G.R. No.

170945, September 26, 2006

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. MARIA MENDOZA SAN PEDRO

FACTS:
The National Power Corporation (NPC) is a government-owned-and-controlled
corporation created to undertake the development of hydro-electric generation of
power and the production of electricity from any and all sources; and particularly
the construction, operation, and maintenance of power plants, auxiliary plants, dams,
reservoirs, pipes, mains, transmission lines, power stations and substations, and other
works for the purpose of developing hydraulic power from any river, lake, creek,
spring and waterfalls in the Philippines and supplying such power to the inhabitants
thereof.# Under Republic Act No.
6395, as amended, the NPC is authorized to enter private property provided that the owners
thereof shall be indemnified for any actual damage caused thereby.

For the construction of its San Manuel-San Jose 500 KV Transmission Line and Tower No.
SMJ-389, NPC negotiated with Maria Mendoza San Pedro, then represented by her son,
Vicente, for an easement of right of way over her property, Lot No. 2076. The property, which
was partly agricultural and partly residential land, was located in Barangay Partida,
Norzagaray, Bulacan and covered by Tax Declaration No. 00386. On June 19, 1997, Maria
executed a Right of Way Grant# in favor of NPC over the lot for P1,277,886.90. The NPC paid
her P524,635.50 for the damaged improvements thereon.

The payment voucher for the residential portion of the lot valued at P6,000,000.00 (at
P600.00 per square meter) was then processed.# However, the NPC Board of Directors
approved Board Resolution No. 97-246 stating that it would pay only P230.00 per sq m for the
residential portion and P89.00 per sq m for the agricultural portion.

On July 12, 1999, Atty. Baltazar and Engr. Cruz submitted their report,# recommending
as payment for just compensation P800.00 per sq m for the residential lot and P700.00 per sq
m for the agricultural lot. On October 28, 1999, the RTC rendered judgment,# declaring as well
grounded, fair and reasonable the compensation for the property as recommended by Atty.
Baltazar and Engr. Cruz.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the just compensation was achieved with regards to the fair market
value of the residential and agricultural property?

HELD:
The trial court fixed the just compensation for the property as follows: (1) P499.00 per
sq m on the 17,195 sq m agricultural portion of the subject land; and (2) P800.00 per sq m on
the 6,565 sq m residential portion of the lot. Noticeably, the trial court did not blindly accept
the recommendation of majority of the commissioners of P800.00 per sq m for the residential
lot and P700.00 per sq m for the agricultural lot. Indeed, the trial court took into account the
evidence of the parties, in tandem with the findings and recommendation of the majority of the
commissioners. Considering that such valuation of the trial court as affirmed by the CA is
reasonable as it is and supported by the evidence on record, we find no compelling reason to
disturb the same.
The constant loud buzzing and exploding sounds emanating from the towers and
transmission lines, especially on rainy days; the constant fear on the part of the landowners
that the large transmission lines looming not far above their land and the huge tower in front of
their lot will affect their safety and health; and the slim chance that no one would be interested
to buy the remaining portions on each side of the residential lot affected by the project, to the
damage of the landowners, both as to future actual use of the land and financial gains to be
derived there from, makes the instant case fall within the ambit of expropriation.

Reyes vs NHA G.R No 147511

Facts:

National Housing Authority filed several expropriation complaints on the sugarland

owned by the petitioners Reyes. The land is located in Dasmarinas, Cavite. The purpose of the
expropriation is for the expansion of the Dasmarinas Resettlement Project to accommodate the
squatters who were relocated from Manila. The trial court rendered judgment ordering the
expropriation of these lots with payment of just compensation. It was affirmed by the Supreme
Court.

The petitioners Reyes alleged the failure of the respondents to comply with the
Supreme Court order, so they filed a complaint for forfeiture of their rights before the RTC of
Quezon City. They also said that NHA did not relocate squatters from Manila on the
expropriated lands which violate the reason for public purpose. The petitioners prayed that
NHA be enjoined from disposing and alienating the expropriated properties and that judgment
be rendered forfeiting all its rights and interests under the expropriation judgment.

In the answer of NHA, they already paid a substantial amount to the petitioners. Thus,
several issues are already raised in the expropriation court.

The trial court dismissed the case. It held that NHA did not abandon the public purpose
because the relocation of squatters involves a long and tedious process. It also entered into a
contract with a developer for the construction of a low-cost housing to be sold to qualified low
income beneficiaries. The payment of just compensation is independent of the obligation of the
petitioners to pay capital gains tax. Lastly, the payment of just compensation is based on the
value at the time the property was taken.
 The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the property expropriated is taking for public purpose.

Held:
The decision appealed is modified.

The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides for the exercise of the power of eminent
domain over the private properties upon paymentof just compensation. Sec. 9, Article III states
that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. The
constitutional restraints are public use and just compensation.

The expropriation judgment declared that NHA has a lawful right to take petitioners
properties for the public use or purpose of expanding the Dasmarinas Resettlement Project.

The public use is synonymous with public interest, public benefit, public
welfare, and public convenience. The act of NHA in entering a contract with a real
estate developer for the construction of low cost housing cannot be taken to mean as a
deviation from the stated public purpose of their taking.

Expropriation of private lands for slum clearance and urban development is for a public
purpose even if the developed area is later sold to private homeowners, commercial firms,
entertainment and service companies and other private concerns.

The expropriation of private property for the purpose of socialized housing for the
marginalized sector is in furtherance of the social justice provision under Section 1, Article XIII
of the Constitution.

When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple unconditionally, either by the
exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and
the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any
impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner.

PHILIPPINE RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES ASSOCIATION, INC., et al. vs. THE

SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
GR. No. 143076. June 10, 2003
Facts:

On May 23, 2003, a class suit was filed by petitioners in their own behalf and in behalf of
other electric cooperatives organized and existing under PD 269 which are members of
petitioner Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. (PHILRECA). The other
petitioners, electric cooperatives of Agusan del Norte (ANECO), Iloilo 1 (ILECO 1) and Isabela 1
(ISELCO 1) are non-stock, non-profit electric cooperatives organized and existing under PD 269,
as amended, and registered with the National Electrification Administration (NEA).
Under Sec. 39 of PD 269 electric cooperatives shall be exempt from the payment of all National
Government, local government, and municipal taxes and fee, including franchise, fling
recordation, license or permit fees or taxes and any fees, charges, or costs involved in any court
or administrative proceedings in which it may be party.

From 1971to 1978, in order to finance the electrification projects envisioned by PD 269,
as amended, the Philippine Government, acting through the National Economic council (now
National Economic Development Authority) and the NEA, entered into six loan agreements with
the government of the United States of America, through the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) with electric cooperatives as beneficiaries. The loan
agreements contain similarly worded provisions on the tax application of the loan and any
property or commodity acquired through the proceeds of the loan.
Petitioners allege that with the passage of the Local Government Code their tax exemptions
have been validly withdrawn. Particularly, petitioners assail the validity of Sec. 193 and 234 of
the said code. Sec. 193 provides for the withdrawal of tax exemption privileges granted to all
persons, whether natural or juridical, except cooperatives duly registered under RA 6938, while
Sec. 234 exempts the same cooperatives from payment of real property tax.

Issue:

Does the Local Government Code (under Sec. 193 and 234) violate the equal protection
clause since the provisions unduly discriminate against petitioners who are duly registered
cooperatives under PD 269, as amended, and no under RA 6938 or the Cooperatives Code of
the Philippines?
Is there an impairment of the obligations of contract under the loan entered into
between the Philippine and the US Governments?
Held:

No. The guaranty of the equal protection clause is not violated by a law based on a
reasonable classification. Classification, to be reasonable must (a) rest on substantial
classifications; (b) germane to the purpose of the law; (c) not limited to the existing conditions
only; and (d) apply equally to all members of the same class. We hold that there is reasonable
classification under the Local Government Code to justify the different tax treatment between
electric cooperatives covered by PD 269 and electric cooperatives under RA 6938.
First, substantial distinctions exist between cooperatives under PD 269 and those under RA
6938. In the former, the government is the one that funds those so-called electric cooperatives,
while in the latter, the members make equitable contribution as source of funds.
a. Capital Contributions by Members Nowhere in PD 269 doe sit require cooperatives to make
equitable contributions to capital. Petitioners themselves admit that to qualify as a member of
an electric cooperative under PD 269, only the payment of a P5.00 membership fee is required
which is even refundable the moment the member is no longer interested in getting electric
service from the cooperative or will transfer to another place outside the area covered by the
cooperative. However, under the Cooperative Code, the articles of cooperation of a
cooperative applying for registration must be accompanied with the bonds of the accountable
officers and a sworn statement of the treasurer elected by the subscribers showing that at least
25% of the authorized share capital has been subscribed and at least 25% of the total
subscription has been paid and in no case shall the paid-up share capital be less than
P2,000.00.
b. Extent of Government Control over Cooperatives The extent of government control over
electric cooperatives covered by PD 269 is largely a function of the role of the NEA as a primary
source of funds of these electric cooperatives. It is crystal clear that NEA incurred loans from
various sources to finance the development and operations of these electric cooperatives.
Consequently, amendments were primarily geared to expand the powers of NEA over the
electric cooperatives o ensure that loans granted to them would be repaid to the government.
In contrast, cooperatives under RA 6938 are envisioned to be self-sufficient and independent
organizations with minimal government intervention or regulation.
Second, the classification of tax-exempt entities in the Local Government Code is germane to
the purpose of the law. The Constitutional mandate that every local government unit shall
enjoy local autonomy, does not mean that the exercise of the power by the local governments
is beyond the regulation of Congress. Sec. 193 of the LGC is indicative of the legislative intent to
vet broad taxing powers upon the local government units and to limit exemptions from local
taxation to entities specifically provided therein.
Finally, Sec. 193 and 234 of the LGC permit reasonable classification as these exemptions are
not limited to existing conditions and apply equally to all members of the same class.
 No. It is ingrained in jurisprudence that the constitutional prohibition on the
impairment of the obligations of contracts does not prohibit every change in existing laws. To
fall within the prohibition, the change must not only impair the obligation of the existing
contract, but the impairment must be substantial. Moreover, to constitute impairment, the law
must affect a change in the rights of the parties with reference to each other and not with
respect to non-parties.
The quoted provision under the loan agreement does not purport to grant any tax exemption in
favor of any party to the contract, including the beneficiaries thereof. The provisions simply
shift the tax burden, if any, on the transactions under the loan agreements to the borrower
and/or beneficiary of the loan. Thus, the withdrawal by the Local Government Code under Sec.
193 and 234 of the tax exemptions previously enjoyed by petitioners does not impair the
obligation of the borrower, the lender or the beneficiary under the loan agreements as, in fact,
no tax exemption is granted therein.

