proportionswho observethesepracticesvaryconsiderablyamongdifferent
communities;recent surveysof AmericanJewish communitiesrecordedthat the
lightingof Sabbathcandlesvariesfrom a quarterto two-thirds,and havingseparate
meat and milk dishes variesfrom 10 percentto about a quarterof the populations
(Tobinand Chenkin, 1985;Wertheimer,1989).Data on other Westerncommunities
and Israelindicatessimilarpatternsof Sabbathand dietarypracticesas those found
in the United States.4

OBJECTIONSTO THE SECULARIZATION

THESIS

No writerhas disputedthe evidenceof a declineof religiouspracticeamongthe

majorityof Jewsin the postemancipationperiod,but it is possibleto distinguishfour

40n Jewish religious observance in England, see Sharot, 1976; Gould, 1984. For South Africa, see
Dubb, 1977; Hellig, 1984. For Israel, see Sharot, 1990. For France, see Bensimon and Pergola, 1984.
In a recent report of a survey of French Jews, carried out by Erik Cohen in 1986 and 1988, three levels
of religious practice were distinguished: 15% observed the Sabbath, kosher laws and religious festivals
in a strict fashion, 49% observed the most important religious festivals and a minimum of dietary laws,
and 36% were "non-observers" (Le Monde, February 23, 1990). Surveys of American Jews have rarely
included questions on religious beliefs, and the data that we have from some other communities is not
extensive. A belief in God was assented to by 64% in Israel, 71% in Johannesburg, 75% in Liverpool
(the same percentage has been recorded for the total British population), and 46% in Amsterdam. There
is little data on how Jews conceive the nature of God; in Israel 47% believed that there was "something
beyond nature that directs the history of the Jews"; in Johannesburg 69% agreed that each individual
could approach God through prayer, and 42% believed that God rewarded the good and punished the
wicked. The central religious myth that legitimates Jewish peoplehood, the revelation of God on Mount
Sinai, was believed by 56% in Israel and 64% in Johannesburg, but only by 23% in Amsterdam. In
Israel 57% believed that the Jews were the "chosen people," but this notion, which doubtless has many
different meanings among respondents, was assented to by only 26% in Johannesburg and "very few"
in Liverpool (Ben-Meir and Kedem, 1979; Dubb, 1977; Kokosalakis, 1982; Wijnberg, 1967).
262 SOCIOLOGICALANALYSIS

countersecularization argumentsthat either questionthe use of the term seculariza-

tion or point to recent developmentsamongJewsthat challengethe secularization
thesis.Definitionalissuesare centralto the firsttwo arguments:the firstdisputesthe
criterionof a declineof practiceby pointingto a transitionfrom practiceto beliefs
or ethics,and the secondredefinesthe religionof Jewsin nonsupernaturalistic terms.
The thirdargumentadmitssecularizationwithinJudaismbut claimsthat manyJews
are findingan alternativesupernaturalformof religionoutsideJudaism.The fourth
argumentis that therehasbeena revivalof traditionalformsof Jewishreligiouspractice
in recentyears.Each argumentwill be reviewedand criticized,and in the main the
secularizationthesiswillbe defended.However,pointsfromthe fourthargumentwill
be incorporatedinto a discussionof religiouspolarizationwithinJewishpopulations.
This discussionwillpointto the divergenteffectsof modernityon patternsof religiosity.

The FirstArgument

An objectionto equatinga decline in practicewith secularizationcan be made

by definingnonsecularityin termsof minimalreligiousrequirements.Kokosalakis,
for example,rhetoricallyasks whetherit is correctto referto recentgenerationsas
secularJewsbecausethey are so distantfromthe ritualpracticesand culturalvalues
of their EasternEuropeanforefathers.He writes:"Forpurposesof analysisany Jew
who acknowledgesbeliefin God and practiceseven a few ritualswill be assumedto
be religious"(1982:23).If,on the basisof suchall-or-nothing formulations,a secularized
societyis taken to mean one in which the majority do not believein God and there
is no religiouspractice,or wherereligiouspracticehas shrunkto a tiny minority,most
Jewishcommunities wouldnot qualify.Wecan agreethatthe abandonmentof particular
religiouspracticesneed not be classifiedas secularizationwhen there is no indication
of a decline in the importanceof the supernaturalin the life of the community(cf.
Deshen, 1974),but if it is admittedthat it is possibleto makejudgmentsregarding
the relativeimportanceof supernaturalistic beliefsand practicesin societies,it would
be difficultto avoid the conclusionthat the majorityof Jewishcommunitiestoday
are relativelysecularizedcomparedwith those of the past.
A furtherobjectionto labelinga declinein religiouspracticeas secularizationis
that such an equationmakesorthopraxysynonymouswith sacrednessand thereby
religiouslydevaluesformsof modernJudaism,suchas Conservative andReformJudaism.
Thereis evidencethat someReformJewsin the UnitedStateshavedefinedtheirJewish
religiouscommitmentin termsof moraldirectivesratherthan religiousobservance
(Sklareand Greenblum,1979;Furman, 1987).In so doing they have adoptedthe
characteristicmoralistorientationof religionin Americawith its equationof good
deeds with the religiouslife. The abandonmentof many religiouspracticeshas been
legitimizedin ReformJudaismby viewingJudaismas a self-transforming faith whose
singleenduringessenceis the principleof ethicalmonotheism,and "classical" Reform
Jewshave pointed to a contradictionbetweenthe ritualprescriptionsof traditional
Judaismand their commitmentto an activistsocial ethic.
Thus, if the test of secularizationis the most salient dimension of religious
commitmentin each communityor congregation,withoutregardto whetheror not
 JUDAISM AND THE SECULARIZATION DEBATE 263

