Week 2: Overview (1949 Present)

Imperial China:
- Unification: 221 b.c.
- Middle country:
o Tributary relations
o Middle kingdom complex
o Self-sufficient
- Imperial rule/ Confucianism
- Qing Dynasty (1611 1914):
o Conquest, consolidation, peace
o Rare mid-east/ Euro envoys
o Largely undisturbed Sino-centric worldview

End of the empire:

- Impact of European colonialism
o Industry ship trade expands
o A different conception of the world
o Opium War (1840-42)
- Sino-Japanese war 1894-95
o Defeat from: system/ leaders/ Chinas gradual opening up
o Other powers: UK, Germany
- 1911 revolution/ warlordism
- 1928-37: nationalist decade

Republican China:
- unstable, weak at centre, uncertainty
- Japan takes advantage:
o 1931 Manchuria becomes puppet regime
o 1937 full invasion/ subjugation, WWII
- CCP almost wiped out (1934)
o Long March, guerrilla warfare, Maos rise
- Post-WWII, 1945-49 civil war
o Nationalist v. Communist after J leaves
- 1949: CCP takes control of mainland
o communist revolution begins
o Nationalist KMT flee to Taiwan

Mao: I
- Revolutionary background China standing up
- Initial alignment with USSR
o Exporting communist revolution
o Emergent Cold War dynamics v. emphasis on superpower bipolarity
- Ongoing suspicion of the West
 o Anti-imperial, anti-colonial
o Scepticism, esp. re. UN
o 1950-53 Korean War
- 1954: Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence
o respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty
o non-aggression
o non-interference in each others internal affair
o equality and mutual benefit
o peaceful co-existence
- but relations with USSR sour
o GLF 58-60 failure/ repayment demands
o Mao critical of Khrushchev (esp. re. West/ revolutionary doctrine decline)
o Lack of support for attempts to take Taiwan 54-55, 58/ border war w/ India
- 1964: tests nuclear weapons / 1966: Cultural Revolution chaos
o isolation from both East and West
o more moderate foreign policy
o 1969, border clashes with USSR
- early 70s, global influence increases:
o reinvention as champion of the non-great developing world (Africa, Asia)
o non-communist state ties established
o October 1971, regains UN seat + P5
o Rapproachement w/ US via 1972 Shanghai Communique, leaves Taiwan

Deng
- 09/1976: Mao dies
- Deng defeats Gang of Four and emerges as new leader
- Reformer: questions excesses + economic priorities popularity
o Backwater global power
- Focused on liberal economic growth in order to create (via FP)
o National/ personal prosperity + stability
o Legitimacy to maintain CCP in power
o Exposure to Western trade/ FDI/ ideas
- Gradual integration in world economy
- Departure from Mao orthodoxy but still socialist
- FP still ideological, opaque
o hiding Chinas capabilities
o offensive, Vietnam 1979 (but fails)

Jiang: the Consolidator

- increasingly conservative
o separation of ideology and policy
o more pragmatic, impartial, learning
o great power diplomacy
- focus on great powers in Asia: ROK, Vietnam, India, Singapore
 - creation of a stable periphery: rapproachment, bilateral partnerships
- reasserted Chinas international status post-T. Sq
- more supportive of UN peace ops but not intervention (NATO)
- +open to multilateral membership
o favours post Cold War multipolarity
o WTO 2001, APEC, SCO, EAS creator
- BUT US sees C as strategic competitor pre-9/11, Taiwan failings
- Continued focus on 5 Principles but also 4 nos:
o No hegemony
o No power politics
o No military alliances
o No arms racing

Hu: the Developer

- Focus on economic dev, anti-poverty, globalisation
- Diplomacy beyond Asia
o EU, Africa, Middle East, Latin America
o Driven by commodities and energy
o Alternative to US
o Non interference / non ideological but anti poverty and pro development
o Position of C as essential power
- More open to aid from international community
- Greater soft power key ideas
- peaceful rise
o china will grow as a great power but not in the same way that others have done
o rise as threatening now often termed peaceful development
o harmonious world peace & stability thru cooperation & communities not
alliances & force
o charm offensive mutual cooperation, trade and dialogue

Xi: the emergent

- Establishing the China Dream
o Be a major economic/ military power
o Issues: corruption, achieving equality, pollution, avoiding negative perceptions
o China renaissance to rightful place
- First overseas visits indications
o Russia: most important strategic partner; energy security, trade, balance, peace
o Africa: continent of hope and promise, 200 bn trade
o BRICS: multipolar, sustainability,
o 1st Beijing: US, clarifying core interests

CONCS: Chinas FP goals

Evident continuities
- preservation of territorial integrity
 - recovery of lost territories
- recognition of PRC/ CCP as Chinas sole legitimate govt/ state
but also change/ evolution/ learning:
- economic trade and development
- enhancement of international structure
- non interference /multilateralism
- general non-ideological basis