Re: Conviction of Judge Adoracion G. Angeles [For Child Abuse]- A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC

Facts:

Respondent was convicted for violation of RA 7610. Senior State Prosecutor Emmanuel
Y. Velasco (SSP Velasco)of the Department of Justice (DOJ) wrote a letter to then CJ Panganiban
inquiring whether it is possible to order the immediate suspension of the respondent. The
matter was referred to the OCA for comment and recommendation where they recommended
that respondent be indefinitely suspended. The Court's Second Division approved all of these
recommendations, thus, suspending respondent from performing her judicial functions while
awaiting the final resolution of her criminal cases. Respondent filed an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration; he claimed that the suspension order was wielded against her without
affording her the opportunity to be heard since she was not furnished copies of SSP Velasco's
letter and OCA's Administrative Complaint. Thus, respondent submitted that her suspension is
essentially unjust. Moreover, respondent manifested that the two criminal cases against her
are on appeal before the CA and have, therefore, not yet attained finality. As such, respondent
still enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence and her suspension clashes with this
presumption and is tantamount to a prejudgment of her guilt. SSP Velasco filed an Urgent
Appeal/Manifestation manifesting that respondent continuously defied the courts Resolution
.Velasco reiterated that due to her conviction on two counts of child abuse, respondent no
longer enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence and should remain suspended in
order to erase any suspicion that she is using her influence to obtain a favorable decision and in
order to maintain and reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the judiciary.
Issues:
Whether or not grounds exist to preventively suspend the respondent pending the
resolution of this administrative case.

Held:
We resolve the issue in the negative. The Court cannot fully agree with the
recommendation of the OCA. By parity of reasoning, the fact of respondent's conviction by the
RTC does not necessarily warrant her suspension. We agree with respondent's argument that
since her conviction of the crime of child abuse is currently on appeal before the CA, the same
has not yet attained finality. As such, she still enjoys the constitutional presumption of
innocence. It must be remembered that the existence of a presumption indicating the guilt of
the accused does not in itself destroy the constitutional presumption of innocence unless the
inculpating presumption, together with all the evidence, or the lack of any evidence or
explanation, proves the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Until the accuseds guilt is
shown in this manner, the presumption of innocence continues. Moreover, it is established that
any administrative complaint leveled against a judge must always be examined with a
discriminating eye, for its consequential effects are, by their nature, highly penal, such that the
respondent judge stands to face the sanction of dismissal or disbarment. Aforementioned, the
filing of criminal cases against judges may be used as tools to harass them and may in the long
run create adverse consequences. The OCA, as well as SSP Velasco, failed to prove that other
than the fact that a judgment of conviction for child abuse was rendered against the
respondent, which is still on appeal, there are other lawful grounds to support the imposition of
preventive suspension. Based on the foregoing disquisition, the Court is of the resolve that,
while it is true that preventive suspension
pendente lite
does not violate the right of the accused to be presumed innocent as the same is not a penalty,
the rules on preventive suspension of judges, not having been expressly included in the Rules of
Court, are amorphous at best. Likewise, we consider respondent's argument that there is no
urgency in imposing preventive suspension as the criminal cases are now before the CA, and
that she cannot, by using her present position as an RTC Judge, do anything to influence the CA
to render a decision in her favor. The issue of preventive suspension has also been rendered
moot as the Court opted to resolve this administrative case. However, even as we find that the
OCA and SSP Velasco have not clearly and convincingly shown ample grounds to warrant the
imposition of preventive suspension, we do note the use of offensive language in respondent's
pleadings.
G.R. No. 169431, April 3, 2007
People of the Philippines, appellee
vs Jerry Rapeza y Francisco, appellant
Ponente: Tinga

Facts:

This is an appeal from the decision of the court of appeals affirming the consolidated judgment
of the RTC of Palawan where Jerry Rapeza was found guilty of 2 counts of murder sentenced to
the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count, plus indemnity for the heirs of the 2 victims.

In 2 separate information, Rapeza together with Regino was charged with the murder of the
spouses Cesar Ganzon and Priscilla Libas.

Information narrates that on October 21, 1995 around 4pm at Culion, Palawan the accused
conspired, confiderating together and mutually helped each other, with evident premeditation,
treachery and abuse of superior strength and feloniously attacked and killed with bladed
weapons the victims.

Regino was at large, so Rapeza was the only one arraigned and pleaded not guilty. The RTC held
that the accused is guilty with conspiracy. Case was elevated to the CA for review but RTC was
affirmed.

Prosecution: October 21, 1995 unidentified woman went to Culion and reported a killing that
took place in Sitio Cawa-Cawa, Culion. the officer in charge sent to the victims' house, the
investigating team saw two blooded bodies, which was later identified as Libas and Ganzon. The
autopsy reports show that the common cause of death was hypovolemic shock secondary to
massive bleeding from multiple stab wounds and both bodies were in the early stage of
decomposition. Upon information supplied, appellant had wanted to confess to the crimes. The
appellant was found fishing in Asinan Island and invited the latter for questioning. Appellant
expressed his willingness to make confession in the presence of a lawyer. The appellant was
brought to the police station and later brought to the house of the only available lawyer in the
municipality- Atty. Reyes. Because Atty. Reyes is suffering from rheumatism and the typewriter
in the police station was out of order, the custodial investigation took place at the house of
atty. Reyes in the presence of VM Marasigan of cULION, 2 SB officials, interpreter and SPO2
Gapas (officer in charge).

Rapeza narrated the crime and was signed and was notarized. Thereafter, a complaint for
multiple murder was files against Regino who was likewise arrested. MTC of Culion conducted
preliminary investigation. Finding probable cause only against Rapeza, Regino was ordered
released. Provincial prosecutor however reversed the finding of the TC by including Regino in
the information, but then the latter had left Culion already.

Defense:
Rapeza testified that he did not know the victims and that he has nothing to do with
their deaths. Rapeza is a native of Samar, illiterate and was staying with Regino in Regino's
house, 40 meters away from the victims' house.Several days after Rapeza's arrival, the killings
took place. Rapeza,, along with Regino and Macabili was asked by the police officer to help load
the bodies of the victims kn a banca. Shortly, Rapeza was arrested and brought to the municipal
hall. Regino too was arrested with him. While in detention, Rapeza told the police that it was
Regino who did the killing but the police did not believe him. Rapeza was told to sign a certain
document for his release. Because Rapeza cannot sign, the officer took his thumb, dipped it in
ink and marked it on the document. Rapeza denied going to the house of Atty. Reyes or
meeting the alleged interpreter. When he was brought to the MTC, the counsel did not assist
him, he was later brought to a hut in the mountain where he was told to go farther, which he
refused for fear of being shot.

On the basis of appellant's extrajudicial confession, the RTc found him guilty.

Issues:
Whether his guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt and whether the qualifying
circumstance of evident premediation was likewise proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling:
There is no direct evidence of appellants guilt except for the alleged confession and the
corpus delicti. Upon careful examination of the alleged confession and the testimony of the
witnesses, we hold that the alleged confession is inadmissible and must perforce be discarded.

Thus, the Court has consistently held that an extrajudicial confession, to be admissible, must
conform to the following requisites: 1) the confession must be voluntary; 2) the confession
must be made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel, preferably of the
confessants choice; 3) the confession must be express; and 4) the confession must be in
writing.

We note that appellant did not voluntarily surrender to the police but was "invited" by SPO2
Gapas to the police station. There he was detained from 11 oclock in the morning of 22
October 1995 up to the morning of 23 October 1995 before his extrajudicial statement was
allegedly taken. At this juncture, appellant should have been informed of his constitutional
rights as he was already considered a suspect, contrary to the finding of the trial court that the
mandatory constitutional guidelines only attached when the investigators started to propound
questions to appellant on 23 October 1995 in the house of Atty. Reyes.

Custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the investigation ceases to be a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular person as a
suspect. According to PO3 Palmero, right after appellants arrest, the latter already insinuated
to him that he would confess his participation in the killing.

In order to comply with the constitutional mandates, there should likewise be meaningful
communication to and understanding of his rights by the appellant, as opposed to a routine,
peremptory and meaningless recital thereof. Since comprehension is the objective, the degree
of explanation required will necessarily depend on the education, intelligence, and other
relevant personal circumstances of the person undergoing investigation.
In this case, it was established that at the time of the investigation appellant was illiterate and
was not well versed in Tagalog. This fact should engender a higher degree of scrutiny in
determining whether he understood his rights as allegedly communicated to him, as well as the
contents of his alleged confession.
The prosecution underscores the presence of an interpreter in the person of Abad to buttress
its claim that appellant was informed of his rights in the dialect known to him. However, the
presence of an interpreter during the interrogation was not sufficiently established. Although
the confession bears the signature of Abad, it is uncertain whether he was indeed present to
assist appellant in making the alleged confession.

For another, the prosecution did not present Abad as witness. Abad would have been in the
best position to prove that he indeed made the translation from Tagalog to Waray for appellant
to understand what was going on. This significant circumstance lends credence to appellants
claim that he had never met Abad.

The extra-judicial confession was allegedly made in Tagalog when accused-appellant is

admittedly not well versed in said language. Even if the confession was made in the presence of
an interpreter, there is no showing that the rights of a person under investigation were
effectively explained and/or interpreted to accused-appellant. The interpreter was not even
presented in Court to prove that said rights were translated in a language understood by
accused-appellant.

(2) The constitutional requirement obviously had not been observed. Settled is the rule that the
moment a police officer tries to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information from
a suspect, the latter should, at that juncture, be assisted by counsel, unless he waives this right
in writing and in the presence of counsel. Appellant did not make any such waiver.
Assuming that Atty. Reyes did assist appellant, still there would be grave doubts as to his
competence and independence as appellants counsel for purposes of the custodial
investigation.