it relates to supernatural notions, there would have to be a different test for each
Judaism. Furman has shown, in her study of a classical Reform congregation, that
many members express a social activistic ideology with little actual involvement in
social action programs, but even if there were high involvement, the application of
the term "secularization"might still be considered appropriate if it is taken to refer
to a decline in religious beliefs and practices anchored in supernaturalistnotions. She
writes: "God forms no active part of the motivational base for [the Reform con-
gregation's]ideology, nor is God used in a justificatoryway." God-language is absent:
"When God is mentioned, even by the rabbis, the referent is usually the God of
history - ancient history - and not a transcendentreality,which potentiallyconfronts
people today" (1987:61, 79).
The ReformJews in Furman'sstudy give their political liberalisma Jewish legitima-
tion by linking it to the prophetic tradition, but although this link is passionately
held, it is made without reference to a supernatural source. Because the "reality of
God is an uncertain proposition," ritual is attenuated and devalued (1987:65). The
main manifest motive of collective prayer is not communication with God but the
experience of community. Thus, if we adopt a supernaturalist definition of religion,
this type of ReformJudaism would have to be described as an expression of seculariza-
tion.5 This does not imply that Reform Judaism is any less sacred than Orthodox
Judaism, because the sacred, a system of beliefs and practices anchored in ultimate
concerns, is not necessarilyidentical with the religious,a system of beliefs and practices
anchored in supernaturalnotions (on the sacred/religiousand profane/secular distinc-
tions, see Spiro, 1968).

The SecondArgument

This argument also turns on a conflation of the sacred and the religious. It differs
from the first position insofar as it points to the emergence of a system of Jewish sacred
beliefs and practices that are, at least in part, a functional alternative to all forms of
synagogue or temple Judaism (or Judaisms). Jonathan Woocher, in his recent book
Sacred Survival:The Civil Religionof AmericanJews, does not confront directly the
secularization thesis, but his analysis is the best example of this type of counter-
secularization thesis. Woocher writes that his central thesis is that "the religion of
American Jews may be found not only in the realm of synagogue and denominational
life, but in the activity and ideology of the vast array of Jewish organizations which
are typically thought of as 'secular'."He focuses on the welfare federation movement,
"the centralcore of the AmericanJewishpolity,"and arguesthat through these organiza-
tions American Jews"have achieved unity, purpose, and identity as a moral community
which transcends (without excluding) the overtly religious ideology and practice of
the denominational movements of American Judaism" (1986:vii). The division of
American Jews along denominational lines (Reform, Conservative, Orthodox) means

5Classical Reform has been in decline since the 1930s, and there has been a reemphasis on ritual
in many Reform congregations. This might be considered a reversal of secularization within the Reform
movement, but it is, in part, the consequence of an influx of new members from Conservative and
Orthodox family backgrounds.
264 SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

that "traditional" religion does not fully express, sustain, or direct American Jewry
as a united moral community. This function and task is performed by a civil religion
that endows the commonality with a transcendent significance. Transcendence does
not refer here to God or to the supernatural, but to the meanings and values of the
collectivity that go beyond the individuals who compose it.
Woocher delineates seven major traits of the civil Jewish faith on which there
is a fundamental consensus among activists in the federations: the unity of the Jewish
people, mutual responsibility, Jewish survival, the centrality of Israel, the enduring
value of Jewishtradition, philanthropy and social justice, and Americanness as a virtue.
Civil Judaism in America also has its central myths and rituals. The myth "from
Holocaust to Rebirth"recounts a processof destructionfollowedby a rebirthor redemp-
tion in which the state of Israel is a symbol of a new era and a new power of the
Jewish people. Another myth emphasizes that America is different: it has provided
American Jews with unprecedented opportunities and a unique security (antisemitism
in American is regarded as an aberration from the "true" America). A third myth
is that of Jews as a chosen people with a specialdestiny and mission. The ritualsinclude
those that are appropriated from traditional Judaism, and those of the polity itself:
the "missions"to Israel and the rituals of the fundraising campaign and the General
Assembly of the federations. These beliefs, myths, and rituals embody a particular
religious sensibility, "the conviction that the meanings of Jewishness is located cen-
trally in the experience of Jewish peoplehood" (1986:172).6
By describing the beliefs, myths, and rituals of civil Judaism as sacred, Woocher
appears to mean that they are referring to a transcendent phenomenon, but he is
wary and hesitant about the meaning of transcendence. He writes that God or "some
form of transcendent reality" is insignificant in the American Jewish civil religion.
The collectivity is at the center of its meaning system, and the antagonismof supporters
is avoided by remaining silent on the role of God in Jewish history and destiny. Civil
Judaism differs from "traditional Judaism"in which the notion of the Jewish people
as a religious entity, a "holy nation," is derived from the people's covenental relation-
ship to God. An emphasis on such a difference between traditional and civil religion
would support a secularization thesis, but Woocher writes that, although the symbols
of civil Judaism "do not have obvious transcendent referents," it is necessary to look
below the surface of the stories and ceremonies to determine "whether they serve as
functional equivalents of traditional myth and ritual for the civil religion's adherents,
indeed whether their secularized language may even mask a genuine transcendent