Makers of FP
- Mao and Deng
o Revolutionary/ activist/ ideological
o Vs. superpowers and bipolarity
o Very leader-based and leader-led
o Domination by single figure/ doctrine
- Under Jiang and Hu, Xi
o More conservative, impartial
o Focus on economics/ stable periphery
o FP to ensure domestic reforms
o Emphasis on ministerial/ bureaucratic consultation, listening and symbiosis

CCP History
- 1921, took power in 1949
- 1920s: urban, proletarian focus
- 1949: rural based revolution
- war hardened leaders rule and influence the CCP until 1990s
- based upon Leninist principles CCP structure akin to Soviet CP
- CCP Rule/ domination central to post 1949 Chinese politics
o State direction of economics/ society

Organisational principles
- Democratic centralism
o Made by a small number are binding and must be implemented
o Centralised bureaucratic: subordination
o Hierarchical structure/ pyramid
o Core party groups in ministries
- Collective leadership: decentralised
- Minority protection
o Views held and voiced in CCP all decisions based upon consensus
o Personal politics can encroach

Diversification
- Upper party tiers more decentralised
- Older leaders less influential/ retire
- Development of factions based upon
 o Background, age, geography, guanxi
o More diverse party membership: capitalists accepted (2001), more foreign
educated/ travelled
o Crucial need for consensus-building
- CCP links needed to fulfil political/ professional ambitions

Organisation
- Party congress system (nationwide)
o NPC in Beijing (c. 2000) symbolic to ratify new policy/ leadership changes
- Central committee (c. 200)
o Announces important policy changes
o Rubber stamp for Politboro personal allegiances/ power base critical
- Secretariat
o Manages Politboro, Politboro SC, gen. party structure
- Politboro (20-25)
- Politboro standing committee (7)
o Inner cabinet
o Most senior leaders of Party & national institutions; previously in Politboro
- Central Military Affairs Commission
o 11 members, chaired by CCP GS as commander-in-chief of armed forces
o reflects key historical role of military (PLA), Tiananmen Sq

Issues of secession
- post Mao continuities
o concentration of power at the top
xitong small groups / system permeates all levels, necessary
o informal politics, personal power and relation networks, factions
o mechanism for transfer of leadership not institutionalised
o secession affects system factionalism/ legacy protection
o process slowly solidifying
- the party-state
o negligible separation between govt and CCP structure: CCP the paramount
political actor
o pre-1949 legal system and bureaucracy, nascent in 1950s
party dominant/ concurrent
party controls all major appts via nomenklatura system
fixed vertical transition
centralised hierarchical system
- key gov FP making
o Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)
Interprets/ substantiates decisions + policies by politburo SC
Oversees more routine, lower-level politics, practices
82 weekly press conferences
o Chinese Peoples Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)
 Meets alongside NPC
Liases w/ other political groups, a forum for discussion and change
o State Council of China (cabinet)
Implements national policy to localities
PRC premier, councillors, ministers
Oversees government machine
o Various ministries and depts.
Ministry of commerce (from 2003)
Often in larger groups xitong; education, economics, military, party all
influential
o PLA
Significant, modernising, corruption

Influences beyond the centre

- Non-governmental actors
o Academics, think tanks, consultants: linked abroad
o peaceful rise
o Confucius Institutes
- FP now more openly discussed
o Rise in visual and print media
o Links to tourism/ overseas students
o Rising internet usage Great Firewall
- Role of nationalism
o Helps CCP augment domestic problems and intl credentials
o Jiangs 3 represents:
Advanced productive forces, advanced cultures, political consensus
CCP guarantor of safety/ prosperity
o Idea of Chinas restoration
o Negative danger of mass protests

CONCS: increasing complexity

- FP makers growing/ diversifying
o More disparate influences
o More proactive than reactive policies
o But ccp is paramount actor
- In general, now greater transparency
o Impact of globalisation/ Chinese trade
o Increased intl participation
- Problems of analysis concerning FP
o Info on agents/ structures can be incomplete/ missing
o CCP/ China continues to be wary of foreign influences on decision-making

Strategic thinking and military

 - Confucian-Menican
o Mixes liberalist and realist perspectives
o Accomodationist grand strategies before violent defence/ offencive ones in a
ranking of strategic choice
o Realpolitik/ parabellum offencive strategy before defencive and
accomodationist stances
o Evidence from imperial China onward
- Confucian beliefs and morality
o Virtue, benevolence, righteousness
- Security culture/identity
o Provides ideational rather than structural military, economic, institutional
explanations of security (constructivism)
o Domestic and FP precedents via interaction, history, culture, memory
o Established guiding characteristics
Values, principles, outlooks, norms
o Self/other perceptions
Chinas regional/global placement
Useful re. multilateralism in Europe

Middle Kingdom emergence

- Self sufficient centre of universe
o China literal middle kingdom
o Manifest cultural superiority at hub of perceived world
o Distinguished from inferior non-chinese barbarians on outside
- In the inner Asian zone (between centre and barbarians)
- Periodic invasions
o 12th C. Khitan and Jurchen; 13th C. Mongols, 17th C. Manchu heightened threat
perceptions re foreign invasion
Great Wall from pre Chin period
- Qing Dynasty (1644 1911)
o A period of conquest, consolidation and long peace
o Occasional middle eastern/ European envoys and missionairies but largely
undisturbed sinocentric worldview