(3) It is settled that a confession is presumed voluntary until the contrary is proved and the
confessant bears the burden of proving the contrary. The trial court found that appellants bare
denials failed to overcome this presumption. However, several factors constrain us to hold that
the confession was not given under conditions that conduce to its admissibility.
First, the confession contains facts and details which appear to have been supplied by the
investigators themselves.Second, the prosecution failed to establish the actual date of the
killings. The actual date of the commission of the crimes is material in assessing the credibility
of the prosecution witnesses and of the admissibility of the alleged confession.

(4) Confession was not sufficiently corroborated.

Courts are slow to accept extrajudicial confessions when they are subsequently disputed unless
they are corroborated. There must be such corroboration so that when considered in
connection with the confession, it will show the guilt of accused beyond a reasonable doubt.
As a general rule, a confession must be corroborated by those to whom the witness who
testified thereto refers as having been present at the time the confession was made or by any
other evidence.
The inconsistencies in the testimonies of the police officers as well as any lingering doubt as to
the credibility of appellants statement could have been laid to rest by the testimonies of Atty.
Reyes, of Abad, and of those allegedly present during the custodial investigation. However, they
were not presented in court.

Consequently, the non-production of these material witnesses raises a doubt which must be
resolved in favor of appellant and the confession should be disregarded as evidence. Verily, we
are left with the unconvincing testimony of two police officers against whose abuse of authority
the Constitution protects the appellant. As their respective testimonies are sated with
inconsistencies and hearsay evidence, we find the same insufficient bases to hold appellants
extrajudicial confession admissible against him.

PEOPLE vs. TING LAN UY

Facts:
Sometime in July 1990, accused Jose Ting Lan Uy, Jr., a public accountable officer, being
the Treasurer of National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), and Ernesto Gamus and Jaime Ochoa,
both public officers being the Manager of the Loan Management and Foreign
Exchange Division and Foreign Trader Analyst, respectively, of NAPOCOR; and accused
Raul Gutierrez, a private individual being a foreign exchange trader, falsify or cause to be
falsified the NAPOCOR's application for managers checks with the Philippine National Bank in
the total amount of 183 805 291.25 pesos, intended for the purchase of US dollars from the
United Coconut Planters Bank, by inserting the account number of Raul Gutierrez SA-111-
121204-4, when in truth and in fact that the Payment Instructions when signed by the
NAPOCOR authorities did not indicate the account number of Raul Gutierrez, thereby making
alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning, and with the use
of the said falsified commercial documents, accused succeeded in diverting, collecting and
receiving the said amount from NAPOCOR, which they thereafter malverse, embezzle,
misappropriate, and convert to their own personal use and benefit to the damage and
prejudice of the NAPOCOR. Gamus, Uy, and Ochoa pleaded not guilty. Gutierrez remained at
large. During pretrial, it was found that Gamus does not have any custody to public funds.
However, because of preponderance of evidence, he is civilly liable for the damages.
Issue:
Whether Ochoa be held guilty of malversation thru falsification of commercial
document without violating his constitutional right to due process and to be informed of the
accusation against him, when the information alleged willful and intentional commission of the
acts complained of, whereas the judgment found him guilty of on excusable negligence
amounting to malice.
Held:
The Sandigan bayan rendered its decision, finding Ochoa guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of malversation thru falsification of commercial document and that, on the
ground of reasonable doubt, accused Ting Lan Uy, Jr., was acquitted of Malversation of public
funds thru falsification of commercial document

People vs. Baloloy, 381 SCRA 31, G.R. No. 140740 April 12, 2002

Facts:

At the waterfalls of Barangay Inasagan, Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur, on the evening of 3
August 1996, the dead body of an 11-year-old girl Genelyn Camacho (hereafter GENELYN) was
found. The one who caused its discovery was accused-appellant Juanito Baloloy (hereafter
JUANITO) himself, who claimed that he had caught sight of it while he was catching frogs in a
nearby creek. However, based on his alleged extrajudicial confession, coupled with
circumstantial evidence, the girls unfortunate fate was pinned on him. Hence, in this automatic
review, he seeks that his alleged confession be disregarded for having been obtained in
violation of his constitutional rights, and that his conviction on mere circumstantial evidence be
set aside.

The information1 charging JUANITO with the crime of rape with homicide reads as
follows:

That on August 3, 1996 at about 6:30 oclock in the evening, at Barangay Inasagan,
Municipality of Aurora, province of Zamboanga del Sur, Republic of the Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
with one Genelyn Camacho, a minor against the latters will and on said occasion and by reason
of the rape, the said Genelyn Camacho died as a result of personal violence, inflicted upon her
by the accused.

Act contrary to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. No. 7659.

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. AZ-CC-96-156.

Upon arraignment2 on 10 December 1996, JUANITO entered a plea of not guilty. Trial on
the merits ensued thereafter.

Jose Camacho, father of GENELYN and resident of Inasagan, Purok Mabia, Aurora,
Zamboanga del Sur, testified that at about 5:00 p.m. of 3 August 1996, he asked GENELYN to
borrow some rice from their neighbor Wilfredo Balogbog whose house was about 200 meters
away. GENELYN forthwith left, but never returned. Thus, Jose went to the house of Wilfredo,
who informed him that GENELYN had already left with one ganta of rice. Jose then started to
look for GENELYN. Speculating that GENELYN might have taken shelter at the house of their
neighbor Olipio Juregue while it was raining, Jose proceeded to Olipios house. Unfortunately,
Jose did not find GENELYN there. Not losing hope, Jose proceeded to the house of Ernesto
Derio. On his way, he met Wilfredo, who accompanied him to the house of Ernesto. GENELYN
was not there either. They continued their search for GENELYN, but when it proved to be in
vain, the two decided to go home.3

A few minutes after Jose reached his house, Ernesto and JUANITO arrived. JUANITO
informed Jose that he saw a dead body at the waterfalls, whose "foot was showing." When
asked whose body it was, JUANITO answered that it was GENELYNs. Immediately, the three
went to the waterfalls where JUANITO pointed the spot where he saw GENELYNs body. With
the aid of his flashlight, Jose went to the spot, and there he saw the dead body floating face
down in the knee-high water. True enough, it was GENELYNs. Jose reported the incident to
Barangay Captain Luzviminda Ceniza. Upon Cenizas order, the Bantay Bayan members and
some policemen retrieved and brought GENELYNs dead body to Joses house.4

Wilfredo Balogbog corroborated the testimony of Jose that GENELYN came to his house
in the afternoon of 3 August 1996 to borrow some rice. GENELYN had with her an umbrella that
afternoon, as it was raining. He learned that GENELYN failed to reach her home when Jose
came to look for her.5
 Ernesto Derio, JUANITOs uncle-in-law, testified that at about 6:30 p.m. of 3 August
1996, Jose, together with Wilfredo Balogbog, arrived at his house to look for GENELYN, but they
immediately left when they did not find her. At about 7:30 p.m., JUANITO arrived at Ernestos
house, trembling and apparently weak. JUANITO was then bringing a sack and a kerosene lamp.
When Ernesto asked JUANITO where he was going, the latter said that he would catch frogs;
and then he left. After thirty minutes, JUANITO returned and told Ernesto that he saw a foot of
a dead child at the waterfalls. With the disappearance of GENELYN in mind, Ernesto lost no time
to go the house of Jose. JUANITO followed him. There, JUANITO told Jose that he saw a foot of
a dead child at the waterfalls. When Jose asked whether it was GENELYNs, JUANITO answered
in the affirmative. The three then proceeded to the waterfalls, where JUANITO pointed the
place where he saw the body of GENELYN. Jose immediately approached the body, and having
confirmed that it was GENELYNs, he brought it to a dry area.6

Ernesto also testified that on 4 August 1996, he saw Antonio Camacho hand over a black
rope to Barangay Captain Ceniza. The latter asked those present as to who owned the rope.
When JUANITO admitted ownership of the rope, Ceniza brought him away from the crowd to a
secluded place and talked to him.7

Finally, Ernesto testified that JUANITO previously attempted to molest his (Ernestos)
child, an incident that caused a fight between him (JUANITO) and his (Ernestos) wife. 8

Antonio Camacho, a cousin of Jose, testified that on 3 August 1996, he was informed by
Joses brother that GENELYN was "drowned." He and the Bantay Bayan members proceeded to
the place of the incident and retrieved the body of GENELYN. At 8:00 a.m. of the following day
he, together with Edgar Sumalpong and Andres Dolero, went to the waterfalls to trace the path
up to where GENELYN was found. There, they found a black rope and an umbrella. They gave
the umbrella to Joses wife, and the black rope to Barangay Captain Ceniza, who was then
attending the wake of GENELYN. Ceniza asked those who were at the wake whether anyone of
them owned the rope. JUANITO answered that he owned it. Thereafter Ceniza talked to
JUANITO.9

Andres Dolero corroborated the testimony of Antonio on the recovery of the black rope
and umbrella at the waterfalls where GENELYNs body was found.10

Barangay Captain Ceniza of Inasagan, Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur, testified that at about
8:30 p.m. of 3 August 1996, Jose Camacho, Ernesto Derio, Porferio Camacho, and JUANITO
arrived at her house to inform her that JUANITO found GENELYNs dead body at the waterfalls.
Ceniza forthwith ordered the members of the Bantay Bayan to retrieve the body of GENELYN,
and reported the incident to the police headquarters of Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur. She
specifically named JUANITO as her suspect. She then went home and proceeded to Joses house
for GENELYNs wake. She saw JUANITO at the wake and noticed that he was very uneasy. 11

Ceniza further revealed that on 4 August 1996, while she was on her way to Joses
house, Antonio gave her a black rope, which he reportedly found at the spot where the dead
body of GENELYN was retrieved. Ceniza then asked the people at the wake about the rope.
JUANITO, who was among those present, claimed the rope as his. She brought JUANITO away
from the others and asked him why his rope was found at the place where GENELYNs body was
discovered. JUANITO answered: "I have to claim this as my rope because I can commit sin to
God if I will not claim this as mine because this is mine." Ceniza further asked JUANITO to tell
her everything. JUANITO told Ceniza that his intention was only to frighten GENELYN, not to
molest and kill her. When GENELYN ran away, he chased her. As to how he raped her, JUANITO
told Ceniza that he first inserted his fingers into GENELYNs vagina and then raped her.
Thereafter, he threw her body into the ravine.12