6Although the civil religion concept may be usefully applied as an analogy in an analysis of the American
Jewish "polity,"Woocher's adoption of the concept raises a number of problems. There are many definitions
of civil religion, but most refer to a system of shared beliefs and public rituals that symbolize or integrate
the nation or state (cf. Bellah, 1967; Liebman and Don-Yehiya, 1983). Most American Jews are citizens
of, and identify with, the American state, and they also identify with the Jewish nation or people, but
American Jews as a collectivity are neither a nation nor a state. From the perspective of American society,
American Jews constitute an ethnic group, and from the perspective of the Jewish nation they con-
stitute one of the communities of the diaspora. If American Jews have a civil religion, this would have
to be a civil religion of an ethnic group or a civil religion of a section of the Jewish nation. American
Jews are not the only ethnic group in America with common beliefs, myths and rituals, and it is not
evident that an analysis of ethnicity is deepened by adding the concept of civil religion. The usefulness
of the concept may be diluted by such an application.
 JUDAISM AND THE SECULARIZATIONDEBATE 265

dimension" (1986:130-31).
But what is this "genuine transcendent dimension"?On the one hand, Woocher
does not want to imply that civil Judaism is a case of collective self-deification; he
writes that civil Judaismacknowledgesthat the values of the Jewish tradition transcend
the characteristicsof the people. On the other hand, he writesthat because the ultimate
source of the tradition is left unclear, the source of accountability is often history or
the people. Woocher is critical of the absence of a serious theology in civil Judaism
that would actively affirm "vertical transcendence," as contrasted to the "horizontal
transcendence" of the people in time and space (1986:93), but I would argue that it
is the absence of a clear notion of a supernatural transcendence that is an indication
of secularization.
It is appropriate to note the difference between Woocher's thesis and Herberg's
thesis of three decades ago (1960). Herberg argued that the "return to religion" of
the immediate postwar and 1950s period was related to the identification problems
of the third generation. The third generation grew up in homes that had adopted
American secular culture, and because ethnic culture was unacceptable as a basis for
identification in America, religion became the focal point of their identity, both as
Jews (or Catholics or Protestants) and as Americans. In fact, the only unambiguous
evidence of a "return to religion" among Jews in that period was a rise in synagogue
affiliation(Sharot, 1973).Becausethe synagoguebecame an importantcenter for secular
social activities and the transmission of an ethnic identity, it appeared legitimate to
refer to the secularization of religious institutions. In the 1980s, when ethnic identity
requires less of a religious facade, Woocher has argued that the unity of American
Jewry is to be understood in terms of the sacralization of its "secular"institutions.

The Third Argument

Secularization has also been denied by writers who have retained an approach
to religion that emphasizes its distinctive supernatural beliefs and related practices.
One variation of this approach, as represented in the work of Stark and Bainbridge,
is to acknowledge that Judaism has been eroded by secularization but to argue that
this is being offset by the movement of Jews into cults or new religious movements.
Although they give little space to an analysis of the Jewish case, Stark and Bainbridge
see it as providing excellent evidence for their thesis that secularization, in the sense
of a long historical trend, is impossible because religion is the unique supplier of com-
pensators for ubiquitous desires.7 They write that the relatively low formal religious
affiliation and attendance at synagogue of Jews shows that secularization has eroded
Judaism more than Christianity. A relatively high proportion of Jews have not had
a religioussocialization,but because the demand for the compensatorsthat only religion
can supply does not disappear and Jews are reluctant to adopt Christianity, there is
"an extraordinary overrepresentation of Jews" in the new religious movements
(1985:402).
The fact that the proportion of Jews in new religious movements is three times
7Stark and Bainbridge present what might be called a partial secularization thesis: a persistence of
religion but a decline of magic. For a critique of such partial theses see Sharot, 1989.
266 SOCIOLOGICALANALYSIS

or more than the proportionof Jewsin the populationis a significantone, but it is

hardlysufficientto discounta secularization trend amongJews.Jewsin new religious
movementsarea smallproportionof the numberwho arenot affiliated witha synagogue
or who do not identifywith a particularJewishdenomination,and from what we
know about the age compositionof new religiousmovementsand life cycle religious
patternsamongJews,it is likelythat those in the new religiousmovementsaremainly
youth or young adultswho will returnto at least a nominalaffiliationor identifica-
tion with Judaismat a later stage in their life cycle.