Adaptive strategic thinking

- Mao: guerrilla warfare/ peoples war: total war = nuclear/ v US/ exportive
- Deng: red v. expert/ non nuclear limited war v. USSR/ local war
- Jiang & Hu: border defence, asset protection
o Local war under modern high tech conditions
o Conditions of informationalisation cyber warfare, asymmetric DNS, ASAT
o Plus fear of encirclement, US pivot 11
- Xi: terrorism, separatism, extremism
- As the Cold War ended, international structural conditions changed
o Direct state-to-state conflict risk declines
 o Peace dividend to mend relationships: border disputes
o Ideological promotion not so necessary, as no direct power adversary
- Comprehensive security
o Environmental, disease, energy, food, people, drug smuggling
o All-directional cooperations
- Security more multifaceted
o Move from tradition to non traditional
o Borders & invasions terrorism, trade and energy security, transnational crime
o Political-military to political-economic
o Focus on engagement/multilateralism
- Non-traditional
o Threats carried out by non-state actors; terrorism/ piracy/ intl crime
o Some (Western) capability post-9/11 + domestic issues
o But anti-hegemony, pro-m-lat, anti-interv

New Security Concept

- Cooperation on basis of UN charter, 1950s Fiv Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, leading
global UN role
- To reform and improve existing intl economic and financial orgs, for common prosperity
via reciprocity
- Focus on security communities not alliances based upon shared, mutual respect
- Emphasis on non-traditional security areas (terrorirsm) plus traditional security areas
- To conduct effective disarmament and arms control

National defence white paper (2012)

- Stop separation and realise complete reunification of motherland
- Stop armed subversion and safeguard to political stability
- Accelerate national defence developlement and achieve national defence and military
modernisation
- To safeguard world peace and oppose aggression and expansion

PLA
- 1946 successor to 20s Red Army
- Maoist peoples war remit
- Ongoing strong role
- Tensions under Deng bloated, corrupt, politicised
- Placated (via spending increases)
- Focus on modernisation
o Increasing influence due to greater decentralisation/ greater nationalism
o Greater role due to: more intl peacekeeping, protecting economic assets/ routes,
terrorism, cooperation
o CCP leaders still need PLA support
o Difficult variable to measure
Military forces
- PLA: 5m in 50s, now 1.49 m
o Army, navy, air force, paramilitaries
o Reserve force of 0.5m (national draft)
o 90s, focus on education not numbers
o greater domestic role, esp. disaster relief
o limited external ops, regional military exercises
o PLA not civilian defence industries
- PAP: 1.5m domestic security forces
- PLA (AF): limited combat experiences very behind western capabilities
- PLAN has limited power projection
o No operational aircraft carriers
o Lacks South China Sea military presence
o Malacca Dilemma as not blue water
- Nuclear test at Lop Nor 64 limited inventory, no first use, deterrent, conservative,
nuclear triad, full ICBM
- Dependence on R arms
o Submarines, destroyers, missiles
o Still under intl embargoes

CONCS: East Asian World order?

- Parallels between Middle Kingdom and Chinas current emergent position
o Regional standing, trade links, but now more global angle, concern
o Regional relations more two-way re. trade and cooperative security
interdependence rather than dominance
- Modernising, adaptive, flexible, in flux:
o Evolution dependent upon leadership/ intl/ systematic changes
o New threats, new cooperation
- Power and influences is expanding
o Bilateral/ world implications + frictions
o Non-traditional security issues
o Assets used for local territorial disputes
- Awareness that intl security issues can affect domestic reforms
- Dominant aim: peaceful development

Economic Perspectives
Economy under Mao
- 1949: little economic development
o 18th/19th C wealth largely decimated by outside interference/ instability
o economy shattered by civil wars/ WWII
- state ownership/ urban heavy industry/ collectivised agriculture
- government controlled wages, prices
o no markets, no private industry
o minimal foreign trade, no FDI/ ODA
 o non-convertible currency
- solid economic growth in 1950s
- Great Leap Forward
o Bad weather and poor communication lead to famine (20-30 mil die)
- 1960s: slow reform/ liberalisation
o private plots, side line production
- cultural revolution (1966-69)
o virtual civil war, production declines
- radical politics, 69-76, Gang of 4: Economy stagnates

World economy under Mao

- part of socialist bloc, limited trade
- autarky after 1960

Economic transformation
- CCP begins to focus on material standards not class struggle
- Dengs political and economic aims
o Like Mao, wants a strong China
o Via opening up/ bringing in technology intensively; efficiency
- Drift from Soviet SOEs, more SEZs + decollectivisation, less central control, market forces
- 1980s: joins IMF, World Bank
o increases in intl trade, FDI, investment abroad, openness
o influence in intl economy grows
- Jiangs socialist market economy
o Market reforms boosted; supply and demand rises; party control drops
- Private business encouraged
o Commerce, real estate, tourism
o Issues: inflation, unemployment, corruption, growing inequalities
- Critical balance between achieving growth & maintaining control of:
o Economy and society
o CCPs political power/ legitimacy
o Therefore significant re. FP