After such confession, Ceniza examined his body and found a wound on his right
shoulder, as well as abrasions and scratches on other parts of his body. Upon further inquiry,
JUANITO told her that the wound on his shoulder was caused by the bite of GENELYN. Ceniza
then turned over JUANITO to a policeman for his own protection, as the crowd became unruly
when she announced to them that JUANITO was the culprit. JUANITO was forthwith brought to
the police headquarters.13

Victor Mosqueda, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed at the
Aurora Police Station, testified that at about 10:00 p.m. of 4 August 1996 he was at Joses
house. Ceniza informed him that JUANITO was the suspect in the killing of GENELYN, and she
turned over to him a black rope which belonged to JUANITO. He wanted to interrogate
JUANITO, but Ceniza cautioned him not to proceed with his inquiry because the people around
were getting unruly and might hurt JUANITO. Mosqueda immediately brought JUANITO to the
police station, and on that same day, he took the affidavits of the witnesses. The following day,
a complaint was filed against JUANITO.14

Dr. Arturo Lumacad, Municipal Health Officer of the Aurora Rural Health Clinic, testified
that he examined JUANITO so as to verify the information that JUANITO sustained wounds in
his body.15 His examination of JUANITO revealed the following injuries:

1. fresh abrasions on the right portion of the cheek;

2. multiple abrasions on the right shoulder;

3. abrasion on the left shoulder; and

4. abrasions on the left forearm.16

Dr. Lumacad also testified that he examined the dead body of GENELYN on 4 August
1996 and found the following injuries:

1. 2.5-inch lacerated wound at her left neck, front of the head;

2. 1-inch wound at the right cheek just below the first wound;

3. multiple contusions on her chest;

4. contusion at the right hip; and

5. fresh lacerations on her vagina at 9 oclock and 3 oclock positions.17

 He opined that the fresh lacerations could have been caused by a large object inserted
into GENELYNs vagina, such as a male sex organ, a rod, or a piece of wood or metal. 18

Presiding Judge Celestino V. Dicon of the Municipal Trial Court of Aurora, Zamboanga
del Sur, testified that when he arrived in his office at around 8:30 a.m. of 4 August 1996 several
people, including Barangay Captain Ceniza, were already in his courtroom. He learned that they
came to swear to their affidavits before him. After reading the affidavit of Ceniza, he asked
Ceniza whether her statements were true. Ceniza answered in the affirmative and pointed to
JUANITO as the culprit. Judge Dicon turned to JUANITO and asked him whether the charge
against him was true. JUANITO replied in the dialect: "[N]apanuwayan ko, sir" ("I was
demonized"). While Judge Dicon realized that he should not have asked JUANITO as to the
truthfulness of the allegations against him, he felt justified in doing so because the latter was
not under custodial investigation. Judge Dicon thus proceeded to ask JUANITO whether he had
a daughter as old as the victim and whether he was aware of what he had done to GENELYN.
Again, JUANITO responded that he was demonized, and he spontaneously narrated that after
he struck GENELYNs head with a stone he dropped her body into the precipice. 19

Lopecino Albano, process server in the court of Judge Dicon, corroborated the
testimony of the latter as to JUANITOs admission that he was demonized when he raped and
killed GENELYN.20

The sole witness for the defense was JUANITO, who invoked denial and alibi. He
testified that he was at his mothers house at around 6:30 p.m. of 3 August 1996. An hour later,
he left for the creek to catch frogs; and while catching frogs, he saw a foot. He forthwith
headed for Ernesto Derios house to ask for help. There, he told Ernesto and his wife of what he
had seen. Ernestos wife asked JUANITO whether the person was still alive, and JUANITO
answered that he was not sure. At this point, Ernesto informed him that Jose Camacho was
looking for GENELYN. JUANITO and Ernesto then proceeded to the house of Jose to inform the
latter of what he, JUANITO, had seen. The three forthwith went to the creek. There, they found
out that the foot was GENELYNs and that she was already dead. Upon Joses request, JUANITO
and Ernesto informed Joses brother about the incident, and they proceeded to the house of
Ceniza. Thereafter, they, along with the members of the Bantay Bayan, went back to the creek
to retrieve the body of GENELYN.21

JUANITO further recalled that after the body of GENELYN was brought to her parents
house, he helped saw the lumber for her coffin. Thereafter, he went to Ernestos house to get
the sack containing the seventeen frogs he had caught that night, which he earlier left at
Ernestos house. He was shocked to find out that the rope which he used to tie the sack, as well
as all the frogs he caught, was missing. As it was already dawn, JUANITO left his sack at his
mothers house; then he proceeded to the house of Jose to help make the coffin of GENELYN.
But, at around 8:00 a.m., policeman Banaag came looking for him. He stopped working on
GENELYNs coffin and identified himself. Banaag took him away from the house of Jose and
asked him whether he owned the rope. JUANITO answered in the affirmative. At this point,
policeman Mosqueda came near them and escorted him and Banaag back to Joses house. At
Joses house, Mosqueda announced to the crowd that JUANITO was the suspect in GENELYNs
untimely demise. JUANITO was then detained and investigated at the police station. 22 During
his investigation by the police officers and by Judge Dicon, he was never assisted by a lawyer.23

In its challenged decision,24 the trial court found JUANITO guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape with homicide. On the challenge on the admissibility of the
admissions he made to Barangay Captain Ceniza and Judge Dicon, it ruled that they are not the
law enforcement authorities referred to in the constitutional provisions on the conduct of
custodial investigation. Hence, JUANITOs confessions made to them are admissible in
evidence. Moreover, no ill-motive could be attributed to both Ceniza and Judge Dicon. It also
found unsubstantiated JUANITOs claim that he was threatened by his fellow inmates to make
the confession before Judge Dicon; and that, even assuming that he was indeed threatened by
them, the threat was not of the kind contemplated in the Bill of Rights. The threat, violence or
intimidation that invalidates confession must come from the police authorities and not from a
civilian. Finally, it ruled that JUANITOs self-serving negative evidence cannot stand against the
prosecutions positive evidence.

The trial court, thus, convicted JUANITO of rape with homicide and imposed on him the
penalty of death. It also ordered him to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000 by
way of civil indemnity. Hence, this automatic review.

In his Appellants Brief, JUANITO imputes to the trial court the following errors:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE ALLEGED CONFESSION OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO WITNESSES LUZVIMINDA CE[N]IZA AND JUDGE CELESTINO DICON AS
EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED.

II

ON ACCOUNT OF THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACCUSEDS ALLEGED CONFESSION THE COURT

GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED BASED ON MERE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

Anent the first assigned error, JUANITO maintains that the trial court violated Section
12(1) of Article III of the Constitution25 when it admitted in evidence his alleged extrajudicial
confession to Barangay Captain Ceniza and Judge Dicon. According to him, the two failed to
inform him of his constitutional rights before they took it upon themselves to elicit from him
the incriminatory information. It is of no moment that Ceniza and Dicon are not police
investigators, for as public officials it was incumbent upon them to observe the express
mandate of the Constitution. While these rights may be waived, the prosecution failed to show
that he effectively waived his rights through a written waiver executed in the presence of
counsel. He concludes that his extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence.

In his second assigned error, JUANITO asserts that the prosecution miserably failed to establish
with moral certainty his guilt. He points to the contradicting testimonies of the witnesses for
the prosecution concerning the retrieved rope owned by him. Consequently, with the
inadmissibility of his alleged extrajudicial confession and the apparent contradiction
surrounding the prosecutions evidence against him, the trial court should have acquitted him.

In the Appellees Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) supports the trial courts
finding that JUANITO is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime as charged. His bare denial
and alibi cannot overcome the positive assertions of the witnesses for the prosecution.
Moreover, he was unable to establish by sufficient evidence that Barangay Captain Ceniza and
Judge Dicon had an ulterior motive to implicate him in the commission of the crime.

The OSG recommends that the civil indemnity of P50,000 awarded by the trial court be
increased to P75,000; and that in line with current jurisprudence, moral damages in the amount
of P50,000 be awarded to the heirs of GENELYN.

We shall first address the issue of admissibility of JUANITOs extrajudicial confession to

Barangay Captain Ceniza.

It has been held that the constitutional provision on custodial investigation does not
apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities but given
in an ordinary manner whereby the suspect orally admits having committed the crime. Neither
can it apply to admissions or confessions made by a suspect in the commission of a crime
before he is placed under investigation. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory
disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 of the Constitution
are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused
to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. 26

In the instant case, after he admitted ownership of the black rope and was asked by
Ceniza to tell her everything, JUANITO voluntarily narrated to Ceniza that he raped GENELYN
and thereafter threw her body into the ravine. This narration was a spontaneous answer, freely
and voluntarily given in an ordinary manner. It was given before he was arrested or placed
under custody for investigation in connection with the commission of the offense.

It may be stressed further that Cenizas testimony on the facts disclosed to her by
JUANITO was confirmed by the findings of Dr. Lumacad. GENELYNs physical resistance and
biting of the right shoulder of JUANITO were proved by the wound on JUANITOs right shoulder
and scratches on different parts of his body. His admission that he raped GENELYN was likewise
corroborated by the fresh lacerations found in GENELYNs vagina.

Moreover, JUANITO did not offer any evidence of improper or ulterior motive on the
part of Ceniza, which could have compelled her to testify falsely against him. Where there is no
evidence to show a doubtful reason or improper motive why a prosecution witness should
testify against the accused or falsely implicate him in a crime, the said testimony is
trustworthy.27

However, there is merit in JUANITOs claim that his constitutional rights during custodial
investigation were violated by Judge Dicon when the latter propounded to him incriminating
questions without informing him of his constitutional rights. It is settled that at the moment the
accused voluntarily surrenders to, or is arrested by, the police officers, the custodial
investigation is deemed to have started. So, he could not thenceforth be asked about his
complicity in the offense without the assistance of counsel.28 Judge Dicons claim that no
complaint has yet been filed and that neither was he conducting a preliminary investigation
deserves scant consideration. The fact remains that at that time JUANITO was already under
the custody of the police authorities, who had already taken the statement of the witnesses
who were then before Judge Dicon for the administration of their oaths on their statements.