The FourthArgument

definitionof religionbut alsosuggests

This argumentnot only retainsa supernatural
that a countertrendto secularizationis occurringwithin the frameworkof Judaism.
Waxman(1983),in particular,writesthat the late 1960sand 1970snot only saw a
revivalof ethnicityamongJews,but a revivalof the Jewishreligionas well (see also
Silberman,1985).He relatesthe "swingof the pendulum"to the emergenceof the
fourthgenerationof AmericanJewsand their responseto the lossesof community,
meaning,and identityin Americansociety.The majorsignof a reversalof seculariza-
tion appearsto be the revival and increasinginfluenceof JewishOrthodoxy, but
Waxmanacknowledgesother trends, such as increasingnonaffiliation,that do not
supportan antisecularizationthesis. Waxmanarguesthat a deinstitutionalization of
Judaismis not the sameas a declineof Judaism,but he doesnot showthat noninstitu-
tionalizedformsof Judaismhave increasedin importanceor arereplacinginstitution-
alizedforms.A numberof hevrot(smallprayercirclesheld in homes)have emerged
in recentyears,but only a smallminorityof AmericanJewsare involved,and many
of these are also synagoguemembers(Bubisand Wasserman,1983).

DIMINISHINGDECLINEOF RELIGIOSITY

Evidenceon the religiouspatternsof the fourthgenerationof AmericanJewshas

begunto appear,and it indicatesa processof stabilizationof religiouspracticerather
than a reversalof secularization.A processof a diminishingdeclineof religiositywas
alreadyevident from comparisonsamongthe firstthree generations;the declineof
religiosityfromthe secondto the thirdgeneration,althoughsignificant,wasof smaller
magnitudethan the declinefromthe firstto the second(Sklareand Greenblum,1979;
GoldsteinandGoldscheider,1968).The differences betweenthe thirdandfourthgenera-
tions appearto be minoror insignificant.Himmelfarband Loar(1984)analyzedthe
1970-1971national Jewish population survey and found a sizeable increase in
nondenominationalism amongthe fourthgeneration,but this was not accompanied
by a decline in religiousobservance.These findings,togetherwith the longitudinal
data of the Boston community(Cohen, 1983;Goldscheider,1986),indicatean in-
creasingcorrespondencebetween synagogueaffiliationand ritualobservance.
An analysisof the 1975 surveyof Boston Jewsfound that, with respectto the
mostwidelypracticedrituals,such as the Sedermealof Passover,therewereno signifi-
cant differencesamong any of the generations,but with regardto other practices,
 JUDAISMAND THE SECULARIZATIONDEBATE 267