Implications of economic power

- Trading power = political power
o commercial diplomacy, leverage
- institutional/ structural power
o a Chinese (global) economic model?
o Beijing consensus exportable? Desirable? New balance of power
- Soft (non-coercive) power
- Military power 2nd largest military spending

Globalisation
- Growth as ongoing balance between global immersion and protection
 o Conservative adoption
o Pop size
o Vulnerability, history
- Comprehensive security perspective and links between poverty and conflict
- Accelerated interdependence: as institutions and tech are increasingly adopted, relied
upon, normalised
- Action at a distance: IMF, WTO, UN, corporations, manufactuers
- Time-space compression: impact of 24 hr transportation and communication
multimedia: trade, ideas, movement
o Destabilising new ideas
o Prices of shares, commodities
- Shrinking world: erosion of borders and geographical barriers to socio-economic activity

Issue and tensions: trade

- Value of chinas currency
o Government control undervaluing unfair trading advantage
o pegged to US then a basket of currencies
- Chinas growing trade surpluses
o Fear of global monopolies
o Much higher saving rates (consumerism)
Energy
- Resource diplomacy/ energy security
o Relations w/ many energy and resource-rich states
o Non-ideological, splits
o Unconditional economic assistance
- Ever-increasing (high) demand for resources, raw materials, energy
- Industrial, cyber espionage
Norms
- General safety of Chinese goods
- Overall: diff global conceptions
- Ignorance of Western-based trade rules & norms for developing states
o Pro-control/ pro-authoritarian
o Anti-liberal & anti-democratic
o Increasing reliance on C capital
Internal
- Unchecked growth severe environmental pollution, degradation
- Critical internal social impacts
o Vast inequalities, protests, unrest
o Corruption: Xi crackdown
- If high growth rates unsustainable may > instability / CCP delegitimacy
o Any crash will have a negative influence on global, regional and state economies

CONCS: economic hegemon?

- Worlds largest economy, but GDP capita, poverty, infrastructure gap
 - New Chinese world order
o Transformative effect + indispensable
o Economic over military power
o Rising outward FDI, most inward FDI
- Impacts bilateral, regional relations
o Growing multilateral influence
o Aids perceptions re. rise of China
- How to counter dominance?

Peripheral relations
Changing regional roles
- Revolutionary support of SE Asia gradually renounced by 1970s
o In line w/ Dengist FP transformation
- Post T-Sq urge to repair relations
o No regression to Mao isolationism
o No interest in regional reordering not hegemon but a partner
o To resist any collective effort to restrain/ contain
o Stable neighbourhood needed to focus on internal (economic/ social) reforms
o Avoidance of conflict/ non-ideological

East Asian security dynamics

- East Asia encompasses the worlds
o Largest economies/ largest armies
o Nuclear (+ nascent nuclear) states
o Significant external presence
- Coupled with
o Increased military expenditure, restricted multilateralism, continued economic
growth, historical animosity
- Current situation
o Defies traditional realist axioms that the strong do, very complex
o Has structuralist economic focus that binds states together
o Governed by constructivists concentration upon cultural identities
- Region of potential volatility

Strategic principles
- Peripheral diplomacy
o Territorial dispute settlement
o Cooperation not competition
o Improving trade relations
- Impact of new security concept importance of soft power/ diplomacy

Security dynamics
- Current situation
o Has structuralist economic focus that binds states together
 o Governed by constructivists concentration upon cultural identities
- Region of potential volatility

Regionalism & Multilateralism

Realism Liberalism Constructivism

Security dilemma created by
intl anarchy makes
institutions marginal in
politics
Analysis focuses exclusively
on capabilities and interests
Analysis focuses on power
distribution and how it is built of different institutional
Institutions can ameliorate
the security dilemma
Institutions develop when
states forsee self-interested
benefits from cooperation
Analysis focuses on efficiency
forms
Explanations focus on identity
To liberalism it adds
consideration of the effects
identities have on formal and
informal institutions
To realism it adds
consideration of ideational
rather than material
structures; of identity of
interests

Current challenges to states

- Transfer of power and authority from states to global institutions
o Erosion of Westphalian concepts esp vis--vis globalisation
o More subnational groups demanding representation, secession, autonomy
- New threats that defy state borders
o Economic
o Terrorism, WMD, disease, smuggling, environment, energy/ trade
- Responses: comprehensive/ cooperative security