While Mosqueda claims that JUANITO was not arrested but was rather brought to the
police headquarters on 4 August 1996 for his protection, the records reveal that JUANITO was
in fact arrested. If indeed JUANITOs safety was the primordial concern of the police authorities,
the need to detain and deprive him of his freedom of action would not have been necessary.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense, and it is made by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or
by his submission to the person making the arrest.29

At any rate, while it is true that JUANITOs extrajudicial confession before Judge Dicon
was made without the advice and assistance of counsel and hence inadmissible in evidence, it
could however be treated as a verbal admission of the accused, which could be established
through the testimonies of the persons who heard it or who conducted the investigation of the
accused.30

JUANITOs defense of alibi is futile because of his own admission that he was at the
scene of the crime. Alibi is a defense that places an accused at the relevant time of a crime in a
place other than the scene involved and so removed therefrom as to render it impossible for
him to be the guilty party.31 Likewise, a denial that is unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence is a negative and self-serving evidence, which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary
weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.32

Anent the alleged inconsistencies in the details surrounding the recovery of the black
rope, the same are irrelevant and trite and do not impair the credibility of the witnesses. Minor
inconsistencies and honest lapses strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of witnesses,
as they erase doubts that such testimonies have been coached or rehearsed.33What matters is
that the testimonies of witnesses agree on the essential fact that JUANITO was the owner of
the black rope and the perpetrator of the crime.

Even if JUANITOs confession or admission is disregarded, there is more than enough

evidence to support his conviction. The following circumstances constitute an unbroken chain
proving beyond reasonable doubt that it was JUANITO who raped and killed GENELYN:

1. At about 5:00 p.m. of 3 August 1996, Jose Camacho bid his daughter GENELYN to borrow
some rice from their neighbor Wilfredo Balogbog. GENELYN did so as told, but failed to return
home.

2. About 7:30 p.m. of the same day, JUANITO arrived at Ernestos house bringing a sack and
kerosene lamp, trembling and apparently weak.
3. Thirty minutes thereafter, JUANITO returned to Ernestos house and told Ernesto that he saw
a foot of a dead child at the waterfalls, without disclosing the identity of the deceased.

4. When JUANITO and Ernesto were at Joses house, the former told Jose that it was GENELYNs
foot he saw at the waterfalls.

5. GENELYN was found dead at the waterfalls with fresh lacerations on her vaginal wall at 9 and
3 oclock positions.

6. At about 8:00 a.m. of 4 August 1996, Antonio Camacho, Andres Dolero and Edgar Sumalpong
recovered at the crime site a black rope, which they turned over to Ceniza, who was then at
GENELYNs wake.

7. When Ceniza asked the people around as to who owned the black rope, JUANITO claimed it
as his.

8. When Ceniza examined JUANITOs body, she saw a wound on his right shoulder and
scratches on different parts of his body.

9. Dr. Lumancads physical examination of JUANITO revealed abrasions, which could have been
caused by scratches.

Guilt may be established through circumstantial evidence provided that the following
requisites concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the inferences are based on
proven facts; and (3) the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.34 All these requisites are present in the case at
bar.

With JUANITOs guilt for rape with homicide proven beyond reasonable doubt, we are
constrained to affirm the death penalty** imposed by the trial court. Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659, pertinently provides: "When by reason
or on occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death."

As to JUANITOs civil liability, prevailing judicial policy has authorized the mandatory
award of P100,00035 as civil indemnity ex delicto in cases of rape with homicide (broken down
as follows: P50,000 for the death and P50,000 upon the finding of the fact of rape). Thus, if
homicide is committed by reason or on occasion of rape, the indemnity in the amount of
P100,000 is fully justified and properly commensurate with the seriousness of the said special
complex crime. Moral damages in the amount of P50,000 may be additionally awarded to the
heirs of the victim without the need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof; the fact that they
suffered the trauma of mental, physical and psychological sufferings, which constitutes the
basis for moral damages under the Civil Code, is too obvious to still require the recital thereof
at the trial.36

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, Aurora, Zamboanga
Del Sur, in Criminal Case No. AZ-CC-96-156, finding accused-appellant Juanito Baloloy guilty of
the crime of rape with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death is AFFIRMED
with the modification that he is ordered to pay the heirs of Genelyn Camacho P100,000 as
indemnity and P50,000 as moral damages.

In consonance with Section 25 of R.A. No. 7659 amending Article 83 of the Revised
Penal Code, upon finality of this Decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to
the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

People v. Tito Zuela

January 28, 2000

The case is an appeal of accused Maximo Velarde y de los Reyes, Nelson Garcia y Temporas and
Tito Zuela y Morandarte from the decision of the RTC, Camarines Sur, Libmanan, Br. 24, finding
them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide.

Issue:

Whether or not the extra-judicial confessions were executed in accordance with the provisions
of the 1973 Constitution?

Held:

The right to counsel attaches the moment an investigating officer starts to ask questions to
elicit information on the crime from the suspected offender.. In other words, the moment
there is a move or even urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even
plain information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he
should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be
made in writing and in the presence of counsel.

Nevertheless, the infirmity of accused-appellants sworn statements did not leave a void in the
prosecutions case. Accused-appellant Maximo repeated the contents of his sworn statement
to Romualda Algarin who, in turn, related these in court. Such declaration to a private person is
admissible in evidence against accused-appellant Maximo pursuant to Rule 130, Section 26 of
the Rules of Court stating that the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact
may be given in evidence against him. The trial court, therefore, correctly gave evidentiary
value to Romualdas testimony.There was no evidence that Maximo executed a waiver of his
right to counsel. In light of these facts, we are constrained to rule that Maximo Velardes extra-
judicial statement is inadmissible in evidence. An uncounselled extra-judicial confession
without a valid waiver of the right to counsel that is, in writing and in the presence of counsel
is inadmissible in evidence. Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, the defect in the
confessions of Tito and Nelson was not cured by their signing the extra-judicial statements
before Judge Bagalacsa.

And in the recent case of People vs. Andan, the Court reiterated the doctrine enunciated in
the Maquedacase. In Andan, the Court said that when the accused talked with the mayor as
confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession did not violate his
constitutional rights. Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an
ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime.

Treachery was not alleged in the information but the suddenness of the assault upon Hegino
and Maria from behind was proven beyond reasonable doubt. As such, treachery may be
appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. Treachery exists when an adult person
illegally attacks a child of tender years and causes his death.

The crime committed is the special complex crime of robbery with homicide defined and
penalized in Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court correctly considered the
crime as robbery with homicide and not robbery with triple homicide as charged in the
information. The term homicide in Article 294(1) is used in its generic sense, embracing not
only the act which results in death but also all other acts producing anything short of death.
Neither is the nature of the offense altered by the number of killings in connection with the
robbery. The multiplicity of victims slain on the occasion of the robbery is only appreciated as
an aggravating circumstance. This would preclude an anomalous situation where, from the
standpoint of the gravity of the offense, robbery with one killing would be treated in the same
way that robbery with multiple killings would be.

G.R. Nos. 138874-75 January 31, 2006

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAAGA alias "PACO;" JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias
"WESLEY;" ALBERT CAO alias "ALLAN PAHAK;" ARIEL BALANSAG; DAVIDSON VALIENTE
RUSIA alias 'TISOY TAGALOG;" JAMES ANTHONY UY alias "WANGWANG;" and JAMES
ANDREW UY alias "MM," Appellants.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
Most jurisdictions recognize age as a barrier to having full responsibility over ones action.1 Our
legal system, for instance, does not punish a youth as it would an adult, and it sees youthful
misconduct as evidence of unreasoned or impaired judgment. Thus, in a myriad of cases, we
have applied the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority embodied in Article 68 of the
Revised Penal Code -- the rationale of which is to show mercy and some extent of leniency in
favor of an accused who, by reason of his age, is presumed to have acted with less discernment.
The case at bar is another instance when the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority
must apply.

For our resolution is the motion for reconsideration2 filed by brothers James Anthony and
James Andrew, both surnamed Uy, praying for the reduction of the penalties we imposed upon
the latter on the ground that he was a minor at the time the crimes were committed.

A brief review of the pertinent facts is imperative.

On February 3, 2004, we rendered a Decision3 convicting the Uy brothers, together with

Francisco Juan Larraaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Cao and Ariel Balansag of
the crimes of (a) special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with
homicide and rape; and (b) simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Cebu City in Criminal Cases
Nos. CBU 45303 and 45304 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAAGA alias
PACO; JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias WESLEY; ALBERTO CAO alias
ALLAN PAHAK; ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES ANDREW UY alias MM, are found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with homicide and rape and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH by
lethal injection;

(2) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAAGA alias
PACO; JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias WESLEY; ALBERTO CAO alias
ALLAN PAHAK; ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES ANDREW UY alias MM, are found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention and are
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA;

(3) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellant JAMES ANTHONY UY who was a minor at
the time the crime was committed, is likewise found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and
rape and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA; in Criminal
Case No. CBU-45304, he is declared guilty of simple kidnapping and serious illegal
detention and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of TWELVE (12) years ofprision
 mayor in its maximum period, as MINIMUM, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion
temporal in its medium period, as MAXIMUM;

(4) Appellants are ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Marijoy and
Jacqueline, in each case, the amounts of (a) P100,000.00 as civil
indemnity; (b) P25,000.00 as temperate damages; (c) P150,000.00 as moral damages;
and (d) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Three (3) Justices of the Court maintain their position that RA 7659 is unconstitutional insofar
as it prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority that
the law is constitutional and the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.

In accordance with Article 83 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of RA No.
7659, upon the finality of this Decision let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to
the Office of the President for the possible exercise of Her Excellencys pardoning power.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGER P. TULIN,

VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C.
INFANTE, CHEONG SAN HIONG, and JOHN DOES, accused-
appellants.