such as keepingkosher at home and lightingSabbathcandles,there were declines

fromthe firstto the thirdgenerationsand no significantdifferencesbetweenthe third
andfourthgenerations(Cohen, 1983).Findingson the fourthgenerationfroma recent
surveyof LosAngelesJewsportrayeda mixedpicture(Sandberg,1986).The difference
betweenthe thirdandfourthgenerationsin synagogueaffiliationwasverysmall(24.6%
to 28.1%respectively).With respectto religiousobservances,amongthose affiliated
with a synagoguethere was a smallincreasein some observancessuch as fastingon
Yom Kippur,but amongthe unaffiliated,who are morethan two-thirdsof the total,
the decline in religiousobservancecontinues in the fourth generation.
Cohen'sstudyof New YorkJews,basedon a 1981survey,showedthat a smaller
proportionof fourthgenerationrespondents fastedon YomKippur(54%),lit Hanukkah
candles(76%),and attendedPassoverSeder(75%)than thirdgenerationrespondents
(whoserespectivepercentageswere 70, 89, and 95), but Cohen points out that care
hasto be takenin interpreting the findingson the fourthgeneration(1988).The number
of fourth generationrespondentsis small, they include a higherpercentageof the
youngestcategorythan other generations,and they are likely to be descendentsof
pre-1881immigrantswho tendedto be less observantthan laterimmigrants.Cohen
showsthat olderfourthgenerationrespondents(aged35-49)werelikelyto haveparents
with very low levelsof observance,and the respondentsdemonstrateda higherlevel
of observancethan their parents.
Cohen'sanalysisof the 1965and 1975Bostonsurveysis the onlyone thatcompares
Jewishreligiosityover a historical,albeitlimited,periodand takesinto consideration
both generationand age (1983).Data for the fourth generationappearsonly from
the 1975survey,but comparisons foreachof the firstthreegenerationsshowno change
overthe ten yearsregardingthe Sederand declinesin kosherpractice,Sabbathcandles,
synagoguemembership,and synagogueattendance.8
As far as Jewishreligiosityis concerned,the data rule out a "religiousrevival"
or a reversalof secularizationin recentyears.The questionof whetherthe dominant
trendamongAmericanJewsis stillone of declineor of stabilizationat a minimallevel
of observanceremainsopen. It is evident,however,that the rateof declinein religiosity
has been diminishingwith each subsequentgeneration,and with regardto participa-
tion in the Seder and lightingHanukkahcandles, stabilizationhas occurred.
Comparisonsof religiouspatternsamongthe Jewishpopulationsin Europeand
Israelwiththose in the UnitedStatesaresomewhatlimitedbecausethe non-American
surveysdo not includedata on a numberof generations,but those studiesthat have
comparedthe ritualpracticeof respondentswith that of their parentshave shown
the samepatternas in the United States:only a smallminority(about 10%)observe
more practicesthan theirparents;the majorityobservefewerpracticesbut retainat
least two or three yearlyrituals(Sklareand Greenblum,1979;Cohen, 1983, 1988;
Dubb, 1977;Gould, 1984;Wijnberg,1967;Bensimon,1968, 1971;Goldscheiderand
Friedlander,1983;Ayalon, Ben-Rafael,and Sharot, 1986).The findingsfromsurveys
in Israelareparticularly
interestingwithrespectto the secularizationdebateandJudaism
8Theproportionof the third generationin the age group 18 to 39 who participatedin the Sederwas
85%in 1965 and 84%in 1975;the proportionwho lit Sabbathcandleswas 37%in 1965and 27%in
1975. In this categorykashrutobservanceremainedstable at the low percentageof 9.
268 SOCIOLOGICALANALYSIS

becausethe situationof a Jewishdominantmajorityallowssome comparativetest of

whetherthe Jewishminoritypositionin the Westcontinuesto depressreligiosityover
and beyond the effectsof involvementin modern industrial,urban society.
Trendsin religiosityin Israelare,in fact,verysimilarto thosein the UnitedStates.
We havenotedthataveragereligiosity is comparatively
highin Israelbecausethe popula-
tion includeslargeproportionsof firstgenerationJewswho camefromrelativelytradi-
tional communitiesin North Africaand Asia. However,a comparisonof IsraeliJews
of European origin with American Jews shows very similar levels of religious
observance.gAtrend of diminishingdecline in religiosityis also indicatedin Israel:
althoughIsraeliJewsof Europeanorigin have lower levels of religiositythan Israeli
Jewsof North Africanor Asian origin,the declinein religiosityfromfirstto second
generationwas much greaterin the lattercategory.As amongAmericanJews,Jews
of Europeandescentin Israelappearto have reachedor to be approachinga stage
at a minimalpointof observance(Ayalon,Ben-Rafael,
of stabilization andSharot,1986).
A comparisonof Moroccanimmigrants andtheirsonsin IsraelandFranceprovides
furtherevidencethat minoritypositioncannot accountfor secularization amongJews
in modernindustrialsociety.The leastsecularized JewsfromMoroccotendedto migrate
to Israelratherthan France,and this is evident in the higherlevel of religiosityof
firstgenerationMoroccansin Israel.Seculartrendsamongthe secondgenerationare
evident in both Franceand Israel;in both casesthe level of religiousobservanceis
considerablylowerthan that of youngJewishworkerswho remainedin North Africa
and retaineda high level of observance.However,the declinein religiositybetween
the morereligiousfathersin Israeland their sons was considerablygreaterthan that
between the less religiousfathersin Franceand their sons. As a consequence,the
level of religiousobservanceof the youngergenerationof North Africanoriginsis
now almost identicalin Israeland France.10

POLARIZATION

Waxman(1983)has suggestedthat a processof polarizationin ethnic identityis

occurringamongAmericanJews,betweena sectorwith a moreintenseJewishidentity
than theirparentsand a sectorwho arebecomingmoreassimilatedthan theirparents.

9The 1970-1971 Survey of American Jews found that 51% fasted on Yom Kippur, 19% recited kiddish,
the prayer recited over wine before the Sabbath meal, and 22% had separate dishes for meat and milk
(Tabory, 1983, quoting unpublished material of Lazarwitz).The respective figures for Israeli Ashkenazim
are 56%, 34%, and 33% (Tabory, 1983, quoting unpublished data from the survey of Ben-Meir and
Kedem, 1979). The respective figures for a sample of Israeli Jews of Polish origin were 55%, 27%, and
16% (Ayalon, Ben-Rafael, and Sharot, 1986).