Isolation and suspicion

- Post WWII, unequal Versailles treaty
o German occupied land given to Japan
o Prompted May 4th 19th movement > CCP
- Republican China
o Concessions taken by external powers
o Regarded as exploitation/ humiliation
- Intl legal processes seen as
o Not guaranteed to be fair, legal cover
o Preventing C entry into intl system as unified state
- Post 1949, PRC shut out of UN
o Not in GATT/ IMF
o Korean War vs. US-led UN troops
o SEATO anti-Communist
- Mao openly hostile to system: intl regimes as socialist/ western-dominated/ anti-socialist
 o Compounded by Brezhnev Doctrine
o Belief in state/ sovereignty primacy and self reliance non participation
- Realist outlook: C weak and vulnerable
- Also gradual worldview shift
o Late 1960s three worlds theory
o Third world of new post-colonial states in Africa, Asia, Latin America
- Coupled w/ attempts to portray China as a large developing state
o NAM observer, G77 declined
o Overall, limited multilateral engagement
o But assuaged intl position

Re-evaluation and engagement

- After Maos death & Gang of Four, Chinas cost-benefit equation changes
- Dengs economic reform drive/ focus:
o Need for hard capital/ info ep re intl norms and practices
o More pragmatism, contact not harmful
o Engagement as necessary/ beneficial multilateralism well developed by 70s
- But Chinas position very weak
o Diplomatic capabilities/ knowledge low
o Aided by 72 dtente with US trust
- Desire to overcome negative views
o To shift external perceptions of China
o C as a status quo not revisionist power + sensitivity obstructionist/ isolationist
o Zero-sum (Mao) > Positive sum (Deng)
- (Economic) positional advantages
o size (market) leverage/ bargaining
o encourages cooperation, influencing
- favours gradual/cautious approach
o slow engagement with IMF/world bank
o gave access to capital
- late 90s, Chinas confidence grows: very cautious re. security regimes
- often based on select partnerships
- preference for a multipolar world
o anti-uni/bipolar, anti-hegemony: BRICS
o all platforms for Beijings worldview
- importance of socialism
o two way: reciprocity, cooperation and mutual learning between C and the world
o but free riding? Shallow? Conditional?

Regional groupings
- ASEAN (10 members, 1967)
o 60s/70s seen as hostile
o regular meeting ASEAN+3
o soft regionalism of non-intervention, non-binding agreements, diplomacy
 - East Asian Summit (2005)
o Initially extended ASEAN+3, specifically for Asia affairs, C a backer not dominant
- Brics (2009) emergent powers

Economic regimes
- Seen as better than strategic/ security: more transparent, less risk, more gain
- GATT (WTO)
o Difficult passage 89 (T Sq), end of Cold War, worries over immaturity
o Strong US opposition/ Taiwan issue
o Developing v. developed, perceptions
- APEC (reaction to NAFTA, EU)
o 91 entry: deal re China, HK, Taiwan
o anarchic: all members have veto
o testing ground for liberalisation

Security regimes
- selective, strong aversion to alliance
o confidence building and cooperation, not alignment and hierarchical power
o no Asian version of OCSE or NATO many different identities/histories
o but ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
large scale security community (1994)
consultative, no enforcement means
consensus based, discursive, anti-GPP
o Six Party Talks
- Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
o SCO, created w/ C influence in 2001
o Consensus not alliance: mutual trust, friendship, good neighbourliness
o 3 main Eurasia issues: terrorism, secessionism, extremism
o extends support to Asian peace-building
o coordinates joint military ops, growing in confidence/ scope/ prowess
o still regional, not global focus

The UN
- CCP initially critical (+ of League of Nations)
o Joins Oct 25, 1971 (replaces Taiwan)
o Has critical positional power (P5 veto)
- 70s, becomes a strong supporter
o develops system-maintaining stance
o praises security-building/ disarmament
o rarely uses veto, v. conservative
- more conciliatory re. peacekeeping/ humanitarian intervention contributes more
troops than other P5s
- favours UNSC reform
From pessimist to activist
- clear policy reversal since 1940s
o evidence of not taking the lead (Deng)
o watch, learn, wait-non-hegemonic
o need for better FP knowledge base
o necessary within a globalised system
- clear financial/ diplomatic gains
o in, not out of, or opposed to system
o helps build (Favourable) perceptions
o mediatory: G20+ at Doha, conciliatory
o FP confidence/ prestige/ soft power
- Now both an active joiner and creator from negligible to abundant power

Relations with the US

Pre-1949 relations
- 1784-85: 1st contact US trade ties
o barred from trading by UK
o 1844 Treaty of Wangxia welcomed by C as mutual ally not exploitative
o US regarded as a pragmatic friend
- Post-1911/ J occupation US treats C as a strategic ally
- WWII and beyond
o US allies with KMT v communists China Lobby support of Taiwan
o 1946: USs CCP/ KMT reunion fails distrust, imperialist + US arms shipment