DECISION
MELO, J.:

This is one of the older cases which unfortunately has remained in docket of the Court for
sometime. It was reassigned, together with other similar cases, to undersigned ponente in
pursuance of A.M. No. 00-9-03-SC dated February 27, 2001.
In the evening of March 2, 1991, M/T Tabangao, a cargo vessel owned by the PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation, loaded with 2,000 barrels of kerosene, 2,600 barrels of
regular gasoline, and 40,000 barrels of diesel oil, with a total value of P40,426,793,87. was
sailing off the coast of Mindoro near Silonay Island.
The vessel, manned by 21 crew members, including Captain Edilberto Libo-on, Second
Mate Christian Torralba, and Operator Isaias Ervas, was suddenly boarded, with the use of an
aluminum ladder, by seven fully armed pirates led by Emilio Changco, older brother of accused-
appellant Cecilio Changco. The pirates, including accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante,
Jr. were armed with M-16 rifles, .45 and .38 caliber handguns, and bolos. They detained the crew
and took complete control of the vessel. Thereafter, accused-appellant Loyola ordered three crew
members to paint over, using black paint, the name "M/T Tabangao" on the front and rear
portions of the vessel, as well as the PNOC logo on the chimney of the vessel. The vessel was
then painted with the name "Galilee," with registry at San Lorenzo, Honduras. The crew was
forced to sail to Singapore, all the while sending misleading radio messages to PNOC that the
ship was undergoing repairs.
PNOC, after losing radio contact with the vessel, reported the disappearance of the vessel to
the Philippine Coast Guard and secured the assistance of the Philippine Air Force and the
Philippine Navy. However, search and rescue operations yielded negative results. On March 9,
1991, the ship arrived in the vicinity of Singapore and cruised around the area presumably to
await another vessel which, however, failed to arrive. The pirates were thus forced to return to
the Philippines on March 14, 1991, arriving at Calatagan, Batangas on March 20, 1991 where it
remained at sea.
On March 28, 1991, the "M/T Tabangao" again sailed to and anchored about 10 to 18
nautical miles from Singapore's shoreline where another vessel called "Navi Pride" anchored
beside it. Emilio Changco ordered the crew of "M/T Tabangao" to transfer the vessel's cargo to
the hold of "Navi Pride". Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong supervised the crew of "Navi
Pride" in receiving the cargo. The transfer, after an interruption, with both vessels leaving the
area, was completed on March 30,1991.
On March 30, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" returned to the same area and completed the transfer
of cargo to "Navi Pride."
On April 8, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" arrived at Calatagan, Batangas, but the vessel remained
at sea. On April 10, 1991, the members of the crew were released in three batches with the stern
warning not to report the incident to government authorities for a period of two days or until
April 12, 1991, otherwise they would be killed. The first batch was fetched from the shoreline by
a newly painted passenger jeep driven by accused-appellant Cecilio Changco, brother of Emilio
Changco, who brought them to Imus, Cavite and gave P20,000.00 to Captain Libo-on for fare of
the crew in proceeding to their respective homes. The second batch was fetched by accused-
appellant Changco at midnight of April 10, 1991 and were brought to different places in Metro
Manila.
On April 12, 1991, the Chief Engineer, accompanied by the members of the crew, called the
PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation office to report the incident. The crew members were
brought to the Coast Guard Office for investigation. The incident was also reported to the
National Bureau of Investigation where the officers and members of the crew executed sworn
statements regarding the incident.
A series of arrests was thereafter effected as follows:
a. On May 19, 1991, the NBI received verified information that the pirates were present at
U.K. Beach, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. After three days of surveillance, accused-appellant
Tulin was arrested and brought to the NBI headquarters in Manila.
b. Accused-appellants Infante, Jr. and Loyola were arrested by chance at Aguinaldo Hi-way
by NBI agents as the latter were pursuing the mastermind, who managed to evade arrest.
c. On May 20, 1991, accused-appellants Hiong and Changco were arrested at the lobby of
Alpha Hotel in Batangas City.
On October 24 1991, an Information charging qualified piracy or violation of Presidential
Decree No. 532 (piracy in Philippine Waters) was filed against accused-appellants, as follows:
The undersigned State Prosecutor accuses ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I.
LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE, and CHEONG SAN
HIONG, and nine (9) other JOHN DOES of qualified piracy (Violation of P.D. No.
532), committed as follows:

That on or about and during the period from March 2 to April 10, 1991, both dates
inclusive, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused, then manning a motor launch and armed
with high powered guns, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping
one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fire upon, board
and seize while in the Philippine waters M/T PNOC TABANGCO loaded with
petroleum products, together with the complement and crew members, employing
violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, then direct the vessel
to proceed to Singapore where the cargoes were unloaded and thereafter returned to
the Philippines on April 10, 1991, in violation of the aforesaid law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

(pp. 119-20, Rollo.)

This was docketed as Criminal Case No. 91-94896 before Branch 49 of the Regional Trial
Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Manila. Upon arraignment, accused-
appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereupon ensued.
Accused-appellants Tulin, Infante, Jr., and Loyola, notwithstanding some inconsistencies in
their testimony as to where they were on March 1, 1991, maintained the defense of denial, and
disputed the charge, as well as the transfer of any cargo from "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi
Pride." All of them claimed having their own respective sources of livelihood. Their story is to
the effect that on March 2, 1991, while they were conversing by the beach, a red speedboat with
Captain Edilberto Liboon and Second Mate Christian Torralba on board, approached the
seashore. Captain Liboon inquired from the three if they wanted to work in a vessel. They were
told that the work was light and that each worker was to be paid P3,000.00 a month with
additional compensation if they worked beyond that period. They agreed even though they had
no sea-going experience. On board, they cooked, cleaned the vessel, prepared coffee, and ran
errands for the officers. They denied having gone to Singapore, claiming that the vessel only
went to Batangas. Upon arrival thereat in the morning of March 21, 1991, they were paid
P1,000.00 each as salary for nineteen days of work, and were told that the balance would be
remitted to their addresses. There was neither receipt nor contracts of employment signed by the
parties.
Accused-appellant Changco categorically denied the charge, averring that he was at home
sleeping on April 10, 1991. He testified that he is the younger brother of Emilio Changco, Jr.
Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong, also known as Ramzan Ali, adduced evidence that he
studied in Sydney, Australia, obtaining the "Certificate" as Chief Officer, and later completed the
course as a "Master" of a vessel, working as such for two years on board a vessel. He was
employed at Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. as Port Captain. The company was engaged in the
business of trading petroleum, including shipoil, bunker lube oil, and petroleum to domestic and
international markets. It owned four vessels, one of which was "Navi Pride."
On March 2, 1991, the day before "M/T Tabangao" was seized by Emilio Changco and his
cohorts, Hiong's name was listed in the company's letter to the Mercantile Section of the
Maritime Department of the Singapore government as the radio telephone operator on board the
vessel "Ching Ma."
The company was then dealing for the first time with Paul Gan, a Singaporean broker, who
offered to sell to the former bunker oil for the amount of 300,000.00 Singapore dollars. After the
company paid over one-half of the aforesaid amount to Paul Gan, the latter, together with Joseph
Ng, Operations Superintendent of the firm, proceeded to the high seas on board "Navi Pride" but
failed to locate the contact vessel.
The transaction with Paul Gan finally pushed through on March 27, 1991. Hiong, upon his
return on board the vessel "Ching Ma," was assigned to supervise a ship-to-ship transfer of diesel
oil off the port of Singapore, the contact vessel to be designated by Paul Gan. Hiong was ordered
to ascertain the quantity and quality of the oil and was given the amount of 300,000.00 Singapore
Dollars for the purchase. Hiong, together with Paul Gan, and the surveyor William Yao, on
board "Navi Pride" sailed toward a vessel called "M/T Galilee". Hiong was told that "M/T
Galilee" would be making the transfer. Although no inspection of "Navi Pride" was made by the
port authorities before departure, Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. was able to procure a port
clearance upon submission of General Declaration and crew list. Hiong, Paul Gan, and the
brokers were not in the crew list submitted and did not pass through the immigration. The
General Declaration falsely reflected that the vessel carried 11,900 tons.
On March 28, 1991, "Navi Pride" reached the location of "M/T Galilee". The brokers then
told the Captain of the vessel to ship-side with "M/T Galilee" and then transfer of the oil
transpired. Hiong and the surveyor William Yao met the Captain of "M/T Galilee," called
"Captain Bobby" (who later turned out to be Emilio Changco). Hiong claimed that he did not ask
for the full name of Changco nor did he ask for the latter's personal card.
Upon completion of the transfer, Hiong took the soundings of the tanks in the "Navi Pride"
and took samples of the cargo. The surveyor prepared the survey report which "Captain Bobby"
signed under the name "Roberto Castillo." Hiong then handed the payment to Paul Gan and
William Yao. Upon arrival at Singapore in the morning of March 29, 1991, Hiong reported the
quantity and quality of the cargo to the company.
Thereafter, Hiong was again asked to supervise another transfer of oil purchased by the firm
" from "M/T Galilee" to "Navi Pride." The same procedure as in the first transfer was observed.
This time, Hiong was told that that there were food and drinks, including beer, purchased by the
company for the crew of "M/T Galilee. The transfer took ten hours and was completed on March
30, 1991. Paul Gan was paid in full for the transfer.
On April 29 or 30, 1991, Emilio Changco intimated to Hiong that he had four vessels and
wanted to offer its cargo to cargo operators. Hiong was asked to act as a broker or ship agent for
the sale of the cargo in Singapore. Hiong went to the Philippines to discuss the matter with
Emilio Changco, who laid out the details of the new transfer, this time with "M/T Polaris" as
contact vessel. Hiong was told that the vessel was scheduled to arrive at the port of Batangas that
weekend. After being billeted at Alpha Hotel in Batangas City, where Hiong checked in under
the name "SONNY CSH." A person by the name of "KEVIN OCAMPO," who later turned out
to be Emilio Changco himself, also checked in at Alpha Hotel. From accused-appellant Cecilio
Changco, Hiong found out that the vessel was not arriving. Hiong was thereafter arrested by NBI
agents.
After trial, a 95-page decision was rendered convicting accused-appellants of the crime
charged. The dispositive portion of said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby

rendered by this Court finding the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres
Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principals, of the
crime of piracy in Philippine Waters defined in Section 2(d) of Presidential Decree
No. 532 and the accused Cheong San Hiong, as accomplice, to said crime. Under
Section 3(a) of the said law, the penalty for the principals of said crime is mandatory
death. However, considering that, under the 1987 Constitution, the Court cannot
impose the death penalty, the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante,
]r., and Cecilio Changco are hereby each meted the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, with all the accessory penalties of the law. The accused Cheong San
Hiong is hereby meted the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, pursuant to Article
52 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5 of PD 532. The accused Roger
Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco are hereby ordered to
return to the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation the "M/T Tabangao" or if the
accused can no longer return the same, the said accused are hereby ordered to remit,
jointly and severally, to said corporation the value thereof in the amount of
P11,240,000.00 Philippine Currency, with interests thereon, at the rate of 6% per
annum from March 2, 1991 until the said amount is paid in full. All the accused
including Cheong San Hiong are hereby ordered to return to the Caltex Philippines,
Inc. the cargo of the "M/T Tabangao", or if the accused can no longer return the said
cargo to said corporation, all the accused are hereby condemned to pay, jointly and
severally, to the Caltex Refinery, Inc., the value of said cargo in the amount of
P40,426,793.87, Philippine Currency plus interests until said amount is paid in full.
After the accused Cheong San Hiong has served his sentence, he shall be deported to
Singapore.