10Surveys by Bensimon (1968, 1971) found that 60% of Jewish young workers in North Africa did
not travel on the Sabbath compared with 74% of their fathers. The respective figures for young workers
in France of North African origin and their fathers were 25% and 34%, and for young workers in Israel
of North African origins and their fathers, 27% and 74%. A survey of Israeli Jews of Moroccan origin
found that 39% of respondents did not travel on the Sabbath compared with 87% of their fathers (Ayalon,
Ben-Rafael, and Sharot, 1986). On the relationships between religion and Jewish ethnicity in Israel,
see Ben-Rafael and Sharot, 1991.
 JUDAISMAND THE SECULARIZATIONDEBATE 269

AlthoughWaxmandoes not stateexplicitlythat polarizationis occurringwith respect

to religiouspractice,his emphasison the revivalof JewishOrthodoxyindicatesthat
this maybe the case.If, as we haveshown,the trendamongthe majorityof American
Jewsis one of stabilizationat a minimallevel, a thesis of polarizationwould not be
appropriatebecauseit impliesa pull in oppositedirections.It remainsa possibility,
however,that an Orthodoxor orthopraxminorityis growingand pullingawayfrom
the secularizedmajority.
Himmelfarband Loar(1984)writethat the developmentand increaseof Orthodox
institutions(dayschools,yeshivot,etc.) has given an impressionof growth,but their
dataindicatedthat whereas,in comparisonwith previousgenerations,therehad been
no furtherdefectionfromOrthodoxyin the fourthgeneration,therewasstillno growth
in numbers.However,changesin the numberand proportionof AmericanJewswho
areOrthodoxremainsproblematic; the ultra-Orthodox wereprobablyunderrepresented
in the nationalsurvey,and given their high birth rate, it is likelythat at least this
sectorof the Orthodox is growing.Himmelfarband Loartreat the Orthodox as a
singlecategory,but the differentiationwithin this categoryis highlyrelevantto the
polarizationthesis.Once the traditionalistor ultra-Orthodox,who rejectcompromise
with the secularculture,aredistinguishedfromthe modernOrthodox,who attempt
to avoid socialinsularity(cf. Davidson, 1990),a bettercase can be made for at least
a modifiedversionof the polarizationthesis.
The declinein the proportionof OrthodoxJewsfromthe firstto the thirdgenera-
tion may have left a core of committedOrthodoxJews,but it was the post-World
War II immigrantsfromEurope,the survivorsof the Holocaustand their children,
who were in the forefrontof the revivalof Orthodoxyin the United States in this
period.In contrastto the abandonmentof Orthodoxyby childrenof earlierimmigrants,
the childrenof the more recent Orthodox immigrantsare more likely to maintain
the highlevelsof observanceof theirparents.In New York,the centerof Orthodoxy,
Cohen (1988)found that the "Orthodoxretentionrate"had risendramatically,and
that amongthose rearedby highlyobservantparentsit was the youngerrespondents
who most often reportedthe maintenanceof high levels. Wertheimer(1989)reports
that, although the highest proportionof Orthodox Jews in the AmericanJewish
communitiesis found in the 65 and over age category,there is a higherpercentage
of OrthodoxJewsin the 18-34agecategorythan in the middleage categories.There
will be ongoing lossesto Orthodoxybecauseof the death of its older category,but
this may be offsetas childrenareborn to its youngercategory.Demographicgrowth
of the ultra-Orthodoxcommunityis especiallylikely becauseof its high birth rate;
a studyof yeshivaalumnifound an averageof four childrenper familycomparedto
1.8 amongJewsin general(Helmreich,1982).
Recent changesin Americansociety have also been favorableto Orthodoxy.
Generalprosperityhas enabledboth modernOrthodoxand ultra-OrthodoxJewsto
developand expandtheirinstitutions.An increasingnumberof Orthodoxparentshave
been able to supporttheir sons financiallyin advancedyeshivot,and studentshave
been able to affordto stay in the yeshivot for longer periods.The questioningof
Americanvaluesfromthe mid-1960smay havediscouragedthe attemptsof American
Jewsto integratewith the "AmericanWay of Lifc,"but probablymoreimportantin
270 SOCIOLOGICALANALYSIS