Cold War relations

- Mao: US diplomacy deceitful/ divisive/ anti-CCP/ colonialist
o Leaning to one side USSR policy
o End of near-severed diplomatic links
o Direct conflict: 1950-53 Korean War
o First Taiwan straits criss freeze
o US + allies refuse to recgonise CCP
- Stalins death and ideological split
o A new opportunity for thawing relations
o Early 70s: Nixon tries to reopen ties via focus on realpolitik
o Prevent C isolation >> revisionist
o Anti-Soviet, useful re Taiwan/ Vietnam
o Slow inklings/ ping pong diplomacy
o Difficult to convince home audience secret Nixon/ Kissinger, 1971
- Feb 1972: Nixon visit/ rapproachement
- Shanghai Communique
o Anti-great power competition, US declares Taiwan part of C, trade
o C change from isolated to pivotal
o Bought C into intl fold, C card
 - Useful allies, primarily v. USSR
- Still major differences
o Taiwan, democracy, global approach
o Late 80s, C close to USSR again
- 1989 Tiananmen Sq incident
o common ground pretence ends
o condemnation/ sanctions yet Bush visit
o economic ties quickly resume but also arms sanctions (still in place)
- mutual pragmatism and suspicion mix

Post-Cold War
- USSR falls, C no longer critical, instead primarily communist power
o C unhappy w/ unipolarity/ hegemon
o Clash of worldviews: new world order v. new international order
o C sees system as one superpower, many great powers
o 91 Gulf War impact: technology
- Sudden resurgence of differences
o Democracy, HR, Taiwan, S China Sea
o C military/ economic threat highlighted
- School of thinking that believes
o High probability of Sino-US conflict as Cs power grows + C military budget
o Challenge to US interests/ influence
- Deeper ideological differences
o Human rights, individuality, nationalism
o Global economic system/ close links between C gov and C firms
- Precedent other great power rises
o Vocal, war-prone, protectionist, active
o Realist: dissatisfaction v satisfaction
o Accurate? Self projection? Determinism

US policy
- Engagement (a) v. Containment (b)
- (a): irrevocably draws C into existing intl regimes and agreement
o enmesh C in international norms to prevent any challenge to status quo
o benefits/ risk balance + socialisation
- (b) regional policies to derter C any regional or international expansion
o renewed US security alliance w/ J with Cs suspicion of militarisation
o US relations in SE Asia fear of encirclement
- US policy as pragmatic but concerns
- C policy v similar
o Anti-balancing agreement w/ US on international trade structure, terrorism
o No alliance building although areas of divergence v. US too overt
o Peaceful rise/ must be anti-revisionist
- IR PTT theory suggests that as US/ China equate, then conflict will come
Post 9/11
- Dramatic improvement in relations
o Information sharing re terrorism
o China pro-US-led Afghanistan invasion, ambivalent re. Iraq invasion
o Efforts to link terrorism/ separatism fail
o strategic competitor rhetoric dropped
o terror threat (Replaces) China threat
- US superiority still in place
o Hard: economics, military
o Soft: culture
o Unrivalled power projection/ advanced
o Dominates multilateral institutions
- C preference for multipolar world
o BUT countering US power difficult internal issues still need to be rectified
o Taiwan, mutual hegemon flashpints
- US concerns continue: C challenge
o Esp. re Cs rising military spending
o Sensitive to Cs improving (naval) power projection capabilities threatens myriad
US regional concerns/ dominance
o Anti-sat/ anti-ship missiles; stealth fighter
o C careful to avoid arms race but potential slow arms walk

Chinese nationalism
- US main target of C nationalism
o July 93: Chinese Yinhe stopped in Perasian Gulf re Chem weapons. Iran
o 95: Taiwanese President speech at Cornell, C missile tests US carrier groups
approaching Taiwan Straits, 96
o May 99: NATO bombing of Chinese embassy in Belgrade
o April 01: Hainan Incident
- Taiwan issue as a general trigger
- Uncertain, volatile, reactionary, useful

Economics
- Indispensable dependent symbiosis
o Cheap C goods/ stable export market
- Growing C power
o Yuan undervalued/ pegged to $
o Few labour/ environmental laws
o Forex reserves
o Neo-imperialism v. US companies
- C & US energy diplomacy colliding
o Mutual global energy demands but tension re. Iran, Sudan competition
- 2008: perfect storm of global conditions, economic overstretch
- US favour an economically strong, stable, peaceful C, essential
 o C wants positive, cooperative and comprehensive relations (Hu)
- Mutual economic + trade success = mutual diplomatic and political power
o BUT eventual inevitable competition

East Asia
- US military presence to deter threats
o Invokes stability economic development
o Major US alliances w/ Japan/ ROK; containment of Taiwan/ DPRK issues
o Some C military ties
- Post-45 Communism bulwarking:
o Via economic tide from J Taiwan/ Singapore/ HK/ ROK
o US security architecture attempts
- Ongoing fear of neo-containment
o Explains regional charm offensive to stop any US-led multilateral efforts
o ROK/J alliances still strong for US
- Taiwan greatest trigger point
o US weapons sales but ambiguity as to intervention in event of any conflict
o A common security concern for US-J
- Stability as status quo; Qs over US withdrawal regionally/ globally:
o Geo-economics over geo-politics
o US-India links + C Asian competition
o US military tilt to Asia Pacific