All the accused shall be credited for the full period of their detention at the National
Bureau of Investigation and the City Jail of Manila during the pendency of this case
provided that they agreed in writing to abide by and comply strictly with the rules and
regulations of the City Jail of Manila and the National Bureau of Investigation. With
costs against all the accused.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 180363 April 28, 2009
EDGAR Y. TEVES, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HERMINIO G.
TEVES

Facts:
In Oct 2007, petitioner was officially disqualified to run for a congressional seat in the
May 2007 election because of a Sandiganbayan decision rendered against him in 2005
involving a crime, allegedly, of moral turpitude.

The Comelec likewise rendered the issue raised by petitioner as moot since the latter
lost in the said election.

Issue:
Whether or not there WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION when Comelec disqualified petitioner in view of the
petitioners conviction.

Ruling:
The Court ruled that the crime for which petitioner was convicted in Sandiganbayan in
2005 did not involve moral turpitude.

As found in the Sandiganbayan, petitioner, then Mayor of Valencia, did not use his
influence, authority or power to gain pecuniary or financial interest in the cockpit.
Second, while possession of business and pecuniary interest in a cockpit licensed by
the local government unit is expressly prohibited by the present LGC, however, its
illegality does not mean that violation thereof necessarily involves moral turpitude or
makes such possession of interest inherently immoral

The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. It was
held that it was not for the judiciary to settle questions which is for other branches of the
government to deal with.

Being so, the Court reversed the Comelecs decision of disqualifying petitioner. The
case was not moot since the resolution of which would determine petitioners
qualification in future elections.
G.R. No. 70748 October 21, 1985

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF LAURENTE C. ILAGAN, ANTONIO B.
ARELLANO, and MARCOS D. RISONAR, JR., Integrated Bar of the Philippines [IBP]; Free Legal
Assistance Group [FLAG] and Movement of Attorneys For Brotherhood, Integrity and
Nationalism, Inc., [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Minister of National Defense; LT. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, Acting
Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines; BRIG. GEN. DIONISIO TAN-GATUE, PC-INP
Regional Commander for Region XI, Camp Catitipan, Davao City, respondents.

Roberto Concepcion, Jose B.L. Reyes, Raul S. Goco, Joker Arroyo, Haydee Yorac, Fulgencio S.
Factoran, Francisco I. Chavez , Lorenzo M. Taada, Wigberto Taada and Martiniano Vivo for
petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

This is a petition for Habeas Corpus filed by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), the Free
Legal Assistance Group (FLAG); and the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and
Nationalism (MABINI) on behalf of Attorneys Laurente C. Ilagan, Antonio B. Arellano, and
Marcos Risonar, Jr.

The facts follow:

On May 10, 1985, Attorney Laurente C. Ilagan was arrested in Davao City by elements of the PC-
INP and detained at Camp Catitipan on the basis of a Mission Order allegedly issued by the
Ministry of National Defense. On that same day, fifteen lawyers from the IBP Davao Chapter
visited Atty. Ilagan. One of the visiting lawyers, Atty. Antonio Arellano, was also arrested and
detained on the basis of an unsigned Mission Order. On May 13, 1985, the military sent word to
the IBP Davao Chapter that Attorney Marcos Risonar would likewise be arrested. The latter
went to Camp Catitipan to verify his arrest papers and was detained on the basis of a Mission
Order signed by General Echavarria, Regional Unified Commander.

This petition for habeas corpus was then filed by and on behalf of the three arrested lawyers
hereinafter referred to as the detained attorneys on the ground that their arrests were illegal
and violative of the Constitution, since arrests cannot be made on the basis of Mission Orders.
and that there appears to be a military campaign to harass lawyers involved in national security
cases.
On May 16, 1985, the Court issued the Writ, required a Return, and set the petition for hearing
on May 23, 1985.

In their Return, respondents contended that the detained attorneys were arrested on the basis
of a PDA issued by the President on January 25, 1985; that the Writ of habeas corpus is
suspended as to them by virtue of Proclamation No. 2045-A; and that pursuant to the ruling
in Garcia-Padilla vs. Ponce Enrile, et al, 1 Courts lack the authority to inquire into the cause and
validity of detention of persons held pursuant to the suspension. Respondents further
expounded on the state of rebellion in Davao City on the basis of seized subversive documents,
implying that the detained attorneys played active roles in organizing mass actions of the
Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. Respondents then
prayed for the denial of the petition.

During the hearing on May 23, 1985, the detained attorneys narrated to the Court the
circumstances of their arrest and detention. Counsel for the respondents, on the other hand,
presented evidence of subversive activities in Davao, but due to lack of evidence linking the
detained attorneys with the alleged subversive activities, the Court, on the same day resolved
to order the temporary release of the detained attorneys on the recognizance of the principal
counsel of petitioner's, namely, retired Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and retired Associate
Justice J.B.L. Reyes. The Court further resolved to give petitioners ten days within which to file a
traverse to the Return of the Writ and the respondents ten days to file a Reply thereto.

The next day, or on May 24, 1985, petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion stating that the
detained attorneys had not yet been released and praying that they be released to the custody
of the principal counsel of petioners at the Supreme Court.

On May 27, 1985, respondents filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's Order
of Release reiterating that the suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus has the effect of
ousting the Court of its jurisdiction to hear the case, and attached thereto classified documents
consisting of the Report of respondent Brig. Gen. Tan-Gatue stating that the detained attorneys
"were arrested not on the basis of their 'lawyering' but for specific acts of rebellion and
economic sabotage as well as for their leadership in the CPP" ... "even to the extent of
attending CPP and NPA rites and using their profession as lawyers as cover-up for their
activities in furtherance of CPP goals and objectives;" and that the detained attorneys were
involved in the Welgang Bayan in Davao City, a mass action "with demands for the armed
overthrow of the government." Sworn statements of several persons also implicated the
detained attorneys in alleged subversive activities. Respondents added that, while there is a
Court Order directing release, they, too, are under orders, pursuant to the PDA, to hold in
custody the detained attorneys until ordered released by the President or by his duly
authorized representative, and that the PDA, when issued, constitutes authority to preventively
detain them for a period not exceeding one year.

On May 28, 1985, respondents filed an Urgent Manifestation/Motion stating that an

Information for Rebellion was filed on May 27, 1985 against the detained attorneys before the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch X, docketed as Criminal Case No. 12,349; that a
Warrant of Arrest had been issued against them; and praying that this Petition be dismissed for
having been rendered moot and academic.

On May 30, 1985, petitioners filed an Opposition to respondents' Urgent Motion/Manifestation

contending that since the detained attorneys were not given the benefit of preliminary
investigation, they were denied their constitutional right to due process; consequently, the
Information for Rebellion filed against them is void. Respondents, on the other hand, filed on
the same day a Comment to petitioners' Manifestation and Motion reiterating their prayer for
the dismissal of the petition on the ground of mootness by virtue of the proceedings before the
Regional Trial Court of Davao.

On June 3, 1985, petitioners filed a consolidated Comment and Traverse contending that the
"Welgang Bayans" were in legitimate exercise of the constitutional right of expression and
assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances; that the detained attorneys'
participation was limited to serving in the legal panel and the negotiating panels; that
Proclamation No. 2045 is unconstitutional because there exists no factual or legal basis for the
suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus as provided for in the Constitution; that the evidence
presented by respondents against the detained attorneys are of a doubtful and flimsy nature;
and that the PDA is unconstitutional because it violates Section 3, Article IV, of the Constitution
prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures.

On July 1, 1985, petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion praying that the Court
immediately resolve the issues raised as the case affects not only the detained attorneys but
the entire legal profession and the administration of justice as well.

Finally, after two extensions granted by the Court, on July 8, 1985, respondents filed a
Consolidated Reply, reiterating first, the validity of Proclamation No. 2045, as amended by
Proclamation No. 2045-A and of the PDA issued against petitioners as an incident to the
suspension of the privilege of the Writ of habeas corpus: secondly, the ruling in Garcia-Padilla
vs. Ponce Enrile, et al.; 2 and thirdly, its prayer for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of
mootness by virtue of the filing of an Information for Rebellion against the detained attorneys
before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City .