the strengthening of Orthodoxy was the greater cultural pluralism that reduced the
social costs of Orthodoxy. The modern Orthodox are still concerned to achieve social
acceptance in the wider society, but they have found that this is obtainable without
abandoning visibleexpressionsof an Orthodox level of observance.The open, pluralistic
society makes it easy for Jewsto discardtheir religiouspractices,but it does not motivate
them to do so, and it has permitted the Orthodox to draw sharperboundaries between
themselves and the wider society (including non-Orthodox Jews). The replacement
of the term "modernOrthodox" by "centristOrthodox" is an indication of this change,
and within the "centrist"Orthodox institutionsthere has been a shift to stricterpatterns,
such as the elimination of mixed dancing at synagogue functions.
The tendency toward more stringent regulations has been encouraged within the
Orthodox day schools, which draw many of their teachersfrom ultra-Orthodoxcircles,
and by parents whose fear of assimilation has motivated them to send their children
to schools that are more Orthodox than themselves. There is now less tolerance in
Orthodox congregations toward members who are only nominally Orthodox, and
because Orthodox rabbis no longer have to accommodate the varied requirements
of communities that are heterogeneous in their religiosity, they are less hestitant in
interpreting the religious law in a strict fashion (Liebman, 1979; Mayer and Waxman,
1983; Kranzler, 1983; Bulka, 1983; Heilman and Cohen, 1986; Wertheimer, 1989).
We may conclude, therefore,that alongsidethe stabilizationof the majorityof American
Jews at a minimal level of observance, there is a section of the Orthodox population
that is growing in size and is pulling away from the majorityby its increasingstringency
of religious practice.
In Israel, even more than in the United States, the trend of a diminishing decline
in religiosity among the majority has occurred at the same time as a growth in ultra-
Orthodoxy or neotraditionalism.The ultra-Orthodoxor haredim(God-fearing),as they
are known in Israel, are not generally represented in surveys of religiosity, but
demographic evidence shows that they have been growing in numbers and spreading
into an increasing number of neighborhoods, especially in Jerusalem where they
represent about 27 percent of the Jewish population (Shilhav and Friedman, 1985).
Only a small part of this growth is a consequence of the baalei teshuvah,"repentents"
from secular backgrounds who become fully Orthodox Jews (Aviad, 1983; Danzger,
1989). Most of the growth is a result of a very high birth rate.
Demographic growth and spread of the haredi population has been accompanied
by the adoption of stricterand more rigorousstandardsof religiousobservance, segrega-
tion from other Jews, and a rejection of modern life-styles.These trends of sectarianism
and pulling away from the majority of the population followed the destruction of the
traditional Eastern European communities in the Holocaust and the development of
a new religious framework, a voluntary community, that encouraged competition in
degreesof stringencyand intrasigence(Friedman,1987;Liebmanand Don-Yehiya, 1984).
In terms of identities, IsraeliJews are more polarized between "religious"(datiim)
and "secular" (hilonim)than American Jews. The context of religious pluralism in
America has encouraged American Jews to differentiate themselves along denomina-
tional lines, to accept the legitimacy of different forms of Judaism, and to formulate
differentmeanings of a "religiousJew"(Harrisonand Lazerwitz,1982).In Israel,religious
 JUDAISMAND THE SECULARIZATIONDEBATE 271

movementsof religiousaccommodationto modernityhave had little success;there

is an Orthodox establishment,and for most IsraeliJews,secularand religiousalike,
"religiousJew"is understoodto mean Orthodox(Sharot,1990).11The depth of this
polarizationshould not, however,be exaggerated.Israelisociety has not entereda
viciousspiralof conflictof the type that Martin(1978)describesin casesof Catholic
"monopoly"such as France.Many secularJewsmay opposewhat they regardas the
limitationsimposedon them by the Orthodox establishmentand its supportersin
Israel,but most do not attackreligionper se becausethey define Israelas a Jewish
state and this necessarilyrequirestheir tacit acceptanceof its religioussymbols.
The religiousobservances,performedwithinthe contextof the family,that have
retainedtheirimportancein Israel,arethe sameas in the United States:the Passover
Seder and the Hanukkahcandles.As in the past, these festivalscontinue to com-
memorateevents in the historyof the Jewishpeopleand to relateeach familyto the
people'shistory, but the traditionalemphasison God's miraculousinterventionis
marginalizedor ignoredby many participants.