Improving but mixed

- Importance of self/other perceptions
- If negative
o Cs long tem intl intentions
o Economic rivalry/ energy security
o What kind of great power? Hegemon?
o Expansive/ aggressive FP
- If positive
o Increasing pol/ eco dependence
o Common ground: global financial markets, global terrorism, peace
o Cooperative/ effective multipolarity
o Conservative China FP

Corruption

Mao
- Dates back to dynastic period
- Concerted efforts under Mao 50s
o 51 3 antis, 52 5 antis, 53 5 new antis
o other movements/ campaigns
o end public corruption >> underground
 - BUT guanxi/ connections/ favours
o Bribes as goods, not monetary, based
o Street-level/ low rank rather than elite
o Hard-to-find commodities exchanged w/ CCP officials for various privileges

70s/80s
- Reform period: petty corruption rises
o Buyers of goods in liberalised markets
o Entrepreneurs wishing to avoid red tape
o Farmers wanting best plots/ maximum production via market-based approach +
state-subsidised fertiliser, pesticides, fuel
o $$: officials between planned sector and market >> arbitraging between two
o official profiterring v visible 89 T-Sq
- CR had pulverised legal system

80s/90s
- Repeated government campaigns
o 82, 86, 89: prosecutions increase, big tiger put on trial/ publically executed
o BUT increases along with reforms: 80s lower-level officials, 90s high-level ones
o Stakes higher: land leased out to develop industry/ commerce/ real-estate plans
o State derived profits leant out privately
o Major national infrastructure projects
o >> normal, culture of corruption, life

00s
- senior-level (country+) prosecutions
- harsher laws/ legislation/ deterrence
- Corruption Perceptions Index GDP growth v adversely affected

Rising Growth
- Corruption traditionally seen by scholars to retard economic growth
- BUT China appears to be exceptional
o Nature of economic transition critical
o Entrepreneurs buy resources: efficient
o speed money cuts through red tape + encourages officials to be more effective
BUT can also make deals more complex
- particular Chinese characteristics
o profit-sharing: business + officials
o large-scale transfer of potential value from state to market-led economy
- transformative nature of C economy
o not a barrier to very high/ accelerating growth rates witnessed in 80s and 90s
o most intense corruption coincided with largest state > market value transfers
o >> corruption feeding not stifling growth
o then controlled by anti-corruption crackdrowns in 00, v adverse
 - plunder vs transactive corruption
o preying on state resources: kleptocracy
o money/ favours: mutually beneficial
o destructive/ enabling re economic core

Xis crackdown
- Chinas economy is in transition from being state-led to market-led
o PRC as developing >> developed
o Need for transparency/ accountability
o CCP legitimate guardian of reform
o Corruption can kill economy & the CCP
o Could doom the party and the state
- Requires variety of approaches
o Punishment: of both tigers and flies
o Better regulation: to reduce opportunities
o Education: of CCP cadres and public
- Structural/ cultural but also political
- >> anti-corruption but also purging
o consolidates factional power base (Jiang, Hu)
o improves image/ re-legitimise the CCP
- 1.5 m+ officials investigated so far
o CDIC trace lineage, guanxi money trails
o Via strategy of encirclement
Political cronies and business partners
Family members
Senior officials
o Competition to uncover corruption
- ZHOU
o Ex-PBSC/ ex-head of Public Security
o Most high profile official ever charged
- Charged with several crimes
o Serious violations of party discipline
o Accepting large sums of bribes
o Disclosing party and state secrets
o Multiple acts of committing adultery
- Other crackdowns
o Shanxi Gang
o Yunnan Fiefdom/ Jiangxi Gang/ Guangdong
- Secures Xi, CCP position/ image
o Used to gain political control/ leverage
o Tension: reformers v conservatives speed of reform v nature of reform

CCP
- Special investigation teams sent up
 - Current investigations only the start
o Fusion of economic/ political power
o More liberalisation > more corruption as controls are relaxed/ decentralise
o Continued growth > even bigger stakes
- Short lived? Any structural solution requires CCP support/ compromise

Cynicism
- Professionalisation of civil servants + judges/ raising pay > improving system
- Higher level elections > county/ township > more scrutiny/ accountability
- Power concentrated in few hands
o Links between officials, business, gangs
o Heightens sense of CCP control along with rising distrust from pop
o Disrespect for those in authority; self-serving CCP not servants of the people
- Possibilities for instability

Still local
- Primary complaint by C population
- For most, a local, not national issue
o Bribes to doctors, schools, daily life
o Against a local official not the PRC CCP
o >> not being an overt threat that joins up different provinces to topple
government (+ state surveillance/ public security)
o BUT >> region-specific mass incidents
- 80s taboo > 00s openly-discussed rebuilding trust v lack of credibility