As contended by respondents, the petition herein has been rendered moot and academic by
virtue of the filing of an Information against them for Rebellion, a capital offense, before the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City and the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against them. 3 The
function of the special proceeding of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's
detention. Now that the detained attorneys' incarceration is by virtue of a judicial order in
relation to criminal cases subsequently filed against them before the Regional Trial Couravao
City, the remedy of habeas corpus no longer lies. The Writ had served its purpose. 4

SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.-If it appears the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process
 issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment, or order of a court of
record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render
the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the
jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged
by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment or order. Nor
shall anything in this rule be held to authorize to discharge of a person charged
with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful judgment. (Rule 102)

If the detained attorneys question their detention because of improper arrest, or that no
preliminary investigatin has been conducted, the remedy is not a petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus but a Motion before the trial court to quash the Warrant of Arrest, and /or the
Information on grounds provided by the Rules or to ask for an investigation / reinvestigation of
the case. 5 Habeas corpus would not lie after the Warrant of commitment was issued by the
Court on the basis of the Information filed against the accused. 6 So is it explicitly provided for
by Section. 14, Rule of 102 of the Rules of Court, reading:

SEC. 14. When person lawfully imprisoned recommitted and when let to bail.- If it
appears that the prisoner was lawfully committed, and is plainly and specifically
charged in the warrant of commitment with an offense punishable by death, he
shall not be released, discharged, or bailed. If he is lawfully imprisoned or
restrained on a charge of having committed an offense not so punishable, he
may be recommitted to imprisonment or admitted to bail in the discretion of the
court or judge. . . .

But petitioners submit that because of the absence of a preliminary investigation, the
Information for Rebellion filed against the detained attorneys is void and the Court below could
not have acquired jurisdiction over them, and consequently, they are entitled to release.

On the other hand, respondents contend that a preliminary investigation was unnecessary since
the detained attorneys were lawfully arrested without a warrant.

Pursuant to the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, no Information for an offense cognizable by
the Regional Trial Court shall be filed without a preliminary investigation having been first
conducted, except as provided for in Section 7 of Rule 112. 7 The Information filed by the City
Fiscal before the Regional Trial Court of the City of Davao fell within the exception. Thus, the
Verification reads:

VERIFICATION

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am filing this Information in pursuance with Rule 112,
Section 7 of the 1985 Rules on criminal Procedure, wherein after examining the
affidavits of the government witnesses and other documents attached to the
records, I found sufficient ground to hold respondents for trial.
 (SGD.) EMMANUEL E. GALICIA

City Fiscal

Section 7, Rule 112, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure above referred to provides:

SEC. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant.- When a person is

lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional
Trial Court the complaint or information may be filed by the offended party,
peace officer or fiscal without preliminary investigation having been first
conducted on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arrested officer
or person.

However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested
may ask for a preliminary investigation by a proper officer in accordance with
this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and in case of
non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his choice. Notwithstanding
such waiver, he may apply for bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the
investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.

If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having
been first conducted, the accused may within five (5) days from the time he
learns of the filing of the information, ask for a preliminary investigation with the
same right to adduce evidence in his favor in the manner prescribed in this Rule.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the same Rules enumerates the instances when an arrest without
warrant is lawful.

SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
 In cases falling under paragraphs [al and [b] hereof, the person arrested without
a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he
shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. (Rule 113)

Paragraphs (a) and (b) refer to cases when a suspect is caught in flagrante delicto or
immediately thereafter, while paragraph (c) refers to escaping prisoners. As to whether the
detained attorneys fall under either of the first two instances enumerated is a question of fact,
which will need the presentation of evidence and is more properly within the province of the
trial Court.

The question of absence of a proper preliminary investigation is also better inquired into by the
Court below. When so raised, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, has
held that the trial Court is called upon "not to dismiss the information but hold the case in
abeyance and conduct its own investigation or require the fiscal to hold a reinvestigation. 8 As
stressed in People vs. Casiano, 1 SCRA 478 [1961], this is the proper procedure since the
"absence of such investigation did not impair the validity of the Information or otherwise
render it defective. Much less did it affect the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance". 9 The
right to a preliminary investigation, being waivable, does not argue against the validity of the
proceedings, the most that could have been done being to remand the case in order that such
investigation could be conducted. 10

... The proper forum before which absence of preliminary investigation should be
ventilated is the Court of First Instance, not this Court. Reason is not wanting for
this view. Absence of preliminary investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of
the court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings. It could even be
waived. Indeed, it is frequently waived. These are matters to be inquired into by
the trial court, not an appellate Court. 11

The Nolasco case, which petitioners invoke, 12 wherein this Court ordered the release of two of
the accused, is not on all fours with the case at bar as, in that case, the accused were charged
only with Illegal Possession of Subversive documents under Presidential Decree No. 33, which is
punishable by prision correccional in its minimum period, and the trial Court had granted bail;
whereas in this case, petitioners are charged with the capital offense of Rebellion, and the trial
Court has not allowed bail.

WHEREFORE, this petition for Habeas Corpus is hereby dismissed for having become moot and
academic. Petitioners are now detained by virtue of a Warrant of Arrest issued by the Regional
Trial Court of Davao City in relation to the criminal case for Rebellion filed against them before
said Court.

SO ORDERED.
Reyes vs Court of Appeals

Facts:
Petitioners Romeo Reyes, Angel Parayao and Emilio Mananghaya question the
respondent Courts decision, which affirmed with modification the agrarian courts
decision, which ordered them and the other defendants therein to, among others,
restore possession of the disputed landholding to private respondent, Eufrocina Vda.
dela Cruz.

Juan Mendoza, father of defendant Olympio, is the owner of farm lots in Bahay Pare,
Candaba, Pampanga. Devoted to the production of palay, the lots were tenanted and
cultivated by now deceased Julian dela Cruz, husband of plaintiff Eufrocina dela Cruz.

Eufrocina alleged that her husbands death, she succeeded him as bona fidetenant of the
subject lots; that Olympio, in conspiracy with the other defendants, prevented her
daughter Violeta and her workers through force, intimidation, strategy and stealth, from
entering and working on the subject premises; and that until the filing of the instant
case, defendants had refused to vacate and surrender the lots, thus violating her tenancy
rights. Plaintiff therefore prayed for judgment for the recovery of possession and
damages with a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in the meantime.
Defendant barangay officials denied interference in the tenancy relationship existing
between plaintiff and defendant Mendoza, particularly in the cultivation of the latters
farm lots and asked for the dismissal of the case, moral damages and attorneys fees.

Mendoza raised abandonment, sublease and mortgage of the farm lots without his
consent and approval, and non-payment of rentals, irrigation fees and other taxes due
the government, as his defenses.

Petitioners now bring the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Issue:
W/N the court erred in holding petitioners liable

Held:
No. The evidence presented before the trial court and CA served as basis in arriving at
their findings of fact. The Supreme Court will not analyze such evidence all over again
because settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court absent the exceptions which do
not obtain in the instant case.
In agrarian cases, the quantum of evidence is no more than substantial evidence.
Substantial evidence does not necessarily import preponderant evidence, as is required
in an ordinarily civil case. It has been defined to be such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion and its absence is not
shown by stressing that there is contrary evidence on record, direct or circumstantial,
for the appellate court cannot substitute its own judgment or criteria for that of the trial
court in determining wherein lies the weight of evidence or what evidence is entitled to
belief.

G.R. No. 71092 September 30, 1987

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANACLETO Q. OLVIS, Acquitted, ROMULO VILLAROJO, LEONARDO CADEMAS and
DOMINADOR SORELA, accused-appellants.

SARMIENTO, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court to Zamboanga Del Norte sitting in
Dipolog City. 1The case was certified to this Court on January 19, 1985 following the death
sentences imposed on each of the three accused-appellants, Romulo Villarojo, Leonardo
Cademas, and Dominador Sorela (the accused first-named, Anacleto Olvis, was acquitted), over
which, under the Constitution then in force, 2we exercised exclusive appellate
jurisdiction. 3 With the promulgation of the 1987 Charter, abolishing the death penalty and
commuting death penalties already imposed to reclusion perpetua 4 we, on May 14, 1987,
issued a death penalty abolition resolution requiring the three accused-appellants to file a
statement, personally signed by them with the assistance of counsel, stating whether or not
they wished to continue with the case as an appealed case. 5 We have since observed this
procedure with respect to all pending capital cases.

In compliance with our resolution, the three accused-appellants, on May 28, 1987, filed a
statement informing us that they desire to continue with this case as an appealed case. 6

This appeal stemmed from an information dated November 11, 1976 charging all four accused
with the murder of Discredit Bagon. The same reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

The undersigned First Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses ANACLETO Q. OLVIS, as

principal by inducement, ROMULO VILLAROJO, LEONARDO CADEMAS and
 DOMINADOR SORELA, as principals by direct participation, of the crime of
murder, committed as follows:

That in the evening on or about the 7th day of September 1975, in title
Municipality of Polanco, Zamboanga del Norte, within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, consprising and confederating with
one another and acting upon the direction and instruction of ANACLETO Q.
OLVIS who mastermind the bizarre plot and directly induced ROMULO
VILLAROJO, LEONARDO CADEMAS and DOMINADOR SORELA to execute the
conspiracy and who, armed with boloes and a hunting knife, with intent to kill by
means of treachery and evident premeditation, and for a consideration of a price
or reward, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, hack and stab one DISCREDIT BAGON, thereby inflicting upon him
multiple inc. (hack) and stab wounds which caused his instantaneous death.

CONTRARY TO LAW, with the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident

premeditation and the generic aggravating circumstances of superior strength,
nighttime and in consideration of a price or reward. 7

xxx xxx xxx

The four accused entered Identical "not guilty" pleas.

After trial, the court a quo rendered the decision under appeal, the dispositive portion whereof
reads as follows:

FOREGOING CONSIDERED, and on the part of accused ANACLETO Q. OLVIS, SR.,

there being no evidence, direct or indirect, whether testimonial, documentary or
physical evidence, that tend to establish his complicity in this case, said accused
has to be, as he hereby is, ACQUITTED.

On the part of the three (3) remaining accused ROMULO VILLAROJO, LEONARDO
CADEMAS, and DOMINADOR SORELA, the degree of moral, certainty establishing
their authorship of the crime is irreversibly positive. The three (3) accused
conspired and confederated with one another to successfully achieve their
ghastly, evil ends. Their guilt has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Treachery and evident premeditation are qualifying circumstances in this case of

MURDER. But said offense was attended by the aggravating circumstances of
superior strength and nighttime. No mitigating circumstance has been shown to
offset the two (2) aggravating circumstances, as a consequence of which, the
Court hereby renders judgment sentencing the accused ROMULO VILLAROJO,
LEONARDO CADEMAS, and DOMINADOR SORELA, to suffer the maximum
penalty of DEATH.