DISCUSSION

The authorsof a numberof recentdiscussionsof the secularizationthesis have

begunby notingthat the conventionalviewamongsociologistsis to supportthe thesis,
and that by questioningthe thesisthe authoris questioningand doingbattleagainst
acceptedwisdom(Bell, 1977;Fichter,1983;Hadden, 1987a).However,the readerof
recent sociologyof religionmight easilyobtain the impressionthat, at least in the
United States,it is the antisecularization
thesisthat has becomethe acceptedwisdom
and that the supportersof the secularizationthesis are in the minority.The anti-
secularizationthesisis not new (Parsons,1963;Greeley,1969;Martin,1969),but the
numberof its proponentsamongsociologistsof religionappearsto have growncon-
siderablyin the 1970sand 1980s(e.g., Herteland Nelsen, 1974;Glasner,1977;Stark
and Bainbridge,1985;most of the contributorsin Hammond,1985;Nelson, 1987).
The secularizationthesis is held to be refutedempiricallyby studiesthat show
that religionis aliveand wellin the modernworldand has not been affectedadversely
by dimensionsof "modernization" such as urbanizationand the developmentof the
mass media (Hadden, 1987b;Finke and Stark, 1988).The growth of conservative
religiousmovements,the successof televisionevangelism,and the proliferationof new
religious movements are believed by many American scholarsto demonstratethe
invalidityof the secularization
thesis(Hadden,1987b;Fichter,1983;Anthony,Robbins,
and Schwartz,1983;Richardson,1985).This conclusionhasbeen challengedby those
who have arguedthat the growthof the conservativemovementshas been negligible
in proportionto the population,that conservativereligiousgrowthhas been internal
and has not attractedthe growingnumbersof unaffiliated,and that the membership
of new religiousmovementsis relativelysmall and has not providedan alternative
1 A national
sampleof IsraeliJewsfoundthat, when askedto identifythemselvesin termsof religion,
17%said "religious,"41%"traditional,"and 42%"non-religious" (Ben-Meirand Kedem,1979).In the
Israelicontext,Jewsidentifythemselvesas "traditional"when they practicecertainobservancesbecause
of the value that they attach to the Jewishtradition.
272 SOCIOLOGICALANALYSIS

forthe majorityof thosewho havedisaffiliated fromthe mainlinedenominations (Bibby,

1987;Hunter,1987;WallisandBruce,1986).An alternativeinterpretation characterizes
the trendin the United Statesas one of increasingpolarizationbetweenreligiousand
nonreligioussectorsof the population(Roof and Hadaway,1979;Himmelfarband
Loar, 1984).
The data presentedin this articleon Jewishpopulationsdo not supporta simple
straight-linesecularizationthesisaccordingto which thereis a continuousdeclineand
foreseeabledisappearance religion.Nor do theysupporta steady-state
of modelof religion
or a modelaccordingto whichreligiousdeclinesarecounteredsooneror laterby religious
revivals.Although the data point to elementsof polarization,they do not support
polarizationin the sense of two sides moving in oppositedirections.There are two
trends,both of whichhave to be understoodin termsof the effectsof Westernpatterns
of modernization on Judaism.The trendamongthe majoritybeganwith sharpdeclines
in religiosity,followedby a diminishingdeclineof religiosity,and has now reached
a fairlysteady-stateof minimalobservance.The trend amonga growingminorityis
towardan even stricterpatternof observancethan wasprevalentin the preemancipa-
tion traditionalsociety.
The Jewishpopulationdoes appearmore polarizedin its religiousand secular
patternsthan the Christian.On the secularizedside,the majorityof Jewsdo not hold
most of the fundamentalbeliefsthat weretaken-for-granted by traditionalJews,only
a smallminorityregularlyattend synagogue,and religiouspracticeis limitedto two
or three yearlyobservances.If the majorityof Jewsare more secularizedthan their
Christiancounterparts,the minorityof neotraditionalistsis less compromisingand
moving fartheraway from the dominanttrendsthan their Christiancounterparts.
WhereasChristianevangelicalsor conservativeshave becomeless austereand ascetic
in recent times (Hunter, 1987),Jewishneotraditionalistshave become more severe
and militant.
BecauseJudaismhas become the closest world religion to Christianityin its
involvementin the processesof modernity,explanationsfor the greaterpolarization
in the Jewishcontext shouldbe soughtin the characteristics of the religion.At least
two differencesbetweenJudaismand Christianityappearto be relevant.The firstis
the integraltie betweenreligionand peoplehoodor nationhoodin Judaism.Accom-
modationto modernityhas been accomplishedby focusingon the ethniccomponent
and expressingit symbolicallythrough a few religiousrituals.This has meant that
the secularizedmajorityand the traditionalistminoritydiffergreatlyin the meanings
that they attributeto the religioussymbolsand rituals.The second difference,the
of theJewishpopulationbecause
focuson practice,contributesto the greaterpolarization
it lends itself to the establishmentand strengtheningof clear boundariesfor those
who wish to defend traditionalreligion.
In conclusion,the case of Judaismin modernsocietysuggeststhat the classical
thesis of secularizationshould be modifiedby attentionto polarization.Among the
majorityof Jews,an often steepdeclinein religiosityfollowedthe breakupof cohesive
localcommunities,exposureto scientificeducation,and involvementin legal-rational
structures.At the sametime,the processesof modernizationencouragedthe counter-
trendof neotraditionalism. This was not simplya matterof a rejectionof modernity,
 JUDAISM AND THE SECULARIZATIONDEBATE 273

or important aspects of it, by conservatives or fundamentalists who felt threatened

by change; the processes of modernity have themselves also provided congenial
conditions for the growth and strength of neotraditionalism. In Judaism, it was the
reorganization of traditionalism on the basis of voluntaristic communities and
reorganizedinstitutionsthat producedgrowth, greatermilitancy,and a radicalalternative
to the secularized pattern of the majority.

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