Global
- prestige, recognition, legitimacy
- conformity: rules, practices, norms
o lack of legitimacy implies distrust of actors, institutions, elite, governments
- Chinas aim to be a great power
- >> criticality of recognition by other:
o common interests/ outlook/ behaviour
o informs being a responsible great power plus wider international role

An existential issue
- part of current economic growth
o BUT >> societal issues/ tensions/ unrest
o V negative portent for CCP / reform project > high profile arrests
- However, economic growth is still high
o Not only retarding, maybe even enabling
o Xis crackdown significant re legitimacy BUT common refrain of a new CCP GS
- Role of perception remains critical
o Can corruption issues be overlooked?
o A function of monopolistic power?
Environment

Causal factors
- Marxist lack of concern + privileging of production over all other factors
o Environment to be tamed > campaigns natural resources not seen to be finite
o >> exploitation to build up industrial base & blow-cost pricing of water, coal,
other
- state-led not market-led solutions
o Huge infrastructure projects (3GD) to solve issue rather than punish polluters
o South-North Water Diversion Program
o Technocratic/ engineer responses that cannot fundamentally solve issue
- 1950s policy of promotion population growth boost economic growth
- natural resources poorly distributed
- >> use coal ~ rest of world combined
o expected to rise by over 20% by 2020
o local/ national pressure on accessibility
- 35 years of extremely rapid economic development and urbanisation political
economy inimical to any policy that can control environmental pollution
- via a co-joining of wider conditions
- + Chinas transition to development is not complete/ equivalent to the West

Economic growth legacies

- high air/ water/ land degradation:
o currently worlds largest CO2 emitter
o most significant polluter of Pacific Ocean
- A critical national issue
o Myriad impacts: health issue but also social stability and economic expansion
o Double-edged: CCP/ PRC requires continued growth but > v evident costs
o >> ever worsening situation
- policy efforts/ guidance/ campaigns
o responsibility devolved to provinces
o private citizens >> official accountability

Environmental landscape
- poor air quality
o 2/3 of cities do not meet standards
o high reliance upon coal for energy
o energy production itself is v inefficient
o 15 > efforts to ban law-quality coal
o exacerbated by growing middle class and high urbanisation
o more and more cars
- high land degradation: extreme soil erosion; from deforestation, over grazing, over
cultivation, dehydration
 - >> desertification of of all land & at a spatial rate that is doubling each year
- severe water issue
o shortages of 440+ out of 600 cities
o many provinces below WB water poverty level (& are critical: indus, agric, GDP)
o 90% of groundwater is polluted via sewage/ refuse/ industrial waste
o half of all rivers/ lakes below standards
- prognosis: will continue to worsen

Broader challenges
- sustaining economic growth
o CCP raison detre: legitimacy/ China Dream
o Externalities: 4-10% of GDP: loss of production, health costs, early deaths
o Heavily affects some provinces: Shanxi
- Public health scares
o Large-scale environmental accidents
o Pollution of drinking water (300m+) >> cancer/ tumours, 66k premature deaths
o Air pollution: external > 4-500k deaths, internal > 300k deaths (each annually)
o Birth defects/ escalating medical costs
- >> engendering of social unrest
- mechanisms for complaint
o hotlines/ letters: 600k complaints (06)
o but often ignored > (violent) large-scale protests, both rural and urban in scope
o danger of co-joining business practice + regulation oversight, with corruption
facilitated by local/ national CCP officials

Governmental response
- a daunting challenge
o worsens as income/ urbanisation rises
o 09 > worlds biggest energy consumer
o questions credibility of CCP / revolution affects all citizens whether rich or poor
o 3rd major crisis created by the CCP
- regarded as a national security threat
- Ministry of Environmental Protection
o Upgraded to ministerial level
o Makes incentives to conform to standards
- 2010: 1st national pollution census
- heavily reliant on coal (self sufficient)
o 05 > worlds largest energy producer
- international pressures/ promises
o globally responsible
o impacts East Asia: acid rain/ waterways
o BUT Beijing argues C is still developing >> current versus historical contribution
o PLUS much due to external MNCs
 - Autocratic one-party rule dependent upon economic growth >> unrivalled state capacity
for rapid policy change
o Clear cost-benefit equation for CCP
o Modernisation/ development/ legitimacy
- Deployment of party-state machine cannot be paralleled
- Leveraging of huge economic clout
- >> Building worlds largest solar and wind production industries
- local governments frequently ignore any violations out of self-interest
o direct financial stake/ personal relations
- widespread use of campaigns
o v political w/ significant investment but little follow through past stated targets
o rarely consult local business/ officials
o do not employ the best tech/ solid incentives to change behaviour
- cost of projects may outweigh gains
o or badly thought through: reforestation

Fundamental issue
- visible/ significant side-effect of the post-Mao economic reform process
o >> local/ national/ global problem
o affects all > instability > CCP illegitimacy
- highly problematic issue to solve
o current growth led politics need high energy consumption to fuel revolution
o negative structural factors: system/ CCP
o paradoxical: growth = pollution?
- Authoritarianism as greatest positive
o Controls big levers of state + past