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Contents
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1 History
4 Criticism
5 References
6 External links
7 Credits
History
In the early nineteenth century, the United Kingdom was torn between
monarchical principle and a desire for new markets. South America as a
whole constituted, at the time, a much larger market for British goods
than did the United States. When Russia and France proposed that
Britain join in helping Spain regain her New World colonies, Britain
vetoed the idea. Britain was in fact negotiating with the United States
as to whether the policies in the Monroe Doctrine should be declared
jointly.
The United States was also negotiating with Spain to purchase Florida,
and once that treaty was ratified, the Monroe administration began to
extend recognition to the new Latin American nationsArgentina,
Chile, Colombia, and Mexico were all recognized in 1822.
The first use of the yet unnamed doctrine was in 1836, when Americans
objected to Britain's alliance with Texas on the principle of the Monroe
Doctrine.
The Monroe Doctrine was invoked when European powers became
involved in the repeated re-occupation of various territories of the
island of Hispaniola, which had been divided between France and
Spain. Both nations were interested in re-claiming their territories in
Hispaniola, or re-exerting their influence. Ultimately, the new Republic
of Haiti not only resisted recolonization attempts, but also gained
control of the other portion of the island, controlling it until 1844 when
it gained its independence as the Dominican Republic.
In 1863, French forces under Napoleon III invaded Mexico and set up a
French puppet regime headed by Emperor Maximilian; Americans
proclaimed this as a violation of "The Doctrine," but were unable to
intervene due to the American Civil War. This marked the first time the
Monroe Doctrine was widely referred to as a "Doctrine." After the war,
the United States government began to pressure Napoleon to withdraw
his troops, and he did so in 1867.
In the 1870s, U.S. President Ulysses S. Grant extended the Monroe
Doctrine, saying that the United States would not tolerate a colony in
the Americas being transferred from one European country to another.
The Doctrine
The Monroe Doctrine (below) states three major ideas, with one more
added by President Theodore Roosevelt. First, it conveys that European
countries cannot colonize in any of the Americas: North, Central, or
South as well as islands of the Caribbean which were considered to be a
part of the Americas. Second, it enforces Washington's rule of foreign
policy, in which the United States will only be involved in European
affairs if America's rights are disturbed. Third, the United States will
consider any attempt at colonization a threat to its national security.
Roosevelt added to the doctrine, and summed up his additions with the
statement, "Speak softly and carry a big stick."
James Monroe
The late events in Spain and Portugal show that Europe is still
unsettled. Of this important fact no stronger proof can be adduced
than that the allied powers should have thought it proper, on any
principle satisfactory to themselves, to have interposed by force in the
internal concerns of Spain. To what extent such interposition may be
carried, on the same principle, is a question in which all independent
powers whose governments differ from theirs are interested, even
those most remote, and surely none more so than the United States.
Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of
the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe,
nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal
concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government de facto as
the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it,
and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy,
meeting in all instances the just claims of every power, submitting to
injuries from none. But in regard to those continents circumstances are
eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the allied
powers should extend their political system to any portion of either
continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can
anyone believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would
adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we
should behold such interposition in any form with indifference. If we
look to the comparative strength and resources of Spain and those old
Governments, and their distance from each other, it must be obvious
that she can never subdue them. It is still the true policy of the United
States to leave the parties to themselves, in the hope that other powers
will pursue the same course....
The doctrine's authors, especially John Quincy Adams, saw the Monroe
Doctrine as a proclamation by the United States of moral opposition to
colonialism, but it has subsequently been re-interpreted in a wide
variety of ways, most notably by President Theodore Roosevelt.
The program spurred export growth and better fiscal management, but
debt settlements were driven primarily by "gunboat diplomacy."
During the Cold War, the Monroe doctrine was applied to Latin America
by the framers of United States foreign policy. When the Cuban
Revolution established a socialist regime with ties to the Soviet Union,
it was argued that the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine should be again
invoked, this time to prevent the further spreading of Soviet-backed
Communism in Latin America. As the situation escalated, the Monroe
Doctrine played a part in the Cuban missile crisis (1962), a
confrontation with the USSR over Soviet missile bases established in
Cuba.
The United States thus often provided intelligence and military aid to
Latin and South American governments that appeared to be threatened
by Communist subversion.
The debate over this new spirit of the Monroe Doctrine came to a head
in the 1980s, as part of the Iran-Contra Affair. Among other things, it
was revealed that the United States Central Intelligence Agency had
been covertly training "Contra" guerrilla soldiers in Nicaragua in an
attempt to destabilize the country and overthrow the Sandinista
revolutionary government and its president, Daniel Ortega. CIA director
Robert Gates vigorously defended the operation, arguing that avoiding
American intervention in Nicaragua would be "totally to abandon the
Monroe doctrine."
Criticism
References
Smith, Gaddis. The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine, 1945-1993. Hill
and Wang, 1995. ISBN 9780809015689
External links
Credits
Monroe_Doctrine history